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Clarence Tiu Crim 1
Clarence Tiu Crim 1
BOOK I
IT BEGINS WITH FAITH & CONVICTION, PERSEVERES WITH HARD WORK & DISCIPLINE, AND
ENDS WITH AN IMPASSIONED TRIUMPH WITHIN, WHEN WE REALIZE THAT WE CAN DO ANYTHING
[SEE EPH. 3:20]
#EMBRACETHEGRIND
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CRIMES IN GENERAL 9
II. FELONIES 11
HOW FELONIES ARE COMMITTED 11
ACTS WHICH SHOULD BE REPRESSED BUT ARE NOT PUNISHED BY LAW; EXCESSIVE PENALTIES 23
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES 37
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES 42
ABSOLUTORY CIRCUMSTANCES 50
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 54
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 65
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES 88
PRINCIPALS 95
ACCOMPLICES 97
ACCESSORIES 98
FENCING 102
GRADUATION OF PENALTIES BASED ON THE STAGE OF EXECUTION AND CRIMINAL PARTICIPATION 132
Article 1. Time when Act takes effect. - This Code shall take effect on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and
thirty-two.
Article 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary.
1. Defines crimes
‣ Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those
that define crimes, treats of their nature and provide for their punishment. (Lacson v. Exec. Secretary 1999)
‣ The RPC is the general governing penal law, it took effect on January 1, 1932 (Art. 1), but it is supplementary to
special penal laws enacted thereafter. (Art. 10)
‣ These are special laws which amend or provide for application to the RPC and thus, are not considered true special
penal laws.
a. RA 6127 (1979) — An Act Amending Article Twenty-Nine Of The Revised Penal Code To Give Full Time Credit
Under Certain Conditions To Offenders Who Have Undergone Preventive Imprisonment (Detention Prisoners) In
The Service Of Their Sentences.
b. RA 7659 (1993) — An Act To Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose
The Revised Penal Laws, As Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, And For Other Purposes
c. RA 9346 (2006) — An Act Prohibiting The Imposition Of Death Penalty In The Philippines
d. RA 10592 (2013) — An Act Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 And 99 Of Act No. 3815, As Amended, Otherwise
Known As The Revised Penal Code
‣ These are penal laws (other than the RPC) which define crimes and provides for its punishment
‣ But note that Special Penal Laws may also contain provisions which amend or have application to the RPC
‣ Special laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished following the rule that special legal
provisions prevail over general ones. Lex specialis derogant generali.
‣ Example — the circumstances affecting criminal liability do not apply to crimes punished under special laws
‣ NOTE — Special laws sometimes use the nomenclature of penalties in the RPC, indicating the intent of Congress to
make the RPC apply suppletorily to such special laws.
‣ The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign
power instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of
the community, the individual and social rights and liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of this rights.
Section 18.
(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted.
Section 19.
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
a. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes
such an act
d. Alters the legal rules of evidence so as to make ti substantially easier to convict a defendant
e. Alters, in relation to the offense or its consequences, the situation of the person, to his disadvantage
f. Assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful
g. Deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal or a proclamation of amnesty
‣ Bill of attainder — is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative act for a judicial determination of guilt. (People vs Ferrer)
‣ Example — Congress passes a law which authorizes the arrest and imprisonment of communists without trial
2. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS MUST BE SATISFIED
‣ No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution)
‣ No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law (Art. 3, Sec. 14[1], 1987
Constitution)
3. PENAL LAWS MUST HAVE GENERAL AND EQUAL APPLICATION
‣ Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution)
‣ This goes into the generality of penal laws which means that it applies to everyone equally and similarly situated.
‣ See Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines (R.A. No 9346)
‣ Thus, whenever a situation obtains where two interpretations are possible, one exculpatory and the other inculpatory,
the former shall prevail, consistent with the rule on presumption of innocence
2. In case of conflict between the spanish text and the english version of the RPC, the spanish text is controlling
‣ This is because the RPC was originally approved and enacted in Spanish
a. Case is pending — it shall be dismissed regardless of whether the accused is a habitual delinquent or not because
there is no more crime for which he should be tried.
‣ EXCEPT —
a. No retroactive effect (the first law will govern) — if the accused is a habitual delinquent or if the favourable second law
prohibits retroactivity.
b. There is retroactive effect (the second law will govern) — if favourable to the offender who is not a habitual delinquent
and the law is silent as to its retroactivity.
Article 2. Application of its provisions. - Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the
provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior
waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by
the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities
mentioned in the presiding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of
this Code.
Article 21. Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to
its commission.
Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
CIVIL CODE
Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a)
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3)
1. GENERALITY (ART. 14 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE)
‣ Penal laws are binding on all persons who reside or sojourn in the Philippines whether citizens or not.
‣ As distinguished from the territoriality principle, generality refers to the persons covered, whereas the former deals
with the situs of the act or the place where the penal law is applicable
‣ EXCEPTIONS — Under the following cases, a person may be exempt from liability:
‣ Example — Republic Act No. 75. This law prohibits the issuance of any warrant of arrest against any
ambassador or public minister of any foreign state, authorized and received as such by the President, including
their domestics or domestic servants registered in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
‣ Note that not all foreign officials are entitled to immunity. The main yardstick in ascertaining whether he is a
diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of a diplomatic
nature.
‣ Example — The immunities granted to diplomatic officials and visiting heads of states, provided the latter do
not travel incognito.
‣ However, a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is
subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. He is not exempt from criminal
prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides.
c. Treaty stipulations
‣ Example — The Military Bases Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America in 1947. Under this agreement, the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over felonies committed
within the Philippines: (1) when the offense is committed within a military base, unless both the offender and the
offended are Filipino civilians or the offense is against the security of the Philippines; (2) when the offense is
committed outside of the bases, but both the offender and the offended are U.S. military personnel; and (3)
when the offense is committed by a member of the U.S. armed forces against the security of the United States.
2. TERRITORIALITY (ART. 2)
‣ The law is applicable to all crimes committed within the limits of the Philippine Territory
‣ This includes the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone (Intra-
territorial application)
‣ EXCEPTION — It is also enforceable outside the Philippine jurisdiction (Extra-territorial application), against
those who:
b. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued
by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
c. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities
mentioned in the presiding number;
d. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
e. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two
of this Code.
‣ Outside these five exceptions, Philippine courts cannot take jurisdiction over a crime committed outside the country.
‣ Note that when it comes to foreign merchant vessels within Philippine Territory (not war vessels over which the
Philippines always has jurisdiction), there are two recognized rules on jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard such
vessels. The Philippines adheres to the English Rule, which is strictly territorial.
a. French Rule —the flag country has jurisdiction over crimes committed within the vessel, except if the crime
disturbs the peace and order of the host country, in which case, the latter has jurisdiction
b. English Rule — the host country has jurisdiction over all crimes committed on the vessel unless they involve mere
internal management of the vessel
‣ Public officers and employees as exceptions to the general rule on territoriality pertains to crimes related to the
exercise of their office. Within such intimatete relation between the office and the crime committed, the officers are
acting it their private capacity, hence, bound by the law of the host country.
3. PROSPECTIVITY (ART. 21 AND 22, ART. 3, SEC. 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND ART. 4 OF THE CIVIL CODE)
‣ Laws have prospective application unless they are favourable to the offender who is not a habitual delinquent.
Article 21. Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.
Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time
of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
‣ NOTE: Justice Regalado adds a fourth characteristic — “legality”. If the law is unconstitutional, it is ineffective.
CRIMES IN GENERAL
DEFINITION OF CRIMES
‣ A crime is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law forbidding or commanding it.
‣ Generally these crimes are felonies punished under the RPC. There are however crimes which although punished
under special laws are deemed mala in se.
‣ These would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them.
‣ In this case, the only question asked is, has the law been violated?
CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMES
2. Mala prohibita
Commission (Art. 3)
2. Culpa or those committed by without malice and by means of fault
Execution (Art. 6)
2. Frustrated
3. Consummated
3. Light felonies
As to the 1. Simple
Application of
2. Compound
Special Penalties
3. Complex
4. Composite
5. Special Complex
6. Continued
7. Continuing
II. FELONIES
Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
DEFINTION OF “FELONIES”
‣ Felonies are acts and omissions punishable by the Revised Penal Code
‣ Elements —
3. Such act is performed or omission incurred by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa)
‣ An act is any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world, it being unnecessary that the
same be actually produced, as the possibility of its production is sufficient.
‣ There must be an external act which has a direct connection with the felony intended to be committed.
‣ A mere criminal thought or intention, no matter how immoral or improper it may be, will never constitute a
felony.
‣ Voluntariness means that the person must have the freedom of doing the act or omitting to do an act.
‣ Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime where there is no law punishing it.
‣ Note that “punished by law” in Art. 3 should be understood to mean “punished by the RPC” and not be special
penal laws.
‣ Felonies are those punished by the RPC, as distinguished from “crimes” or “offenses” which are punished by
special penal laws
‣ For omission, the RPC must require the doing or performance of an act.
‣ Thus, if there is no law that punishes a person who does not report to the authorities the commission of a crime
which he witnessed, the omission to do so is not a felony.
‣ Anyone who fails to render assistance to any person whom he finds in an uninhabited place wounded or in
danger of dying, is liable for abandonment of persons in danger (Art. 275, par. 1)
‣ An officer entrusted with collection of taxes who voluntarily fails to issue a receipt as provided by law, is guilt of
illegal exaction (Art. 213, par. 2[b])
‣ Every person owing allegiance to the Philippines, without being a foreigner, and having knowledge of any
conspiracy against the government, who does not disclose and make known the same to the proper authority,
is liable for misprision of treason (Art. 116)
a. Intentional Felonies—With malice and deliberate criminal intent, it is the intentional doing of a wrong
‣ Means that the act or omission of the offender is malicious.
‣ Deliberate intent here means intentional doing of a wrong or criminal intent. Distinguish this with intentional
in the sense that the person intended to do an act.
‣ The offender, on performing the act or incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another.
‣ Note that “deceit” in Art. 3 is not the proper translation of “dolo”. Dolus is equivalent to “malice” which is the
intent to do an injury to another’s person, property, or rights.
b. Culpable Felonies — Without malice and deliberate criminal intent, it is by mere fault, or by imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
‣ The injury caused by the offender to another is unintentional and merely through fault.
‣ While the injury is unintentional, the act or omission itself was intentional and voluntary.
‣ There is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
‣ Most felonies are intentional. Only few are committed by means of fault.
‣ Example —Malversation through negligence (Art. 217). Evasion through negligence (Art. 224). Acts by
imprudence or negligence, which, had they been intentional, would constitute grave, less grave or light
felonies (Art. 365).
‣ Thus, a person who caused an injury but without intention to cause an evil, may be liable for culpable felony.
A defendant who was not a medical practitioner who performed medical assistance upon a girl in good faith
and to the best of his ability, may be liable for physical injuries through imprudence (U.S. vs Divino)
‣ Thus, a hunter who discharges his gun at his companion with the intent to kill him is guilty of homicide. And the hunter,
who discharged his gun at this companion, thinking it was a deer, is merely guilty of homicide thorugh reckless
imprudence (a culpable felony). Notice that in both instances, the act was intentional and voluntary. But in the first
case, there was a deliberate intent to cause the injury and wrong. In the second case, the hunter failed to take all the
necessary precaution and diligence to prevent the injury.
‣ Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an
act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. (US vs Apostol)
‣ Where the facts proven are accompanied by other facts which show that the act complained of was not unlawful, the
presumption of criminal intent does not arise.
‣ Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act
‣ Every criminal act is presumed to be voluntary and the offender must prove that it is not
‣ One must prove that his case falls under the Exempting Circumstances in Art. 12, to show that his act or omission
is not voluntary
‣ Thus, a person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force is exempt from criminal liability. (Art. 12,
par. 5)
a. The RPC continues to be based on the Classical Theory, according to which the basis of criminal liability is
human free will
b. Acts or omissions punishable by law are always deemed voluntary, since man is a rational being.
c. In felonies by dolo, the act is performed with deliberate intent which must necessarily be voluntary; and in
felonies by culpa, the imprudence or negligence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do
an act from which material injury results
‣ When a person acts without freedom, he is no longer a human being but a tool; his liability as much as that of the
knife that wounds, or of the torch that sets fire.
‣ Example: A person who suddenly got up in his sleep and was sleep walking, left the room with a bolo and upon
meeting his wife who tried to stop him, wounded her, is not criminally liable because his acts were not voluntarily
done. He was acting in a dream. Therefore there is no criminal intent.
2. INTELLIGENCE
‣ The offender must have the intelligence while doing the act or omitting to do the act.
‣ Without intelligence, necessary to determine the morality of human acts, no crime can exist.
‣ Thus, an imbecile or the insane and the infant under 15 years of age, as well as the minor over 15 but less than 18
who acted without discernment have no criminal liability, because they acted without intelligence (Art. 12, par. 1, 2,
and 3)
3. INTENT
‣ The offender must deliberately intend to cause the injury or wrong while doing the act or omitting to do the act.
‣ This is a mental process and is presumed as so. The presumption arises from the proof of the commission of the
unlawful act, and in the absence of a satisfactory and reasonable explanation.
‣ Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a person.
‣ Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. The act of a person does not make him a criminal, unless his mind be
criminal.
‣ A crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained is innocent.
‣ There are classes of specific intent for specific felonies which are NOT presumed, and proof of such particular
and specific intent is required.
‣ Such as intent to gain (for theft and robbery), intent to kill (for homicide), intent to kidnap (in illegal detention)
‣ NOTE — In culpable felonies, the act or omission must also be voluntariness, freedom and intelligence on the part of the
offender, but the element of criminal intent is replaced with the requisite of “imprudence, negligence, lack of skill or
foresight”
2. Intelligence
2. Intelligence
NOTE — Felonies in general have all the foregoing elements, whereas each specific felonies have their own elements. The
elements under Art. 3 appertain to the offender, while the elements of specific felonies relate to the acts constituting the
felony.
c. Illegal exactions
‣ What is the difference between “intent to commit the crime” and “intent to commit the act”?
2. Intent to commit the act — it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously
‣ A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime (the injury or wrong); but he did intent to commit
an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. (US vs Go Chico)
‣ When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient
that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law. The act alone, irrespective of criminal
intent, constitutes the offense. Thus, good faith and the absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses in crimes
punished by special laws.
‣ RATIONALE — when a doing of an act is prohibited by a special law, it is considered that the act is injurious to
public welfare and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.
‣ Example — If a person carries his revolver into a polling precinct which is contrary to special penal election laws, it
is immaterial that such person did not intent to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way. The
mere fact that he committee that prohibited act of bringing a firearm inside the polling precinct wilfully, freely, and
consciously means that he had intent to perpetrate the act. (People vs Bayona)
‣ If a special penal law uses the nomenclatures of penalties in the RPC, what is the effect on the nature of
the crime covered by the special law?
‣ NO effect. The fact alone that a special law uses the terms of penalties in the RPC will not make the act or
omission malum in se. The law may only intent to make the RPC apply suppletorily thereto.
‣ Are crimes punished by special penal laws always considered mala prohibita?
‣ NO When the acts or omission are inherently immoral, they are mala in se, even if punished under special law.
Thus, in a case of a penal provision in the election law, penalizing the omission or failure to include a voter’s
name in the registry of list of voters is not only wrong because it is prohibited, it is wrong because it
disenfranchises a voted and violates one of his fundamental rights. Hence, for such act to be punishable, there
must be malice or criminal intent. (People vs Sunico)
‣ NOTE — Laws that merely amend provisions of the RPC, do not convert their violations into mala prohibita.
