This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been
fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TVT.2017.2789022, IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015
Optimization-based Access Assignment Scheme for
Physical-Layer Security in D2D Communications
Underlaying a Cellular Network
Lei Wang, Jiaming Liu, Mingkai Chen, Guan Gui, Senior Member, IEEE and Hikmet Sari, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we consider physical-layer security
for device-to-device (D2D) communications underlaying cellular
networks in which cellular users are under threat from multiple
eavesdroppers. We propose an access selection scheme for D2D
users to protect cellular users against eavesdropping. Specifically,
in our proposed scheme, multiple D2D users whose distance to
the cellular user are more than the threshold we set will be
selected to share the same spectrum as that cellular user, and
the interference generated by the selected D2D users can be seen
as a jamming measure to interrupt the eavesdropping. Then, we
consider the secrecy throughput as a standard based on which to
quantify the security performance of our proposed scheme, and
we derive a closed-form expression for the secrecy throughput
of a cellular user with the aid of stochastic geometry. Moreover,
by using the optimization method, we prove the existence of
optimal threshold and design an iterative algorithm based on the
advance-and-retreat method to determine the optimal threshold.
Simulation results show that our access selection scheme can
effectively improve the physical-layer security of cellular users
and that the maximum secrecy throughput can be achieved with
the optimal threshold.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, D2D communication,
Stochastic geometry, Access selection, Optimization method
I. I NTRODUCTION
As mobile communication enters the 5G era, the number of
network users and the level of service demands are explosively
growing. This high density of users and the accompanying
network service requirements will inevitably place an increas-
ingly heavy burden on traditional cellular networks. In fact,
the existing cellular network architecture cannot satisfy the
Copyright (c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted.
However, permission to use this material for any other purposes must be
obtained from the IEEE by sending a request to pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
This work was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foun-
dation of China (61571240, 61671253), the Priority Academic Program
Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions; the Natural Science
Foundation of Jiangsu Province (BK20161517), the Open Research Fund of
National Local Joint Engineering Research Center for Communication and
Network Technology, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
(TXKY17005), the Open Research Fund of the State Key Laboratory of
Integrated Service Networks, Xidian University (ISN17-04), and the Major
Projects of the Natural Science Foundation of the Jiangsu Higher Education
Institutions (16KJA510004), Jiangsu Specially Appointed Professor Grant
(RK002STP16001), Innovation and Entrepreneurship of Jiangsu High-level
Talent Grant (CZ0010617002), and ”1311 Talent Plan” of Nanjing University
of Posts and Telecommunications.
The authors are with the National Engineering Research Center for
Communication and Network Technology, Nanjing University of Posts and
Telecommunications, Nanjing 21003, China (Emails: {wanglei, 1016010414,
guiguan, hikmet}@njupt.edu.cn, mingkaichen1989@163.com).
L. Wang is also with The State Key Laboratory of Integrated Service
Networks, Xidian University, Xi’an 710126, China.
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1
growing demands for spectrum resources, and this situation
has motivated related efforts for heightening spectral efficiency
in cellular networks. Device-to-device (D2D) communication
[1], as an important complement to cellular networks, can
enable effective reuse of spectrum resources and efficient data
transmission [2] by means of direct communication between
pairs of users. Thus, the question of how to combine D2D
communication with traditional cellular networks to improve
spectrum resource utilization and network capacity has be-
come a hot topic of research in academia and industry [3]–[8].
The core of D2D communication is that two communication
devices, called a D2D pair, communicate directly in close
proximity through spectrum sharing, without imposing an
additional burden on the base station. However, such spectral
reuse inevitably leads to problems such as interference. Thus,
much of the literature on D2D communication [9]–[11] is
devoted to reducing the side effects of D2D communication-
s in cellular networks through interference management or
suppression. In [12], the authors utilize a destination routing
algorithm to design a multi-hop routing scheme for cyber-
physical systems to avoid interference among cellular users.
In [13], the authors utilize a novel interference graph to model
the relationships between different D2D communication links.
In these works, the interference generated by D2D users is
considered to be a harmful phenomenon that will severely
disrupt cellular users and needs to be suppressed and isolated
through various schemes.
However, this interference can also have a positive effect
in protecting cellular users from eavesdropping when we
consider the interference problem from the perspective of
physical-layer security. In the context of the physical layer
[14], secure communication is ensured when the achievable
rate between the signal source and the legitimate receiver
is higher than that between the source and eavesdroppers.
In particular, many recent works [15]–[18] have revealed
that cooperative relaying is a reliable method of enhancing
physical-layer security. In [19], the authors considered D2D
communication in the context of physical-layer security for
the first time, turning the interference induced by D2D pairs
into a jammer to intercept eavesdroppers and proposing an
access scheme to limit the transmission power of D2D pairs. A
Stackelberg-game-based power selection algorithm is proposed
in [20] to enhance the security performance of D2D pairs
by improving the secrecy energy efficiency. In view of the
cross-interference between a cellular user and a D2D pair,
[21] studies the influence of resource allocation on security
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Transactions on Vehicular Technology
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015
capacity and derives a minimum achievable secrecy rate. In
[22] and [23], the authors study the energy consumption of
large-scale D2D communications in cellular networks. With
the design of a suitable link adaptation scheme, the D2D pairs
can adaptively adjust their own transmission power to strike a
desired balance in the trade-off between spectrum utilization
and security protection efficiency. In [24], the authors study
how to choose the appropriate D2D protection pair based on
channel gains in the case of a random distribution of D2D
pairs.
Although many previous works have demonstrated the ad-
vantages of D2D in terms of security protection, few studies
have investigated how to select and control the access of
D2D pairs to maximize protection performance. Therefore, the
question of how to design a reasonable access scheme to select
the appropriate D2D pairs to serve as protection pairs from
among a large number of D2D pairs remains a sticking point in
efforts to ensure the physical security of D2D communications
underlaying a cellular network.
In this paper, we investigate physical-layer security for
D2D communications underlaying cellular networks in which
multiple D2D pairs share the spectrum with a cellular user
who may be overheard by multiple eavesdroppers. We use
the interference generated by the D2D pairs to confuse the
eavesdroppers. We formulate this scenario as an optimization
problem in which the objective is to maximize the achievable
secrecy throughput of cellular users. In addition, compared
with previous related works, we consider a more general
scenario in which both the D2D pairs and the eavesdroppers
are randomly distributed and multiple D2D pairs can simul-
taneously share the spectrum with a given cellular user. The
main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We construct a new cellular network scenario in which
multiple D2D pairs can share the same spectrum as a
single cellular user. Also, we assume that the positions
of the D2D pairs are random as well as those of the
eavesdroppers. Unlike in [24], multiple eavesdroppers can
collaboratively tap into legitimate transmissions from the
cellular user.
• We propose a novel access selection scheme to control
the interference generated by the D2D pairs and improve
the secrecy throughput of the cellular user. Unlike in
previous related works, in our proposed scheme, we select
a subset of the D2D pairs as D2D protection pairs which
is permitted to share the spectrum with the cellular user
according to distance. We set a threshold µ to limit the
distance between D2D protection pairs and the cellular
user, rather than limiting the power of the D2D pairs as
in [19] or channel gains in [24]; thus, our scheme does
not affect the data transmission capabilities of the D2D
links.
• We design an iterative algorithm based on the advance-
and-retreat method to determine the feasible optimal
threshold for our scheme. Simulation results show that
our scheme achieves a substantial improvement in terms
of secrecy throughput over the schemes presented in [19]
and [24].
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2
Ⱦ
Ⱦ Set of D2D
BS
protection
pairs
Bob
Set of
ȾȾȾ
Eves
Communication Interference
link link
Eavesdropping D2D link
link
Fig. 1: A D2D communication system underlaying a cellular network with the reuse of
downlink resources.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model of the D2D-underlaid cellular
network, the access selection scheme and the definition of se-
crecy throughput. The modeling process for random geometry
is also described as part of the system modeling discussion.
Next, we derive the expression for the secrecy throughput
by analyzing an eavesdropper’s probability of outage and the
coverage probability of the cellular user in Section III . Then,
we analyze the optimal threshold for access selection scheme
and design the relevant practical algorithms in Section IV,
followed by the presentation and analysis of numerical results
in Section V. A conclusion is presented in Section VI.
II. P ROBLEM F ORMULATION
A. System model
In this paper, we consider D2D communications underlay-
ing a cellular network that consists of a base station (BS) lo-
cated in the present cell, a cellular user Bob who receives data
from the BS, multiple D2D pairs with certain communication
requirements, and multiple eavesdroppers (Eves). It is impor-
tant to note that only D2D pairs that are selected as protection
pairs can reuse the same spectrum as the cellular user; not
all D2D pairs share the spectrum with the cellular user. By
sharing the spectrum, eavesdroppers can arbitrarily overhear
and capture data transmissions from the BS to Bob, and
we cannot obtain information on the eavesdroppers’ physical
locations or eavesdropping channels because the eavesdroppers
are passive. In addition, every node in the cellular network is
equipped with a single antenna. The structure of the system
is shown in Fig.1.
We apply both large-scale fading and small-scale fading
for channels in the underlaying model. The large-scale fading
satisfies the standard path loss model
l(r) = r−α , (1)
where r represents the distance and α > 2 [25] is the path
loss factor. In addition, we assume that the small-scale fading
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TABLE I:
LIST OF KEY NOTATIONS AND VARIABLES USED IN THIS PAPER R2 and consider densities of λD and λE , respectively. We
denote the positions of all D2D pairs, the D2D protection pairs
Symbol Meaning
and the eavesdroppers by ΦD , ΦsD and ΦE , respectively. In
α Path loss factor this paper, the two-dimensional space considered is simply the
ΦD Set of D2D pairs circular area R2 covered by a cellular network with radius R.
ΦSD Set of selected D2D protection pairs The notations used in this paper are summarized in Table I.
ΦE Set of eavesdroppers
Average transmission power of the D2D
PD
pairs B. SINR model
PB Transmission power of the BS
Rt Transmission rate of the cellular user The channel model used in this paper satisfies the following
Rs Secrecy rate of the cellular user expression:
Interference received at Bob generated by Pr = Pt · h · r−α , (2)
D
IB
the D2D protection pairs where Pt is the transmission power of the transmitter; Pr is
D Interference received at the jth Eve gener- the received power at the receiver; h ∼ exp(1) is the channel
IEj ated by the D2D protection pairs gain, which follows an i.i.d Rayleigh fading process; and α is
Ts Secrecy throughput the fading exponent.
Connection success probability of the cel- D
In the cellular network, Bob receives interference IB from
Pcs
lular user the co-channel D2D protection pairs, while the Eves also
Po Outage probability of the eavesdroppers receive interference IED
from the co-channel D2D protection
SINR threshold for outage for the eaves- pairs.
δC
droppers The interference affecting Bob can be expressed as
SINR threshold for connection success for
δE db −α
X
D
the cellular user IB = PD (hdb
i )(ri ) , (3)
rBb Distance between the BS and Bob i∈ΦS
D

