Nielssen - The - Politics - of - Migrants' Transnational Political Practice

The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices
Author(s): Eva Østergaard-Nielsen

Source: International Migration Review, Vol. 37, No. 3, Transnational Migration: International
Perspectives (Fall, 2003), pp. 760-786
Published by: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.
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The Politics of Migrants' Transnational
Political Practices
Eva 0stergaard-Nielsen
Autonomous University of Barcelona
This article critically examines transnational political engagement of

migrants and refugees in local, national and global political processes.
Based on inductive reading of existing scholarship and in particular the
author's own research on Turks and Kurds in Europe, the article discuss-
es key concepts and trends in our understanding of why, how and with
what consequences migrants engage in transnational political practices.
These practices, this article suggests, are influenced by the particular mul-
tilevel institutional environment, which migrant political actors negoti-
ate their way through. This environment includes not only political insti-
tutions in the sending and receiving country, but also global norms and
institutions and networks of other nonstate actors. Finally, the article
argues for critical examination of the democratic transparency and
accountability of migrants' transnational networks in any analysis of their
long and short-term impact on domestic and global politics.
The field of migrants' transnational political practices is as complex as the

multilevel processes, structures, and actors involved. Lately, research has
sought to make typologies for 'degrees of transnationalness' or establish the
socioeconomic or political institutional determinants for why transnational
political practices occur in the first place (see, among others, Portes et al.,
2002). Such research on the 'why' of transnational political practices is essen-
tial for identifying the scope and significance of migrant transnationalism.
This article, however, also takes a closer look at the 'how' and the 'then what'
of migrants' transnational political engagement. In terms of the 'how,' it con-
centrates on the continuous feedback mechanism through which migrants'
transnational practices are being influenced by - and influence - their polit-
ical institutional environment. Migrants' transnational practices, this study
suggests, are shaped through a multilevel process of institutional channeling
constituted by the converging or differing interests of political authorities in
not only the country of origin but also the country of settlement, global
human rights norms and regimes, as well as the network of other nonstate
actors with which migrants' transnational political networks often are inter-
twined. Following such line of inquiry, it is relevant to look at whether the
interplay between migrants' transnational networks and their multilevel insti-
© 2003 by the Center for MigrationStudies of New York.All rightsreserved.

0198-9183/03/3703.0143
760 IMR Volume 37 Number 3 (Fall 2003):760-786

THE POLITICS OF MIGRANTS' TRANSNATIONALPOLITICALPRACTICES 761
tutional environment shape not only their ways of working but also the mes-
sage that they try to get across. In terms of the 'then what,' I discuss the influ-
ence that migrants' transnational practices may have on policymaking in their
country of origin and settlement and argue for further attention to the nor-
mative evaluation of the democratic transparency and accountability of
migrant transnationalism.
The following pages sketch out some of the main trends and ideas with-
in research on migrants' transnational political practices. This is followed by
suggestions for further research agendas based on intuitions inferred from
inductive reading of the literature as well as my own research on Turks and
Kurds in four European countries.
WHEN ARE MIGRANTS' POLITICAL PRACTICES

TRANSNATIONAL?
The field of migrants' transnational practices encompasses a wide range of
phenomena such as transnational election campaigns and cross-border vot-
ing, migrants' rallies against injustices in the country of origin or demonstra-
tions to defend it, or engagement in hometown associations' projects in the
region of origin. Analysis of such transnational political practices ranges from
liberal uses of the term to laying down more strict criteria for what it desig-
nates. In order to make sense of a very dispersed field of inquiry, recent stud-
ies seek to map transnational political practices by looking at the intensity of
the field (see Portes et al., 1999; Portes et al., 2002). One such attempt is to
distinguish between 'broad' and 'narrow' transnational practices as opposite
ends of a continuum of different practices (Itzigsohn et al., 1999). The more
a transnational political practice is institutionalized and has migrants
involved, and the more they move around to carry it out, the narrower it is
understood to be. Thus, in terms of political practices, 'narrow' refers to actu-
al membership of parties or hometown associations while 'broad' refers to the
(occasional) participation in meetings or events. In a similar vein, the concept
of'core' transnationalism defines activities that are a regular, patterned and an
integral part of an individual's life, while 'expanded' transnationalism refers to
more occasional practices (Guarnizo, 2000; see also Levitt, 2001). Such dis-
tinction helps identify the more durable patterns of transnational political
participation, and as such this mapping exercise is a necessary first step to
delimit where the field of inquiry begins. Migrants engaged in 'narrow' or
'core' political transnationalism are few and far between compared to the
wider, more sporadic engagements among those who stay in touch with and

762 INTERNATIONALMIGRATION REVIEW
are occasionally mobilized by political events and actors in the country of ori-
gin (Portes et al., 2002; 0stergaard-Nielsen, 2003b)
In my own work, I operate with a rather wide definition of 'political
transnational practices': various forms of direct cross-border participation in
the politics of their country of origin by both migrants and refugees (such as
voting and other support to political parties, participating in debates in the
press), as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the
host country (or international organizations). In the latter case, the transna-
tional element includes the way that political participation in one country,
such as voting patterns or lobbying, is informed by political events in anoth-
er. This dimension constitutes a major part of the political activity of the
migrants and refugees, which means that actual mobility of the migrants
involved is not a main parameter for the 'transnationalness' of the political
practices. In contrast to economic and social practices, regular cross-border
contact, but not necessarily actual travel, is a constitutive part of political
transnational practices (see also Iztigsohn et al., 1999:329).
Migrants (and refugees) may mobilize around a whole host of issues, the
main types of which are immigrant politics, homeland politics, emigrant pol-
itics, diaspora politics and translocal politics. Immigrant politics are the
political activities that migrants or refugees undertake to better their situation
in the receiving country, such as obtaining more political, social and eco-
nomic rights, fighting discrimination and the like. Immigrant politics can be
transnational when the country of origin becomes involved in helping over-
seas citizens or former citizens to improve their legal and socioeconomic sta-
tus abroad.
Homeland politics denotes migrants' and refugees' political activities
pertaining to the domestic or foreign policy of the homeland. That is, it
includes both opposition to and support for the current homeland political
regime and its foreign policy goals. Yet, one of the main issues in the dialogue
between migrants and their countries of origin is about their own legal, eco-
nomic and political status in the homeland. With this type of claimsmaking,
which I will refer to as emigrant politics, migrants work towards the institu-
tionalization of their transnational status as residents abroad who are eco-
nomically, socially and politically engaged in their country of origin. They ask
for favorable investment schemes, tax and toll exemptions, and regulation of
pension schemes and child benefits. And interestingly in this context, they
ask for extended channels for influence on politics at home, such as advisory
councils, absentee voting rights, and the right to be candidates in elections.

Diaspora politics can be grouped as another subset of homeland politi-

cal practices confined to those groups that are barred from direct participa-
tion in the political system of their homeland - or who do not even have a
homeland political regime of their own to support/oppose - like the not so
often used concept of emigre politics (Cohen, 1997). Recently, however, dias-
pora politics has gained a much wider connotation in line with the recent,
more inclusive definitions of the concept of 'diaspora'and thus overlaps with
the term homeland politics. Still, analyses that use the phrase 'diaspora poli-
tics' are usually about political disputes over sensitive issues such as national
sovereignty and security (see Constas and Platias, 1993).
Finally, another subset of homeland politics is translocal politics, that is,
initiatives from abroad to better the situation in local communities of origin.
Engagement in development in the home community may have wider polit-
ical ramifications as the empowerment of local communities serves as a cata-
lyst for wider political change (Portes, 1999:473-474), although the emanci-
patory or 'counter-hegemonic' character of migrants' transnational practices,
including their economic support, should not be overstated (Guarnizo and
Smith, 1998:7; Mahler, 1998; Itzigsohn, 2000).
Clearly, these dimensions of migrants' transnational political practices
overlap and blend into each other depending on the particular constellation
of diverging/converging interests of the main actors involved. Elsewhere I
have argued that notably immigrant politics and homeland/diaspora politics
are inseparable categories within Turkish and Kurdish organizations, where
the migrant political claims for ethnic or religious distinctiveness send strong
homeland political signals to the Turkish political regime who may try to sup-
press such proliferation within Turkey (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2003b). Migrant
political disputes may also serve foreign policy agendas of the homeland,
when treatment of Turkish citizens in Germany provides counter-arguments
to German criticism of human rights violations in Turkey. For instance, for-
mer Turkish Prime Minster Tansu Ciller once remarked that she wished
"Turks in Germany have just 10 percent of the rights that Kurds in Turkey
have," thereby upsetting the entire spectrum of German political actors and,
of course, Kurdish activists (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2003b:38). Likewise, it is
not the case that diaspora politics is only nationalist and local in its orienta-
tion while migrant politics is cosmopolitan and global. As will be further
illustrated below, both sets of political practices seek legitimation in interna-
tional norms of individual rights and democratization (Shain, 1999; Soysal,
2000).

DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVESACROSS THE ATLANTIC

Studies of migrant transnationalism, including migrants' transnational polit-
ical practices, mainly come out of the West. Although neither U.S.-based or
European-based research constitute homogeneous blocks, the perspective dif-
fers somewhat between the United States and Europe on a very generalized
level. Most strikingly, there is noticeably less attention to and research avail-
able on migrants' transnational politics in Europe than on the other side of
the Atlantic (Rogers, 2000). This has less to do with occurrence of the phe-
nomena than the extent to which it is investigated and the political context
in which it is observed. When looking at political activities of migrants, Euro-
pean-based research has tended to focus on their immigrant political partici-
pation - their efforts to better their situation in the receiving country, such as
obtaining more political, social and economic rights, fighting discrimination
and the like. The significance of transnational ties is mainly included as a fac-
tor in the analysis of political integration rather than as a phenomenon in its
own right. There are, for instance, relatively few studies (in English) of one of
the only successful 'diaspora political' lobby groups in Europe: the Armeni-
ans in France. This is not unrelated to the fact that Armenians are not an
'immigrant group' on par with those groups who originate in labor migration
or have arrived as asylum seekers during the last five decades.
While European-based research is (pre)occupied with the implications
of transnational political practices on receiving countries, the role of the send-
ing country as a mobilizing factor is at the forefront of U.S.-based studies of
transnational political practices. Indeed, a recent article defines immigrants'
political transnational field as a realm of "recurrent and institutionalized
interactions and exchanges between, on the one hand, immigrants and their
social and political organizations and, on the other hand, the political insti-
tutions and the state apparatus of the country of origin" (Itzigsohn,
2000:1130). Another very recent publication states that "transnational polit-
ical organizations rarely capture the attention of host-countries' governments"
(Mahler, 2000:209).
Such observations are far from the European experience. Most of the
U.S.-based studies deal with migrants or refugees from Central or Latin
America residing in the United States, and their sending countries are there-
fore all at the weaker end of highly asymmetrical bilateral power relations
with the receiving country. Local initiatives from abroad and cooperation
with local counterparts at home, so-called 'grassroots transnationalism' or
'transnationalism from below,' are analyzed in dialectic with the attempts of
sending country governments and elites to coopt nationals abroad in an

attempt to tap into their various economic and political resources (see, inter
alia, Landolt et al., 1999; Mahler, 1998; Levitt, 2001). Admittedly, the insti-
tutions that engage themselves in the field of transnational political practices
in order to channel some of its energy to their own use are usually from the
sending country (see Levitt, 2001). However, the lack of research on the role
of receiving country institutions may also stem from the fact that there is very
little comparative research on these issues in the United States. In Europe, on
the other hand, the 'one migrant group in several countries' approach is much
more common (see www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk; Wahlbeck, 1999; 0stergaard-
Nielsen, 2001a; Koopman and Statham, 2001) - probably because it points
to the ever popular issues of policies of migrant reception and integration.
Finally, perhaps partly for the same reasons, there is a difference in level
of analysis. As illustrated in publications such as Smith and Guarnizo (1998)
and the Ethnic and Racial Studies special issue on Transnational Communities
(1999), there is more local-to-local, bottom-up research of political practices
in the United States than in Europe, where researchersseem drawn to those
practices that are more directly plugged into national ideologies and policies.
For instance, there are very few studies of hometown associations among
Turks in Western Europe, although they are the center of much economic,
social and political translocal activity, albeit in a less institutionalized form.
Instead, the main Turkish and Kurdish ethnic, religious or political party
organizations have to cope with a steady flow of researchers and journalists
who come to probe their agendas. Consequently, most of these organizations
have appointed spokespersons fluent in two or three languages, and dissemi-
nate printed informational material which answers the most frequently asked
questions about the groups' origins and agendas.
THE 'WHY' THE 'HOW' AND THE 'THEN WHAT'