2. CULPABLE FELONIES
‣ Negligence and imprudence are both—
‣ Criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense under Art. 365, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. Quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. Thus, the
technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to
person or property. (Ivler vs Modesto-San Pedro 2010)
As to the basis of The basis of criminal liability is the offender’s moral The basis of criminal liability is the offender’s voluntariness,
Criminal Liability trait, hence good faith or lack of criminal intent is a hence, good faith or lack of criminal intent is not accepted as
defense. Intent governs a defense, unless this is an element of the crime. The only
inquiry is whether the law has been violated.
As to the Modifying circumstances are taken into account in Modifying circumstances are not considered because the
Materiality of imposing the penalty on the offender precisely law intends to discourage the commission of the act
Modifying because his moral treat is the basis of this crime
specially prohibited. Moreover, the act prohibited is not
Circumstances inherently evil but made evil only by the prohibition of the
(Thus, if the offender is reverse, Art. 14 on aggravating
statute, hence, does not involve perversity or lack of it by the
circumstances shall apply, whereas, if the offender
offender which is the basis for the aggravation or mitigation
shows remorse of the like, his penalty shall be
of the penalty
mitigated pursuant to Art. 13)
As to the Degree The degree of participation determines the penalty The degree of participation of the offenders does not affect
of Participation imposable so that it is computed on the basis of their liability, hence, the penalty on all of them are the same
whether he is a principal offender, or merely an whether they are principals or merely accomplices or
accomplice or accessory accessories.
As to the Stages The stage of accomplishment affects the penalty The stage of accomplishment considered is only when the
of Criminal imposed thus the penalty depends on whether the crime is accomplished or consummated. There is no
Liability crime is consummated, frustrated, or attempted attempted or frustrated stage because it is the commission
of the act itself that is prohibited and also since intent which
is inherent in attempted/frustrated stage is not an element.
Thus, just like culpa, mala prohibita is always consummated
As to the Generally, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude Generally, crimes mala prohibita do not involve moral
Involvement of turpitude
Moral Turpitude
As to the Source Generally crimes mala in se are punishable under the Generally, crimes mala prohibita cover violations of special
of Law RPC penal laws
‣ Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definitive result. Intent is the purpose to use a particular
means to effect such result
‣ Basically motive is the reason why you committed a crime, while criminal intent is the state of mind of the offender
while the crime is committed.
‣ Motive is NOT an essential element of a crime, hence, need not be proved for purposes of conviction (People vs
Aposaga 1981)
‣ EXCEPT — MOTIVE MAY BE RELEVANT FOR EVIDENTIARY PURPOSES, WHEN —
1. There is doubt as to the identity of the accused. It is immaterial when the accused has been positively identified
(People vs Gandiana 1991)
2. If the evidence is merely circumstantial, proof of motive is essential (People vs Oquino 1983)
3. The act brings about variant crimes (People vs Puno 1993)
4. The evidence of guilt of the accused is purely circumstantial
5. Lack of motive may be an aid in showing the innocence of the accused (People vs Taneo; People vs Padirayon
1975)
‣ NOTE — Motive alone is not sufficient to support a conviction. Even a strong motive to commit the crime cannot take
the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt, sufficient to overthrow the presumption of innocence. (People vs Pisalvo
1981)
‣ But it may be punishable by special penal laws, which case it is not called a “felony”
3. Error in personae (Mistake in Identity) — May or may not lower criminal liability depending on whether the actual crime
committed and the intended crime are of equal or different gravity (Art. 49)
4. Praeter Intentionem (No intent to cause so grave a wrong as that committed) — Lowers criminal liability as a
mitigating circumstance under Art. 13
5. Proximate Cause (The cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused) — Gives rise to criminal liability by analogy
to Art. 4, par. 1
‣ Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the person who caused injury to another. He is not,
however, criminally liable, because he did not act with criminal intent.
‣ While ignorance of the law (or mistake of law) excuses no one from compliance therewith (Ignorantia legit non
excusat), ignorance or mistake of fact relieves the accused from criminal liability (ignorantia facti excusat)
‣ Note however that the person may still be held liable for a culpable felony.
‣ Requisites of Mistake of Fact as a Defense —
1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be
2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful
3. That the mistake must be without fault (imprudence or negligence) on the part of the accused
‣ Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. Mckinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked
himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone
trying to open the door. He called out twice, “who is there?”, but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was
a robbery he leaped from his bed and called out again “if you enter this room, I will kill you”. But at that precise
moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed against the door, and believing that he was attacked, he
seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roomate. Ah Chong
was acquitted because of mistake of fact.
a. Offender
b. Intended victim
c. Actual victim
‣ Consequently, the act may result in a complex crime (Art. 48) or in two or more separate felonies, but there is only one
intent that characterized the crimes.
‣ See — Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
‣ Example — Andy intends to shoot and kill Marc, but because he is a poor marksman, he mistakenly shot Rose, Marc’s
lover instead. OR Andy may intend to shoot only Marc but with one shot he shot both Marc and Rose, killing the lovers
with one blow.
3. ERROR IN PERSONAE (MISTAKE IN IDENTITY)
‣ In error in personae or mistake in the identity, the offender committed a mistake in ascertaining the identity of the
victim
‣ The only two persons present here: the offended and the actual but unintended victim.
‣ Example — Andy intends to shoot and kill Marc, but because of his stupidity and impulsiveness, he shot and killed a
person whom he thought was Marc, but was really Kevin, his father. Thus the intended crime was homicide but turned
out to be parricide.
‣ The fact that the victims were different from the one the offender intended cannot save him from conviction. Mistake in
the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on is intended victim. The main
reason is that the accused had acted with such a disregard for the life of victims without checking carefully the latter’s
identity as to place himself on the same legal plain as the one who kills another wilfully. It is not a mitigating
circumstance (People vs Pinto 1991)
‣ Rules on criminal liability (See Art. 49) —
1. If the actual crime and intended crime are punished with the same penalty — no effect. Penalty of the crime
committed is imposed, regardless of whether it was intended for another victim
‣ Such as if the crime committed and the crime intended to be committed are of the same severity or
classification (such as if both are homcide).
2. If the actual crime and intended crime are punished with the different penalties — the lower penalty will be
imposed BUT in its maximum period
‣ In this case, the crimes are different (such as if intended crime is homicide but the actual crime is parricide, or
vice-versa), Art. 49 shall govern, in which case, error in personae becomes mitigating.
‣ Mistake of fact refers to the situation itself, not the identity of the persons involved.
‣ In mistake in identity, two persons are present, the offender and the actual victim. In mistake in blow, three persons
are involved, the offender, the actual victim, and the intended victim.
‣ Mistake in identity may or may not be mitigating, but mistake in blow generally aggravates the liability for a
complex crime or two separate felonies may be committed because there could be two victims
‣ There is a great disparity between the intended felony and the actual felony committed.
‣ This is a mitigating circumstance (Art. 13,[3]). But if the means used to commit the desired crime would also logically
and naturally bring about the actual felony committed, praeter intentionem will not be appreciated.
‣ Note that praeter intentionem is NOT available in violations of the hazing law as expressly provided therein.
5. PROXIMATE CAUSE (THE CAUSE OF THE CAUSE IS THE CAUSE OF THE EVIL CAUSED)
‣ Proximate cause is that cause which, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. That acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary and prudent and intelligence person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
(Mckee vs IAC)
‣ Simply stated, the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Mistake of Fact No criminal intent No criminal liability While Jon Snow was guarding the gates of
Castle Black at night, a person malevolently
entered the gates. Jon, thinking it was an
intruder, called the person to stop, the person
did not and was even brandishing his weapon at
Jon. Terrified, Jon shot him with an arrow, killing
him. It turns out it was merely his brother
Samwell playing a prank on him. Jon is not
criminally liable because of mistake of fact
Aberratio Ictus Intended result falls on Increases criminal liability Tyrion was angry at her sister Cersei and shot
another person or may be in which generally result to her with a bow and arrow, it missed and hit his
(Mistake in
addition to the injury on the complex crime (Art. 48) father Tywin, instead, killing him.
