G.R. No.

89252 May 24, 1993 February 9, 1981

———————
RAUL SESBREÑO, petitioner, VALUE DATE
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION AND PILIPINAS TO Raul Sesbreño
BANK, respondents.
April 6, 1981
————————
MATURITY DATE
FELICIANO, J.:
NO. 10805
On 9 February 1981, petitioner Raul Sesbreño made a money market placement in the amount of
P300,000.00 with the Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation ("Philfinance"), Cebu Branch; DENOMINATED CUSTODIAN RECEIPT
the placement, with a term of thirty-two (32) days, would mature on 13 March 1981, Philfinance,
also on 9 February 1981, issued the following documents to petitioner: This confirms that as a duly Custodian Bank, and upon instruction of PHILIPPINE
UNDERWRITES FINANCE CORPORATION, we have in our custody the following securities to
(a) the Certificate of Confirmation of Sale, "without recourse," No. 20496 of one (1) Delta Motors you [sic] the extent herein indicated.
Corporation Promissory Note ("DMC PN") No. 2731 for a term of 32 days at 17.0% per annum;
SERIAL MAT. FACE ISSUED REGISTERED AMOUNT
(b) the Certificate of securities Delivery Receipt No. 16587 indicating the sale of DMC PN No. NUMBER DATE VALUE BY HOLDER PAYEE
2731 to petitioner, with the notation that the said security was in custodianship of Pilipinas Bank,
as per Denominated Custodian Receipt ("DCR") No. 10805 dated 9 February 1981; and 2731 4-6-81 2,300,833.34 DMC PHIL. 307,933.33
UNDERWRITERS
(c) post-dated checks payable on 13 March 1981 (i.e., the maturity date of petitioner's investment), FINANCE CORP.
with petitioner as payee, Philfinance as drawer, and Insular Bank of Asia and America as drawee,
in the total amount of P304,533.33. We further certify that these securities may be inspected by you or your duly authorized
representative at any time during regular banking hours.
On 13 March 1981, petitioner sought to encash the postdated checks issued by Philfinance.
However, the checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Upon your written instructions we shall undertake physical delivery of the above securities fully
assigned to you should this Denominated Custodianship Receipt remain outstanding in your favor
On 26 March 1981, Philfinance delivered to petitioner the DCR No. 10805 issued by private thirty (30) days after its maturity.
respondent Pilipinas Bank ("Pilipinas"). It reads as follows:
PILIPINAS BANK
PILIPINAS BANK (By Elizabeth De Villa
Makati Stock Exchange Bldg., Illegible Signature) 1
Ayala Avenue, Makati,
Metro Manila On 2 April 1981, petitioner approached Ms. Elizabeth de Villa of private respondent Pilipinas,
Makati Branch, and handed her a demand letter informing the bank that his placement with
Philfinance in the amount reflected in the DCR No. 10805 had remained unpaid and outstanding,