The disciplinary unboundedness of research on migrants' transnational prac-
tices is one of its defining features (Mitchell, 1997). This makes it difficult to
divide it into disciplines since many studies are inter- or multidisciplinary and
therefore draw on multilevel analysis, including both macro (state oriented),
meso (migrant institution oriented) and micro (individual) levels. The fol-
lowing sections structure the discussion as a three-step approach to a process-
oriented analysis of migrants' political practices: a) processes of mobilization
(the 'why'); b) strategies and participation (the 'how'); and c) the impact of
migrant transnational practices on democratic processes in the host country
and the country of origin (the 'then what').

The 'Why'
The first set of research questions focuses on the determinants for transna-
tional political orientation. When and why do some migrants engage in
transnational political activities while others do not? More specifically, the
central issue, as formulated by Smith (1999), is to understand why "princi-
ples of trust and solidarity are constructed across national territories as com-
pared to those which are entirely locally-based and maintained" (M. P. Smith,
1999). Some researchdiscusses the extent to which a given migrant group has
such an orientation in the first place (Portes et al., 2002 ), while others spec-
ulate on the reasons for the particular directions such orientation may take,
such as ethnonationalism, strict versions of the homeland religion, cos-
mopolitanism, or hybrid third-space identification (Schiffauer, 1999).
The mobilizing role of 'sending countries' (an ambiguous term since
not all countries 'send' their nationals abroad), as indicated above, has not
been underestimated in this part of the literature on migrants' transnational
political engagement. Political developments in the country of origin (inter-
national or intrastate conflicts, regime change and nation-building, environ-
mental disasters) may mobilize both recently departed migrants and estab-
lished diasporas. Moreover, recent scholarship is full of interesting examples
of how sending countries' political elites actively try to tap into the resources
of the communities abroad (de la Garza et al., 2000; Itzigsohn, 2000; Guarni-
zo, 1998; Mahler, 2000; Louie, 2000; AI-Ali et al., 2001). Smith (1997) dis-
tinguishes between 'homeland policies,' where sending states create institu-
tions aimed at orienting migrants towards return, and 'global nation policies,'
where sending states seek to encourage migrants to stay abroad but stay in
touch. In the case of Turkey, the latter form of policies has gradually replaced
the former. One Turkish MP outlined how Turkish citizens abroad, in partic-
ular those living within the EU, could provide economic (remittances) and
political (lobbying) support - and by integrating and being good citizens they
could give Turkey a better image in Europe. Accordingly, recent Turkish gov-
ernments, as well as a whole host of states throughout the world, have tried
to woo their nationals abroad using a wide range of measures. These include
more straightforward strategies for economic investment or political inclu-
sion, such as granting extended political rights for citizens abroad and coopt-
ing migrant representatives into consultative fora, as well as measures to forge
national loyalty such as sponsoring rallies on national days, student
exchanges, sporting events, and cultural performances (0stergaard-Nielsen,
2003a).

Arguably, migration provides sending countries, both centrally and, in

particular, peripherally positioned in the global economy, with new options
for reconfiguring the reach of the nation-state through transnational eco-
nomic, social and political ties with nationals abroad. Several studies ponder
the complex set of domestic and international structural and historical factors
which combine to make some sending states more interested in their overseas
nationals than others (see Sheffer, 1986; Guarnizo, 1998; Itzigsohn, 2000; de
la Garza et al., 2000; and 0stergaard-Nielsen, 2003a). In this context, it
should be noted that by no means are all sending countries successful in try-
ing to engage nationals abroad in homeland affairs. Cases such as Mexico,
Turkey and India show that relations do not change overnight. For instance,
official policies that reach out to emigrants may lack credibility because it is
not easy to convince an overseas community of the sincerity of official inter-
est after years of neglect (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2003a).
Besides governments, other sending country actors, such as political
parties, look for economic and political support among emigrants (see Itzig-
sohn, 2000; Levitt, 2001). In Turkey, the transnational outlook of political
parties varies greatly. It is the parties with a dominant religious or nationalist
agenda, such as the nationalist Milli Hareket Partisi or the religious Saadet
Partisi, who frequently send their leaders to Western Europe to rally support.
These parties have a close relationship with migrant organizations whose
leaders, in several instances, have stood as candidates for the party in Turkish
elections (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2003b). Similarly, other institutions, such as
religious movements or human rights organizations, are engaging citizens
abroad in Turkish politics. Notably, religious movements, known for their
missionary work among Turks abroad, may seek to channel economic and
political support for certain Turkish political parties.
The role of sending country institutions is at the forefront of much
research on migrants' transnational political practices. However, only the
crudest analysis would ascribe homeland political orientation among
migrants to the agency of the sending country only. Not only are such efforts
often reactive rather than proactive, but the extent to which this falls on fer-
tile ground also relates to the societal and political-institutional context in the
receiving country. Drawing on ethnographic or more quantitative sociologi-
cal research methods and data, it has been argued that transnational political
orientation is related to mode of migration, length of stay and
migrant/refugees' structural position in the receiving countries. Elsewhere, I
have argued for a decoupling of these factors and transnational political

engagement (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2001 a). While these factors certainly

