1 ARTICLE XIV & XV

Go vs. Collegio de San Juan de Letran, G.R. No. 169391, Oct.10, 2012
Facts
In October 2001, one of the school’s officials received information that certain fraternities were recruiting
new members among Letran’s high school students. School authorities started an investigation, including
the conduct of medical examinations on the students whose names were on the list. The school eventually
suspended them from attending classes.

On January, 2002, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Caloocan City
claiming that the respondents had unlawfully dismissed Kim.

Issue
Does Letran, a private school, possess authority to impose a dismissal or any disciplinary action against
students who violate is policy against fraternity membership?

Ruling
Yes, private schools have the authority to promulgate and enforce a similar prohibition pursuant to their
right to establish disciplinary rules and regulations. This right has been recognized in the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools, which has the character of law (Section 78 of the 1992 Manual of
Regulations of Regulations for Private Schools). The right to establish disciplinary rules is consistent with
the mandate in the Constitution for schools to teach discipline; in fact, schools have the duty to develop
discipline in students.
2 ARTICLE XIV & XV

People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, Feb. 18, 2015

Facts
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr., a probationary midshipman at the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all
new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination
and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. However, Balidoy died on 3 May
2001 and PMMA were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as
accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law.

Issue
What is the extent of liability of schools and school authorities under R.A. 8049, aka The Anti-Hazing
Law?

Ruling
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual
knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as
accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in the act, they
may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above
elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to
or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
3 ARTICLE XIV & XV

Calawag vs. UP, G.R. No. 207412, Aug. 7, 2013

Facts
Petitioners Flord Nicson Calawag, et.al. enrolled in the Master of Sciencein Fisheries Biology at UP
Visayas under a scholarship program from the Dept. of Science and Technology-Phil. Council for
Aquatic and Marine Research and Development (DOST-PCAMRD). In their second year, Calawag, et.al.,
enrolled in the thesis program and drafted their thesis titles. All requirements were satisfied. Thereafter,
Calawag, et.al., sought the approval of their thesis from Dean Carlos Baylon. However, the Dean
disapproved the request on the ground that the thesis titles connote a historical and social dimension study
which is not appropriate for their chosen master’s degree.

Issue #1
Is the right to education absolute?

Ruling
The right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, we held that the
right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[e]very
citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements." The thesis requirement and the compliance with the procedures
leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic requirements a person desiring to complete a course of
study would have to comply with.

Isssue #2
Does academic freedom give the dean the power to disapprove the composition of a thesis committee?

Ruling
Yes. The academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning gives them the right to decide for
themselves their aims and objectives and how best to attain them. They are given the exclusive discretion
to determine who can and cannot study in them, as well as to whom they can confer the honor and
distinction of being their graduates. This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish requirements for
graduation, such as the completion of a thesis, and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by
their students.

The courts may not interfere with their exercise of discretion unless there is a clear showing that they
have arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their judgment.
4 ARTICLE XIV & XV

Imbong vs. Ochoa, G. R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

Facts
Petitioners in this case question the constitutionality of the RH Law as it violates academic freedom.
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach
reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.

Issue
In mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under
threat of fine and/or imprisonment, does the Reproductive Health Law violate academic freedom?

Ruling
No. It is rather in pursuant to the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the
moral development of the youth. Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but
also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against
discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based
violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and
children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and
that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching
of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among
adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements,
rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
5 ARTICLE XIV & XV

Cudia vs. PMA Superintendent, G.R. No. 211362, Feb. 24, 2015
Facts
Cadet 1st Class Cudia was supposed to graduate but he was issued a Delinquency Report because he was
late for two minutes in his English class. Several days after, was reported to the Honor Committee and
they recommended that the case be formalized. Cudia pleaded not guilty but the verdict says otherwise.

Issue #1
Does the Philippine Military Academy enjoy academic freedom?

Ruling
It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the
studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you
will, of the total man. Essentially, education must ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty
and reverence.Under the rubric of "right to education," students have a concomitant duty to learn under
the rules laid down by the school.Every citizen has a right to select a profession or, course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. The PMA is not different.
As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom.

Issue #2
If in the affirmative, is it within academic freedom for PMA to impose disciplinary measures and to
enforce its internal rules and regulations on its students?

Ruling
Yes. If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to
determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension
and the withholding of graduation privileges.

The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act done
by the student prior thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, We upheld
the university's withdrawal of a doctorate degree already conferred on a student who was found to have
committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation.
As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and
the Honor System in particular.
6 ARTICLE XIV & XV

International School vs. ISAE, G.R. No. 167286, Feb. 5, 2014

Facts
Santos was first hired by the School in 1978 as a full-time Spanish language teacher. In School Year
1993-1994 she started teaching Filipino, because there was only 1 Spanish class left, but got poor
comments in the Classroom Standards Evaluation for teachers. After getting poor comments again in the
Classroom Standards Evaluation being below standard instruction as assailed by their Assistant principal
Peter Loy in the School Year of 1995-96, but after being unresponsive while being placed in Professional
Growth Plan on March 29, 1996, she was dismissed on May 29, 1997.

Issue
Can a teacher be dismissed on account of academic freedom in view the high standards set up by the
school?

Ruling
Yes. As ruled in Mercado v AMA, “the prerogative of a school to provide standards for its teachers and to
determine whether these standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom, which gives
the educational institution the right to choose who should teach.”