1
and that he in effect was asking for the physical delivery of the underlying promissory note.
Petitioner then examined the original of the DMC PN No. 2731 and found: that the security had
been issued on 10 April 1980; that it would mature on 6 April 1981; that it had a face value of
P2,300,833.33, with the Philfinance as "payee" and private respondent Delta Motors Corporation
("Delta") as "maker;" and that on face of the promissory note was stamped "NON NEGOTIABLE."
Pilipinas did not deliver the Note, nor any certificate of participation in respect thereof, to
petitioner.
Petitioner later made similar demand letters, dated 3 July 1981 and 3 August 1981, 2 again asking
private respondent Pilipinas for physical delivery of the original of DMC PN No. 2731. Pilipinas
allegedly referred all of petitioner's demand letters to Philfinance for written instructions, as has
been supposedly agreed upon in "Securities Custodianship Agreement" between Pilipinas and
Philfinance. Philfinance did not provide the appropriate instructions; Pilipinas never released DMC
PN No. 2731, nor any other instrument in respect thereof, to petitioner.
Petitioner also made a written demand on 14 July 1981 3 upon private respondent Delta for the
partial satisfaction of DMC PN No. 2731, explaining that Philfinance, as payee thereof, had
assigned to him said Note to the extent of P307,933.33. Delta, however, denied any liability to
petitioner on the promissory note, and explained in turn that it had previously agreed with
Philfinance to offset its DMC PN No. 2731 (along with DMC PN No. 2730) against Philfinance PN
No. 143-A issued in favor of Delta.
In the meantime, Philfinance, on 18 June 1981, was placed under the joint management of the
Securities and exchange commission ("SEC") and the Central Bank. Pilipinas delivered to the
SEC DMC PN No. 2731, which to date apparently remains in the custody of the SEC. 4
As petitioner had failed to collect his investment and interest thereon, he filed on 28 September
1982 an action for damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Cebu City, Branch 21,
against private respondents Delta and Pilipinas. 5 The trial court, in a decision dated 5 August
1987, dismissed the complaint and counterclaims for lack of merit and for lack of cause of action,
with costs against petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15195. In a Decision
dated 21 March 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and held: 6
Be that as it may, from the evidence on record, if there is anyone that appears liable for the
travails of plaintiff-appellant, it is Philfinance. As correctly observed by the trial court:
This act of Philfinance in accepting the investment of plaintiff and charging it against DMC PN No.
2731 when its entire face value was already obligated or earmarked for set-off or compensation is
difficult to comprehend and may have been motivated with bad faith. Philfinance, therefore, is
solely and legally obligated to return the investment of plaintiff, together with its earnings, and to
answer all the damages plaintiff has suffered incident thereto. Unfortunately for plaintiff,
Philfinance was not impleaded as one of the defendants in this case at bar; hence, this Court is
without jurisdiction to pronounce judgement against it. (p. 11, Decision)
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed in toto. Cost against plaintiff-appellant.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above Decision, without success.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
After consideration of the allegations contained and issues raised in the pleadings, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective
memoranda. 7
Petitioner reiterates the assignment of errors he directed at the trial court decision, and contends
that respondent court of Appeals gravely erred: (i) in concluding that he cannot recover from
private respondent Delta his assigned portion of DMC PN No. 2731; (ii) in failing to hold private
respondent Pilipinas solidarily liable on the DMC PN No. 2731 in view of the provisions stipulated
in DCR No. 10805 issued in favor r of petitioner, and (iii) in refusing to pierce the veil of corporate
entity between Philfinance, and private respondents Delta and Pilipinas, considering that the three
(3) entities belong to the "Silverio Group of Companies" under the leadership of Mr. Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. 8
There are at least two (2) sets of relationships which we need to address: firstly, the relationship
of petitioner vis-a-visDelta; secondly, the relationship of petitioner in respect of Pilipinas. Actually,
of course, there is a third relationship that is of critical importance: the relationship of petitioner
and Philfinance. However, since Philfinance has not been impleaded in this case, neither the trial
court nor the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction over the person of Philfinance. It is,
consequently, not necessary for present purposes to deal with this third relationship, except to the
extent it necessarily impinges upon or intersects the first and second relationships.
I.
We consider first the relationship between petitioner and Delta.
2
The Court of appeals in effect held that petitioner acquired no rights vis-a-vis Delta in respect of
the Delta promissory note (DMC PN No. 2731) which Philfinance sold "without recourse" to
petitioner, to the extent of P304,533.33. The Court of Appeals said on this point:
Nor could plaintiff-appellant have acquired any right over DMC PN No. 2731 as the same is
"non-negotiable" as stamped on its face (Exhibit "6"), negotiation being defined as the transfer of
an instrument from one person to another so as to constitute the transferee the holder of the
instrument (Sec. 30, Negotiable Instruments Law). A person not a holder cannot sue on the
instrument in his own name and cannot demand or receive payment (Section 51, id.) 9
Petitioner admits that DMC PN No. 2731 was non-negotiable but contends that the Note had been
validly transferred, in part to him by assignment and that as a result of such transfer, Delta as
debtor-maker of the Note, was obligated to pay petitioner the portion of that Note assigned to him
by the payee Philfinance.
Delta, however, disputes petitioner's contention and argues:
(1) that DMC PN No. 2731 was not intended to be negotiated or otherwise transferred by
Philfinance as manifested by the word "non-negotiable" stamp across the face of the Note 10 and
because maker Delta and payee Philfinance intended that this Note would be offset against the
outstanding obligation of Philfinance represented by Philfinance PN No. 143-A issued to Delta as
payee;
(2) that the assignment of DMC PN No. 2731 by Philfinance was without Delta's consent, if not
against its instructions; and
(3) assuming (arguendo only) that the partial assignment in favor of petitioner was valid, petitioner
took the Note subject to the defenses available to Delta, in particular, the offsetting of DMC PN No.
2731 against Philfinance PN No. 143-A. 11
We consider Delta's arguments seriatim.
Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that the negotiation of a negotiable instrument must be
distinguished from theassignment or transfer of an instrument whether that be negotiable or
non-negotiable. Only an instrument qualifying as a negotiable instrument under the relevant
statute may be negotiated either by indorsement thereof coupled with delivery, or by delivery
alone where the negotiable instrument is in bearer form. A negotiable instrument may, however,
instead of being negotiated, also be assigned or transferred. The legal consequences of
negotiation as distinguished from assignment of a negotiable instrument are, of course, different.
A non-negotiable instrument may, obviously, not be negotiated; but it may be assigned or
transferred, absent an express prohibition against assignment or transfer written in the face of the
instrument:
The words "not negotiable," stamped on the face of the bill of lading, did not destroy its
assignability, but the sole effect was to exempt the bill from the statutory provisions relative
thereto, and a bill, though not negotiable, may be transferred by assignment; the assignee taking
subject to the equities between the original parties. 12 (Emphasis added)
DMC PN No. 2731, while marked "non-negotiable," was not at the same time stamped
"non-transferable" or "non-assignable." It contained no stipulation which prohibited Philfinance
from assigning or transferring, in whole or in part, that Note.
Delta adduced the "Letter of Agreement" which it had entered into with Philfinance and which
should be quoted in full:
April 10, 1980
Philippine Underwriters Finance Corp.
Benavidez St., Makati,
Metro Manila.
Attention: Mr. Alfredo O. Banaria
SVP-Treasurer
GENTLEMEN:
This refers to our outstanding placement of P4,601,666.67 as evidenced by your Promissory Note
No. 143-A, dated April 10, 1980, to mature on April 6, 1981.
As agreed upon, we enclose our non-negotiable Promissory Note No. 2730 and 2731 for
P2,000,000.00 each, dated April 10, 1980, to be offsetted [sic] against your PN No. 143-A upon
co-terminal maturity.
Please deliver the proceeds of our PNs to our representative, Mr. Eric Castillo.
Very Truly Yours,
3
(Sgd.)
Florencio B. Biagan
Senior Vice President 13
We find nothing in his "Letter of Agreement" which can be reasonably construed as a prohibition
upon Philfinance assigning or transferring all or part of DMC PN No. 2731, before the maturity
thereof. It is scarcely necessary to add that, even had this "Letter of Agreement" set forth an
explicit prohibition of transfer upon Philfinance, such a prohibition cannot be invoked against an
assignee or transferee of the Note who parted with valuable consideration in good faith and
without notice of such prohibition. It is not disputed that petitioner was such an assignee or
transferee. Our conclusion on this point is reinforced by the fact that what Philfinance and Delta
were doing by their exchange of their promissory notes was this: Delta invested, by making a
money market placement with Philfinance, approximately P4,600,000.00 on 10 April 1980; but
promptly, on the same day, borrowed back the bulk of that placement, i.e., P4,000,000.00, by
issuing its two (2) promissory notes: DMC PN No. 2730 and DMC PN No. 2731, both also dated
10 April 1980. Thus, Philfinance was left with not P4,600,000.00 but only P600,000.00 in cash and
the two (2) Delta promissory notes.
Apropos Delta's complaint that the partial assignment by Philfinance of DMC PN No. 2731 had
been effected without the consent of Delta, we note that such consent was not necessary for the
validity and enforceability of the assignment in favor of petitioner. 14 Delta's argument that
Philfinance's sale or assignment of part of its rights to DMC PN No. 2731 constituted conventional
subrogation, which required its (Delta's) consent, is quite mistaken. Conventional subrogation,
which in the first place is never lightly inferred, 15 must be clearly established by the unequivocal
terms of the substituting obligation or by the evident incompatibility of the new and old obligations
on every point. 16 Nothing of the sort is present in the instant case.
It is in fact difficult to be impressed with Delta's complaint, since it released its DMC PN No. 2731
to Philfinance, an entity engaged in the business of buying and selling debt instruments and other
securities, and more generally, in money market transactions. In Perez v. Court of Appeals, 17 the
Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Herrera, made the following important statement:
There is another aspect to this case. What is involved here is a money market transaction. As
defined by Lawrence Smith "the money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term
credit instruments (involving large amounts) where lenders and borrowers do not deal directly with
each other but through a middle manor a dealer in the open market." It involves "commercial
papers" which are instruments "evidencing indebtness of any person or entity. . ., which are
issued, endorsed, sold or transferred or in any manner conveyed to another person or entity, with
or without recourse". The fundamental function of the money market device in its operation is to
match and bring together in a most impersonal manner both the "fund users" and the "fund
suppliers." The money market is an "impersonal market", free from personal considerations. "The
market mechanism is intended to provide quick mobility of money and securities."
The impersonal character of the money market device overlooks the individuals or entities
concerned.The issuer of a commercial paper in the money market necessarily knows in advance
that it would be expenditiously transacted and transferred to any investor/lender without need of
notice to said issuer. In practice, no notification is given to the borrower or issuer of commercial
paper of the sale or transfer to the investor.
xxx xxx xxx
There is need to individuate a money market transaction, a relatively novel institution in the
Philippine commercial scene. It has been intended to facilitate the flow and acquisition of capital
on an impersonal basis. And as specifically required by Presidential Decree No. 678, the investing
public must be given adequate and effective protection in availing of the credit of a borrower in the
commercial paper market.18 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
We turn to Delta's arguments concerning alleged compensation or offsetting between DMC PN No.
2731 and Philfinance PN No. 143-A. It is important to note that at the time Philfinance sold part of
its rights under DMC PN No. 2731 to petitioner on 9 February 1981, no compensation had as yet
taken place and indeed none could have taken place. The essential requirements of
compensation are listed in the Civil Code as follows:
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal
creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consists in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of
the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts are due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons
and communicated in due time to the debtor. (Emphasis supplied)
4
On 9 February 1981, neither DMC PN No. 2731 nor Philfinance PN No. 143-A was due. This was
explicitly recognized by Delta in its 10 April 1980 "Letter of Agreement" with Philfinance, where
Delta acknowledged that the relevant promissory notes were "to be offsetted (sic) against
[Philfinance] PN No. 143-A upon co-terminal maturity."
As noted, the assignment to petitioner was made on 9 February 1981 or from forty-nine (49) days
before the "co-terminal maturity" date, that is to say, before any compensation had taken place.
Further, the assignment to petitioner would have prevented compensation had taken place
between Philfinance and Delta, to the extent of P304,533.33, because upon execution of the
assignment in favor of petitioner, Philfinance and Delta would have ceased to be creditors and
debtors of each other in their own right to the extent of the amount assigned by Philfinance to
petitioner. Thus, we conclude that the assignment effected by Philfinance in favor of petitioner
was a valid one and that petitioner accordingly became owner of DMC PN No. 2731 to the extent
of the portion thereof assigned to him.
The record shows, however, that petitioner notified Delta of the fact of the assignment to him only
on 14 July 1981, 19that is, after the maturity not only of the money market placement made by
petitioner but also of both DMC PN No. 2731 and Philfinance PN No. 143-A. In other
words, petitioner notified Delta of his rights as assignee after compensation had taken place by
operation of law because the offsetting instruments had both reached maturity. It is a firmly settled
doctrine that the rights of an assignee are not any greater that the rights of the assignor, since the
assignee is merely substituted in the place of the assignor 20 and that the assignee acquires his
rights subject to the equities — i.e., the defenses — which the debtor could have set up against
the original assignor before notice of the assignment was given to the debtor. Article 1285 of the
Civil Code provides that:
Art. 1285. The debtor who has consented to the assignment of rights made by a creditor in favor
of a third person, cannot set up against the assignee the compensation which would pertain to
him against the assignor, unless the assignor was notified by the debtor at the time he gave his
consent, that he reserved his right to the compensation.
If the creditor communicated the cession to him but the debtor did not consent thereto, the
latter may set up the compensation of debts previous to the cession, but not of subsequent ones.
If the assignment is made without the knowledge of the debtor, he may set up the compensation
of all credits prior to the same and also later ones until he had knowledge of the assignment.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 1626 of the same code states that: "the debtor who, before having knowledge of the
assignment, pays his creditor shall be released from the obligation." In Sison v. Yap-Tico, 21 the
Court explained that:
[n]o man is bound to remain a debtor; he may pay to him with whom he contacted to pay; and if
he pay before notice that his debt has been assigned, the law holds him exonerated, for the
reason that it is the duty of the person who has acquired a title by transfer to demand payment of
the debt, to give his debt or notice. 22
At the time that Delta was first put to notice of the assignment in petitioner's favor on 14 July 1981,
DMC PN No. 2731 had already been discharged by compensation. Since the assignor Philfinance
could not have then compelled payment anew by Delta of DMC PN No. 2731, petitioner, as
assignee of Philfinance, is similarly disabled from collecting from Delta the portion of the Note
assigned to him.
It bears some emphasis that petitioner could have notified Delta of the assignment or sale was
effected on 9 February 1981. He could have notified Delta as soon as his money market
placement matured on 13 March 1981 without payment thereof being made by Philfinance; at that
time, compensation had yet to set in and discharge DMC PN No. 2731. Again petitioner could
have notified Delta on 26 March 1981 when petitioner received from Philfinance the Denominated
Custodianship Receipt ("DCR") No. 10805 issued by private respondent Pilipinas in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner could, in fine, have notified Delta at any time before the maturity date of DMC
PN No. 2731. Because petitioner failed to do so, and because the record is bare of any indication
that Philfinance had itself notified Delta of the assignment to petitioner, the Court is compelled to
uphold the defense of compensation raised by private respondent Delta. Of course, Philfinance
remains liable to petitioner under the terms of the assignment made by Philfinance to petitioner.
II.
We turn now to the relationship between petitioner and private respondent Pilipinas. Petitioner
contends that Pilipinas became solidarily liable with Philfinance and Delta when Pilipinas issued
DCR No. 10805 with the following words:
Upon your written instruction, we [Pilipinas] shall undertake physical delivery of the above
securities fully assigned to you —. 23
The Court is not persuaded. We find nothing in the DCR that establishes an obligation on the part
of Pilipinas to pay petitioner the amount of P307,933.33 nor any assumption of liability in
solidum with Philfinance and Delta under DMC PN No. 2731. We read the DCR as a confirmation
on the part of Pilipinas that:
5
(1) it has in its custody, as duly constituted custodian bank, DMC PN No. 2731 of a certain face
value, to mature on 6 April 1981 and payable to the order of Philfinance;
(2) Pilipinas was, from and after said date of the assignment by Philfinance to petitioner (9
February 1981), holding that Note on behalf and for the benefit of petitioner, at least to the extent
it had been assigned to petitioner by payee Philfinance; 24
(3) petitioner may inspect the Note either "personally or by authorized representative", at any time
during regular bank hours; and
(4) upon written instructions of petitioner, Pilipinas would physically deliver the DMC PN No. 2731
(or a participation therein to the extent of P307,933.33) "should this Denominated Custodianship
receipt remain outstanding in [petitioner's] favor thirty (30) days after its maturity."
Thus, we find nothing written in printers ink on the DCR which could reasonably be read as
converting Pilipinas into an obligor under the terms of DMC PN No. 2731 assigned to petitioner,
either upon maturity thereof or any other time. We note that both in his complaint and in his
testimony before the trial court, petitioner referred merely to the obligation of private respondent
Pilipinas to effect the physical delivery to him of DMC PN No. 2731. 25 Accordingly, petitioner's
theory that Pilipinas had assumed a solidary obligation to pay the amount represented by a
portion of the Note assigned to him by Philfinance, appears to be a new theory constructed only
after the trial court had ruled against him. The solidary liability that petitioner seeks to impute
Pilipinas cannot, however, be lightly inferred. Under article 1207 of the Civil Code, "there is a
solidary liability only when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity," The record
here exhibits no express assumption of solidary liability vis-a-vis petitioner, on the part of Pilipinas.
Petitioner has not pointed to us to any law which imposed such liability upon Pilipinas nor has
petitioner argued that the very nature of the custodianship assumed by private respondent
Pilipinas necessarily implies solidary liability under the securities, custody of which was taken by
Pilipinas. Accordingly, we are unable to hold Pilipinas solidarily liable with Philfinance and private
respondent Delta under DMC PN No. 2731.
We do not, however, mean to suggest that Pilipinas has no responsibility and liability in respect of
petitioner under the terms of the DCR. To the contrary, we find, after prolonged analysis and
deliberation, that private respondent Pilipinas had breached its undertaking under the DCR to
petitioner Sesbreño.
We believe and so hold that a contract of deposit was constituted by the act of Philfinance in
designating Pilipinas as custodian or depositary bank. The depositor was initially Philfinance; the
obligation of the depository was owed, however, to petitioner Sesbreño as beneficiary of the
custodianship or depository agreement. We do not consider that this is a simple case of a
stipulation pour autri. The custodianship or depositary agreement was established as an integral
part of the money market transaction entered into by petitioner with Philfinance. Petitioner bought
a portion of DMC PN No. 2731; Philfinance as assignor-vendor deposited that Note with Pilipinas
in order that the thing sold would be placed outside the control of the vendor. Indeed, the
constituting of the depositary or custodianship agreement was equivalent to constructive delivery
of the Note (to the extent it had been sold or assigned to petitioner) to petitioner. It will be seen
that custodianship agreements are designed to facilitate transactions in the money market by
providing a basis for confidence on the part of the investors or placers that the instruments bought
by them are effectively taken out of the pocket, as it were, of the vendors and placed safely
beyond their reach, that those instruments will be there available to the placers of funds should
they have need of them. The depositary in a contract of deposit is obliged to return the security or
the thing deposited upon demand of the depositor (or, in the presented case, of the beneficiary) of
the contract, even though a term for such return may have been established in the said
contract. 26 Accordingly, any stipulation in the contract of deposit or custodianship that runs
counter to the fundamental purpose of that agreement or which was not brought to the notice of
and accepted by the placer-beneficiary, cannot be enforced as against such beneficiary-placer.
We believe that the position taken above is supported by considerations of public policy. If there is
any party that needs the equalizing protection of the law in money market transactions, it is the
members of the general public whom place their savings in such market for the purpose of
generating interest revenues. 27 The custodian bank, if it is not related either in terms of equity
ownership or management control to the borrower of the funds, or the commercial paper dealer, is
normally a preferred or traditional banker of such borrower or dealer (here, Philfinance). The
custodian bank would have every incentive to protect the interest of its client the borrower or
dealer as against the placer of funds. The providers of such funds must be safeguarded from the
impact of stipulations privately made between the borrowers or dealers and the custodian banks,
and disclosed to fund-providers only after trouble has erupted.
In the case at bar, the custodian-depositary bank Pilipinas refused to deliver the security
deposited with it when petitioner first demanded physical delivery thereof on 2 April 1981. We
must again note, in this connection, that on 2 April 1981, DMC PN No. 2731 had not yet matured
and therefore, compensation or offsetting against Philfinance PN No. 143-A had not yet taken
place. Instead of complying with the demand of the petitioner, Pilipinas purported to require and
await the instructions of Philfinance, in obvious contravention of its undertaking under the DCR to
effect physical delivery of the Note upon receipt of "written instructions" from petitioner Sesbreño.
The ostensible term written into the DCR (i.e., "should this [DCR] remain outstanding in your favor
thirty [30] days after its maturity") was not a defense against petitioner's demand for physical
surrender of the Note on at least three grounds: firstly, such term was never brought to the
attention of petitioner Sesbreño at the time the money market placement with Philfinance was
made; secondly, such term runs counter to the very purpose of the custodianship or depositary
agreement as an integral part of a money market transaction; and thirdly, it is inconsistent with the
6
provisions of Article 1988 of the Civil Code noted above. Indeed, in principle, petitioner became thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum counted from 2 April 1981. As so modified, the
entitled to demand physical delivery of the Note held by Pilipinas as soon as petitioner's money Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
market placement matured on 13 March 1981 without payment from Philfinance. costs.

We conclude, therefore, that private respondent Pilipinas must respond to petitioner for damages SO ORDERED.
sustained by arising out of its breach of duty. By failing to deliver the Note to the petitioner as
depositor-beneficiary of the thing deposited, Pilipinas effectively and unlawfully deprived petitioner
of the Note deposited with it. Whether or not Pilipinas itself benefitted from such conversion or
unlawful deprivation inflicted upon petitioner, is of no moment for present purposes.Prima facie,
the damages suffered by petitioner consisted of P304,533.33, the portion of the DMC PN No.
2731 assigned to petitioner but lost by him by reason of discharge of the Note by compensation,
plus legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum containing from 14 March 1981.

The conclusion we have reached is, of course, without prejudice to such right of reimbursement
as Pilipinas may havevis-a-vis Philfinance.

III.

The third principal contention of petitioner — that Philfinance and private respondents Delta and
Pilipinas should be treated as one corporate entity — need not detain us for long.

In the first place, as already noted, jurisdiction over the person of Philfinance was never acquired
either by the trial court nor by the respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner similarly did not seek to
implead Philfinance in the Petition before us.

Secondly, it is not disputed that Philfinance and private respondents Delta and Pilipinas have
been organized as separate corporate entities. Petitioner asks us to pierce their separate
corporate entities, but has been able only to cite the presence of a common Director — Mr.
Ricardo Silverio, Sr., sitting on the Board of Directors of all three (3) companies. Petitioner has
neither alleged nor proved that one or another of the three (3) concededly related companies used
the other two (2) as mere alter egos or that the corporate affairs of the other two (2) were
administered and managed for the benefit of one. There is simply not enough evidence of record
to justify disregarding the separate corporate personalities of delta and Pilipinas and to hold them
liable for any assumed or undetermined liability of Philfinance to petitioner. 28

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15195 dated 21 march 1989 and 17 July 1989, respectively, are hereby
MODIFIED and SET ASIDE, to the extent that such Decision and Resolution had dismissed
petitioner's complaint against Pilipinas Bank. Private respondent Pilipinas bank is hereby
ORDERED to indemnify petitioner for damages in the amount of P304,533.33, plus legal interest

7
 Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Coporation
G.R. No. 141309, December 23, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
It is a fundamental principle in the law of public officers that a duty owing to the public in general
cannot give rise to a liability in favor of particular individuals.[1] The failure to perform a public duty
can constitute an individual wrong only when a person can show that, in the public duty, a duty to
himself as an individual is also involved, and that he has suffered a special and peculiar injury by
reason of its improper performance or non-performance.[2]
By this token, the Court reconsiders its June 19, 2007 Decision[3] in this case.
As culled from the said decision, the facts, in brief, are as follows:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA
7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette
brands Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands subjected to
an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days
before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93
reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More as locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in
effect subjected Hope, More, and Champion cigarettes to the provisions of RA
7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which
are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes
an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than
Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor
A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it
was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco
received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20,
1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of
RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter datedJuly 30, 1993. The same letter
assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting
to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded
payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. OnAugust 3, 1993, respondent
filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which
on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation
of RMC 37-93. In its decision datedAugust 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC
37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner
from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No.
37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this
Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held,
among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid
administrative issuance.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for
damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that
the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right
against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to
equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent
has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification
against forum shopping was signed by respondents counsel in violation of the
rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to
dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to
prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to
present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forum
shopping was cured by respondents submission of the corporate secretarys
certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum
shopping. x x x x
xxxx
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that
under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did
not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38,
Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of
public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs
the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the
complaint for damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect
of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the
8
 corporate secretarys certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the
same.[4] [Citations and underscoring omitted.]
In the aforesaid June 19, 2007 Decision, we affirmed the disposition of the Court of Appeals (CA)
and directed the trial court to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK.[5]
Petitioner, on July 20, 2007, subsequently moved for the reconsideration of the said
decision.[6] After respondent filed its comment, the Court, in its April 14, 2008 Resolution,[7] denied
with finality petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Undaunted, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the case] to the Honorable
Court En Banc.[8] She contends that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of
paramount importance. The earlier decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to
public officers, and will adversely affect the performance of duties of superior public officers in
departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi-judicial powers. With the said decision, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue will have reason to hesitate or refrain from performing his/her
official duties despite the due process safeguards in Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue
Code.[9] Petitioner hence moves for the reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision.[10]
In its June 25, 2008 Resolution,[11] the Court referred the case to the En Banc. Respondent
consequently moved for the reconsideration of this resolution.
We now resolve both motions.
There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the duty owing to the public collectively
(the body politic), and the duty owing to particular individuals, thus:
1. Of Duties to the Public. The first of these classes embraces
those officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public collectively --- to the
body politic --- and not to any particular individual; who act for the public at
large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury.
The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are
numerous and the distinction will be readily recognized. Thus, the governor
owes a duty to the public to see that the laws are properly executed, that fit and
competent officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill-considered acts
of the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, and many others of a
like nature, are duties which he owes to the public at large and no one
individual could single himself out and assert that they were duties owing to
him alone. So, members of the legislature owe a duty to the public to pass only
wise and proper laws, but no one person could pretend that the duty was owing
to himself rather than to another. Highway commissioners owe a duty that they
will be governed only by considerations of the public good in deciding upon the
opening or closing of highways, but it is not a duty to any particular individual of
the community.
These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed that
they are sufficient to define the general doctrine.
2. Of Duties to Individuals. The second class above referred to
includes those who, while they owe to the public the general duty of a proper
administration of their respective offices, yet become, by reason of their
employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an official
capacity, under a special and particular obligation to him as an individual. They
serve individuals chiefly and usually receive their compensation from fees paid
by each individual who employs them.
A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a
recorder of deeds in recording the deed or mortgage of an individual, a clerk of
court in entering up a private judgment, a notary public in protesting negotiable
paper, an inspector of elections in passing upon the qualifications of an elector,
each owes a general duty of official good conduct to the public, but he is also
under a special duty to the particular individual concerned which gives the
latter a peculiar interest in his due performance.[12]
In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or
non-performance of a duty, it must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is
involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs, [t]he liability of a public officer to
an individual or the public is based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to the individual or the
public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur no liability.[13]
Stated differently, when what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an
individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he
may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to
the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the officer has
touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty to him as an individual.[14] The
remedy in this case is not judicial but political.[15]
The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or
special injury on account of the public officers improper performance or non-performance of his
public duty. An individual can never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to
9
the public only; he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage alone does not
constitute a wrong.[16] A contrary precept (that an individual, in the absence of a special and
peculiar injury, can still institute an action against a public officer on account of an improper
performance or non-performance of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of
suits, for if one man might have an action, all men might have the likethe complaining individual
has no better right than anybody else.[17] If such were the case, no one will serve a public
office. Thus, the rule restated is that an individual cannot have a particular action against a public
officerwithout a particular injury, or a particular right, which are the grounds upon which all actions
are founded.[18]
Juxtaposed with Article 32[19] of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the rule
that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or
omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the
former. This is consistent with this Courts pronouncement in its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject of
petitioners motion for reconsideration) that Article 32, in fact, allows a damage suit for tort for
impairment of rights and liberties.[20]
It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for damages for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed the plaintiff, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. Indeed, central to an award of tort damages is the premise
that an individual was injured in contemplation of law.[21] Thus, in Lim v. Ponce de Leon,[22] we
granted the petitioners claim for damages because he, in fact, suffered the loss of his motor
launch due to the illegal seizure thereof. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[23] we upheld the
right of petitioner to the recovery of damages as there was an injury sustained by him on account
of the illegal withholding of his horserace prize winnings.
In the instant case, what is involved is a public officers duty owing to the public in general.
The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken to
task for Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite
notice, hearing and publication, and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals,[24]we declared as having fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance.[25] A
public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a
duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid
administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body
politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule.
Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages against the
petitioner, respondent must allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the
non-performance by petitioner of the public duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the
trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged to have been sustained by the
respondent. The phrase financial and business difficulties[26] mentioned in the complaint is a
vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate into a particular injury. In contrast, the
facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as
the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment levied by the former by virtue of
RMC 37-93.
With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act
or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the
respondent.Without such delict or tortious act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a
cause of action, because a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right
of another.[27]
A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on
the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.[28]
The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to set up
this defense in a motion to dismiss, or in the answer. A motion to dismiss based on the failure to
state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged
therein. However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the relevant and material facts
well-pleaded in the complaint and inferences deducible therefrom. The admission does not extend
to conclusions or interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is
subject to judicial notice.[29]
The complaint may also be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the
complaint and its annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.[30]
The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein reiterates that under Article 32 of the Civil
Code, the liability of the public officer may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as
there is a violation of constitutional rights, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[31] where we
said:
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer
acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of duties.[32]
10
 The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner. Without any
allegation of bad faith, the cause of action in the respondents complaint (specifically, paragraph
2.02 thereof) for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code would be premised on the findings of
this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals (CIR v. CA),[33] where we
ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by petitioner in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, had fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance. This is a logical
inference. Without the decision in CIR v. CA, the bare allegations in the complaint that
respondents rights to due process of law and to equal protection of the laws were violated by the
petitioners administrative issuance would be conclusions of law, hence not hypothetically admitted
by petitioner in her motion to dismiss.
But in CIR v. CA, this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional; certainly not
from either the due process of law or equal protection of the laws perspective. On due process,
the majority, after determining that RMC 37-93 was a legislative rule, cited an earlier Revenue
Memorandum Circular (RMC No. 10-86) requiring prior notice before RMCs could become
operative.However, this Court did not make an express finding of violation of the right to due
process of law. On the aspect of equal protection, CIR v. CA said: Not insignificantly, RMC
37-93 might have likewise infringed on uniformity of taxation; a statement that does not amount to
a positive indictment of petitioner for violation of respondents constitutional right. Even if one were
to ascribe a constitutional infringement by RMC 37-93 on the non-uniformity of tax provisions, the
nature of the constitutional transgression falls under Section 28, Article VInot Section 1, Article
IIIof the Constitution.
This Courts own summation in CIR v. CA: All taken, the Court is convinced that the
hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative
issuance, does not lend itself to an interpretation that the RMC is unconstitutional. Thus, the
complaints reliance on CIR v. CAwhich is cited in, and a copy of which is annexed to, the
complaintas suggestive of a violation of due process and equal protection, must fail.
Accordingly, from the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that paragraph 2.02 of
respondents complaint loses the needed crutch to sustain a valid cause of action against the
petitioner, for what is left of the paragraph is merely the allegation that only respondents
Champion, Hope and More cigarettes were reclassified.
If we divest the complaint of its reliance on CIR v. CA, what remains of respondents
cause of action for violation of constitutional rights would be paragraph 2.01, which reads:
2.01. On or about July 1, 1993, defendant issued Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (hereinafter referred to as RMC No. 37-93)
reclassifying specifically Champion, Hope and More as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. A copy of the aforesaid circular is attached
hereto and made an integral part hereof as ANNEX A. The issuance of a
circular and its implementation resulted in the deprivation of property of
plaintiff. They were done without due process of law and in violation of the right
of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws. (Italics supplied.)
But, as intimated above, the bare allegations, done without due process of law and in
violation of the right of plaintiff to the equal protection of the laws are conclusions of law. They are
not hypothetically admitted in petitioners motion to dismiss and, for purposes of the motion to
dismiss, are not deemed as facts.
In Fluor Daniel, Inc. Philippines v. EB. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd.,[34] this Court declared
that the test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance
with the prayer of the complaint. In the instant case, since what remains of the complaint which is
hypothetically admitted, is only the allegation on the reclassification of respondents cigarettes,
there will not be enough facts for the court to render a valid judgment according to the prayer in
the complaint.
Furthermore, in an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code premised on
violation of due process, it may be necessary to harmonize the Civil Code provision with
subsequent legislative enactments, particularly those related to taxation and tax
collection. Judicial notice may be taken of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code,
as amended, and of the law creating the Court of Tax Appeals. Both statutes provide ample
remedies to aggrieved taxpayers; remedies which, in fact, were availed of by the
respondentwithout even having to pay the assessment under protestas recounted by this Court
in CIR v. CA, viz.:
In a letter, dated 19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate division of
the BIR, Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall of
RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or
on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax
deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00.
On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with
the CTA.[35]
The availability of the remedies against the assailed administrative action, the opportunity to
avail of the same, and actual recourse to these remedies, contradict the respondents claim of due
process infringement.
11