explain parts of migrants' transnational engagement, they are also categories
with a strong legacy of a linear one-way perception of migration and migrant
incorporation. Transnational ties cut through these factors and make
migrants as engaged in homeland politics as refugees, settled migrants as
active as newly arrived, and well-integrated migrants as active as those with a
weaker foothold in the new country of settlement. Indeed, Guarnizo and
Portes show that those migrants who have obtained U.S. citizenship are more
active than those who have not (Portes et al., 2002).
Another dimension of the relationship between migrants' transnation-
al engagement and the receiving country is how the particular system of
migrant incorporation, in particular the notion of political opportunity
structures, may impact the scope and agency of transnational political prac-
tices. On the one hand, it has been argued that 'exclusive' political systems
can strengthen transnational orientation among migrants (Abadan-Unat,
1997). The usual example of such a system is Germany, where migrants are
categorized as foreigners and not given political rights unless they national-
ize - a process which has recently been made easier, although dual citizenship
is still not allowed. On the other hand, it has been argued that a multicul-
tural incorporation regime, as in Holland, can contribute to transnational
political orientation because of the resources and space given to institution-
alization of ethnic and religious organizations (Faist, 2000:214; see also Kaya,
1998; Vertovec, 1996).
So far there are only few comparative studies which have tested these
assumptions about the relationship between political opportunity structures
and transnational political engagement. Research on the amount of transna-
tional 'claims-making' understood as the frequency with which it is reported
in the media in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands, concludes that,
in particular, Germany's exclusive treatment of immigrants makes for
transnational political mobilization. In the Netherlands, there was only a
third of the transnational political activity found in Germany, and the fact
that the Netherlands has given political rights to migrants explains that
transnational political activity takes place within the system rather than out-
side of it (Koopman and Statham, 2001). In my experience, the receiving
country's political institutions and actors are also strong mediators of
transnational political activity (see below). But perhaps because of the very
different methodologies employed, the landscape of transnational political
organizations stands out as very similar in Germany and the Netherlands

(and Denmark), illustrating the importance of migrants' transnational net-

works to their countries of origin and, not least, between organizations in
Germany and the Netherlands (see 0stergaard-Nielsen, 2001la).
The 'How'
Another area of analysis focuses on how migrants' transnational political prac-
tices are articulated and received within and across the political institutional
context in both the sending country and receiving country. How, as formu-
lated by M. P. Smith (1999), is "political connectedness organized across bor-
ders to guarantee commitment and motivate social action?" (M. P. Smith,
1999). Migrants' direct individual political engagement, such as voting, is
largely dependent on the extent to which such right is granted by the send-
ing country authorities or if, as in the case of Turkey, it remains an electoral
promise as it falters on bureaucratic obstacles and opposition in the sending
country. But migrants' transnational political practices are clearly not to be
equated with participation in elections only. In my research, one of the main
units of analysis is 'transnational political networks,' mainly understood as the
ever-changing patterns of cooperation among migrant or refugee organiza-
tions outside the country of origin and back with political parties and other
political institutions in the country of origin.
Migrants' organizational patterns are central components in research on
these issues. Among Turks and Kurds, associations, organizations and federa-
tions represent the institutionalization of ethnic, religious, and party political
currents and movements from the homeland as well as the situation in the
host-country. Generally, homeland politically-oriented organizations in the
Netherlands, Germany or Denmark find it difficult to come together because
of their differing homeland political orientations. Rather, there are trans-state
links within the different subgroups of the communities from Turkey (Kurds,
Alevis, Sunni-Muslims, right-wing nationalist Turks, etc.). These networks
are not just a 'function of' homeland politics. Indeed, within the transna-
tional network of Turkish and Kurdish organizations the question of 'who ini-
tiates what' is crucial for understanding the dynamics of the political links.
Simultaneous processes of Europeanization and decentralization char-
acterize the transnational political networks of Turks and Kurds. First, there
is a process of 'Europeanization' shaping Turkish and Kurdish transnational
networks. In most cases, the institutionalization of transnational networks
within Europe has been initiated from Turkey. However, within each sub-
group there are now European-wide 'federations,' usually based in Germany,

with membership associations in several European countries. These federa-

tions act as bridgeheads between the political party/movement in Turkey and
organizations elsewhere in Europe. The federations initiate and coordinate
joint European-wide activities and campaigns. In some cases, where the net-
works within Europe are particularly hierarchical, Turkish (not Kurdish)
organizations in the Netherlands are slightly wary of the German-based orga-
nizations, which they feel dominate in terms of membership and agenda set-
ting. Second, there is a simultaneous process of decentralization as associa-
tions become increasingly anchored in their local context and focus on
migrant political issues of concern to their members rather than issues in
Turkey or elsewhere in Europe (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2001la).
How do such networks go about trying to influence politics? Which
strategies and means do they use? Here, I would suggest, there are several
paths of inquiry. First, there is the issue of why different migrant groups
choose different strategies to promote their agendas. It is certainly a question
of social and economic resources of the group itself, of which the transna-
tional dimension is significant. Homeland political organizations pool finan-
cial resources and draw on expertise and manpower in sister organizations
elsewhere. They reinforce their campaigns by coordinating them with politi-
cal counterparts in other countries - either in the form of producing joint
informational material or in organizing and coordinating confrontational
activities (demonstrations/mass meetings) to happen simultaneously. In the
case of Turks, and in particular Kurds, such networks and coordination are
clearly facilitated by modern means of communication such as e-mail and
internet, although one should not underestimate the ability of these networks
to communicate and gather large crowds of people by word of mouth.
Second, while this unboundedness is one of the 'strengths' of many
transnational political networks and practices, these are also anchored in
their local context. How do such transnational networks interact with or
accommodate to local power structures? Which institutions shape the
transnational field and which institutional channels are used to put transna-
tional linkages into practice?A systematic appraisal of such dynamics calls for
comparative empirical data as indicated by several scholars based in the Unit-
ed States (see Mahler, 1998; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; M.P. Smith, 1999).
As mentioned, sending states, political parties and hometown associa-
tions have been heralded as central actors in shaping the field of transnational
political practices. There are, however, only a few comparative studies of how
receiving states shape transnational political networks and their choices of

