Case study on analysis of Bus Bar protection relay

tripping due to improper logic configuration

K N Dinesh Babu U Sivakumar A Kathiresh Jyoti Gupta Jinu P Joseph
Lead Application Commissioning Application Service Commissioning
Engineer Engineer Engineer Director Engineer
Protection & Control Protection & Control Protection & Control Protection & Control Protection & Control
General Electric General Electric General Electric General Electric General Electric
India India India India India

Abstract —Modern numerical relays called as intelligent
electronic device (IED), are embedded with advanced protection
features to facilitate additional security features. Such security
features eliminate the conventional topology of providing dual
current transformers (CT) on either side of bus coupler circuit
breaker (CB) to eliminate blind zones. Further, it also supports
dynamic CT switching based on CB status, which assists
elimination of blind spots, thereby eradicating the need for
additional CT, thus providing a cost effective solution without
compromise on protection.
Such a solution implemented in a 220kV bus bar protection
relay, encompassing double bus with transfer bus arrangement,
located in Chindwara, Madhya Pradesh, has resulted in tripping
of dual zones for a fault in a single zone, thus over riding the
additional security logics. The analysis and precautionary
measures carried out in this case, has been discussed in this
paper to ensure that similar solutions can be adopted to inhibit
analogous issues in future.
This paper attempts to highlight the fact that the human
errors may not be identified & eliminated during the installation,
commissioning and testing phase at site. One has to remain
vigilant throughout the product/ project lifecycle. This case is a
live example of the same.
Keywords—Bus Bar protection, Bus Zones, intelligent
electronic device (IED), Dual zone tripping, Dynamic CT switching
the need for additional CT (Three single phase), thus
providing a cost effective solution without compromise on
protection. Such a solution is implemented in a 220kV bus
bar protection system located in Chindwara, Madhya Pradesh,
India. Further sections of this paper are segregated as below
Section II of this paper talks about the description of the
system
Section III talks about the fault scenario
Section IV details about the process followed in analyzing
the fault
Section V provides the solution to prevent this issue in
future
Section VI concludes the discussion
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this substation (SS), the status of the CB was wired to the
IED to switch the CT in the respective zone. The current
measured by the CT will be accounted in both the zones for
differential calculation on successful closure of the CB. Fig 1
shows the typical single line diagram (SLD) of the station
where this logic is incorporated. F1 to F7 represent the CT of
the IED. F4 is the CT corresponding to BC which is switched
in both the zones depending on the BC CB status.

I. INTRODUCTION
Bus bar protection has undergone a huge evolutionary
change with the advent of numerical relays called as
intelligent electronic device (IED). IEDs are equipped with
several cutting-edge features which provide greater
engineering flexibility, by the use of which, smart solutions
can be implemented. One such application is blind spot
elimination in bus coupler (BC) bay, utilized in double bus bar
system. In double bus bar arrangement, the bay connecting
both the buses are coupled by a circuit breaker (CB) called as
BC, and the boundary of the differential zone is defined by the
location of the current transformer (CT). The area between
the CT and the CB is signified as blind zone, as it is enclosed
by the alternate zone based on the CT position. The
conventional way of eliminating this blind zone is by
providing a zone overlap with the use of dual CTs located on
either side of the CB. This arrangement will eliminate the
blind spot by tripping both the zones for a fault located in that Fig 1: SLD of the SS
specific area. Similar solution is implemented in IED with the
use of single CT, by a concept of dynamic CT switching based
on CB status. This feature provides the benefit of eradicating
978-1-5090-0128-6/16/$31.00 ©2016 IEEE
 This system was tested and was in service, however
during a fault, the IED did not operate as per the expectation.
The phenomenon is detailed in the next section.
III. FAULT SCENARIO
The Y Phase Bus PT located in Bus1 was burnt due
to internal circuity issue which has led to a Bus1 fault. The
bus bar protection IED has identified the fault, however the
tripping was issued for both the zones and eventually both the
buses were tripped.
IV. TROUBLE SHOOTING
The IED setting files of R-Phase, Y-Phase, B-Phase and Logic
IEDs were verified and the analysis results are as follows.
Fig2 shows the BC CT selection logic implemented in the
IED. The current flowing in the BC CT will be accounted in Fig 3: Event Record of Y Phase Relay – Bus 2 pick up
Zone-1 and Zone-2 whenever 52a contact of BC CB is closed.
The 52a contact input has been wired to the N5c contact of the
logic IED. This input is used for bus zone selection logic for
Bus-1 and Bus-2 in all R, Y and B phase IEDs (‘Direct input
77’ as shown in Fig 2). This logic has eliminated the current
read by the BC CT before the CB was physically opened
(whenever 52a is high, the BC CT will read in both zone and
when it is low, it will be removed from the zone). This
resulted in a differential current and hence Bus-2 operated
without a fault in its zone.

