Autonomous Systems Mining

20181008_Implementation_of_Autonomous_Systems-GMG-AM-v01-r01
GUIDELINE FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
IN MINING
SUBMITTED BY
The Implementation of Autonomous Systems Sub-Committee of the Autonomous Mining Working Group
VERSION DATE
08 Oct 2018
APPROVED BY
Vote of the Autonomous Mining Working Group
05 Apr 2019
and
GMG Governing Council
17 Apr 2019
EDITED BY
Francine Harris
05 Jan 2019
PUBLISHED
18 Apr 2019
DATE DOCUMENT TO BE REVIEWED

18 Apr 2021
PREPARED BY THE AUTONOMOUS MINING WORKING GROUP

IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS SUB-COMMITTEE
Global Mining Guidelines Group (GMG)

i | GUIDELINE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS IN MINING
ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE PREPARATION OF THESE GUIDELINES
3D-P, ABB, Accenture, acQuire Technology Solutions, Adria Manufacturing Inc., Agnico Eagle, Alcoa, Alex Atkins & Associates,
Alma de Papel, Amazon, AMDAD, AMIRA, AMSA, AMTC, Anglo American, AngloGold Ashanti, Antofagasta Minerals, Antucoya
Mine, Apex Automation, Applied Mining Technologies, ArcelorMittal, ARIGAL, Asociación Peruana de Control Automático en
Minería, Austrobots, Automated Systems Alliance, Autonomous Earthmoving Systems, Autonomous Solutions, AVST Con-
sulting, Barrick Gold, Batchfire Resources, BBA, Bestech, BGC Contracting, BHP, Blast Movement Technologies, Bluwrap, BMT,
Boliden, British Columbia Ministry of Energy and Mines, C3 Human Factors, Calibre Global, Capstone Mining Corp., Caterpillar,
Cementation, CEMI, CF Mining, CGM, CheckMark Consulting, Cia Minera Antamina, Cia Minera Quenchua S.A., Cia Minera
Poderosa S.A., CITIC Pacific Mining, CMOC International, Codelco, Codelco Tech, Commercialize Pty Ltd., Commit Works,
Compañia Minera Zaldívar, ComStock Mining, Consiac TI, Consorcio Inversiones Pacifico, CONTAC, CORFO, CSA Group,
CSIRO, Czro Inc., Dassault Systèmes, Data Peru, De Beers, Deloitte, Desert Falcon Consulting, Dexcent, DMC Mining, Driver
Industrial, Endevea, Epiroc, Equifax Perú S.A., Erdenes Mongol LLC, ETF Mining Equipment, Eye3, Farellones Ingenieria,
Finning, Flanders Electric, Flow Partners, Fostergy, Freeport-McMoRan, Fundación Chile, GEOBLAST, GeoSystems Analysis,
Glencore, Global IO, Global Research, Gold Fields, Goldcorp, Government of Alberta, GS1, GV Mapper, Hard-Line, Hatch,
Haultrax, HC-GROUP, Hexagon Mining, Hochschild Mining, Howden Simsmart Technologies, Hudbay Minerals, Iamgold, Icono
Advisory, Ikkuna, IMagosoft, iMineros, Imperial Oil, Indimin, Innovative Wireless Technologies, INTER SERVICE, InterSystems
Chile & Latam, Ionic, ITI Solutions, JVA, Kenna Metal, Kinross Gold, Komatsu, Kouchi, Larrain y Salas, Liebherr, Lockheed Mar-
tin, Lundin Mining, LTMT Consulting, Machine Sensory, MacLean Engineering, Maptek, Marcotte Mining, Marcus Punch Pty.,
McEwen Mining, McKinsey, METS Ignited, MG Trading, Microvast, Mine Connector, Minera Candelaria, Minera Chinalco Peru
S.A., Minera Las Bambas, Mineopoly Pty., Minera Yanacocha, Mine Vision Systems, Minetec, MineWare, Mining3, Mitacom,
Mitsui Minerals Resources, Modular Mining Systems, Mohammed VI Polytechnic University, Mongolian Mining Company,
Monico, Moose Mountain, Mosaic, Motion Metrics, MST Global, MTGA, NASA, National Research Council Canada, Natural
Resources Canada, Nevsun Resources Ltd., Newmont, Nexa Resources S.A., NHP Electrical Engineering, Nick Courtois
Automation & Technology Consultant, NIOSH, Normet, Nueva Union, Nutrien, Off World, Olio Technology Solutions, Ontario
Ministry of Labour, Ontario Ministry of Northern Development and Mines, OP3 Consulting Pty Ltd., Optimal Mining Solutions,
ORICA, Origin, Organum Technology, OSIsoft, PACE, Partners in Performance, Pattern Discovery, Peck Tech, Pivot Industries
Limited, Polaris Australia, Protab, Proudfoot Consulting, Queen’s University, QUT, R&O Analytics, RapidBizApps, RCT, Real IRM,
Red3H Triple Hélice para el Desarollo, Rigid Robotics, Rio Tinto, Robotic 3D Systems, Rock-Tech, Rockford Engineering
Works, Rockwell Automation, Ronin8 Technologies, Roy Hill, RPM Global, Sandvik, Scania, Schneider Electric, SDMT, See-
quent, Seyo, SHYFT, Sibanye-Stillwater, Siemens, Sitech, skymineUAV, SMART Systems Group, SMM Gold Cote, SMS Equip-
ment, Split Engineering, SRK Consulting, SSR Mining, ST Computacion, Stantec, Strata Worldwide, Strategy Focused
Innovation, Suncor, Symbiotic Innovations, Syncrude, Synergistics, Technology Miner, Teck, Teletrac Navman, The Open
Group, Thiess, TKM Consulting Inc., Torex Gold, Toromont CAT, TrackVia, Trade and Investment Queensland, Trimble, Trust
Journey, TyreSafe Australia, Universal Field Robots, Universidad Mayor, Universidad de Santiago de Chile, University of
Alberta, University of British Columbia, University of Queensland, Unmanned Arial Services, Uptake, Vale, VectORE, Virtual
Business Links, VIST Group, Western Australia Department of Mines Industry Regulation and Safety (DMIRS), Whitehaven
Coal, and WSP Mining.

GUIDELINE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS IN MINING | ii
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Although these guidelines and other documents or information sources referenced at http://www.gmggroup.org are believed
to be reliable, we do not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of any of these other documents or information sources.
Use of these guidelines or the above documents or information sources is not intended to replace, contravene, or otherwise
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ments regarding the matters included herein. Compliance with these guidelines is entirely voluntary.

iii | GUIDELINE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS IN MINING
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GUIDELINE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS IN MINING | iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DISCLAIMER ii
COPYRIGHT NOTICE iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS iv
1. FOREWORD 1
2. ABBREVIATIONS 1
3. KEYWORDS 1
4. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1
4.1 Contextual Background 1
5. SCOPE 2
5.1 Principles of Scope 2
6. COMMON TERMS OF REFERENCE 2
6.1 Terminology and Definitions 3
6.2 Maturity Model 3
6.3 Implementation Approaches 4
7. CHANGE MANAGEMENT 5
7.1 Change Management Plan 5
7.1.1 Critical Success Factors 6
7.2 Change Management Progression 6
8. BUSINESS CASE 6
8.1 Safety Considerations for the Business Case 7
8.2 Holistic Change Considerations for the Business Case 8
8.2.1 People 8
8.2.2 Processes 8
8.2.3 Technology 8
8.3 Value Drivers 8
8.4 Costs 9
8.5 Strategic Fit 9
8.6 Communication with Stakeholders 9
8.7 Business Risks and Potential Problems 10
8.8 Other Considerations 10
9. HEALTH AND SAFETY 10
9.1 Risk Management 11
9.1.1 Risk Identification 11
9.1.2 Risk Analysis 12
9.1.3 Controls for Risk and Hazard Management 12
9.1.4 Monitoring and Review 13
9.1.5 Documentation 13
9.2 Emergency Management Planning 13
10. REGULATIONS 14
10.1 Adapting Regulations to Autonomous Mining 14
10.2 Engaging Regulators 14

v | GUIDELINE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS IN MINING
11. COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL IMPACT 14

11.1 Engagement Plan 14
11.1.1 Evolving Workforce Requirements 15
11.1.2 Communications Strategy 15
11.1.3 Social and Economic Impact Assessment 15
11.2 Education 15
12. OPERATIONAL READINESS AND DEPLOYMENT 16
12.1 Mine Planning and Design to Accommodate Autonomous Systems 16
12.1.1 Physical Mine Planning and Design 16
12.1.2 System Infrastructure Planning and Design 17
12.1.3 Process Planning 17
12.2 Engineering Design Management Framework 17
12.2.1 Key Challenges 17
12.2.2 Design Management Plan 18
12.2.3 Configuration Management 18
12.3 Architecture 18
12.4 Deployment and Commissioning 20
13. FOLLOW-UP 20
14. RESOURCES, REFERENCES, AND RECOMMENDED READING 21
APPENDIX A: SAMPLE CHANGE MANAGEMENT MODEL 23
APPENDIX B: BENEFITS, VALUE DRIVERS, AND COSTS 24
APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY MATERIALS 24
C.1 Hazard Identification and Verification List 26
C.2 Maintenance Hazard Controls 26
C.3 Preparing Personnel for Safe Work 26
C.3.1 Information 26
C.3.2 Training 26
C.3.3 Supervision 27
APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL IMPACT MATERIALS 27
D.1 Detailed Steps for Completing a Social and Economic Impact Assessment 28
D.2 Collaboration with Educational Institutions and Government 28
APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL READINESS AND DEPLOYMENT MATERIALS 28
E.1 Mine Design Comparison 29
E.2 Key Engineering Design Challenges 29
E.2.1 Balancing Safety and Productivity 29
E.2.2 Balancing New and Existing Systems 30
E.3 Document Deliverables List for the Design Management Plan 30
E.4 Commissioning Activities List 30
APPENDIX F: LESSONS LEARNED 31
F.1 Site A: Autonomous Loader and Personnel Interaction 32
F.2 Site B: Semi-Autonomous Loader and Personnel Interaction 32

GUIDELINE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS IN MINING | 1
1. FOREWORD value: it can improve safety, increase production efficiency,

The Global Mining Guidelines Group (GMG) is a network and lower maintenance costs. Implementing autonomous
of representatives from mining companies, original equip- systems also presents new challenges such as security and
ment manufacturers (OEMs), original technology manufac- safety risks and workforce and workflow changes.
turers (OTMs), research organizations, and consultants Whereas there are existing safety standards, such as
around the world, creating multi-stakeholder working groups the International Organization of Standardization (ISO) stan-
to systematically remove the impediments to building the dard: Earth-moving machinery and mining—Autonomous
safe, sustainable, and innovative mines of the future. To and semi-autonomous machine system safety (2017; sub-
achieve this goal, GMG working groups establish focused sequent references are to standard number ISO 17757:2017
projects to develop guidelines, such as this one, for the inter- (International Organization for Standardization, 2017a) and
national mining industry. Draft documents are checked and the Western Australia Code of Practice for Safe Autonomous
approved by working group members, prior to approval by Mining (Government of Western Australia Department of
the GMG Governing Council. Mines and Petroleum, Resources Safety, 2015; some sec-
Please note: if some of the elements of this document tions in this guideline are adapted, with permission, from this
are subject to patent rights, GMG and the Canadian Institute source), mining stakeholders have identified a need for a
of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum (CIM, of which GMG is global guideline that covers autonomous mining implemen-
a legal entity) are not responsible for identifying such patent tation more broadly. This guideline not only assists those
rights. implementing autonomous systems with maximizing the
value of autonomy but also provides a framework for miti-
2. ABBREVIATIONS gating risks and managing change.
AI Artificial Intelligence This implementation guideline provides mining compa-
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable nies, OEMs, OTMs, third-party solution providers, system
API Application Programming Interface integrators, regulators, and other stakeholders with the tools
CHAZOP Control Hazard and Operability Study necessary to move forward with autonomous mining pro-
FIFO Fly-in Fly-out jects. The guideline serves as a first step, assisting compa-
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis nies implementing autonomous mining projects ranging
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study from single autonomous vehicles and hybrid fleets to highly
IP Internet Protocol autonomous fleets.
ISO International Organization for Standardization This guideline:
IT Information Technology • Provides a high-level checklist and playbook for imple-
KPI Key Performance Indicator mentation
LOPA Layers of Protection Analysis • Outlines the risks and benefits of autonomous mining
OEE Overall Equipment Effectiveness • Offers a global and unified understanding to influ-
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer ence how key stakeholders approach autonomous
OMF Open Mining Format mining
OT Operational Technology • Enables future autonomous mining innovation with the
OTM Original Technology Manufacturer aid of common practices
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats • Communicates that implementation can be facilitated
TCP Transmission Control Protocol through cooperation between involved parties, includ-
ing OEMs, OTMs, system integrators, and miners
3. KEYWORDS As autonomous technologies are rapidly changing,
Automatic, Autonomous, Autonomous equipment, this guideline will be reviewed and updated as needed.
Autonomous mining, Autonomous systems, Change man-
agement, Industry 4.0, Technological innovation 4.1 Contextual Background
Automation is part of a broader industrial movement,
4. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND often referred to as the fourth industrial revolution or Indus-
The mining industry is increasingly embracing automa- try 4.0, which also includes robotics, artificial intelligence
tion as a safety and productivity enabler and as a critical fac- (AI), and the Internet of Things. This movement is marked by
tor in making future mining methods sustainable. technology integration and interconnection, which can
Successfully implementing autonomous systems adds clear improve efficiency and productivity. To achieve these kinds