sites and venues for their practices. Yet, transnational political networks' con-
tinuous use of different sites indicates the fundamental tension between states
and transnational political practices. Herein, the receiving state plays a central
role by setting the boundaries of inclusion, exclusion and citizenship, allowing
or prohibiting various forms of political mobilization within their boundaries.
Needless to say, certain Turkish and Kurdish transnational networks, as is the
case with many other migrant or refugee networks, are more intensely scruti-
nized following the events of September 11, 2001.
Comparative studies of immigrant political participation in Western
Europe, dealing with the dyadic relationship between immigrants and their
host country, consider the significance of receiving countries' 'political oppor-
tunity structure' for migrants' collective patterns of organization and the strate-
gies of participation. Such studies hold that host societies shape the collective
organization of migrants by providing certain resources for, and models of,
organizing (Soysal, 1994:84, 235; Doomernik, 1995). Similarly, the more
rights and access to relevant political gatekeepersin the receiving country (trade
unions, political parties or NGOs), the more immigrants' political activities are
channeled into the political system of the receiving country and adapted to the
political discourse and ways of negotiating various demands (see Soysal, 1994;
Ireland, 1994). As discussed above, research argues that both exclusive and
inclusive multicultural regimes of migrant incorporation can be conducive to
migrants' transnational political engagement and organization.
At this stage I would like to add two points. First, while both types of
incorporation regime may strengthen transnational political orientation, they
do not encourage the promotion of these issues in the receiving country. At
least in Europe, transnational political practices are not very welcome, either
in countries with more exclusive political systems (such as Germany) or in
countries with inclusive multicultural policies of incorporation (such as the
Netherlands and Denmark). More inclusive political structures, which make
for more participation and cooperation on immigrant political issues, may at
the same time, and for that very reason, serve to exclude dialogue on home-
land politics. In Holland, Denmark and Germany, there are examples of how
migrant-descent members and candidates are excluded from political parties
because of their membership in organizations with agendas oriented towards
a different religion, nation or state than that of the party. Different national
discourses on the political inclusion of immigrants may exist alongside
remarkably similar discourses on homeland politics. That is, although
migrants' ethnic and religious identities may be easily tolerated - even

encouraged through funding of social and cultural associations - there is less

enthusiasm when it comes to the political promotion of such distinctiveness
in the homeland (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2001la).
My second point is that the 'one group in several countries' research
should not forget the findings of the 'several groups in one country
approach. Different migrant groups within the same receiving country may
have different access and choose very different strategies. Even among Turks
and Kurds (from the same country of origin, Turkey), certain organizations
have more easy access to central policymakers than others. These are usually
the less controversial organizations in terms of both host-country domestic
politics and relations with Turkey. Meanwhile those organizations with less
easy access may turn to what has been called 'confrontational participation'
(Ireland, 1994) or 'contentious politics' which includes strategies of mass
demonstrations and large-scale protests, civil disobedience or political vio-
lence (Tarrow, 1998; see also Adamson, 2001; 0stergaard-Nielsen, 2003b).
Where local (national) institutional structures in the receiving country
may serve to constrain, global institutional structures may facilitate transna-
tional political practices. In particular, discourses of human rights provide
the language for negotiation between transnational political networks and
states, and international organizations are the site where such negotiation
may take place. Studies of 'transnationalism' within the discipline of interna-
tional relations, by which is mainly meant the role of nonstate actors in inter-
national relations, have established the significance of the institutionalization
of international cooperation (that is, the degree of international organization
and cooperation within a given issue area) for the work of nonstate actors
lobbying for democratization and human rights (Risse-Kappen, 1995).
In particular, transnational political networks that oppose a state that
has strong allies in their host-states, or simply is too powerful for other states
to meddle with, may turn to international organizations such as the UN, the
OSCE, the European Council, and the like. The continuous lobbying by the
PLO for recognition of Palestine as a member of the UN is one of the more
classic examples. Another example is the Tibetans, who have advocated their
story of persecution and discrimination by the Chinese in international fora
rather than in their host state, India. However, in my research experience,
only very resourceful groups manage to lobby international organizations at
a more professional level on their own. Few Turkish and Kurdish movements
in Europe have managed to navigate their way into political institutions at
the European level, and even then lobbying is fairly sporadic.

Rather, the so-called trans-state advocacy networks of NGOs are very

valuable (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The coopting of NGOs at both the
national and international levels is a much sought after strategy for transna-
tional political networks since such organizations facilitate contact with lev-
els of policymaking that are otherwise difficult to gain access to for a diaspo-
ra organization (see Ellis and Khan, 2001). For instance, one project within
the transnational communities research program demonstrates how Andean
indigenous political organizations have become 'scaled up' as they link up
with local and international NGOs. Similarly, migrants' transnational prac-
tices weave themselves into such nets of influence. Notably, Kurdish organi-
zations have managed to plug into networks of international human rights
organizations with easier access to policymakers than the Kurds themselves
(0stergaard-Nielsen, 2001c). Sometimes migrant organizations' search for
legitimating networks leads to surprising coalitions, like the exchange of
information on how to work towards local autonomy between the Welsh
Independence Party and a German-based Kurdish organization supporting
the then PKK (now KADEK).
Another, probably more important, role of international organizations
is to provide a normative frame of reference for those groups advocating
democratization and human rights agendas - to provide the "discursivespace
of the global human rights arena as a distinct site..." (M. P. Smith, 1999; see
also Soysal, 2000). For instance, research on diaspora political groups in the
United States has argued that Cold War bipolarity between Western and
Soviet foreign policy interests meant that migrant groups based in the West
(particularly the United States) would position themselves accordingly.
Migrants opposing political regimes supported by the Soviet Union were wel-
comed, and those supporting such regimes spoke to deaf ears (Shain, 1999).
Today, there seems to be more ample leverage for foreign policy lobbying of
migrants, as ideals of democracy, pluralism, self-determination and human
rights are, at in least in principle, heralded as central to foreign policymaking
of Western states in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, the treatment of
minorities has increasingly become a trans-state issue, with the introduction
of new and broader regional security structures, implementation of norms of
humanitarian intervention and calls for the implementation of universal
principles of human rights. Accordingly, in some cases states have become
more open to the idea of subordinating their domestic politics to the scruti-
ny of foreign states and international organizations (G. Smith, 1999).

