PHILIPPINE ARMY MANUAL 3-06

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Proponent: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil-Military

Operations, G7, Philippine Army
Promulgated: 09 August 2022
 PHILIPPINE ARMY MANUAL 3-06

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Proponent: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil-Military

Operations, G7, Philippine Army
Promulgated: 09 August 2022
 PHILIPPINE ARMY MANUAL 3-06

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Philippine Army Manual 3-06 (PAM 3-06) is promulgated on 09 August 2022 by

authority of the Commanding General, Philippine Army

LTGEN ROMEO S BRAWNER JR PA

Commanding General, Philippine Army
 PAM 3-06

Preface

1. The Information Operations Manual provides the overarching definition,

relevance and application of Information Operations in strengthening military power
and measuring the effect of Army operations. It focuses on how the prevailing planning
and decision making process of the PA are applied in the context of IO in full spectrum
of operations.

2. This also sets forth the key elements, concepts, frameworks and principles
through which IO activities are anchored on as well as the composition of the
information environment; importance of information-related capabilities in support to
military operations; and identification of key stakeholders of the various IO activities.
It also determines the effective sustainment and depth to which the PA IO can conduct
decisive operations in support to its overall mission accomplishment.

3. The PA Information Operations Manual guides and directs Commanders, IO

planners and practitioners to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in the operational
and information environments. It applies to the Philippine Army, its commanders, joint
task forces, and its subordinate components.

4. The proponent of this manual is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Civil-Military Operations, G7, Philippine Army. However, Doctrine and Capability
Integration Center (P), TRADOC, PA is responsible for the review and updating of this
material. Send comments or recommendations to further improve this manual to
Commander, TRADOC, PA (Attn: Director, DACIC) or via email at
dcannex45@gmail.com and via website at doctrinecenterpa.com. Feedbacks to this
publication are also welcome telephonically via the Bonifacio Telephone Exchange
trunk line number 845-9555 or military local line number 7650 extension 4971.

5. All publications, manuals and directives inconsistent with this manual are
hereby rescinded.

6. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not
refer exclusively to men.

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Content Page

Chapter I – Understanding Information Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Importance of Information Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Information Operations as Element of Army Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Information Operations as Contributor to Information Superiority . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Information Operations in Landpower Maneuver Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter II – Fundamentals of Information Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Information Operations Framework, Focus and Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Information Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Different Information-Related Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Selection of Information-Related Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
Information Operations Organization and Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chapter III – Information Operations Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Operations Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Information Operations Intent of the Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Military Decision Making Process Application in Information Operations. . . . . . 36
Targeting and Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Chapter IV – Information Operations in Army Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
The Full Spectrum Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Counterinsurgency Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
Civil-Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
Annexes
Annex A – Conducting Information Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Annex B – Support Relationship between Information Related Capability. . . . . . 73
Annex C – Example of an Information Operations Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Annex D – Example of an Information Operations Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Annex E – Example of an Information Operations Supporting Plan Annex . . . . . 79
Annex F – Example of a Simplified Information Operations
Synchronization Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Annex G – Operations Security Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Annex H – Example Information Operations Action on Critical Activities. . . . . .96
Annex I – Sample Information Operations Concept Matrix Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Annex J – Concept of Strategic Information Operations against KFR . . . . . . . . . 99
Annex K – Sample Information Operations Sync Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Annex L – Information Operations Related Intelligence Questions . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Annex M – Record of Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figure List
Figure 1.1 – Information Operations as a Critical Element of the Army’s LMC . 5
Figure 2.1 – Information Operations Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 2.2 – The Information Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Figure 2.3 – Three Interrelated Dimensions of the Information Environment . . . 14
Figure 2.4 – Matching IRCs with Intended Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Figure 2.5 – The Philippine Army IO Cells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Figure 3.1 – Information Operations Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 3.2 – Current Landscape of the Information Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Figure 3.3 – Military Decision Making Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Figure 3.4 – Characteristics of Centers of Gravity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Figure 3.5 – COG Analysis Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Figure 3.6 – IO Inputs to the Targeting Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

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Figure 3.7 – Sample IO Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Figure 3.8 – Measure of effectiveness components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Figure 3.9 – Measure of Performance Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Figure 3.10 – Assessment methodology for the IO Objective done by IRCs . . . . 58
Table List
Table 1.1 – Common Information Operations Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 2.1 – PA IO Cell Key Taskings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Table 3.1 – CARVER Value Rating Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Table 3.2 – Sample High Payoff Target List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Table 3.3 – Format for IO Synchronization Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Table 3.4 – IO Actions during MDMP compared with targeting process . . . . . . . 62
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Abbreviation and Acronym list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

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Chapter I
Understanding Information Operations

0101. Since the advent of the information age, governments and their militaries
worldwide recognize information as a forceful weapon and a critical element of national
power. The proliferation of technology has dramatically changed society as those with
access to, and control of information and information systems can easily shape
commerce, public opinion, and other issues relevant to national security.

0102. In the military sense, the operating environment, the wars, and conflicts that
occur are being shaped and enabled by information. Control over information, or lack
thereof, affects an organization’s ability to act proactively and decisively. State actors,
particularly the armed forces, can win wars and armed conflicts by exploiting,
disrupting, and disabling command and control systems, and other critical information
infrastructure of their enemies. Conversely, states can crumble through the
dissemination of black propaganda and disinformation by the adversaries.

0103. Information Operation (IO) is one of the warfighting functions characterized by

the “integrated employment of information-related capabilities (IRCs) in connection
with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making
of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting the friendly forces” (United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014).

0104. IO is a systematic process of integration, synchronization, and coordination of

information activities. This to achieve optimum combined outcome of lethal and non-
lethal effects, to affect the decision-making process of a defined target while protecting
our own troops.

Importance of Information Operations

0105. The concept of information operations (IO) was developed and put into practice
to strengthen the military’s ability to move, process, analyze, and present vast amounts
of information to decision-makers quickly and understandably. As the information age
progresses, it has been accepted reality that for states to remain competitive in the
military battlefields, they must develop their respective capabilities to acquire,
leverage, and protect information and information-processing systems.

0106. The mission of IO is to synchronize and de-conflict the employment of

Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs) to affect the information environment (IE) for
operational advantage. The role of information as an element of combat power is
transcending during peace time, conflict, and war (Milkovski & Bogdanoski, 2015).

0107. The IO underscore two essential elements: IRCs and integrated employment.

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Information-Related Capabilities

0108. IRCs referred as the “tools, techniques, or activities employed within a

dimension of the information environment to create effects and operationally desirable
conditions” (United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014; United States Department of the
Navy, 2014). Information activities are actions designed to affect the information itself
and the information systems used. Meanwhile, the information environment stretches
across the physical, information, and cognitive dimensions through which information
is received, processed and conveyed. These dimensions will be discussed in detail in
the succeeding chapter of this Manual.

0109. Traditionally, IRCs include, but not limited to, operations security (OPSEC),
military deception (MILDEC), civil-military operations (CMO), electronic warfare
(EW), psychological operations (PSYOPS), cyberspace operations (CO), special
technical operations (STO), and counterintelligence (US Department of Defense, 2016;
Beasley, 2002).

Information Operations Integration

0110. Information operations integration is a systematic process that integrates and

synchronizes various IRCs to achieve and maintain operational superiority in the
information environment. IO is a concert of efforts to create synergy and achieve an
optimum combination of lethal and non-lethal outcomes intended to exploit or deny an
adversary’s information and decision systems while protecting the friendly forces.

Information Operations as Element of Army Power

0111. Technological advancements in these contemporary times continue to shape the
military environment (i.e., Army) operates in. Today’s warfare is not simply won by an
Army’s firepower and troop strength but through an effective command and control of
information.

0112. Not even the most powerful army can operate in the modern operational
environment without influencing the information environment of one’s existing and
possible adversaries. Mission and operational planning must always consider the effects
of adversaries or possible adversaries’ information activities to one’s forces with the
same degree of importance an army gives to planning the desired effects of its
information activities to their intended recipients and against their enemies.

0113. Warfare entails knowledge-based operations at every echelon. The extent and
degree of such control over information and information systems affect the quality of
command and control across all levels of decision-making and engagement, from the
strategic down to the operational and tactical levels. Information operations enable the
effective integration, synchronization, and coordination of information across the full
range of the Army’s operations to enhance the elements of combat power (Hahn, 1998).
Information services (i.e., traditional, intelligence, CMO and communications) have
since served both leading and supporting functions to Army’s campaigns and actual
warfare functions of fire, maneuver and strike.

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0114. Through IO, the Army’s organization can prepare and execute knowledge-based
warfare across the full range of military operations. Successful IO allow information to
reach Army decision-makers promptly and in an understandable form. Such requires
an information system that is secure at multiple classification levels that provides
seamless transfer of information from tactical to national levels; and, that are versatile
to adapt and to spread across the many force configurations and echelons found in
today’s Army.

0115. The military viewed information as an “enabler for military operations”

(Nissen, 2011). Quality intelligence and other pertinent information can only be
acquired through functional and reliable information systems. The manipulation of
information to attack an adversary and protect the organization can be achieved to gain
an advantage against the enemy. Information operations enable the Army organization
to shape the information environment by affecting the decision-makers, which is the
effective consolidation of intelligence (processed and analyzed information on an
adversary), friendly force information, and environmental information (terrain and
weather) (McConville, 1997).

Information Operations as Contributor to Information

Superiority
0116. Information superiority can be construed as the Army organization’s relative
strength against its adversaries to receive a timely, uninterrupted, and accurate flow of
information to support operational planning. In this sense, information superiority
would mean an Army’s ability to effectively inflict damage to an opponent’s
information and information systems and successfully defend its own from hostile
information operations against it. Information superiority is the “operational advantage
derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of
information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same” (AFPM
3-14, 2019; US Air Force Doctrine Document, AFDD, 2-5 as cited in Brice, 2003;
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2010; United States Department of the Navy,
2014).

0117. Information superiority is about Army forces being able to see first, understand
first, and act first. Army Forces cannot develop information superiority if they are
constantly reacting to enemy operations. Information superiority requires proactive
commanders, view relevant information, and “conduct (plan, prepare, execute and
continuously assess) operations accordingly” (“Chapter 11: Information superiority”,
n.d.; United States Department of the Army, 2016). To achieve information superiority,
commanders synchronize and target information as intensely as they do fires and
maneuver, CMO, intelligence and sustainment operations. They seek to make better use
of their information and information systems than adversaries or enemies do of theirs.
These information systems include the analysis, procedures, and training necessary to
extract and exploit intelligence and other critical information from raw data and present
it in a form that can be easily understood. Successful commanders are those who see,
understand, and then exploit the situation.

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0118. Contributors to Information Superiority. Commanders direct three

interdependent contributors to achieve information superiority (“Chapter 11:
Information superiority”, n.d.; United States Department of the Army, 2016):

a. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

b. Information Management

c. Information Operations

0119. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). ISR integration is

fundamental to information superiority. Thoroughly integrated ISR operations add
many collection sources. ISR integration eliminates unit and functional “stovepipes”
for planning, reporting, and processing information and producing intelligence. It
provides a common mechanism for all units to conduct ISR operations in a coordinated,
synergistic way.

0120. Information Management (IM). Information Management is “providing

relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate
situational understanding and decision-making. It uses procedures and information
systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information” (United States
Department of the Army, 2016). IM is far more than technical control of data flowing
across networks. It communicates decisions that initiate effective actions to accomplish
missions and fuses information from many sources. Successful IM adds meaning to
information as it is processed, so decision-makers can focus on understanding instead
of processing or evaluating information. IM consists of two supporting components:
information systems and relevant information.

0121. Information Operations (IO). IO is the “integrated and synchronized use of

selected military and non-military capabilities in order to affect friendly, neutral, and
adversarial human and automated decision-making systems” (AFP, 2019; United States
Department of the Army, 2016, 2017; United States Department of Defense, 2014).

0122. In the earlier sections, we established that IO are the Army’s actions that affect
adversary information and information systems while being able to defend one’s
information and information systems. The expanded the definition of IO “as actions to
affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s
information and information systems and divides it into two major subcategories—
Information-in-Warfare (IIW) and Information Warfare (IW)” (US Air Force Doctrine
Document 2-5 as cited in Brice, n.d.). IIW is relevant in IO's “gain and exploit” aspects,
while IW is associated with IO's “attack and defend” aspects.

0123. How does IO work for the Army to attain information superiority? First,
information superiority is the ability of the Army to conduct direct or indirect
information warfare against its enemies successfully. Second, information superiority
means that the Army’s organization is capable to successfully defend or protect
“friendly information” from any direct or indirect attacks from adversary forces. And
third, information superiority requires the effective application of technologies to
intercept and gain “information transparency” against an opponent and maximizing the
utility of this information for operational planning (make offensive and defensive

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decisions) to defeat any threat to the organization without suffering from information
overload. Conversely, understanding how IO works for a friendly organization can
provide enemies an understanding of how to attack it, defeat it, or deny it with
information superiority.

Information Operations in Landpower Maneuver Concept

0124. The Landpower Maneuver Concept (LMC) is the Philippine Army’s
overarching strategy and concept for securing sovereignty and land territory.

0125. Being executed in a “joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational

(JIIM) environment,” LMC would require an Army that is postured and capable to
quickly combine various capabilities and efforts of itself and with its mission partners
that take place within a shared operational and informational environment. To achieve
its land dominance, the Army must achieve dominance in the information domain, both
offensively and defensively. It has been discussed earlier that IO shapes military
operations to create conditions favorable for friendly forces’ actions. Figure 1.1
illustrates how IO is a critical element of fulfilling the Army’s mission anchored on the
LMC.

Figure 1.1 – Information Operations as a Critical Element of the Army’s LMC

(Adapted from the Philippine Army’s Landpower Maneuver Concept, 2016)

0126. Effective IO would benefit the Army’s LMC in two major ways: first,
information activities (both physical and non-physical, and lethal and non-lethal) would
help protect and defend own forces; and second, information activities can boost
offense against the adversary. IO serves as a “lynchpin” that integrates and
synchronizes other elements of the Army’s LMC (strategic and operational maneuver,
army diplomacy, and force development) to achieve both strategic and operational
objectives. In this sense, IO ensures that each LMC element supports and complements
one another towards the successful execution of other elements. Across the various

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component activities of IO, IRCs support the Army’s ability to inform and influence
across a range of operations to shape desired outcomes.

0127. The LMC’s ultimate objective is to protect and defend the land force,
information infrastructures, systems, and capabilities would be critical in achieving
multiple objectives at the operational and tactical levels that focus on: dissuading and
deterring adverse intents; disrupting, mitigating, and redirecting adverse actions;
disrupting and destroying adversarial information infrastructures and systems; and
destroying and influencing adversary’s cognitive ability.

Points to Ponder

IO is a coordinating function and can be used in the decisive action

IO is not rocket science, BUT it is hard business!

The most important thing to know about Inform and Influence Activities at the tactical
level is to keep it simple.

IO Owns nothing and controls nothing - it synchronizes and enables.

The only way to do this is by integration and synchronization with the Commander’s
Intent.

Don’t be afraid to recommend lethal options! However, must ensure that they are
considered as part of the planning process and approved by the commander.

IO does not have primary responsibility for themes and messages, that’s both a PsyOps
and Public Affairs Office responsibility.

IO is not just media (TV/radio); that’s a Public Affairs Office function.

How the team is organized is import to the synchronization of the IRCs

IRCs are most effective when synchronized with each other and physical fires. If our
Information Related Capabilities are de-synced, then our ability to influence enemy decision-
making is degraded

REMEMBER: IO is not a stand alone effort. It must SUPPORT tactical operations. A

common term used throughout the services is “IO Campaign Plan”. However, what we tend to
call an IO campaign is simply an IO or engagement strategy to support the overall operational
campaign in order to achieve the commander’s intent.

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Chapter II
Fundamentals of Information Operations

0201. This chapter presents a much detailed discussion on the key elements of IO,
particularly what the information environment is composed of, how important
information-related capabilities are to supporting military operations; and, who are the
key stakeholders of the various IO activities.

Information Operations Framework, Focus and Principles

0202. A decision-maker’s effectiveness is a function of will, understanding and
capability. A decision-maker must have the will to act. They must understand the
situation to act and must be capable of acting. The absence of one of these three
elements adversely affects the decision-maker's effectiveness to achieve their
objectives.

0203. As visualized in the IO framework in Figure 2.1, IO directly influence and shape
the will of the adversaries, neutrals and friendlies; and affect the military commander
and decision-maker’s understanding and the capabilities that promote the
understanding or the application of the will across a range of military operations to be
undertaken.

Figure 2.1 – Information Operations Conceptual Framework

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Desired Targets in the Information Environment

0204. Military’s IO are planned, designed and executed to “influence the emotions,
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior” of the following groups of
people and audiences in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives (United States
Department of the Army, 2016; United States Department of the Navy, 2014):

a. Friendlies. Which include national and local government leaders and decision-
makers; government officials; military decision-makers; own military troops,
dependents and relatives; police and other law enforcement agencies/units;
regional and international community; international, national and local media
practitioners; and, civil society organizations (e.g., religious, local and
international non-governmental organizations);

b. Neutrals. Which include various publics (to include government leadership and
decision-makers) who remain undecided, uncommitted, or are fence-sitters;
and,

c. Adversaries. Which include enemy political leaders and decision-makers;

enemy military leadership and decision-makers; enemy troops; and their
relatives and friendlies (mass base); militant government officials; biased
international, national and local media practitioners; and militant civil society
organizations (e.g., religious, local, international non-governmental
organizations).

Effects

0205. As earlier discussed, the primary objective of IO is to affect friendly, neutral,

and “adversarial human and automated decision-making systems” while protecting
one’s own from detrimental factors. To affect desired targets would mean using various
capabilities to inform, attack, or protect. Table 2.1 summarizes the commonly desired
effects of IO.

Table 1.1 – Common Information Operations Effects (Source: AFP, 2019)

IO Effects Description
To Inform
1. Inform ▪ To impart information or knowledge
▪ To make known or cause to be visible to public view
2. Expose
▪ To make visible, to reveal something undesirable or injurious
▪ To Overcome by argument
3. Convince
▪ To bring to belief, consent, or a course of action
▪ To effect selected projection or distortion of the truth to
persuade the opposition to act in a manner detrimental to
mission accomplishment while benefitting accomplishment of
4. Influence
friendly objectives
▪ To cause a change in the character, thought, or action of a
particular entity
To Attack
1. Destroy ▪ To cause permanent damage to all aspect of the function

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▪ To permanently impair a function’s operations that extends to

all the facets of the function’s operations
▪ To cause permanent damage, but only portions of the function
2. Degrade are affected; that is, the function still operates, but not fully
▪ To permanently impair a function’s operations
▪ To cause temporary damage to the function, and only portions
of the function are affected
3. Disrupt
▪ To temporarily (short-term) impair a function’s operations, but
the damage extends to all facets of the function’s operations
▪ To cause temporary damage to the function, but all aspects of
the function are affected
4. Deny ▪ To temporarily (short-term) impair a function’s operations,
but the damage extends to all facets of the function’s
operations
▪ To create a false perception that leads the opposition to act in
5. Deceive/Mislead a manner detrimental to mission accomplishment of friendly
objectives
▪ To attempt to gather information that will enable opposition’s
6. Exploit
ability to conduct operations to induce other effects
▪ To effect selected projection or distortion of the truth to
persuade the opposition to act in a manner detrimental to
mission accomplishment while benefitting accomplishment of
7. Influence
friendly objectives
▪ To cause a change in the character, thought, or action of a
particular entity
To Protect
▪ To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an
1. Detect
intrusion into information systems
▪ To react quickly to an adversary’s or others’ IO attack or
2. Respond
intrusion
▪ To bring information and information systems back to their
3. Restore
original state
Other Common Effects
▪ To deprive of hope or power of acting or succeeding
1. Prevent
▪ To keep from happening; to avert
▪ To cover or shield from exposure, damage or destruction
2. Protect/Safeguard ▪ To keep from harm, attack, injury or exploitation
▪ To maintain the status or integrity of
▪ To render ineffective, invalid or unable to perform a particular
3. Negate/Neutralize task or function
▪ To counteract the activity or effect of
▪ To determine or direct the course of events
▪ To modify behavior by rewarding changes that tend toward a
4. Shape
desired response
▪ To cause to conform to a particular form or pattern

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Focus of Information Operations

0206. AFPM 3-14 provides some examples of how IO may support mission
accomplishment in all military operations. These are:

a. Will. IO are aimed at decision-makers who can influence the information

environment or the situation itself. IO activities are aimed at influencing the
adversary’s will and ability to decide. For example, questioning the legitimacy
of leadership and cause may undermine the opponent’s moral power base,
separate leadership from supporters in politics, the military, and the public.
Conversely, any adversary attempts to influence one’s will be countered to
maintain cohesion and enhance freedom of action.

b. Understanding. IO aim to affect the decision-makers’ understanding of any

situation through the denial, degradation, disruption, and manipulation of
information. As an offense against the enemies, information activities must
directly affect the actions of the adversary decision-makers to enable effective
decision-making and information superiority of friendly forces. As a defense
against enemies, information activities must prevent the adversaries from
gathering information regarding Army forces and friendly forces.

c. Capability. IO aim to affect adversary forces’ command and control,

communications, cyber infrastructure, and propaganda facilities that support
their understanding of the situation and enable their will. Offensively,
information activities must be focused on degrading, disrupting, deceiving,
destroying or denying the effectiveness of adversary capabilities to impede or
hinder their ability to understand and subsequently prevent them from taking
the initiative against friendly forces. Defensively, information activities must be
geared towards protecting one’s command, control, and communication
infrastructure to enable and improve one’s understanding of the situation and
successfully impose one’s will against the enemies.