2 | GUIDELINE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS IN MINING
of benefits, new technologies like autonomous systems from those dealing with in situ material, mining activities that
require a holistic approach. contribute to material extraction (drilling, blasting, loading,
GMG’s working groups have several projects underway haulage, dumping), to those from feed to processing plant
tackling this broad movement toward greater connectivity. (handling prepared material that is ready to process).
These projects complement this guideline, and relevant ref- Though this guideline is specific to mobile equipment oper-
erences will be added to the recommended reading list (Sec- ation, many of the guiding principles for fixed plant automa-
tion 14) as they become available. They include ongoing and tion (which is mature compared to mining equipment
upcoming projects on: automation) are the same.
• Interoperability, which is a necessity for implementing Stakeholders in this process could include, but are not
autonomous systems. A high-level definitions and limited to:
roadmap guideline (GMG, 2019b) is in preparation. • Management
• Open data and data exchange, which is needed to • Information technology (IT)/Operational technology
enable autonomous systems. The Data Access and (OT)
Usage Working Group is addressing this topic. The first • Operations and Maintenance
version of the Mobile Equipment Open Data Consensus • Engineering
Guideline is published (GMG, 2016), and the first ver- • OEMs
sion of the Open Mining Format (OMF), an open stan- • OTMs
dard for geometric data transfer, was launched in • Support services (e.g., safety and emergency response,
2017. Both projects are currently being updated. human resources, risk management)
• Short Interval Control, which is a process enhanced by • Internal and external subject matter experts
automation. An implementation guideline is in its final • Legal representatives
stages (GMG, 2019a). • Regulators
• Underground mine communications infrastructure, • Financial representatives
which is necessary for implementing autonomous sys- • Corporate affairs
tems underground. A guideline suite is being devel- • Unions
oped, and the first two parts have been published • Communities
(GMG, 2017a, 2017b). The third is in its final stages • Educational facilities (universities, training academies)
(GMG, 2019c). • Governments
• AI, which can enhance many autonomous system • Suppliers
capabilities. An educational project, Foundations for AI • Environmental approvals and compliance departments
in Mining, is underway. and agencies
• Cybersecurity, which is a critical concern with inte- After defining common terms of reference, this guide-
grated digital systems, will be a key topic for GMG in line is structured around the key areas of consideration for
2019. those implementing autonomous systems. These topics
are presented in Sections 7–12: change management,
5. SCOPE developing a business case, health and safety and risk man-
This guideline communicates and educates using cur- agement, regulatory engagement, community and social
rent industry practices and common terms of reference impact, and operational readiness and deployment. Though
(defined in Section 6) and provides guidance on justifying, arranged in broadly chronological order, many of these con-
planning, developing, testing, implementing, and executing siderations must happen simultaneously and inform each
autonomous systems. It offers high-level guidance which other. The appendices provide additional contextual infor-
recognizes that different levels of autonomous system mation, checklists, considerations, and examples.
maturity exist across mining operations (Section 6.2) and
that requirements are varied depending on the type of 5.1 Principles of Scope
operation. This guideline does not replace safety requirements,
This guideline covers the application of autonomous regulations or duty of care. It acknowledges that regulatory
systems in mining and quarry operations and large-scale bodies and standards already exist that influence the pro-
construction projects, including both new mine (greenfield) cesses at various stages of the mine cycle. This guideline
and existing mining (brownfield) operations and both sur- should be taken in the context of integration into the overall
face and underground operations. These operations range mining cycle value chain.

6. COMMON TERMS OF REFERENCE Manual operation: An operation where a human is in

This section outlines key terminology and a maturity control of the equipment. This can be either manned or
model for autonomous mining and defines broad implemen- remote control.
tation approaches. Mobile autonomous mining: Mobile equipment oper-
ated using an autonomous system.
6.1 Terminology and Definitions Operational readiness: The capability to operate a new
Because this guideline deals with concepts and opera- system, technology, or piece of equipment. This involves hav-
tional processes where the specific terms often vary ing people, processes, controls, and infrastructure in place.
depending on the mine and region, this list identifies terms Organizational readiness: Having a business structure
the guideline applies to describe these concepts and dis- that is ready for a desired change.
ambiguates terms that are often used interchangeably. Redundancy: Duplication of components or functions to
Definitions are informed by standard language in ISO create a backup or fail-safe mode in which to operate after a
17757:2017 (International Organization for Standardiza- disruption.
tion, 2017a) and the Western Australia Code of Practice for Reliability: A measure of the dependability of a system
Safe Autonomous Mining (Government of Western Aus- to perform at a defined quality.
tralia Department of Mines and Petroleum, Resources Remote controlled: A type of operation where the func-
Safety, 2015). tionality and operator interface are the same or similar on
Automatic: A process or part of a process when a the machine but the controller is separate from the machine
machine follows well-defined rules. and is under human supervision while the machine is oper-
Automation: The technique, method, or system of operated in line-of-sight or tele-remote mode.
ating and controlling a process or machine by automatic Safe state: Operating or shutdown equipment condition
means with minimal human intervention. whereby a hazardous event is unlikely if autonomous activity
Autonomous: A process or machine that is intended to continues.
accomplish task(s) within a set of defined operations with- Semi-autonomous: A process or machine that is
out human intervention or direct control. intended to accomplish a portion of assigned task(s) within
Autonomous area: The area in which autonomous a set of defined operations without human intervention or
equipment operates. direct control.
Autonomous operator: The person who operates an Situation awareness: The ability to perceive environ-
autonomous process or machine and takes control when mental elements and comprehend their meaning and, in
necessary. some cases, project the future status.
Autonomous supervisor: The person who supervises
one or several autonomous processes or machines at high 6.2 Maturity Model
levels of equipment maturity and intervenes when necessary. This subsection outlines a maturity model for
This role overlaps with that of the autonomous operator. autonomous mining (Figure 1). The model assigns levels of
Autonomous system: A system that can perform autonomy that can be used to describe specific pieces or
desired tasks in unstructured environments without contin- types of equipment, as well as stages of maturity that reflect
uous human guidance. the overall operation’s level of autonomy.
Availability: The amount of time in a defined period The levels assigned to mining equipment are based on
during which an asset is available to provide the needed those outlined in the SAE International (2018) taxonomy of
function. driving automation terms and adapted to apply to mining
Component: A part of a larger whole. In this guideline, automation using standard terminology from ISO
component refers to components of individual machines 17757:2017 (International Organization for Standardization,
and components of integrated systems. 2017a). The levels are defined as follows:
Control room: A facility from which dispersed opera- • Level 0: No automation: Equipment is operated entirely
tions, systems, and equipment can be monitored and con- manually. Operator completes all tasks.
trolled; often also called an operations centre. • Level 1: Operator assistance: The system has some
Implementation plan: The high-level plan developed for function-specific automated features. The operator
implementing autonomous systems in mines. maintains control throughout the entire task.
Manned operation: An operation where a human is at • Level 2: Semi-autonomous: The system performs a
the location and operating the equipment. portion of its tasks autonomously within a set of

LEVEL 5
FULLY
AUTONOMOUS
LEVEL 4
HIGHLY The system can
AUTONOMOUS complete continuous
LEVEL 3 operations
CONDITIONALLY The system can autonomously with
complete continuous and without a
AUTONOMOUS
operations designated
LEVEL 2 autonomously
The system can autonomous area.
SEMI- (including situation The system can
complete continuous
AUTONOMOUS operations
awareness) in the identify when
autonomously, designated intervention is needed
LEVEL 1 The system performs including situation autonomous area. The and functions as a
ASSISTANCE system can identify fallback, adapting
a portion of its tasks awareness in the
when intervention is operations to
autonomously within designated
LEVEL 0 The system has a set of defined needed and functions accommodate minimal
autonomous area. The
NO AUTOMATION some function- operations. The system can identify as a fallback, adapting risks. It will enter a
specific automated operator performs when intervention is the operations to halted state in higher
features. The accommodate minimal risk situations. The
Entirely manual. other tasks and is needed and will enter a
operator completes risks. It will enter a autonomous
Operator completes generally responsible halted state. An
most tasks and for situation halted state in higher operator/supervisor
all tasks. autonomous
maintains control. awareness. operator/supervisor can risk situations. The can also request the
disengage the system autonomous system to disengage.
operator/supervisor
and must be available
can also request the
to operate it manually
system to disengage.
as a fallback.
Manual Semi-Autonomous Autonomous
HYBRID OPERATION: HIGHLY AUTONOMOUS

MANUAL OPERATION: OPERATION:
The mine has a mixed fleet of
The mine uses manual
manual, semi-autonomous, and The mine has a fleet of all or
equipment for their operations. mostly autonomous equipment
autonomous equipment.
Figure 1. Mining Automation Maturity Model (Figure Design, GMG)
defined operations without human intervention or tion awareness capabilities. The system can intervene
direct control. The operator performs other tasks. in minimal risk situations. In higher risk situations, it
Remote control is often in place at this level, though it will enter a halted state. The autonomous operator/
is not required. supervisor can request the system to disengage.
• Level 3: Conditionally autonomous: The system can Levels 0–1 are manual because there is still continuous
complete sustained operations autonomously in a des- human guidance. Level 2 is semi-autonomous, and the level
ignated autonomous area. It has situation awareness of human guidance varies. Levels 3–5 are autonomous
capabilities and enters a halted state when intervention because the system completes continuous operations.
is needed. An autonomous operator/supervisor can A given mine’s autonomous operational maturity is
disengage the system at any time and must be avail- defined as follows:
able to operate it manually if necessary. • Manual operation: The mine uses manual equipment
• Level 4: Highly autonomous: The system can complete for their operations (levels 0–1).
sustained operations autonomously in a designated • Hybrid operation: The mine has a mixed fleet of man-
autonomous area and has situation awareness capa- ual, semi-autonomous, and autonomous equipment.
bilities. The system can intervene in minimal risk situa- • Highly autonomous operation: The mine has a fleet of
tions. In higher risk situations, it enters a halted state. all or mostly autonomous equipment (levels 3–5).
The autonomous operator/supervisor is able to
request the system to disengage. 6.3 Implementation Approaches
• Level 5: Fully autonomous: The system can complete There are many ways mines can implement
sustained operations autonomously both with and autonomous systems. Possible implementation approaches
without a designated autonomous area and has situa- for mines replacing old systems are:

• Slow implementation: A lower risk

but higher cost approach where
!"#$
implementation is extended over a
long time period with multiple
checkpoints (e.g., of concept, trials, !"#$%&' .#$,
()!*%)%+,#,(-+ ()!*%)%+,#,(-+
#2,-)#,(-+')#,21(,5
1%62*#,-15'#&7-0#05
multiple releases). This approach
allows the mine to incorporate
1($4',-*%1#+0%
research and development efforts.
• Phased implementation: A medium
risk and medium cost approach
where implementation is completed
in paced stages with two or three
$*-/' !"#$%&'
checkpoints. This approach often
involves implementing a mix of
()!*%)%+,#,(-+ ()!*%)%+,#,(-+
mature and agile solutions.
%&'
• Fast implementation: A higher risk
but lower cost approach where the %&' !"#$
new system completely replaces the 0-$,'!1%$$21%
old one. This approach often involves
$0"%&2*%'!1%$$21%
implementing mature commercial
solutions.
32$(+%$$'$,#4%"-*&%1'$2!!-1,
There is also variation within these
approaches based on each mine’s situa-
Figure 2. Factors Influencing the Choice of Implementation Approach (Figure Design, GMG
tion. Contributor)
The choice of approach depends on
several factors. Figure 2 represents how low or high regula- cultural change management plan must be executed con-
tory advocacy, risk tolerance, autonomous operational currently. It should also be reviewed regularly throughout
maturity, cost pressure, schedule pressure, and business implementation to incorporate necessary adjustments
stakeholder support can be used to determine the appropri- based on unexpected situations.
ate approach. Key recommendations for developing a change man-
agement plan for implementing autonomous systems
7. CHANGE MANAGEMENT include:
Implementing autonomous systems is a holistic organi- • Establish visible management support and commit-
zational and cultural change; change management must be ment, such as executive sponsorship. Such support
a primary consideration throughout all stages of the pro- adds credibility to the entire process.
cess. Ultimately, change management aims to achieve a sit- • Engage champions at all organizational levels from the
uation where stakeholders have the appropriate level of trust outset; this can encourage other employees to support
that the change is useful, support the implementation pro- the change. Champions should be selected carefully:
cess, and understand the benefits and risks of the new sys- they should not only include early adopters who tend
tem. Change management processes vary depending on to be open to new technology, but also individuals who
whether it is a greenfield or brownfield site, the type of activ- might not typically champion new technologies or pro-
ity, the planned level of autonomous maturity, the compo- cesses.
nents to be automated, and the implementation approach. • Have a single on-site person or team responsible for
This section covers the topic broadly and provides some analyzing data, ideas, and interpretations brought for-
suggestions for how to approach change management ward from multiple champions at different organiza-
based on industry experience. tional levels; this person would then recommend
actions.
7.1 Change Management Plan • Have a single on-site person or team to contact with
For the implementation project to realize the business questions and concerns about the incoming system,
benefits associated with automation, a clear and transparent someone who can dispel rumours or misgivings and

disseminate facts. This activity is also valuable for user for success. These should be measured and monitored
adoption/compliance. throughout the process (Table 1).
• Provide ways for those affected to make positive con-
tributions. This effort helps to create a culture that is 7.2 Change Management Progression
open to change, thereby reducing the chances of resis- Change management considerations should evolve as
tance or minimal enthusiasm. the project progresses through project preparation, imple-
A well-developed communication plan is also vital to mentation, and early operation (Figure 3). Three major
implementation. Successful change management commu- aspects of change need to be considered at all stages:
nication can be accomplished by: 1. Workforce management
• Crafting a clear and consistent message covering what 2. Stakeholder engagement
the changes are, why they are important for the busi- 3. Process management
ness, when they will happen, who they will affect, and Throughout the entire process, ongoing operational
how they will be implemented. readiness assessments and planning, risk management,
• Communicating the message to stakeholders (see list project controls, and management reporting also need to be
in Section 5) at the appropriate time, explaining why conducted.
the change is important for them, and managing their Figure 3 outlines essential change management con-
expectations. siderations for implementing autonomous mining systems
Communication should occur early and often, and it at different stages of the project. It represents a mine that is
should address questions and concerns that are important moving from a current (“as-is”) state as a manual operation
to the front-line staff and supervisors. Connecting with what to a future (“to-be”) state as a highly autonomous operation,
is important involves discerning how the technology benefits following either a slow implementation or staged process.
front-line staff and supervisors by making their jobs safer Many of these considerations are discussed in more detail in
and easier or helping them to achieve desirable results (see other sections of this guideline.
also Section 8). Communication is most effective across a
variety of channels (e.g., email, engagement sessions, social 8. BUSINESS CASE
media, posters) when messages are targeted based on who This section assists those planning or preparing a busi-
(which stakeholders) and how (i.e., one-way, two way, inter- ness case for autonomous mining. Before implementing
active) they engage. autonomous systems, there needs to be a well-defined busi-
Established methodologies for change management ness case that addresses potential issues and opportunities
can help to guide the approach. One example, Kotter’s (2012) that can affect desired outcomes. Because every company
8-Step Model, is outlined in Appendix A. has different requirements and implementation processes
vary, it is not possible to provide explicit instructions. Instead,
7.1.1 Critical Success Factors this section provides considerations for the business case to
The change management plan should identify critical help readers produce accurate and complete business cases
success factors—the areas of the project that are essential that are applicable to their situations.
Table 1. Critical Success Factors for Change Management
Critical success factor How to measure

Level of authority Level of support/sponsorship
Approvals
Inclusiveness Stakeholder analysis
Quantified risk Risk analysis
Realization of value Business case value drivers, key performance indicators (KPIs)
Change management competency Measure process improvement
Influencers identified and engaged
Presence of informal leaders/change champions
Safety Safety risk identification
Hazard controls

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Figure 3. Change Management Progression from Preparation to Mature/Steady State (Figure Design, GMG)
Comparison between the “as-is” state (reviewing cur- • How to approach implementation (slow implementa-
rent constraints and issues), and potential “to-be” state tion, phased implementation, or fast implementation,
(the new system’s capabilities and enablers) is the basis of see Section 6.3)
the business case. The business case addresses the fol- • How long the transition will take (a realistic time frame
lowing: between initial implementation and steady state opera-
• Why automation is desirable tions)
• What level of maturity to implement, including: The business case also:
– What components/processes/tasks to automate • Defines the financial, operational, and safety risks
(for hybrid operations) and which ones to auto- associated with automation
mate first (in a slow or staged implementation • Defines positive and negative externalities (i.e., the
process) costs or benefits to to third parties)
– What components/processes/tasks will be more • Analyzes the potential solution’s strengths, weak-
highly automated (e.g., equipment maturity levels nesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT analysis)
4 and 5 versus level 3) • Defines KPIs to evaluate and measure success

8.1 Safety Considerations for the Business Case business case (see Appendix B). Ultimately, the “to-be” state
One benefit frequently associated with autonomous for people involves cultural change where the new way of
mining systems is increased safety; however, these systems doing things becomes habitual and where people are open to
also present new safety risks. While all business cases must ongoing change. Section 11 covers many of these changes,
consider all types of risks associated with the project, it is how to assess them, and how to engage the community.
especially important to consider both the safety benefits and The business case for people will differ between green-
risks of automation. The business case should address the field and brownfield mining operations. New mining opera-
following questions about safety: tions can build their management and workforce structure to
• What are the expected safety and organizational bene- support autonomous mining from the beginning. Existing
fits? mines have to consider the transition costs (e.g., retraining
• What are the hazards associated with the transition to and upskilling) to change the organizational structure.
the new technology?
• If there is an existing operation, what hazards can 8.2.2 Processes
emerge that need to be considered and managed dur- Automation affects many mining processes, such as
ing integration? traffic management plans, safety management plans, safe
• What is a realistic lead time for full implementation, work procedures, work instructions, interfacing between
given the need for verification and validation trials as autonomous areas and maintenance, and shift manage-
part of the risk management process? ment. The increased potential for remote services and work
Companies should invest sufficient time and resources to also changes processes and introduces new organizational
ensure autonomous operations can start up safely and meet processes and challenges (e.g., managing time zone differ-
production expectations. Matters to be considered include: ences and offering language support). These changes need
• Organizational and operational readiness to be identified and addressed promptly, and the mine layout,
• Project management mine design, mine plans, and schedules need to be tailored
• Site-specific risks to accommodate autonomous equipment (see Section 12).
See Section 9 for more specifics about health and safety The business case should address possible benefits (e.g.,
and risk management for autonomous systems. reduced process variability) and costs (e.g., time and
resources required for implementing these changes) (see
8.2 Holistic Change Considerations for the Business Appendix B).
Case
Introducing autonomous systems is a holistic change. 8.2.3 Technology
The business case must communicate why such a shift is Implementing autonomous equipment requires compa-
necessary and valuable while also addressing the potential nies to apply supporting technology, such as sophisticated
costs and risks involved (see Appendix B for lists of potential and robust wireless communications networks and control
benefits, value drivers, and costs). The business case should rooms. These need to be identified and be part of the opera-
consider the “as-is” and “to-be” states specific to people, tional readiness planning and deployment process (Sec-
processes, and technology. tion 12). The business case should consider how technology
continuously evolves; this involves considering potential new
8.2.1 People technologies and their impact on the scope and business
Introducing automation affects the workforce, and the case. Those implementing autonomous systems also need
following potential changes need to be identified and man- to understand the cost to study, select, and implement sup-
aged carefully. port technology, understanding the cost and risk of poor
• The size and shape of the workforce: Changing opera- interoperability associated with closed systems and closed
tional processes and requirements will influence the size standards for technology. See also the interoperability defi-
and shape of the workforce (e.g., there might be more nitions and roadmap guideline (GMG, 2019b).
options for remote work and fewer people on-site).
• Roles, skill requirements, and competencies: New skills 8.3 Value Drivers
will be part of new organizational structures and some The business case should communicate the project’s
existing skills might no longer be applicable. value drivers. For technology implementation projects, value
The costs (e.g., training) and benefits (e.g., improved drivers refer to the increased value that the new technology
safety) of these changes need to be considered as part of the brings. Some value drivers are easily measured (e.g.,

reduced downtime) or refer to a specific cost reduction (e.g., the business case from the corporate standpoint. The orga-
lower insurance rates), while others are more difficult to nization’s leaders need to understand the current state to
measure (e.g., improved safety). Value drivers vary depend- assess whether or not the organizational change and the
ing on many factors, so each potential value driver must be costs associated with adopting autonomous systems align
carefully considered in the appropriate context. Value drivers with their goals and are strategically viable. There are situa-
can help with financial and sensitivity analysis, determining tions where autonomous systems are not viable at all or
strategic fit, and developing communications strategies. where a highly automated operation is not viable, and a
Key drivers for implementing autonomous systems hybrid one would be preferable. Table 2 provides examples
include (see Appendix B for a more extensive list): of situations where there may be a strong strategic fit and
• Improved safety from separating humans from haz- where the strategic fit may need more consideration. The
ardous situations operation’s current scope and autonomous operational
• Reduced personnel support costs from the possibility maturity and the organization’s current capacity and capa-
of remote operations (e.g., accommodation and travel bility are important factors. For example, automation can
for fly-in fly-out [FIFO] operations) compound poor reliability and poor availability if it is not han-
• Improved productivity from reduced variability and dled correctly.
increased efficiency in processes Individual mines should make decisions concerning
• Improved overall equipment effectiveness (OEE) from technologies and components based on the appropriate-
optimized processes and increased situation awareness to their specific operation. Autonomous technologies
ness and components vary in maturity (Section 6.2) and applica-
• Improved mining strategies (e.g., autonomous systems tions. The strategic fit discerns which maturity level(s),
can offer smaller truck/digger sizes, which can reduce implementation approach, and specific applications are
maintenance and underground ventilation costs) most appropriate.
The business case also needs to consider the possibility
8.4 Costs that automation can unlock new business models. New
The business case also needs to consider the costs models require new plans, such as lease versus buy or min-
associated with autonomous system implementation. These ing as a service—where a third party to the OEM and mining
costs include, but are not limited to: company offers automated mining as a service to the mining
• New technology and equipment company by assembling a full system offering composed of
• Supporting infrastructure elements that OEMs provide. Some understanding can be
• Training gleaned from other industries and generic packages on
• Ongoing updates and technical support makes or models.
See also Appendix B.
8.6 Communication with Stakeholders
8.5 Strategic Fit Should the business case demonstrate positive value,
It is necessary to ask whether autonomy is an explicit promoting the business case is essential. It is necessary to
corporate strategic goal: the lack of a strategic fit can derail understand the audiences and their values in order to
Table 2. Guidance for Assessing Strategic Fit for Automation
Strong strategic fit Strategic fit may need more consideration