Patterns of dialogue between Kurdish and Turkish political organiza-

tions and German or Dutch political actors illustrate how transnational polit-
ical networks change their formulation of political agendas in order to com-
ply with more internationally accepted discourses of human rights. Certain
Kurdish organizations, for instance, have gone from radical left-wing paroles
advocating freedom for Kurdish workers to stressing human rights violations
against the Kurdish people in Turkey or Iraq. In Germany, it is those organi-
zations evoking democracy and human rights rhetoric in their information
campaigns which more easily reach the attention of more central policymak-
ers, while those stressing nationalist separatist or radical communist ideology
are confined to dialogue with more marginalized political counterparts
(0stergaard-Nielsen, 2001 c).
To sum up, one way of researching the interaction between migrants'
transnational political practices and their complex institutional environment
is to employ a methodology which considers that a process of 'multi-level
institutional channeling' is taking place (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2003b).
Transnational political networks' strategies and activities may not only adapt
to their local institutional environment but also appropriate global (Western
liberal) norms of democracy and human rights via their interaction with
national and international institutions. That is, the notion of multilevel insti-
tutional environment and institutional channeling is not necessarily about
different levels of governance. Human rights are not 'up there,' but prevalent
in government practices at the local level also.
The 'Then What'

Transnational political networks enter political processes at local, national
and international levels as actors in their own right. However, such observa-
tions raise as many questions as they answer. What makes some transnation-
al political networks more influential than others? And how do we go about
measuring this influence? When, if at all, do migrants' transnational political
activities bring about change? Who benefits from migrants' transnational
political practices? What are the consequences for the role of the state in
domestic and international politics?
One of the key parameters for discussing change is the way that transna-
tional political practices contribute to democratic political processes. 'Demo-
cratic political processes' mainly refers to both democratization in the coun-
try of origin and the evolvement of multicultural democracy in the receiving
country (see Shain, 1999; Faist, 2000:328).

The Effect on the Sending Country. In terms of the country of origin, recent
research has looked at how outside political participation benefits democrat-
ic processes at home. The very term 'grassrootstransnationalism' implies bot-
tom-up participation in what may be otherwise top-down democracies. For
instance, translocal initiatives may not only benefit the home village or region
but also challenge political rule at the national level (Portes, 1999). Similarly,
the formation of 'transnational civil society,' with the communicative power
to question, criticize and publicize, may strengthen democratic control at
home. In cases where migrants can participate directly in the politics of their
country of origin from afar, they are understood to have a platform from
where they can obtain less biased information and exert an influence in the
politics of their homeland that would be unobtainable if they had not left.
While such findings are a valuable contribution to the constructive dimen-
sion of the relationship between sending countries and their citizens abroad,
some caution should be included. First, it is very difficult to 'measure' the
influence from abroad in terms of democratization and social change. In my
experience, data on the channeling of economic and political support
through cross-border networks are hard to come by. Even more accessible
processes are difficult to assess since actual electoral participation is marginal,
and the candidates from Germany in Turkish elections are not very contro-
versial in terms of the general party political agenda.
Similarly, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly how much influence transna-
tional political networks can exercise by putting pressure on their host gov-
ernments. An analysis of U.S. policies towards the Middle East, Haiti, Cuba,
or Northern Ireland, would be deficient without considering the efforts of
Jewish, Arab, Haitian, Cuban or Irish diasporas, respectively. However, as
argued elsewhere, diaspora political lobbying does not redirect foreign policy
away from governments' already defined national interests such as economic
or security political relations with the homeland or other countries in the
region. (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2001b). Indeed, it is important to emphasize
that not all homeland political groups are very successful. Many a homeland
political campaign is ignored or even forbidden if the political movement
seeking recognition uses means that are too radical.
Moreover, part of the difficulty with assessing the contribution by
transnational political networks to democratization in homelands relates to
the lack of accountability of transnational political networks. It is, for
instance, difficult to determine 'who represents who' in terms of political
organization of migrants.

First, how representative are the transnational political networks of the

groups abroad? That is, to what extent are those organizations that often
advocate democratization at home actually based on democratic principles?
To what extent are they anchored within the population of migrants/refugees
abroad? Not all 'grassroots' transnational practices are very rooted. Certain
very left-wing Kurdish and Turkish associations belong to networks with
tight hierarchical militant structures and stand out as not having much input
from their members or of having anything that remotely looks like democra-
tic election processes. Likewise, the right-wing nationalist Turkish federation
in Germany presents their 'elected' leaders, always pre-approved by the party
executive in Ankara, for the crowds at their annual meetings (0stergaard-
Nielsen, 2003b:52). In any case, the claims for representation by organiza-
tions is usually difficult to evaluate since organizations rarely underestimate
both their membership and their independence from political actors in the
sending country.
Second, it is not always clear to what extent transnational political insti-
tutions represent the groups in the country of origin. Exile may provide a
platform for voicing discontent with totalitarian regimes, but sometimes such
intervention may hamper rather than bridge disputes in homeland politics.
For instance, leaders of Kurdish-oriented legal parties in Turkey are not
always delighted with the efforts of the more radical Kurdish diaspora and
most certainly do not want to be identified as closely linked to them (0ster-
gaard-Nielsen, 2001 b). What about all those transnational political practices
that enter into homelands with democratically elected regimes? Clearly all
governments want supportive lobby groups abroad - in particular when they
reside in countries that are influential in global politics. Yet, some sending
countries, such as India, Armenia and Cyprus, are ambiguous about the wish
for political influence from afar because they feel that those who left have lost
touch with the everyday reality of their homelands and focus on more emo-
tive political issues only (Lall, 2003; Panossean, 2003; Demetriou, 2003) -
like Anderson's description of the long distance nationalist (Anderson, 1992).
In the case of countries in conflict, it has even been argued that "transnational
mobilization and international involvement can exacerbate problems encoun-
tered by domestic coalitions, and introduce additional obstacles to the effec-
tive pursuit of social change" (Maney, 2000). While groups who would not
otherwise cooperate in the country of origin can be brought together abroad,
this can also lead to the formation of rival blocks that are exported back to
the domestic policy area.