At this point, a brief examination of relevant American jurisprudence may be instructive.
42 U.S. Code 1983, a provision incorporated into the Civil Rights Act of 1871, presents a parallel
to our own Article 32 of the Civil Code, as it states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
This provision has been employed as the basis of tort suits by many petitioners intending to
win liability cases against government officials when they violate the constitutional rights of
citizens.
Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Investigation,[36] has
emerged as the leading case on the victims entitlement to recover money damages for any
injuries suffered as a result of flagrant and unconstitutional abuses of administrative power. In this
case, federal narcotics officers broke into Bivens home at 6:30 a.m. without a search warrant and
in the absence of probable cause. The agents handcuffed Bivens, searched his premises,
employed excessive force, threatened to arrest his family, subjected him to a visual strip search in
the federal court house, fingerprinted, photographed, interrogated and booked him. When Bivens
was brought before a United States Commissioner, however, charges against him were
dismissed. On the issue of whether violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal agent acting
under color of authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his
constitutional conduct, the U.S. Supreme Courtheld that Bivens is entitled to recover damages for
injuries he suffered as a result of the agents violation of the Fourth Amendment.
A number of subsequent decisions have upheld Bivens. For instance, in Scheuer v.
Rhodes,[37] a liability suit for money damages was allowed against Ohio Governor James Rhodes
by petitioners who represented three students who had been killed by Ohio National Guard troops
at Kent State University as they protested against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In Wood v.
Strickland,[38] local school board members were sued by high school students who argued that
they had been deprived of constitutional due process rights when they were expelled from school
for having spiked a punch bowl at a school function without the benefit of a full hearing. In Butz v.
Economou,[39] Economou, whose registration privilege as a commodities futures trader was
suspended, without prior warning, by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, sued on a Bivens action,
alleging that the suspension was aimed at chilling his freedom of expression right under the First
Amendment. A number of other cases[40] with virtually the same conclusion followed.
However, it is extremely dubious whether a Bivens action against government tax officials
and employees may prosper, if we consider the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Schweiker v. Chilicky,[41] that a Bivens remedy will not be allowed when other meaningful
safeguards or remedies for the rights of persons situated as (is the plaintiff) are available. It has
also been held that aBivens action is not appropriate in the civil service system[42] or in the military
justice system.[43]
In Frank Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United States of
America,[44] petitioner Vennes instituted a Bivens action against agents of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) who alleged that he (Vennes) owed $250,000 in tax liability, instituted a jeopardy
assessment, confiscated Vennes business, forced a total asset sale, and put Vennes out of
business, when in fact he owed not a dime. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, ruled:
The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that a
taxpayers remedies under the Internal Revenue Code preclude such
a Bivens action. Vennes cites to us no contrary authority, and we have found
none. Though the Supreme Court has not addressed this precise question, it
has strongly suggested that the district court correctly applied Bivens:
When the design of a Government program suggests that
Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial
mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in
the course of its administration, we have not created
additional Bivens remedies.
xxxx
Congress has provided specific and meaningful remedies for
taxpayers who challenge overzealous tax assessment and collection
activities. A taxpayer may challenge a jeopardy assessment both
administratively and judicially, and may sue the government for a tax refund,
and have authorized taxpayer actions against the United States to recover
limited damages resulting from specific types of misconduct by IRS
employees.These carefully crafted legislative remedies confirm that, in the
politically sensitive realm of taxation, Congresss refusal to permit unrestricted
damage action by taxpayers has not been inadvertent. Thus, the district court
correctly dismissed Venness Bivens claims against IRS agents for their tax
assessment and collection activities.
12
 2008Resolution. Civil Case No. CV-97-341-MK, pending with
the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, is DISMISSED.
In still another Bivens action, instituted by a taxpayer against IRS employees for alleged violation
of due process rights concerning a tax dispute, the U.S. District Court of Minnesota said: SO ORDERED.

In addition, the (Tax) Code provides taxpayers with remedies, judicial

and otherwise, for correcting and redressing wrongful acts taken by IRS
employees in connection with any collection activities. Although these
provisions do not provide taxpayers with an all-encompassing remedy for
wrongful acts of IRS personnel, the rights established under the Code illustrate
that it provides all sorts of rights against the overzealous officialdom, including,
most fundamentally, the right to sue the government for a refund if forced to
overpay taxes, and it would make the collection of taxes chaotic if a taxpayer
could bypass the remedies provided by Congress simply by bringing a damage
suit against IRS employees.[45]

American jurisprudence obviously validates the contention of the petitioner.

Finally, we invite attention to Section 227, Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997), which
provides:

Section 227. Satisfaction of Judgment Recovered Against any

Internal Revenue Officer. When an action is brought against any Internal
Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in the
performance of official duty, and the Commissioner is notified of such action in
time to make defense against the same, through the Solicitor General, any
judgment, damages or costs recovered in such action shall be satisfied by the
Commissioner, upon approval of the Secretary of Finance, or if the same be
paid by the person sued shall be repaid or reimbursed to him.

No such judgment, damages or costs shall be paid or reimbursed in behalf of a

person who has acted negligently or in bad faith, or with willful oppression.

Because the respondents complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any
money judgment by the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of
thePhilippines. As such, the complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.[46]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT petitioners motion for reconsideration of the

June 19, 2007 Decision and DENY respondents motion for reconsideration of the June 25,

13
G.R. No. 197597 April 8, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner,
vs.
WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG
CITY and all other persons acting on his behalf and/or having custody of DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In
such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally
detained.
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision2 reversing the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting
Datukan Malang Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other
Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo
visited and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."5 He returned to the
Philippines on December 20, 2009.6
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.7
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating
in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by
the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name.
There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in
the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.9
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of his passport,
boarding passes and other documents"10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo
was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not
Butukan S. Malang.12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport
that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at
the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days.13
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in
Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on
documents.14
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently
detained.15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas
Corpus16questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained
that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.18
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010,the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice).20 The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the
Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and
produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010.21 Proceedings
before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought Salibo before the
trial court. The Warden, however, failed to file a Return one day before the hearing. He also
appeared without counsel during the hearing.22
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010 at 2:00 p.m.23
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. However, during the September
29, 2010 hearing on the Return, the Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal
Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.24 Salibo questioned
14
the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf of the Warden and argued that only the
Office of the Solicitor General has the authority to appear on behalf of a respondent in a habeas
corpus proceeding.25
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court reset the hearing on the
Return to October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.26
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito
appeared on behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo’s Petition
for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a valid Information and
Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was "no longer availing."27 Salibo countered that
the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to
by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused.
Reiterating that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the
Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial court to order his release from detention.28
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"29 under any resolution, information, or
amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information presented in court
did not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there
was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the
trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court.30
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang charged with
murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation
Clearance dated August 27, 2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the
date of the certificate.31 A Philippine passport bearing Salibo’s picture showed the name "Datukan
Malang Salibo."32
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the country"33 from
November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact was supported by a Certification34 from Saudi
Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo’s departure from and arrival in Manila on board its flights.35 A
Flight Manifest issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No.
0652113 also showed this fact.36
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo’s Petition for Habeas
Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court’s
Decision.38Through its Decision dated April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo’s
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo’s arrest and subsequent
detention were made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest.39 Even assuming that
Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals
said that "[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before
the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"40 According to the Court of Appeals, Salibo’s proper
remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.41
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 which the Court of Appeals denied in the
Resolution43 dated July 6, 2011.
Proceedings before this court
On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for Review (With Urgent
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a
Comment,45 after which petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.46
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with 57 counts of murder
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals’
finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was not duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of
his liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas Corpus.47 Petitioner Salibo
adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial
court the authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court’s Decision should be
deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly
filed his appeal before this court.48
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even
assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner
Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition
for Habeas Corpus.49
The issues for our resolution are:
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner
Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and
15
Second, whether petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.
I In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a Petition for Habeas
Contrary to petitioner Salibo’s claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of
Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court or
any of its members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by
law,51 or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ
and requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to
file a return of the writ.53 A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.55 Should the
court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court
shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court
"acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas
corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court . . . [o]n
behalf of . . . Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)]."59 This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered
respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This
court made the Writ returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.60
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First Instance denied Saulo’s
Petition for Habeas Corpus.61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance heard the Petition for
Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely delegation[.]"62 Consequently,
"this Court should have the final say regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only [this
court’s decision] . . . should be regarded as operative."63
This court rejected Saulo’s argument and stated that his "logic is more apparent than real."64 It
ruled that when a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves
whether the respondent should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in
whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty.65 However,
once the superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of
Court, the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body,
whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of effect[.]"66 The decision on the petition for habeas
corpus is a decision of the lower court, not of the superior court.
Corpus. This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance granted
Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered that Medina be released from detention.68 The
Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals.69 Atty. Amelito
Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a "Motion for Certification of Appeal
to the Supreme Court." The Court of Appeals, however, denied the Motion.70
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for Certification of Appeal
to the Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal basis.71 The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in
deciding Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus, "acquired the power and authority to determine the
merits of the case[.]"72 Consequently, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on
Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals.73
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and
decided the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and authority to
determine the merits"74 of petitioner Salibo’s Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas
Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court
of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts,75 respondent
Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
II
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom."77 The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary78 and
summary79 in nature, consistent with the law’s "zealous regard for personal liberty."80 Under Rule
102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend to all cases of llegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."81 The primary purpose of the
writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
16
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."82 "Any restraint which will preclude freedom
of action is sufficient."83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to
the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy84 or when
there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively
substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right,
courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to
liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.87
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario Gumabon (Gumabon), Blas
Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno
Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. They
commenced serving their respective sentences of reclusion perpetua.89
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving their sentences, this
court promulgated People v. Hernandez90 in 1956, ruling that the complex crime of rebellion with
murder does not exist.91
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus. They prayed for their release from incarceration and argued that the
Hernandez doctrine must retroactively apply to them.92
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares properly availed of a
petition for habeas corpus.93 Citing Harris v. Nelson,94 this court said:
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action. . . . The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to
reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural
mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The
very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to
insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.95
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,96 the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued Resolution No. 25,
Seriesof 1917. The Resolution ordered the Mangyans removed from their native habitat and
compelled them to permanently settle in an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the
Resolution, Mangyans who refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao reservation were
imprisoned.97
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi and all the other
Mangyans being held in the reservation.98 Since the application questioned the legality of
deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other Mangyans, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus
and ordered the Provincial Board of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ.99
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.100 "[T]o exterminate
vice,"101 Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex
workers previously employed by these brothels were rounded up and placed in ships bound for
Davao. The women were expelled from Manila and deported to Davao without their consent.102
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, this court issued a Writ of
Habeas Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among others, to make a Return of the Writ.
Mayor Justo Lukban, however, failed to make a Return, arguing that he did not have custody of
the women.103
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a Return of the
Writ.104 As to the legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived the
women he had deported to Davao of their liberty, specifically, of their privilege of domicile.105 It
said that the women, "despite their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not
chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other
citizens[.]"106 The women had the right "to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality."107
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the
writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of
his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality
of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the
issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial
inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas
corpus even if the petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]"108 Although the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when
the public safety requires it,109 the writ itself may not be suspended.110
III
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of
liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.111 The restraint then has become
legal,112 and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.113
17
Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if
the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held
to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines,
or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police arrested Atty. Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued
by then Minister of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty.
Ilagan’s arrest, 15 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in
Camp Catitipan, where he was detained.115
Among Atty. Ilagan’s visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty. Arellano, however,
no longer left Camp Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him based on an unsigned
Mission Order.116
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military informed the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty.
Risonar). To verify his arrest papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. LikeAtty. Arellano, the
military did not allow Atty. Risonar toleave. He was arrested based on a Mission Order signed by
General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.117
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas
Corpus in behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.118
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile, Armed Forces of the
Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos), and
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police Regional Commander Brigadier General
Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ.119 This court set the
hearing on the Return on May 23, 1985.120
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue contended that the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar
by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A.121 The lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly "played
active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
Democratic Front."122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the temporary release of Attys.
Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar on the recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.123
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister Enrile, General Ramos,
and General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for Reconsideration.124 They filed an Urgent
Manifestation/Motion stating that Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan,
Arellano, and Risonar. They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus for
being moot and academic.125
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism opposed the motion. According to them, no
preliminary investigation was conducted before the filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan, Arellano,
and Risonar were deprived of their right to due process. Consequently, the Information was
void.126
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became moot and academic
with the filing of the Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in court:127
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by
virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The
function of the special proceeding of habeas corpusis to inquire into the legality of one’s detention.
Now that the detained attorneys’ incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal
cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy
of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.128 (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v. Ramos.129 Roberto Umil,
Rolando Dural,Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo Anonuevo,
Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested
without a warrant for their alleged membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People’s Army.130
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations against them were
filed before this court. The filing of the Informations, according to this court, rendered the Petitions
for habeas corpus moot and academic, thus:131
18
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the
proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged
before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.132(Emphasis in the original) In
such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas
corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly
course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash
the information or the warrant of arrest.134
At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or
information based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i)
That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information
filed against him [or her] for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information."136 If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to
quash, the accused "hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the information."137 "Evidence
aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are not to be considered."138
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be
cured by amendment, the court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or information]."139 If
the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information
do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution "an opportunity to correct the
defect by amendment."140 If after amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the
same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or information.141
IV
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue
of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an
order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of
a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221,
Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.charged and accused
Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of57 counts of murder in connection with the
Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
19
In cases falling under paragraphs(a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to
clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo
was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing
nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any
offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant.
They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas
corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the "disturbing" case of
143
Ilagan.144 Like petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any
arrest papers against him. Then and there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his
dissenting opinion in Ilagan,145 Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary
investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of his right to due
process of law — a ground for the grant of a petition for habeas corpus:146 The majority decision
holds that the filing of the information without preliminary investigation falls within the exceptions
of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this is
erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules. The petitioners are not
persons "lawfully arrested without a warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the stale and inoperative
PDA of January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if all that was needed
was to get a PDA and then serve it at one’s whim and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA
is premised on its imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President himself. The
majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes arrests without warrant by a
citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of
committing the offense. Quite obviously, the arrest was not a citizen’s arrest nor were they caught
in flagrante delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an
offense "has in fact just been committed." This connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes
cases under the old rule where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago.
Similarly, the arrestor must have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that the [arrestee] has
committed it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has committed it"
under the old rule). Clearly, then, an information could not just be filed against the petitioners
without due process and preliminary investigation.147 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo
filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of
the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will
not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The
Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and
Datukan Malang Salibo are the same person. There is evidence, however, that the person
detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person named
Datukan Malang Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,148 his identification card from the
Office on Muslim Affairs,149 his Tax Identification Number card,150 and clearance from the National
Bureau of Investigation151 all bearing his picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang
Salibo." None of these government-issued documents showed that petitioner Salibo used the alias
"Butukan S. Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23, 2009
when the Maguindanao Massacre occurred.1âwphi1
A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi
Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A
Certification153 from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia
on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the
Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20, 2009.
V
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the most complex case
pending in our courts. The case involves 57 victims154 and 197 accused, two (2) of which have
become state witnesses.155 As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been arraigned,
and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already been resolved.156 To require petitioner
Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his liberty. Urgency dictates that
we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he is not Butukan S. Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo’s release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence.
However, between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty without due
process of law and the government that has all the "manpower and the resources at [its]
20
command"157 to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper remedies
against him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived
of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated April 19, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon City Jail
Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building,Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, is
ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Malang Salibo from detention.