Blow)
intended victim
Error in Intended result falls on Mitigates criminal liability if Arya, the assasin, was in King’s Landing
Personae another due to the error in the resulting crime is greater crossing names of her list. One night, she was a
the identity of the victim than intended (such as silhouette of a woman at the queen’s chambers.
(Mistake in
parricide when what was She striked. She was targeting the queen,
Identity)
intended was merely Cersei, but instead she found out that she killed
homicide) (Art. 49)
her mother, Catelyn instead.
Prater Actual crime is greater than Mitigates criminal liability When Joffrey called Tyrion an “imp”, Tyrion got
Intentionem that intended (Art. 13) mad and choked Joffrey. His intent was merely
to hurt him and make him unconscious,
(No intent to
however, Joffrey died. Tyrion is criminally liable
cause a wrong
for homicide, although this was different from
as that
that felony which he intended to do.
committed)
Proximate Results in crime although not Results in criminal liability to Tyrion spilled wine in a corridor at the Red Keep
Cause intended the actor whether acting with where people pass all the time. He neglected to
intent or through negligence clean the wine and it was in a position where
people would hardly notice it. King Joffrey
passed by and slipped on the wine and fell,
hitting his head on the pavement, he died.
Tyrion is liable for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide.
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought
are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the
same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of
impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the
result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender,
shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.
1. By any person committing a felony (although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended)
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. (Impossible
Crime)
‣ Ordinarily, when a person who commits a felony with malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act; but
there are cases where the consequences of his felonious act are not intended by him.
‣ In view of Art. 4, par. 1, a person committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious
act are not intended by him.
‣ RATIONALE — “he who is the cause of the cause, is the cause of the evil caused”.
‣ Example — When Joffrey called Tyrion an “imp”, Tyrion got mad and choked Joffrey. His intent was merely to hurt him
and make him unconscious, however, Joffrey died. Tyrion is criminally liable for homicide, although this was different
from that felony which he intended to do.
‣ The act or omission must be punishable by the RPC, as felonies are so.
‣ When a person has not committed a felony, he is not liable for the result which is not intended.
‣ Examples —
‣ Ramsay raped Sansa, however, while doing so, he accidentally hit her head on the bedside table, causing her
death. Ramsay is liable for rape and homicide, despite the fact the death was by accident. This is because when
she hit her head, Ramsay was committing an act which constitutes a felony, and thus, he is responsible for all the
consequences of such act, regardless of his intention.
‣ King Joffrey has a beautiful crossbow which Queen Margeary wanted to see. She took it from Joffrey’s hands
without permission and in the process, she accidentally let the arrow loose, hitting Joffrey and killing him. Margeary
is not liable for Joffrey’s death as her act of snatching the property of another just to satisfy her curiosity is not a
felony punished by the RPC.
‣ Lord Ned Stark was defending himself against the troops of Ser Jaime Lannister, the kingslayer, however, while he
was doing so, he accidentally struck and killed Jory, his friend and a bystander, with his sword. Ned is not liable for
his death as in acting in self-defense is not a felony.
‣ Is Art. 4, par. 1 limited to intentional felonies and doesn’t apply to culpable felonies?
‣ This should be interpreted to mean only those “intentional felonies” or those committed with malice or criminal
intent. This is because Art. 4, par. 1 speaks of a wrongful act done “different from that which he intended”.
Thus, the element of intent should be present.
‣ If the wrongful act results from the imprudence, negligence, lack of skill, or lack of foresight of the ofender, his
liability should be determined under Art. 365, which defines and penalizes criminal negligence
‣ BOADO — it applies to BOTH intentional and culpable felonies, as Art. 4 does not distinguish and uses the word
“felony” which encompasses both kinds
‣ Example — King Tommen, aghast and aggrieved at her mother’s despicable acts of bombing the Sept of
Baylor, jumped out of the window of the Red Keep. Instead of hitting the pavement, she accidentally hit and
killed her mother, Cersei instead, who happened to be passing by the minute the King jumped. The King
somehow survived. He is not liable for Cersei’s death as jumping out the window or suicide is not a felony,
however, he can be liable for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide, if he had reason to believe that the
place he would land was a place where people often passed by. By jumping onto a place where people often
passed, Tommen did not observe due care in committing suicide. He is liable although the act done was
different with that which he intended. Hence, he is liable by virtue of Art. 3, in relation to Art. 4, par. 1 and Art.
365 (on criminal negligence)
2. THAT THE WRONG DONE TO THE VICTIM BE THE DIRECT, NATURAL, AND LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE FELONY COMMITTED
BY THE OFFENDER, ALTHOUGH IT WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH HE INTENDED
‣ The causes which may produce a result different from that which the offender intended are —
c. Praeter intentionem — The act exceeds the intent, that is the injurious result is greater than that intended
‣ The wrong done must be the direct, natural and probable consequence (proximate cause) of the felonious act.
‣ The felonious act must be the proximate and efficient cause of the injury, without any efficient intervening cause; or
it accelerated death (in case the victim was already suffering some disease)
‣ There must be a relation of “cause and effect”, the cause being the felonious act of the offended, the effect being
the resultant injuries and/or the death of the victim.
‣ If the consequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the criminal act, the
offender is not responsible for such consequences.
‣ The felony committed is NOT the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
a. Efficient Intervening Cause— An active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting
injury, and the active face is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act. It is a force sufficient to
break the cause and effect.
‣ What if after the offender stabbed the victim on a major organ and the latter refused to submit to a surgical
operation, which would have saved his life, and died instead. Is the offender liable for his death?
‣ YES. The offended party it not obliged to submit to a surgical operation to relieve the accused from the natural and
ordinary results of his crime. (US vs Marasigan)
‣ Any person who creates in another’s mind an immediate sense of danger, which causes the latter to do
something resulting in the latter’s injuries, is liable for such injuries.
‣ Example — While on a ship from Dorne bound for King’s Landing, pirates, led by Salladhor Saan came onboard
and announced they were sacking the ship and raping the women. Scared, Princess Myrcella jumped overboard
only to be eaten by sharks. Salladhor Saan and his pirates are liable for her murder. If a man creates in another
person’s mind an immediate sense of danger, which causes such person to try to escape, and in doing so, the
latter injures himself, the man who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries. (People vs
Page; People vs Toling 1975) This is because when the pirates boarded the ship, they were committing a felony,
piracy and rape, and such acts were the proximate cause of why Marcella jumped overboard, thus the pirates are
the cause of the evil caused.
3. That its accomplishment is inherently impossible, or that the means employed is either inadequate or ineffectual
4. That the act performed should not constitute a violation of another provision of the RPC.
‣ NO. The law states that the act “would be a crime” hence, it has not ripened into an actual crime because of the
ineffectual means employed or due to its inherent impossibility. Objectively, no crime has been committed.
‣ The purpose is to suppress lawlessness. Subjectively, the offender is a criminal although no crime has been
committed. There is also no attempted and frustrated stage because there is no actual crime.
‣ The commission of an impossible crime is indicative of criminal propensity or criminal tendency on the part of the
actor. Such person is a potential criminal.
‣ There is intent (subjective) but actually no crime is committed (objective), the law merely pins criminal liability to
penalize the criminal intent of the offender.
‣ In committing an impossible crime, the offender intends to commit a felony against persons or a felony against
property, and the act performed would have been an offense against persons or property. But a felony against
persons or property should NOT have been actually committed.
‣ If the act performed would be an offense other than a felony against persons or property, there is NO impossible
crime
8. Rape (Art. 266-A) 8. Arson and other crimes involving destruction (Art. 320, 321,
322, 323, 324, 325, 326)
3. THAT ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT IS INHERENTLY IMPOSSIBLE, OR THAT THE MEANS EMPLOYED IS EITHER INADEQUATE OR
INEFFECTUAL
‣ In impossible crime, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property, either
because —
i. Legal Impossibility
‣ Where the intended acts, even if completed would not amount to a crime. It applies to those circumstances
where:
1. The motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
4. The consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.
‣ Examples:
‣ One night while Bran was sleeping in his chambers, he died from his injuries as a result of falling from a
tower in Winterfell. Thereafter, an assassin hired by the Lannisters sneaked in and stabbed him
repeatedly. There is an impossible crime due to legal impossibility as you cannot kill a dead person
(actually these’s physical impossibility also). However, note that the assassin did not know that Bran was
already dead, if he knew, then there is no impossible crime, as there was no intent to commit a felony.
‣ Stealing property which turned out to belong to the thief is legally impossible as in theft, the personal
property must belong to another.
‣ This occurs when the extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime.
‣ Example — When Queen Daenerys Targaryen was in the City of Qarth, she heard that her host, the richest
man if Qarth, Xaro Xhoan Daxos had a huge vault filled with vast treasures. One night, she sneaked into a
vault but found that is was empty. This is an impossible crime, due to physical impossibility.
‣ However, where the means employed was adequate, yet it did not achieve the result expected, the crime is
committed in its frustrated stage.
‣ Examples —
‣ Queen Cersei wanted to kill the King’s Hand, Lord Jon Arryn of the Vale. One night, when they were having
dinner, she puts what she believes to be lethal poison in his drink, however, it turns out that it was not lethal
anymore, as age has doused its lethality. The poison is inadequate to kill Lord Arryn. However, if the poison
was lethal, however, Lord Arryn somehow survived because Grand Maester Pycelle was able to give him an
antidote in time, there is frustrated. homicide/murder.
‣ A, with intent to kill B, aimed his revolver at the back of the latter, A not knowing it was empty. When he
pressed the trigger, it did not fire. The means employed by A is ineffectual.
4. THAT THE ACT PERFORMED SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF ANOTHER PROVISION OF THE RPC.
‣ Example — Ser Bronn of the Blackwater saw that Lady Lollys Stokeworth had a beautiful and expensive diamond
necklace and he wanted to rob it. One night in Flea Bottom, Bronn chanced upon her and drew his sword and told
Lollys to hand over the necklace or else he will kill her. However, during that time Lollys fortunately forgot to wear it.
Bronn is still guilty of attempted robbery and NOT an impossible crime. This is because Bronn, in threatening Lolly’s life
with his sword, constitute a crime (at least grave threats) punishable under the RPC.
‣ NOTE — this requisite was NOT been strictly applied by the SC in Intod vs CA, where several men wanted to kill
someone and sprayed the latter’s house with bullets, thinking he was inside, however, it was empty. The court said
that it was an impossible crime, despite the fact that the shooting of the house was arguably, a felony itself.
ACTS WHICH SHOULD BE REPRESSED BUT ARE NOT PUNISHED BY LAW; EXCESSIVE
PENALTIES
Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law,
and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress
and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of
legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may
be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense.
“ACTS WHICH SHOULD BE REPRESSED BUT ARE NOT PUNISHED BY LAW” (ART. 5, PAR. 1)
‣ RULE — Whenever an accused has committed an act not punishable by law, but should be repressed, the court
should acquit the accused. However, it shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.
‣ This is based on “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege” there is no crime is there is no law that punishes the act”
‣ The penalty imposed by the law for the crime should be clearly excessive, either because —
‣ This is based on “dura lex sex lex” the law may be harsh but it is still the law.
‣ Courts should not be concerned with the wisdom, efficacy, or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within
the province of the Legislature. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and it not in harmony with the
constitution, to apply them. (People vs Limaco)
‣ NOTE — this rule only applies to the felonies and crimes mala in se. It has no application to offenses defined and
penalised by special laws (People vs Salazar). This is because the paragraph expressly mentions “the provisions of
this code”, and makes reference to the “degree of malice”.
Article 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is
frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own
spontaneous desistance.
Article 7. When light felonies are punishable. - Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated,
with the exception of those committed against person or property.
Article 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. - XXXXXX Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a
felony is general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the consummated felony.
‣ The intention and effect must concur. The mere intention producing no effect is no more a crime than a mere effect
without the intention is a crime.
‣ Hence, proposal and conspiracy to commit a felony, which are only preparatory acts are not punishable
‣ Examples —
‣ Arya plans to kill several people who have wronged her, and even comes up with a list of victims. She always
recites this list of names at night before she sleeps and even lets other people overhear her. In the event that
she starts to buy weapons, train to use them, or even conspires with others and actively solicits help to
accomplish her plan of killing, she cannot be criminally liable until she actually commences it. These are merely
preparatory acts which are not punishable.
‣ Merely buying poison or carrying a weapon with which to kill the intended victim, or carrying inflammable
materials to the place where the house is to be burned are merely preparatory acts which are generally not
punishable.
‣ EXCEPT — In these instances, preparatory acts are punishable —
ii. When the preparatory acts are considered by law as independent crimes by themselves
‣ Such as — possession of picklocks (Art. 304), such crime is preparatory to the crime of robbery.
b. ACTS OF EXECUTION/OVERT ACTS — PUNISHABLE UNDER THE RPC
‣ Overt acts are external acts which if continued will logically result in a felony. It is the start of criminal liability
because the offender has started the commission of the offense.
‣ The overt acts must be directly connected to the accomplishment of the crime sought to be committed. It
commission should already indicate the crime sought to be committed
‣ In other words, to determine whether an act is merely a preparatory act or an overt act/act of execution, the act
must be tested in light of the felony sought to be committed. If the act already directly evidences (there is a
direct connection with) the intent of the offender to commit any of the elements of the felony, it is already an
overt act.
‣ But, if the act itself does not evince criminal intent because there could be another reasonable explanation, it is
merely preparatory. (Thus, if a person buys poison, it is merely preparatory as he could use that poison to kill
pests. But if he pours the poison into another person’s cup, it is already an overt act of murder)
‣ The intention of the accused must be viewed from the nature of the acts committed, and not from his own
admission
‣ Once the acts of execution are committed, there is already reference to the stages of execution
STAGES OF EXECUTION
1. Attempted — when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony by some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
2. Frustrated — when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator
3. Consummated — when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present.
‣ NOTE — In performing the acts of execution of a felony, the offender may reach only the first stage or the second. In
either case, he does not produce the felony he intends to commit. But he is liable for attempted felony or frustrated
felony, as the case may be.
‣ It is important for purposes of applying the proper penalty. See Arts. 50-57. The penalties imposed in Book 2 are
understood to be imposed on consummated felonies. If the felony is merely attempted or frustrated, then the
penalties are lowered.
INDETERMINATE OFFENSES
‣ It is one where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain.
‣ Example — A person intending to rob a store made an opening on its wall but before he could enter, he was already
apprehended. He cannot be charged with attempted robbery even if that was his intention because the overt act of
making an opening is not directly linked with robbery. The reason for this is that while inside he may commit robbery, or
murder, or rape, or any other crime. Since intent is a state of mind it can only be speculated what he would do inside. At
most, he may only be charged with attempted trespass because that act is directly related to the purpose of entering the
store of malicious mischief because of the destruction of property.
b. Such external acts have a direct connection with or an immediate and necessary relation to the crime intended to
be committed
‣ However, note that some overt acts may not be by physical activity. Such as in felonies, where by their nature or the
manner of committing them, the overt acts are not performed with bodily movement or by physical activity
‣ Such as — a proposal consisting in making an offer of money to a public officer for the purpose of corrupting him
is the overt act own the crime of corruption of public officers (US vs Gloria)
2. HE DOES NOT PERFORM ALL THE ACTS OF EXECUTION WHICH SHOULD PRODUCE THE FELONY
‣ If the offender has performed all the acts of execution, meaning nothing more is left to be done, the stage of execution
has passed beyond the attempted stage, and is at the frustrated stage, if the felony is not produced, or at the
consummated stage, if the felony is produced.
‣ If anything yet remained for him to do, the offender is merely in the attempted stage.
3. THE NON-PERFORMANCE OF ALL THE ACTS OF EXECUTION WAS DUE TO CAUSE OR ACCIDENT OTHER THAN HIS OWN
SPONTANEOUS DESISTANCE
‣ In attempted felony, the offender fails to perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony because of
some cause or accident.
‣ Example — A, with intent to kill B, aimed his revolver at the back of the latter. When he pressed the trigger, it did
not fire as it had jammed (or it fired but did not hit B). B, upon noticing this, was able to stop A in time before he
could fire again.
‣ The cause must NOT be the offender’s own spontaneous desistance, because if it were, there is NO criminal
liability.
‣ The law does not punish the offender who willingly and spontaneously desists from completing all the acts of
execution.
‣ It is sort or a reward granted by law to those who, having one foot on the verge of crime, heed the call of their
conscience and return to the path of righteousness.
‣ Desistance is the act of discontinuing the execution of the felony which will negative criminal liability of the
offender when done during the attempted stage. It is an absolutory cause because the law encourages a person to
desist from a crime. There is no desistance in the frustrated or consummated stage because the offender has
performed all the acts of execution.
‣ The desistance may be through fear or remorse, it is not necessary that it be actuated by a good motive.
‣ Note that the desistance must be made before all the acts of execution are performed.
‣ Also, the desistance which exempts from criminal liability has reference to the crime intended to be committed,
and has no reference to the crimes actually committed (frustrated or consummated already) by the offender before
his desistance.
‣ Example — A, with intent to kill, fired his gun at B, but did not hit the latter. B cried and asked for mercy. A
desisted from firing his gun again at B. Is A criminally liable? Not for attempted homicide, the intended crime,
as A desisted before he could perform all the acts of execution. But A is liable for grave threats, which was
already committed by him before he desisted.
‣ Thus, for homicide or murder, a mortal wound must be inflicted (People v. Kalalo)
‣ In attempted felonies, the offender does not performed all the acts of execution. He does not perform the last act
necessary to produce the crime. He merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts
‣ Example — If A, with intent to kill, fired his gun at B, the discharge of the gun is only an overt act. If the slug fired
from the gun misses B or the wound inflicted on B is not mortal, the last act necessary to produce the crime of
homicide is not yet performed by A. Bit if the wound inflicted is mortal, that is, sufficient to cause death, A performs
the last act. If no medical attendance is given, B would surely die. In homicide or murder, the crime is
consummated if the victim dies. If the victim survives, the crime is frustrated.
‣ What if the victim feigned death and the accused thought he had killed him (and had performed the last act
which would have produced the felony), but in reality, the wound is not mortal?
‣ It seems like the felony is still attempted, not frustrated, because the offender had not performed all the acts of
execution necessary to produce the felony. (There are conflict opinions on this and SC decisions)
‣ Such as — the timely intervention of a third person, or the victim simply lived, despite the mortal wound inflicted.
‣ What if the intended crime is not produced because the offender himself prevented its consummation?
‣ There is no frustrated felony. Neither is it an attempted felony of the intended felony, as all the acts of execution
had already been performed. It seems that there is no criminal liability (similar to voluntary desistance). But it could
be some other crime.
‣ Example — If Cersei was able to give Tommen the poison was already ingested, but upon second thoughts, she
changed her mind and gave him the antidote, the crime is not frustrated, as it was due to causes dependent on the
will of the offender. Neither is the crime attempted as all the acts of execution have been performed. At most, the
crime is merely physical injuries, as poison, as an injurious substance could cause it. The intent to kill which was
presented in the beginning disappeared when Cersei prevented the poison from producing the death of Tommen.
‣ What if the felony intended was not produced due to inadequate or ineffectual means?
CONSUMMATED FELONIES
‣ RULE — WHEN ALL THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR ITS EXECUTION AND ACCOMPLISHMENT ARE PRESENT, THE CRIME IS
CONSUMMATED
‣ Every crime has its own elements which must all be present
‣ The offender does not have to do anything else to consummate the offense. He has already reached the objective
stage of the offense as he no longer has control of his acts having already performed all that is necessary to
accomplish his purpose.
‣ All the elements of all the crimes in the RPC will be taken up in Book 2
‣ During this phase, the offender is stopped by any cause outside of his voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has
not been passed and it is an attempt.
2. Objective phase — the phase which commences once the offender has performed the last act to complete the
elements of the crime
‣ If he has not so stopped in the subjective phase, but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated, provided
the crime is not produced. If it is produced, the crime is consummated.
‣ Example — Queen Cersei, wanted to kill her own child, Tommen. This was because her brother-in-law, King Stannis
Baratheon, was already at the gates of King’s Landing, threatening to sack the city and put their heads on spikes atop the
city gates. She wants to give Tommen a clean death. Thus, she procures a deadly poisin, the tears of lys. If Cersei, with
intent to kill mixes the poison in the soup intended for Tommen, and Tommen begins to take the soup into his mouth, until
this point, Cersei can still prevent the poisoning by voluntarily desisting and telling Tommen to throw away the substance
from his mouth as it contains poison. But from the moment Tommen swallows it, Cersei has no more control over his acts.
The poison is now in Tommen’s stomach and it will required the intervention of a maester to prevent his poisoning. If
because of the intervention of Grand Maester Pycelle, Tommen did not die (as if he was provided with a timely antidote),
Cersei will be liable for frustrated murder. The acts performed by Cersei, passed from the subjective phase to the objective
phase of the crime.
‣ Difference — In impossible crime, the criminal intent can never be accomplished. In attempted or frustrated felonies, it is
possible of accomplishment.
‣ Remember that in impossible crime the evil intent of the offender cannot be accomplished because it is inherently
impossible of accomplishment or because the means employed by the offender is inadequate or ineffectual
‣ In attempted or frustrated felonies, what prevented its accomplishment is the intervention of certain causes or
accidents in which the offender had no part.
‣ NOTE — due to these three factors, there are certain crimes which cannot be committed in all three stages, there are even
some that are immediately consummated.
‣ This includes grave and less grave felonies (as defined in Art. 9)
‣ EXCEPT — LIGHT FELONIES ARE PUNISHABLE ONLY WHEN THEY HAVE BEEN CONSUMMATED (ART. 7)
‣ Light felonies are felonies for which the law prescribes a penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200. (Art. 9)
‣ Such as —
‣ RATIONALE — Light felonies produce slight, such insignificant moral and material injuries that public conscience is
satisfied with providing a light penalty for their consummation. If they are not consummated, the wrong done is so
slight that there is no need for providing a penalty at all.
‣ EXCEPTION TO EXCEPTION — LIGHT FELONIES COMMITTED AGAINST PERSON OR PROPERTY ARE PUNISHABLE IN
WHATEVER STAGE (ART. 7)
‣ The commission of felonies against persons or property presupposes in the offender moral depravity. For that reason,
even attempted or frustrated light felonies against persons or property are punishable.
8. Rape (Art. 266-A) 8. Arson and other crimes involving destruction (Art. 320, 321,
322, 323, 324, 325, 326)
‣ This is because the offender cannot perform the acts necessary for its execution without consummating the offense.