Distance between the ith D2D pair D2Di where PD is the transmission power of the D2D protection
ridb
and Bob pairs and hdb and ridb are the channel gain and distance,
i
de Distance between the ith D2D pair D2Di respectively, between D2Di and Bob.
rij
and the jth Eve Evej The interference affecting the jth Eve can be expressed as
Channel gain between the ith D2D pair
hdb D
X
de −α
i D2Di and Bob IEj
= PD (hde
ij )(rij ) , (4)
Channel gain between the ith D2D pair i∈ΦS
hde
ij
D
D2Di and the jth Eve Evej
where hde de
ij and rij are the channel gain and distance, re-
No Power of AWGN noise
spectively, between D2Di and Evej . Thus, we can determine
the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs) at
Bob and the Eves.
is an independent quasi-static Rayleigh fading phenomenon The received SINR at Bob can be expressed as
whose channel gains follow an exponential distribution with a −α
parameter of 1, as in [26]. PB hBb (rBb )
SIN RB = D +N
In the cellular network, relative to the single fixed cellular IB 0
user, the distribution of the multiple D2D pairs is random,
and their locations are difficult to acquire. At the same time, −α
(5)
PB hBb (rBb )
the Eves passively work to maintain the eavesdropper state. = P −α ,
In this case, it is difficult for the traditional physical model to PD (hdb db
i )(ri ) + N0
i∈ΦS
describe the distribution characteristics of the eavesdroppers D