Long life and large scale Short life, small, intermittent
Labour constraints, high turnover Social licence requires employment
Highly efficient operation Inefficient operation
New automation-ready equipment Old equipment with short remaining mine life
Remote, challenging logistics Low-quality planning
High altitude, difficult environment Constraints in upstream and/or downstream processes
Greenfield projects Immature project delivery capability
Highly variable commodities Local community with high capability in existing technologies
Mature health and safety
High change acceptance

achieve acceptance by the mine site and gain strong opera- 9. HEALTH AND SAFETY
tional ownership. Stakeholder participation is also essential. This section provides guidance for developing health
During the business case development process, identify and and safety management plans in an autonomous mining
include key stakeholders at the mine to promote the changes environment. Safety must be a standalone part of the imple-
rather than have higher level decisions handled by those not mentation plan and included in other plans as necessary.
embedded in the mine culture. Develop the business case Those planning to implement autonomous systems must
with participation and input from corporate and site levels. It address all safety requirements up front and establish a
is important to teach all stakeholders about the problems safety culture applicable to autonomous mining. This sec-
that they face, and how the solutions can enhance their over- tion describes safety requirements generally, but GMG has
all efficiency and safety. See also Sections 5, 7.1, and 11. also identified the need to create a separate guideline on
functional safety for autonomous mining equipment, which
8.7 Business Risks and Potential Problems will be added to the recommended reading when available.
Consider the risk of the organization not being able to Safety requirements for autonomous systems are var-
achieve the change. Ask: What is the delivery capacity of the ied. Broadly, they can be considered in the following cate-
organization? Be aware of the following potential problems: gories:
• Delays to allow for “growing pains” • Environmental health and safety (e.g., weather, heat,
• Long-term OEM commitment ventilation)
• Change in mine plan (e.g., caused by market issues) • Facilities (e.g., machinery, buildings, roads)
• Legacy issues • People (e.g., workforce, site visitors)
• Obsolescence • Processes
• Difficulties related to change out • Community
• Cybersecurity (this will require separate attention and
8.8 Other Considerations will be covered in more depth the forthcoming func-
• Assumptions: Identify realistic and specific scenarios tional safety guideline)
that the mining company assumes will happen. Because health and safety processes change over time,
• Transparency with regulators: See Section 10. effective change management processes (Section 7) are nec-
• Timing: Determine the estimated timeframe for imple- essary to ensure the processes, workforce, and stakeholders
menting autonomous systems and follow a proper are ready to meet new health and safety requirements.
stage gate evaluation process. Consider investment Effectively managing the health and safety risks associ-
return times and the overall operation lifetime. ated with operating an autonomous mining system requires
• Financial and economic analysis: Determine the appro- input from diverse operational groups, including:
priate balance between capital expenditures and operat- • Researchers
ing expenses, consider the return on investment, and • Design engineers
consider financial opportunities (e.g., tax deductions). • Project managers
Complete different types of financial analyses such as: • Team leaders
– Internal rate of return analysis • Control room operators
– Net present value analysis • Health and safety representatives
– Discounted cash flow analysis • Emergency response personnel
• Environmental and social analysis: Analyze strengths • Any other workers involved in the tasks
and weaknesses of the business/trade environment A safety committee should be established to identify
internally and externally (e.g., SWOT analysis) and ana- risks and determine the training required.
lyze social impact (see Section 11). Those implementing autonomous systems need to
• Alternatives: Identify alternatives to implementing delineate how roles and responsibilities might change from
autonomous systems and alternative ways of imple- the previous system. It is recommended to create a respon-
menting autonomous systems (e.g., if the business sibility assignment matrix (such as “responsible, account-
case is for highly autonomous operations, an alterna- able, consulted, informed” or “responsible, accountable,
tive might be for hybrid operations). supportive, consulted, informed”). These would specify the
• Organizational readiness: Consider changes in roles owner/contributor of the information for implementing the
and responsibilities and in the organizational structure autonomous solution of choice and what that provider is
resulting from automation and how to approach them. expected to submit. This matrix would include, but not be

limited to OEMs, operators, consultants, third-party technol- • That there are emergency response plans in place
ogy providers, and regulators. Appendix F describes some examples of incidents and
The system must comply with all regulations and safety lessons learned.
standards, including local regulatory requirements (Sec-
tion 10). The new system should also gain approval from 9.1 Risk Management
authorities at all stages, ideally undergoing a peer-review The risk management process involves identifying the
process. Those planning for safety should compile a list of system’s functional safety requirements and identifying and
established standards with a classification of what they rep- planning to manage potential risks and hazards. It is recom-
resent, their purposes, and applicability. Table 3 offers a pre- mended to create a risk evaluation matrix that covers inci-
liminary list of relevant international standards. The full dent management, human errors, and change management
citations and links to these standards are presented in Sec- planning. Deployment scheduling, site preparation, commu-
tion 14. The final list should include regional and geographic nications, contingency, vendor partner selection, execution,
nuances (such as environmental variability or geopolitical support and handover, and business continuity should have
risk) but where possible reference globally accepted docu- separate plans. Plans will vary to accommodate different
ments (e.g., ISO). mine types and operational and equipment maturity.
The project must undergo a rigorous risk assessment Communication and consultation are necessary for effec-
and management process specific to health and safety; the tive risk management. Those with knowledge of the auto-
following subsections outline this process. The process and nomous mining system design, engineering, commissioning,
terminology are based on those described in ISO 17757:2017 operation, and maintenance should be involved in assessing
(International Organization for Standardization, 2017a). and minimizing associated risks during the operational life cycle.
Once the system is planned, verify:
• That it meets functional safety requirement 9.1.1 Risk Identification
• That it is prepared for ongoing maintenance implica- It is important to identify how using autonomous
tions (test/validate/response) technology changes established safety systems and any
Table 3. Recommended International Standards Relevant to Health and Safety and Risk Management
Standard number Title Citation
IEC 60204-1:2016 Safety of machinery – Electrical equipment of machines—Part 1: General International Electrotechnical
guidelines Commission, 2016
IEC 61508-1:2010 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related International Electrotechnical
systems—Part 1: General requirements Commission, 2010
IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009 Industrial communication networks–Network and system security–Part 1-1: International Electrotechnical
Terminology, concepts and models Commission, 2009
ISO 13849-1:2015 Safety-related parts of control systems—Part 1: General principles for design International Organization for
Standardization, 2015a
ISO 13849-2:2012 Safety-related parts of control systems—Part 2: Validation International Organization for
Standardization, 2012
ISO 31000:2018 Risk management—Guidelines International Organization for
Standardization, 2018c
ISO 20474-1:2017 Earth-moving machinery – Safety—Part 1: General requirements International Organization for
Standardization, 2017b
ISO 19296:2018 Mining – Mobile machines working underground—Machine safety International Organization for
ISO 17757:2017 Earth-moving machinery and mining—Autonomous and semi-autonomous machine International Organization for
system safety Standardization, 2017a
ISO 73:2009 Risk management—Vocabulary International Organization for
ISO 12100:2010 Safety of machinery – General principles for design—Risk assessment and risk International Organization for
reduction Standardization, 2010
ISO 45001:2018 Occupational health and safety management systems—Requirements with International Organization for
guidance for use Standardization, 2018b

risks and hazards associated with those changes (see • Operational environment (e.g., scale, complexity, physi-
Appendix C.1 for a list of hazard identification systems and cal environment of mining activities)
processes). This process might involve identifying safety • Operational processes (e.g., maintenance systems,
functionality and operational process limitations of the work practices, interaction, separation)
autonomous system. The following questions can help to • Autonomous systems (e.g., functionality, functional
identify autonomous mining health and safety risks. safety requirements, safety features)
1. What are the potential scenarios for autonomous min- • Site continuity plan
ing incidents? • Corporate risk guidelines
2. What are their potential consequences concerning
safety and health? 9.1.3 Controls for Risk and Hazard Management
Once health and safety risks hazards have been identi-
9.1.2 Risk Analysis fied and analyzed, it is essential to put appropriate controls
At the risk analysis stage, mine sites should determine in place to prevent and/or reduce their risk and minimize
the nature of the hazard and the risk level, considering the potential consequences (see Appendix F for specific exam-
likelihood of an incident, potential severity of injury or dam- ples). Start by asking: What controls are available, and how
age, and ability to identify an incident. Those assessing the effective are they? This question is best answered by apply-
risk must have the necessary information, training, knowl- ing a hierarchy of controls (Figure 4). Types of controls are
edge, and experience of the: listed below from 1 (most effective) to 5 (least effective):
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Figure 4. Hierarchy of Controls for Autonomous Mining Systems (Figure Design, GMG)

1. Elimination controls eliminate or remove the hazard • Types of potential incidents

(e.g., designing for safety). • Consequences and likelihood of each incident
2. Substitution controls provide alternatives to the haz- • Controls used to mitigate each risk
ard (e.g., alternative routes). • Monitoring and review outcomes and actions
3. Engineering controls isolate people from hazards (e.g., Documenting this information forms the basis of the
separating autonomous and manned operations). mine site’s safety plan for autonomous mining systems
Appendix C.2 lists controls at the first three levels that and facilitates communication with other sites and opera-
are specific to maintenance activities. tions.
4. Administrative controls for work practices prevent
hazards (e.g., providing sufficient safety training for 9.2 Emergency Management Planning
personnel, see Appendix C.3). Emergency management involves understanding the
5. Personal protective equipment reduces the conse- likelihood and potential consequences of an emergency
quences of a safety incident (e.g., protective clothing). event and being prepared to mitigate its effects, respond
When determining how to implement various controls, effectively, and recover afterwards. Effective emergency
mine sites must ensure they provide sufficient information management identifies all foreseeable emergency sce-
for decision-making. Though the systems are autonomous, narios and develops emergency response plans for each
human decisions are still required to overcome exception so that there is a comprehensive and coordinated
states for autonomous systems at all maturity levels. The response if they occur. These plans should also take into
system should be designed such that alerts and alarms on consideration that safe access and effective communica-
the machines and in the control room are prioritized with tion can be difficult to establish and maintain during an
humans in mind. emergency. Emergency response planning for
autonomous operations should be integrated with the
9.1.4 Monitoring and Review overall emergency response planning for the mine where
A monitoring and review program should be imple- necessary.
mented that includes control audits, verification, and valida- The mine site must establish the following:
tion to ensure controls are effectively maintained at the mine • An emergency response plan
site. Responsibilities and accountabilities should be clearly • Accident investigation and root cause analysis proce-
defined and assigned as part of the mine site’s validation dures
process and may include independent auditing. The findings • Recovery methods after an emergency
should be used to: The autonomous safety system should include emer-
• Confirm that the recommendations from previous gency response procedures to isolate all or part of the
reviews have been actioned autonomous area safely and shut down the equipment. Tiered
• Confirm that appropriate responses have been made shutdown is preferable. For example, two-tier isolation cir-
to any incidents or issues cuits—where the first tier isolates all primary power (actuation
• Verify compliance with specifications (e.g., inspection, systems) and the second isolation layer is for the
monitoring, quality control) controller/telemetry system—have been shown to be safer in
• Recommend any necessary operational or system underground situations because the telemetry can influence
design modifications, which are documented and man- the emergency response.
aged through a formal change management process All personnel should be familiar with the emergency
Mine sites should also consider that autonomous sys- response strategy and understand their responsibilities in an
tems create a greater dependency on instrumentation to emergency before entering the mine site. Before entering an
report equipment health and incidents. autonomous area, the emergency response team should
understand how the system works and the controls that are
9.1.5 Documentation required. A member of the autonomous mining team should
The risk assessment results need to be formally docu- brief emergency personnel and might be required to escort
mented in the operation’s risk register in compliance with them to the location.
regional and/or national regulations. Details should include: Emergency response plans should be regularly tested to
• Locations of autonomous areas ensure they are effective with both simulated tests and
• Size, mining methods, and complexity of operations emergency response drills involving all on-site personnel.
• Autonomous maturity The drills can be used to evaluate how people respond, and