The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court is hereby
NOTED.

SO ORDERED.

21
G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012 CHARGE 1: VIOLATION OF THE 96TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN
OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN).
MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), Petitioner,
vs. SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: cash holdings with
GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.), DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF the Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six
CORRECTIONS, Respondents. million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received from AFPSLAI
from June 2003 to December 2003 in the amount of one million three hundred sixty-five thousand
DECISION pesos (P1,365,000.00); dollar peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking
Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's
Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wife’s names
PERALTA, J.:
such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr.
PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC 134,
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 under Rule 65, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ 582 and 2001 Toyota RAV 4 Utility Vehicle with
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to annul and set aside the Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011, promulgated by the Office of the President.
SPECIFICATION 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following: FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn
On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act
Col. Henry A. Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes, issued a Restriction to No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: his cash holdings
Quarters1 containing the following: with the Armed Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six
million five hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received form AFPSLAI in
1. Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the directive of the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP to the June 2002 and December 2002 in the total amount of one million four hundred thirty-five thousand
undersigned dtd 12 October 2004, you are hereby placed under Restriction to Quarters under pesos (1,435,000.00), dollar and peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking
guard pending investigation of your case. Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut
Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his
2. You are further advised that you are not allowed to leave your quarters without the expressed wife’s names such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with
permission from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP. Plate Nr. PEV-665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr.
FEC-134, 1997 Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ-582, and 2001 Toyota RAV 4
3. In case you need immediate medical attention or required by the circumstance to be confined in
a hospital, you shall likewise be under guard. Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.

Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004 was filed with the Special General Court SPECIFICATION 3: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
Martial NR 2 presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.), enumerating the FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, while in the active military
following violations allegedly committed by petitioner: service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully violate his