and D2D pairs in the current cell. where PB is the transmission power of the BS; hBb and rBb
Fortunately, a stochastic geometric model can well represent are the channel gain and distance, respectively, between the
the statistical properties of these random distributions without BS and Bob; and N0 is the noise power.
knowledge of the exact locations. In related research on the The received SINR at Evej can be expressed as
application of stochastic geometric tools in wireless networks, −α
such as [27] and [28], such random distributions are usually PB hBe Be
j (rj )
SIN REj = D
described by means of Poisson point processes (PPPs), and IEj + N0
the statistical properties of such a distribution are described
by quantitative features such as expectation and density, which (6)
−α
are also widely adopted in research on physical-layer security PB hBe Be
j (rj )
= P −α ,
[29], [30]. Therefore, we model the positions of the D2D pairs PD (hde de
ij )(rij ) + N0
and the Eves using two independent homogeneous PPPs on i∈ΦS
D

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This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TVT.2017.2789022, IEEE
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where hBej and rj
Be
are the channel gain and distance, respec-
tively, between the BS and Evej .
C. Secure throughput
Here, we use the secure throughput Ts to study the feasi-
ble secrecy performance of our scheme through a combined
analysis of cellular users and eavesdroppers. In accordance
with Wyner’s encoding scheme [31], [32], we denote the
secrecy rate by Rs and the transmission rate by Rt . Bob can
successfully decode the received signal only if the capacity of
the channel is higher than the transmission rate. This condition
can be expressed as
log2 (1 + SIN RB ) > Rt .
The probability of this condition is called the connection
success probability, denoted by Pcs .
Meanwhile, a secrecy outage will occur under the condition
that the capacity of Alice communicating to multiple Eves is
higher than the redundancy rate [33], [34]. This condition can
similarly be expressed as
log2 (1 + SIN RE ) > Rt − Rs .
The probability of this condition is called the secrecy outage
probability, denoted by Po .
Therefore, the secrecy throughput (Ts ) can be defined as
Ts = Rs Pcs (1−Po ).
By adjusting the number of selected D2D protection pairs,
the achievable secrecy throughput can be maximized. We
formulate this optimization problem as follows:
max Ts
.

log2 (1 + SIN RB ) > Rt
s.t.
log2 (1 + SIN RE ) > Rt − Rs
III. ACCESS S ELECTION S CHEME
In this section, we propose an access selection scheme for
selecting the appropriate D2D pairs as protection pairs such
that the communication security of the cellular user to be
protected is maximized. Then, we derive the outage probability
of the eavesdroppers and the connection success probability of
the cellular user.
A. Acess threshold
When reusing spectrum resources, D2D pairs will inevitably
induce same-frequency interference. This interference will
affect the communication quality of both cellular users and
eavesdroppers. When sharing the spectrum with a cellular
user, the D2D pairs which are far from the cellular user may
not be sufficient to effectively interfere with eavesdropping,
whereas the D2D pairs which are close to the cellular user
can cause excessive interference and thus inhibit the cellular
user’s normal communication.
Therefore, it is necessary to select an appropriate distance
between D2D protection pairs and the cellular user to ensure
that the communication security of the cellular user will be
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4
protected well. In our scheme, we select the D2D protection
pairs from all potential D2D pairs according to the distance
between the D2D pair and Bob ridb . In particular, multiple
D2D pairs whose ridb are more than a fixed threshold we
set will be selected to serve as D2D protection pairs and
share the spectrum with Bob. With such access selection
scheme, D2D protection pairs can shelter the cellular user’s
transmission by maximizing the difference in receiving perfor-
mance between the cellular user and the eavesdroppers. This
not only protects the security of the cellular user from the
perspective of physical-layer security but also enhances the
spectral efficiency of the cellular network.
Here, distance between D2D protection pairs and Bob
(7) should be in the following set:
ΦSD = {ridb |µ ≤ ridb ≤ R+rBb andi ∈ ΦD }, (11)
where µ is the selection threshold for D2D protection pairs,
R+rBb is the maximum of ridb in the cell.
By treating the access threshold µ as the main variable of
interest, the problem of maximizing the secrecy throughput Ts
can be reformulated as
(8) max Ts
µ 
 µ ≤ R+rBb . (12)
s.t. log2 (1 + SIN RB ) > Rt
log2 (1 + SIN RE ) > Rt − Rs

(9) By solving this optimization problem, we can determine the
optimal threshold µ that maximizes the security performance
of our scheme. Simultaneously, to simplify the optimization
problem, we need to analyze the connection success proba-
bility of the cellular user and the outage probability of the
eavesdroppers to derive a suitable expression for Ts .
(10)
B. Connection success probability of the cellular user
In this subsection, we analyze the connection success prob-
ability of the cellular user.
In the access assignment scheme, when the selected D2D
protection pairs share the spectrum with Bob, the interference
D
IB received by Bob will grow and affect the capacity of
the channel between the BS and Bob. In accordance with
(7), to ensure connection success for Bob, we should set the
threshold for SIN RB appropriately to limit the number of
D2D protection pairs.
For a cellular user, we denote the SINR threshold for
connection success by δC , which satisfies
log2 (1 + δc )=Rt , (13)
where δC is the minimum SIN RB that can satisfy the
requirement on the transmission rate Rt and ensure that Bob
can successfully decode the received signals.
Then, we can use δC to express Pcs as follows:
Pcs = P rob(SIN RB ≥ δC ). (14)
By combining (14) and (15), we can obtain the following
relationship between δC and the transmission rate Rt :
δC =2Rt −1. (15)
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Hence, using the definition of SIN RB given in (5), we C. Outage probability of the eavesdroppers
obtain the following expression for the connection success
probability of the cellular user in the access assignment
This subsection analyzes the outage probability of the access
scheme:
assignment scheme. Similarly to (14), we denote the SINR
Pcs = P rob (SIN RB ≥ δC ) threshold for connection outage by δE , which satisfies
 −α 
PB (hBb )(r Bb )
= P rob D +N ≥ δC
 IB 0
D
 log2 (1 + δE )=Rt − Rs , (21)
δ (N0 +IB )
= P rob hBb ≥ PC (rBb ) −α
B
α where δE is the maximum SIN RE that satisfies the require-
δ (r Bb ) (N0 +IBD
 