The Court enunciated in Peña v. National Labor Relations Commission that "it is the prerogative of the
school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since quality education is a mandate of the
Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to
set them aside.
7 ARTICLE XIV & XV

National Artists vs. Exec. Sec., G.R. 189028, July 16, 2013
Facts
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP
Board of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the
standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition, certiorari and
injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the Order of National Artists be conferred on
Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Masa and Moreno be enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

Issue
Did the President validly confer the Order of National Artists to Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno as National Artists?

Ruling
No. There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution when the former President
gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The former
President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies
of the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National
Artists proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said award. The
manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines and processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act
that unduly favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The conferment of the
Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and
should be set aside.
8 ARTICLE XIV & XV

Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

Facts
Petitioners in this case question the constitutionality of the RH Law as it deprives the parents of their
authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
Moreover, they also claimed that Section 23(a) (2) (i) Reproductive Health intrudes into marital privacy
and autonomy.

Issue #1
Is Section 7 of the RH Law which debars parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be
undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, valid and constitutional?

Ruling
No. The court declared unconstitutional Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents or guardian/s.

However, a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information
about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and
modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned,
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under
the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own
body and that of her unborn child.

Issue #2
Is Section 23(a) (2) (i) Reproductive Health Law unconstitutional for intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy?

Ruling
Yes. The court declared unconstitutional Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-
IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the
spouse.

But again, a differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand,
and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the
other must be distinguished.
9 ARTICLE XIV & XV

Kalaw vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, Jan. 14, 2015

Facts
Kalaw failed to prove that his wife (Fernandez) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the
testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent including constant mahjong
sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.

Issue #1
What is psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code?

Ruling
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that
is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she was about to assume.

NOTES: "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other.

Issue #2
Should the marriage of the petitioner and respondent be voided?

Ruling
Yes. It would be great injustice to compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. In this case, the
marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with psychological
incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage.

NOTES:
All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family
and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social
institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal
aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-
political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the
legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family.This has
been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the
10 ARTICLE XIV & XV

family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family
life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.
Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated
person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given
the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as
the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life.
11 ARTICLE XIV & XV

Republic vs. Romero, G.R. No. 209180, Feb. 24, 2016

Facts
Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972 and were blessed with two children. The couple parted
ways in 1986 because they experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent fights
and jealous fits.
On June 16, 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriagebefore the RTC of Quezon.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between Reghis and Olivia null and void ab initio
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. It ruled that Reghis'
condition amounts to psychological incapacity within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code
as it is permanent in nature and incurable.

Issue #1
What is the constitutional policy on the family?

Ruling
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees marriage as
legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.

Issue #2
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity?

Ruling
Yes. The decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals are reversed and set aside. Absent sufficient
evidence to prove psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court
upholds the indissolubility of the marital tie.

NOTE: Thus, it has consistently been held that psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.It must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Indeed, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports
may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital tie. After all, marriage is an
inviolable institution protected by the State.
12 ARTICLE XIV & XV

Manila Memorial Park vs. DSWD Sec., G.R. No. 175356, Dec. 3, 2013
Facts
RA 7432 as amended by RA 9257 otherwise known as the Senior Citizens Act was passed into law,
granting a 20% discount from all establishments for everything that is exclusively used, consumed or
enjoyed by senior citizens. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme of the said
act as it contravenes Article III, Section 9; Article XV, Section 4; and Article XIII, Section 11 of the
Constitution, claiming that it shifts the State’s constitutional mandate of improving the welfare of the
elderly to the private sector.

Issue
Does the tax deduction scheme under R.A. 7432, violate Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution
because it shifts the State’s constitutional mandate or duty of improving the welfare of the elderly to the
private sector?

Ruling
No, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted by petitioners and the
other private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means employed in invoking the active
participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably
and directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the
continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will
refrain from quashing a legislative act.

NOTES: Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution provides:The family has the duty to care for its
elderly members but the State may also do so through just programs of social security.
13 ARTICLE XIV & XV

Valino vs. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014

Facts
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano) married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15,
1955. The couple had two (2) sons, three (3) daughters, and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
They eventually separated-in-fact.
Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino until they decided to live together as husband and wife but he
continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their children.
When Atty. Adriano died, Rosario was in the US. Valino shouldered the funeral and burial expenses for
Atty. Adriano and interred his remains at the mausoleum of the family Valino.

Issue
As between the legal wife and the common-law wife, who has the legal right over the remains of
deceased patriarch?

Ruling
Rosario has the right and duty to make funeral arrangements being the surviving legal wife of Atty.
Adriano.The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he
died has no controlling significance.
As to Valino, the Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages.

Note: The weight of legal provisions puts the responsibility of the burial with the respondents, to wit:

The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the
order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers
and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. (New
Civil Code Art. 305)

Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (Family Code, Art. 199)

No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons
mentioned in Articles [199 of the Family Code] and 305. (New Civil Code, Art. 308)

To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to
make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced,
except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.
It is also recognized that a corpse is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a
certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion
of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising
out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the
dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a
proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right.
There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.
14 ARTICLE XIV & XV

Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article
307 of the Civil Code. Valinos own testimony that it was Atty. Adrianos wish to be buried in their family
plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than Valinos claim that Atty.
Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to
corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in
the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano
was unclear and indefinite.

Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the
presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been created in Valinos favor, solely on
account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.