PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP.

v NOLASCO
G.R. No. 203990, August 24, 2020
SECOND DIVISION, HERNANDO

Maceda Law, Acknowledgment, Jurat, Notarial Practice Rule, Rescission

Doctrine:

Nolasco filed a complaint against Pryce, seeking a refund for the lots he purchased. Pryce
argued that it was a contract to sell, not a contract of sale, and Nolasco was not entitled to
a refund under RA 6552. The RTC ruled in favor of Nolasco, granting the refund, and Pryce
appealed. The CA affirmed the refund but clarified the contract was a contract to sell. Pryce
now seeks a review, claiming Nolasco agreed to the Contract to Sell and RA 6552 applies.
Nolasco maintains his entitlement to a refund as he did not sign a written Contract to Sell.

Was the contract between Pryce and Nolasco rescinded in accordance with RA
6552?

NO. The contract to sell between Pryce and Nolasco was not validly canceled. The Realty
Installment Buyer Protection Act (RA 6552 or Maceda Law) protects buyers of real estate on
installment payments. RA 6552 specifies conditions for the cancellation, including a 60-day
grace period for defaulting buyers who have paid less than two years of installments. Pryce
attempted to cancel based on two documents, but both failed to support their claim.

The written Contract to Sell is ineffective in canceling the agreement between Pryce and
Nolasco. Pryce insists on applying the Contract to Sell, but it conflicts with the Realty
Installment Buyer Protection Act (RA 6552). The contract's highlighted conditions do not
align with RA 6552's requirements for cancellation. Moreover, the Contract to Sell was not
signed by Nolasco and did not clearly state automatic cancellation. Despite fulfilling some
conditions, Pryce failed to meet all the necessary requirements for cancellation, including
serving a notarial notice of rescission. As a result, the Contract to Sell does not bind
Nolasco, and the agreement continues to be valid.

Pryce's Answer with Counterclaims cannot be deemed a valid notarial rescission under RA
6552. The document was not notarized as an acknowledgment, which is required for a
proper notarial rescission. Instead, it was notarized through a jurat, which does not satisfy
the technical requirements for a notarial rescission. The mode of rescission as claimed by
Pryce, conveyed through a jurat, lacks clarity and is questionable. The absence of a clear
notice of rescission led to confusion and disputes between the parties. Pryce's complacency
and negligence in properly effecting rescission resulted in the failure of their case.