)
= EIBD exp − C PB ment on the secrecy rate Rs .
Bb α α
δ (r Bb ) I D
   
= exp − δC (rPB) N0 EIBD exp(− C PB B ) , Then, we can use δE to express Po as
α D 
(16) Po = P rob(SIN RE ≥ δE ). (22)
δC (r Bb ) IB

where EIBD exp(− PB ) is difficult to simplify by
the general way. Here, we use Laplace transform to solve this By combining (21) and (22), we can obtain the relationship
problem. According to [25], we have between δE and the transmission rate Rt − Rs as follows:

LIBD (s) = EIBD exp(−sIB D

) , (17) δE =2Rb −Rs − 1. (23)

where LIBD (s) is defined as the Laplace transform of interfer- Hence, using the definition of SIN RE given in (6), we ob-
D
ence IB evaluated at s. tain the outage probability of the Eves in the access assignment
Bb −α scheme as follows:
Therefore, when set s = δC (r PB) PD , we can turn
α Po = P rob(SIN RE ≥ δE )
δ (r Bb ) I D


D
EIBD exp(− C PB B ) into EIBD exp(−sIB ) which is = 1 − P rob (SIN RE ≤ δE )
easier to simplify. Be −α
PB (hBe
 P 
j )(rj )
D db α
PD (hdb
P
Since IB = i )(ri ) , we can have
 j∈ΦE
= 1 − P rob  ≤ δE 

i∈ΦS D +N )
(IE
D
j 0
D


LIBD (s)=EIBD exp(−sIB ) 
−α

−α PB (hBe )(rjBe )
exp(−shdb (ridb ) ))
Q Y j
= E( =1−E (P rob( ≤ δE ))
(I D +N )
i∈ΦS
D E 0
R R+rBb j∈Φ E j
db db −α
= exp(− µ Eh (1 − e−sh (ri ) )λD dridb ) = 1 − exp{−λE π
= exp( λα−1
Dπ
((R+rBb )−(α−1) − µ−(α−1) ) Be −α
!
PB hBe
j (rj )
Z
2
2
· Γ(1 + α )Γ(1 − α2 )s α ). · (1 − P rob D +N
≥ δE dσEj )},
(18) R2 IE j 0
The proof of (17) and (18) is shown in Appendix A. (24)
Bb α
where σEj is the position of Evej and the function given in
By substituting s = δC (r PB) PD
into (18), we can obtain (24) is a complex two-dimensional integral associated with the
the following result for LIbD (s) eavesdroppers’ location information.
 Bb −α
 To simplify, we first calculate the value of the accumulated
LIBD δC (r PB) PD
function as follows:
= exp{ λα−1
Dπ
[(R+rBb )−(α−1) − µ−(α−1) ] (19) −α !
2 2 2
δC PD α Bb 2 PB (hBe )(rjBe )
· (1 + α )Γ(1 − α )( PB ) (r ) }, P rob ≥ δE
D +N )
(IE
R +∞ j 0
where Γ(x) = 0 tx−1 e−t dt is the gamma function. Note 
de −
α
Be α

) (hde
P
δE [N0 + PD (rij ij )](rj )
that each instance of the gamma function in the above expres-  Be i∈ΦS 
D
sion depends on the path loss factor α. = P rob h ≥

PB 
Then, by substituting (19) into (16), we obtain
 α −α 
δE (rjBe ) [N0 + PD de
(hde
P
(rij ) ij )]
Bb α
 i∈ΦS
D

Pcs = exp{− δC (rPB) N0 + λα−1 Dπ
[(R+rBb )−(α−1) − µ−(α−1) ] = EIEDj exp(− )

PA 
· Γ(1 + α2 )Γ(1 − α2 )( δCPPBD )2/α (rBb )2 },
(20) α ! α !
δE (rjBe ) N0 δE (rjBe ) PD
which provides a closed-form expression for the connection = exp − LIED ,
success probability of the cellular user in the presence of PB j PB
interference from the D2D protection pairs. It can be observed (25)
D
from (20) that the connection success probability depends only where LIEDj (s) is the Laplace transform of IEj . Specifically, it
on µ. is a two-dimensional Laplace transform in the two-dimensional

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JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 6

area of the cell, which is expressed as follows: Although we have the closed-form secrecy throughput ex-
! pression presented in the previous section, we cannot directly
de de −α determine the optimal threshold for maximizing the physical-
Q
LIED (s) = E exp(−shij (rij ) )
j
i∈ΦS
D
layer security protection for cellular users. Here, we analyze
de −α
 R de