debriefings should be conducted as soon as practicable 2. Conduct a gap analysis of standards, regulations, and
after an emergency or drill to help identify potential improve- norms for which compliance might be challenging that
ments to the emergency response plan. identifies what needs to change
3. Based on the gap analysis, determine the level and
10. REGULATIONS type of engagement with regulators (e.g., adjustments
Autonomous mining methods often require regulatory to existing requirements is generally simpler than
changes. Establishing regulatory requirement changes developing entirely new regulations or addressing cur-
must be done early in the process because existing regula- rent regulations that are prohibitive and incompatible
tions can have unintended consequences and are often with autonomy)
inconsistent when it comes to autonomous systems (see 4. Evaluate those stakeholders who need to be part of
Appendix F for case studies that exemplify some possible regulatory engagement
consequences). Implementing autonomous mining meth- 5. Consider the time it takes to get regulatory approvals
ods might require: Organizations can do the following to facilitate engage-
• Exemption from existing regulations ment with regulators:
• Development of entirely new regulations • Understand the regulator’s autonomy knowledge and
• Updating some existing regulations maturity
• A combination of the above • Bring in a subject matter expert when meeting regula-
Those implementing autonomous systems might tors who has knowledge of how the autonomous sys-
encounter gaps in regulators’ understanding when defining tem works to help maintain credibility
new and updated regulatory regimes and should be prepared • Understand the differences between autonomous sys-
to discuss how regulations might need to change. This dis- tems at different maturity levels (such as those out-
cussion needs to happen early in the process because regu- lined in Section 6)
latory changes take time. Eventually, quality assurance and • Share project management plans outlining how the
quality control checklists must be created to ensure compli- autonomous systems are intended to be deployed and
ance. controlled to achieve equivalent or higher level of pro-
tection for workers, environment, and property (see
10.1 Adapting Regulations to Autonomous Mining Section 9)
Existing regulations often need to be adapted to accom- • Share risk assessments that offer deeper details on
modate both technological and procedural changes, such as how failure modes and consequences would be miti-
different equipment types (e.g., scoops versus haulage gated and handled (see Section 9)
trucks) associated with autonomy. Levels of autonomy, such • Suggest mitigation strategies for any operational con-
as those outlined in Section 6.2, could be developed around straints in regulations
equipment types. • New jurisdiction mining companies could find it useful
Though many current regulations were written without to create a project plan based on the Western Australia
autonomous systems in mind, a person or team should be code of practice (Government of Western Australia
able to grasp the sense of an existing regulation by consid- Department of Mines and Petroleum, Resources Safety,
ering what it intends to accomplish and seeking to meet or 2015)
exceed that expectation. • Consider ongoing reporting requirements during opera-
tions
10.2 Engaging Regulators
Actively engaging with local and regional regulators is 11. COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL IMPACT
essential to successful autonomous system deployment; it Assessing the social impact of autonomy is critical
is important to consider how to approach regulators. Con- because implementing autonomous systems changes
sider when to begin this process of engagement, what mate- labour needs. As a result, fear of job loss has been identified
rial needs to be shared with regulators, and for which as a primary concern with automation. These issues affect
milestones follow-up discussions are needed. Initial steps not only employees but also other businesses and local
are as follows: communities that depend on the mine; a clear social licence
1. Identify applicable regulators and regulations and to operate is necessary and engagement is critical. This sec-
understand legal liability related to operating tion describes what to consider when engaging the work-
autonomous systems force and community.

11.1 Engagement Plan example, automation is a safer approach in mining because

Those implementing autonomous systems should it minimizes the exposure to hazards, which should be
develop an engagement plan designed for listening to and appealing to the community at large. The potential to work
addressing concerns. This plan will vary significantly based remotely can also provide flexibility and increase job satis-
on whether the operation is a brownfield or greenfield one. faction, especially for FIFO operations where it offers the
For brownfield operations, the bulk of the engagement will opportunity to work closer to home (for more examples of
often be about the changing work landscape. For greenfield benefits, see Appendix B). There needs to be a detailed com-
operations, engagement strategies will focus on exploring munications plan for each stakeholder group, targeted to
the social benefits of automation for the community. The their specific needs. Consider communication methodology
engagement plan should: and engaging with a marketing or communications special-
• Communicate a clear and consistent message ist (see Section 7.1).
• Define the planned future state
• Develop a personnel plan that facilitates the transition 11.1.3 Social and Economic Impact Assessment
from employees’ current responsibilities to their new ones Investigating the community’s socioeconomic situa-
A specific plan for engaging the community is also nec- tion is essential. There may be existing agreements with
essary. These actions demand a clear, strong, and aligned the community regarding jobs and educational opportuni-
leadership to be effective. It would be helpful to collect some ties (e.g., agreements with indigenous communities con-
supporting case studies on the successes or failures of cerning employment quotas). Plans must accommodate
autonomous deployments in various environments to guide these agreements. The type of community determines
engagement (e.g., how well a specific product has been how to perform the social and economic impact assess-
adopted by various organizations). ment and whether the degree of change affects the orga-
nization’s social licence to operate. The degree of social
11.1.1 Evolving Workforce Requirements impact will vary greatly depending on the type of operation
Those implementing autonomous systems in brown- or community. In FIFO operations where no local commu-
field operations need to address anxieties about how jobs nity is present, the changes would likely have little to no
will change. To do so, they must engage with the community, community impact. In less populated areas, small local
local workforce, and unions honestly and transparently to communities may be dependent on the operation and be
manage expectations. Leaders need to carefully evaluate significantly affected. Larger regional communities could
their changing workforce requirements, the skillsets of the be less dependent on the operation but still be affected. A
current workforce, and the actions to take. Changing work- detailed list of steps to take and considerations for com-
force requirements include: pleting a social and economic impact assessment are in
• Different skillsets needed (reskilling, upskilling, or new Appendix D.1.
talent; see Section 11.2)
• Employee relocation (support and accommodation 11.2 Education
should be offered) As autonomous methods become more common,
• Job loss (outplacement services should be considered) shortages of specific new skillsets could make it difficult to
In some situations, automation can prevent job loss or operate the new systems. Those implementing autonomous
create new jobs. It can prevent job loss in situations where systems need to invest in people and technology at the
manual operations would no longer be feasible. For example, same time by playing a role in defining new skill require-
the potential for increased productivity with automation ments, providing educational opportunities to prevent skill
allows companies to mine lower-grade resources, making shortages, and empowering the community at large.
continued operations feasible. For greenfield operations or The first step to defining needed skillsets is to com-
marginal operations, automation can allow financial invest- plete staff assessments that identify the current skillsets,
ment where the manual equipment operations may other- talent, and adaptability of the workforce. From there, iden-
wise close down or not be developed at all. Increased tify the new skills required, and identify, promote, and pos-
productivity from automation can also lead to job creation. sibly find the new skills pathways for individual employees
and local or regional communities. Training pathways
11.1.2 Communications Strategy include:
Communicating the overall social benefits of automa- • Retraining existing employees (most applicable to
tion can help to engage the workforce and community. For brownfield operations)

• Attracting, training, and retaining recruits using intrinsic • Open data (more modular, open, application program-
motivators (e.g., job satisfaction) and, if sustainable, ming interface [API] based; see GMG, 2016)
extrinsic motivators (e.g., high salaries) • Present and future needs
• Determining opportunities for cross-training • Best practices rather than rigid design criteria (accom-
Additional considerations include: modating change)
• Training timelines • Customer first (define the customer and their metrics
• Training staff requirements of value, see Section 8)
• How the work culture will change The processes outlined in this section are done concur-
• The growing role of contractors and service providers rently with many of those described earlier in this document:
• Collaboration with other departments and suppliers to change management activities (Section 7), the risk assess-
develop and deploy solutions ment (Section 9), ensuring regulatory compliance (Sec-
• Collaboration with universities, colleges, and govern- tion 10), and evaluating social impact (Section 11). These
ment to ensure that educational programs align with processes also need to address cybersecurity requirements
future needs of the industry (see Appendix D.2 for and intellectual property issues and incorporate interfaces
more information) and integrations.
12. OPERATIONAL READINESS AND 12.1 Mine Planning and Design to Accommodate
DEPLOYMENT Autonomous Systems
Introducing autonomous systems is a process that Mine management and mine designers and planners
takes time to plan, design, and implement. Autonomous sys- should understand the limitations of the autonomous mining
tems are complex, requiring those implementing them to technology they will use and the differences between man-
integrate many layers of planning before deployment. While ual and autonomous operations (Appendix E.1). These dif-
meticulous planning is needed, technological change is an ferences influence designs and plans on many levels.
ongoing process, and plans must also be adaptable to those The physical mine, system infrastructure, and operational
changes. This section covers fundamental principles and processes need to accommodate new characteristics of
considerations for implementing autonomous systems. This autonomous systems that require new approaches to exca-
section discusses mine planning, engineering design, and vation and material movement design. Ultimately, the mine
architecture and covers essential deployment and commis- design needs to be suitable for autonomous equipment and
sioning activities. potential combinations of autonomous, semi-autonomous,
The following factors need to be determined upfront, as and manual equipment; conventional designs for one or the
the processes discussed in this section vary according to other might not be sufficient. In greenfield projects or com-
them: plete redesigns, the whole design can facilitate automation. In
• Why the organization wishes to automate a mine site brownfield projects, current designs and operational pro-
(Section 8) cesses need to be adjusted or redesigned.
• The project scope and scale (what components to All mine design and planning must incorporate safety by
automate, what level(s) of autonomous system/equip- design. From the earliest stages, controls should aim to min-
ment maturity to implement, and planned autonomous imize the start-up risks with the systems (e.g., start simple
operational maturity); these choices dictate the neces- and small and gradually build up capacity) and create an
sary changes to the mine design and plan area where the autonomous system is isolated or interac-
• Implementation approach (Section 6.3) tions with manned mining systems are managed (e.g., con-
• Technological approach (integration with supplier(s), sider the implications in mine design, plans, and schedules).
mature technology, or new technology) Emergency management planning is also part of this pro-
Fundamental principles or tenets for autonomous sys- cess and is explored in Section 9.
tem planning and design activities are listed below. These
principles must be considered throughout all stages from 12.1.1 Physical Mine Planning and Design
planning and design through to deployment and commis- Mine designers and planners should ensure the physical
sioning. mine design is suitable for autonomy, including:
• Safety by design • Work area, road design and construction that are in line
• Systems thinking (consider how the mining value chain is with the system builder requirements (e.g., road sur-
affected by the decisions to automate, see Section 11.3) face, gradients, potentially harsh conditions)

• Traffic management (e.g., intersections, park-ups, load 12.1.3 Process Planning

and dump locations, access controls for exclusion and Mine processes change with autonomy: there are bene-
interface areas) fits to planning new processes from scratch, though there
• Mine geometry (e.g., pit shape, haul road width, tunnel can also be modifications to existing ones. Considerations
profile, decline angle, bend and turn radius) include:
• Ventilation requirements (especially for underground • The sequence of activities that may change for a spe-
mining) cific mining process
• Infrastructure placement within the autonomous area • Shift management and changeover
(e.g., fuel facilities, crushers or ore passes, stockpiles, • New mining processes (e.g., continuous versus batch)
workshops and service areas, crib rooms, calibration • Adjustments to the mining rate because of down-
and commissioning areas, services) stream material requirements, potentially minimizing
• Separate roads for manned light vehicles if possible, rehandling and stockpiling downstream
which can help reduce interaction • Situations and processes where people still need to be
monitoring equipment (e.g., water drainage/dewatering
12.1.2 System Infrastructure Planning and Design pumps)
Supporting infrastructure and area requirements • Wait period following a blast for blast gas clearance
need to be identified early in the project. Considerations before humans can enter the work area
include:
• The autonomous system and associated infrastructure 12.2 Engineering Design Management Framework
scalability and capability To ensure successful delivery of an autonomous sys-
• Equipment specifications, fleet size, and operating tem, engineers must follow a robust and structured design
capabilities (e.g., turning circle, road network layout, management framework, considering specific design prac-
gradient) tices in connection with broader contexts. A strong design
• Network communication infrastructure, especially criti- management framework improves OEE and enables safe
cal in underground situations (e.g., wireless, fixed; see and predictable production results by:
GMG, 2017a, 2017b, 2019c) • Reducing safety risks and resulting delays
• Area access (e.g., location and control of area entry and – Embedding safety controls fail to a safe level of
exit points, provision of perimeter protection and signage) operations
• Monitoring system health (e.g., wireless, positioning • Maximizing asset availability
systems) – Minimizing breakdowns and failures
• Location of remote operation and control rooms – Allowing maintenance activities to be conducted
• Automated system boundaries: whether the mine site within the planned hours
can operate autonomously or whether there are addi- • Ensuring equipment utilization conforms to the plan
tional communications infrastructure requirements, – Minimizing production delays
such as a backhaul internet connection for executing – Ensuring the mining equipment performs and
some automation services delivers to production targets
• Managing electrical load and balancing demand Figure 5 presents key considerations for a design man-
• Water management and dust control (especially in agement framework for mining automation. Specific
underground operations) design considerations (technology assessments, design
• Layers of control, including location and tracking of and engineering standards, functional requirements, func-
humans and non-autonomous equipment and other tional safety, and maintainability) are at the centre and
object detection and avoidance systems (reactive and broader design contexts (communications infrastructure,
predictive) human/system integration, environmental and social con-
• OEM and OTM testing programs for autonomous sys- siderations and requirements, and local versus centralized
tem software/firmware updates and a mine-specific decision-making) are towards the outside. Safety by design
test system to ensure the viability of system is central to all parts of the framework. Bidirectional arrows
software/firmware updates connect the points to show that all these considerations
• How changes integrate with non-mining external (e.g., and contexts are interrelated.
urban environments) and internal (e.g., mill/processing Table 4 offers a non-exhaustive list of existing design
plants) infrastructure standards that may be applicable.

