Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Charles Marsh
Classical Rhetoric and
Modern Public Relations
Routledge Research in Public Relations
Charles Marsh
Acknowledgments xi
Notes 157
Bibliography 175
Index 189
Acknowledgments
“If all writing about the past is partly an effort to understand the pres-
ent, a confusing and contradictory present would seem to call more
insistently for historical analysis and explanation. This is particularly
true for the profession and academic discipline of public relations.”
–Ron Pearson (1992)
“[Y]ou are eager for education, and I profess to educate; you are ripe
for philosophy, and I direct students of philosophy.”
–Isocrates (To Demonicus)
As seen in Gorgias and Phaedrus, Plato (circa 428–347 bce) rejected rheto-
ric unless it was in the service of absolute truth (Phaedrus, 277b–c). Rhet-
oric, he believed, should be the exclusive province of philosophers who,
through the thoughtful give and take of dialectic, had discovered divine,
ultimate truths that predated creation (Republic, 484b). Popular rhetoric,
such as that practiced by the sophist Gorgias, was not an art at all, Plato
wrote; rather, it was a mere technique, like cookery, or, worse, just a form
6 Classical Rhetoric and Modern Public Relations
of flattery (Gorgias, 462d–463c). All too often, he maintained, rhetoric is
“some device of persuasion which will make one appear to those who do
not know to know better than those who know” (Gorgias, 459c). Plato
thus relegates the art of persuasion to those who are certain they are right,
who enter a relationship fi rmly believing that they must change others and
remain unchanged themselves.
Possessing such moral certainty, the ideal rulers of Plato’s Republic, the
philosopher-kings, could use dubious rhetorical tactics to lead lesser beings
to the light: “The rulers then of the city may, if anybody, fitly lie on account
of enemies or citizens for the benefit of the state. . . . It seems likely that
our rulers will have to make considerable use of falsehood and deception
for the benefit of their subjects” (Republic, 389b, 459c). Such deception, of
course, remained the exclusive privilege of the philosopher-king: “If then
the ruler catches anybody else in the city lying . . . he will chastise him for
introducing a practice as subversive and destructive of a state as it is of a
ship” (Republic, 389d).
Plato’s insistence on unshakable knowledge of absolute truth as a pre-
requisite to rhetoric is, in the words of Jaeger (1944), “repulsive to ordinary
common sense” (p. 57). Even if such perfection in truth seeking were possi-
ble, the breathtaking asymmetry of Platonic rhetoric has prompted ringing
condemnations. Platonic rhetoric, writes Kennedy (1994), is “responsible
for much of the dogmatism, intolerance, and ideological oppression that
has characterized Western history” (p. 41). Jaeger (1944) calls Platonic
rhetoric “uncompromising” (p. 70). Black (1994) notes that it deviates into
“social control” (p. 98). Kauff man (1994) fi nds Platonic rhetoric “totalitar-
ian and repressive” (p. 101). In brief, Platonic rhetoric—based on absolute
certainty, exclusivity, and the condoning of deception—hardly seems a pro-
ductive model for modern public relations.
In defi ning rhetoric as the art of fi nding all the available means of per-
suasion, Aristotle must recommend selecting, compiling, and arrang-
ing arguments to gain maximum persuasive advantage. Such strategies
to gain the prize need to hide the weakness of one’s own position. They
need to divert an audience’s attention away from the strength of an
opponent’s argument. . . . And fi nally they need to put the audience in
a receptive form of mind that will lull their “natural reason.” (p. 96)
The purpose of this book is to address the idea of this heading: the rhetoric
of Isocrates. Ideally, the book will present much of Isocratean rhetoric as
8 Classical Rhetoric and Modern Public Relations
a—not the—normative model for modern public relations. For the moment,
however, I offer this overview: For Isocrates, rhetoric was the discourse of
responsible citizenship and was built upon the core values of justice (dikaio-
syne) and moderation (sophrosyne).13 Far from focusing on the discovery
and delivery, in any given case, of the available means of persuasion (as
Aristotle would have it) or the promulgation of absolute truth, even, ironi-
cally, through deception (as Plato would have it), Isocrates envisioned rhet-
oric as a community-building discipline in a world that didn’t always offer
Platonic certainty:
[S]ince we have the ability to persuade one another and to make clear to
ourselves what we want, not only do we avoid living like animals, but we
have come together, built cities, made laws, and invented arts (techne).