‣ Such as —
a. Felonies punished on the basis of the result or gravity and the result cannot be determine without first
consummating the offense
‣ Such as — physical injuries (serious, less serious, or slight)
c. Felonies by omission
b. Theft and Robbery — This cannot be frustrated as the element of unlawful taking is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same (Valenzula
vs People 2007)
c. Arson — This is defined as the burning of property, thus the moment the burning occurs, even if a small portion only,
the offense is consummated.
d. Corruption of Public Officers — Because the offense requires the agreement or participation of two parties, such
that when the offer is accepted, it is consummated. If rejected, the offense is attempted because the offender was
not able to perform all the acts of execution by persuading the public officer.
e. Adultery — Because its presence is sexual congress, hence the same principle in rape applies
‣ In impossible crime, the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the
execution of the same, but nevertheless, the crime is not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended
is by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are
essentially inadequate or ineffectual to product the result desired by him.
‣ Since the offender in impossible crime has already performed all the acts for the execution of the same, there is
no attempted impossible crime
‣ There is also no frustrated impossible crime, because the acts performed by the offender are considered as
constituting the consummated offense.
b. Light felonies
‣ EXCEPT — felonies against persons or property, which are punishable in whatever stage.
Article 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. - Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in
the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it.
There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some other person or
persons.
1. Conspiracy to commit a felony — exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
2. Proposal to commit a felony — exists when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its
execution to some other person or persons.
‣ EXCEPT — THEY ARE PUNISHABLE ONLY IN THE CASES IN WHICH THE LAW SPECIALLY PROVIDES A PENALTY THEREFOR
‣ Such as —
2. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, coup d’etat, or insurrection (Art. 136)
‣ RATIONALE— The enumerated felonies are those pertaining to the security of the state. The external, internal and
economic security of the state.
‣ A conspiracy presupposes a meeting of the minds of two or more persons (similar to a contract)
‣ It must be an agreement to act, to effect, or to bring about what has already been conceived and determined
‣ The conspirators should have made up their mids to commit the crime.
‣ There must already be a determination and a general plan on how to commit it.
‣ It must be the execution of the felony that is proposed, meaning the acts of execution and not merely preparatory
acts.
‣ NOTE — the law does not required that the proposal be accepted. What constitutes the felony of proposal is the
making of the proposal itself.
KINDS OF CONSPIRACY
1. CONSPIRACY AS A CRIME IN ITSELF
‣ This is when the crime being conspired upon has not been committed yet, and the mere act of conspiring is
punishable by law
‣ This is when the crime being conspired upon has actually been committed, and commenced by overt acts.
‣ The mere act of conspiracy being punished by law is immaterial. All felonies may committed by conspiracy and
such leads to conspiracy being a mens of incurring criminal liability.
‣ When conspiracy is only a manner of incurring criminal liability, it is not punishable as a separate offense.
‣ In this aspects, conspiracy is similar with culpa, both are either crimes per se or means of committing a crime
‣ Example: When people conspire to commit rebellion, the it is actually committed, they are not liable for conspiracy
to commit rebellion (which is subsumed), they are liable for rebellion itself, and conspiracy will be a means of
incurring criminal liability for the acts of others
NOTE — Conspiracy as a means to commit a crime is discussed in the section on “persons criminally liable” in Art. 16-20
Article 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies. - Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches the
capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with Art. 25 of this Code.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional, in
accordance with the above-mentioned Art..
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which a penalty of arrest menor or a fine not exceeding
200 pesos or both; is provided.
Article 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. - A fine, whether imposed as a single of as an alternative penalty,
shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000
pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a light penalty if it less than 200 pesos.
‣ Example: A felony punishable by prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period
is a grave felony, because the higher period, which is the minimum of prision mayor, is a period of an afflictive
penalty.
‣ Afflictive penalties —
a. Reclusion perpetua
b. Reclusion temporal
e. Prison mayor
2. LESS GRAVE FELONIES — CORRECTIONAL PENALTIES
‣ When the penalty for the offense is composed of two or more distinct penalties, the higher or highest of the penalties
must be a correctional penalty.
‣ Correctional penalties —
a. Prision correccional
b. Arresto mayor
c. Suspension
d. Destierro
3. LIGHT FELONIES — ARREST MENOR OR A FINE NOT EXCEEDING 200 PESOS OR BOTH
a. Fine of less than or exactly P200 — light felony
‣ NOTE — according to Art. 26, a fine “not less than P200” (which includes exactly P200) is a correctional penalty.
However Art. 9 it is merely a light felony. As it uses the the words “not exceeding 200” (which also includes P200).
It is suggested that Art. 9 should prevail over Art. 26, because it classifies felonies according to their gravity, while
Art. 26 classifies the fine according to its amount.
5. Prison mayor
4. Destierro
Felonies
2. Fine not exceeding 200 pesos (including exactly P200), or
3. Both
1. Whether a complex crime was committed, which requires grave or less grave felonies (Art. 48)
3. The duration of the detention in case of failure to post bond to keep the peace (Art. 35)
5. Whether or not there is delay in the delivery of detained persons to the judicial authority (Art. 125)
PURPOSE
‣ Every penalty under the RPC is understood to be prescribed for consummated felonies and against principal offenders.
Likewise, the RPC is primarily classical, the penalties are predetermined without regard to the moral state of the offender.
Thus, the need for circumstances to modify criminality liability taking into consideration the moral, emotional, and mental
state of the offender and the circumstances when the offense was committed. The RPC therefore provides for
circumstances which modify criminal liability of the offenders.
‣ Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.(Art. 100). This is called civil liability arising from delict, ex
delicto.
4. Mitigating Circumstances
Reduces criminal liability
(Art. 13)
5. Aggravating Increases criminal liability Court can take them into consideration in the
Circumstances (Art. 14) award of damages
1. Justifying 1. Self-defense
Circumstances
2. Defense of relatives
(Art. 11)
3. Defense of strangers
2. Exempting 1. Imbecility/Insanity
Circumstances
2. Minority (as amended by RA 9344, April 23, 2006)
(Art. 12)
3. Accident
3. Absolutory 1. Spontaneous desistance in the attempted stage unless the overt act committed already constitutes
Circumstances a crime other than that intended (Art. 6, par. 3)
2. Attempted or frustrated light felonies except those against persons or property (Art. 7)
4. Certain relatives who are accessories subject to the requisites provided (Art. 20)
5. Death and physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances (Art. 247)
6. In trespass, a person is not liable if he entered another’s dwelling for the purpose of preventing
some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be
applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to
humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns, and other public places (Art.
280)
8. Marriage of the offender with the offended party in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness, and rape (Art. 344, par. 4)
9. Instigation
13. Repeal of a law, either absolute or modification of the penalty when favourable to the offender
Circumstances
1. Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstances
(Art. 13)
2. Senility (over 70 years of age)
3. Praeter intentionem
4. Sufficient provocation
7. Voluntary surrender
9. Physical defects
Privileged Mitigating —
1. Art. 68 (as amended by RA 9344) — Minors over 15 and under 18 years of age who acted with
discernment
2. Art. 69 — If the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions
required to justify the same or to exempt form criminal liability, if majority of such conditions are
present.