= exp − R2 Eh [1 − eshij (rij ) ]λSD dσ the security throughput and prove that it is a quasi-concave
2 function. Then, we design an iterative algorithm based on the
= exp[−λD π(R−α − µ−α )Γ(1 + α2 )Γ(1 − α2 )s α ], advance-and-retreat method to obtain the optimal threshold.
(26)
where s is the Laplace transform α
of SIN RE .
δE (rjBe ) PD
By substituting s = PB into (26), we can obtain
the following result for the Laplace transform: A. Secrecy Throughput Analysis
−α
δE (rjBe ) PD
LIED [ PB ]
j According to the previous analysis, we find that there is an
= exp(−λD π(R − µ−α )Γ(1 + α2 )
−α (27)
2
optimal threshold µo that can help us to achieve the optimal
· Γ(1 − α2 )( δEPPBD ) α ), secrecy throughput, that is, the optimal trade-off between the
beneficial interference received by the Eves and the harmful
where rjBe it is an uncertain value due to the random distri-
interference received by Bob. Before deriving the optimal
bution of the Eves and we have obtained its expectation value
threshold, we must first prove that the secrecy throughput Ts
by means of the Laplace transform.
is a quasi-concave function of the threshold µ. The quasi-
By combining (25) and (27), we can obtain the correspond-
concavity of the secrecy throughput is given by Theorem 1:
ing expression for the integral function as follows:
 −α
 Theorem 1: Ts is a quasi-concave function with respect to
PB (hBe )(rjBe ) µ.
P rob D
(IE +N0 )
≥ δE
j
δE N0 (28) Proof: To simplify the expressions, we use the parameters
= exp{− − λ π(R−α − µ−α ) D
PB
2
a and b to rewrite the connection success probability of
· Γ(1 + α2 )Γ(1 − α2 )( δEPPBD ) α }. the cellular user (Pcs ) and the outage probability of the
Finally, by substituting (28) into (24), we obtain eavesdroppers (Po ), respectively.
Here, we define
Po =
λE
1 − exp(− δ 2 )
E N0 2
+λD π(R−α −µ−α )Γ(1+ α 2
)Γ(1− α )(
δE PD
)α Bb α
PB
(29)
PB
a = − δC (rPB) N0 + λα−1
Dπ
[(R+rBb )−(α−1) − µ−(α−1) ]
α
which provides a closed-form expression for the outage prob- · Γ(1 + α )Γ(1 − α )( δCPPBD ) 2 (rBb )2 ,
2 2

ability of the Eves in the presence of interference from the (32)

D2D protection pairs. It can be observed from (29) that the
outage probability depends only on the threshold µ, similar to b=
the case of the connection success probability. −δ λE
2 , (33)
E N0 2
+λD π(R−α −µ−α )Γ(1+ α 2 δE P D
)α
After completing the analysis of both the connection success PB )Γ(1− α )( PB

probability and the outage probability, using the definition where both a and b are functions of the variable µ, and we
given in (9), we can obtain a complete expression for the can rewrite the Pcs and Po as
secrecy throughput Ts , as shown in (30). This expression will
help us to investigate the optimal threshold on the number of Pcs = exp(a), (34)
D2D protection pairs for maximizing the secrecy throughput.
Po = 1 − exp(b). (35)
IV. S ECRECY T HROUGHPUT A NALYSIS AND We can also obtain the first-order partial derivatives of a and
O PTIMIZATION b as follows:
In this section, we present the secrecy throughput analysis ∂a 2 2 δC PD α Bb 2
and optimization method for the access assignment scheme. = λD πµ−α Γ(1 + )Γ(1 − )( ) 2 (r ) , (36)
∂µ α α PB

Ts = Rs · Pcs · (1−Po )
Bb α 2
=Rs · exp[− δC (rPB) N0 − λD π Bb −(α−1)
α−1 ((R+r ) − µ−(α−1) )Γ(1 + α2 )Γ(1 − α2 )( δCPPBD ) α (rBb )2 ]
λE
· exp[− δ N 2 ]
E 0 +λ π(R−α −µ−α )Γ(1+ 2 )Γ(1− 2 )( δE D P
)α
PB D α α PB
α
δC (r Bb ) N0 λD π 2
(30)
=Rs · exp[− PB − Bb −(α−1)
α−1 ((R+r ) − µ−(α−1) )Γ(1 + α2 )Γ(1 − α2 )( δCPPBD ) α (rBb )2 ]
λE
− δ N δE PD
2
E 0 2 2
PB +λD π(R−α −µ−α )Γ(1+ α )Γ(1− α )( PB )α

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JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 7

2 2
∂ a ∂ b
Here, we can find that ∂n 2 + ∂n2 ≤ 0 when µ satisfies
∂(a+b)
∂b
= ∂µ = 0. Therefore, (a + b) is a quasi-concave function of
∂n
λE λD παµ−(α+1) Γ(1+ α
2 2 δE PD
2
)α
µ and Ts is also a quasi-concave function of µ, from which
)Γ(1− α )( PB . (37)
δ N0 δ PD
2 2 Theorem 1 can be derived.
2 2
( E
PB +λD π(R−α −µ−α )Γ(1+ α )Γ(1− α )( E
PB )α )

