Within the Commonwealth Caribbean, the unsuspecting sightseer is fascinated by

the existence of chattel houses which decorate the West Indian landscape. A
chattel house is a small, board or wooden house, built with a unique architectural
design resting on piled stones or on short stilts, with one roof and erected in
sections that can be taken down and relocated elsewhere, anytime the dweller so
desires. According to Bolden in his 1982 thesis, 70% of the Barbadian population
resided in some form of chattel house. As expressed within the confines of the
common law, any object that is used in connection with land may or may not
become land. Where a chattel has been affixed to land so much that it qualifies as
land or realty, it loses its chattel quality and becomes a fixture. This law of fixtures
rests on the maxim ‘quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit’ i.e. whatever is attached to
land becomes a part thereof and thereby becomes the property of the owner of
the soil.
According to Simeon McIntosh, the maxim appealed to the avoidance of
economic waste in bequeathing the land to the heir and the severed chattel to
the personal representative, and to get around the damage involved in the
severance from the freehold. The legal status of these structures which are home
to many in the Commonwealth Caribbean, takes up a high importance in that,
title to these structures, depends on if the law views it as land or chattel. The
basis of the doctrine has been unjustifiably extended to matters involving landlord
and tenant and mortgagor and mortgagee, who could possibly lose their
investment when the maxim is applied. Due to the difficulties arising from this
firm application, the law has made exemptions allowing a tenant to remove a
fixture if it is used for ornamental, agricultural or trade purposes.
The main question as to whether a chattel has been affixed to land is a question
of law and the onus is on the judge to decide. However, the decision depends
upon the individual facts of each case and for the most part, the degree of
annexation and object of annexation. According to Cheshire and Burn, as it
pertains to the degree of annexation, the chattel is not considered a fixture unless
it is connected to the land or building. Ordinary laying of the object no matter its
weight does not make it a fixture. Therefore, under object of annexation, the test
would be to determine whether the chattel has been fixed to be used as a chattel

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or for the handy use of the building or land. In Trinidad and Tobago, the classic
case is that of Mitchell v Cowie laid down by Chief Justice Wooding. He proposes
that a house may be a chattel or a fixture depending on whether it was intended
to form part of the land. This intention is to be determined objectively. For a
chattel to be classed as a fixture there should be considerable attachment.
Chief Justice Wooding in Mitchell v Cowie looked to the case of Turner v Cameron
which involved railway lines, in upholding the decision that the house was a
fixture and not a chattel. However, if it wasn’t for the special facts of Mitchell’s
case Chief Justice Wooding could not have decided that the house was a fixture.
The house’s construction was done in a way that removal could cause its
disintegration. In Fields v Modeste, the Court of Appeal considered that due to
the house being built with tapia and concrete nogging it did not have the features
of a chattel i.e. movability. Similarly in Elitestone v. Morris, the court decided that
the bungalow was a fixture as the nature of its construction rendered it unable to
be removed.
If one attaches the chattel to his land, then it can be said that he intended to
make it part of his land. The degree of attachment matters not. The case of
Bernard v Burke explains this. The Court of Appeal rejected the claim that since
the upper storey could be removed without destroying the lower storey, the
upper storey was a chattel which could be recovered.
According to Sampson Owusu, where the tenancy is of a short duration, e.g. one
month, it is unreasonable to impute to the tenant an intention to make the
chattel a fixture. Justice Fraser in Mitchell v Cowie preferred the reasoning of
Justice of Appeal Georges in O’ Brien Loans and Missick where he explained that
in cases where a yearly tenant erects and anchors a wooden structure in the
ground by the degree of annexation, the house is no longer a chattel.
In Leigh v Taylor tapestry nailed to the wall combined with molding were deemed
necessary for the adornment and proper enjoyment of them as tapestry, rather
than enhancement of the land. This principle was also employed in Berkley v
Poulett.

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In the application of these aforementioned rules and principles, unfairness thrives
such as in the Commonwealth Caribbean where the chattel house is a cultural
phenomenon. According to Dr. Nicholas Liverpool, a poor man with no home and
land, finds a house spot for rent and builds a wooden house for himself and his
family, securing it against the elements to which all Caribbean territories are
prone, could never contemplate leaving his life’s possession to a landlord. From a
judicial standpoint, one feels sorry for a judge who is unfamiliar with Caribbean
life; but it is nothing new that these houses are removed either whole or in parts
to their new locations.
According to Marshall, the pure Englishness of West Indian Land Law causes it to
have few points of reference of its own. He contends that this has severe socio-
economic implications. As it pertains to the gap between law and social reality,
the most important consequence of this Englishness of West Indian Land Law is
the disregard for the socio-economic situation. The common law territories in the
West Indies follow the English rules which restrict the usefulness of conditions
against the concept of alienation of land. Also, the tendency to use cheap wood in
the Caribbean has been responsible for the prevalence of chattels.
Simeon McIntosh contends that the maxim quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit has
no application in the Commonwealth Caribbean to tenant’s fixtures.
While most Commonwealth Caribbean countries have stuck to the common law
tradition on the subject, a few have sought to move away from the maxim with
respect to fixtures. Section 13 of the Belize landlord and tenant act, specifically
removes the maxim when dealing with tenants and similarly in the Guyana
Landlord and Tenants Act s. 15. However the Barbados property Act of 1979
although not specifically mentioning a separation from the maxim states that any
chattel…fixture…building… erected by the lessee at his sole expense for any
purpose of residence…or for the domestic convenience of the lessee…not affixed
in violation of any agreement…may be removed by the lessee at any time during
the continuance of the lease.

The St. Lucia Civil Code, s372 mentions that when improvements have been made
by a possessor with his own materials, the right of the owner to such
improvements depends on their nature and the good or bad faith of such
possessor. If they were necessary, the owner of the land cannot have them taken

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away. He must, in all cases, pay what they cost, even when they no longer exist;
except, in the case of bad faith. This is the main difference between the common
law and those statutes in civil code. Under the common law, barring exceptions of
extended time given by the landlord, periodic tenancy, and the tenant retaining
possession of his fixtures for a reasonable time until he can have it removed, the
fixtures must be removed during the tenancy otherwise they become a gift of the
landlord.

As explained by Jane Glenn in her article Chattel Houses and Mobile Homes,
legislation does not resolve all the difficulties encountered in the Commonwealth
Caribbean. Some chattel tenants cannot afford to purchase the freehold; some
landlords cannot afford to pay the cost of a house as compensation and not all
jurisdictions have enacted legislation.

In conclusion, hopeful signs of judicial and legislative attempts to close the

aforementioned gap between law and social reality in relation to chattel houses
do exist. West Indian circumstances validate judicial boldness whilst some West
Indian legislatures provide statutory solutions. Coupled with technical and socio-
economic law reform, the closing of the gap can be achieved.