Principles of Information Operations

0207. The IO has key principles that will shape how IO integrates and directs
information activities to support the various military operations. (AFPM 3-03, 2010 as
cited in AFPM 3-14, 2019)

0208. Effects-based. An effects-based approach is “an approach in which operations

are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted to influence or change systems or
capabilities in order to achieve desired outcomes” (Curtis E. Lemay Center, 2016). The
military organization must determine the desired effects to accomplish its objectives
and help achieve the military strategy, which will subsequently identify the best set of
capabilities to create those effects. Following the effects-based approach principle, IO
activities must seek “to create desired effects with the least risk and least expenditure
of time and resources” as can be allowed by circumstances (Curtis E. Lemay Center,
2016). In this sense, commanders seek solutions that are most effective first (those most
suitable to achieve the objectives and end-state) and strive for efficiency.

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0209. Commander’s direction and personal involvement. The success of IO is

driven by the clarity and quality of the commander’s intent (the commander’s vision of
the end state to be achieved). Tactical level planning is based on this intent, which must
have a clearly defined military end state, and must define the effects required to achieve
the relevant military objectives. The personal involvement of the commander is
necessary to strengthen internal control over all activities across the chain of command,
improve integration and coordination; and, boost the overall morale of their
subordinates in pursuing information activities and other aspects of military operations.
Commanders must know each part of the military operations and how each element can
impact the organization directly and indirectly, which can subsequently improve their
proactiveness in thinking, planning, and execution.

0210. Close coordination and synchronization. IO must be done systematically. All

plans and activities from participants in all information activities are coordinated, de-
conflicted, and synchronized across all levels of the chain of command. Effects of
information are not made in isolation but through a combination of other elements of
military operations. Close coordination and sequencing of military activities, including
those requiring coordination with political, civil and other external partners, are
necessary not to compromise, negate, or diminish the desired effects of each component
of the IO.

0211. Accurate intelligence and information. Timely, accurate, and relevant

intelligence and information are crucial to decision-making. Successful military
information activities must be anchored on effective intelligence (INTEL) support. It
has been discussed earlier that sustained effective information operations result in
information superiority, which yields an advantage over adversaries and threat groups,
particularly concerning deterrence and preemption. Moreover, operational and tactical
intelligence quality can have the most decisive impact on how forces are employed and
how success is achieved in military operations.

0212. Centralized planning and decentralized execution. Centralized planning is

“maintaining authority over a group while providing direction or giving orders on how
to operate or function.” Decentralized execution is “distributing authoritative power to
various local authorities, allowing action based on current knowledge” (Gomez, 2003).
Centralized planning and decentralized execution are a function of effective
information operations. Combat decisions and military actions can only be made across
the chain of command if there is “adequate quality knowledge of the situation,
objectives, intent, and local intelligence” available to both planners and implementors.

0213. Input to the targeting process. Targeting is the “process of selecting targets
and matching the appropriate response to them based on operational requirements and
capabilities” (Yingling, n.d.). As a knowledge-based process, information operations
must provide critical inputs to effective targeting. Targeting starts with a clear and
detailed understanding of the operational environment and the Commander’s intent.
Thus, information activities must identify the intended effects in the information
environment necessary to achieve the Commander’s intent (objectives) and a range of
actions to achieve those objectives when integrated into the overall operational plan.

0214. Early involvement and timely preparation. IO must effectively put all
necessary information at the start of the planning processes and throughout

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implementation. Information activities must be undertaken at the earliest time possible.

The Commander’s intent and direction can be conveyed to enable analysis, planning,
execution, and evaluation of military operations thereon.

0215. Continuity. The IO function must be performed continuously before the

operation, during the operation, and after the operation is completed. Moreover, IO
activities must be done across the full spectrum of operations, from peacetime to the
escalation of conflict/war and eventual resolution, and from territorial defense to
internal security activities.

0216. Monitoring and assessment. As the operational and information environments

evolve through time, information operations must continuously monitor and assess the
environment, the organization itself and its adversaries to measure success and progress
and ensure that timely and relevant data can support the planning decision-making
processes. Likewise, information activities must be subjected to continuous monitoring
and assessment to ensure their efficacy and relevance to the military operations they
support.

Information Environment
0217. IE refers to the “virtual and physical space in which information is received,
processed, and conveyed” (NATO Bi-SC Information Operations Reference Book,
2010; Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 as cited in the US Department of Defense, 2016). It
consists of the information systems and the information itself.

0218. The IE is composed of five interrelated components:

a. Human

b. Infrastructure

c. Information

d. Decision-Making

e. Effects.

0219. Most of the IE is not under military control, adding to the challenges
commanders face. While they cannot control the entire information environment, they
must be prepared to operate within it. Interaction with the information environment
increases the complexity of Army operations. More than ever, commanders consider
how factors outside their area of operations (AO) may affect their operations. IO often
requires coordination with governmental and non-governmental agencies. Legal
limitations on IO vary according to the situation. This interaction may affect the impact
of tactics on operation and strategy. Military actions that are tactically or operationally
insignificant may influence strategy or even national policy when highlighted by the
media. Case in point, Marawi Siege wherein national government declared Martial Law
Rule in whole Mindanao. Therefore, operational commanders consider more than the
military conditions of the end state of a campaign. They consider the comprehensive
political, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural aspects of it as well.

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0220. The information environment is the combination of “individuals, organizations,

or automated systems that collect, disseminate, or act on information” (AFP, 2019;
United States Department of the Army, 2016; United States Department of the Navy,
2014). This also includes the information itself (NATO, 2010). Nowadays, military
operations can be accessed and known by near or far-reaching audiences in today’s
information environment, where information itself is interactive and pervasive. The
presence and influence of the current and emerging electronic information technology
may allow the access of the information in both civilian and military operations to be
known locally or globally. Likewise, internet and digital media information access may
be known by the researching public even without censorship.

0221. The actors include “leaders, individuals, and organizations”. Resources include
materials and systems used to collect, process, store, disseminate, display and protect
information. Human and automated systems “observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA
Loop) upon information in the information environment, making it the principal
environment for decision-making” (AFP, 2019).

0222. Friendly, adversarial, or neutral individuals, organizations, and systems in the

IE rely upon credible, timely, and usable information in formulating their opinions or
perceptions to form an effective decision. Successful planning and execution or any
military missions is dependent upon an accurate assessment and full understanding of
the IE (See Figure 2.2)

Figure 2.2 – The Information Environment

0223. The IE is the “aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect
process, disseminate, or act on information”. The IE is the space through which both
actors and information systems interact to “observe, orient, decide, and act upon the
information” (AFP, 2019; US Department of Defense, 2016; United States Department
of the Army, 2016; United States Department of the Navy, 2014).

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0224. Actors include individuals (decision-makers, leaders, opinion leaders, opinion

formers, spin doctors, journalists, editors, media publishers, and even common people);
groups (the population as a whole or parts of it based on region, ethnicity, religion,
activity, etc.); and, organizations (government agencies, governmental organizations,
non-governmental organizations, international organizations local regional and
international business enterprises, etc.)

0225. Information systems typically include communication and information systems

(CIS) (equipment, methods and procedures, and if necessary, personnel organized to
accomplish information processing and transfer functions); and command and control
systems (C2S) (equipment, methods and procedures that include planning and decision-
making tools, and if necessary, personnel that enable leaders/commanders and their
staffs to exercise command and control).

0226. The information environment comprises three interrelated dimensions:

physical, informational, and cognitive as shown in Figure 2.3 (AFP, 2019; US
Department of Defense, 2016; United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018):

COGNITIVE DIMENSION
(human-centric)

INFORMATIONAL DIMENSION PHYSICAL DIMENSION

(data-centric) (tangible, real-world)

Figure 2.3 – Three Interrelated Dimensions of the Information Environment

(Source: AFPM 3-14)

0227. The physical dimension comprises “command and control systems, and the
supporting infrastructure that enables individuals and organizations to conduct
operations across the air, land, sea and cyberspace” (US Department of Defense, 2016;
AFP, 2019). It represents the tangible, real-world encompassing all physical platforms
and communications networks distributed and connected across national, economic,
and geographical boundaries. This dimension includes, but is not limited to, “human
beings, C2 facilities, printed documents, radio facilities, computer and other processing
units, smartphones, and any other objects subject to empirical measurement” (AFP,
2019).

0228. The information dimension is data-centric and is composed of the

information/content itself, including how it is created, collected, processed,
manipulated, disseminated, and protected (US Department of Defense, 2016; AFP,
2019). This dimension includes the military’s C2 structure and system through which
the commander's intent is conveyed. It is characterized by electronic, human-to-human,
or a combination of both properties. Among these properties are technical design and
specifications (capacity, configuration) of the information infrastructure; human-to-
human networks and social relationships and associations, whether formal or informal,
used to transmit the information; and content and context. The information dimension

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primarily affects the content and how the information flows across the military
organization.

0229. The cognitive dimension is human-centric and comprises the “attitudes,

beliefs, and perceptions of those who transmit, receive, respond to, or act upon
information” (US Department of Defense, 2016). It is the dimension that encompasses
an individual and group’s information processing, perception, judgment, and decision-
making, which shape or influence how people think, perceive, visualize and decide.
This dimension is normally a function of the “psychological, cultural, behavioral, and
other human attributes” that affect how individuals and groups at any level of the
military organization decide, convey, and interpret information (AFP, 2019). Effects in
the physical and informational dimensions ultimately affect the cognitive dimension,
making it the central object of operations in the information environment (US
Department of Defense, 2016); thus, making it the most important component of the
information environment (AFP, 2019).

0230. Within these dimensions are human and information system components that
are either “friendlies, adversaries, or neutrals” (AFP, 2019). It must also be understood
that the IE analysis is a continuous and ongoing process that starts from peacetime to
the emergence of war/conflict/crisis and the eventual return to stability or peaceful
order. This cyclical process can be observed and applied on every level of the Army’s
hierarchy and would only differ in the scope and level of detail.

0231. Moreover, as threats and challenges to security transcend beyond borders and
across multiple geographies, the Army IO involves interacting within the global IE.
Army adversaries are no longer bound within the limits of the Philippine territory. The
CPP-NPA-NDF and other terrorist groups operating in the country have international
networks targeted by the Army IO. Thus, the Army must maximize the use of all
information available through the military systems and open sources like media, the
Internet, and other global access information systems to assist military decision-makers
in achieving operational success.

Points to Ponder

Visualize how complex the Information Environment (IE) and focus your attention on
the three dimensions and the means they provide to create an effect on our selected inform and
influence activities audiences.

Understand the IE, determine what we want it to be, and then act to make it so. The
physical domain is basically the facts we observe, collect, collate, and reference to help form an
understanding. It includes the positive and negative consequences of our actions.

The information domain includes the messages, words, systems, procedures, policies,
and techniques we use to record, transfer, and share, shape or deny a common understanding
of our environment
.
The Cognitive domain is where information effects happen. It is the most difficult
domain to operate in. It is where perceptions of the truth are formed and directly influences
understanding and decision making. It is the most important domain.

Other considerations are the people, culture and prevailing governance practice. The
point is that there are many things which affect and shape the Information Environment and we
have to always be looking to leverage everything we have access to.

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Different Information-Related Capabilities

0232. Information-related capabilities (IRCs) were initially defined in the preceding
chapter as the “tools, techniques, or activities employed within a dimension of the IE
to create effects and operationally desirable conditions.” IO is not about the “ownership
of individual capabilities,” but rather the integrated, synchronized, and coordinated
planning, monitoring, and assessment of all applicable IRCs that must be employed to
achieve the desired end-state.

0233. Successful IOs require the proper identification of IRC that is most likely to
achieve the desired effects, not simply employment capability. Thus, the capabilities
used to support IO must be selected based on mission requirements (campaign
objectives, the operational environment, and adversary and friendly forces), which
ultimately dictate what capabilities a commander must use and how they are employed.

0234. The military, particularly the Army organization, is not new to employing IO.
During its campaign against the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (HUKBALAHAP)
in the late 40s to early 50s, the Philippine Army implemented various IRCs ranging
from MILDEC to PsyOps and CMO activities, among others, that resulted in successful
military operations and subsequent surrender of enemy forces within 15 months.
MILDEC resulted in disruptions to enemy forces’ logistics and degradation of their
readiness. PsyOps led to surrender among enemy forces and boosted support from the
local population. CMO programs, particularly civil affairs and public affairs targeting
the general population, adversely impacted and influenced enemy information systems.

0235. Today, the Philippine Army IRCs being used as aligned to the AFPM 3-14 are
the following but not limited to:

a. Operations Security

b. Military Deception

c. Civil-Military Operations

0236. Operations Security. Aims to protect “both sensitive unclassified and

classified information” and activities, “identify, select, and execute measures that
eliminate or reduce indications and other sources of information exploited by an
adversary to an acceptable level” (AFP, 2019; United States Department of the Army,
2016). As offensive support, OPSEC may be used to deprive enemies of critical
information that could slow down the latter’s decision cycle, which could subsequently
open up opportunities to attain friendly objectives. As defensive support, OPSEC
denies adversaries access to one’s critical information, which subsequently reduces
enemies’ ability to attack or counter friendly operations.

0237. Military Deception. Aims to mislead adversary’s military decision-makers “to

take specific actions or inactions that will contribute to accomplishing the friendly
mission” (AFP, 2019; United States Department of the Army, 2016).

0238. As offensive support, MILDEC operations target the decision-makers to affect

their information systems and decision-making processes and reinforce or change their

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behavior in one’s favor (achieving surprise, preserving friendly forces and equipment,
gaining time, minimizing adversary’s physical advantage, etc.). It deters hostile actions
and contributes to the success of any potential friendly offensive action.

0239. As defensive support, MILDEC misleads an adversary regarding the strength,

readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces.

0240. In IO, MILDEC is enhanced by using selected IRCs to promote the MILDEC
operations subtly. MILDEC operations apply the following basic deception techniques:

a. Ruse, which is a technique of deception operations designed to deceive the

enemy, characterized by deliberately exposing false information to the
collection means of the enemy, thereby obtaining an advantage. This can be
done by any means, including electronic signals and signatures, dummy
positions, dummy vehicles and facilities, or misleading troop and force
movements

b. Feint, which is a type of attack used as a deception intended to draw the enemy’s
attention away from the area of the main attack. This includes the enemy
moving their reserves or shifting fire support in reaction to the feint. Feints must
appear real and therefore require some contact with the enemy, which usually
involve the conduct of a limited-objective attack ranging in size from a raid to
a supporting attack

c. Demonstration, which is an attack or show of force on a front where a decision

is not sought that is made to deceive the enemy. It is a deception similar to a
feint but without contact with the enemy. In stability and support operations, a
demonstration can be a military operation in sight of an actual or potential
enemy to show military capabilities

d. Display, which aims to mislead the enemy’s visual senses (their observation by
radar, camera, infrared device, or human eyes) through simulations, disguises,
portrayals, or a combination of any of these measures

0241. Civil-Military Operations. Composed of planned activities undertaken

independently or in coordination with civilian entities to gain support in favor of the
friendly forces military (Army), weaken the adversary’s will to fight, and influence
threat groups to abandon armed struggle in support of the accomplishment of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) mission. In support of the other IRCs, CMO employs
all necessary capabilities to integrate critical communication in the operational
environment. Through CMO, innovations in communications are advanced and
employed by the different line units to gain advantage within constricted sectors in the
main battle area (MBA). Moreover, CMO also serves as a means of contributing to the
government’s nation-building and social development activities, which include
preparing or even rescuing people from upcoming disasters and calamities, among
others. The three pillars of CMO are:

a. Public Affairs

b. Civil Affairs

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c. Psychological Operations

0242. Public Affairs (PA), which includes “public information, and community
relations activities: that are directed towards local and foreign public audiences with an
interest in the military to promote a positive image of the military through the
dissemination of clear, accurate, credible and timely information (AFP, 2019; United
States Department of the Army, 2016).

0243. For example, media can be both an enabler and a risk to successful military
operations. For one, news coverage by media personnel provides an avenue for the
military to provide critical information that the general populace deems necessary for
transparency and accountability. However, their presence in the field could compromise
ongoing operations as uncensored broadcast materials could serve enemy forces’
sensitive and critical information. Media personnel may risk themselves being potential
hostages by the enemy. PA, through media management, has always been essential in
the Army’s various focused military operations and clearing operations, among others.
The establishment of media centers and the designation of a dedicated media team are
among the best practices in military PA. The objectives these practices fulfill are geared
towards establishing standards, protocols, limitations, and procedures on the release of
credible information for public consumption.

0244. PA is related to IO because of our involvement in the global IE. We disseminate

and process information that supports IO in the following areas: Expedite flow of
accurate, timely information to internal/external audiences Create awareness of military
goals in operations, campaigns.

0245. Satisfy desires of internal/external audiences to be kept informed. Inform

internal/external audiences of significant developments affecting them. Through the
media, inform adversary or potential adversary about friendly force’s intent/capability.

0246. PA should coordinate with IO to ensure unity of effort with messaging. In

addition, safeguarding of operations against the offensive communication threats in a
conflict.

0247. This is a way for practitioners to be part of an IO Cell without jeopardizing the
commander and unit's credibility or their relationship with the public’s trust. PA is a
command responsibility. A PA will advise his commander, but, ultimately, we carry
out the commander's intent. We will talk in more detail about what public affairs does
specifically to support PA and civil affairs as part of an information campaign in later
units of instruction.

0248. Role of PA in an IO/Inform and Influence Activities Cell. Commanders,

through non-public affairs information-related activities, communicate to select, neutral
publics to change attitudes, beliefs, and behavior.

0249. In tactical and operational environments, and when appropriate,

synchronization and coordination of communication objectives are conducted directly
between staff sections in the information operations working group. The IO Cell
conducts coordination in which public affairs and command-designated IRCs

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participate during tactical and operational missions, however, the capabilities retain
their own distinct identities and staff organization.

0250. Civil Affairs (CA), which include activities performed and supported by the
military to enhance the “good relationship between military forces and civil authorities
in the areas where military forces are present or operating” (AFP, 2019). Community
and stakeholder engagement and interagency coordination allow the military
organization to maximize the synergy of planning, preparation, implementation and
sustaining security programs, projects and activities. Among various stakeholders
targeted for such efforts include local chief executives (LCEs), community leaders,
religious sector, research and academic think-thanks, civil society groups, and other
non-governmental organizations. Their experience and influence in their respective
fields and communities make them credible third-party advocates in support of the
narratives and the agenda of the government.

0251. CA activities are an important contributor to IO because their ability to interface

with key organizations and individuals in the information environment. CA activities
can support and assist the achievement of the IO objectives by coordinating with,
influencing, developing, or controlling indigenous infrastructures in foreign operational
areas.

0252. The role of CA in IO is gain and maintain relationships; build capacity within
the community and generate population confidence in, and positive perception of the
government and its actions.

0253. CA encompass activities that military commanders take to establish and

maintain relationships between their forces and the civil authorities, the general
populations, resources, institutions in friendly and neutral, or hostile areas where their
forces are employed.

0254. These activities may occur before, during, subsequent to, or in the absence of
other military actions.

0255. CA activities support the military unit’s initiatives to improve relations with
friendly forces, civilian populations, regional strategy and long-term goals by
strengthening the capabilities of the government in effectively applying it’s indigenous
resources to mitigate or resolve its instability, privation, or unrest.

0256. CA and PsyOps are mutually supportive within CMO. During military
operations other than war (MOOTW), PsyOps support various CA activities (establish
population control measures) to gain support for the government in the international
community, and reduce support or resources to those destabilizing forces threatening
legitimate processes of the government. CA personnel and forces can advise
commanders on the most effective military efforts to support friendly or civilian
welfare, security, and developmental programs, PsyOps maximize these efforts through
information products and programs. PsyOps publicize these CMO activities to generate
target population confidence in and positive perception of government actions.

0257. Psychological Operations (PsyOps), which are “planned operations to convey

selected information” to adversarial target audiences and their organizational support

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base “to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately their
behavior” in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives (NATO, 2010; OG7,
2008; United States Department of the Army, 2016). While enemy forces are the
primary targets of PsyOps, trapped civilians and hostages inside the main battle area
are also target audiences. PsyOps can be conducted traditionally through loudspeakers,
leaflets, textblast, radio broadcasts, tarpaulins, stakeholder engagements, digital/social
media operations, and counter violent extremism programs.

0258. Inherent to the CMO capability that being used by the above mentioned three
pillars is the combat photography/Combat Camera Team (COMPHO/ComCam), which
provides the Army and the rest of the military organization “with an imagery capability
to support operational and planning requirements across a range of military operations”
(AFP,2019). COMPHO supplies valuable imagery for MILDEC, PA, CA, PsyOps,
strategic communication (STRATCOM) and commanders that can be used to influence
selected audiences. Currently, COMPHO is an embedded function of the CMO.