22
solemn oath as a military officer to uphold the Constitution and serve the people with utmost
loyalty by acquiring and holding the status of an immigrant/permanent residence of the United
States of America in violation of the State policy governing public officers, thereby causing
dishonor and disrespect to the military professional and seriously compromises his position as an
officer and exhibits him as morally unworthy to remain in the honorable profession of arms.
CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE 97TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO
GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE).
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assets in
his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and
military discipline.
SPECIFICATION NO. 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003,
knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assts in his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and
military discipline.
Petitioner, upon arraignment on November 16, 2004, pleaded not guilty on all the charges.
The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a Memorandum2 dated November 18, 2004, directed the
transfer of confinement of petitioner from his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the
ISAFP Detention Center. On the same day, petitioner, having reached the age of fifty-six (56),
compulsorily retired from military service after availing of the provisions of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1650,3 amending Sections 3 and 5 of P.D. 1638, which establishes a system of
retirement for military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Pursuant to a Resolution4 dated June 1, 2005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner was transferred from the ISAFP Detention Center to the Camp Crame Custodial
Detention Center.
After trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2, on December 2, 2005, the findings or the
After-Trial Report5of the same court was read to the petitioner. The report contains the following
verdict and sentence:
MGEN CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 AFP the court in closed session upon secret written
ballot 2/3 of all the members present at the time the voting was taken concurring the following
findings. Finds you:
On Specification 1 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the
Phils, dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine
Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 2 of Charge 1 – Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the
Phils, dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine
Island, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.
On Specification 3 of Charge 1 – Guilty
On Specification 1 of Charge 2 – Guilty
On Specification 2 of Charge 2 – Guilty
And again in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 all the members are present at the time
the votes was taken concurrently sentences you to be dishonorably [discharged] from the service,
to forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due and to be confined at hard labor at such
place the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. So ordered. (Emphases
supplied)
Afterwards, in a document6 dated March 27, 2006, the Staff Judge Advocate stated the following
recommended action:
IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
The court, after evaluating the evidence, found accused: GUILTY on Charge 1, GUILTY on
Specification 1 on Charge 1 – except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines,
dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of
the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY
on Charge 1, Specification 2 except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines,
dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of
the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY
on Specification 3 of Charge 1; GUILTY on Charge 2 and all its specifications. The sentence
imposed by the Special GCM is to be dishonorably discharged from the service, to forfeit all pay
and allowances due and to become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place the
reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. As it is, the sentence is proper and
23
legal. Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, is the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October
2004 shall be credited in his favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was
sentenced. Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not
served is less than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.
4. To carry this recommendation into effect, a draft "ACTION OF THE REVIEWING AUTHORITY"
is hereto attached.
In an undated document,7 the AFP Board of Military Review recommended the following action:
8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
A. Only so much of the sentence as provides for the mandatory penalty of dismissal from the
military service and forfeiture of pay and allowances due and to become due for the offenses of
violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and for violation of AW 97
(Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) be imposed upon the Accused.
B. The records of the instant case should be forwarded to the President thru the Chief of Staff and
the Secretary of National Defense, for final review pursuant to AW 47, the Accused herein being a
General Officer whose case needs confirmation by the President.
C. To effectuate the foregoing, attached for CSAFP's signature/approval is a proposed 1st
Indorsement to the President, thru the Secretary of National Defense, recommending approval of
the attached prepared "ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT."
After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive confinement, on December 16, 2010,
petitioner was released from the Camp Crame Detention Center.8
The Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the
Confirming Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court
Martial against petitioner. The Confirmation of Sentence,9 reads in part:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, do hereby confirm the sentence imposed by the Court Martial in
the case of People of the Philippines versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP:
a) To be dishonorable discharged from the service;
b) To forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and
c) To be confined for a period of two (2) years in a penitentiary.
FURTHER, pursuant to the 48th and 49th Articles of War, the sentence on Major General Carlos
Flores Garcia AFP shall not be remitted/mitigated by any previous confinement. Major General
Carlos Flores Garcia AFP shall serve the foregoing sentence effective on this date.
DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th day of September, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand
and Eleven.
Consequently, on September 15, 2011, respondent Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T.
Gazmin, issued a Memorandum10 to the Chief of Staff, AFP for strict implementation, the
Confirmation of Sentence in the Court Martial Case of People of the Philippines Versus Major
General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP.
On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and detained, and continues to be detained at
the National Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.11
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and petition for habeas
corpus, alternatively. However, this Court, in its Resolution12 dated October 10, 2011, denied the
petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration13 dated November 15,
2011, but was denied14 by this Court on December 12, 2011.
Petitioner enumerates the following grounds to support his petition:
GROUNDS
A.
THE JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL CEASED IPSO
FACTO UPON THE RETIREMENT OF PETITIONER, FOR WHICH REASON
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE, AND PETITIONER'S
ARREST AND CONFINEMENT PURSUANT THERETO IS ILLEGAL, THUS
WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
B.
24
 EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER
REMAINED AMENABLE TO COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION AFTER HIS
RETIREMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE SENTENCE OF TWO (2)
YEARS CONFINEMENT WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, FOR WHICH
REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT IS ILLEGAL, THUS
WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
C.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE PENALTY
OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT MAY BE IMPOSED IN ADDITION TO
THE PENALTIES OF DISMISSAL AND FORFEITURE, THE SENTENCE HAD
BEEN FULLY SERVED IN VIEW OF PETITIONER'S PREVENTIVE
CONFINEMENT WHICH EXCEEDED THE 2-YEAR SENTENCE, AND THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REPUDIATE SAID
SERVICE OF SENTENCE, FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST
AND CONFINEMENT DESPITE FULL SERVICE OF SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL,
THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.15
In view of the earlier resolution of this Court denying petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, the
above grounds are rendered moot and academic. Thus, the only issue in this petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was properly filed with this
Court, is whether the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011.
In its Comment16 dated October 27, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) lists the
following counter-arguments:
I.
PETITIONER'S DIRECT RECOURSE TO THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATES THE
DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS; HENCE, THE PETITION SHOULD BE
OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
II.
THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER DESPITE
HIS RETIREMENT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM SINCE
THE SAID TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION HAD ALREADY FULLY ATTACHED PRIOR TO
PETITIONER'S RETIREMENT.
III.
THE CONFIRMATION ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DIRECTING
PETITIONER TO BE CONFINED FOR TWO (2) YEARS IN A PENITENTIARY IS SANCTIONED
BY C. A. NO. 408 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 178, PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP.
IV.
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS NOT VIOLATED IN
THIS CASE.
V.
THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT ON PETITIONER
BY THE GCM, AND AS CONFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, IS VALID.
VI.
ACCORDINGLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING AND IMPLEMENTING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE.17
Petitioner, in his Reply18 dated January 20, 2012, disagreed with the arguments raised by the
OSG due to the following:
(A)
THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE IS AN ACT BY
THE PRESIDENT, AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND NOT MERELY AS
THE HEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THEREFORE, THE
HONORABLE COURT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE COURT WHERE HIS
ACT MAY BE IMPUGNED, AND NOT IN THE LOWER COURTS, I.E.,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ("RTC") OR THE COURT OF APPEALS ("CA"),
AS THE OSG ERRONEOUSLY POSTULATES.
(B)
25
 ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL ("GCM") RETAINED
JURISDICTION "OVER THE PERSON" OF PETITIONER EVEN AFTER HE
RETIRED FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES ('AFP"),
HOWEVER, HIS RETIREMENT, CONTRARY TO THE STAND OF THE OSG,
SEVERED HIS "JURAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE MILITARY, THEREBY
PLACING HIM BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIVE REACH OF THE AFP'S
COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION.
(C)
UNDER ART. 29, REVISED PENAL CODE ("RPC"), PETITIONER'S COURT
MARTIAL SENTENCE OF TWO (2) YEARS IN CARCERATION HAD
ALREADY BEEN SERVED IN FULL SINCE HE HAD ALREADY SUFFERED
PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT OF AT LEAST SIX (6) YEARS BEFORE THE
SENTENCE COULD BE CONFIRMED, WHICH MEANS THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAD NO MORE JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED IT,
THEREBY RENDERING THE "CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE" A PATENT
NULLITY, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, INVALIDATING THE OSG'S POSITION
THAT THE PRESIDENT STILL HAD JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED
THE SENTENCE.19
Petitioner raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try his case. According
to him, the said jurisdiction ceased ipso facto upon his compulsory retirement. Thus, he insists
that the Office of the President had acted without jurisdiction in issuing the confirmation of his
sentence.
This Court finds the above argument bereft of merit.
Article 2 of the Articles of War20 circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law over persons subject
thereto, to wit:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. - The following persons are subject to these articles and
shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons
subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the
Philippine Constabulary; all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active
duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other
persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from
the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same;
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise
subject to these articles;
(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.
(As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516).
It is indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the active service of the AFP in March 2003 and
2004, when the alleged violations were committed. The charges were filed on October 27, 2004
and he was arraigned on November 16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations were
committed until the time petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over
the case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the
parties but continues until the case is terminated.21 Therefore, petitioner's retirement on November
18, 2004 did not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction. In B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V.
Gudani, et al. v. Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga, et al.,22 this Court ruled that:
This point was settled against Gen. Gudani's position in Abadilla v. Ramos, where the Court
declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to
be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated
against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the
officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, the Court held:
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the
alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to
the end of the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
Citing Colonel Winthrop's treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated:
We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which
goes against the contention of the petitioners, viz. —
3. Offenders in general — Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law,
in regard to military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to
them previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to
trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle has
mostly been applied to cases where the offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In
26
such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished. It is
held therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a
discharge is complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him — as by arrest
or the service of charges, — the military jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached may be
continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of the enlistment of
the accused x x x
Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained
of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4
October 2005. We see no reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also points out that
under Section 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, as amended, "an officer or enlisted man
carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be subject to the Articles of
War x x x" To this citation, petitioners do not offer any response, and in fact have excluded the
matter of Gen. Gudani's retirement as an issue in their subsequent memorandum.23
It is also apt to mention that under Executive Order No. 178, or the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP,
the jurisdiction of courts-martial over officers, cadets, soldiers, and other military personnel in the
event of discharge or other separation from the service, and the exceptions thereto, is defined
thus:
10. COURT-MARTIAL – Jurisdiction in general – Termination – General Rules – The general rule
is that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers and others in the military service of
the Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as
to any offense committed during a period of service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry
into the military service.
Exceptions – To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions, among them the
following:
xxxx
In certain case, where the person's discharge or other separation does not interrupt his status as
a person belonging to the general category of persons subject to military law, court-martial
jurisdiction does not terminate. Thus, where an officer holding a reserve commission is discharged
from said commission by reason of acceptance of a commission in the Regular Force, there being
no interval between services under the respective commissions, there is no terminating of the
officer's military status, but merely the accomplishment of a change in his status from that of a
reserve to that of a regular officer, and that court-martial jurisdiction to try him for an offense
(striking enlisted men for example) committed prior to the discharge is not terminated by the
discharge. So also, where a dishonorable discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense
committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable discharge, such discharge does not
terminate his amenability to trial for the offense. (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioner also asserts that the General Court Martial's continuing jurisdiction over him despite his
retirement holds true only if the charge against him involves fraud, embezzlement or
misappropriation of public funds citing this Court's ruling in De la Paz v. Alcaraz,et al.24 and Martin
v. Ve r.25 However, this is not true. The OSG is correct in stating that in De la Paz,26 military
jurisdiction over the officer who reverted to inactive status was sustained by this Court because
the violation involved misappropriation of public funds committed while he was still in the active
military service, while in Martin,27 military jurisdiction was affirmed because the violation pertained
to illegal disposal of military property. Both cited cases centered on the nature of the offenses
committed by the military personnel involved, justifying the exercise of jurisdiction by the
courts-martial. On the other hand, in the present case, the continuing military jurisdiction is based
on prior attachment of jurisdiction on the military court before petitioner's compulsory retirement.
This continuing jurisdiction is provided under Section 1 of P.D. 1850,28 as amended, thus:
Section 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed
Forces. - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding – (a) uniformed members of the
Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall
henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons
subject to military law under article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or
offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles
of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or
tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has
prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial
jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no
longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having
duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law: Provided further, that the President
may, in the interest of justice, order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular
case be tried by the appropriate civil court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having established the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial over the case and the person of