Since Ts = Rs Pcs (1−Po ), we have B. Optimal threshold for D2D pairs

Ts = Rs exp(a + b), (38) Since the secrecy throughput Ts is a quasi-concave function
where (a + b) depends only on µ. with respect to the threshold µ, we can design an iterative al-
gorithm based on the advance-and-retreat method, an efficient
Thus, Ts is a quasi-concave function with respect to µ if
method of optimization, to locate the optimal threshold µo .
and only if (a + b) is a quasi-concave function with respect
Here, we define the search direction dk and the search step
to µ.
ζ. The search step is defined as follows:
We can prove the quasi-concavity of Ts by using the conclu-
sion presented in [35], i.e., f (x) is a quasi-concave function xk+1 = xk + ζ, (44)
on R2 if and only if ∂f (x)/∂x = 0 ⇒ ∂ 2 f (x)/∂x2 ≤ 0.
where xk represent the kth search point and the search
By combining (34) and (35), we find that when ∂(a+b)
∂µ = 0, direction dk is from 0 to R + rBb .
the following holds:
Considering that all search points are continuous, we can
2
λE λD παµ−(α+1) Γ(1+ α
2 2
)Γ(1− α )(
δE PD
PB )α use xk to represent the distance between D2D protection pairs
δE N0 2 2 D α ) δ P
2 2
(39) and Bob.
( PB +λD π(R−α −µ−α )Γ(1+ α )Γ(1− α )( E
PB )
−α 2 2 δC PD α When Ts (xk ) satisfies
= λD πµ Γ(1 + α )Γ(1 − α )( PB ) 2 (rBb )2 .
Ts (xk ) ≥ Ts (xk−1 ) (45)
When µ satisfies (36), we can obtain the expression for
∂ 2 (a+b)
∂µ2 in (39) at the bottom of the page. Since the expression and
for ∂ 2 (a+b)
is too long, we divide (39) into T1 , T2 and T2 and Ts (xk ) ≥ Ts (xk+1 ), (46)
∂µ2
rewrite the (39) as follows: we can obtain the optimal secrecy throughput, and the corre-
sponding value of xk is the optimal value for the threshold µ.
∂ 2 (a + b) The specific process is shown in Algorithm 1.
= −(T1 +T2 +T3 ), (40)
∂µ2
where V. S IMULATION R ESULTS AND D ISCUSSION
−(α+1) 2 2 δC P D 2
T1 = αλD πµ Γ(1 + )Γ(1 − )( )α , (41) In this section, several representative simulation results are
α α PB
presented to provide more insight into the theoretical analysis.
We assume that the D2D pairs and eavesdroppers are randomly
T2 = distributed in a cell region of radius R = 100 m. We set PB =
2
δE PD
λE λD πα(α+1)µ−(α+2) Γ(1+ α
2 2
)Γ(1− α )( PB )α , (42) 20 dBm and set the noise power at all nodes to −50 dBm.
4
δ N0
( E 2
+λD π(R−α −µ−α )Γ(1+ α 2
)Γ(1− α
δ PD
)( E
2
)α )
The transmission rate is Rt = 5 bps/Hz, and the secrecy rate
PB PB
is Rs = 4 bps/Hz. Additionally, the path loss factor α is set
and to 3 unless otherwise stated.
T3 = Fig. 2 shows the outage probability of the eavesdroppers
4
λE λD 2 π 2 αµ−2(α+1) Γ2 (1+ α
2
)Γ2 (1− α
2
)(
δE P D
PB )α (43) versus the threshold µ that is used in the proposed scheme
δ N0 2 2 δ PD
2 4 for different eavesdropper densities λE . From Fig. 2, we can
( E +λD π(R−α −µ−α )Γ(1+ α )Γ(1− α )( E )α )
PB PB
see that as the threshold µ grows, the eavesdroppers’ outage
is positive. probability Po is always decreasing and tends toward 0 for

∂ 2 (a+b)
∂µ2
2
2
−(α+1) 2 2 δC PD α λE λD πα(α + 1)µ−(α+2) Γ(1 + α2 )Γ(1 − α2 )( δEPPBD ) α
= − αλD πµ Γ(1 + )Γ(1 − )( ) − 2 4
α α PB
| {z } ( δEPN0 + λD π(R−α − µ−α )Γ(1 + α2 )Γ(1 − α2 )( δEPPD ) α )
B B
T1
(39)
| {z }
T2
4
2 2 −2(α+1) 2 2 2 2 δE PD α
λE λD π αµ Γ (1 + α )Γ (1 − α )( PB )
− 2 4
( δEPN0 + λD π(R−α − µ−α )Γ(1 + 2
α )Γ(1 − 2 δE PD α
α )( PB ) )
| B {z }
T3

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Algorithm 1 Iterative algorithm for threshold optimization 1

based on the advance-and-retreat method
0.9
Initialize the SINR threshold δC ,δE , the density of eaves-

Outage probability of eavesdroppers

0.8
droppers λE , rBb PB , PD , m and α . Theoretical(λE =0.001)

0.7 Theoretical(λE =0.002)

for k = 1; k < m; k + + do Theoretical(λE =0.003)
0.6
ζ = 0.01 Simulation(λE =0.001)
Simulation(λE =0.002)
xk = k · ζ 0.5
Simulation(λE =0.003)
xk+1 = xk + ζ 0.4

if Ts (xk+1 ) < Ts (xk ) then 0.3

Ts = Ts (xk+1 ) 0.2

else 0.1
k0 = k 0
Ts = Ts (xk ) 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Threshold µ (m)
return k0 , Ts
Fig. 2: The outage probability Po of the Eves versus the threshold µ for different λE
end if values, where PD = 10 dBm.
end for
for k = k0 + 1; k ≤ m; k + + do
xk = k 0 · ζ 1.8

xk+1 = k 1.6
Theoretical(λ =0.002)
E
Theoretical(λE =0.004)
if Ts (xk+1 ) > Ts (xk ) then Theoretical(λE =0.006)

Secrecy Throughput T s (bps/Hz)

1.4
k0 + + Simulation(λE =0.002)

1.2 Simulation(λE =0.004)

else Simulation(λ =0.006)
E
if k == m then 1 Simulation optimization
0 Theoretical optimization
µo = k0 0.8
Ts = Ts (x0 ) 0.6
return n, Ts
0.4
end if
end if 0.2

end for 0
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Threshold µ (m)

three different values of λE . This means that the D2D protec-
tion pairs we select can effectively suppress and interrupt the
eavesdropping links for different densities of eavesdroppers.
At the same time, the eavesdropper density λE also affects
the rate of increase of the outage probability. To achieve the
same outage probability Po with a higher eavesdropper den-
sity, a smaller µ are required. Moreover, although increasing
the threshold µ can significantly reduce the eavesdropper’s
probability of interruption, the efficiency of this improvement
can be divided into two periods. In the first period, when the
threshold µ is small, the outage probability decreases slowly.
In the second period, the decline of the outage probability
becomes rapid, and the outage probability approaches to 0.
This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the outage
probability of the eavesdroppers is not linearly related to the
distance between D2D protection pairs and Bob. In other
words, when the distance threshold µ is more than a certain
value, their inhibitory effect on the eavesdroppers will become
exceptionally weak, below which increasing the threshold µ
will not reduce the outage probability obviously.
Fig. 3 shows the secrecy throughput versus the threshold µ
used in our proposed scheme for different eavesdropper densi-
ties λE . As shown in Fig.3, the theoretical secrecy throughput
calculated using (30) agree well with those obtained through
simulation under different λE conditions, which further ver-
ifies our analysis of the secrecy throughput. Moreover, we
find that as the threshold µ increases, the secrecy throughput
Fig. 3: The secrecy throughput of the cellular user versus the threshold µ for different
λE values, where Rt = 5 bps/Hz, Rs = 4 bps/Hz, PD = 10 dBm and
λD = 0.001.
initially shows an obvious improvement. After this growth, the
secrecy throughput reaches a peak and then rapidly decreases.
This proves the Theorem 1 that Ts is a quasi-concave function
of µ and there exists an optimal threshold µo can maximize
the security performance of cellular users. Additionally, in
Fig.3, we also mark the position of optimal threshold µo where
secrecy throughput achieves maximum. We can observe that,
the position of optimal threshold µo obtained by Algorithm
1 matches well with that obtained through simulation. This
verified that our proposed iterative algorithm can help us to
find the optimal threshold µo effectively.
Fig. 4 shows the optimal threshold µo versus the eaves-
dropper density λE for different values of the transmission
power PD of the D2D pairs. It can be seen from Fig. 4 that
the values of µo calculated by Algorithm 1 agree well with
those obtained through simulation. We also observe that as the
density of eavesdroppers increases, the optimal threshold µo
simultaneously decreases. This can be explained by the fact
that more beneficial interference from D2D protection pairs is
required to ensure the deterioration of eavesdropping channels
as λE increases. Fig. 4 also shows that the transmission power
of the D2D pairs markedly affects the value of the optimal
threshold µo . A higher transmission power of the D2D pairs