0259. Army COMCAM rapidly deploys worldwide throughout the full spectrum of
military operations to capture, edit and transmit high definition still and video imagery
in support of commanders’ objectives. Army COMCAM units provide still and video
acquisition of all operations to include land, static airborne, and air assault operations.
Trained and equipped to operate under all and lighting conditions with both
conventional and special operations units.

0260. Army COMCAM team gains are countering adversary misinformation,

disinformation and propaganda, and assist commanders in gaining situational
awareness on operations beyond written or verbal reports; providing historical
documentation, public information, or evidentiary foundation; support gathering of site
exploitation or imagery for forensic documentation of evidence, and legal proceedings;
providing intelligence documentation to include imagery for facial recognition, key
leader engagements, and support special reconnaissance and; document key events such
as training of a host country's police, defense, and special operations units. These
products can support a myriad of activities such as international defense security
engagements (IDSE), IO and STRATCOM

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Psychological Operations against HUKBALAHAP

After World War II, the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (HUKBALAHAP), a guerilla
force created by Central Luzon farmers during the Japanese occupation, evolved into a
socialist/communist guerrilla movement. President Elpidio Quirino personally requested that
Lansdale be assigned to the Joint United States Military Assistance Group, Philippines, in
1950 to aid the Philippine Armed Forces' intelligence agencies in defeating the Communist
Hukbalahap. Lansdale was a pioneer in the field of psychological warfare. Lansdale employed
a method pioneered by the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines during World War II to
propagate tales that Aswangs, blood-sucking creatures in Philippine folklore, were loose in
the jungle. The Hukbalahap fled the location after his troops kidnapped an enemy soldier and
drained the blood from his body, leaving the corpse where it might be seen.
In one such operation, government psychological warfare squads propagated stories
that a vampire lived on a hill where the Hukbalahap was stationed, based on a superstitious
fear of Aswang (vampires) in the countryside. The Huks' location is advantageously located
on a high vantage point. As a result, the government forces must maintain control of the
decisive location.
Two nights later, on LTC Landsdale's orders, a government squad apprehended the
last guy on a night rebel patrol, punctured his neck with two holes, hung his body until the
blood drained out, and then returned the body to the trail. When the Huks saw the body of a
fallen friend, the entire Huk unit abandoned their camp and sought refuge elsewhere. That
allowed government forces to clear the contested territory.
According to reports, the locals, who had previously been either apathetic or
sympathetic to the Huk cause, were now afraid. The same pattern of holes, animal bites, and
carcasses appeared over the landscape in quick succession.
Lansdale and his team also employed the "eye of God," painted in the dead of night
on a wall facing the house of suspected Huk sympathizers. "The next morning, the
inexplicable presence of these malicious eyes had a severely sobering effect," Lansdale
recalled.
The Huks began to lose moral support in the territories they had controlled due to a
mix of logistical and factional issues. The Army's hunt and destroy missions continued and
intensified after the psychological operation was deemed adequate until Luis Taruc and most
of the Huks put down their arms in 1954 to accept a pardon.
Another of Landsdale's stories is about "Godless Communism," or perhaps it was just
confirmation of the Philippines' continuing culture and mythology. Whatever the operation
proved, it demonstrated that Filipinos, past and present, are still afraid of aswang in the face
of rebellions, wars, and political machinations.

Electronic Warfare

0261. Involves using “electromagnetic and directed energy to control the

electromagnetic spectrum”, attack the enemy, or protect the spectrum used by one’s
forces (United States Department of the Navy, 2014). EW consists of the following:

a. Electronic attack (EA), which involves the “use of electromagnetic energy,

directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or
equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy
combat capability. EA is considered a form of fires” (AFP, 2019; United States
Department of the Army, 2016).

b. Electronic protection (EP), which is composed of “actions taken to protect

personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use
of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly
combat capability” (AFP, 2019; United States Department of the Navy, 2014).

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c. Electronic Support (ES), which involves “actions tasked by, or under the
direct control of, and operational commander, to search for, intercept, identify,
and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic
energy for immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of
future operations” (AFP, 2019).

Physical Attack

0262. This involves two aspects to create effects in the IE, namely:

a. Attacking command and control (C2) systems, which makes use of force to
deny systematically, disrupt, degrade or destruct selected adversary C2 systems
that will allow the military (Army) to gain an informational advantage.

b. Sending message, which directly applies force to create significant

psychological impact to coerce, deter and reduce an adversary’s ability to
exercise command.

Physical Security

0263. This aspect of security that is concerned with physical measures. It is “designed
to safeguard personnel, prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, materials,
and documents, and safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft”
(AFP, 2019; United States Department of the Army, 2016). In short, physical security
is a system of a barrier placed between the potential intruder and the material to be
protected.

Counter-Intelligence

0264. Defined as the “total action taken by which information is gathered and
activities are conducted to protect that agency against espionage, theft of materials,
sabotage, assignations, or other intelligence activities conducted by, or on behalf of,
hostile foreign governments or other threatening foreign organizations (terrorist groups,
rogue military units, etc.)” (Encyclopedia of the CIA, 2003). It also refers to
“information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations
conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or their agents,
or international terrorist organizations or activities” (Executive Order 12333, 2008; JP
2-01.2, CI and HUMINT in Joint Operations, 2011).

0265. Essentially, CI involves combating adversarial intelligence threats. It identifies

and combats enemy intelligence threats through “knowledge” and “action.” CI
highlights the importance of understanding the nature, scope, and capacity of the threat,
whether from state or non-state actors and counter such threats.

Cyberspace Operations

0266. Defined as the “employment of cyberspace capabilities, where the primary

purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace” (United States Department

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of the Navy, 2014). It is further categorized into three distinct cyber missions based on
objectives and activities as follows:

a. Active Defense Operations (ADO) covers the purpose/s of exploiting (disrupt

and deny) the enemy cyber vulnerabilities in order to defeat and deny them the
ability to use cyberspace against Army forces.

b. Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) is to defend (secure and deny) the

Philippine Army network (PANET) from all forms of cyber threats and attacks.
It also provides a prompt and effective response to cyber incidents.

c. Information Network Operations (INO) covers the actions taken to build

(design, build, configure, secure, operate, maintain and sustain) the PANET and
effect the expedient restoration of connectivity and services after a computer
emergency.

Information Assurance

0267. Protects and defends “information and information systems by ensuring their
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation”. In addition,
IA includes “providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities” (AFP, 2019; United States Department
of the Army, 2016).

0268. There are five pillars of the information assurance model: availability, integrity,
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation (PA Intelligence School, 2015).

a. Availability is ensuring the timely and easy access of authorized users to vital
information services. It requires that all data or system is in the place needed by
the user, at the time the user needs it, and in the form needed by the user. This
requires that all IT infrastructure and resources remain fully functional and
reliable even during adverse conditions, such as database conundrums or fall-
overs. An effective IA involves protecting against malicious codes, hackers, and
other threats that can hinder or block access to the military’s information
systems.

b. Integrity ensures the accuracy and completeness of vital information, which

must be free from tampering, damage, or destruction during transmission and
storage. It is an assurance that the information that arrives at a destination is the
same as the sent information. If any changes occurred, they are detected and
reported.

c. Authentication is the security measure designed to establish the validity or

“certainty of user or receiver identification and authorization to receive specific
categories of information” (United States Department of the Army, 2016). An
authentication measure prevents impersonation by establishing and confirming
identities before access to the information system through user names,
passwords, and digital IDs or certificates, among others.

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 PAM 3-06

d. Confidentiality is the assurance that information is not disclosed to

unauthorized individuals, groups, processes, or devices. Only authorized
individuals or parties are granted access to confidential information, which must
be encrypted to protect it from any unauthorized access.

e. Non-repudiation is the assurance that neither the sender nor the intended
recipient of the information can deny sending, receiving, or accessing data. The
sender of data is provided with proof of delivery, while the recipient is provided
with proof of the sender’s identity. Security measures must be used to prove
identities and to validate the communication process.

0269. Key IA capabilities include:

a. Information security (INFOSEC), which includes all “measures necessary to

detect, document, and counter threats” to information integrity (AFP, 2019;
United States Department of the Army, 2016).

b. Computer security, which includes measures that “deny unauthorized access

and exploitation of friendly computer systems” (AFP, 2019).

c. Communication security (COMSEC), which includes all measures that “deny

unauthorized persons’ information of value that may be derived from possession
and study of telecommunications” (AFP, 2019; United States Department of the
Army, 2016). COMSEC also involves misleading unauthorized persons to
interpret the information they have accessed, possessed, and studied. There are
three essential components of COMSEC: 1) Transmission security results from
“all measures designed to protect the transmission from interception”, traffic
analysis, and imitative deception. Imitative deception introduces fraudulent
transmissions, which imitate authentic transmissions, into the communications
channel of an opposing force. 2) Physical security, as it pertains to COMSEC,
results from “all measures designed to protect classified communications
equipment and material” from access to/by unauthorized persons. 3)
Cryptographic security results from developing a technically sound
cryptosystem, their proper use, and application of proper crypto-technologies.

Defense Support to Public Diplomacy

0270. “Activities and measures are taken by Department of National Defense (DND)
and its AFP components to support and facilitate GRP public diplomacy efforts, not
solely in the area of IO” (AFP, 2019). IO capabilities are integrated under the direction
of the DND STRATCOM coordinating council or its equivalent.

Strategic Communication

0271. DND initiated-government an interagency process for coordinating, integrating,

directing and disseminating strategic guidance. It ensures consistency of the message
delivered to selected national and international audiences. IO and STRATCOM
disciplines are highly complementary but not interchangeable.

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 PAM 3-06

Intelligence support

0272. Enables IO's conduct by continuously providing relevant and timely

information to understand and assess a dynamic operational environment. Information
operations intelligence integration (IOII) coordinates and synchronizes intelligence
disciplines and analytic methods to assess, characterize and forecast the information
environment, identify its vulnerabilities, and determine its effects on the military
organization's operations.

Selection of Information-Related Capabilities

0273. IO organization and implementing and support units must ensure collaborative
planning and execution of military and non-military capabilities at all times.

0274. Selection of IRCs will depend on the operations to be conducted, the

commander’s mission intent, purpose, end-state and the desired effects that can best
support them.

0275. INTEL and OPSEC requirements must be included in all IO support plans.

0276. IO does not own any of the capabilities available. It only coordinates, integrates,
synchronizes, negotiates, and de-conflicts the different IRCs and information effects.

0277. Figure 2.4 presents a matrix that matches the various IRCs with the desired
effects (end-state of military operations or activities).
Neutralize

Safeguard
Negotiate
Influence
Convince

Diminish
Degrade

Mislead
Destroy

Prevent
Defend

Disrupt

Protect
Expose
Exploit

Inform

Shape
Deny

IRCs

1. OPSEC X X
2. MILDEC X X X
3. CMO-PA X X X X
4. CMO-CA X X X
5. CMO-PSYOPS X X X
6. EW X X X X X X X X
7. Physical Attack X
8. PHYSEC X X
9. CI X X
10. CO X X X X X X
11. IA X X X X X X
12. COMPHO X X X X X
13. DSPD X X X X X X X
14. StratComm X X X X
15. Intelligence X X X X X X X X
support
Figure 2.4 – Matching IRCs with Intended Effects

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 PAM 3-06

Information Operations: Excerpts from Task Force Minion

The fall of Leoncio “Parago” Pitao, the central figure of the insurgency movement in Davao
Region and successive operational victories that followed, is the story of the right mix of seven lines
of operations, with strong emphasis on intelligence followed by CMO and focused military
operations.
The 10th Infantry Division during the leadership of MGEN EDUARDO M AÑO AFP employed
an operational design anchored on functional TRIAD, the Sword of Gideon Concept, and the Seven
(7) Lines of Operations (LOO).
The successful story of 10ID in a result of understanding the origins of the enemy, their
ideologies, objectives, and their strategies to attain these objectives.
The Sword of Gideon is a concept of operations capitalizing on the principle of mass and
concentration to decisively destroy the enemy. With the SoG Cocept, the battalion is also able to
efficiently employ its forces without disrupting its Community Support Program (CSPs)/CMO efforts
that should be made with the objective of shaping the battlefield. Identification and recruitment of
Sangay sa Partido sa Lokalidad (SPLs) and Militia ng Bayan (MB) and the completion of operational
data must be accomplished through CSPs as these are the critical ingredients to operationalize the
SoG concept.
As the 10ID’s campaign mission, priority areas shall be cleared using the seven Lines of
Operations (LOO). The LOOs provide a framework of the operational and tactical tasks a unit has
to do across the spectrum of operations from shaping to decisive to sustainment operaitons. It
should be noted that emphasis given to each LOO and the appropriate combination of some of all
of them may vary depending on the dynamics of the operational environment. The LOOs are as
follows:
1. Community Support Program – it involves the integration of the TRIAD elements
and is conducted by Community Support Teams that is composed of a regular Infantry Rifle Squad.
Each team is subdivided into three cells namely, Intelligence Cell, Combat Cell, and Civil-Military
Operations Cell.
2. Focused Military Operations – Tactical victory is the best Psyops. Several enemy
casualties and recovery of firearms from decisive encounters are propaganda itself. Effects of
decisive engagement are physical and mentally defeating to rebels therefore opportunities to
encourage the rebels to finally abandon the armed struggle. In able for enemy to surrender three
conditions must be present: 1) enemy must feel exhausted because of continuous operations; 2)
chances of getting killed during operations and; 3) option to surrender.
3. Stakeholder Engagement – social pressure from the stakeholders because military
alone cannot bring the basice services needed by the people. It is the duty of the military to prompt
local chief executive. Former rebels should be organized with the help of other stakeholders. It is
a showcase for the active rebels that there is a better life waiting for them if they decide to return to
return to the fold of the law. It also contributes to mission accomplishment since FRs come form
different organs and units in the movement, some were former political cadres while others from the
armed group, they can be tapped and consulted during mission planning. This is the main reason
CMO officers and stakeholders should work together in taking care of former rebels. Strategically,
engaging stakeholders to contribute to this effort is one way of bridging mutual interest and goals.
4. Intelligence – All intel units are “designed to work with one another”. The efforts of
these units should be regularly consolidated to boost intelligence capabilities and subsequent win
decisive victories. Intelligence units should maximize technology by mastering the use of
Geographical Information System (GIS), Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and
Graphical Estimate of the Situation for Counter-insurgency (GESCON). Recruitment of Category A
asset including medics since the NPA employ them when they launch tactical offensives against the
government forces.
5. Legal Offensive – the 10ID campaign emphasized in implementing Army’s legal
offensive: 1) File cases against all aboveground and underground enemy personalities; 2) Use
former rebels as witnesses; and Every NPA-initiated violent incident must have a corresponding
case filed before appropriate court of law. The primary units assigned to do these are the intel and
CMO but combat units shall be the source of data and witnesses.
6. Information Operation – All tactical victories must be maximized to generate
surrenderees. The local media must be tapped to feature both combat and non-combat exploits

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such as decisive encounters even in other units as well as during Serbisyo Caravans and
other successful peace and development initiatives conducted. Units must strive to have
airtime in local radio programs where the accomplishments and peace-building efforts of the
Army in communities can be conveyed to the people. It is also important for the Army troops
to participate in the activities of local government units and project an image of the AFP as
the best fighters of the lawless elements, especially during parades and exhibitions. A
deliberate show of force and capability demonstration in public events also very telling on the
might of the AFP.
7. Bayanihan Investment Protection & Security Operations (BIPSO) – Army
units should come-up with an inventory of all the infrastructure projects and business
activities in each army unit. The insurgent’s logistical lines of supply and resources that
should be cut off so they will be forced to abandon the armed struggle. TRIAD operations
should also be conducted to address all aspect of insurgent extortion activities. The CMO
should organize forums to educate businessmen on how to deny or counter any extortion
attempts. Meanwhile intel operations should focus on infiltration and entrapment operations
with the covert participation of businessmen. Combat patrols should be routinely conducted
on project sites while deliberate operations should be conducted on most threated targets.
Lines of efforts complement and support one another and are done simultaneously.
It is difficult to achieve decisive military operations without proper CSP and focused intel
operations. CSP on the other hand, can only be successful with the Army’s effective
engagement with local government units and line agencies. Decisive encounters, purposive
information operations, and continuous CSP activities, collectively result in increased number
of surrendered rebels. Moreover, successful intel operations should always be coupled with
proactive legal offensives. Lastly, denying the enemy their resources is done through
collaborative BIPSO and proper application of the TRIAD. By putting together the lines of
operations, it is the formula of success.

Information Operations Organization and Functions

General Headquarters

0278. According to AFPM 3-14, the Chief of Staff, AFP (CSAFP) shall serve as the
overall authority for ensuring the promulgation of standardized doctrine, tactics,
techniques and procedures, manpower authorizations, training, and institutional
sustainability of IO. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (J3) shall serve as the
primary functional officer for IO at the military headquarters level.

Philippine Army Information Operations

0279. The Army Chief of Staff for Operations (G3) on behalf of the Commanding
General, Philippine Army (CG, PA), shall serve as the office of primary responsibility
(OPR) for oversight of the Army IO doctrine, organization, training, equipment,
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) needs across the
Philippine Army organization. In addition, G3 will serve as the senior Army IO officer
responsible for integrating and synchronizing the Army’s information activities. Other
offices having responsibilities for IRCs will coordinate with G3 to ensure the consistent
and standardized application of IO policy, guidance, and program oversight.

0280. The IO officer is the principal staff officer responsible for the synchronizing the
IRCs and coordinates operations via the G3’s coordinating authority. Tasks are derived
from Mission Command and executed through Movement and Maneuver. Coordinates
and integrates IRCs ISO combined arms maneuver through the Information

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Environment to affect the Operational Environment; principal advocate of non-lethal

integration into targeting process. IO Officer also aligns and synchronizes the
command’s communication efforts throughout the attributed, delayed attribution and
non-attribution spaces (physical, informational, and cognitive domains). Uniquely
trained in the synchronization of all IRCs; a professional staff officer – no command
tracks.

Philippine Army Information Operations Cell

0281. Consistent with AFPM 3-14, the Army leadership task-organizes a PA IO Cell
to integrate, coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict the use of IRCs to support actions
that will achieve the desired effects of the Commander’s Plan and the general military
objectives as a whole (as visualized in Figure 2.5). The primary role of the PA IO cell
is to ensure that military information activities are coherent and synchronized with other
actions affecting the information environment.

PA IO CELL

1BCT ARMOR DIV

IO CELL PA ENGR BGDE IO CELL
INF DIV IO CELL
IO CELL

FSRR SFR(A) LRR ASR CMOR AIR AAR CBT AVN RGT
IO CELL IO CELL IO CELL IO CELL IO CELL IO CELL IO CELL ENGR BN IO CELL
IO CELL

PSYOPS
CENTER

Figure 2.5 – The Philippine Army IO Cells

0282. In consultation with subordinate commanders and component IO cells, the PA

IO Cell may advise and recommend to the PA leadership the IRC and forces necessary
to meet operational requirements. In addition, during peacetime, the PA IO Cell
coordinates (when tasked) with service-, joint-, and national-level organizations to plan
and achieve effects to deter or, if deterrence fails, influence, shape, and prepare the
operational environment for effective follow-on landpower maneuver operations.

0283. Functions of the PA IO Cell. Based on the principles and guidelines of the
AFPM 3-14, the following are the key functions of an IO cell:

a. Coordinates, synchronize, orchestrate and directs action to inform and engage

target audiences in support of the Commander’s intent and concept of
operations related to the overall PA IO effort

b. Develops IO plans to support the Commander’s concept of operations

(CONOP), intent, effects, and desired end-state. It oversees and monitors IO
execution, assesses IO performance measures, determines IO measures of
effectiveness, and conduct future IO planning

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c. Develops non-lethal and lethal IO target list for approval and integration into
the unit-targeting priorities

d. Assists in the preparation of a protected target list and target de-confliction

e. Determines IO augmentation requirements (manpower and equipment) and

coordinates with higher headquarters for its support and fulfilment

f. Causes the formulation of measures of effectiveness that support the

accomplishment of stated IO objectives. In conjunction with the military’s
intelligence and operational campaign analysis, the IO Cell conducts an
assessment of the impact of IO throughout the operation

g. Coordinates for computer network operations (CNO) options. De-conflicts and

integrates any planned cyber operations actions with other elements of the
operation

h. Coordinates media interface to ensure that press releases, etc. do not conflict
with the Commander’s intent

0284. PA IO Cell Composition. The PA IO Cell composition and its equivalent in

PAMU level are similar to the Battle Staff. G-staffs will designate IO representatives
in the IO cell. Members of the PA IO Cell shall perform tasks summarized in Figure 8.

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Table 2.1 – PA IO Cell Key Taskings

Key
Tasks
Offices/Units
G1 § OPR on personnel readiness requirements of the IRCs
§ Provides inputs on matters concerning recruitment, morale and welfare, and personnel readiness of the PA
§ Designates primary and alternate representatives to the PA IO Cell

G2 § OPR on the development of intel-related capabilities (unit security practices, force protection, OPSEC,
counter-reconnaissance, deception, information, and personnel security)
§ Provides inputs on matters concerning OPSEC and readiness IRCs on intelligence
§ Designates primary and alternate representatives to the PA IO Cell
G3 § Overall OPR on the operationalization of the PA IO Cell
§ Acts as Chairperson of the PA IO Cell
§ Designates primary and alternate representatives to the PA IO Cell

G4 § OPR in providing for the logistical requirements (equipment and facilities readiness) of IRCs
§ Provides inputs on matters concerning logistical capability development of IRCs
§ Designates primary and alternate representatives to the PA IO Cell

G5 § Provides inputs on the overall capability development of IRCs

§ Designates primary and alternate representatives to the PA IO Cell

G6 § OPR on the capability development of IRCs in terms of C4S (Command and Control Communications, and
Cyber Support) requirements
§ OPR on the proper utilization of cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and other C4S related capabilities
§ Develops platforms for propagation of IO products
§ Designates primary and alternate representatives to the PA IO Cell

G7 § OPR on the enhancement of the IRCs (PA, CA, ISA, SocMed, and PCVE) in support to execution of operations
§ Designates primary and alternate representatives to the PA IO Cell

G8 § OPR on the training requirements of IRCs

§ Designates primary and alternate representatives to the PA IO Cell

G9 § OPR on the Reserve Force Development Program in support of PA IO

§ Provides inputs on matters regarding involvement of reservists and retirees
§ Designates primary and alternate representatives to the PA IO Cell

AJA, ACS § Designates primary and alternate representatives to the PA IO Cell

ACPA § OPR on the propagation of IO products concerning public information

All PAMUs § Organize respective IO Cell for the conduct of IO in respective areas
§ Develop IRCs for the enhancement of IO

0285. PA IO Cell Chief. The Army will designate a PA IO Cell Chief. In Army’s
case, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, G3, will be the Chief, IO planner
whose primary mission is to integrate and synchronize all planning processes across the
Army organization. All IO aspects are coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate
staffs and among the supporting teams and cells of the PA IO system. The PA IO Cell
Chief shall also ensure that all IO portions of operational plans reflect the intent and
guidance of the CG, PA and are consistent with the Army’s LMC and applicable
military plans and policies of the AFP leadership.

0286. PA IO Team and Unit-Level IO Cells. As required by the multi-dimensional

nature of Army operations, the PA IO Cell Chief is supported by smaller IO cells per
operating unit and functional area to ensure that the operational objectives and effects
are achievable. These include individual IO cells for all infantry divisions, engineering
brigades, other divisions, and functional units (FSSR, SFR(A), LRR, ASR, CMOR,
AIR, AAR, CBT Engineering Bn, AVN RGT, etc.), each of which contributes a planned
capability that is synchronized and integrated to create a combined defensive or
offensive IO effect.

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0287. These component IO cells work within the PA IO Cell framework/organization

to develop rules of engagement (ROE) necessary to support IO and fuse specific
discipline, expertise, and intelligence into attack plans and tasking orders.

0288. Inputs of Staff in IO Cell. The following are the inputs of each staff to the IO
cell: commander’s guidance, commander’s intent and CCIR; specified and implied
tasks; running estimates, isr products, target audience analysis; assessment of preview
IE activities and their effects. Higher messages and talking points; PA/PsyOps themes
and messages, measure of performance/measure of effectiveness; electronic warfare,
military deception, cyber operations plans; intel support plans and combined
information overlay.

0289. Results of IO Cell. The following are the result based on the planning of IO
cell: IO synchronization matrix; products (Print, radio, Social Media, et.al); CCIR/IR
nominations; updated target sync matrix; refined themes and messages, refined battle
drills and; updated operations officer.

0290. IO is an integrating function that enables the infantry division to use information
related capabilities to affect adversary decision making while protecting our own.
While IO is the integrated employment of IRCs, IO is separate and distinct from the
IRCs. While most of the actions taken by the IRCs will support IO objectives to either
affect adversary decision making or protect friendly decision making, the IRCs will
also execute independent activities in support of infantry division operations. Making
these distinctions highlights a key role for the commander in determining the role of
the IO element and its relationship to the IRCs. The commander has to weigh the type
of operation and the experience of IO and IRC personnel when determining how to
organize.

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Chapter III
Information Operations Process

0301. This chapter identifies how the existing planning and decision-making process
of the Philippine Army is used in the context of IO. The doctrinal approach will be
reviewed and identify its application in the IO. This chapter also includes discussing
the tools used to measure the effect of the military operations on the mission objective
and different assessment approaches.

Operations Process
0302. The Army’s view on planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations
IO planning must begin simultaneously with the PA campaign and its operational
planning. It must be an integral part and not an addition to the overall planning effort.
IO planning principles and processes should be parallel to established principles and
processes for operational planning. The IO staff coordinates and synchronizes all
available capabilities to accomplish operational objectives. Uncoordinated IO can
compromise, complicate, negate, or harm other AFP military operations, as well as
other government interagency information activities. AFP commanders must ensure
that IO planners are fully integrated into the planning and targeting process.

Authority for Information Operations Planning and Execution

0303. As part of the planning process, the designation of a release and execution
authority in IO operation is required. Release authority provides the approval for IO
employment and normally specifies specific offensive means and capabilities provided
to the executive authority. Execution authority is described as the authority to employ
IO capabilities at a designated time and place. Normally, the mission commander has
overall authority for IO before, during and after an operation. However, the commander
may choose to delegate his authority to his operations officer.

Information Operations Planning Considerations

0304. IO is used in all phases of a PA campaign or operation. A detailed IO

preparation during the early phase of the operation can significantly influence the effort
required in the remaining phases. Many IO capabilities require a long lead time. As
an example, intelligence requires an expanded timeline to collect, analyze and
disseminate information. Consequently, Commanders must ensure that IO objectives,
PIRs, and RFIs are accurately defined and appropriately prioritized as the planning
begins. In addition, the intelligence gain/loss from the application of an IO capability
and the status of the target as a viable element of the target system must be carefully
evaluated during the planning phase prior to its execution. The joint planning process
involves the following steps:

a. Planning Initiation

b. Analysis of Mission

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c. Development of COA

d. Analysis of COA and War-Gaming

e. Comparison of COA

f. COA Finalization/Approval

g. Plan or Order Production

h. Plan Refinement

0305. Planning Initiation. Integration of IO into joint operations begins as soon as

the operations order or warning order is issued to the command. In this phase, the Key
IO staff actions are:

a. Observe situational development pending the initial planning guidance and

review concepts and estimates of applicable OPLANs

b. Assemble the IO Cell to notify subordinate commands/units of possible tasking

to support IO planning. The IO cell is regularly convened for assessment of
situation and identification of preliminary planning actions during crisis action
planning. However, it is required for contingency planning to convene the full
IO cell for informal consultation with its members, as needed.

c. Determine the initial scope of IO in the operation

d. Distinguish location, SOP, and routine of other staff organization that requires
IO interaction, and divide the coordination responsibilities among the IO staff

e. Start to identify the critical information needed for mission analysis and course
of action (COA) development and availability of required information.
(Continues throughout planning development)

f. Determine requirements for IO Planning as well as staff augmentation and

necessary support and request from various supporting organizations the
necessary support following the established procedures

g. Confirm and update PIRs and RFIs considering the time spent accomplishing
the requirements of IO (Consistently undertaken through the processes of
contingency planning

h. Supply additional information and recommendations for IO strategies and

resolutions that dispute other IO plans.

i. Present preliminary nominations for IO target for review of the intelligence

community (IC) on its gains or losses and joint forces de-confliction and
validation

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0306. Mission Analysis. During the analysis of the mission, the assigned mission is
assessed in order to identify the objectives and tasks of the commander and to plan the
instructions for subordinate elements. Key IO staff actions during this phase are the
following:

a. Determine the specified, implied, and essential IO tasks

b. Determine important, challenges, and limitations to the IO

c. Develop initial MOE and MOP

d. Identify accessible IO capabilities for the mission and determine at what level
should the authority for deployment and employment come

e. Determine material systems, information, and the elements of human reasoning

(whether friendly, adversarial or neutral or third party) that are associated with
or may have an impact on the operational IO environment

f. Further develop the PIRs and RFIs proposals

g. Incorporate the particulars of IO into the updated mission submitted for the
approval of the commander

h. Identify specific IO skills, sets the specialized tasks required for the mission,
and initiate augmentation request and or tasking

i. Review initial intelligence/threat information, assessment of the staff mission,

and determine possible targets for IO

j. Assemble a list of targets, sustain the documentation of targets, and develop a

folder for every IO target nomination.

0307. COA Development. The initial estimates of staffs, mission and tasks, and the
planning guidance of the commander which are output from the mission analysis are
critical to the development of the COA. In this phase, Key IO staff actions are:

a. Identify IO capabilities that may be employed individually or together with

other IOs for the accomplishment of the COA IO supporting

b. Update the section on the IO in the COAs in order to improve the estimates of
the staff.

c. Update all COAs considering the findings in the risk analysis

0308. COA Analysis and War-gaming. The commander must war-game all
proposed COAs opposite the COAs of the enemy which were gathered from the
intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). In this phase, the key IO staff actions
are:

a. Assess from the perspective of a functional IO, all COAs.

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 PAM 3-06

b. Disclose all vital IO decision items

c. Propose adjustments to the IO task organization

d. Supply IO information for the synchronization matrix and supplementary tools

for decision-making

e. Determine sections of IO for the branches and sequels

f. Enumerate potential IO high-value targets (HVTs)

g. Endorse critical information vital to IO to the commander

0309. COA Comparison. COA comparison stars off with the analyzation and
evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from the perspective of
all staff members. In this phase, key IO staff actions are:

a. Comparison of the COAs accounting the mission and the IO task

b. Comparison of each COA about the IO requirements and per the available IO
resources

c. Prioritize COAs from an IO perspective

0310. COA Selection/Approval. There are no significant IO staff actions during

COA approval.

0311. Plan or Order Development. In this phase, the segment on IO of the plan or
order is developed by the IO Staff. Key IO staff actions are:

a. Enhance IO tasks based on the approved COA

b. Enumerate gaps in IO capability and provide alternative resolutions

c. Assist in developing IO support plans by providing the responsible

organizations the necessary, complete, and timely details of the IO plan
provided the protocol on information access is followed in the planning process

d. Inform the concerned commander of all issues and concerns raised during the
review and approval of the supporting

0312. Plan Refinement. During plan review, IO cell modifies/refines the plan as
necessary.

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Information Operations Intent of the Commander

0313. The IO’s role in the operation starts prior the initiation of the planning process.
IO-related PIRs and RFIs must be of high priority to the commander even before the
need for the intelligence products. The IO vision of the commander must include the
initial guidance. It is preferred however that the guidance for IO be integrated in the
overall concept. Still, in most cases, IO guidance is given separately. For example, the
guidance on IO may be given by the commander during a direct discussion on IO.
Additionally, providing the guidance on IO separately during exercises improves the
appreciate of the commander’s staff to the IO as a vital component of the operation.

0314. IO planning illustrated. Quick look at the IO process:

Figure 3.1 – Information Operations Process

Military Decision Making Process Application in

Information Operations
0315. The Headquarters Philippine Army (HPA), its commander and planners, must
ensure that IO support planning begins at the earliest stage of operational planning, is
consistent with the IO plans of the higher headquarters, and is fully integrated into the
concept of operations. IO planning also consider that certain IO (MILDEC, ISA, and
CO) requires a longer lead time to plan and the impact and threat of hostile information
from outside the operational area due to the ease of information flow through
information networks and the media. Figure 3.2 shows the current landscape of the IE
where IO planning takes into account.

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Figure 3.2 – Current Landscape of the Information Environment

0316. The Army uses the MDMP in the development of the IO concept of support and
plans. It is done in order to identify problems or anticipated problem behaviors in the
context of the environment that may impede or prevent the achievement of supporting
objectives. The IO MDMP is not a stand-alone planning process but integrated into the
overall MDMP campaign of the PA unit. The IO plan is a supporting and
complementing plan. Figure 3.3 shows the full process of the MDMP. In this section,
the IO will be integrated into the MDMP and incorporate multi-agency synchronization
throughout the process.

Figure 3.3 – Military Decision Making Process

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Receipt of the Mission

0317. The process starts with the receipt of the mission through an order from higher
headquarters. This is the form of an operations order or a warning order. This is
important as this would alert all the concerned regarding the mission, identify the
available time for planning and preparation, and decide on the planning approach. Upon
the receipt of the mission, the PA HQ/unit should undertake the following:

a. The IO Officer must always be updated on the situation and the guidance from
initial planning while reviewing OPLAN estimates, conducting an initial
assessment of the time and resources available to plan, prepare, and begin
executing an operation.

b. IO cell must be convened to alarm all concerned subordinate units of probable

tasking in connection to the support for IO planning. In planning for crisis
action, the IO cell is regularly convened to re-evaluate the situation and identify
the actions to be taken from the preliminary planning. In contingency planning,
it is required to convene all members of the IO cell for informal consultation, as
needed.

c. The commander must issue initial guidance that includes the initial time
allocation, necessary coordination to perform, authorization of movements and
any reconnaissance and surveillance to initiate, initial information requirements,
planning schedules and locations, and additional tasks of the staff.

d. A warning order (WARNO) must be issued. It include but not be limited to the
type of operation, general site of operation, timeline, and all movements and
reconnaissance operations to be undertaken.

Mission Analysis

0318. Essential Tasks for IO. It is rare for a unit to conduct IO by itself. Instead,
there is always higher headquarters guidance and tasks. While the higher headquarters
have specifically assigned some tasks, others may be implied, meaning they must
accomplish specified tasks or the overall mission. Implied tasks require resources and
may not be administered. IO personnel identify tasks that the command must
accomplish to successfully affect adversary and friendly use of information from the
specified and implied tasks. These become the unit’s essential tasks for IO. Essential
tasks for IO should be limited to no more than five; any more than that will overburden
the subordinate element with developing tasks supporting essential IO tasks or create
an IO that is too complex to execute.

0319. A rule of thumb for validating an essential task is to ask: If the unit accomplishes
all other tasks marginally and does this one well, will it accomplish the mission? If the
answer is no, then the task is not essential. Suppose more than five essential tasks are
identified. In that case, IO personnel should question the validity of each essential task
or the nature of the requirements levied on the unit by higher headquarters.

0320. Shortfalls in Information Operations Capabilities. IO personnel should

determine if the unit has the assets to perform the assigned tasks. This is done by

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identifying any organic and supporting IO-capable assets. Organic assets are resident
in assigned or attached forces. Supporting assets are available to the unit from a higher
headquarters or Government agency. Available assets are then compared with the IO
mission requirements (specified and implied tasks) to determine gaps in capabilities
and all supplementary assets required. To ensure the use of these assets, IO personnel
must start coordination early. IO planners face a challenge in expressing IO capabilities
to the commander and staff. A simple list of IO-capable assets or units—such as three
tactical ISA teams or two COMPHO teams—does not help the commander visualize
the command’s capabilities in the IE. In developing its product, IO personnel will
consider three basic questions:

a. What can IO effects be created or produced using the command’s organic

assets?

b. What can IO effects be created or produced using supporting assets from the
higher headquarters?

c. What can IO effects not be created or produced with available assets?

0321. Restraints and Constraints for Information Operations. Restraints are the
things you cannot do, and constraints are the things you must do that do not qualify as
specified tasks but need to be identified and carried forward into COA development
and subsequent planning to affect how operations will be conducted.

0322. Like most other operations, information operations are restrained by rules of
engagement; Philippine national policy; international politics; and other legal, moral,
cultural, and operational factors. Additionally, IO personnel must consider that IRCs
have restraints of their own, particularly MILDEC, PsyOps, CO, and EW. Common
restraints include approval of authorities for deception operations, ISA products,
PsyOps themes to avoid, allied forces’ national policies and capabilities, restricted
targets and frequencies, and public affairs guidance (PAG). The limitations for IO can
be organized in terms of information content and flow to enhance understanding.

0323. Information content is the substance, value, or meaning of the information,

normally comprised within the words and images; includes the intended action or
inaction the information was designed to elicit.

0324. Critical Information Requirements for the Commander. Only the

commander decides what information is critical, but the staff may propose CCIRs to
the commander. The CCIRs are continually reviewed and updated or deleted as
required. Initially, CCIRs may reflect the nature of planning and identify intelligence
or information requirements to assist with the planning and decision process. As the
planning moves forward and execution looms, CCIRs normally change to reflect key
information/intelligence requirements tied to decision points or needed for execution
(MCWP 3-40.4, MAGTF IO,2016).

0325. Key IO staff actions. After mission analysis, the operations planning team
(OPT) or IO cell has done the following:

a. Revision of mission statement and incorporation of IO to the mission statement

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b. Identification of specified, implied, and essential tasks, assumptions, and

potential targets

c. Development of initial MOE and MOP

d. Analyzation of available IO capabilities available

e. Identification of IO skills, level of authority to approve the for development and

employment, material systems, information, and elements of human reasoning

f. Update PIR’s and RFI’s

g. Review of initial intelligence/threat information

Course of Action Development

0326. Planners use the mission statement, commander’s intent, and commander’s
planning guidance to develop COAs. COA development provides options for how the
mission and commander’s intent might be accomplished while refining the
understanding of the problem. The IO planner aims to develop a concept of support that
generates effects that create information superiority over the adversary at the proper
time and place. An IO concept of support is examined to ensure that it is suitable,
feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete concerning the current and
anticipated situation, mission, and commander’s intent (MCWP 3-40.4, MAGTF IO,
2016).

0327. Planning that was started during problem framing will continue during COA
development. The JIPOE/IPB products requested and developed will be reviewed for
applicability with the commander’s planning guidance. As necessary, IO-related
JIPOE/IPB products are modified and updated. As new information is received, CCIRs
are revised and additional requirements submitted.

0328. IO cell planning efforts continue to be closely linked with those of the OPT. In
the case of the Philippine Army, OPT is equivalent to TRIAD (G2, G3, and G7) staff
in the IO cell or the battle staff. The IO planner (G3) assists the OPT by graphically
displaying the significant characteristics of the information environment, allowing the
OPT to see the capabilities of both friendly and adversary forces. In coordination with
the Intelligence Officer (G2), the IO cell (battle staff) will conduct nodal analysis to
assess relative IRCs and provide the OPT (IO Cell) with an understanding of the
strengths and weaknesses of both friendly and adversary forces. In addition, the IO cell
conducts an assessment of friendly vulnerabilities to adversary information actions. The
IO cell also continues to refine its analysis of the adversary center of gravity (COG) to
determine the critical adversary vulnerabilities most susceptible to information
operations. The refined COG and critical vulnerabilities are used during the initial COA
Development.

0329. The IO cell closely follows the development of the OPT’s COAs to ensure that
the IO concept of support adequately supports these COAs. The IO cell may formulate
an IO concept of support that will identify IO actions to be implemented regardless of
the eventual COA that is adopted. In addition, the IO cell creates a concept of support

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for every COA developed by the OPT. Just as every COA will have to meet the OPT’s
criteria for suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness,
the IO cell must ensure that the IO concept of support can pass a similar review. Each
IO concept of support must address the following:

a. What will IO tasks be accomplished?

b. Who will execute the IO tasks (IO assets capabilities)?

c. When will IO tasks be executed?

d. Where will the IO tasks occur?

e. Why each IO task is required (intended effect)?

f. How will the unit employ IRCs and other organic capabilities to accomplish the
tasks?

g. How is the IO concept nested with the higher headquarters’ IO plan and scheme
of maneuver?

0330. Characteristics of Course of Action. COA in this stage should be:

a. Adequate. COA must realize the mission in the scope set in the commander’s
guidance

b. Feasible. COA must realize the mission in the timeline and given the limitations
on resources

c. Acceptable. COA should consider the costs and risks with the outcome/s gained

d. Distinguishable. COA should be unidentical and distinct from the other COAs

e. Complete. COA must incorporate the objectives, effects, tasks to be undertaken,

major forces requirements, deployment, employment and sustainment concepts,
estimated timeline, end state, and mission success criteria

0331. Key IO staff actions. After COA development, the OPT or IO cell has
developed the following:

a. An overall IO concept

b. An IO support concept for every COA to include objectives and purposes for
essential IO tasks, target nominations, and an assessment plan to measure the
effectiveness of the tasks

c. Recommendations for the commander’s wargaming guidance and evaluation

criteria

d. Updated IO-associated JIPOE/IPB products

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e. Input to the COA graphic and narrative

f. An initial staff estimates for information operations with additional asset

requirements or require support from higher headquarters

Analysis of Course of Action and Wargaming

0332. The commander must war-game the initial COA opposite the COA of the
opponent that were gathered through JIPOE/IPB depending on the available time. COA
war game examines and refines the broad option(s) in light of adversary capabilities
and potential actions/reactions, as well as the characteristics peculiar to the
environment. All friendly COA should be war-gamed opposite chosen adversary
COAs. COA wargaming assists the planners in identifying strengths and weaknesses,
associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA. The IO cell’s objective in
the war game is to refine and validate both the overall IO support concept and the
specific IO concepts of support for every COA while fully participating in the COA
war game. The IO actions are integrated into the COA war game in an interactive
process to determine the impact on both friendly and adversary capabilities. The IO cell
observes and records the benefits and gaps of every COA and the capability of IO to
support each COA. For future planning, it also identifies possible branches and
potential sequels based on the IO concept.