the petitioner, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, therefore acquired the jurisdiction to confirm
petitioner's sentence as mandated under Article 47 of the Articles of War, which states:
Article 47. Confirmation – When Required. - In addition to the approval required by article forty-five,
confirmation by the President is required in the following cases before the sentence of a
court-martial is carried into execution, namely:
27
(a) Any sentence respecting a general officer;
(b) Any sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer except that in time of war a sentence
extending to the dismissal of an officer below the grade of brigadier general may be carried into
execution upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in the field;
(c) Any sentence extending to the suspension or dismissal of a cadet, probationary second
lieutenant; and
(d) Any sentence of death, except in the case of persons convicted in time of war, of murder,
mutiny, desertion, or as spies, and in such excepted cases of sentence of death may be carried
into execution, subject to the provisions of Article 50, upon confirmation by the commanding
general of the Army in the said field.
When the authority competent to confirm the sentence has already acted as the approving
authority no additional confirmation by him is necessary. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242).
(Emphasis supplied.)
In connection therewith, petitioner argues that the confirmation issued by the Office of the
President directing him to be confined for two (2) years in the penitentiary had already been fully
served in view of his preventive confinement which had exceeded two (2) years. Therefore,
according to him, the Office of the President no longer has the authority to order his confinement
in a penitentiary. On the other hand, the OSG opines that petitioner cannot legally demand the
deduction of his preventive confinement in the service of his imposed two-year confinement in a
penitentiary, because unlike our Revised Penal Code29 which specifically mandates that the
period of preventive imprisonment of the accused shall be deducted from the term of his
imprisonment, the Articles of War and/or the Manual for Courts-Martial do not provide for the
same deduction in the execution of the sentence imposed by the General Court Martial as
confirmed by the President in appropriate cases.
On the above matter, this Court finds the argument raised by the OSG unmeritorious and finds
logic in the assertion of petitioner that Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code can be made
applicable in the present case.
The OSG maintains that military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine
judicial system, citing Olaguer, et al. v. Military Commission No. 4,30 hence, they are not expected
to apply criminal law concepts in their implementation and execution of decisions involving the
discipline of military personnel. This is misleading. In Olaguer, the courts referred to were military
commissions created under martial law during the term of former President Ferdinand Marcos and
was declared unconstitutional by this Court, while in the present case, the General Court Martial
which tried it, was created under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, and remains a valid
entity.
In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,31 this Court ruled that a court-martial
case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the
same case, this Court clarified as to what constitutes the words "any court" used in Section 1732 of
the 1935 Constitution prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel in any criminal case
in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation
to his office. This Court held:
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court"
includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning
of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as
counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or
a Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where
words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail
over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the
limited sense is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not
hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial;
what we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may
provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not
refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of
Ramon Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection
the following:
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no
relation or connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is
a court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal.
As a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the
absence of special provision of the subject in the military code, it observes in general the rules of
evidence as adopted in the common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms of
28
its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. and the accused "without partiality,
favor, or affection," and according, not only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its
"conscience," i.e. its sense of substantial right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the
words of the Attorney General, court-martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice.
(Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)
In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the
same authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any
other, and it differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies to
officers and soldiers of the army but not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited
to breaches of military duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United
States, have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter courts have
in controversies within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled
to as untrammelled an exercise of their powers.
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. — It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has
the right to be represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the
statues controlling the procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional provision
extending that right to one accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and
gives the accused the undeniable right to defend by counsel, and that a court-martial has no
power to refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if he is properly licensed to practice in the
courts of the state. (Citing the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs. Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127;
36 American Jurisprudence 253)
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be
approved by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not
change or affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First
Instance imposing death penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be
executed.
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the
Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the
Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1,
Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury
done to the Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the
People of the Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or
special court-martial shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."
Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:
In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-martial is
strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a
debt, or award damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil
verdict; its proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's
Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)
In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some
meaning, and none can be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte
Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74;
Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol.
10, p. 485.)
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal
and not an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to
another prosecution of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the
accused in jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Grafton vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following
was held:
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be
accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgments of
a civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance; x x x and restricting our decision to
the above question of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and
for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the
crime of homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a military court of
competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States, could not be
subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that
territory.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
29
Hence, as extensively discussed above, the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest
sense of the word and acts as a criminal court. On that premise, certain provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for
Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future
may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
A special law is defined as a penal law which punishes acts not defined and penalized by the
Revised Penal Code.34 In the present case, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman (96th Article of War) and Violation of the 97th Article of
War, or Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline, both of which are not defined
and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The corresponding penalty imposed by the General
Court Martial, which is two (2) years of confinement at hard labor is penal in nature. Therefore,
absent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and
execution of the General Court Martial's decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner's period of confinement
to his sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review, thus:
x x x Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, is the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October
2004 shall be credited in his favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was
sentenced. Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not
served is less than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer
appropriate.35 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above was reiterated in the Action of the Reviewing Authority, thus:
In the foregoing General Court-Martial case of People of the Philippines versus MGEN. CARLOS
F. GARCIA 0-5820 AFP (now Retired), the verdict of GUILTY is hereby approved.
The sentence to be dishonorably discharged from the service; to forfeit all pay and allowances
due and to become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority
may direct for a period of two (2) years is also approved.
Considering that the Accused has been in confinement since 18 October 2004, the entire period
of his confinement since 18 October 2004 will be credited in his favor. Consequently, his two (2)
year sentence of confinement will expire on 18 October 2006.
The proper place of confinement during the remaining unserved portion of his sentence is an
official military detention facility.1âwphi1 However, the Accused is presently undergoing trial
before the Sandiganbayan which has directed that custody over him be turned over to the civilian
authority and that he be confined in a civilian jail or detention facility pending the disposition of the
case(s) before said Court. For this reason, the Accused shall remain confined at the PNP's
detention facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The Armed Forces of the Philippines defers to the
civilian authority on this matter.
Should the Accused be released from confinement upon lawful orders by the Sandiganbayan
before the expiration of his sentence adjudged by the military court, the Provost Marshal General
shall immediately take custody over the Accused, who shall be transferred to and serve the
remaining unserved portion thereof at the ISAFP detention facility in Camp General Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City.36 (Emphasis supplied.)
Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.37 It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.38 The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities.39 In other words, the concept
of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.40 It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to
all members of the same class.41 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."42 In the present case, petitioner belongs to the class of those who have been
convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no
substantial distinction between those who are convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature
under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same reasoning, petitioner is
also entitled to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.43 It must be remembered that the
provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal in nature.
30
The OSG is correct when it argued that the power to confirm a sentence of the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, includes the power to approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the
sentence given by the court martial. As provided in Article 48 of the Articles of War:
Article 48. Power Incident to Power to Confirm. - The power to confirm the sentence of a
court-martial shall be held to include:
(a) The power to confirm or disapprove a finding, and to confirm so much only of a finding of guilty
of a particular offense as involves a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense when, in the
opinion of the authority having power to confirm, the evidence of record requires a finding of only
the lesser degree of guilt;
(b) The power to confirm or disapprove the whole or any part of the sentence; and
(c) The power to remand a case for rehearing, under the provisions of Article 50. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In addition, the President also has the power to mitigate or remit a sentence. Under Article 49 of
the Articles of War:
Article 49. Mitigation or Remission of Sentence. - The power to order the execution of the
sentence adjudged by a court-martial shall be held to include, inter alia, the power to mitigate or
remit the whole or any part of the sentence.
Any unexpected portion of a sentence adjudged by a court-martial may be mitigated or remitted
by the military authority competent to appoint, for the command, exclusive of penitentiaries and
Disciplinary Barracks of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine Constabulary, in which
the person under sentence is held, a court of the kind that imposed the sentence, and the same
power may be exercised by superior military authority; but no sentence approved or confirmed by
the President shall be remitted or mitigated by any other authority, and no approved sentence of
loss of files by an officer shall be remitted or mitigated by any authority inferior to the President,
except as provided in Article 52.
When empowered by the President to do so, the commanding general of the Army in the field or
the area commander may approve or confirm and commute (but not approve or confirm without
commuting), mitigate, or remit and then order executed as commuted, mitigated, or remitted any
sentence which under those Articles requires the confirmation of the President before the same
may be executed. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242).
Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military
personnel is a clear recognition of the superiority of civilian authority over the military. However,
although the law (Articles of War) which conferred those powers to the President is silent as to the
deduction of the period of preventive confinement to the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier,
such is also the right of an accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC.
As to petitioner's contention that his right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated, this
Court finds the same to be without merit.
No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy
disposition of cases.44 However, it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative
and flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient.
Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.45 In
determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this
Court has laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such
delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused
by the delay.46
In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being
questioned by petitioner is the delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically,
the case has already been decided by the General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by
the proper reviewing authorities without any delay. The only thing missing then was the
confirmation of sentence by the President. The records do not show that, in those six (6) years
from the time the decision of the General Court Martial was promulgated until the sentence was
finally confirmed by the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his right to a speedy
disposition of his case. This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,47 where, in
spite of the lapse of more than ten years of delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could not
rightfully complain of delay violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his case, since he
was part of the reason for the failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution. The
Court held, inter alia:
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for
resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of
Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter
court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of
stenographic notes that matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More
importantly, it was only after the new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November
9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the
accused suddenly became zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
31
 xxxx WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of Major General Carlos F.
Garcia, AFP (Ret.) is hereby DISMISSED. However, applying the provisions of Article 29 of the
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to Revised Penal Code, the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement
speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the
assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right − a situation amounting to laches − conditions set forth by the same law.
had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records
and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have SO ORDERED.
taken a different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his
memorandum and 1989 when the case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his
right which was granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at least made some
overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe
stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as
a waiver of such right.

While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a
speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive
and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's
individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to
public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the
accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just
the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right
seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on
the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give the parties
fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.48

Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights.49 In fact, the delay in the
confirmation of his sentence was to his own advantage, because without the confirmation from the
President, his sentence cannot be served.

Anent petitioner's other arguments, the same are already rendered moot and academic due to the
above discussions.1âwphi1

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse
of discretion, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.50 Thus, applying, the earlier disquisitions, this Court finds that the Office of the President did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence in question.

32