The Effect on the Receiving Country.While there is no doubt that migrants'

transnational practices in many cases, albeit not all, can contribute to democ-
ratization of the country of origin, then there is disagreement on the positive
effect such transnational engagement may have on the host country. Among the
shriller opponents is Huntington (1997), who argues that the 'disintegrative
cult of multiculturalism' legitimates diaspora political claims for U.S. interven-
tion in the affairs of their homelands, but erodes the democratic relationship
between policymakers and their electorates. On the other side, it is argued that
engagement in the politics of the country of origin is not necessarily incompat-
ible with political integration in the country of settlement (Faist, 2000; Fen-
nema and Tillie, 2001). Similarly, Portes et al. (1999) argue against such prac-
tices having disintegrative consequences for the host society and culture.
Migrant's transnational political orientation gives them a voice that they would
otherwise not have. This serves to empower them, invest them with a sense of
purpose and self-worth, and thus "act as an effective antidote to the tendency
towards downward assimilation ..." (Portes, 1999:471; see also Goldring, 1997).
Indeed, Shain (1999) argues that transnationalpolitical practices can contribute
to the development of multicultural democracy in the host country. Participa-
tion in campaigns for democratization in the homeland can give otherwise mar-
ginal groups of refugees and migrants a broader interface with the political sys-
tem of the host country (Shain, 1999). For instance, in Denmark, Turkish and
Kurdish migrant organizations stand out as significant bridges between migrant
communities and the host-country political system. Their transnational politi-
cal engagement is a platform from which it is easierto orient oneself in and con-
tribute to politics in the country of settlement (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2002).
Again, there are also research findings that indicate a slight caution to
such arguments. First, transnational political practices can also serve to disem-
power. Glick Schiller and Fouron (1999) note how transnationalism among
Haitians in the United States lessens their participation in U.S.-based grassroots
struggles for social justice. Similarly, Kurds in London, who spend their day ille-
gally working long hours under harsh conditions in the sweatshops of northern
London, use their sparse free time to mobilize around homeland political agen-
das which are untenable in even the most optimistic analysis of Turkish and
Middle Eastern regional politics. This leaves no time for participating in rallies
for better social and legal conditions for asylum seekersin the United Kingdom.
That is, although political loyalty in general is by no means a zero-sum game
between receiving country and homeland, processes of political mobilization
related to the homeland may serve to divert attention in particular instances.

Second, transnational political practices might serve to exclude in cases

of migrant populations with majority/minority issues. Certain Turkish and
Kurdish organizations find it hard to cooperate because of their homeland
political, ethnic or religious differences. This may skewer representation in
immigrant political fora. For instance, in one of the main consultative insti-
tutions in the Netherlands, the ethnic minority of Kurds have never been rep-
resented - and the religious minority of Alevis only briefly - because their
organizational heads are unable to bury the hatchet with the Turkish conser-
vative pro-government organizations. Thus, Dutch inclusive incorporation
strategies unintentionally end up resembling exclusive minority policies in
Turkey. This is particularly sensitive in a political system where immigrant
participation centers on immigrant organizations, as is the case in the Nether-
lands (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2001a).
Third, migrants do not always want to be perceived as fifth column
block voters by policymakers in their host country because they fear this can
hamper their work for equal rights. In the run-up to the German federal elec-
tion in 1998, the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, Mesut Yilmaz, com-
mented that he hoped Turks in Germany would not forget the then-govern-
ing party's negative stance towards Turkey's EU candidacy. He was, in other
words, asking Turks abroad to vote in support of Turkish foreign policy inter-
ests. However, this provoked an outcry among Turkish organizations in Ger-
many, all of whom publicly denounced such intervention - not least since
they feared this would provide those in opposition to the introduction of dual
citizenship with strong arguments (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2003b: 115-116).
CHALLENGING THE STATE

Whatever their actual impact on democratization in sending or receiving
countries, the phenomena of transnational political practices in and of them-
selves further erode the (admittedly quite dated) distinction between foreign
and domestic policy. They contribute to what has been referred to as a 'diffu-
sion of domestic politics' (Miller, 1981) or a 'globalization of domestic poli-
tics' in both the sending and receiving countries.
In light of such observations, it has been argued that the scope and
impact of transnational political practices challenge the role of the state in
contemporary world politics. Debates on the power and influence of nonstate
actors vs. state actors have been fluctuating between Realists and Liberalists
within the discipline of international relations for the past four decades. Real-

ist resistance to legitimization of other actors to be considered alongside the

state are opposed by liberal approaches that stress the impact of nonstate
actors, including NGOs and multinational companies, and the impact of
transnational diffusion of people, goods and ideas. Most Realists agree with
Liberalists that the significance of nonstate actors, such as NGOs and multi-
national companies, should be taken into account in any interpretation of
international relations and global politics. It is the degree to which nonstate
actors matter that they differ (Keohane and Nye, 1971; Rosenau, 1993;
Risse-Kappen, 1995; Josselin and Wallace, 2001).
Recent literature on migrant transnational practicesrelate to such debates
though their focus on, in particular,sending countries' policies towards nation-
als abroad (seeGlick Schiller et al., 1992). They point to the processes by which
state institutions coopt or are at least involved in channeling migrants' transna-
tional practices. As importantly, they question whether migrants' transnational
practices challenge state institutions or serve their interests (see, inter alia,
Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Mahler, 1998, 2000; Faist, 2000:327). In the case
of Turkish and Kurdish transnational practices, state institutions certainly fig-
ure as important actors which form and reconstitute transnational political ties
and networks. Indeed, one of the major challenges is to assess the balance
between state authority and nonstate autonomy in the analysis of Turkish and
Kurdish homeland political practices. Such ambiguity is probably more preva-
lent in research on homeland political networks that are more directly plugged
into party politics in the homeland than with the more locally oriented net-
works. Still, it points to careful application of two central concepts in the more
recent literature on migrant transnational political practices: 'bottom-up/grass-
roots transnationalism' and 'transnational civil society.' As it is not a matter of
'either/or' it points to further work on which criteriato lay down for establish-
ing the relations between migrants' transnational networks and the state.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I have argued for empirical investigation and theorizing of
migrants' transnational political practices which place them in a framework
that critically examines their role and agency in local and global politics. Such
inquiry moves on from appreciating the degree of transnationalness of
migrants' political practices to taking these practices seriously as part of local,
national and international political processes. In other words, it adds the
'how' and the 'then what' to the understanding of the 'why.'
In my research, migrant organizations and their transnational networks