0333. Key IO staff actions. During this phase, the key IO staff actions are:

a. Evaluate every COA using the IO functional perspective

b. Disclose all vital IO decision items

c. Propose adjustments to the IO task organization

d. Supply IO information for the synchronization matrix and supplementary tools

for decision-making

e. Determine sections of IO for the branches and sequels

f. Enumerate potential IO high-value targets (HVTs)

g. Endorse CCIRs for IO

0334. At the conclusion of COA analysis and war gaming, the OPT and the IO cell
should have developed the following:

a. Updated input to JIPOE/IPB products

b. Refined staff estimates for information operations

c. Refined input to CCIRs

d. Task organization and asset shortfalls for IO resources

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e. IO input to COA synchronization matrix

Course of Action Comparison

0335. COA comparison begins with the assessment and evaluation of the benefits and
gaps of every COA by all members of the staff.

0336. Key IO staff actions. During this phase, the key IO staff actions are:

a. Compare of all COA of the mission related to the IO task

b. Compare of each COA about the IO requirements and by the accessible

resources for IO

c. Organize the prioritization of the COAs following the perspective of IO.

Course of Action Approval

0337. During COA approval, the commander evaluates all friendly COAs against his
established criteria, against each other, and then selects the COA that will best
accomplish the mission or forms an alternate COA. As appropriate, the IO cell provides
additional comparison criteria directly relevant to IO that may assist the commander in
his decision. The IO results from the COA war game are briefed as a separate,
supporting concept by the IO cell or presented by the OPT as an element of the overall
plan.

0338. In any event, the IO cell should ensure that the commander is apprised of the
effects that operations in the IE have created. The IO cell is also responsible for ensuring
that IO's impact and anticipated effect upon the adversary targets for each COA and the
relative merit of each COA from an IO perspective are provided to the commander.

0339. COA narrative should include the operational mission, situation in the area and
COAs, analysis of opposing COAs, friendly COAs comparison and recommendations.
This should also include the operational description, which includes the operation,
reference, description of military operations, operational description, and remarks.

Orders Production

0340. The IO staff should develop the section on IO of the plan or order of the mission,
taking the commander’s COA decision, mission statement, intent, and guidance and
develops orders to direct the unit's actions. Thus, orders serve as the principal means
by which the commander expresses his decision, commander’s intent, and guidance.

0341. The IO cell is responsible for taking the overall IO concept of support and the
concept of support specific to the COA selected by the commander and turning them
into appropriate sections of the OPORD under the direction of the IO officer. However,
the IO cell must be careful not to let the requirement to develop and explain information
activities and contributions to the operation overwhelm the primary purposes of the IO
appendix, which are to:

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a. Provide operational details on IO

b. Focus element and unit tasks on creating specific effects in the IE

c. Provide the information needed to assess IO

0342. During order reconciliation and crosswalks, the IO cell may be called upon to
review the IO sections of the orders, identify gaps in planning or discrepancies, provide
corrective action, and finalize IPB products. If fragmentary orders are issued, then the
IO cell will ensure appropriate instructions are given to IO-capable units (MCWP 3-
40.4, MAGTF IO, 2016).

0343. Key IO staff actions. In this phase, the key IO staff actions are:

a. Develop the IO tasks based on COA approved

b. Determine gaps in the IO capabilities and provide alternative resolutions.

c. Assist in developing IO support plans by providing the responsible

organizations the necessary, complete, and timely details of the IO plan
provided the protocol on information access is followed in the planning process

d. Inform the concerned commander of all issues and concerns raised during the
review and approval of the supporting

Plan Refinement

0344. The changes in the IE and in the PA and developments may come at any point.
Thus, on the final stage, refinements must be made to the plans. The plans are:

a. Adequate. The range and concepts imbedded in the planned operations must be
accomplish the mission while working within the planning guidance released.

b. Feasible. The assigned mission must be completed considering accessible

resources and in the allowed time indicated in the plan

c. Acceptable. The plan is relative and commensurate the expected costs

d. Complete. The plan incorporates all tasks to be accomplished

e. Compliant with Doctrine. The plan complies with doctrine to the maximum
extent possible

Multi-Agency Synchronization

0345. Consultations with select civilian agencies are also key in the accomplishment
of the mission. IO activities should be done through inter-agency coordination and
collaboration since they are on the same side as the government. Partnership with
civilian agencies is vital as they have the resources needed that should be vital or even

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enhance the COAs and orders put in place. With these resources, the Army’s logistics
and support personnel would lessen to include the cutting of costs.

0346. The importance of multi-agency synchronization also be seen through the

specific sectors where civilian agencies work on. Because of the specificity and mastery
of their sector, other possible information vital to the mission would be received by the
Army.

Targeting and Assessment

0347. The sections of this chapter discuss the targeting, specifically how the IO
Officer/IO cell integrates into the process and the assessment. Targeting starts from the
identification and description of the problem in order to assess the outcomes of the
executed COA. This process tests solution paths, helps in problem comprehension, and
provides the necessary enhancement to the proposed solution.

Targeting
0348. Activities coordinated through IO focus directly on influencing will, affecting
understanding and on those capabilities that promote understanding of the application
of will. Therefore, IO targeting must be simple and authoritative. Its objective must be
easily understood in both current and future operations. They must focus on the assets
of enemy capabilities that could interfere in the successful conduct.

0349. Targeting Cycle. As reflected in PAFM 3-01 and PAM 3-041, the principles
of effective targeting were the foundation in coming up with the six phases of the
targeting cycle. The cycle indicates the targeting alternatives for the objectives for
combat operations of the commander at the same time reducing unintentional and
undesirable consequences.

a. Phase 1 —Objectives, Guidance, and Intent of the Commander

b. Phase 2 —Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization of Target

c. Phase 3 —Assessment of Capabilitieis

d. Phase 4 —Decision and Force Assignment of the Commander

e. Phase 5 — Planning and Execution of Mission

f. Phase 6 —Assessment of Combat

0350. Targeting meetings. This is chaired typically by the operations staff, which
functions to synchronize the targeting efforts of the staff. The IO cell is a distinct and
separate working group effort that feeds the staff to target meetings. Members of
targeting meetings look at how the staff achieves the desired effects to meet the themes
and messages developed in the IO cell for different audiences. The IO officer looks at
how the staff integrates information-related capabilities into operations to achieve the
desired effects. Targeting and IO are both integrating processes that affect and reinforce
each other. Information-related capabilities provide assets that detect targets, deliver

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effects, and then assess these effects. Military information activities include a wide
range of actions and will be achieved by lethal and non-lethal means. Concerning
human factors, it is important to realize that any element of targeting activity may
influence a range of audiences and create other unintended effects. The IO cell
coordinates the assessment of the possible impact of such activity and proposes
appropriate actions.

0351. Targeting Coordination. A coordinated targeting approach is required to

achieve information objectives. This means that all information activities must be
closely aligned with the objectives of the operation plan. In addition, it is vital that
targeting considers all possible secondary effects (intended and unintended) that
resulted in psychological or physical damage. This means the full range of targets affect
the by military information activities, including adversary decision-making processes,
key decision-makers and technical components of information systems. IO involvement
in the joint targeting process is crucial to create required effects in the IE (JP 3-60, Joint
Targeting, 2007).

0352. Information Operations Contribution to Target Nomination. IO assists in

the targeting process by identifying where information activities could be applied to
create specific effects supporting the CDR’s mission objectives. Therefore, during the
planning and continuously as part of the implementation, target nominations must
implement information activities. These targets are coordinated through the IO
planning process (using the IO cell as a coordination forum) and include various
subjects, including decision-making systems, information systems, and other linked
activities.

0353. Analysis of Adversary Information Activities. The IO staff will review

adversary capabilities and information objectives to identify those that will require
countering or exploitation. These systems-of-systems analysis of the adversary
provides fundamental information on adversary abilities and own exposed areas. This
review is conducted through the IO cell in conjunction with other staff branches as
appropriate. The analysis must also consider the impact of any constraints or restraints
imposed by higher authority such as:

a. Mission-specific political guidance on information activities and themes

b. Political, legal and rules of engagement (ROE) issues, which may include
international law, custom and practice, host nation agreements/arrangements,
support by other nations and other sensitivities

c. Those arising from social and cultural attitudes will limit information activity
options and lead to the development of rules of behavior

0354. Targeting Integration. In targeting, the commander’s objectives, guidance,

and intent are achieved by integrating forces. The commander sets the priorities,
presents clear guidance, and identifies the contribution of the operations. Staff sections
determines the HVTs and HPTs for acquirement and engagement and recommend for
the deployment of forces according to the guidance of the commander in attaining the
mission. A key component of this planning is the COG analysis of both adversary and
friendly forces.

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a. High-Value Target (HVT). As in defined in the AFP Information Operations

Manual (AFPM 3-14), HVT is a target that the commander requires to complete
his mission against the enemy forces and their support base. The loss or
degradation of HVTs would greatly damage the functions vital to the enemy
within the area of interest of friendly commanders. The IO Officer determines
the IO HVTs based on the IO objectives and IO tasks during the mission
analysis and COA development. Likewise, the IO Officer is responsible for
prioritizing the IO HVTs to identify high payoff target (HPT) during the
analysis of COA. The IO objectives, tasks, and targets are then integrated by the
IO Officer to accomplish the IO mission.

b. High Payoff Target (HPT). It is a target that would greatly damage the
functions vital to the enemy within the area of interest of friendly commanders.
It is greatly important to acquire and engage HPTs (AFPM 3-14). Priority IO-
related HPTs includes, but not limited to: enemy C2 links/nodes, intelligence
collection methods/equipment, supporting institutions/organizations,
supporting military equipment/systems, automated data systems/decision
support systems, human networks, populace support and or any other target that
is designated as an HPT. HPT is a single or a grouped target set.

c. Centers of Gravity (COG) and Decisive Points (DPs). The identification of

COGs and DPs is vital in accomplishing the objectives set by the commander
following the guidance and intent issued. The mentioned would greatly
contribute to the effective targeting specifically in generating the type and extent
of damage to achieves the objectives identified by the commander

Figure 3.4 – Characteristics of Centers of Gravity

1) Center of Gravity. The AFP (2013) defines this as the source of power that
provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will act. All
objectives are directly associated to a COG. COGs vary at different levels
however, these are nested. It is important to remember that ISO directly looks

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into the legitimacy and influence over a population. However, territorial defense
aims to situate direct action to defeat the enemy forces, to eliminate the war-
making capacity of the enemy or to create an environment that would change
the structure and policies of the enemy. Thus, the population would be both
considered the enemy and friendly COG in an ISO environment.

a) Vital Role of Friendly and Enemy COGs Analysis in Operational Design.

Intelligence analysts determines the COGs of the enemy, its source of freedom
of action, resources, and will to fight. The G-2 together with the operational
planners, identify the legitimacy or vitalness of tentative and candidate COGs
as this is essential to the planning process. The same analysis is also conducted
by other staff to the determine the friendly COGs. Capabilities, requirements,
and vulnerabilities that were identified in the analysis is important to consider
in the planning process. It is also important to consider the relationship between
and among the COGs in order to come up a more precise operational design.
Planners must conduct the COG analysis through the following critical factors:
(1) Critical Capabilities (CC) which are the most crucial COG enablers and are
vital to the enemy to attain its objectives; (2) Critical Requirements (CR) which
are the situation, resources, and mechanism necessary for the critical capability
to be operational; and, (3) Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) which are
insufficiencies and inadequacy in the CR to achieve enemy objectives.
Generally, the commander must have sufficient and adequate operational and
combat resources and other necessary resources in order to get ahead of the CV
of the enemy at the same time protect friendly CCs within the operational
environment of the enemy.

b) Analysis and Testing of COG Validity Before Finalization of COGs in

the Plan. It is important that the results of the war-gaming to test the COG show
that there is a change in COA of the enemy or prevention of enemy objectives.
If the results despite the targeting, defeat, destruction, neutralization or
weakening of the COG shows otherwise, the staff may have not identified the
COG. Thus, planners need to review and revise the COG and critical factors
analysis. In the process of planning and throughout the operations, there is a
need for continuous reevaluation and reassessment of COGs as the environment
or other factors in the operations may change. The staff needs to be on alert and
change the COGs to include the adjustment of plans and operations with
friendly forces.

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Figure 3.5 – COG Analysis Hierarchy

2) Decisive Points. Decisive points directly contribute to the outcomes of the

operations. The concerned commanders together with their staff should always
consider the effect of these points to the enemy, affected population, behavior,
relationships with friendly and enemy forces, and stability in the area of interest.
The COG critical factors (i.e. CC, CR, and CV) determines the decision points
given that it can provide direct or indirect actions on the COG. Majority of the
critical factors can be identified also as decisive points during the planning
process (VAM, A tool for Center of Gravity Analysis, 2014

0355. Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and

Recognizability (CARVER). The CARVER method is used to assess, validate, and
define requirements planning. Units use the CARVER targeting process in addition to
vulnerability assessments. The CARVER selection factors help in selecting the best
targets or components to attain the commander’s desired end state. As the staff
considers factors, each factor receives a numerical value. This value represents the
desirability of engaging the target. Staffs place the values in a CARVER matrix. After
assigning values for each target or component, the sum of the values indicates the
highest value target or component to engage the limits of requirements and the intent
of the commander.

0356. As the staff evaluates each potential target for each CARVER factor, the analyst
enters the numerical value into a matrix. After evaluating all the potential targets, the
analyst adds the scores for each target. The totals represent the relative desirability of
each potential target and constitute a prioritized list of targets. Staffs consider the targets
with the highest totals first for engagement.

a. Criticality. Criticality, or target value, is the primary consideration in targeting.

Criticality relates to the degree to which a target’s destruction, denial,
disruption, and damage impair the adversary’s political, economic, or military
operations or the degree a target component disrupts the function of a target
complex. In determining criticality, staff analyzes individual targets in a target
system concerning the other elements critical to the function of the target system
or complex. Critical targets are selected for information collection missions.

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b. Accessibility. A target’s accessibility is when an information-related capability

(IRC) can impact the target with sufficient personnel to accomplish its mission.
A target is accessible even if it requires the assistance of knowledgeable
insiders. This assessment entails identifying and studying critical paths that the
operational element must take to accomplish its objectives and measuring those
things that aid or impede access.

c. Recuperability. A target’s recuperability is measured in time – how long it will

take to recover from the effects on the target. Recuperability varies with the
nature of the target and the effect of various IRCs with which it is being
engaged. Recuperability is not as important in terrorist targeting as the
considerations of publicity, the symbolism of the target, and the desire to
accomplish an engagement.

d. Vulnerability. A target is vulnerable if there are the means and expertise to

engage it successfully. When determining the vulnerability of a target, the scale
of the critical component needs to be compared with the capability of the
engaging element. A much broader range of resources and technology are
available at the strategic level to conduct the target engagement. At the tactical
level, resources are limited to organic assets or those that can be attached,
borrowed, or improvised.

e. Effect. Effects on the populace can alienate the local inhabitants, strengthen the
resistance movement, or trigger reprisals against the indigenous people in the
immediate target area. The IO analyst must calculate and weigh collateral
damage against the expected military benefit to determine if an engagement is
advisable under the concept of proportionality. Collateral damage includes, but
is not limited to, civilian injuries, deaths, and adverse economic, social, and
political impacts of the proposed engagement.

1) There are two types of targeting effects, namely direct or indirect. As defined
in the AFP IO Manual (AFPM 3-14), (a) direct effects are the immediate, first
order of effects of a military action (i.e. employment results of weapons, etc.),
that are unchanged by intervening situations or processes. These are easy to
identify. On the other hand, (b) indirect effects are the delayed and displaced
second and third-order effects of military action. Indirect effects are not easy to
identify because of varied behavior of the enemy which can mask the extent.
Indirect effects are commonly IO effects.

2) There are three (3) fundamental characteristics of direct and indirect effects
which may qualitatively affect the enemy’s capabilities. (a) Cumulative Nature
of Effects. The compounding of effects is common. For direct effects, it is
common to see it being greater than the immediate consequences while for
indirect effects, it combines to create greater change comparing to the total
consequences. It is possible that it may occur simultaneously or at different
levels of the operations while lower-order effects are being accomplished. (b)
Cascading Nature of Effects. Indirect effects can indirectly affect the target
system of the enemy, at times even influencing other target systems. This
commonly happens through common and critical nodes connected to the target
systems. Indirect effects cascades usually from the top to bottom levels of war.

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(c) Collateral and Additional Nature of Effects. Unintended consequences to

persons or objects not connected to the objectives may be caused by effects.
Thus, plans should include risks of unintended second-and third-order
consequences.

3) There is a possibility that an event and direct effects associated with the event
may have expanded effects over time and distance. With this, there is a need to
use the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) which is a tool to measure results
achieved from the overall mission and accomplishment of assigned tasks. These
MOEs are necessary prior to the combat assessment. Assessments commonly
are at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war to include destroyed
equipment and resources. It is important to identify the time when the
predetermined conditions on the enemy’s operational employment and overall
strategy was met together with the information on whether the effects are
recurring or not. These information is important in the continuing intelligence
analysis that helps in the placement of combat assessment measures

f. Recognizability. A target’s recognizability is the degree to which the threat can

recognize the intelligence process, reconnaissance, surveillance assets, and
under varying conditions. Factors that influence recognizability include the size
and complexity of the target, the existence of distinctive target signatures, the
presence of masking or camouflage, the technical sophistication and training of
the threat.

0357. Targeting Priorities. The targeting team must identify their priorities during
every phase or critical event during the operation. Targeting priorities are reflected in
the following products:

a. High Payoff Target List (HPTL). The HPTL is a list of selected HPTs. Loss
of single or multiple assets on this list is expected to reduce the enemy capability
significantly. This is to provide additional support for the success of a friendly
COA.

b. IO Synchronization Matrix (ISM). The primary tool employed by the IO

officer, and refined and driven by the IO cell, is the synchronization matrix.
This comprehensive management tool ties together objectives, themes,
messages, targets and assessments. Used effectively helps the staff ensure that
themes, messages, actions synchronize with each other and with operations to
convey a unified narrative of effects.

0358. The IO Officer and the targeting team develop or contribute to developing these
products during the phases of planning and execution. The commander approves the
ISM concurrently with the approval of the COA. The IO officer ensures that the ISM
includes all the relevant information necessary to engage an IO-related target. On the
other hand, the IO-related vulnerability analysis being done by the intelligence staff and
the IO officer provides the basis in deciding which of the IO-related targets to engage
and when to engage them.

0359. Functions of IO Targeting. IO targeting is established through the four

interrelated functions: decide, detect, deliver, and access (D3A). The image (Figure 3.6)

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below shows the four functions of IO targeting and the related IO planning actions
associated with them.

Figure 3.6 – IO Inputs to the Targeting Cycle

a. Decide. This occurs parallel with planning and the ongoing military decision-
making process (MDMP). During the decide phase, the IO planner, in
conjunction with the members of the IO cell who are designated as the “IO
targeting team,” establishes the target selection priorities and determines the
intelligence collection criteria for each target.

b. Detect. This occurs in both the IO planning and execution cycle thus involved
in the accurate identification and location of the HPTs to be effectively engaged
for a reasonable effect. During the detect phase, the intelligence collection plan
(ICP) is focused on answering priority intelligence requirements (PIR)
associated with the selected targets. Detecting targets for non-lethal attacks
requires intensive intelligence support and accurate methods to measure the
effectiveness of targeting. Target detection is an ongoing process that is flexible
enough to meet the changes in the operation as the situation develops.

c. Deliver. This takes place in the execution phase despite the engagement of IO-
related targets during the preparation of the overall operations of the command.
During this phase, IO HPTs are tracked and engaged. At the same time
simultaneously, intelligence collection assets continue to locate and accurately
describe lesser refined or future HPTs as priority targets or combined target sets.
When a new target is identified and located, the IO cell determines the most
appropriate “delivery system” required to service the target for a specific desired
effect, synchronizes the engagement with ongoing operations or mission needs,
and develops mechanisms for measuring effectiveness. During the delivery

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phase, IO planners in the current operations and intelligence activities tightly

coordinate the best use of collection assets, target analysis, target linkages, and
the attainment of the desired effects. The IO cell maintains, integrates,
synchronizes, and updates its targeting for inclusion in the operations high
payoff target list (HPTL) and the subsequent tasking necessary to service IO
target(s).

d. Assess. This function occurs throughout all phases of an operation but most
intense during execution. The effects of lethal/physical attacks on IO-related
targets are assessed using traditional target assessment processes and
methodologies. The effects of non-lethal attacks on IO-related targets require
non-traditional methods, techniques and processes to assess or measure
effectiveness. The IO's role in assessing target payoff or adjusting effects to a
target or target node is continuous throughout the current operations and the
follow-on post-operation phases. All IO core elements, including related
activities and supporting military enablers, used to collect information that
provides an accurate assessment of IO targeting efforts when collated.