12.2.1 Key Challenges

Key challenges to engineering
design for autonomous systems are:
• Safety systems must be engi- ;/22-&$.(+$/&#'
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neered, tested and commissioned
in a simulated operational environ-
ment to be fit-for-purpose without
compromising the productivity
value driver. C(<"+5'A5')"#$%&
• New and existing systems must be
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uplifts so that they can be suc- #(<"+5 *"1-$*"2"&+#
cessfully interfaced into the design.
Appendix E.2 provides further $%&'
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details on addressing these challenges. $&. (+$/&# '
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12.2.2 Design Management Plan +4
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+( ')"# &'
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A design management plan must . ?&7$*/&2"&+(0'(&)'
#/.$(0'
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stakeholders upfront (including the *"1-$*"2"&+#
autonomous system supplier) and

should include:
• Acceptance and performance cri- Figure 5. Engineering Design Management Framework for Implementing Autonomous Systems (Figure
teria Design, GMG)
• Agreement on how the design will
be verified and approved (i.e., verification approach, The Open Group, 2018). Overall, the architecture for
quality management plans) autonomous systems is an integrated IT/OT system: IT sys-
• Risk assessment approaches (see Section 9) tems used for data-centric computing are integrated with
• A document deliverables list with both internal and the OT systems used to monitor processes and devices.
external stakeholders (Appendix E.3) Experience has shown that there needs to be an aligned
IT/OT capability: most autonomous systems require a heavy
12.2.3 Configuration Management reliance on both disciplines. Considerations around availabil-
A comprehensive configuration management system ity, redundancy, resiliency, and cybersecurity need to be
must be employed for changes that are introduced through addressed at every level of the architecture.
implementing autonomous systems, including: Architectures for autonomous systems need to be incor-
• Operational and maintenance practices porated into the other design and planning processes out-
• Design specifications lined earlier in this section. Early on, roles and responsibilities
• System changes (e.g., software updates, upgrades, required to develop the architectures need to be specified to
parameters) that affect mine design ensure the appropriate skills and capabilities are in place.
• Data collection and integration Architectures also need to consider both the current and
• End of life/obsolescence considerations for long-term future state of the system. Reviewing emerging technologies
installations is necessary to future-proof solutions and understand that
• Risk transformation new business value might arise in the future. Overall, the
architecture should facilitate planning for future expansions
12.3 Architecture and technology development and confirm that systems can
Architecture refers to the structure, components, and be upgraded and expanded.
design principles of a system and the relationships between There several ways of categorizing architectures.
them (International Organization for Standardization, 2011; Table 5 describes architecture in the context of autonomous

Table 4. Recommended Industry Design and Engineering Standards

Standard number Title Citation
ANSI/ISA-95.00.01-2010 Enterprise-Control System Integration—Part 1: Models and Terminology International Society for
Automation, 2010a
ANSI/ISA-95.00.02-2010 Enterprise-Control System Integration—Part 2: Object Model Attributes International Society for
Automation, 2010b
ANSI/ISA-95.00.03-2013 Enterprise-Control System Integration—Part 3: Activity Models of International Society for
Manufacturing Operations Management Automation, 2013a
ANSI/ISA-95.00.04-2012 Enterprise-Control System Integration—Part 4: Object and attributes for International Society for
manufacturing operations management integration Automation, 2012
ANSI/ISA-95.00.05-2013 Enterprise-Control System Integration—Part 5: Business-to-Manufacturing International Society for
Transactions Automation, 2013b
IEC 61508-1:2010 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related International Electrotechnical
systems—Part 1: General requirements Commission, 2010
ISO 13849-1:2015 Safety-related parts of control systems—Part 1: General principles for design International Organization for
ISO 13849-2:2012 Safety-related parts of control systems—Part 2: Validation International Organization for
ISO 20474-1:2017 Earth-moving machinery –Safety—Part 1: General requirements (See also International Organization for
parts 2–10 for specific types of machinery) Standardization, 2017b
ISO 19296:2018 Mining—Mobile machines working underground—Machine safety International Organization for
ISO 17757:2017 Earth-moving machinery and mining —Autonomous and semi-autonomous International Organization for
machine system safety Standardization, 2017a
ISO 10007:2017 Quality management–Guidelines for configuration management International Organization for
Standardization, 2017c
ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010:2011 Systems and Software Engineering—Architecture description International Organization for
ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2015 Systems and Software Engineering – System life cycle processes International Organization for
Standardization, 2015b
SAE J3016 Taxonomy of Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems SAE International, 2018
Table 5. Architecture Subsets Applied to Autonomous Systems (continued on next page)

Category Definition Further details
General For autonomous systems
Business Drivers and processes Social impact, safety and organizational and Business impact assessment should be
that generate operational readiness completed early to ensure the design is structured
business value (see to meet business requirements for both systems
Appendix B) and data
“As-is” and “to-be” state for roles and responsibilities See mining business reference model and
and reporting structures based on system exploration and mining business capability
interdependencies reference map (The Open Group, 2013, 2014).
Data How the organization Required data baseline (plans for data capture, Data streams to examine:
manages data sensor data, measurement strategy) • Operating physical data (operating logics)
Scale (quantity) of data and data model (mapping • Input operational data (commands and plans)
where data are and need to go) • Technical services and design inputs
Master data management and data quality • Optimization loops for production (localized and
management (including traceability of lineage) integrated optimization)
Alert monitoring (to quickly address issues with flow • Equipment data (maintenance and operational)
or quality) • Edge systems (safety, management,
Data exchange considerations (often for large environment)
volumes at high speed/resolution) • Localization and positioning information (to
Data security, scalability, and validation feed and from fleet management)
Data standards (open/closed)
Automated data surveys

Table 5. (Continued)
Category Definition Further details
General For autonomous systems
Technology Software and How existing technologies intersect with current Systems:
hardware functionality, data and application landscape • Basic input/output system
capability, and how Changes that will be necessary for meeting business • Solid communications network/fixed
they integrate with needs with the new system infrastructure (e.g., network link, network
other processes Blocks of technology redundancies, consideration for protocols,
considerations for latency)
• Onboard autonomy system (automation
processors)
• Onboard detection/object avoidance system
• Onboard machine actuation systems
• Redundant power
• Security systems
systems as they fall into the following subsets, as defined by and user acceptance. See Appendix E.4 for a more detailed
in the TOGAF® standard (The Open Group, 2018): business, commissioning activities list.
application, data, and technology. The implementation process must encompass a con-
tinuous improvement loop to feed back into the planning
12.4 Deployment and Commissioning process. Keeping ongoing focus after commissioning is
Deploying and transitioning to a new autonomous sys- required for the system to allow for continuous improve-
tem requires careful consideration of: ment. The project closeout should include extensive field
• Proofs of concept testing with key metrics measurement before final accep-
• Definitions of many KPIs and performance metrics tance and commissioning.
• Operating parameters
• Timelines 13. FOLLOW-UP
• Commissioning criteria Once the operation is commissioned and running, fol-
The system also needs validation and testing following low-up processes should continue. A transformation impact
an earlier formulated acceptance and commissioning strat- assessment should be conducted. Lifecycle and configura-
egy with a clearly articulated vision of the future. tion management, conflict resolution management, and pro-
A clear project execution plan should be developed that ductivity optimization need adjustment. New maintenance
covers staging and timing, detailed and full deployment regimes will need to be established, traffic flows might need
plans, and personnel needs. This plan should be formed adjusting, and plans for failed equipment recovery in an
based on the planning and design considerations presented autonomous area of the mine site may also be needed.
earlier in this section and the chosen implementation Operational KPIs should be reviewed once the system is
approach (Section 6.3). operational. Moreover, geotechnical constraints may influ-
A systematic commissioning strategy is also required ence and be influenced by mine automation. Roles and
that covers the commissioning process, timeline, risks, roles responsibilities also need to be continually reassessed and
and responsibilities, and test plan and meets formal approval updated to reflect ongoing changes.

14. RESOURCES, REFERENCES, AND International Organization for Standardization (2009). Risk Man-
agement—Vocabulary (Standard No. ISO 73:2009). Retrieved from
RECOMMENDED READING
https://www.iso.org/standard/44651.html
Bonekamp, L., & Sure, M. (2015). Consequences of Industry 4.0 on
human labour and work organisation. Journal of Business and International Organization for Standardization (2010). Safety of
Media Psychology, 6(1), 33–40. Retrieved from https://journal- machinery – General principles for design—Risk assessment and
bmp.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/04_Bonekamp-Sure_final.pdf risk reduction (Standard No. ISO 12100:2010). Retrieved from
https://www.iso.org/standard/51528.html
Burgess-Limerick, R., Horberry, T., Steiner, L., & Cronin J. (2017).
Mining automation human-systems integration: CMOC North- International Organization for Standardization (2011). Systems
parkes case study. 13th AusIMM Underground Operators Confer- and software engineering—Architecture description (Standard No.
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Global Mining Guidelines Group (2016). Mobile equipment open
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gmggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Mine-Communica-
tions-Guideline-I-REV-2018.pdf International Organization for Standardization (2013b). Informa-
tion technology—Security techniques—Code of practice for infor-
Global Mining Guidelines Group (2017b). Underground mine com- mation security controls (Standard No. ISO/IEC 27002:2013).
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gmggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Mine-Communica- related parts of control systems—Part 1: General principles for
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www.iso.org/standard/69883.html
Global Mining Guidelines Group (2019a). Guideline for implement-
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Global Mining Guidelines Group (2019b). Interoperability defini- No. ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2015). Retrieved from https://www.iso.org
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https://www.isa.org/store/products/product-
detail/?productId=116783

APPENDIX A: SAMPLE CHANGE MANAGEMENT the changes, intelligent change management will seek to
MODEL paint a picture of the benefits and new opportunities wher-
Established change management models can help ever possible while remaining transparent and acknowledg-
guide the approach to the human change management for ing possible negative impacts.
an implementation project of this complexity. There are
many options: Kotter’s eight-step change model (Kotter, Step 4: Communicate for vision
2012) is laid out below to illustrate what this might look like Clear, consistent, regular, and long-running communi-
for the implementation of autonomous mining initiatives. cation is essential for achieving a strong platform for
These steps are at once sequential and parallel: they often change. A thorough, disciplined, and exhaustive communi-
overlap with and support one another. cations plan is required, ideally involving the broadest possi-
ble range of stakeholders.
Step 1: Create positive motivation for all participants to
support the change Step 5: Remove obstacles
Generating inspiration and motivation to drive changes It is necessary to continually review and remove obsta-
in behaviour, practices, routines, and processes is a key suc- cles to change. Excellent change management constantly
cess factor in the human component of all change initiatives. assesses the stakeholder landscape to ensure that potential
This step is particularly relevant when building the case for problems and obstacles are being proactively monitored and
implementing autonomous systems because the change will managed. The change process is dynamic and often
almost always affect the workforce. A strong change man- becomes more so as the change is implemented and
agement program will need to find ways to focus all human becomes a reality.
participants on the positives associated with automation to
overcome its negative association with job loss. Some of Step 6: Establish short-term goals
these will be part of business case, but more work is often Short-term goals and short-term wins keep employees
required to help employees and others overcome their initial motivated. Companies need to divide their complex pro-
fears and begin to be motivated by the potential positives. It cesses into small, achievable chunks to motivate employees.
is also important to acknowledge that there will be changes Many businesses aim to become more agile when approach-
for the local community and to respond transparently to their ing change; this can be accomplished by breaking down what
concerns. Providing positive case studies as concrete exam- might seem overwhelming in scope into doable pieces and
ples may help with this process. managing both investment and delivery risk by thoughtfully
planning the work in stages. Intentionally celebrate small
Step 2: Form influential and powerful alliances successes and build a winning culture along the way.
To reduce resistance to change, it is critical to engage
with key influencers within management, the workforce, Step 7: Keep working
unions, the community, government, and other stakeholders Business success requires constant effort. The change
affected by autonomous mining activities. These key influ- environment is dynamic because humans generally respond
encers may or may not be those in formal positions of emotionally to change. The change management effort
authority. Informal influencers often have the greatest must be planned and executed with great discipline through
capacity to undermine change, and effective change man- to the end state. People should not be assumed to accept
agement works to understand the stakeholder landscape change until it is considered standard practice and process.
and its nuances. Simple top-down authoritative approaches
to complex change are generally less effective. In contrast, Step 8: Integrate change in the workplace’s culture
broad alliances help promote and support change while also Large change initiatives can lay the foundation for a
providing excellent feedback for anticipating and addressing company culture that expects and thrives on change, but
concerns and resistance. this requires enormous discipline and focus on developing a
consistently strong approach to managing change and see-
Step 3: Create a vision for change ing it implemented successfully. Change failures can not
Creating a compelling vision for the coming change is only result in the failure of the project but they can also
the most effective way to influence people and garner their impact the business’s longer-term disposition toward fur-
support for the changes in the workplace. Visions must be ther change. Thus, it is critical to manage change well to
desirable to all stakeholders. For those negatively affected by ensure the organization’s long-term adaptability.