stand at the center. This methodological choice is in some ways a double-

edged sword. Using migrant organizations as points of entry to research on
transnational political practices may give a biased understanding of the degree
of engagement within the migrant group as a whole. The organization's lead-
ership will usually engage in 'narrow' or 'core' transnational practices, but
may not be very representative of the wider group of immigrants and
refugees. However, migrant organizations are very relevant units in research
on how migrants negotiate their transnational, often multilevel political insti-
tutional environments. This negotiation takes the form of a multilevel process
of institutional channeling. While the institutional and normative local con-
text of transnational political practices, including the way that such practices
are embedded in local discourses on immigrant incorporation, shape (con-
strain) their institutional space for action, the global context of human rights
norms facilitates such agency.
This approach should not reduce the agency of migrants by presenting
them as weak players easily modified by their surrounding political institu-
tional environments. Certainly, migrants' associations manage to promote
their agendas, although the eventual outcomes of their campaigns are not
always easy to pin down. Instead, I argue for further consideration of how dif-
ferent institutional environments may explain the different strategies and
modes of engagement which characterize migrants' transnational practices. As
mentioned in several recent articles (Mahler, 1998; Smith, 2001), more com-
parative research, particularly of the 'same' transnational political network in
different political contexts or 'different' transnational networks within the
same political context, could provide more systematic understanding of the
thresholds of tolerance set down by receiving and sending states.
Moreover, in the quest for a more holistic understanding of such process-
es, it would be interesting, with more research on the seemingly silent majority
of such networks, to come closer to an understanding of the complex set of
internal factors (lack of resources) and external factors (access to policymaking)
which contribute to homeland political mobilization and its success. It is, in
other words, also important to stop and listen at the Hyde Park Corner of
transnational politics, even if central policymakers rarely pass by.
Another aspect of such inquiry is to critically examine the democratic
transparency and accountability of transnational networks and the short and
long-term implications for democratic political processes in domestic and
global politics. This not only refers to the need to further compare instances
when transnational political networks challenge or reproduce existing hierar-

chies of power in countries of origin. Also, it is generally questionable if

democracy, the main legitimating principle of government, can follow the
"migration of issues, problems, strategies and solutions into transnational
society" which globalization entails (Dryzek, 2000:30). Research on the
boundedness and unboundedness of migrants' transnational political net-
works, and in particular on their degree of independence from the state,
could provide an interesting contribution to such wider questioning of
processes of globalization and democracy.
One way of going about this is to compare the dynamics of migrants'
transnational networks to those of other nonstate actors, such as environ-
mental or human rights NGOs, within more international-relations-based
theoretical frameworks of transnational relations such as those employed by
Keck and Sikkink (1998), Risse-Kappen (1995) or Josselin and Wallace
(2001). This includes asking how the strategies and influence of migrants'
transnational political networks compare to those of other nonstate actors.
Moreover, international relations, some argue, are shaped by a plurality of
influences, only some of which are states and their representatives. Transna-
tional companies, social networks, or links among city and regional authori-
ties now bypass state power and state boundaries. To what extent do other
nonstate actors shape the political institutional space of migrants' transna-
tional political practices? As part of that exercise, it could be beneficial to
question the extent to which these practices relate to the universalistic versus
the communitarian, have ethical principles in terms of violent means, or are
democratic in internal structure (see Halliday, 2001). This is not a call for
'securitizing' migrants' transnational political networks, but to apply the same
critical analysis to their practices as has been applied to analysis of other non-
state actors in recent years.
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Nielssen - The - Politics - of - Migrants' Transnational Political Practice

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The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices

Author(s): Eva Østergaard-Nielsen

This content downloaded from 141.51.247.39 on Tue, 1 Jul 2014 11:51:27 AM

This article critically examines transnational political engagement of

The field of migrants' transnational political practices is as complex as the

© 2003 by the Center for MigrationStudies of New York.All rightsreserved.

760 IMR Volume 37 Number 3 (Fall 2003):760-786

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WHEN ARE MIGRANTS' POLITICAL PRACTICES

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This content downloaded from 141.51.247.39 on Tue, 1 Jul 2014 11:51:27 AM

Diaspora politics can be grouped as another subset of homeland politi-

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DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVESACROSS THE ATLANTIC

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THE 'WHY' THE 'HOW' AND THE 'THEN WHAT'

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Arguably, migration provides sending countries, both centrally and, in

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engagement (0stergaard-Nielsen, 2001 a). While these factors certainly

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(and Denmark), illustrating the importance of migrants' transnational net-

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with membership associations in several European countries. These federa-

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encouraged through funding of social and cultural associations - there is less

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Rather, the so-called trans-state advocacy networks of NGOs are very

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Patterns of dialogue between Kurdish and Turkish political organiza-

The 'Then What'

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First, how representative are the transnational political networks of the

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The Effect on the Receiving Country.While there is no doubt that migrants'

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Second, transnational political practices might serve to exclude in cases

CHALLENGING THE STATE

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ist resistance to legitimization of other actors to be considered alongside the

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stand at the center. This methodological choice is in some ways a double-

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chies of power in countries of origin. Also, it is generally questionable if

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2003b TransnationalPolitics: Turksand Kurds in Germany. London: Routledge.

2002 Politik Over Graenser,Aarhus Universitet: Magtudredningens Skriftserie.

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1999 "New Approaches to Migration and Transnationalism: Locating Transnational Prac-

This content downloaded from 141.51.247.39 on Tue, 1 Jul 2014 11:51:27 AM

Smith, M. P. and L. E. Guarnizo, eds.

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