0360. Targeting assessment and prioritization occurs daily within the IO cell. IO
activities in close contact with the civilian populace, civil government or non-
government agencies/groups are valuable intelligence augmentation assets in collecting
and analyzing targeted assessment. CMO (PA, PsyOps, CA), chaplains/religious
leaders, military police/civil law enforcement, finance/resource managers, logisticians,
non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel, medical personnel, government
interagency representatives and local government officials are but a few of the possible
contributors in the assessment of the effects of non-lethal IO targeting. Operations will
use the success established as a criteria throughout the COA analysis to assess the
effectiveness of the and monitor the targets as necessary thus, the continuous
assessment. Following the assessment, IO, in conjunction with the current operations,
determines whether to engage with the target, terminate the engagement, or engage with
the target through a different element. This decision is founded on whether the
engagement undertaken realizes the IO objective and the success of the mission.

0361. It is difficult to capture the effects of the target engagement due to the large
amount of information generated during its operations. Therefore, IO, Intelligence, and
CMO work closely together in the IO cell to develop meaningful and timely battle
damage assessments or measures of effectiveness for an IO-related target. Additionally,
operations must establish the processes and systems together with the supplemental
staff elements, specifically intelligence, which will allow efficient and timely
information dissemination necessary for IO targeting.

0362. IO Targeting Process. In targeting, lethal and non-lethal fires are synchronized
with the outcomes of the operating systems in other battlefields. Considering the target
guidance and targeting objectives provided by the Commander, the IO cell develops the
IO targets, assigns targets to systems/methods where it is best suited to achieve the
desired effect and synchronizes these targets into the operational timeline (what or who
to engage, where to engage, when to engage, and what method will be used for the
engagement) and the overall integrated Joint targeting process. IO targeting is a cyclical
process (determined by the command’s battle rhythm) that supports both offensive and

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defensive operational objectives. For a comparison of IO actions to traditional targeting

actions within the MDMP process.

Assessment

0363. It discusses the assessment of IO activities.

0364. Purpose of Assessment. Assessment determines the progress in the fulfilment

of the task, the formation of the condition, and attainment of the objective. Assessing
the effectiveness of IO activities challenges both the staff and commander. Assessment
criteria must be measurable and tied to intermediate goals and end states. Development
of assessment criteria for an operation starts at the beginning of the planning cycle. The
IO cell develops the mission and objectives for IO. The measures of performance
(MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) should support an objective. Within each
measure of effectiveness are one or more indicators that show progress towards
achieving the desired outcome.

0365. Evaluating the operation against criteria of success allows the commander and
staff to make decisions and adjust the plan. Assessment entails the following three
tasks:

a. Continuously assess the reactions and vulnerabilities of relevant audiences and

targets

b. Continuously monitor the situation and progress of the operation toward the
commander’s desired end state

c. Evaluate the operation opposite the MOEs and MOPs

0366. The IO officer uses various means to conduct assessments, some internal to the
organizations, others external. When time and resources permit, multiple sources help
corroborate other sources and strengthen the conclusions drawn from results. The
commonly used sources are reports of intelligence assets; Soldier and leader
engagements; CMO; polling and surveys (both AFP generated and external – whether
contracted or not); media monitoring and analysis, especially local channels; unified
action partners; conversations with local partners; passive monitoring; and, patrol and
spot reports.

0367. Assessment Development for IO Activities. Assessment of goals and

objectives is necessary when using various information-related capabilities in the
conduct of IO. Specific indicators to measure are extremely hard to establish and must
be identified early in the planning process. The identified indicators help the
commander and staff to assess the effectiveness of the shaping operation.

0368. Objective Development. The objective statement helps staff decide which
effects and information-related capabilities they need to achieve the commander’s
intent to shape the IE. Figure 3.7 below shows how to develop the IO objective
statement through effect, target, action, and purpose.

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Figure 3.7 – Sample IO Objective

a. The effect describes the specific desired outcome. Normally inform or influence
is the most commonly used effect under the IO construct. Additional effects
such as deceive, degrade, deny, destroy, disrupt, exploit, isolate, mitigate, and
neutralize will be used. The backward planning process dictates starting with
the desired effect to ensure follow-on actions are coordinated

b. The target portion is a detailed description of the target. The specific target
audience could be a demographic of the population, an individual, a defined
area, or a piece of equipment with the associated capability

c. Action specifies the behavior or capability of the target. The desired target
behavior/effect must be measurable, observable, and specific. The units or
assets tasked to observe and report on the target now have a specific criterion to
refer to and can confirm or deny seeing the desired target behavior/effect

d. Purpose explains and justifies the benefit of engaging the target. It directly links
to the commander’s intent and mission. Purpose is the planned rationale for the
operational benefit that affects the target demonstrate, by performing this action

0369. Measure of Effectiveness Development. MOE measures the results of the

overall mission and execution of IO objectives. More practically, MOE determines if a
desired condition or outcome is in place, even if it has not been directly caused by
planned military action. The IO objectives are written to articulate a specific condition
or state in an operational environment. Most MOE is crafted and used to measure the
effects generated by those tasks collectively executed to achieve each IO objective.
MOE is used in assessing developments in system behavior, capability, or the
operational environment. It is related to the measurement of the realization of the
projected end state, accomplishment of the objective/s, or the creation of influence.
MOE describes what the specific target (audience) needs to accomplish to accomplish
the desired effect. Since the IO objective identified the desired effect first, the IO cell
determines how to measure the desired effect. The activity, descriptor, subject, metric,
and baseline need to form a measure of effectiveness. Other observable actions are only
considered indicators if they are not tied to activity, descriptor, subject, metric, and
baseline. They are subjected to scrutiny due to a lack of proper statistical support
(Commander’s Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution, Version 1, 2011).

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Figure 3.8 shows how each part of activity, descriptor, subject, metric, and baseline
leads to a measure of effectiveness.

Figure 3.8 – Measure of effectiveness components

0370. The activity specifies the desired direction of change (increase or decrease).
Increasing or decreasing describes how the specific subject (noun) is desired to change.

0371. The descriptor is a restatement of the target mentioned in the IO objective. The
descriptor is the target audience and is responsible for performing the activity.

0372. The subject is a noun related directly to the affected activity. The subject is what
the IO cell is trying to influence the target to do. The subject is the measurable,
observable, and specific item that observers or other tasked assets can note.

0373. The metric is the numerical percentage threshold of effectiveness that the IO
cell derives from the MDMP, commander’s guidance, research, and analysis. The
metric is the percentage goal how specific activity will change to prove effectiveness.

0374. The baseline is the historical measure from which the current metric is
determined to show statistical or acceptable significance. The IO cell may have to
establish a baseline metric if no historical metrics exist. In some cases, it may take
several months to establish a baseline. The lack of a historical basis for comparison
lengthens the time to determine if the measure of effectiveness is successful.

0375. Measure of Performance Development. MOP is an assessment of friendly

actions related to the measurement of the accomplishment of tasks. MOP describes
what and how forces need to communicate to achieve the desired effect.

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Figure 3.9 – Measure of Performance Components

0376. The quantity states the number of broadcasts or deliveries of a message or

product. In addition, it can state the number of night patrols or other actors.

0377. The medium describes the product format used to disseminate the message. The
medium can describe any type of print, broadcast, electronic, physical, or personal
method to disseminate a message or a talking point.

0378. The delivery states how and where IRCs delivered the medium or product to the
audience. The delivery method helps to define how a selected audience reacts to a mode
of delivery. The specific delivery method also allows units and assets to support the
measure of performance.

0379. The target provides a detailed description of the selected audience as described
in the IO effect.

0380. IO cannot generate effects if IRCs do not execute tasks successfully. As such,
assessment accounts for task execution. Because task completion affects execution as
well as assessment, representatives and subordinate units of IRCs report
accomplishment of their respective tasks. Performance measures are not measures of
success—they gauge task completion. MOPs are future operations the IO cell needs
information about from units and fellow staff to generate effects. Figure 3.10 below
shows a completely developed measure of performance in terms of quantity, medium,
delivery, and target.

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Figure 3.10 – Assessment methodology for the IO Objective done by IRCs

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Table 3.1 – CARVER Value Rating Scale

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Table 3.2 – Sample High Payoff Target List

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Table 3.3 – Format for IO Synchronization Matrix

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Table 3.4 – IO Actions during MDMP compared with the targeting process
MDMP Step IO Action Targeting Action
Receipt of • Conduct COG • Determine specified,
Mission and analysis • implied, and essential
Mission Analysis • Determine specified, • fire support tasks
implied, and essential • Determine HPTL
IO tasks • Translate status of
• Select targets for fire
nomination to HVTL • support assets into
• Determine • capabilities
supporting IRC • Develop draft
• Determine targeting
supporting IO • objectives or essential
Objectives and • fire support tasks
essential IO tasks • Nominate targets to
• Product: Restated • HPTL
mission for IO;
Initial synch targets
effects statements
COA Development • Input to the concept • Develop concept of
of fires • fires (or effects)
• (or effects • Develop initial HPTL
• Target nominations • Quantify effects for
to • essential support
• HPTL tasks
• Quantify effects
• Product: Initial IO
• Synch Matrix (ISM);
• Effects statements
• refined
COA Analysis and COA • Results of IOWG • Finalize concept of
Comparison • Input to ISM fires
• Discuss 1, 2, 3rd • Finalize HPTL
order • Develop Fires Synch
• of effects • Matrix
• Product: ISM • Develop support
control
• measures
COA Approval • Targets approved, • Brief fire support
• added to ISM plan
• as part of each COA
Orders Production, • Synchronize IO and • Write fires paragraph
Dissemination, and Fire of
Transition • Support Annexes • OPORD/Plan and
Fire
• Support Annex

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Chapter IV
Information Operations in Army Operations

0401. This chapter identifies how the IO applied to Army operations, particularly in
the counterinsurgency and full-spectrum operations. It also recognizes the fundamental
principles of war, tenets of army operations, and combat power elements that provide
the basis for full spectrum operations. For example, as an element of combat power,
information enhances leadership and magnifies the effects of maneuver, firepower, and
protection.

0402. The widely recognized definition of full-spectrum operations is Army forces

combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously
as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and
achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action – lethal and nonlethal,
proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables
of the operational environment. (US Army's Field Manual 3-0 Operations).

The Full Spectrum Operations

0403. The components of full-spectrum operations define offensive operations as
“combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain,
resources, and population centers” and states that offensive operations are the decisive
aspect of full-spectrum operations. Defensive operations are defined as “combat
operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, develop
conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations,” and are critical in regaining
the initiative and momentum. Stability operations involve “various military missions,
tasks, and activities.” They include establishing a safe and secure environment,
establishing legal, social, and economic institutions, reconciling local and regional
adversaries, and supporting the transition to legitimate local provincial and national
government. Finally, civil support includes “operations that address the consequences
of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks, and incidents in the
Philippine national territory” and addresses issues of essential services, rescue
operations, law and order, governance support, and infrastructure and property
protection.

0404. Full-spectrum operations entail simultaneous and continuous combinations of

offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations. Based on the mission,
one type of operation may predominate. Commanders shift the predominant type of
operation based on the current situation and their assessment as they shape the
operational environment and set the conditions to achieve the end-state. Commanders
must be cognizant of employing IO to support the campaign and as part of the combined
arms operation.

0405. IO is an integral part of the full spectrum of the Army operations to affect
friendly, neutral, and adversarial human and automated decision-making systems while
protecting one’s own from detrimental factors. To affect desired targets would mean
using various capabilities to inform, attack, or protect. IO is applicable in the situation,

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particularly in a counter-insurgency environment wherein there is a battle between the

insurgents and counter-insurgents. It is a battle of legitimacy and gaining the popular
support of the people. Full-spectrum operations are a combination of offensive,
defensive, and either stability and support operation or civil support operations. The
activities performed by the Army in its counterinsurgency operations are stability
operations, nation-building activities, CMO, and support operations to civil authorities.
The national-building activities are developmental and shaping the human terrain of the
battlefield are purposely to shift the favor and narratives to the Philippine Army.

0406. Four conditions define the spectrum of conflict--Stable Peace, Unstable Peace,
Insurgency, and General War. The dynamic interactions between the actors characterize
the operational environment. Actors can be internal or external, state or non-state, and
individual or collective. Interactions play an important role in determining the nature
of the operational environment. Interactions may involve one, many, or all of the
following operational variables: political, military, economic, social, informational, and
infrastructure; however, the political and military interactions usually provide the best
insights into the nature of the operational environment. The spectrum of conflict
provides an exceptional tool to visualize and describe the nature of the operational
environment but offers little insight into military forces' actual operations.

0407. The main task of the Army information is to inform and influence activities. In
full spectrum operations and an environment situated by information, messages,
themes, and actions are inextricably limited, effective full spectrum operations require
integrated themes and messages synchronized with actions. The most powerful
message that soldiers send is their actions on the ground. (HQDA, 2010a, para 7-1)

0408. IO is the integrated and synchronized use of selected military and non-military
capabilities in order to affect friendly, neutral, and adversarial human and automated
decision-making systems while protecting our own. Institutionalizing IO and applying
it to various AFP and PA missions create operational advantages and opportunities for
success.

0409. The fundamental principles of war, tenets of Army operations, and elements of
combat power provide the basis for full spectrum operations. The elements of combat
power are building blocks that underlie combat power generation to produce
overwhelming effects. The principles of war guide and instruct commanders as they
combine elements of combat power. The principles reflect the distillation of Army
experience into a set of time-tested guidelines. The tenets of Army operations
characterize both the substance and form of full-spectrum operations. The tenets
permeate Army doctrine. The operational framework relates the activities of Army
forces in time, space and purpose. Combined with tenets of Army operations, the
framework provides commanders with a conceptual basis for applying combat power.
Commanders combine and use the capabilities of combined arms formation in
complementary, reinforcing and asymmetric ways. Combined arms organizations
apply combat power to achieve decisive results across the range of operations. Combat
operation focuses on reducing the strength and equipment of the adversary through
decisive combat engagements; intelligence operation focuses on finding the adversary,
and CMO focuses on gaining public support and destroying the will of the adversary to
fight.

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0410. In the elements of combat power, information enhances leadership and

magnifies the effects of maneuver, firepower and protection. In the same way,
Information operations will enhance the Army operations favorable toward the friendly
force's objectives and missions. In the past, when the Army engages the adversary,
campaign commanders developed the situation to gain information or shape the
battlefield. In addition, army leaders use information collected by field units, including
from open-source CMO, supporting the accomplishment of the Army's mission by
accomplishing tasks related to operations other than war (OOTW) to include support to
national development and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

0411. Information is not neutral; opposing sides use it, directly and indirectly, to gain
exploitable advantages and apply them against selected targets. Some examples
illustrate the use of information as an element of combat power; in 2017, during the
Marawi crisis, IO and PsyOps were heavily used to demoralize the adversary, rescue
civilians and boost the morale of the friendly forces. The weakening of the enemy’s
will to fights was combined with the demonstrated destructive power of Army and Air
Force assets that convinced many enemy troops to surrender. The use of military
deception (an element of IO) was also highlighted by using feint and ruse during
numerous combat operations to constrict the enemy’s movement towards designated
engagement areas resulting in the decisive encounter like the death of Isnilon Hapilon,
the erstwhile emir of the "Philippine Province” the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) until his death during Marawi crisis.

0412. Support to national development improves the condition of the people, thus
eliminating socio-economic issues (poverty, illiteracy, and lack of basic services).
However, the enemies use these issues to discredit the government and influence people
to fight the government.

Counterinsurgency Operations
0413. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations may equate to full spectrum operation at
the tactical level because it is also a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability
operations. COIN offensive operations focus on eliminating the insurgents. COIN
defensive operations focus on protecting the populace and infrastructure from insurgent
attacks. COIN stability operations focus on addressing the root causes that allowed the
insurgency to come into existence. Determining the combination is not easy since it
varies depending on the situation, the mission, and the commander’s desired end-state.
These three operations are sometimes conducted simultaneously within the different
parts of the area of operations.

0414. The clear-hold-consolidate-develop (C-H-C-D) operational methodology of the

government of winning a barangay back from the control or influence of the insurgents
and setting up the organizational structures that will prevent the return of the insurgents
and pave the way for the economic development of the community. Clear – hold –
consolidate – develop strategy: clear the affected areas of enemies and threats through
combined military and police operations; hold and consolidate the cleared areas
principally through police and local government efforts; and develop the cleared areas
through the initiatives of the local governments, the various national government
agencies, and the private sector and civil society. IO enhance the strategic gains in
achieving each phase's objectives and the end state of the campaign.

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Civil-Military Operations
0415. CMO helps mitigate the impact of the violence on the people and builds public
trust and confidence in the Army and the government during man-made disasters like
terrorism and armed conflict. Furthermore, CMO mitigates the effects of the operational
mission as the Army is obligated to manage the people during these situations. CMO
also helps isolate the threat groups and prevent them from influencing them and gaining
public support. The ability of the PA to decrease the impact on the lives of the people
during calamities and natural disasters further increases public trust and confidence.

0416. In the PA context, PsyOps by deeds sends a strong message to the subconscious
of the target audiences by projecting an image through posting and actuations. This
shapes the perception of the people, thus gaining support and legitimacy in the process.
Thus, the major deliverable of PsyOps is influencing the adversary and neutrals while
informing friendlies.

0417. The PA IO task to inform and influence are under PA and PsyOps, respectively.
The distinction between “each line of effort” has a different purpose and effect. These
lines of effort may rely on the same capabilities to accomplish these effects and must
be integrated closely to ensure unity of effort in words, images and actions. This is to
avoid the contradiction of the appearance that may undermine the force’s efforts.
(HQDA, 2010a, para 7-12) It has been contested that the PsyOps influence task tends
to manipulate people or target audience while the public affairs task is to inform and
also influence its target audience.

0418. There are also contentions on the definition of strategic communication and IO.
Strategic communication, by essence, is coordinated efforts to inform, influence, and
persuade in pursuit of national objectives (Paul 2009a). The difference between IO and
strategic communications (StratCom) is the latter is at the highest level and involves
the whole of government. At the same time, the former rested within StratCom and is
conducted exclusively by the DND.

0419. IO can have three different visions: integrating functions, an influence

capability, and achieving capability. Inform and influence operations are efforts to
inform, influence, or persuade selected audiences through actions, utterances, signals,
or messages. IO has two realms which are psychological and technical. Under the
psychological realms are PsyOps, public affairs, information assessment and aspects of
MILDEC, while information on technical operations is cyber operations, electronic
warfare, aspects of MILDEC and OPSEC.

0420. IO is an effects-based planning process that aims to attain information

superiority. Information superiority is the operational advantage derived from the
ability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting or denying the threats’ ability to do the same. The intent is to shape the IE
that will set favorable conditions in attaining our country's security and interest.

0421. Once the end state is already established, IO objectives shall be determined to
attain the end state. Selecting the appropriate military and non-military capabilities that
will best suit the attainment of objectives follows. Then, on each of the capabilities, the
activities are lined up to accomplish the mission. Most often, AFP operations are

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simultaneously integrated with those of the other agencies of the government. This
requires the AFP personnel to be knowledgeable and skillful in integrating and using
information and information systems and planning and executing military missions in
support of national security and interest.

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Annex A
Conducting Information Operations

General. Since many IO objectives and tasks require long lead times to create the
desired effects, preparation for IO often starts in advance of other operational
requirements. IO preparation is G7, PA requirement at all appropriate levels of
command. The Division/Regimental equivalent IO Cell synchronizes all the major IO
elements and related activities to achieve unity of effort. The IO Cell brings together
the representatives of the different organizations responsible for all IO capabilities. In
most cases, PA Triad and Operational Security (OPSEC) representatives are always
engaged in the final preparation for conducting IO and for this activity, OPSEC is
strictly observed. Commanders may designate or require other representatives of IO
capabilities, special battlefield operating systems and coordinating staff sections to
participate in the final preparation as the mission requires.

Scope. IO anticipatory planning by the command IO officers/planners entails building

a repository of information and databases that will be used for planning purposes in
various Areas of Operation (AO). The IO Officer undertakes the continuous collection
of relevant information through the IO Cell. Preparing to conduct IO also includes other
actions performed before execution to improve the ability to conduct IO for both
offensive and defensive purposes. It includes revising and refining plans and orders,
assessment, force protection, coordination and liaison rehearsals, task organization and
movements, pre-operation checks and assessments and logistic preparations. It further
includes the orientation/integration of new soldiers and units such as Special Operations
Team (SOT), CMO personnel, maneuver/support forces and other military or staff of
civil authority or government interagency employees who will execute the IO
requirements at the operational and tactical level. IO Officers should spend time talking
to staff members, sharing information about what they are doing, and inquiring about
staff activities.

IO Staff Preparation Duties

1. IO Daily Activities. The key to successful IO is anticipating trends, mission

requirements, operational effects, future targets, themes and messages and a broad
range of information requirements. At the Division level, the IO Officer may be the
only person assigned to conduct daily IO activities. He/She may consider assembling
an ad-hoc core group of essential personnel who, like the IO staff higher commands,
meet for several hours each day. A typical day for the IO Officer and staff/core group
will consist of, but not limited to, the following activities:

a. Update IO objectives and tasks.

b. Update IO estimates. (See ANNEX F for an example of an IO Estimate)
c. Review and update execution timelines.
d. Review operational reports. (previous 12-24 hours)
e. Follow up on Requests for Information (RFI).
f. Identify and submit new RFI’s.
g. Review current intelligence collection plan and priorities.
h. Review threat information.
i. Conduct open-source research.
j. Analyze media trends.

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k. Review and update Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).

l. Review, update and submit IO Priority Intelligence Requirements.
m. Review and update IO targeting information/target folders.
n. Prepare IO products for dissemination and use by subordinates and higher
commands.
o. Establish communication with higher and lower command IO officers/planners.
p. Review and monitor IO training and preparation.
q. Review Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) and Measures of Performance
(MOP).
r. Prepare to operationalize the IO Cell.
s. Prepare for command briefings or commanders' operational updates.
t. Attend other staff coordinating meetings or working/planning
groups and review mission plan(s).

2. Assess Mission Status and Readiness. Daily IO preparation and management

duties include evaluating readiness in the execution of assigned IO tasks. To facilitate
timely and precise implementation of offensive and defensive IO, the IO officer/staff,
in collaboration with the commanders and their staff, assess the unit and individuals to
accomplish their designated tasks. If necessary, assist the subordinates in developing
assumptions to replace the missing or unknown facts concerning the current or future
information and maneuver operations, such as:

a. Status of forces (as planned/predicted).

b. Available time (Are the planned timelines reasonable?)
c. Mission and Intent (Can it be integrated/synchronized/achieved? Are there any
requirements to restate?)
d. IO limitations at the subordinate level, if any.
e. Tasks that units and individuals must achieve are correctly identified? (Do
subordinates foresee any constraints?)
f. Tasks that cannot be achieved that were assigned by higher headquarters, if any.
(Do subordinates foresee any restraint?)
g. Newly identified mission detractors or inhibitors (For example: political,
weather, terrain, legal, civil, humanitarian).
h. Review and update adversary and friendly Center(s) of Gravity (COGs) and
associated decisive points.
i. Conduct continuous analysis of IO adversary COGs and coordinate findings
with subordinate units/activities.
j. Identify and integrate new ways for IO to assist in protecting friendly force
COGs.
k. IO tasks to be performed by AFP mission forces.
l. Are the specified tasks current /evolving?
m. Are implied tasks changed?
n. Were the essential tasks or goals changed?
o. Redefined IO offensive effects.
p. Redefined IO defensive requirements.
q. Are there sufficient IO assets/capabilities available to accomplish IO tasks?
r. Is MOE producing meaningful information on IO effects being achieved, or is
the desired end state accomplished? Do IO parameters need to be adjusted?

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3. Revision and Refinement of Plans and Execution Requirements. Plans are

not static; the commander may adjust them based on the new information received. This
information may include assessments of unit preparations or answers to IO Intelligence
Requirements (IR). While the AFP is preparing, the adversaries also prepare and
execute their own IO. Therefore, when the commander directs the revision or
refinement of the operations/mission plan, the IO Cell must adjust their portion of the
plan and prepare to conduct a cross command/unit coordination and synchronization.

4. IO Tasks. The IO Officer reviews subordinate unit operation plans and

directives to ensure that IO tasks are effectively interpreted and consistent at all
echelons. It does not have any timing/execution conflicts at all levels. In addition, the
IO Officer works closely with the operations center to ensure that proper lead times are
considered when tasking units/activities.

5. IO Communications, Planning and Synchronization. It is necessary to

establish and test how various IO Cells will connect and communicate via telephone
(landline and cell), secure radio, and computer network/internet to be able to pass IO
information and access on its files, briefings, situation reports, plan changes, pending
IO events/activities, etc.

6. IO Coordination/Battle Rhythm. This involves developing a synchronized

24-hour timeline that depicts all critical link-up times to coordinate/exchange
information. Some examples of what need to be included are:

a. IO Cell Meeting (high-to-low command)

b. IO Situation Reports Submitted (past 12 hours)
c. c. IO Situation Reports Posted (past 24 hours)
d. d. High Command IO Cell update to subordinate IO Cell’s
e. IO Huddle
f. IO/PA/ISA/STRATCOM Synchronization Sessions
g. Morning/Evening battle update and/or commander’s update brief (CUB)
h. IO Product exchange (Electronic)
i. Daily press clips disseminated or received and analyzed
j. STRATCOM coordination meeting (usually GHQ AFP)
k. Scheduled Press Conferences
l. Rehearsals
m. CMO/NGO meetings
n. Targeting Meetings
o. Attending Other Meetings such as:
1) Intelligence Collection management meeting
2) Future Plans meetings (Operations)
3) Key Interagency link-up
4) Video Teleconference (VTC)

The IO Staff

1. Members of the IO Staff. The IO Staff shall be composed of the permanent

members from the other staff functions who work together daily to manage the routine
and crisis/contingency IO management requirements of the Command. The IO Staff is
one of the first staff to receive/conduct a mission assessment/analysis when new

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operational planning requirements are initiated and undertaken within the operation.
Upon receipt of the mission or planning task, the concerned IO Staff develops a
tentative IO Concept of Operations, determines the critical IO tasks/capabilities and its
prerequisites, and identifies the AFP staff functional specialties that will be required to
participate when the IO Cell convenes to begin the formal planning process. Typically,
the IO Staff may be composed of:

a. IO Chief
b. Deputy IO Chief
c. IO Planner
d. Senior Staff IO NCO/Planner
e. Junior NCO OPSEC Planner
f. Intelligence Officer/Planner or NCO
g. Public Affairs (PA) Officer/Planner
h. Information Support Activities (ISA) NCO/Planner
i. Civil Affairs (CA) NCO/Planner
* Not assigned, but generally included via staff relationships

2. Intelligence, PA, CA, ISA, and IO Staff members assigned to the IO Staff also
serve as direct liaisons and principal facilitators to their respective professional,
functional specialties.

3. Based on current/future projected PA manpower authorizations and approved

staff table of organization, the IO Staff is organized at the following levels of
command’s operation functions:

a. GHQ, PA
b. Division

The IO Cell Meeting. The IO Cell shall meet daily during ongoing operations, at least
once a week during regular days, or as often as necessary to proactively engage in
anticipatory planning. IO Cell meetings should never exceed one hour. If more time is
needed, it shall convene more frequently than to convene on longer periods. By doing
so, current and afterthoughts stay fresh in the mind of the participants. The Operations
facilitate the IO Cell to ensure that a broad range of IO capabilities is integrated and
synchronized with the ongoing or planned operations. The IO cell structure must be
flexible to accommodate various deliberate crises or ad-hoc planning under a certain
operational circumstance. To ensure that the attendee’s time is optimized, the IO Staff
shall prepare/disseminate well to the IO Cell the agenda-related materials before the
meeting. The agenda should be standardized to the greatest extent possible to streamline
the administration of the meeting. IO Cell meetings bring together a diverse cross-
section of AFP military professionals and civilian Subject Matter Experts (SME) to
provide enhancing thoughts and good inputs during serious discussions in every
meeting. Their time is valuable, and their attendance contributes to the success of the
IO Cell. It is noted that if the attendee’s time and experiences are wasted, or their views
are not considered, they will quickly lose their interest and may not attend any more to
any meeting or worse; they may attend but will not contribute any input at all. Enhanced
knowledge or ideas of subject matter experts are far more important to the successful
collaboration in the IO Cell than giving importance to the ranks of the attendees. Well-
thought-out IO will emerge naturally in a comfortable setting that will promote and

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stimulate intellectual creativity. Note: A written summary of the meeting must be

finalized within 24 hours and be submitted to the chief of operations for his disposition.
A particular IO Cell shall transmit summaries of its IO Cell meetings to the other IO
Cell for mission, coordination and synchronization. Summaries shall be retained as a
permanent record in the IO
Cell for future reference.

Assessing Information Operations. As stated in Targeting and Assessment,

assessment involves a continuous monitoring process throughout all phases of IO
planning, preparation and execution. It serves as the basis for determining if IO is
achieving the desired effect and sets conditions for key IO or operational decisions,
such as adjusting IO to the current or future planned operations or continuously
expanding an in-depth IO estimate. IO is monitored and assessed by the effect they
received from a specified target or audience. IO assessment is focused on individual or
collective IO tasks, established measures of performance, and criteria for measuring its
effectiveness. Timely and accurate reporting of information is essential in assessing IO
effectiveness. Most of this information is reported from IO subordinate units.
Intelligence collection assets, including maneuver units, tactical PSYOP teams, and
tactical HUMINT teams, can provide information that will gauge the success of an IO
support plan. Continuous intelligence analysis, including analysis of media and other
open sources, supports the assessment of whether IO is achieving its objectives and if
the IO concept of support has been successful. Civil Affairs, although not an
intelligence collection asset, can also provide feedback on IO mission success. The IO
Staff should actively monitor the operational situation and aggressively pursue the
utilization of information through unit reports and debriefings, IO Cell meetings and
other venues of information collection/dissemination. Commanders’ battle update
briefings, conference calls and other meetings also facilitate IO monitoring. RFIs shall
be tailored to assist in collecting and analyzing information that can be used in assessing
IO. Public sources, LGUs and LGAs and NGOs shall also be included in any ongoing
IO assessment. The IO assessment shall be thoroughly articulated in a comprehensive
IO Assessment Plan.

Summary. Information Operations (IO) often deliver unanticipated results. Therefore,

it is difficult to estimate how the use of IO for offensive and defensive purposes will
affect an Operation. Actions by decision-makers and the ultimate targets of IO will
sometimes take surprising turns in uncovering unanticipated weaknesses or strengths.
Similarly, AFP commanders may be stressed by an operation's pressing demands,
which may result in their unexpected reaction. The key to the success of IO is flexibility
in execution. Effective commanders and well-trained staff should be flexible enough to
balance their actions for the adversary IO while exploiting both projected and
unanticipated adversary vulnerabilities. The successful IO execution relies on the
teamwork of the different staff sections and their rapid exchange of information. As an
operation unfolds and the situation becomes increasingly fluid, IO objectives and tasks
are modified to exploit success and protect friendly vulnerabilities. IO is a disciplined
capability available to the commanders that becomes a powerful tool to an operation
when synchronized at a precise and decisive time.

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Annex B
Support Relationship between Information Related Capability

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Annex C
Example of an Information Operations Agenda

1. Roll Call
2. Announcements
3. Current Situation (Briefed by Intelligence and Operations)

a. SITREP Highlights (Briefed by Operations)

b. Review Spot Report (Briefed by Operations)

4. Enemy Situation (Briefed by Intelligence)

5. Future Plans (Briefed by Operations)
6. IO Review/Assessment

a. Last 24 Hours

1) IO Measures of Effectiveness (Briefed by IO Officer)

2) Themes and Message Effectiveness (Briefed by Public Affairs)
3) Significant CMO Activities (Briefed by CMO)
4) Communications Security (Briefed by CIS Officer)
5) Battle Damage Assessment (Briefed by Intelligence)
6) OPSEC Assessment (Briefed by Operations)
7) IO Targeting Objectives: Successful and Unsuccessful
a) Physical Targets (Briefed by Intelligence)
b) Human Targets: Non-Lethal (Briefed by ISA)
c) Decision Support Targets (Briefed by IO Officer and ISA)
8) IO Objective(s) Achieved/Not Achieved (Briefed by IO Officer)
9) IO Assessment/Feedback Mechanisms: Working/Not Working
10) IO Tasks: Completed/Not Completed (Briefed by IO Officer)
11) Subordinate IO Cell Report (Briefed by IO Officer)

b. Next 24 Hours: Synchronize and Integrate (Discussion led by IO Officer)

1) New Intelligence Requirements

2) Target/Audience Recommendations
3) New IO Engagement Recommendations (Activity, Event)
4) Themes and Messages to Emphasize
5) New OPSEC Critical Information Recommendations
6) New IO Assessment/Feedback Mechanisms Recommendations
7) New Media Events/Activities Recommendations
8) New CMO (Civil Affairs and ISA) Events/Activities
9) New IO Tasks
10) New IO Objective(s)

c. Next 48-72 Hours: Synchronize and Integrate (Discussion led by IO Officer).

Review commander’s intent, mission objective and operations tempo and adjust
IO plan as necessary.

7. Agenda Topics: Items with an asterisk are mandatory agenda items.

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a. IO Officer: OPSEC and special topics.

b. Intelligence: Update on intelligence collection/analysis relevant to IO (includes
overt or open-source, intelligence summaries and others), Priority Intelligence
Requirements (PIR) and Requests for Information.
c. Public Affairs: Update on media activities/events and issues.
d. *CA/ISA: Discuss future operations.
e. Combat Photography (COMPHO): Update on COMPHO activities and product
presentation (when requested)
f. CEIS: Discussion of current computer network threats.
g. SJA: Discuss Rules of Engagement and legal actions or opinions that impact IO
planning/execution.
h. STRATCOM: Discuss current STRATCOM and defense support to public
diplomacy initiatives that have a bearing on IO.
i. Military Support to Civil Authority: Discussion of law enforcement or
interagency issues that bear IO.
j. Medical Health Services: Discussion of medical issues, activities or events that
have a bearing on IO.
k. Chaplain: Discussion of religious issues, activities or events that have a bearing
on IO.
l. Future/Strategic Operations Planning: Discussion of issues and workshops that
bear IO planning and execution.
m. Other: Resource Management, Training, Personnel, Information
Management, Exercises, IG Oversight, Maneuver, Combined Armed Support,
Close Air Support and topics of IO relevance from any other AFP functional
specialty.

8. Products Review and Update. Critical to IO continuity. Therefore, detailed

efforts should focus on depicting, creating and refining, timelines, synchronization
matrices, leaflets/handouts, 24-72 hour IO Snapshots, IO target folders and other
graphic or written IO materials/tools/aids.

9. Commander’s Guidance. This is the most important part of each meeting; it

provides IO with the commander’s evolving needs and expectations of the successful
competition of the operation/mission. Thus, although IO is never a “stand-alone,” it
always supports the commander’s intent.

10. Date, Time and Location of next IO Cell Meeting. The next IO Cell Meeting
schedule and venue should be set during the current meeting before the group adjourns.
This will enable members to prioritize the IO Cell Meeting in their respective schedules
before other calls on their time arise.

Note: A written summary of the meeting should be finalized within 24 hours and
provided to the chief of operations for distribution. IO Cells should transmit IO Cell
meeting summaries to fellow IO Cells. Summaries will be retained as permanent record
for future reference.

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Annex D
Example of an Information Operations Estimate

Originating
Section and
Issuing HQs
Place of Issue
Date/Time Group
IO ESTIMATE NO. ______________

References: a. Maps and charts.

b. Other relevant documents.

1. MISSION.
a. Mission. Restated Mission of the Command.
b. IO Concept. Identify the main effect the commander wants to achieve with IO
expressed about his forces and activities.

2. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS. Summarize IO Situation

Considerations Affecting Possible COAs in four major categories:

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Discuss terrain, weather, and other

characteristics of the area of operation likely to exert significant influence on
both threat and friendly IO, including political, economic, sociological,
psychological, and information infrastructure. Reference the Intelligence
Estimate for details as necessary.
b. Threat Situation. Threat IO capabilities, intentions, compositions, dispositions
and susceptibilities likely significantly influence COAs. Identify probable threat
IO activities and HVTs for each likely COA.
c. Friendly Situation. Friendly IO capabilities, compositions, disposition and
susceptibilities are likely to influence COAs significantly. Identify critical
events that should be evaluated within the COA analysis to assess defensive IO
requirements. Compare requirements versus susceptibilities and IO capabilities.
Identify IO evaluation criteria for determining COA supportability. IO
evaluation criteria will vary by mission to include the following:

1) Costs versus Benefits. Compare the costs of IO in each COA based on the
resources and time required executing them in relation to the operational
impact of their success.
2) Risk to Mission and Friendly Assets. Compare the level of risk to COA
success and friendly assets should IO fail or be compromised.
3) Chance of Success. Summarize the advantage and disadvantages for IO in
each COA to evaluate the chance of success in each.

d. Assumptions. IO assumptions developed during mission analysis.

e. Conclusions. Assess the effectiveness of friendly and threat IO in relation to
each other, the effects of the AO as favorable or unfavorable to IO and the most
significant friendly and threat IO vulnerabilities.

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3. ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION

a. COAs. Friendly courses of action for which IO is being assessed in the
estimate.

b. IO in COA 1.

1) IO Objective(s) for COA 1. Identify specific threat action or inaction to be

induced by IO.
2) Analysis. Analyze the first COA using the IO evaluation criteria. Assess the
potential for intentions, composition, and disposition versus the threats.
Next, assess the availability and criticality of assessment assets and
information for the execution of IO in the COA. Next, assess any specific
characteristics of the IO concept of support that could result in unfavorable
termination of the IO plan or its critical aspects (i.e., deception operation,
PSYOP effort, etc.). Finally, summarize major resource requirements for the
execution of IO in this COA.
3) Risk Analysis. Assess the risk of failure or compromise of IO in terms of
effects on the success of the COA and the potential for loss or compromise
of command assets. Assess the potential for unintended consequences of
IO's conduct and/or success and possible impacts on both threat and friendly
COAs. Include an assessment of the risk in executing IO in the COAs in
terms of non-availability or untimely availability of assessment.

c. IO in COA 2.

4. COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON. Compare the COAs in terms of the IO

evaluation criteria. Rank order COAs for each criterion. Visually support the
comparison with a decision matrix.

5. RECOMMENDATION. Present a conclusion on the best COA from an IO

standpoint as revealed by the analysis conducted and documented in the estimate.
Identify issues, deficiencies, risks and recommendations to reduce their impacts.

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Annex E
Example of an Information Operations Supporting Plan Annex

(INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C

(OPERATIONS) TO OPERATIONS ORDER [codename]

References:
a. ___________
b. ___________
c. ___________

1. Situation

a. Competing Messages and Information Activities in the IE.

1) General.
2) Competing Propaganda Themes/Actions
3) Media attention.

b. Friendly.

1) Identify friendly forces IO capabilities to operate in the information

environment.
2) Identify IO assets needed to attack enemy targets.
3) Identify the friendly forces that will directly affect IO.
4) Identify the critical limitations of planned IO.
5) Identify potential conflicts within the friendly electromagnetic spectrum
especially. For example, suppose conducting joint or multinational operations.
Identify de-confliction methods and priority of spectrum distribution.
6) Address each IO element’s capabilities and vulnerabilities in separate
subparagraphs.
7) List constraints on friendly IO.
8) Identify friendly vulnerabilities to the enemy and third-party actions in the
information environment.

c. Environment.

1) Terrain. Refer to Annex __ (Engineer) as required. Describe and identify

significant terrain that affects IO.
2) Weather. Refer to Annex __ (Intelligence) as required. Lists weather aspects
that affect each IO element.
3) Civil Considerations. Refer to Annex __ (Civil-Military Operations) as
required.

a) Identify key people, organizations and groups in the AO that will operate in
the information environment to affect friendly and enemy operations.
b) Describe likely objectives and activities of these key people, organizations
and groups in the AO that will affect IO.

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d. Information Environment. Identify significant characteristics of the information

environment to include the following:

1) Populace and civil infrastructure.

2) Information content, flow and distribution.
3) Populace and third party perceptions, awareness and understanding.
4) Identify those aspects of the information environment that favor all other
persons on the battlefield.

e. Attachments and Detachments. Lists of IO assets that are attached or detached.

Lists of IO resources that are available from higher Headquarters.

2. MISSION. State the mission of IO in support of the operation.

3. EXECUTION

a. Commander’s Intent for Messaging:

b. Commander’s Desired Effects for IO.
c. IO Supporting Objectives:
d. Concept of Support.

1) Describe IO tasks. These are tasks developed to support the accomplishment

of one or more IO objectives. Sequence the key tasks by phase.
2) Place details of each IO element in a separate subparagraph. Use appendixes
if necessary.
3) Explain how IO will help achieve information superiority at the operations
decisive points.
4) Refer to Annex H (IO Synchronization Matrix) to Annex __ to clarify the
timing relationships among IO tasks.
5) Use other annexes and appendixes as necessary.
6) Place details in element subparagraphs that describe each element’s role and
priorities in information operation.

a) Operations Security. State how OPSEC tasks will deny the enemy
knowledge of the EEFI of the operation. Synchronize this element with
the other IO elements. Refer to Appendix 1, Operations Security, for
detailed information.
b) Information Support Activities (ISA). State how the ISA tasks will
degrade, disrupt, deny, or influence the enemy to support the
accomplishment of the operation. Identify the audiences and desired
effects, in priority, for ISA to support the commander’s intent.
Synchronize this element with the other IO elements. Refer to Appendix
2 (ISA) for detailed information.
c) Military Deception. State how the MILDEC tasks will deceive and
influence the enemy. State how MILDEC supports the accomplishment
of the operation. Synchronize this element with the other IO elements.
Refer to Appendix 3 (Military Deception) for detailed information.
d) Electronic Warfare. State how the EW tasks will degrade, disrupt, deny,
and deceive the enemy. State the defensive and offensive EW measures.
Identify target sets and effects, by priority, for EW operations. State how

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EW supports the accomplishment of the operation. Synchronize this

element with the other IO elements. Refer to Appendix 4 (Electronic
Warfare) for detailed information.
e) Computer Network Operations. For echelons above corps or a
corps/division designated as a JTF, stating CNO requirements is
appropriate. For a corps or lower echelon unit that is not designated as a
JTF, CNO is not appropriate. In the case of a JTF, the CNO paragraph
or appendix states CNO tasks in CNA, CND, and CNE (as in the
following paragraphs).
f) Computer Network Attack. State how the CNA tasks will destroy,
degrade, disrupt, and deny the enemy. Identify target sets and effects, by
priority, for CNA. If appropriate, state how CNA supports the
accomplishment of the operation. Synchronize this element with the
other IO elements. Pass request for CNA to higher headquarters for
approval and implementation.
g) Computer Network Defense. State how CND will protect and defend
computer networks. State how CND supports the accomplishment of the
operation. Synchronize this element with the other IO elements. Refer
to Annex ___, Command, Control, Computer, and Communications, for
detailed information.
h) Computer Network Exploitation. For echelons above corps or a
corps/division designated as a JTF, stating CNE requirements is
appropriate. For a corps or lower echelon unit that is not designated as a
JTF, CNE is not appropriate. In the case of a JTF, the CNE paragraph or
appendix states the CNE tasks. Synchronize CNE with other IO
elements. Pass requests for CNE to higher headquarters for approval and
implementation.
i) Physical Destruction. State how the physical destruction tasks will
destroy, degrade, disrupt, and deny the enemy. Identify target sets and
effects, by priority, for physical destruction. State how physical
destruction used in the IO role supports the accomplishment of the
operation. Synchronize this element with the other IO elements. Refer
to Annex ___ (Fire Support) for detailed information.
j) Information Assurance. State how the IA tasks will deny the enemy
access to the friendly C2 system. Identify the information and INFOSYS
for protection. State how IA supports the accomplishment of the
operations. Synchronize this element with the other IO elements. Refer
to Annex H (Command, Control, Computer and Communications) for
detailed information.
k) Physical Security. State how the physical security tasks will deny the
enemy information about the command. The state of the physical
security needs to support IO. Synchronize this element with other IO
elements. Refer to Annex __ (Provost Marshal) for detailed information.
l) Counterintelligence. State how the counterintelligence tasks will
degrade, disrupt, deny, and exploit the enemy. Identify the units for
protection. State how CI supports the core elements of IO in
accomplishing the mission. Synchronize this element with the other IO
elements. Refer to Annex __ (Intelligence) for detailed
counterintelligence information.

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m) Counterpropaganda. State how the counterpropaganda objectives and

counterpropaganda tasks will degrade, disrupt, deny, and exploit the
enemy based on the approved COA. Identify the units for protection.
Synchronize this element with the other IO elements. Refer to Appendix
2 (ISA) for detailed counterpropaganda information.
n) Civil Affairs. State how the activities shall enhance good relationships
among military and civilians.
o) Public Affairs. State how to inform the public on the activities of the
unit, thereby promoting a good relationship.
p) Combat Photography. State how to provide the DND and AFP imagery
capability in support of the operational and planning requirements.
q) Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. State the activities and measures
taken by the DND and the AFP to support the country's diplomacy
efforts.
e. Tasks to Subordinate Units.
1) List IO tasks to maneuver units.
2) List IO tasks to ISA units.
3) List tasks to EW units.
4) List IO tasks to counterintelligence units.
f. Instructions to IO Cell.
1) List members of IO cell if not covered in SOP.
2) State non-SOP tasks assigned to the IO cell.
g. Coordinating Instructions. Include only IO instructions not already covered in
the base OPLAN/ OPORD common to two (2) or more units. State the Rules of
Engagement for each IO elements. Do not include SOP information. List the
constraints that are not contained in the concept of support.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. Identify requirements for supply distribution,

transportation, and HN support pertaining to IO as a whole. Identify service support
to individual IO elements their respective appendixes or annexes.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL. Significant command and signal information related

to IO is normally covered in the body of the order. This paragraph covers
arrangements needed to exchange information among IO elements.

ACKNOWLEDGE: (if distributed separately from base order).

[Authenticator’s last name]
[Classification]
[Authenticator’s rank]

APPENDICES:
1. Operations Security (OPSEC)
2. Information Support Activities (ISA)
3. Military Deception (MILDEC)
4. Electronic Warfare (EW)
5. IO Execution Matrix
6. Others as required

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Annex F
Example of a Simplified Information Operations Synchronization Matrix

XX INFORMATION OPERATIONS SYNCH MATRIX

MISSION:

COMMANDERS INTENT:

END STATE:

Operational IO
IO Tasks Element MOP MOE
Objectives Objectives

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XX INFORMATION OPERATIONS SYNCH MATRIX

MISSION:
COMMANDERS INTENT:
END STATE:

Operational
IO Objectives IO Tasks Element MOP MOE
Objectives
1. Strengthen 1.1 Convince T.1.1.A: Develop ISA MOP3.1.1: MOE 3.1.1: ID
public support regional and distribute multi- Number of in number of the
for… populace to media products for broadcast and positive media
support… local/regional print media stories reporting
Activities, in media products on the benefits
order to promote distributed of … (2OE)
peace, P1.1.A To demonstrating
prosperity, and demonstrate the the benefits
future combined benefits of activities from…
operations T2.1.5 Provide COMPHO MOP3.1.2: MOE 3.1.2: ID
products depicting PAO Number of in number of the
combined broadcast and positive media
operations print media stories reporting
successes. products on the benefits
distributed of combined
P2.1.B: Gamer depicting the operations…
support for success of (2OE)
activities combined
operations
3.2 Prevent T.3.2.A: PAO MOP3.2.1: MOE 3.2.1: ID
adversaries from Coordinate, Messages are in number of the
interfering with… develop and distributed to media stories
Activities in order distribute themes local/regional that contains
to maintain and messages media distributed
possible regional explaining AFP reinforcing the messages…
development missions/successes positive aspects (2OE)
of activities…
P.3.2.A Obtain and MOE 3.2.2: ID
reinforce support in number of
with local populace requests for
and local/regional additional
leadership information
received (3OE)
T3.2.D Active ATFP OPSEC MOP3.2.4: MOE 3.2.5: ID
posture and ATFP/OPSEC in number of
OPSEC measures standards are soldiers carrying
are in place, posted in unit ATFP/OPSEC
monitored and facilities and cards (2OE)
adhered to… reinforced
through MOE 3.2.6: ID
P3.2.D: Mitigate command in numbers of
adversaries actions orderings. ATFP/OPSEC
against… violations (3OE)

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Annex G
Operations Security Process

STEP ONE: IDENTIFY CRITICAL INFORMATION

Identification of EEFI

1. Information that reveals the specific capability of an organization.

•
2. Information that reveals a weakness or a compromise of a specific
operations.
•
3. Knowledge about specific measures used to protect a mission or
operations.
•
4. Information that reveals a security weakness of a unit or activity.
•
5. Information that reveals security classification of various projects.
•
6. Information that associates cover names or nicknames with classified
projects, activities, or operations.
•
7. Material about special installation projects, dates, and locations.
•
8. Essential personnel privacy information, to include chain of command.
•

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Critical Information Value

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STEP TWO: THREAT ASSESSMENT

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Threat Matrix

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STEP THREE: VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

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STEP FOUR: RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk is assessed as a measure of the probability that an adversary will be successful in

collecting CI and the resultant cost to the mission (impact).

1. Probability is determined by multiplying a vulnerability value by the relative threat

value. In other words, if the vulnerability involves susceptibility to HUMINT
collection, the threat value would be specific to the adversary’s HUMINT collection
capability. In a situation where a single vulnerability might be exploited by multiple
collection methodologies, use the highest rating for risk calculation.

2. Use Figure D-5 as a decision chart for probability, combining the values for threat
and vulnerability.

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3. Determine the risk by multiplying probability times impact. The measure of impact
in this example can be determined by reviewing the value of the CI that is
susceptible to HUMINT collection. Should multiple items of CI be susceptible to
exploitation by a given vulnerability, the analyst makes a decision on the combined
value of that CI. Most often, the combined value is the highest value placed on any
one CI item.

4. Use Figure 4-2 as a decision chart for risk, combining the values for probability and
impact. For example, if the threat is high and the vulnerability is medium high, the
probability of compromise is medium high. If the value of the CI is medium high,
the risk is medium.

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STEP FIVE: MESURES/COUNTERMEASURES

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Annex H
Example Information Operations Action on Critical Activities

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Annex I
Sample Information Operations Concept Matrix Plan

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Annex J
Concept of Strategic Information Operations against KFR

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Annex K
Sample Information Operations Sync Matrix

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Annex L
Information Operations Related Intelligence Questions

These questions should be answered when building different IO-related Intel products.
However, these are meant as a guide only, and the IO Planner and Intel Analyst should
not be confined to just these questions. IO has three dimensions:

• Physical Dimension: Key individuals and human networks and technical and
physical infrastructure that supports the information flow to an audience.
• Informational Dimension: Content of information that influences effect and the
way it flows to an audience.
• Cognitive Dimension: The beliefs of a person or persons whose decisions can
impact the Commander’s End State.

Key questions when assessing a TARGET AUDIENCE.

Physical Dimension:
• Who are the people the TA associates with?
o Key individuals that have a close relationship with the TA and provide
advice and counseling:
▪ Who are the key advisors (family, business, religious,
organization)?
▪ What are the primary beliefs of these advisors (attitude towards
the US)?
▪ Who is the TA’s spokesman?
o Human networks the TA uses for support:
▪ What organizations or groups does the TA associate with
(political, business, criminal, media, religious, tribal) and how
close is he to them?
▪ What are the goals of these groups?
▪ Does he have a media cell?
• What equipment and facilities does the TA have?
o Technical infrastructure needed to produce, process, receive, send, and
store information so the TA can interact with others and make decisions:
▪ What technical resources does the TA have access to?
▪ What media does he have access to, control, or own?
▪ What means does he use to communicate with others (email,
social network tools, phones, courier, radio)?
o Physical infrastructure that houses the TA’s technical infrastructure and
those associated with the TA:
▪ Where are the media facilities that the TA uses?
▪ What religious facilities does the TA use?
▪ Where does the TA socialize?
▪ What front companies does the TA utilize?
▪ Where is the TA’s residence and place he conducts business?
o Can the TA actually send and receive information?
▪ Does the environment support the actual ability to send and
receive information?
▪ What or who is most capable?
Informational Dimension:

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• What is the content of the information? Content of the message that the TA
thinks will influence others to help meet his goals.
o Who is the message intended for?
o Why was the message or image sent? Is the TA pushing out his ideology
or responding to someone or some event?
o What does the message say, and what are its key points or themes?
o How do the themes in the message compare to themes in past messages?
Does it represent anything new?
o What do the images show?
o Is the TA emphasizing any particular part of his ideology more than
other parts?
• How is the information sent? How the message flows so its intended audience
will hear and see it.
o Who is sending the message?
o How is the message being passed – method (how), tempo (speed),
language, format (style)?
o What format is the message in (written, verbal, image)?
o Is the message or image clear, and will it be easily understood by the
intended audience?
o How is the quality of the product?
o Is the message being picked up and passed by others?
o Is the intended audience receiving it?
o Are unintended audiences receiving it? How are they reacting to it, and
what impact is it having on them?
• Is there any competing information?
o Is the message being countered by another group? If so, how?
o What does the counter message say?
o How is it being received by the intended audience compared to the TA’s
message?

Cognitive Dimension:

• What influences the TA? Decisions based on culture, life experiences,

relationships, outside events, ideology, and the influences of those inside and
outside the TA’s group.
o What are the TA’s life experiences?
o What historical events impact the TA’s thinking?
o What current events or issues will most likely have an impact on the
TA?
o Who inside the TA’s group is trying to influence him, what are they
telling him, and why?
o Who outside the TA’s group is trying to influence him, what are they
telling him, and why?
• Who does the TA collect on? Then, build perceptions based on the information
collected, either overtly or covertly, on others' beliefs, perceptions, or plans.
o What groups is the TA most interested in?
o What has the TA learned about those groups?
o What perceptions could the TA develop based on what he may have
learned?

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• Who does the TA influence? Decide how to react and who and how to engage
and influence to meet goals.
o What has the TA most likely decided to do?
o Who has the TA decided to engage and influence, and why?
o What is the TA’s end state?

Key questions for the CIO

Physical Dimension:
• What are the basic demographics of the AO?
o Size of the population.
o Location/density of the population.
o Percentage of rural versus urban. Primary areas for each.
o Age and sex statics.
o Number above and below the poverty level.
o Literacy and education level.
o Primary livelihoods.
o Cultural highlights of groups.
o Type of government that governs the population.
o The level of government, religion, or other restrictions the population
lives under.
• Who are the main groups that have the most influence?
o Consider tribal, business, government, military, militia, religious,
political, criminal, etc.
o Include who these groups are, where they are located, and what type of
infrastructure they own or control (media, mosques, businesses, etc.).
o Identify who the primary leaders of these groups are to include who their
key lieutenants are and where these leaders are based.
o Identify what other groups ally themselves with these groups.
o Who or what outside of the groups influences the group?
o Consider the NGOs or international groups operating in the country and
their role with the main groups and general population.
• What is the radio, TV, print, and internet infrastructure?
o Who owns the media?
o How their news is slanted.
o Penetration into the population.
o Who the main groups favor and trust.
o Location of the media.
o The medium radio and TV use – antenna or satellite.
• What is the telecom infrastructure?
o Who owns the telecom?
o Penetration into the population.
o What is the most popular?
o Location of the supporting infrastructure.
• Where/what are the major communication hubs.
o Consider mosques, markets, gas stations, schools, etc.
• For the government, HN military, militias, insurgents groups, and perhaps
political groups, what does their C2 structure consist of, and where are the major
components of that structure located?
• How sophisticated is the environment?

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o Does the environment support the actual ability to send and receive
information?
o What or who is most capable?

Informational Dimension:
• What are the dominant narratives in the AO?
o Consider narratives that impact all groups as well as narratives that the
main groups stress.
• What are the other competing narratives in the AO?
• How are the narratives being passed?
o Consider method (how), tempo (speed), language, format (style) and the
format of the narrative (written, verbal, image)?
• What other information is being passed, by whom, and how?
• How are decisions by the decision-makers of the main groups passed?

Cognitive Dimension:
• How do the main groups see themselves?
o Consider, at a minimum, family, religious, cultural, tribal variables.
• What are the main perceptions of the main groups towards their government,
insurgents, their economy, business, other regional countries, and outsiders
(such as the US and NGOs)?
• How does the population as a whole and/or the main groups see themselves or
others based on a historical incident/event?
• What current events or issues may be impacting their perceptions?
o Consider those events and issues inside the AO and outside.
• What are the main groups most concerned with?
o Consider local events, regional, international, economy, family, etc.
• Why do they send or support certain narratives?

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Annex M
Record of Changes

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Glossary

Attack
Refers to any offensive action taken, whether in lethal or non-lethal form, intended for
adversaries.

Civil Affairs
A function of CMO; refers to specialized projects (e.g., construction, medical, dental,
veterinary activities) performed and supported by the military that enhance the
relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces
are present or operating.

Civil-Military Operations
A vital component of the PA is characterized by planned activities undertaken
independently or in coordination with specific government/civilian entities to establish,
maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and
nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities and the civilian populace.

Civil-Military Operations
Are composed of planned activities undertaken independently or in coordination with
civilian entities to gain support in favor of the military, weaken the adversary’s will to
fight, and influence threat groups to abandon armed struggle in support of the
accomplishment of the military’s mission.

Combat Photography
Refers to the activities that supply valuable imagery for MILDEC, PA, CA, ISA,
strategic communication (STRATCOM) and commanders that can be used to influence
selected audiences.

Computer Network Operations

Refers to the utilization of computer networks to attack, deceived, degrade, disrupt,
deny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure.

Counter-Intelligence
Consists of information gathered, and activities conducted to protect against espionage,
other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of
adversarial groups, organizations and persons, both local and foreign, or their elements.

Cyberspace Operations
Is the use of networked computers and supporting information technology
infrastructure systems to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend
electronic information and infrastructure.

Detect
To discover the existence of key leadership linkages, supporting organizations,
command and control, communications and computer, intelligence and reconnaissance
systems/networks/nodes and other human factors or decision support processes crucial
to the adversary.

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Disrupt
To break or interrupt the flow of information, thereby diminishing its timeliness or
reliability to a decision-maker, analyst or end-user.

Electronic Warfare
Involves the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic
spectrum, to attack the enemy, or to protect the spectrum used by one’s forces.

High Payoff Target List

A prioritized list of HPTs. Loss of single or multiple assets on this list is expected to
reduce the enemy capability significantly, thereby contributing to the success of the
friendly COA.

High Payoff Target

A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the
friendly COA.

High-Value Target
The commander requires a target to complete his mission against the enemy forces and
their support base.

Information Assurance
It is the process of protecting and defending information and information systems by
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and
nonrepudiation.

Information Environment
It is the combination of individuals, organizations or automated systems that collect,
process, disseminate, or act on information; this also includes the information itself; is
made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive.

Information Operations Cell

Is a group of planning experts representing selected IO capabilities, who frequently
meet to conduct IO planning and execution; could also be referred to as IO Working
Group (IOWG) or IO Fusion Cell (IOFC) by other militaries.

Information Operations
It is the systematic process of integration, synchronization, and coordination of
information activities to achieve synergistically (optimum combined outcome of) lethal
and non-lethal effects in order to affect the decision-making process of a defined target
while protecting our own.

Information Related Capabilities

Are tools, techniques, or activities employed within a dimension of the information
environment to create effects and operationally desirable conditions.

Information Superiority
Is the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate
an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability
to do the same.

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Inform
Refers to the process of providing or giving knowledge, fact, or information about
something to a desired audience in the IE to achieve a specified effect based on the
mission’s intent.

Inter-agency Coordination
The collaboration between elements of the PA with the other NGAs/LGUs or
NGOs/POs to achieve an objective.

Military Deception
Refers to actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision-makers as to
friendly military capabilities, intentions and operations, which subsequently cause the
adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the
accomplishment of the friendly mission.

Operations Security
Refers to military activities that aim to protect unclassified information and activities,
identify, select, and execute measures that eliminate or reduce indications and other
sources of information, which is exploited by an adversary, to an acceptable level.

Physical Attack
Refers to the use of lethal military force to destroy, degrade or neutralize a military
target.

Physical Security
Refers to the identification and implementation of physical measures to safeguard
personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and
documents; and, to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

Protect
Are actions taken to safeguard the military’s sensitive equipment or military
infrastructures that include classified and unclassified information from unauthorized
disclosure and prohibit its access from the adversary.

Public Affairs
Includes public information and community relations activities that are directed
towards local and foreign public audiences with an interest in the military to promote a
positive image of the military through the dissemination of clear, accurate, credible and
timely information.

Target Selection Standards

It is an established criterion for deciding when the targets are determined to be
accurately located and that the information associated with it is complete enough to
attack/service the target.

Target Synchronization Matrix

It is a list of HPTs by category and the agencies responsible for detecting and attacking
them and assessing the effects of attacks. It is a combined data from the high-payoff
target list, intelligence collection plan and attack guidance matrix.

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Abbreviation and Acronym list

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

AFPM Armed Forces of the Philippines Manual
AOR Area of Responsibility
BIPSO Bayanihan Investment Protection and Security Operations
C2 Command and Control
C2S Command and Control Systems
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence
C4S Command and Control, Communications, and Cyber Support
CA Civil Affairs
CARVER Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect,
and Recognizability
CC Critical Capability
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
CI Counter-Intelligence
CIS Communication and Information Systems
CMO Civil-Military Operations
CND Computer Network Defence
CO Cyberspace Operations
COA Course of Action
COG Center of Gravity
COMPHO Combat Photography
CR Critical Requirement
CSAFP Chief of Staff, AFP
CSP Community Support Program
CV Critical Vulnerability
D3A Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Access
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and
Education, Personnel and Facilities
EA Electronic Attack
EP Electronic Protection
ES Electronic Support
EW Electronic Warfare
HPT High Payoff Target
HPTL High Payoff Target List
HVT High Value Target
IA Information Assurance
ICP Intelligence Collection Plan
IE Information Environment
INTEL Intelligence
IO Information Operations
IRC/s Information-Related Capability/ies
ISA Information Support Affairs
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISM Information Operation Synchronization Matrix
ISO Internal Security Operations
JIIM Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
LCEs Local Chiefs Executives

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LMC Landpower Maneuver Concept

MBA Main Battle Area
MDMP Military Decision Making Process
MILDEC Military Deception
MOE Measures of Effectiveness
MOP Measures of Performance
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OOTW Operations Other Than War
OPORD Operations Order
OPSEC Operations Security
PA IO Philippine Army Information Operations
PA Public Affairs
PAG Public Affairs Guidance
PAMU Philippine Army Major Unit
PHYSEC Physical Security
PIR Priority Intelligence Requirement
SME Subject Matter Expert
STRATCOM Strategic Communications
WARNO Warning Order

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