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JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 9

90 adopted in [19]. Moreover, as PD increases, the performance

of the joint-guard-zone-based access control scheme is always
80
lower than that of our scheme, and the disparity continues
to grow. This shows that the guard-zone-based access control
Optimal threshold µ o (m)

70
scheme presented in [24], in which the channel gains are used
60 as the selection criteria, cannot effectively limit the distance
50
ridb as well as the amount of interference caused by the D2D
Algorithm 1(P =12dBm)
D
Algorithm 1(PD=10dBm)
pairs, which will adversely affect the data transmission of
40 Algorithm 1(PD=8dBm) the cellular user they are intended to protect. By contrast,
Simulation(P =12dBm)
D
Simulation(P =10dBm)
our scheme can effectively select the D2D protection pairs
30
according to ridb and limit this harmful interference, thereby
D
Simulation(P =8dBm)
D

20 improving the secrecy performance.

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Density of Eves λE /m 2 × 10-3

Fig. 4: The optimal threshold µo versus the density of Eves λE for different PD VI. C ONCLUSION
values, where λD = 0.001 and r Bb = 10 m.
In this paper, we discuss physical-layer security in a D2D-
underlaid cellular network from the perspective of protecting
2 a cellular user’s communication security. We select multiple
1.8 The proposed access selection scheme D2D pairs to serve as protection pairs by sharing the same
Secrecy-based access control scheme
1.6 Guard zone based access control scheme spectrum as the cellular user to be protected in order to resist
1.4
eavesdroppers. First, we select the D2D protection pairs from
all D2D pairs according to the distance between the D2D
Secrecy Throughput T s

1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 which can maximize the secrecy throughput of the cellular
-10 -8
Fig. 5: Performance comparison of different schemes, where λE = 0.001,
λD = 0.001, PD = 10 dBm and r Bb = 10 m.
will lead to a larger threshold µ0 . This phenomenon can be
explained by the fact that the higher transmission power of
the D2D pairs can amplify the interference effect generated by
the D2D protection pairs and we need to expand the distance
between D2D protection pairs and Bob in order to limit the
interference.
In Fig. 5, we plot the secrecy throughput versus the trans-
mission power of the D2D protection pairs for our scheme
as well as the secrecy-based access control scheme presented
in [19] and the joint-guard-zone-based access control scheme
presented in [24]. The threshold used in our proposed scheme
is the threshold µo obtained by Algorithm 1. As shown in Fig.
5, as the D2D protection pairs’ transmission power increases,
the three schemes show considerably different performance
in terms of the secrecy throughput. Specifically, the secrecy-
based access control scheme performs the worst, and our pro-
posed scheme is better than the others. One can observe from
Fig. 5 that as PD increases, the secrecy throughputs of our
scheme and the joint-guard-zone-based access control scheme
are significantly enhanced, whereas that of the opportunistic
jammer selection scheme improves relatively slowly. This
indicates that the multiple D2D protection pairs adopted in our
scheme and the joint-guard-zone-based access control scheme
enable much better security performance than the single one
pairs and the cellular user. Then, we set a threshold for the
distance in order to amplify the performance of our scheme
in terms of throughput. With the help of an optimization
method and stochastic geometry, we derive the expression
of throughput in our scheme and design a one-dimensional
search algorithm to determine the feasible optimal threshold
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
P D(dBm) user. On this basis, an access selection scheme for D2D users
is proposed that achieves the optimal physical-layer security
performance for D2D communications underlaying cellular
networks. Simulation results show that the proposed access
selection scheme can effectively intercept eavesdroppers and
enhance the communication security of cellular users by means
of an optimal threshold.
It is necessary to note that the case investigated in this paper
is a simple one in which only a single cellular user is protected
by multiple D2D protection pairs in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers. It would be interesting to study a more general
case in which multiple cellular users require physical-layer
security protection under threat from multiple eavesdroppers.
In contrast to a single cellular user, multiple cellular users will
use multiple independent spectra, and thus, a more flexible
access strategy will be required to coordinate the conflicting
security requirements for different cellular users. This problem
will be explored in our future work.
A PPENDIX A
P ROOF OF THE T WO -D IMENSIONAL L APLACE T RANSFORM
To prove the result for the Laplace transform given in (18),
we derive the general expression for a Laplace functional. A
D
set IB that follows one or more PPPs can be described as a
set of points in a certain area A of the cell of interest. We
use the intensity measure Λ to represent the average number
D
of points in IB ; it is defined as
Λ(A)= ID
B (A), (A.1)