APPENDIX B: BENEFITS, VALUE DRIVERS, AND not all apply to every situation. Further, because this is a
COSTS holistic project, benefits and value drivers are often interde-
Table B1 is designed for those developing a business pendent. For example, insufficient data analytics have the
case to consider which potential benefits, value drivers, and potential to reduce situation awareness with autonomous
costs apply to their situation. It can also serve as a starting systems because the technologies that improve situation
point for financial analysis and/or communications consid- awareness (e.g., predictive maintenance) depend on their
erations. Please note that this list is not exhaustive and does environment.
Table B1. Potential Benefits, Value Drivers, and Costs Associated with Implementing Autonomous Systems (continued on next page)
Area Benefits Value Drivers Costs

Workforce
Automation can More flexible locations Reduced personnel support costs for FIFO Recruiting and offering incentives to attract
change the size possible with remote operations (accommodations, travel) and retain skilled labour (because of the
and shape of the operation Reduced employee turnover (relates to better current skill gap)
workforce and Improved work/life conditions, more flexible locations, and Labour displacement, retraining and
alter specific roles, balance improved work/life balance) upskilling current employees, and training
responsibilities, Improved diversity and Minimize the costs/effects of absenteeism new recruits
and skill inclusion (e.g., Reduced overtime Change management (e.g., consultants,
requirements opportunity to hire Easier to recruit people for better working engagement)
people with disabilities conditions Government, regulator, or self-imposed
or to implement more community commitments
family-oriented
strategies)
Larger resource pool
(new worker
demographics will be
interested in mining if
jobs are cleaner)
Health and safety
Automation Distancing operator from Lower health and safety costs (e.g., those Implementing new health and safety
introduces new operation can lower associated with work-related incidents) management procedures
health and safety exposure to health and Lower fatigue management costs New physical infrastructure for physical
challenges and operational hazards Lower lost time hours (from health and safety separation, identifying autonomous areas,
hazards, but it also Better overall quality of concerns) access points, control rooms
reduces many of life for workers Lower accident repair costs Implementing new hazard controls
those associated Cleaner, less dangerous Lower health- and safety-related insurance New communications and digital
with manned operating conditions rates (lower human involvement and lower infrastructure (e.g., for remote operations)
operations (physical and mental variability in machine operation) Implementing layers of protection
health benefits)
Processes and technology
Overall, autonomous More efficient mine Long-term savings on mine design and Time and resources for implementing
systems change design and processes structure design, scheduling, and safety management
how mines operate. (e.g., more efficient Reduced productivity loss from process changes
They can facilitate scheduling and traffic variability Required improvements to foundational
optimized mine management) Decreased planned operator and equipment technologies (e.g., radio, Wi-Fi®, LTE®
design and Consistent performance, downtime (e.g., shift time delay, meal time) network positioning) and geospatial
consistent leading to Reduced inter- and intra-cycle idle time technologies
processes and can standardization and Reduced non-value-added but necessary time Constructing the physical environment for
help minimize waste repeatability of operating (e.g., refuelling and maintenance stops) autonomy (roads, stockpile spaces, bypass
and improve overall practices and overpass roads, control rooms)
Reduced costs associated with equipment
planning processes. New kinds of mining Digital infrastructure and facilities
abuse/misuse and human-caused damage
methods and equipment Optimized processes and increased (hardware, cloud provisioning, configuration,
Preventive or predictive communications capability can reduce and commissioning)
maintenance can lead to wasted/inefficient time or unplanned Technology development and maintenance
longer machine and downtime (e.g., shovel hang time, bunching, Required incremental network
machine component life traffic conflicts, misdirected loads) improvements

Table B1. (Continued)
Area Benefits Value Drivers Costs

Processes and technology (continued)
These changes can Increased Defer capital investment (by moving more Required improvements to upstream and
translate directly measurement and material with the same equipment and downstream equipment and processes
and indirectly to control are often extending the life of the equipment from Hardware or retrofit costs per machine
increased OEE and possible, increasing autonomous operation versus manned Cost of handover
productivity, situation awareness operation. Improved efficiencies can also Loss in productivity during ramp-up and
reduced process Increased system reduce the need to extend fleet size.) deployment
variability, and long- integration Lower machine maintenance costs (condition- Equipment insurance
term savings. All Mining process will based or predictive maintenance through Upfront and ongoing licence costs
changes need to be become closer to a instrumentation and monitoring versus a
IT infrastructure and/or cloud platform
identified and continuous one scheduled maintenance regime)
maintenance and support, other technical
developed in a Better coordination Increase end-of-life asset (asset management support
timely manner to with downstream to specification and through-life asset history
maximize the Ongoing subscriptions to usage-based service
processes capture will increase disposal value)
success of contracts
introducing Sensor change outs
automation. Maintaining the physical infrastructure
Obsolescence

APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL HEALTH AND includes providing the information necessary to complete
SAFETY MATERIALS tasks safely. Such information includes:
• Manuals, specifications and operating instructions pro-
C.1 Hazard Identification and Verification List vided by the system builder
Hazard identification and verification systems can be • The operation’s policies, procedures and plans
implemented to quantify autonomous mining risks. They • Applicable legislation, standards, and other guidance
include, among others: material
• A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) or control haz- • Identified hazards and their associated risks
ard and operability study (CHAZOP) • Historical incidents, near misses, and their docu-
• Layers of protection analysis (LOPA) mented resolutions
• Functional safety analysis • Emergency shutdown procedures for autonomous
• As low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) equipment
• Bowtie analysis • Training materials
• Task-based risk assessment • Ongoing identification of autonomous boundaries
• Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) Personnel must also be instructed about system func-
• Employee hazard identification and reporting proce- tionality and specific tasks including the hazards and risks,
dures and tools the controls to be applied, and the job steps necessary to
• Workplace inspections complete the tasks safely and correctly.
• Monitoring the working environment Tools such as safe work instructions or procedures and
• Change management standard operating procedures may be used to document
• Incident investigations the process but should be reviewed and amended if there are
• Monitoring OEM and service company bulletins, rec- any changes (e.g., to equipment or conditions). If there is to
ommendations and specifications be a deviation from the safe work procedures, job safety or
• Regulator safety alerts hazard analyses should be undertaken to capture the haz-
ards and ensure controls are implemented and operational.
C.2 Maintenance Hazard Controls Supervisory or management personnel must formally
Maintenance hazard controls are especially important approve instructional tools. Establishing safe work practices
for autonomous equipment. To achieve the desired safety is an administrative control (see Section 9.1.3). These are a
outcomes, maintenance activities for autonomous equip- secondary line of defence after higher level controls such as
ment should address: designing out hazards.
• Safety-related parts of control systems and functional
safety considerations for system maintenance C.3.2 Training
(autonomous systems will not function without opera- Personnel must be competent in the tasks to which they
tional safety systems) are assigned; they must have the knowledge and skills nec-
• Scheduled maintenance and inspections processes essary to perform the task safely and correctly. Competency
• In situ inspection and servicing (e.g., consider ventila- is gained through training and experience while being super-
tion for human traffic in autonomous areas during in vised or mentored. Competency assessments should be
situ work) based on evidence and verified before work commences.
• Base platform autonomous components Competency verification must include a documented
• Recovery procedures in autonomous areas assessment. Competency can be verified by:
• Maintenance area and activity isolation • Recognition of prior learning
• Condition monitoring and diagnostics • On-site recognition or validation of current competency
• Calibration and testing (including designated testing • Using the operation’s training and development pro-
areas) gram
The risk management training provided must be appro-
C.3 Preparing Personnel for Safe Work priate to the assigned roles and responsibilities, and provide
information on:
C.3.1 Information • The risk management process
Personnel need to be informed so they are prepared to • Task-specific safe work methods, including the safe
work safely and respond to any issues. This preparation use of equipment and safe systems of work

All personnel should understand the effects that their ation help achieve the operation’s health and safety goals in
activities may have during commissioning, operation, and a variety of ways, including:
maintenance of the mobile autonomous mining system. • Leading and managing their team using their under-
They should also understand: standing of the key principles and safety features of
• What to expect if environmental or operational condi- the autonomous technology
tions change • Ensuring work is carried out following system builder
• Site requirements for monitoring of machine perfor- documentation
mance • Confirming workers (including contractors) are trained
• How to recognize when machines are not operating as and verified as competent to perform their duties
intended • Communicating regularly with those affected by work
• How to report incidents • Confirming fit-for-purpose equipment is available and
Whenever systems of work or plant and equipment used
change or new systems of work or plant and equipment are • Monitoring the workplace and identifying and control-
introduced, there must be a system to ensure affected per- ling hazards following site rules
sonnel are consulted, retrained and reassessed as neces- • Confirming the operation’s risk register reflects the risk
sary. analysis of jobs and critical tasks
• Reporting and recording performance issues (e.g.,
C.3.3 Supervision equipment failures, variances to approved operating
Supervision is a fundamental safety function that com- parameters)
plements information, instruction, and training provisions. • Referring new and changed circumstances not covered
Effective supervision sets and maintains high performance in site rules to management for further instructions
standards. Supervisors within an autonomous mining oper- • Communicating lessons from incidents

APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL COMMUNITY AND • Unions: In the context of the local governmental
SOCIAL IMPACT MATERIALS rules and labour laws
• Employment statistics: Including diversity (e.g.,
D.1 Detailed Steps for Completing a Social and the status of women in the workforce), age, and
Economic Impact Assessment education levels
The social and economic impact assessment deter- 3. Assess the outcome by asking the following questions:
mines the engagement strategy to take with the community. • What is the community’s level of dependency on
1. Consider demographics and how they can influence the mining operation, and how will it be affected
the implementation project: by the introduction of automation?
• Population: Size, trends (growing or diminishing, • Will there be a significant impact and for how
native-borns or outsiders) long?
• Age: Distribution, generational gaps • How can the introduction of the technology
• Cultural values: Education, remuneration, quality improve the community situation (e.g., mine life,
of life, mobility, family (understanding cultural val- new suppliers, visitors to demonstration site)?
ues can help to explain how identity can be bound
up to current manual skills and consider new D.2 Collaboration with Educational Institutions and
replacement skills that are valued by organization Government
and individual) Mining companies should also work with universities,
• Economic situation: Employment rates, gross rev- colleges, and government to ensure that educational pro-
enue, investment in the community, education and grams align with the future needs of the industry. Working
skills development, new startups toward this in the short term, they can:
• Education level: Skills, literacy, languages • Offer bursaries to students learning desired skills
• Diversity policies: For example, those concerning • Provide students with relevant practical experience
ethnic groups and gender diversity (case studies (e.g., hiring them through co-op programs, internships,
can help guide this process) summer jobs)
• The importance of the mine to local suppliers For more systemic educational changes, mining com-
and towns: Both in the current state and future panies can work with universities, colleges, and government
state. to:
2. Develop a community profile to determine how chang- • Redefine curricula in mining fields so they reflect the
ing roles can be managed in specific situations. It can industry’s future needs
also help to determine what benefits the new technol- • Define flexible pathways via staged qualifications in
ogy can have for the community (e.g., it may attract new mining-related disciplines
suppliers or attract visitors to the demonstration site). • Encourage educational structures to change to provide
The current community situation needs to be compared more practical experience
with the feasibility study of the operation. The following • Educate and retrain teachers and instructors
details can be used to build a community profile: • Establish globally relevant curricula, as there is more
• Location: Remoteness, accessibility (transporta- international mobility today
tion, presence of community) Potential future skills needed include (but are not limited
• Community history: Industry presence, evolution to):
• Industry sectors and employers in the commu- • Data analytics
nity: Both those depending on the mining opera- • Machine learning/data science
tion (e.g., suppliers) and other industries • AI
• Infrastructure: Schools, colleges, utilities, hospi- • Robotics
tals, accessibility • Optimization
• Strategic community plans: Growth, population, • Automation
sustainability, urban planning • Networking (transmission control protocol/internet
• Academic institutions: Strategic collaboration protocol [TCP/IP])
between academia and industry to stimulate • Wireless propagation and antenna theory (especially in
simultaneous technological development and an underground context)
regional economic development and education • Other languages (for a more global industry)

APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL utilization, and negatively affecting production performance

READINESS AND DEPLOYMENT MATERIALS targets. A safety system that is not rigorous enough, how-
ever, exposes resources to safety breaches, incidents, and
E.1 Mine Design Comparison regulatory risks.
Table E1 describes potential design differences between Achieving the right balance can be accomplished by:
manual and autonomous operations. • Assessing, interpreting, and applying corrective actions
for equipment OEM failure modes (i.e., braking, accel-
E.2 Key Engineering Design Challenges erating, steering, engine, hydraulics). The design must
fully describe how all failure modes will be handled and
E.2.1 Safety and Productivity how these will be tested to confirm the design. The
Achieving the appropriate levels of safety without com- design must correlate the autonomous system back to
promising the productivity value driver is a key design chal- the equipment’s safe working parameters.
lenge. Safety systems that are too conservative, • Incorporating an effective alarm management
oversensitive, or prone to false positives (especially those at approach, ensuring data collected from alarms, alerts,
maturity level 3 where operator intervention is required for and events are rationalized and that systems, pro-
even minimal risk situations; see Section 6.2) regularly fail at cesses, and roles are assigned to assess, interpret, and
a safe level of operation, increasing task variation, reducing action them.
Table E1. Mine Design Difference between Manual and Autonomous Operations
Feature Manual Autonomous

Design layout Designed using conventional Can require separation of manned and autonomous operations
design packages Typically requires the same road widths as manned operations, but road
Design layout conforms with widths must be accurate
site-established parameters The design and area at loading and dumping locations will be to autonomous
such as clearances, speeds, OEM specifications (similar to manned operations but may have different
ramp angles, exclusion zones, design requirements)
angle of repose, and safety Might prompt review of intersection designs, ramp angles, truck speeds,
requirements and traffic density
Requires consideration for the interface between manual and autonomous
fleets/operations
Requires consideration for the maintenance interface
Requires consideration for fuelling location and layout
Plans Plans prepared at a functional Plans prepared at an execution level with the autonomous vehicle as the
level with the site supervisors/ “customer,” the vehicles operate exactly to plan
operators as the “customer” Plans can be levelled and optimized in an autonomous environment
Planning Planner prepares and delivers Mine plan is uploaded into the autonomous operating system and the
the plan of the day to the mine autonomous vehicles execute according to plan
supervisors Planner requires feedback on plan effectiveness
Supervisor executes plan using Supervisor does not have the discretion to modify the plan
mining judgment and experience If there is a machine breakdown, the plan must be modified
(supervisor can change
loading/dumping locations
and truck allocation)
Supervising Supervisor primarily schedules Supervisor primarily manages machines
and manages people Supervisor must understand the mine plan and machine operating parameters
Controlling Mine controller manages Mine controller oversees operations and manages the effectiveness of the
logistics within the pit operation
Mine controller monitors autonomous vehicle operations and manages
unexpected or inefficient operations
Mine controller manages survey and dispatch changes

• Assessing cybersecurity threats and system vulnera- – System operators

bilities upfront and balancing them with the functional – Regulators
and safety requirements of the solution. – Other stakeholders as required
• Commissioning planning
E.2.2 Balancing New and Existing Systems – Communications and reporting plan
It is challenging to balance new systems with existing – Commissioning project plan and timeline
ones. Unless the mine site is a greenfield environment, the – Select and survey suitable commissioning area
mining equipment typically has existing onboard systems (e.g., segregated, isolated)
that need to be incorporated and interfaced into the design – Checklists for installation, assembly, and commis-
(e.g., fleet management system, high-precision global posi- sioning
tioning system [GPS], asset health monitoring). – Change management plan
Upstream and downstream systems might also require • Commissioning test plan based on system builder rec-
uplift or improvements to interact with or support an ommended test procedures
autonomous system. These include:
• Improving communications network availability, relia-
Table E2. Potential Document Deliverables List for Inclusion in
bility, throughput, bandwidth, latency, and coverage the Design Management Plan
• Identifying and removing single points of failure (i.e.,
components that, if they fail, halt the entire system) Document deliverables
within the network Risk management plan and assessments (e.g., HAZOP, FMEA)
• Improving network routing, firewalls, and protocols Inspection and test plans
• Improving high-precision GPS availability, reliability, Audit schedules
accuracy, and coverage Packing and shipping procedures
• Improving data centre availability, redundancy, and Quality management plan
capacity Material listing and certificates (including hazardous materials)
• Improving computer and storage availability, reliability, Manufacturing data sheets
and capacity Engineering and technical specifications
Construction and installation specifications
E.3 Document Deliverables List for the Design Applicable standards
Management Plan
Asset management plans
Table E2 is designed to be a starting point: specific doc-
General arrangement drawings
uments will vary depending on the situation.
Detailed engineering drawings (including electrical/wiring/cabling
drawings)
E.4 Commissioning Activities List
Equipment listing (mechanical, electrical, instrumentation, controls)
To achieve the desired outcomes, commissioning activ-
Installation, operation, and maintenance manuals
ities for autonomous equipment should adequately address
System architecture drawings
matters such as:
Interface control document
• System operator and system builder roles and respon-
Configuration and logic files
sibilities
– Boundaries agreed upon, defined, and docu- Human-machine interface
mented Commissioning management plans and procedures
– Commissioning tasks assigned to competent per- Performance testing and acceptance procedures
sons Commissioning test procedures
– Formal commissioning and handover process Vendor technical specifications
• Risk management process Network requirements
– Understand technology and specific functionalities KPIs
– Identify hazards specific to commissioning phase Design management plan
(e.g., safety critical lists) Root cause analysis
– Ensure appropriate controls are in place Factory assessment
• Formal approvals process Stakeholder responsibility assignment matrix assessment overview
– System builders

– Safety systems tests – Compliance with relevant standards

– Operational performance tests – Test results are documented (e.g., pass, fail,
– System integration tests defects, issues)
– Documented test procedures • System acceptance formal process for managing
• Functional and user acceptance testing conducted in unresolved defects and issues
line with documented test procedures – User acceptance based on system builder specifi-
– Testing traceable to the system version or type to cations
confirm systems meet system builders and opera- – Training and competency assessment for various
tional requirements roles

APPENDIX F: LESSONS LEARNED LESSONS LEARNED

Below are examples of safety incidents that occurred at Risk Management
two mine sites, discussion of their root causes, and the • An essential-factors process was undertaken and
lessons learned from them. For two additional examples showed we must continue to look to replace adminis-
from Western Australia, see: http://www.dmp.wa.gov.au/ trative (people-based/behavioural-dependent) controls
Documents/Safety/MS_SIR_226_Collision_between_an_auto with engineering controls.
nomous_haul_truck_and_manned_water_cart.pdf and http:// Monitoring and Measurement
www.dmp.wa.gov.au/Documents/Safety/MSH_SIR_260.pdf. • Administrative control risk mitigation for potential or
In addition, a Safety Bulletin on “Seeking safe mobile known hazards requires frequent auditing for compli-
autonomous equipment systems” is available at http://www. ance and desired effect.
dmp.wa.gov.au/Documents/Safety/SRS-Publications-Mining Fatal Risk Control
_and_Explorations-Safety_Bulletin_110.pdf • There is currently no fatal risk management standard
related specifically to autonomous operations.
F.1 Site A: Autonomous Loader and Personnel Training and Awareness
Interaction • Accountability for personal behaviours must be consis-
Date: 21 April 2018 tent with policies and procedures.
Region: North America
Incident: Autonomous loader and personnel interaction (no F.2 Site B: Semi-Autonomous Loader and Personnel
injuries) Interaction
Date: 27 June 2018
CONTROL FAILURE Region: Africa
Vehicle/Pedestrian Interaction – Underground – Incident: Semi-autonomous loader and personnel interac-
Pedestrian Vehicle Segregation tion (no injuries)
• The mucking level was not properly cleared of personnel.
• The mucking level access barrier was not in place to Description of Event
prevent access to the level. Remote loading operations were being conducted with
• Requirements for entering loading area were not fol- a semi-autonomous loader. Operations started after fixing a
lowed. problem with the laser barrier, which had tripped and caused
• Safe operating procedures included lockout-tagout of the loader to shut down. Another trip-out occurred, requiring
barrier control panels when accessing levels, but was it the operator to inspect the work area before resetting the
unclear on specific uses in different situations. barriers, but the operator could not ascertain the reason for
the trip. Mucking operations continued. While reversing from
ROOT CAUSE the draw point, the operator observed reflections on the rear
Risk Management monitor. He stopped but could not identify the reflections. As
• Global fatal risk control standards do not currently the operator turned to tram to the stockpile, he observed two
consider autonomous equipment. people some distance away with the front monitor. He shut
• Requirements for contacting the loader operator were the machine off to investigate and found two production drill
found to be inconsistent. operators in the exclusion zone. Figure F1 presents a visual
Change Management of this event.
• The change management process for implementing
new technology in existing operations was insufficient. CONTROL FAILURE
Procedures Vehicle/Pedestrian Interaction – Underground –
• Although the standard operating procedures and stan- Pedestrian Vehicle Segregation
dard task procedures for autonomous operations were • Separation and exclusion zone: The laser barrier was
very specific, there were small discrepancies in the reset with personnel within the remote operation area.
documents concerning testing the system within the • Personnel crossed the physical and electronic barriers
exclusion zone. while remote loading was in operation.

Figure F1. Visual of Semi-Autonomous Loader and Personnel Interaction (Provided by a GMG Contributor)
ROOT CAUSE LESSONS LEARNED

Organizational Culture Risk Management
• The design and application of barriers allows them to • Replace administrative controls with engineering con-
be crossed for perceived authorized reasons. trols to eliminate/reduce behavioural dependency.
Procedures Change Management
• The standard operating procedures did not provide • Standard operating procedures and training need to
sufficient guidance on managing multiple laser trigger address all process changes, and personnel affected
events. by that change need to be informed of how it could
Design affect their work activities.
• The laser system produced multiple false positives, Fatal Risk Control – Vehicle/Pedestrian Interaction
diminishing the value of the control. • The reliability of the laser detection technology needs
improvement to minimize false positive trigger events.
Processes also need to be in place for escalation when
multiple trigger events occur and for clearing the area
prior to resetting the laser barrier.
• Visual and audible alarms when the laser detection is
triggered need improvement.

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20181008_Implementation_of_Autonomous_Systems-GMG-AM-v01-r01

DATE DOCUMENT TO BE REVIEWED

PREPARED BY THE AUTONOMOUS MINING WORKING GROUP

Global Mining Guidelines Group (GMG)

ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE PREPARATION OF THESE GUIDELINES

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To request permission, please contact:

Global Mining Guidelines Group

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11. COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL IMPACT 14

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1. FOREWORD value: it can improve safety, increase production efficiency,

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6. COMMON TERMS OF REFERENCE Manual operation: An operation where a human is in

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HYBRID OPERATION: HIGHLY AUTONOMOUS

Figure 1. Mining Automation Maturity Model (Figure Design, GMG)

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• Slow implementation: A lower risk

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Table 1. Critical Success Factors for Change Management

Critical success factor How to measure

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Table 2. Guidance for Assessing Strategic Fit for Automation

Strong strategic fit Strategic fit may need more consideration

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1. Elimination controls eliminate or remove the hazard • Types of potential incidents

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11.1 Engagement Plan example, automation is a safer approach in mining because

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• Traffic management (e.g., intersections, park-ups, load 12.1.3 Process Planning

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12.2.1 Key Challenges

autonomous system supplier) and

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Table 4. Recommended Industry Design and Engineering Standards

Table 5. Architecture Subsets Applied to Autonomous Systems (continued on next page)

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Area Benefits Value Drivers Costs

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Area Benefits Value Drivers Costs

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APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL utilization, and negatively affecting production performance

Table E1. Mine Design Difference between Manual and Autonomous Operations

Feature Manual Autonomous

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