Speech (logos) is responsible for nearly all our inventions. It legislated in
matters of justice and injustice, and beauty and baseness, and without
these laws, we could not live with one another. . . . With speech we
fight over contentious matters, and we investigate the unknown. We use
the same arguments by which we persuade others in our own delibera-
tions. . . . If one must summarize the power of discourse, we will discover
that nothing done prudently occurs without speech (logos), that speech is
the leader of all thoughts and actions. . . . (Nicocles, 6–9)14
The Schools
Following the lead of Cicero, who in Brutus pronounced, “[Isocrates’]
house stood open to all Greece as the school of eloquence” (8), historians
have given the laurels in this category to Isocrates. Of the three schools,
Clark (1957) writes:
Isocrates and Modern Public Relations 9
In Greece of the fourth century bc there was a three-cornered quarrel
among the leading teachers concerning what it takes to make a success-
ful speaker. From this quarrel Isocrates (436–338 bc) came out trium-
phant. . . . For forty years Isocrates was the most influential teacher in
Athens. (pp. 5, 58)
[T]here is no doubt that Isocrates has one claim to fame at least, and
that is as the supreme master of oratorical culture. . . . On the whole,
it was Isocrates, not Plato, who educated fourth-century Greece and
subsequently the Hellenistic and Roman worlds. (p. 79)
Significantly, Beck (1964, p. 300) and Gwynn (1966) believe that the suc-
cess of Isocratean education and rhetoric ultimately persuaded Plato to alter
both his philosophy of rhetoric and of an ideal, ultimate truth–seeking cur-
riculum. Gwynn writes:
In the Laws, his last attempt to win Athenian opinion for his social and
political theories, Plato outlines a programme of educational studies
very different from the earlier programme of the Republic. Metaphys-
ics are no longer mentioned; and the study of mathematics is reduced
to that elementary acquaintance with abstract reasoning which even
Isocrates would have considered desirable. This is a direct concession
to public opinion, made by the most haughtily aristocratic of all Athe-
nian philosophers: a concession, too, which must have been largely due
to the success of the Isocratean programme. (pp. 50–51)15
Thus, in the words of Grube (1965), “it was [Isocrates’] kind of education which
triumphed over all others and dominated the Graeco-Roman world” (p. 38).
The Graduates
Once again, the most dramatic assessment of the three teachers’ students
comes from Cicero: “Then behold Isocrates arose, from whose school,
as from the Trojan horse, none but real heroes proceeded” (De Oratore,
2:22).16 Cicero’s contemporary, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, concurred:
10 Classical Rhetoric and Modern Public Relations
“[Isocrates] became . . . the teacher of the most eminent men at Athens
and in Greece at large, both the best forensic orators, and those who dis-
tinguished themselves in politics and public life” (Isocrates, 1). And in his
Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian writes, “The pupils of Isocrates were emi-
nent in every branch of study” (3.1.14), adding that “it is to the school of
Isocrates that we owe the greatest orators” (12.10.22).
Among more recent critics, Jaeger (1944) surmises that Isocrates’ gradu-
ates must have symbolized the teacher’s quality even to those unfamiliar
with his discourses:
[F]or the Athenians, especially those who did not know his speeches, the
long line of statesmen and great public figures who had gone through
Isocrates’ school must have meant more than the written word. For
they were a living witness to the force which had flowed from his teach-
ing all through the life of his native city. (p. 137)
Jebb (1876) echoes Cicero’s praise of Isocrates’ students and adds an anec-
dote about an oratorical competition of the fourth-century bce:
In the year 351 Mausolos, dynast of Karia, died; and his widow Arte-
mesia proposed in honour of his memory a contest of panegyrical
eloquence which brought a throng of brilliant rhetoricians to Halikar-
nassos. No competitor (it is said) presented himself who had not been a
pupil of Isokrates; and it was certainly a pupil of Isokrates—Theopom-
pos the historian—who gained the prize. (p. 11)
Although Aristotle had not yet opened his school at the time of this compe-
tition, he certainly was teaching rhetoric in Plato’s Academy.
In specific comparisons between the abilities of his students and those of
Plato and Aristotle, Isocrates again prevails. Jaeger (1944) says that there
“was no near rival” to the quality of Isocrates’ students; of Plato’s students,
Jaeger adds, “[M]ost of them were characterized by their inability to do
any real service to [the state] and exert any real influence upon it” (p. 137).
Of Aristotle’s students, Hunt (1990) writes that Aristotle’s school “seems
to have been productive of little eloquence” (p. 132). Jebb (1876) adds that
“the school of Aristotle—in which Rhetoric was both scientifically and
assiduously taught—produced not a single orator of note except Demetrios
Phalereus; the school of Isokrates produced a host” (p. 431).17 In short,
most scholars, past and present, agree with Freeman (1907): “The pupils of
Isokrates became the most eminent politicians and the most eminent prose-
writers of the time” (p. 186).18
[I]t is to Isocrates more than to any other person that the honour and
responsibility belong of having inspired in our Western traditional
12 Classical Rhetoric and Modern Public Relations
education a predominantly literary tone. . . . On the level of history
Plato has been defeated: posterity had not accepted his educational ide-
als. The victor, generally speaking, was Isocrates. (pp. 79–80, 194)
Like Marrou, Hunt (1990) has mixed feelings regarding the triumph of prac-
ticality over speculative philosophy, but he too accords the victory to Iso-
crates: “[W]hether for good or ill, the conception of the aims and purposes of
the American liberal college, as set forth by the most distinguished modern
educators, is much closer to Isocrates and Protagoras than to Plato” (p. 135).
Corbett (1989), however, is not quite so guarded in his praise: “[Isocrates]
might very well be canonized as the patron saint of all those, then and now,
who espouse the merits of a liberal education” (p. 276). More recently, Muir
(2005) has declared, “Generations of classical scholars and historians of edu-
cational thought have argued that Isocrates’ educational ideas were—and
still are—more influential in the history of educational thought and practice
than those of any other classical thinker . . .” (pp. 167–168).20
When we compare the merits of the rhetorics of Plato, Aristotle, and Iso-
crates using the four touchstones of school influence, quality of graduates,
influence on Roman rhetoricians, and impact on history, we must conclude
that the rhetoric of Isocrates was surely the most successful, powerful, and
influential rhetoric of classical Greece and beyond, both spatially and tem-
porally. The purpose of this book, again, is to explore Isocratean rhetoric,
the values-driven discourse of responsible citizenship, to see if it might offer
productive guidance to modern public relations.
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
Chapter 8
Chapter 9
Chapter 10