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JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 10

where ID D
B (A) denotes the number of points in IB . Then, in (19) as follows:
D
we can define the 2-dimensional Laplace functional of IB as Y
de −α
follows: LIED (s) = E[ exp(−shde
ij (rij ) )]
R D j
LIBD = E[e R2 f (x)Ib (dx) ] i∈ΦS
D
P
− x∈I D f (x)
, (A.2) Z
de de −α
= E[e b ] = exp{− Eh [1 − eshij (rij ) ]λSD dσ} (A.10)
R2
D
where f is a function on A. In the case that all points in IB 2 2 2
= exp[−λSD πΓ(1 + )Γ(1 − )s α ].
satisfy PPPs, α αc
Z
LIBD = exp(− (1 − e−f (x) )Λ(dx)). (A.3)
R2

D
Since IB is the interference set, we can express the total
interference power measured at a point x in the cell as follows:
X & Tutorials, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 1801-1819, Apr. 2014.
I(x) = l(kx − Y k), (A.4)
Y ∈ΦS
D Tutorials, 2017, 17(4):1923-1940.
where Y represents the position of the transmitter in each of
the D2D protection pairs. Here, we consider the interference
as a shot noise process and calculate the Laplace transform of
the interference as follows:
LI (s) = E[e−sI ]
Y tion for D2D Communications Underlaying Cellular Networks,” IEEE
= E[ exp(−sl(r))].
r∈ΦS
D Mode Selection for D2D Content Sharing Scenarios,” IEEE Transactions
To account for the fading terms, we can assert that the
interference satisfies i.i.d. fading h as follows:
l(rdb ) = hd b(rdb )−α .
Since fading is defined as an independent point process, we
can simplify (A.3) by moving the expectation value of hd b
inside the product. Thus, we can transform (A.3) as follows:
γ
LIBD (s) = exp(−λSD cd E[(hdb )γ Γ(1 − γ)s ],
where γ = αd . We find that the expression above is valid
only in the case of γ < 1. Thus, we can draw the following
conclusions:
• When α ≤ d, we find that I = ∞. When the interference
tends toward infinity, the normal transmission of cellular users
will be interrupted. Therefore, this situation must be avoided.
• When α > d, we find that I < ∞. Since the dimensional-
ity of space A is d = 2, the path loss exponent ∂ should be set
to a value greater than 2. In fact, we set α = 3 to ensure that
the interference is infinite. Since the channel exhibits Rayleigh
fading and d = 2, we obtain the following:
E[(hdb )γ ] = Γ(1 + γ)
and
cd = πR2 = π,
where cd is a unit circle and R = 1 in the two-dimensional
space A. By substituting (A.8) and (A.9) into (A.7), we can
obtain the closed-form result for the Laplace transform given
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Lei Wang received the M.Sc. degree and the Ph.D.
degree in Telecommunications and Information En-
gineering from Nanjing University of Posts and
Telecommunications, China, in 2007 and 2010, re-
spectively. From 2012 to 2013, he was a Postdoctoral
research fellow at the Department of Electrical Engi-
neering, Columbia University, USA. He is currently
an associate professor at the College of Telecom-
munications and Information Engineering, Nanjing
University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chi-
na. His research interests include millimeter wave
wireless communications, device to device communications, physical-layer
security, signal processing for communications, cognitive wireless networks,
and random matrix theory.
0018-9545 (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
11
Jiaming Liu received the B.S degree with major on
Communication and Information System from Nan-
jing University of Posts and Telecommunications,
China in 2016. He is currently a M.S student at Nan-
jing University of Posts and Telecommunications,
China. His research interests include wireless multi-
media communication and physical-layer security in
wireless networks, etc.
Mingkai Chen received the M. Sc. degree with ma-
jor on Communication and Information System from
Fuzhou University, China in 2014. He is currently
a Ph. D student at Nanjing University of Posts and
Telecommunications, China. His research interests
include wireless multimedia communication and re-
source allocation in wireless networks, etc.
Guan Gui received the Dr. Eng degree in Infor-
mation and Communication Engineering from U-
niversity of Electronic Science and Technology of
China (UESTC), Chengdu, China, in 2012. From
October 2009 to March 2014, he joined Department
of Communications Engineering, Graduate School
of Engineering, Tohoku University as for research
assistant as well as postdoctoral research fellow,
respectively. From April 2014 to October 2015, he
was an Assistant Professor in Department of Elec-
tronics and Information System, Akita Prefectural
University. Since November 2015, he has been a professor with Nanjing
University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing, China. He is currently
engaged in research of deep learning, compressive sensing, and advanced
wireless techniques. He has published more than 150 papers in prestigious
peer-reviewed journals and conferences. Dr. Gui is the Editor (2017∼) of
IEEE Transactions on Vehicle Technology and KSII Transactions on Internet
and Information Systems. He serves as the international chair for ICNC2018,
TPC members for many conferences such as GLOBECOM, ICC and VTC.
He received ICC Best Paper Award in years 2014 and 2017, as well as IEEE
VTC-spring Best Student Paper Award in year 2014. He is an IEEE Senior
Member.
Hikmet Sari is currently Professor of Nanjing U-
niversity of Posts and Telecommunications (NUP-
T), and also Chief Scientist of Sequans Commu-
nications. He received his Engineering Degree and
Ph.D. from the ENST, Paris, France, and the post-
doctoral Habilitation degree from the University of
Paris-Sud, Orsay. Prior to his current positions, he
held various research and management positions in
industry including Philips Research Laboratories,
SAT, Alcatel, Pacific Broadband Communications,
and Juniper Networks. His distinctions include the
IEEE Fellow Grade (1995), the Andr Blondel Medal (also in 1995), the Edwin
H. Armstrong Achievement Award in 2003, the Harold Sobol Award in 2012,
as well as election to Academia Europaea (the Academy of Europe) and
to the Science Academy of Turkey in 2012. Prof. Sari has served as an
Editor of the IEEE Transactions on Communications (1987∼1981), a Guest
Editor of the European Transactions on Telecommunications (1993) and of
the IEEE JSAC (1999), and an Associate Editor of the IEEE Communications
Letters (1999∼2002). He served as a Distinguished Lecturer of the IEEE
Communications Society in 2001 -2006, as a member of the IEEE Fellow
Evaluation Committee in 2002∼2007, and as a member of the Awards
Committee in 2005∼2007.