Fig 4: Event record of Y Phase relay – Bus 2 operated

The above concept is illustrated with an example as

Fig 2:B90 bus selection logic in Y-Phase relay
From Fig 3, it can be observed that, breaker close status (52a)
was low (event number 1532872) and after 2.5ms, bus-2
differential has picked up (event 1532873).
In Fig 4 we can observe that bus-2 has operated after 15ms of
bus-2 pickup (event number 1532873 and 1532885). This
operation is in line with the relay specification of tripping.
Hence it is concluded that the operation of bus-2 was due to
the wrong zone selection logic of BC CT. BC CT was
removed from both the zones before it was physically opened.
shown in Fig 4 and table 1 & 2. Let us assume a fault in bus-1
as shown in Fig 5. The direction of current of all the bays
flow towards the fault as shown. The current flow for this fault
is tabulated in Table 1. Bus-1 reads 6 p.u differential whereas
bus-2 reads 0 p.u. In this example it is assumed that all the
bays will contribute only 1 p.u during the time of fault. The
bus zone direction A has been configured as OUT in zone-1
and IN in zone-2 as observed in Fig1 [1]. Due to this
configuration, the F4 CT current (3 p.u) is read as 3∟0 in bus-
1 and 3∟180 in bus-2. Hence bus-2 did not operate at the
instance of bus-1 fault. The bus-1 differential current has
issued a trip command to all bays in zone-1. The moment the
trip command has executed, bus-1 has been dropped off as
observed in Fig3, event number 1532874.
Bus tie CB was in the process of opening, but it
wasn’t fully opened (it will be completely open only after
breaker operation time). 52a contact has opened resulting in
removal of bus tie CT from both zones as shown (*) in Table2.
The F4 CT in table2 denoted by * shows that, the current is
physically flowing in the CT but not measured by the relay.
This has resulted in a differential current of 3 p.u in bus-2
which in turn has tripped bus-2.

a b
Fig 5: Direction of current flow measured in the relay represented by arrow
during bus-1 fault.
V. SOLUTION
To resolve the above mentioned issue the sequence of settings/
configuration/ logic that has to be incorporated is discussed in
this section. Fig 6 shows the isolator configuration which has
an inbuilt logic to detect proper feedback of 52a and 52b of
any switchgear. The bus tie CB feedback should be
configured to isolator-2 as shown. The internal operand:
isolator-2 position will become high whenever the breaker is
successfully closed and will be low when the breaker is
successfully opened. Any improper status will be handled by
the internal isolator logic as explained in B90 user manual [1].

TABLE 1: DIFF CURRENT FOR FIG 5.A

Fig 6: Menu=>Settings=>Control Elements=>Bus

CHK
Bays BUS-1 BUS-2 Replica=>Isolator
ZONE

Fig 7 shows the perfect detection of open or close position of

F1 1∟0 1∟0 CB. The BC 52 set (VO1) high represents a successful CB
closure and BC 52 reset (VO2) represents a successful CB
F2 1∟0 1∟0
open condition. These two logics are in turn assigned to a
F3 1∟0 1∟0 Non-Volatile Latch as shown Fig 8. Latch-2 will be high when
the CB is closed which in turn will select the BC CT in both
F4 3∟0 3∟180 zones in all the boxes.
F5 1∟0 1∟0
F6 1∟0 1∟0
F7 1∟0 1∟0
DIFF 6 0 6

TABLE 2: DIFF CURRENT FOR FIG 5.B

Fig 7: Bus tie open/close feedback logic

CHK
Bays BUS-1 BUS-2
ZONE

F1
F2
F3 Fig 8: Menu=>Settings=>Flex Logics=>Non-Volatile Latches
F4* 3∟0* 3∟180*
F5 1∟0 1∟0 In case of improper feedback of the BC CB, the CT selection
F6 1∟0 1∟0 logic of bus tie shown in Fig 9 will not work. In case the
feedback has failed due to switch yard issues, the zone-1 and
F7 1∟0 1∟0 zone-2 trip logic (DI26 and DI27) will eliminate the bus tie
DIFF 0 3 3 CT from both zones after 150ms and the scheme will still
work perfectly eliminating the blind spot. The delay (150ms)
in tripping is only for the rare occasion of failure of CB
feedback. In case of proper feedback the fault is cleared after
the bus coupler breaker operation. This secured logic ensures The bus bar IED’s unwarranted operation has been
100% fault clearance even in worst case of failure of studied and the issue has been identified as wrong setting and
switchyard feedback signal. logic configuration. The solution discussed in this paper has
been tested and proper operation of the system was verified.
Though IEDs provide enhanced flexibility to the user, it is
associated with additional risks which need to be handled by
proper implementation of logics and secured testing
methodologies. The analysis and precautionary measures
carried out in this case, can be adopted to inhibit analogous
issues in future.
Fig 9: CT switching logic for bus tie
REFERENCE
[1] B90 Busbar Protection Relay - Instruction Manual. GE
Now let us discuss the above mal operation condition with the publication No.GEK-106241, 2002
solution proposed. The bus-1 fault will trip bus-1, but the bus
tie CT will not be eliminated from both the zones unless the
bus tie CB is successfully opened. The successful opening of
the bus tie CB is ensured by the logic discussed above from
Fig 6 to Fig 10. After the successful opening of bus tie CB, the
current flow measured in the IED is shown in table 3. It can be
concluded that zone-2 will not operate after implementation of
the proposed logic.

Fig 10: Stability of bus-2 after implementation of the proposed solution.

TABLE 3: DIFF CURRENT FOR FIG 10

Bays BUS-1 BUS-2 CHK

ZONE
F1 0
F2 0
F3 0
F4
F5 1∟0 1∟0
F6 0.5∟180 0.5∟180
F7 0.5∟180 0.5∟180
DIFF 0.0 0.0

VI. .CONCLUSION: