A Preliminary History of the Tripartite Treaty of December 13, 1906

Author(s): HAROLD G. MARCUS

Source: Journal of Ethiopian Studies , JULY 1964, Vol. 2, No. 2 (JULY 1964), pp. 21-40
Published by: Institute of Ethiopian Studies

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41965711

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A Preliminary History of the Tripartite Treaty
of December 13, 1906
by HAROLD G. MARCUS
Howard University, Washington, D.C.

This article has been entitled a "preliminary history" because more work is
needed on the subject before it will be possible to write a complete history. This
article relies totally on British archival material because I have not, as yet, had the
opportunity to investigate those materials held in Paris and Rome. Nonetheless, I feel
that the information presented in this "preliminary history" is sufficient to warrant
publication at this time, and that most of it will withstand the test of further research.

* * *

At the beginning of the twentieth centu

Ethiopia were rivals for influence at the
government had alienated Italy and Great
attempting to use the French-financed railw
of Ethiopia. Italy still dreamed of absorbi
Empire, but was opposed by Britain, who vie
without treaty guarantees, as a threat to Brit
the Nile, and by France, who regarded Eth
England, recognizing the difficulties inheren
seek the protection of her many interests in
British Somaliland Protectorate by uphol
Menilek's government against French and
power was afraid that the others would take
full control of Ethiopia.

As Menilek grew older, it began to appear

he were to die without naming a successor. Th
fall into internal chaos while various cont
European power should back a different ca
would undoubtedly gain special favours and

Archival materials used in this article have been dra

Mr. S. Rubenson of Haile Sellassie I University.

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 It was apparently M. Martini, the Governor of Eritrea, who conceived the idea
of an agreement to forestall this possibility. In an interview Martini was reported to
have said that it was desirable

in view of the uncertainty of future developments in Abyssinia, and of the

increasing years of the Emperor Menelik, that Great Britain, Italy, and France
should arrive at some definite understanding as to which of the possible candi-
dates for the succession they will support, and if necessary impose, and that on
this point there should be no rivalries or differences of opinion, i
Sir Rennell Rodd agreed that
it might be desirable ... to arrive, if possible, at some negative understanding,
which would prevent the powers interested from acting otherwise than in con-
cert and simultaneously as regards the question of eventual succession. But it
can, I venture to think, be only to the general disadvantage if their future action
is discussed in press interviews, and suspicions are thus aroused in Abyssinia of
intended foreign interventions
Lord Lansdowne asked Harrington for an opinion on Martini's scheme, and
Harrington replied that, if Menilek did not name an heir, his "death will be the
signal for a return to the old state of internal disintegration and civil war until one
of the . . . candidates to the throne makes himself supreme by force of arms." Each
candidate would undoubtedly seek the support of the European governments rep-
resented in Ethiopia; should a candidate supported by one European power be
successful, it might "lead ... to the . . . domination of Ethiopia by that power."
If France, Britain, and Italy were to support three different candidates, "these
[candidates] would probably declare themselves independent in their own terri-
tories . . . thus creating a state of affairs which would lead to division of Abyssinia
into spheres of influence." Thus, since "the maintenance of the independence of
Abyssinia" was a fundamental aim of British policy, Harrington felt that Rodd's
conception of a negative understanding which would "prevent the Powers interested
from acting . . . otherwise than in concert and simultaneously" was a good idea,
which could prevent "France making herself the dominating Power in Abyssinia"
and protect "British interests as far as Egypt, the Soudan, and British East Africa
are concerned."3

Because both Rodd and Harrington agreed that the Italian suggestion warranted
further discussion, the British Government was receptive when an official note from
Admiral Morin, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived in late May 1903.
Admiral Morin stated his Government's view than Menilek needed Great Britain's
support against France and "that the danger should be avoided of placing the
outlets of Ethiopia to the sea in the hands of one Power alone." He therefore pro-
posed that Britain and Italy should pursue the following objectives : to eliminate all
monopolistic clauses in any concessions regarding communication from Addis

1. F.O. 403/323, Rodd to Lansdowne, Sept. 10, 1902.

2. ibid

3. F.O. 403/334, Harrington to Lansdowne, Dec. 15, 1902.

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Ababa to the coast; to obtain the right of constructing railway lines from their
colonies to Shoa; and to involve themselves officially in the Harar- Addis Ababa line.
Admiral Morin added that

The Royal Government . . . wish to point out the advantages which, in their
common interests in Ethiopia, England and Italy would gain in coming to a
definite understanding of a general nature by which for the present and the
future the interest of the two friendly and allied Powers would be reciprocally
safeguarded on the basis of an Agreement, having regard on the one hand to the
Italian position in Erythraea and Somaliland, and on the other to the English
position in the Soudan, Somaliland, and the East African Protectorate.4
In August 1903 Italy sent Great Britain a second note, this time hinting at a
desire to divide Ethiopia into spheres of influence. The note explained that "the
King's Government believe that progressive commercial development in Ethiopia
could be realised ... by a practical definition of reciprocal interests in the sphere of
activity assigned to each of the Powers." The note then urged quick agreement
between England and Italy on all matters of common interest in Ethiopia, so that
Italy would not be obliged to take independent action to gain security for her interests
and colonies. 5 This statement caused Rennell Rodd to believe that the Italians wanted
the agreement with Great Britain "because of the general prestige" which "the
existence of a definite agreement with the preponderating Power. ... [in East Africa
would add] to the somewhat unsubstantial authority of Italy in those parts." He
added, however, that he could not be certain of Italy's aims since "the Memoranda
presented by the Italian Foreign Office . . . are apt to be obscured by vagueness of
expression and a superabundance of generalising phrases. "6
On October 8, 1903, Sir F. Bertie, the British Ambassador in Rome, was instruc-
ted to inform the Italian Government that

His Majesty's Government are quite willing to enter into an engagement with
the Italian Government for consultation and joint action in the eventualities
suggested. It must, however, be understood that the action contemplated by
them is of a diplomatic nature, and that they do not bind themselves to armed
interventions

In December Sir John Harrington, en route from Ethiopia to England, joined Sir
Rennell Rodd in Rome, where they held a week of meetings with Giacomo Agnesa,
the Head of the Colonial Department of the Italian Foreign Office. On December 19
the three men signed "a form of Agreement, consisting of a Preamble and five
Articles embodying the joint recommendations of the British and Italian co-operation
in and regarding Abyssinia. "8 It was clearly understood by the three delegates that

4. F.O. 403/334, Memo, by Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British Government, Mav 1 23,
1903. 1
5. F.O. 403/334, Memo, bv Italian Government. Aug. 29. 1903.
6. F.O. 403/334, Rodd to Lansdowne, Sept. 6, 1903.
7. F.O. 403/334, Lansdowne to Bertie. Oct. 8. 1903.
8. F.O. 403/334, Bertie to Lansdowne, Dec. 19, 1903.

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"any conclusions upon which they were able to agree" were merely to be presented
''for the consideration of their respective Governments," and were not binding.9
The preamble stated:
Italy and Great Britain, having a common interest in maintaining the integrity
of the Ethiopian Empire, in establishing reciprocal guarantees for any contin-
gency that may arise in that country, including the questions of the eventual
succession to the throne, and in insuring that the action of the two Powers in
protecting the interests of their respective possessions bordering on Ethiopia,
as well as their interests in Ethiopia itself, should be of such a nature as not to
injure the interests of either Power.
In Article One the two powers declared "both directly and through their Represen-
tatives in Ethiopia," to maintain "a full and current interchange" of views on
Ethiopia; if their Ethiopian representatives could not agree on any "particular"
point, the matter was to be referred to London and Rome for negotiation. In Article
Two "Great Britain and Italy engage themselves to work together for the main-
tenance of the political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia" as defined by various
documentsio and of the "de facto situation existing between Ethiopia and the
French Colony of Obok-Djibuti." Artiele Three pledged the two European powers
to "work together with the object of insuring that a concession granted in the
interests of one of the parties shall not prejudice the interests of the other." Article
Four bound them to "maintain a neutral attitude" in case of any internal disturbance
in Ethiopia, and to "abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of Ethiopia."
They would, however, "watch events with a view to maintaining their common
interests in the status quo as defined by the present Agreement," and, if events
required it, representatives of the two powers were "authorised to take such steps
as they mutually agree to be necessary for the protection of the Legations, the lives
of foreigners, and the common interests of the two Powers." Article Five suggested
the "possibility of the eventual disintegration of the Ethiopian Empire" and engaged
the two powers to act together so that
any eventual partition of territory shall be made on the basis of the Agreements
enumerated in Article 2, but with such modifications as in the interests of the
one or the other Power may be considered necessary for safeguarding the
interests of Great Britain in the Nile Basin, and the interests of Italy in Ethiopia
(having regard ot Erythraea and Somaliland including the Benadir), and par-
ticularly in the intervening zone between these two Italian possessions, with
a view to establishing territorial connections between them.
If this should prove impossible,
they engage themselves to oppose . . . any other Power attempting to contravene
the realisation of the objects contemplated in this Article, by occupation or

9. F.O. 403/334, Memo, by Harrington and Rodd, n.d.

10. The Agreements included were the Anglo-Italian Protocols of March 24, April 15, and May 5,
1894, the Treaty between Italy and Ethiopia of July 10, 1900, the Treaty of May 15, 1902, the
Anglo-French Agreement of Feb. 2 and 9, 1888, and the Franco-Italian Protocols of Jan. 24 and
July 10, 1901.

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 exercise of influence in such territories, and will deliberate as to the means of
making such opposition effective. It is understood that this document remains
secret, h

Despite the ease with which Mr. Agnesa had admitted that "the avowed object
of his Government [was] the maintenance of the integrity of the Ethiopian Empire, "
Harrington and Rodd suspected that Italy was primarily interested in absorbing as
much of Ethiopia as possible, should that Empire disintegrate at Menilek's death.
Mr. Agnesa had clearly been dissatisfied with the British delegates' "purely non-
commital" attitude that they should support any candidate to the Ethiopian throne
who "would give specific assurances to the two Governments as to his future attitude
after establishing himself." Furthermore, several of the documents mentioned in the
Agreement recognized Ethiopia as an Italian sphere of influence. The British dele-
gates suggested that a recognition of this Italian sphere could be sanctioned only if
"at the same time . . . the possibility of a remodelling of the frontier toward the
valley of the upper Nile by a line more favourable to British interests" could be
secured. If this were possible, Harrington and Rodd agreed that "it would be in the
interests of Great Britain by assisting Italy ... to prevent the western extension of
French influence over any considerable area towards the Nile."i2
Sir Francis Bertie wrote that, as the Agreement stood, Article Five "practi-
cally . . . means that England and Italy will forcibly resist . . . France, the Power
against whom the Article is designed, from occupying derelict Abyssinian territory."
He regarded this as a dangerous clause, even in view of Britain's overriding concern
with the protection of the Nile Basin. But he realized that the Agreement with Italy
would put Great Britain "in a more favourable position to counteract them [possible
French designs] than if Italy were a neutral onlooker." Furthermore, Bertie realized
that the news of the Agreement would "probably deter them [the French] from
persisting in the designs attributed to them." He therefore suggested to M. Tittoni
of the Italian Foreign Office that the British Government might want to inform
France of the negotiations, but M. Tittoni insisted that the proceedings remain
secret to avoid the French Government saying, "that is also our desire, why did you
not ask us to join you."i3
At the same time Lord Cromer suggested that Great Britain should make "an
arrangement with the French . . . because, if no such arrangement is made, the
Emperor will persevere in the common Oriental policy of playing off one Power

11. F.O. 403/334, Agreement signed by Giacomo Agnesa, John Lane Harrington, and Rennell Rodd,
Dec. 19, 1903. At the same time a "Declaration" was signed about the southern border of Ethiopia
with British East Africa and Italian Somaliland. See H. G. Marcus "A History of the Negotia-
tions Concerning the Border between Ethiopia and British East Africa, 1897-1917" to be pub-
lished in the Proceedings of the Boston University Professional Seminar in African History , fall,
1964.

12. F.O. 403/334, Memo, by Harrington and Rodd, n.d. Compare this idea with the British policy
of using Italy as a tf watch dog" in eastern Africa before the Battle of Adwa. See H. G. Marcus
<CA Background to Direct British Diplomatic Involvement in Ethiopia, 1894-1896" Journal of
Ethiopian Studies 1:2: 1963, p. 122-123.
13. F.O. 403/334, Bertie to Lansdowne, Dec. 20, 1903.

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against the other, and will probably not deal sincerely with either side." He felt that
France and Great Britain should agree to respect Ethiopia's independence and that
a western boundary of French political influence ought to be drawn; moreover, he
suggested that "Anglo-French control - with no predominance in the French role -
should be established over the whole railway as far as the coast." 14 Cromer was
worried about the implied military commitment included in the proposed Anglo-
Italian Agreement and cautioned that the matter should "receive very careful
consideration."^

He stressed that "the Power against whom this ... is manifestly designed i
France," and "a recourse to arms" to forestall French influence becoming pre-
dominant in Ethiopia would be "a very wide step indeed." He implied that a mod
vivendi with France would have to be found and stated that in his opinion "the Itali
proposal should on no account be accepted." is
Apparently London heeded Lord Cromer's advice since further negotiation
concerning Ethiopia were put off for several months despite repeated requests from
Italy that the talks be resumed. 17 Meanwhile, Lord Lansdowne tried to convince the
Italians that the French should be included in the talks. He told M. Pansa, the
Italian Ambassador.
that some of the documents referred to concerned France as well as Italy and
Great Britain, and it therefore seemed . . . especially necessary that France should
be aware of what was intended. . . . There was nothing hostile to them in the
arrangements proposed, and it would not be desirable to conclude these behind
the back of the French Government, is

In another conversation with the Italian Ambassador, Lansdowne repeated that

France ought to be a party to the discussions, or
we should be placed in an unfortunate position if, after we had bound ourselves
to the actual signature of an Agreement, we were to find that exception was
taken to the Arrangement - perhaps upon grounds we could not dispute - by
the French Government.«

On May 16 M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in England, complained to

Lord Lansdowne that Harrington was "pursuing an anti-French policy which
might now be regarded as quite out of date" in light of the Anglo-French entente of
1904,20 and in view of the "unofficial suggestion" which M. Lagarde had made in
Addis Ababa on April 28 that Great Britain and France should agree to respect

14. F.O. 403/334, Cromer to Lansdowne, Dec. 26, 1903.

15. F.O. 403/346, Cromer to Lansdowne, Jan. 7, 1904.
16. F.O. 403/346, Cromer to Lansdowne, Jan. 8 1940; see also F.O., 403/346 Cromer to Lansdowne,
May 13, 1904.
17. For example see F.O. 403/346, Bertie to Lansdowne, Apr. 13, 1904.
18. F.O. 403/346, Lansdowne to Bertie, Apr. 20, 1904.
19. F.O. 403/346, Lansdowne to Bertie, May 4, 1904.
20. When Harrington heard of M. Cambon's statement that the settlement of the Egyptian problem
had put an end to France's political aims in Ethiopia, he wrote to Lansdowne :
a single railway, under the complete control of a single foreign Government, cannot be regarded
as anything but a bid for political supremacy in the country through which that railway runs,

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Ethiopia's independence; that they should act in accord regarding any serious
internal problem that might arise; and that the British Government should abandon
its opposition to the extension of the railway. In return France would agree to make
Jibuti an open port and to facilitate trade between Jibuti and Zeila.
Lansdowne explained that it was "impossible to expect that we should allow a
single Power to retain absolute control over a portion of the Abyssinian Railway
system, especially as that portion was 'the neck of the bottle'." M. Cambon replied
that a method of securing to Great Britain the unrestricted use of the line as far as
the sea could undoubtedly be found without difficulty.
He impressed upon me strongly that the whole question should be dealt with as
a commercial one; now that we had come to terms with regard to Egypt, France
could have no political designs upon Abyssinia, and there would probably be
no difficulty in coming to a general agreement as to that country.
Lansdowne then admitted that Great Britain had had "some conversation" with
Italy on the same subject and assured M. Cambon that any settlement with Italy
would "take fully into consideration the rights of France in these regions." M. Cam-
bon said he saw no reason why all three countries could not arrive at an acceptable
arrangement regarding their interests in Ethiopia, 21 and on May 18 Lord Lansdowne
told him that Great Britain was "quite ready to discuss . . . the question of an under-
standing as to the position of France and Great Britain in Abyssinia and the ad-
joining regions." Cambon suggested that the French Government outline an arrange-
ment, which would contain four main points: recognition of Ethiopia's indepen-
dence; delimitation of Ethiopia's frontiers; definition of zones of influence; and
solution of the railway issue.22
In an effort to bring Italy and France together for the negotiations, Lord
Lansdowne informed M. Tittoni of his conversations with M. Cambon. 23 M. Tittoni
did not appear at all disturbed and said he was reconciled to a series of tripartite
negotiations, because he realized
that the situation had been greatly altered by the recently concluded Anglo-
French Agreements, and that it would be necessary to divest the Italian pro-
posals of the somewhat anti-French character which they had possessed when
first put forward.
He therefore promised a new draft of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, to which formal
British consent would be withheld "until the French Government had been given a

and the only reason France can have for seeking a predominant position in Abyssinia must be
to gain the power of threatening England by flanking her in Egypt and the Soudan, and by
commanding the Blue Nile. ... To say that I am pursuing an out-of-date anti-French policy
is a distortion of the facts ; what I have done is to endeavour to combat the deliberately anti-
British policy of France and to defend the legitimate interests of my country to the best of my
ability.
F.O. 403/346, Harrington to Lansdowne, June 15, 1904.
21. F.O. 403/346, Lansdowne to Monson, May 16, 1904.
22. F.O. 403 '346, Lansdowne to Monson, May 18, 1904.
23. F.O. 403/346, Lansdowne to Bertie, May 18, 1904.

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full opportunity of making . . . [Great Britain] aware of the manner in which they
regarded them. "24

The revised Agreement, communicated to the Foreign Office on June 6, was

similar to the Agreement already signed except in regard to the disposition of
Ethiopian territory in case of the Empire's disintegration. Italy was now very eager
to obtain Britain's agreement that the two powers should "bind themselves to
co-operate with a view to an eventual systematic disposition of the territories" but
with consideration to Great Britain's and Egypt's interests in the Nile Basin, Italy's
interests in Eritrea and Somaliland, "and especially in the zone lying between these
Italian possessions, the object to be aimed at being to prevent a break in the con-
tinuity of these respective possessions of Italy."25 Lord Cromer felt that the new
Italian proposal was contrary to Britain's "main political interest in Abyssinia . . .
[of] maintaining native rule in the country. We do not want to annex any part of
Abyssinia ourselves, and we do not want any part of it to be annexed by either
France or Italy." In his opinion the proposals looked upon "disintegration" as
"highly probable." Of the three powers "England is in reality alone in being opposed
to 'disintegration'-by which term is . . . meant the division of the country between
the three parties." In his opinion Great Britain should not assume any more "very
serious responsibilities," and, since
we do not want any great Power to be established on any of the main sources
of the Nile. ... I would proceed on the assumption that, if civil war ensues
[in Ethiopia], it should be allowed to continue until the Abyssinians have
settled amongst themselves how the country is to be governed.

If Italy forces Great Britain to deal with the contingency of "disintegration," then it
should be laid down
as clearly as possible, that the main object of our common diplomacy should
be to avoid any action which might tend to disintegrate ; a self-denying ordinance
might be good. . . . [that England and Italy] would regard disintegration as evil,
and that the common object of their diplomacy should be to prevent its occur-
rence^«

When these views were communicated to Italy, she was wil

number of concessions in order to insure her claim to a territo
Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. After a number of changes in w
draft of Article Four finally suggested that the two governmen
territorial arrangement which
may be considered necessary for safeguarding the interests of
and Egypt in the basin of the Nile. . . . [and] consists of possessing
the waters of that river and its affluents, to safeguard the int

24. F.O. 403/346, Lansdowne to Bertie, June 1, 1904.

25. F.O. 403/346, Memo, communicated to Lord Lansdowne by M. Tittoni, Ju
26. F.O. 403/346, Memo, by Cromer, June 25, 1904.

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 Britain and Egypt in the Basin of the Nile, and more especially in the regulation
of the waters of that river and its direct affluents. 27
However, upon the advice of the War Office, which felt that Great Britain must have
control over all the Nile affluents, not merely the "direct" ones, 28 Lord Lansdowne
told the Italian Chargé d'Affaires that the new draft article could not be accepted.

On January 4, 1905, the Italian Government submitted another revised version

of Article Four, still using the terminology "to safeguard the interests of Great
Britain and Egypt in the basin of the Nile," but adding the statement: "at the
opportune time steps will be taken, by means of special Agreements, to arrive at the
necessary arrangements between the two Powers for the eventual practical application
of this Article." Lord Salisbury immediately objected to the omission of the references
to the regulation of the waters of the Nile and its affluents and warned that, if the
Italians omitted this reference, he would insist upon omitting reference to an Eritrea-
Somaliland link. The Italian Ambassador replied that both would stand if Britain
would permit the inclusion of a statement that British control of the sources of the
Nile would not prejudice local interests.29

The version of Article Four which the British Government then prepared safe-
guarded Britain's interest in the "basin of the Nile, and more especially in the
regulation of the waters of that river and its affluents (due consideration being paid
to local interests)."3o The new wording conceded what Italy wanted, while providing
Great Britain with the means of maintaining undisputed control over the Nile
affluents. Italy accepted the new version, and Britain immediately suggested that the
proposed agreement be used as a basis for a Tripartite Treaty including France.

The British Government had been carrying on talks with France since 1904,
and Lord Lansdowne had described the proposed Anglo-Italian agreement to
M. Cambon, stating Italy's and Great Britain's opinion that the subject of the
railway would be the greatest stumbling block to a Tripartite Agreement.31 On
November 2 M. Cambon told Lord Lansdowne that he could promise England and
Italy equal treatment at Jibuti and on the railway, but that it would be impossible to
internationalise the first part of the line, which was in French territory, and difficult
to do so for the second part if it were to continue receiving a French Government
subsidy. The Ambassador then supported M. Delcassé's opinion that the European
powers should not wait until Ethiopia should start disintegrating before agreeing to
a division - "that we should at once consider what spheres of influence might with
advantage be assigned to each of the three Powers." These areas might be regarded as
"economic spheres at least for now." Furthermore, M. Delcassé was not pleased
that England had agreed to territorial communication between Italian Eritrea and

27. F.O. 403/346, New Draft of Article Four communicated by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, Sept.,
1904.
28. F.O. 403/346, Intelligence Division to Foreign Office, Sept. 30, 1904.
29. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Lister, Jan. 4, 1905.
30. F.O. 401 ;8, Lansdowne to Lister, Jan. 18, 1905.
31. F.O. 403/346, Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 26, 1904.

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Somaliland, because such a link would encroach upon the French Somaliland hinter-
land.32
Lord Cromer immediately stated his opposition to the French proposal of
dividing Ethiopia into spheres of influence. "Both France and Italy are carried away
by the earth-hunger so prevalent nowadays, and look to turning a 'sphere of in-
fluence' into effective French or Italian possession at no very distant date." He
repeated that Ethiopia's independence must be stressed, that disintegration of the
Empire must be regarded as an "evil," and "that the principal and common object
of . . . diplomacy should be to prevent its occurrence." Lord Cromer also felt that
the entente-cordiale and the Anglo-Italian friendship might be disrupted at any time,
allowing a European power to gain control over some of the sources of the Nile. It
would, therefore, be wiser for England to support a neutral, weak, indigenous
Ethiopian Government than to allow the country to be divided into spheres of
influence. With regard to the railway, Cromer felt that internationalization was the
best plan but, knowing that France would never yield this point, was inclined to
drop the issue, provided that in doing so "we should secure whatever guarantees . . .
possible to prevent French influence being absolutely paramount in Abyssinia." The
guarantees should include absolute equality of treatment for Italy and England on
the railway, the construction of the railway west of Addis Ababa under British
auspices, and recognition of the British right to build a railway from Somaliland to
Sudan.
Although very probably we may never want to avail ourselves of this right, its
retention is most important, as it would be a powerful guarantee that any
arrangement as to the equality of treatment of English subjects or goods on the
railway . . . would be accurately executed. 33
To these comments Lord Lansdowne added the Government's view that France
should agree to a western limit to her political influence in Ethiopia. 34
On December 16 Lansdowne wrote M. Cambon the British Government's
ideas on the different points of the proposed agreement: first, "any attempt to d
Abyssinia into spheres of influence in anticipation of an eventual disintegrat
the country might tend to precipitate such a disintegration, a contingency whic
three Powers are anxious to avoid" ; on the railway issue, "our general view in su
matters is that King Menelek . . . should be left free to construct his own railwa
in his own territory without the interruption of a foreign Government, should
think fit to do so." Lord Lansdowne pointed out, however, that all extensions of
railway west of Addis Ababa should be kept in British hands and that Brita
tained the right to build a Somaliland-Sudan railroad and wished to have an o
to connect it to the Ethiopian railway system. Finally, he said that he could not
why an Italian territorial link must encroach upon the hinterland of French Som
land. 35

32. F.O. 403/346, Lansdowne to Monson, Nov. 2, 1904.

33. F.O. 403/346, Cromer to Foreign Office, Nov. 12, 1904.
34. F.O. 403/346, Lansdowne to Harrington in Lansdowne to Cromer, Nov. 30, 1904.
35. F.O. 403/346, Lansdowne to Cambon, Dec. 16, 1904.

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 In his reply to Lord Lansdowne's letter M. Cambon stated that the Foreign
Minister objected to two points : first, he disliked the idea of the Italian link running
through Ethiopia, because, if the British sphere included the entire watershed and
affluents of the Nile, then Italy's line would have to go through that part of Ethiopia,
"the reversion of which would naturally fall to France." At this point Lord Lans-
downe reiterated
that it should be possible (if such arrangements should ever become inevitable)
to provide Italy with the communication she desired without in any way en-
croaching upon the sphere which would naturally fall to France.
M. Delcassé's second objection was to handing over the Harar-Addis Ababa section
of the railway to Menilek ; he wanted it to remain in the hands of the French capi-
talists who already held the Concession.36 The French Minister added, however, that
British financiers were welcome to take part in the enterprise should they desire to
do SO. 37

On January 9 M. Cambon strongly repeated the French demand for economic

spheres of influence, which each power could exploit separately. He stated that
"this division would have for its aim the suppression of all germs of difficulty or
conflict between the three powers, and would not in any way undermine the integrity
of the Abyssinian Empire." Concerning Italy's connecting link
M. Delcassé would consider it impossible to give satisfaction to Italy. To bring
this communication into effect, it would be necessary to intrude into French
Somaliland, to cross the hinterland of our possessions, indeed, to enter into that
region of Abyssinia which adjoins this hinterland, and which we consider as the
area reserved for our economic expansion. It is important that on this point no
ambiguity exist. Neither the French Government, nor the Parliament, nor
[public] opinion could admit to a penetration of a nature to compromise the
existence and the development of a colonial enterprise which has imposed upon
us great sacrifices.
As for the railway, the French Government was willing to abandon the Company's
right to build the line from Addis Ababa to the Nile if the British Government would
in turn grant France the right to construct the second part of the line from Harar to
Addis Ababa. M. Cambon then registered another complaint about Harrington's
anti-French behaviour, emphasizing that "our political interests no longer conflict
in the Nile Valley, [so] why . . . should conflicts of influence continue which hamper
matters and which profit no one."38
Two days later M. Cambon said that M. Delcassé wanted to reach agreement
soon, because a German Mission was about to go to Ethiopia, and other powers
were also becoming interested in that country. Therefore, the French Government

36. M. Delcassé was mistaken in his facts since the Concession belonged only to Alfred Ilg, for whom
a French company was acting.
37. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Mr. de Bunsen, Jan. 4, 1905. M. Deicasse was laier o oe proven
incorrect.

38. F.O. 401/8, Cambon to Lansdowne, Jan. 9, 1905.

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was prepared to concede absolute equality of treatment to British trade on the rail-
way. Lord Lansdowne then asked for a definition of the proposed French sphere of
influence and was told that it would probably "include everything that did not fall
within the watershed of the Nile and its affluents and . . . that this would include Addis
Ababa, which was clearly outside the Nile watershed." When Lord Lansdowne
suggested that this claim might be "extreme," Cambon only replied that this was the
reason why his Government had protested against Italy's claim to a passage from
Eritrea to Somaliland; "in that case Italy would have to march over the body of
France in order to get from the one to the other."39
Lansdowne wrote Cambon that the main points at issue remained the railway
and the Italian communication, and he suggested that the latter point could easily
be disposed of after an understanding was reached "as to the amount of territory
which France would regard as falling under her influence, now or hereafter." The
present French claim was too "far-reaching" since it involved the admission that
only France would have economic rights in Addis Ababa. While the British Govern-
ment was loath to discuss spheres of interest in Ethiopia, it did feel that several
general statements could be made on the subject : France's chief interest lay in the
territory to the rear of her actual possessions and to the east of the Nile watershed;
Britain's concern lay in the Nile and its affluents; and Italy's chief desire was to
establish communication between Eritrea and Somaliland. The only conflict was that
Italy's communication must not interrupt the continuity of the possessions to which
France would be entitled.

It seems to me ... so little probable that Abyssinia will fall to pieces within the
future which concerns us, that I deprecate a too minute discussion of the
manner in which that eventuality might be dealt with.40
Delcassé received these proposals "very favourably, and thought that the time
had come when the discussion of them might well be undertaken 'à trois ' by the
three Powers concerned." Lansdowne agreed that it was time to initiate the tripartite
negotiations but warned that, since he had so far been negotiating personally, some
of his views might be modified when laid before the cabinet.«
On January 18, 1905, Italy and Great Britain provisionally signed an agreement
which followed the form of the earlier draft and contained the modifications agreed
upon by the two powers.42 On February 16 Lord Lansdowne gave the text to the
French Government for comment. M. Delcassé stated his belief that Article Four
ought to be amended to make it very clear that the Italian communication link wou
never cross French Somaliland or its hinterland. If this change were made, h
"thought it would be expedient to turn the proposed Agreement between Gr
Britain and Italy into a tri-partite Agreement." He added "that it would be usef
to mention in it the texts of the various Conventions and Agreements conclud

39. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Bertie, Jan. 11, 1905.

40. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Cambon, Jan. 13, 1905.
41. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Bertie, Jan. 18, 1905.
42. F.O. 401/8, Agreement between Italy and Great Britain, Jan. 18, 1905.

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between Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, and Italy." Toward this end he would
submit to Italy and Great Britain a counterdraft which would include those French
Agreements which he believed to be relevant.43

The French draft followed the form of the provisional Anglo-Italian Agreement,
but added to Article One were the Franco-British Treaty of February 2-9, 1888, the
Franco-Ethiopian Treaty of March 20, 1899, the Railway Concession of March 9,
1894, the Convention between French Somaliland and the Railway Company of
February 6, 1902, and Menilek's Declaration of August 8, 1904. Article Four
assured England of the safeguards to control the Nile Basin and Italy the com-
munication between Somaliland and Eritrea, provided this would not undermine
French interests; France saw her own interests as the safeguarding of the Awash
Basin, "which would be crossed by the second section of the railway from Jibuti to
Addis Ababa in virtue of the Convention of March 9, 1894, and the Declaration of
Menelek of August 8, 1904." Article Five specified that the Agreement should
remain secret.44

In mid-April the Italians stated their views on the French draft treaty. "The
Italian Government . . . object just as much as the Emperor Menelek to the extension
of the French Railway to Adis Ababa as this would destroy their hopes for the
future junction of their possessions. "45 Furthermore, the Italian Government could
not admit that the French hinterland extended as far as Addis Ababa.46 England and
Italy both felt that the Railway Convention of 1 894 was political and not economic
in nature and ought not to be included among the international agreements listed in
the Treaty.

Sir Francis Bertie reported these comments to the French Government, and
Lord Lansdowne suggested to the French Ambassador that British and Italian
representatives might be placed on the board of the railway line. He also warned
that a solution to the railway problem should be found rapidly, as there was now a
threat that the German Government might provide Menilek with the capital to
build the second section of the line.47

43. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Bertie, March 15, 1905.

44. F.O. 401/8, French Draft Treat, March, 1905.
45. F.O. 401/8, Egerton to Lansdowne, Apr. 16, 1905.
46. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Egerton, Apr. 17, 1905.
47. F.O. 401 /8, Lansdowne to Bertie, Apr. 19, 1905. On March 7, 1905, an Ethio-German commercial
treaty, similar to the Ethio-American Treaty of 1903, had been signed. Rosen, the German
head of Mission, told Harrington that Germany's policy was to maintain Ethiopia's indepen-
dence; he stressed that Germany only wanted her just share in Ethiopia's markets and that she
would not interfere in politcal questions which directly concerned France, Italy, and Great
Britain. Harrington wrote home, however, that
in spite of M. Rosen's assurances that Germany would attend strictly to her own business,
there is not one single question here in which the German Mission has not sought to inter-
fere. ... With the entrance of Germany into the sphere of Abyssinian politics Great Britain
has acquired another bitter opponent, and one who will not hesitate to use the most unscrupu-
lous means to deal a blow at British influence.
See F.O. 401/8, Harrington to Lansdowne, March 7, 1905.

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 At the same time, during discussions with the French Ambassador in Rome,
M. Barrère, the Italian Foreign Minister, M. Tittoni, complained that the con-
tinuation of the railway line by the French Government would prevent the future
junction of the Italian possessions in the Horn of Africa. M. Barrère agreed to work
for an understanding if Italy would accept the promise of communication, "however
narrow," between her spheres of influence. 48 On April 25 the French sent the British
a memorandum stating that they had decided to approve a possible link between
the two Italian territories, "providing that their line of communication would pass
to the west of Addis Ababa, leaving in consequence intact the communications of the
railway from Jibuti to the capital of Ethiopia, and . . . the hinterland the French
Government judges necessary to its colony." They realized, however, that this
suggestion would require British permission since the area in question would fall in
the British zone of influence. M. Delcassé also asked for a clause stipulating that a
French company would construct the Harar-Addis Ababa section of the railway.
At the same time he formally accepted Lansdowne's idea of having an Italian, a
British and an Ethiopian representative on the Board of Directors, provided that
the office of Director would remain French. With these suggestions "M. Delcassé,
happy to hope that the accord is today complete between the three cabinets, con-
siders that the arrangement . . . could be signed before the end of this month."49

The proposed agreement, assuring the British of the safeguards they considered
necessary for controlling the Nile Basin and promising them a voice in the director-
ship of the Railway Company, made the railway issue look much less important.
They made some attempt to press upon the French a scheme which,
whilst preserving the substance of the arrangement between the British and
French Governments, would give the railway scheme an appearance which
v/ould satisfy the Emperor Menelek sufficiently to prevent his making an appeal
to Germany.so

To this end they suggested treating the railway in a separate agreement so that
the general policy agreement could be signed immediately. si But, when the French
would not consider this proposal, the British Government dropped the issue of
internationalisation and agreed to leave the railway in French hands. At Italy's
request, however, the British moved to eliminate all references to the 1902 Convention
from the agreement, leaving only a brief statement that the extension of the railway
as a French interest was analogous to the British and Italian interests described in
Article Four.52

Lansdowne suggested a draft stating that the three Governments would agree
to the extension of the railroad from Dire Dawa to Addis Ababa by the Railway

48. F O. 401/8, Egerton to Lansdowne, Apr. 16, 1905.

49. F.O. 401/8, Memo, communicated by Geoffray, Apr. 25, 1905.
50. F.O. 401/8, Bertie to Lansdowne, Apr. 25, 1905.
51. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Bertie, Aor. 28, 1905.
52. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Egerton, May 5, 1905.

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Company "on condition that the subjects and commerce of the three countries shall
receive absolutely equal treatment both over the railway and at the port of Jibuti";
that an Englishman, an Italian, and a representative of Menelek should be appointed
to the Board of Directors of the railway ; that the Railway Company should surrender
its Concession for a railway beyond Addis Ababa; that any railway to the west of
Addis Ababa should be under British auspices; and that the three powers would
recognize Britain's right "to build a railway from British Somaliland through
Abyssinia to the Soudan border. "53 The French accepted this proposal, 54 and on
May 23 sent a revised draft, including most of Lansdowne's suggestions, to the British
Foreign Office. 55

The draft reconciled the basic differences in policy between France and England
and left only the problem of gaining Italy's agreement. Italy now wanted the right
to construct all railways to the north and south of Addis Ababa, 56 a proposal which
the British Government refused to consider, 57 and some other ambiguously stated
modifications, which France refused to discuss.58 Italy thereupon held up the nego-
tiations, complaining that France was being difficult about Italian rights to build
railways in Ethiopia.59 Britain and France then refused to accept Italy's demand that
her communication between Eritrea and Somaliland be an "Italian zone over which
Italy would exercise sovereign rights," on grounds that such a link would only
"give needless offence to King Menelek's susceptibilities." In early January 1906
M. Barrère suggested rewording Article Four to specify that the Italian land connec-
tion should be "territorial," not "terrestre," and that there should be a subsequent
"exchange of notes stating that the paragraph in question meant that the Italian
possessions of Erythraea and Somaliland should be connected by a band of territory
between the English and French Hinterlands. "60 When the Italians continued to be
recalcitrant, Egerton told M. Tittoni clearly that "there was no time to lose, and that
there was no reason I could see for not agreeing to the text as it stood."6i

On January 29 the French Ambassador told Sir Edward Grey, now British
Foreign Minister, that the Italian Government finally seemed ready to accept the
draft treaty, "on condition that . . . [the] explanatory letters from the British and
French Government respecting Article 4" state that the promised communication
was to be a territorial Italian sphere of interest connecting Eritrea to Somaliland and
situated to the west of Addis Ababa and to the west and north of the Awash Basin.
The French accepted this pro vision, 62 and Grey cabled to Harrington: "we expect

53. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Bertie, May 5, 1905.

54. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Bertie, May 17, 1905.
55. F.O. 401/8, Draft of Treaty communicated to M. Cambon, May 23, 1905.
56. F.O. 401/8, Modifications proposed by the Italian Government to the Draft submitted by the
Government on May 23, 1905; communicated by M. Pansa on June 15, 1905.
57. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Bertie, June 27, 1905.
58. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Bertie, Aug. 2, 1905.
59. F.O. 401/8, Lansdowne to Lister, Aug. 12, 1905; and Lansdowne to Mr. DesGraz, Sept. 27, 1905.
60. F.O. 401/9, Egerton to Grey, Jan. 8, 1906.
61. F.O. 401/9, Egerton to Grey, Jan. 23, 1906.
62. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Bertie, Jan. 29, 1906.

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 [the] Agreement will now soon be signed, as we are informed that an arrangement
has been come to between [the] Italian and French Governments.'^
But the delay continued while Italy tried to obtain every possible concession
and insisted that, besides being too favourable to England, "the terms of the Agree-
ment . . . [would] offend Menelek."64 M. Cambon thereupon suggested that, as the
Italians apparently did not want to sign the Agreement, France and England "might
turn it into a dual instead of a tripartite Agreement.'^ M. Louis, the Political Direc-
tor of the French Foreign Ministry, felt that France and Great Britain should at
least sign the agreements concerning the railway immediately: Italy could then be
left out because the railway "did not directly concern her," and her attitude through-
out the negotiations had been "enigmatic."66
As a result of these suggestions Grey sent Cambon a draft projet de lettre
ready for signature as an exchange of notes and worded exactly like the. Tripartite
Agreement except for the deletion of all references to Italy or to Italian Treaties.67
Grey suggested that "we must wait at least until the end of next week before definitely
deciding to sign," because he had only just informed Tittoni of France's and Great
Britain's intention. 68 M. Tittoni, now Ambassador to London, told him that signa-
ture of an Anglo-French agreement excluding Italy might have a bad effect on
Italian public opinion, and Grey "agreed it was very preferable" to sign a three-
power agreement, but that "it was impossible for us to wait any longer." Tittoni
promised to prod Rome into taking a decision.69
On June 7,1906, the Italian Chargé d'Affaires 70 called on Grey to tell him that
the Italian Government would sign the Agreement as soon as some further modifica-
tions were made making their part of Article Four more specific as to the nature of
the connecting link and mentioning the Eritrean and Somaliland hinterlands as part
of the Italian sphere of interest in Ethiopia. The Italians claimed that, if France and
England agreed to these changes, then Italy would abandon the suggested explana-
tory letter.71

The British Government was agreeable, but now France held back. Grey wrote :
"it will be most unfortunate if the whole thing collapses now" after the British and
French manoeuvre to force Italy into action had been successful. Furthermore,
"such a fiasco could not but prejudice the willingness of Italy to co-operate in other
[negotiations], such as Mediterranean questions in the future." Grey instructed
Bertie to impress this fact upon the French Government, 72 and during his appoint-
ment with M. Bourgeois, the French Foreign Minister,

63. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Harrington, Jan. 30, 1906.

64. F.O. 401/9, Egerton to Grey, March 3, 1906.
65. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Bertie, May 21, 1906.
66. F.O. 401/9, Lister to Grey, May 21. 1906.
67. F.O. 401/9, Projet de Lettre . Mav. 1906.
68. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Bertie, Mav 23. 1906.
69. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Egerton, Mav 23, 1906.
70. Tittoni had left for Rome on Mav 23 to hold nersnnnl consultation* with hie onvprnmpnt
71. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Eeerton, June 7. 1906.
72. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Bertie, June 19, 1906.

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 His Excellency said that he would do his best to arrive at an arrangement, but
he is anxious to clear up the question of contingent land communication be-
tween the Italian possessions. It is not stated whether it is proposed to make the
intercommunication at the expense of France or of England. Difficulties might
arise hereafter between those two Powers if the Convention left that question
open. 73

Shortly thereafter M. Bourgeois told Bertie that the French Government would be
satisfied with the Italian changes if the British Government would provide a clear
statement that in the event of disintegration, "the connecting link between the
Italian possessions shall be provided out of the territory falling to England in the
Nile Basin. "74 His Majesty's Government immediately agreed that a strip of territory
for Italy would be provided west of Addis Ababa.75

On July 4, 1906, the French Ambassador, the Italian Minister, and Grey came
together to draft and initial the final form of the Tripartite Treaty. 7« The formal
signature was postponed
until King Menelek . . . [has] had an opportunity of expressing his views. . . . His
Majesty's Government are confident that the present arrangement is the best
possible under all circumstances, and . . . have no hesitation in strongly recom-
mending King Menelek to adhere to it.

Harrington was directed to tell Menilek that Britain's one overriding consideration
throughout the negotiations "has been to secure in the future the integrity and inde-
pendence of Abyssinia and to promote the material development of the country."77

Menilek was not at all pleased with the Tripartite Treaty; he felt that he should
have been consulted during the negotiations and that the Treaty detracted from his
sovereignty. He retained his copy of the Agreement but refused to signify whether or
not he would adhere to it. On August 28 Harrington was instructed to induce
Menilek to accept the Treaty "with the least possible delay."78 Harrington answered
that "the Emperor Menelek will probably reply that he sees no reason to object to
the agreement being signed by the three Powers." He doubted, "however, whether
His Majesty will become a signatory to the Agreement." Pressure applied to Menilek
has resulted only in "my own personal disadvantage in my relations with His Majes-
ty. "79 Grey replied that
so far as it concerns us, it will be sufficient for all practical purposes if the Em-
peror Menelek will say that he has no objection. That he should be an actual
party to or sign the Agreement does not appear to be necessary. so

73. F.O. 401/9, Bertie to Grev. June 21. 1906.

74. F.O. 401/9, Bertie to Grev, June 22. 1906.
75. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Bertie, June 22, 1906.
76. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Lister, July 4, 1906.
77. F.O. 401/9, Harrington to Grey, July 4, 1906.
78. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Harrington, Aus. 28, 1906.
79. F.O. 401/9, Harrington to Grey, Sent. 11. 1906.
80. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Harrington, Oct. 9, 1906.

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In fact the three powers felt that, "even if Menelek raised objections to the Conven-
tion, it would still be valid."8i

On October 11, at an audience with the representatives of the three powers

Menilek raised his objections to the Treaty, asked for explanations of various clauses,
and requested copies of the treaties mentioned in the text. The Italian representative,
M. Ciccodicola felt "that Menelek was . . . seeking to gain time."s2 Harrington
thought that it was enough that the Agreement had been communicated to Menilek
before signature, and that now the "simplest solution of the question would seem to
be for the Powers to sign. "83 The French Government thereupon suggested signing
immediately and telling Menilek that it had been necessary to do so because of
Parliamentary exigency.84

All through October and November Harrington and his colleagues continued
to press Menilek to approve the Agreements Finally, on December 10, 1906, they
received his official reply :
We have received the arrangement made by the three Powers. We thank them
for their communication, and their desire to keep and maintain the independence
of our Government. But let it be understood that this arrangement in no way
limits what we consider our sovereign rights. »6

The Tripartite Treaty, composed of a preamble and eleven articles, was officially
signed on December 13, 1906.87 The preamble stated that the common interest of
the three powers was "to maintain intact the integrity of Ethiopia," and that the
purpose of the Agreement was only to protect "their respective interests." The first
article discussed the maintenance of the status quo in Ethiopia, as defined by various
previously signed agreements. It is interesting to note the inconsistency of this
article, which first recognized the validity of the Anglo-Italian Protocols of 1891 and
1894 defining Ethiopia as an Italian protectorate and then stated
that the various Conventions mentioned in this Article do not in any way in-
fringe the sovereign rights of the Emperor of Abyssinia, and in no respect
modify the relations between the three Powers and the Ethiopian Empire as
stipulated in the present Agreement.

Article Two bound the powers to ensure that concessions granted to their nationals
would not "be injurious to the interests of the two others." In Article Three they
pledged neutrality and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Ethiopia. If, how-
ever, intervention should become necessary, it would require the agreement of all
the three powers. Article Four defined the interests of the powers in case of Ethiopia's

81. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Egerton, Oct. 10, 1906.

82. F.O. 401/9, Communication for the Marquis di San Giuliano, Oct. 12, 1906.
83. F.O. 401/9, Harrington to Grey, Oct. 12, 1906.
84. F.O. 401/9, Grev to Bertie, Oct. 15, 1906.
85. F.O. 401 /9, Memo, to M. Cambon, Oct. 25, 1906; Egerton to Grey, Oct. 30, 1906; Harrington to
Grey, Dec. 1, 1906.
86. F.O. 401/10, Statement by Menilek, Dec. 10, 1906.
87. F.O. 401/9, Grey to Clerk, Dec. 13, 1906.

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disintegration, but emphasized that the signatory powers must "make every effort
to preserve the integrity" of Ethiopia. Articles Five and Six recognized the right of a
French Company to continue the railway from Dirre Dawa to Addis Ababa on
condition that the railway practice no discrimination "in . . . matters of trade and
transit." Furthermore, Article Seven granted Great Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia
each the right to have one of their nationals on the Board of the French Company.
France was to have the same privilege on English or Italian railway companies
formed "for the construction or working of railways running from any point in
Abyssinia to any point in the adjoining English or Italian territory." In Article Eight
the French Government agreed "to abstain from all interference as regards the
Concession previously granted beyond Addis Ababa," and Article Nine put the
construction of all railways west of Addis Ababa "under the auspices of Italy."
Attached to Article Nine was a British reservation of "the right" to construct a
railway from British Somaliland through Ethiopia to the Sudanese frontier. Article
Ten stated that the representatives of the three powers would "keep each other fully
informed, and will co-operate for the protection of their respective interests," and
that any disagreements would be referred to the home governments. The final
article made it clear that except for those agreements listed in the text, "no agreement
concluded by any one of the contracting Powers concerning Ethiopia shall affect
the other signatory Powers of the present Agreement." The Agreement was signed
by Sir Edward Grey, M. Paul Cambon, and the Marquis di San Giuliano. 88

While the Tripartite Treaty was important in maintaining Ethiopia's indepen-

dence during the troubled days after 1906, it is clear that for France and England it
was only one part of their general world settlement ; it removed one more annoyance
from their entente by safeguarding what they considered to be their overriding
interests in Ethiopia. Great Britain's control of the Nile Basin was affirmed by
France, and her interest in upholding Ethiopia's integrity and sovereignty was
legalised by the major European powers involved. France had obtained the right to
continue her control over Ethiopia's economic life, and her way to end the railway
stalemate by direct negotiations with Menilek had been opened.

On the other hand Italy gained little by the Agreement except the promise of
equal treatment on the railway. She had obtained only the vaguest acknowledgment
of her claim to an Ethiopian protectorate and of her right to a connection between
Eritrea and Somaliland. That she had originally wanted this connection to run east
of Addis Ababa and through the Awash Basin cannot be doubted ; why else had she
been so anxious to exclude France from the negotiations? Her acceptance of the
Treaty's nebulous references to this cherished link and the fact that she signed an
Agreement which explicitly robbed her claims of all substance indicates the weakness

88. F.O. 401/9, Tripartite Agreement, Dec. 13, 1906; and Stephen Heald, ed., Documents on Inter-
national Affairs, 1935 (London, 1937), II, 556-560.

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of her position in Ethiopia and her desperation to gain any scrap of recognition that
the two major powers might grant. Despite her frustration with the terms of the
Agreement, however, Italy had succeeded only in slowing down the negotiations.
Ultimately she was forced to agree to everything that England and France demanded
in order to avoid losing all her interests in Ethiopia.

Although Ethiopia had not been a participant in the negotiations, she gained
considerable stability from the Agreement. It ended the active imperialism of France
and England in the Horn of Africa and eliminated for a time the possibilities for
Italian expansion. It is true that in order to safeguard the interests of the three powers
in Ethiopia, the Treaty did not admit Ethiopia's full sovereignty in international
affairs. On the other hand all three Governments did pledge themselves to the active
promotion of Ethiopia's national integrity.

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