Circumstances
1. Taking advantage of public position (Art. 14[1])
(Art. 14)
2. In contempt or with insult to the public authorities (Art. 14[2])
6. Crime committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or where public authorities
are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship. (Art. 14[5])
10. Conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune (Art. 14[7])
11. Aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity (Art. 14[8])
15. Inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or international damage thereto, derailment
of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin (Art. 14[12])
24. Motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means (Art. 14[20])
1. Insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party (Art. 14[3]) — applies only to crimes
against persons and crimes against honor
2. Superior strength or weakening of defense (Art. 14[15]) — applies only to crimes against persons
and crimes against property
4. Ignominy (Art. 14[17])— applies only to crimes against chastity and crimes against persons (but it
has been recognized as aggravating in light and grave coercion, and treason)
5. Cruelty (Art. 14[21])— applies only to crimes against chastity and crimes against persons (but it has
been recognized as aggravating in Treason)
Special Aggravating —
6. Alternative 1. Relationship
Circumstances
2. Intoxication
(Art. 15)
3. Degree of instruction and education of the offender
IMPUTABILITY VS RESPONSIBILITY
‣ Imputability — is the quantity by which an act may be ascribed to a person as its author or owner. It implies that the act
committed has been freed and consciously done and may, therefore, by put down to the does as his very own
‣ Responsibility — is the obligation of suffering the consequences of crime. It is the obligation of taking the penal and civil
consequences of the crime
‣ Guilt is an element of responsibility, for a man cannot be made to answer for the consequences of a crime unless he
is guilty.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or
adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity within the fourth
civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present,
and the further requisite, in case the revocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had
no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second requisites
mentioned in the first circumstance of this Article are present and that the person defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another, provided that the
following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. - The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented
shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been
caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.
‣ RULE — WHEN THE OFFENDER ACTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES, HE INCURS NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY
AND NO CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO.
‣ BASIS — Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. The act of a person does not make him a criminal, unless his
mind be criminal.
‣ Justifying Circumstances are those where the act of a person is said to be in accordance with law, so that such
person is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liability.
‣ Generally, there is no civil liability ex delicto, EXCEPT in par. 4 of Art. 11 where the civil liability is borne by the
persons benefited by the act
‣ The basis of justifying circumstances is the recognition of the law of the non-existence of a crime by expressly
stating in the opening sentence that the persons therein mentioned “do not incur criminal liability”.
‣ Upon allegation of justifying circumstances, the burden of evidence shifts to the offender to prove them, as he
practically admitted to the felony charged.
‣ Justifying circumstances are matters of defense and it is incumbent upon the accused to avoid criminal liability, to
prove them.
‣ Well-entrenched is the rule that where the accused invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution. For, even if the prosecution’s evidence is weak, it could not be
disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. (People vs Sazon 1990)
2. Defense of relatives
3. Defense of strangers
‣ RATIONALE — The law on self-defence embodied in any penal system in the civilised world finds justification in man’s
natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person or rights form impending danger or peril. It is based on necessity
and that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being. (Castanares vs CA 1979)
i. Right to life
‣ When there is no peril to one’s life, lim or rights, there is no unlawful aggression.
ii. Imminent — the danger is on the point of happening. It is not required that the attack already begins, for it
may be too late.
‣ There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life limb, or right is either actual or imminent. It must refer
to an attack that has actually broken out or materialised or at the very least clearly imminent, it cannot consist
in actual threats or a merely threatening stance or posture. If there is no aggression, there is nothing to prevent.
‣ Mere threatening attitude is not unlawful aggression. The aggression must be real, not merely imaginary.
‣ In order to justify homicide on the ground of self-defense, it is essential that the killing of the deceased by the
defendant be simultaneous with the attack made by the deceased or at least both acts succeeded each other
without appreciable interval of time (US vs Ferrer)
‣ When the killing of the deceased by the accused was after the attack made by the deceased, the accused
must have no time for deliberation and cool thinking.
‣ Quality criterion — The aggression must employ actual physical force to inflict real injury.
‣ Such as — the use of a weapon, a slap on the face, a punch in the gut.
‣ A slap is an assault against the person’s dignity and honor. (People vs Sabio)
‣ Legality criterion — The aggression must be unlawful
i. Lawful aggression — the fulfilment of a duty or the exercise of a right in a more or less violent manner is an
aggression, but it is lawful. Such as the acts of police, using violence to capture offenders.
b. REASONABLE NECESSITY OF THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY THE ACCUSED TO PREVENT AND REPEL IT
‣ The person attacked by the accused must be the person who unlawfully assaulted him (but perhaps mistake of
fact may be raised?)
‣ There must be a necessity of the course of action taken by the accused and a necessity of the means used
‣ The test of reasonableness depends on the circumstances of each case. It depends on the nature and extent
of the unlawful aggression.
‣ To be entitled to the benefit of self-defense, the one defending himself must not have given cause for the
aggression by his unjust conduct or by inciting or provoking the assailant.
‣ Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the defender shows that there may have been provocation but it
should not be sufficient or proportionate and it must not immediately precede the act.
‣ The provocation must be disproportionate to the act of aggression and inadequate to stir the aggressor to
its commission.
‣ Such as — mere exchange of verbal arguments which wounded the pride of the aggressor
iii. Even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself
iv. Even if a privation was given by the person defending himself, it was not the proximate and immediate act to
the act of aggression
‣ Such as — when a appreciable interval of time was passed since the provocation was made
‣ Is retaliation/revenge a justifying circumstance?
‣ NO. Retaliation is not self-defense, as the unlawful aggression has already ceased
‣ In retaliation, the aggression the was begun by the injured party already ceased to exist when the accused
attacked him. In self-defense, the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the
person making a defense.
‣ When the unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former
aggressor. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the necessity for
the person invoking self-defence to attack his adversary ceases. If he persists in attacking his adversary, he can no
longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense
‣ NO. There is no unlawful aggression in a concerted fight. If there is an agreement to fight, the aggression is
reciprocal and legitimate as between the parties. However the challenge to a fight must be accepted.
‣ Where the fight is agreed upon, each of the parties is at once assailant and assaulted, and neither can invoke the
right of self-defence, because aggression which is an incident in the fight is bound to arise from one or the other of
the combatants (People vs Quinto)
‣ One who voluntary joined a fight, cannot claim self-defense, unless the aggression was ahead of the stipulated
time and place. (Justo vs CA)
‣ What is the effect when not all the requisites for self-defense are present?
‣ The accused cannot claim self-defense as a justifying circumstance. However he could be entitled to either of the
following provided unlawful aggression is present:
a. Ordinary mitigating circumstance — at least one requisite which is unlawful aggression is present (Art. 13[1])
b. Privileged mitigating circumstance — at least two requisites, one of which is unlawful aggression is present
(Art. 69)
‣ May mistake of fact apply to unlawful aggression?
‣ YES. The unlawful aggression may be made to depend upon the honest belief of the one making a defense, taking
into consideration mistake of fact as a defense (US vs Emedia)
‣ Should an attack against a person’s property be coupled with a corresponding attack on his person for an
unlawful aggression to be present?
‣ NO. The destruction of the property alone may amount to an unlawful aggression (People vs Narvaez 1983)
‣ SEE — Art. 429 of the Civil Code which provides “the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may
be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
his property.”
‣ NOTE — the Battered Woman Syndrome under Sec. 26 of RA 9262 was included in Justifying Circumstances in the Bar
Syllabus but I included that in Absolutory Circumstances, to be discussed later. But read that in relation to self-defense as
it also makes reference to the requisites of self-defense and it applies as an exception to those requisites.
‣ The justification of defense of relatives by reason of which the defender is not criminally liable, is founded not only
upon humanitarian sentiment, but also upon the impulse of blood which impels men to rush, on the occasion of great
perils to the rescue of those close to them by ties of blood.
a. There is unlawful aggression against the person or rights of relatives of the accused
i. Spouse
ii. Ascendants
iii. Descendants
v. Relatives by affinity in the same degrees (relatives by reason of marriage such as parents-in-law, children-in-
law, siblings-in-law)
vi. Relatives by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree (relatives by blood)
b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent and repel it
c. In case provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making defense had no part therein
‣ The fact that the relative defended gave provocation is immaterial. It does not negate the application of this
justifying circumstance, as long as the person defending had no part in such provocation.
‣ Although the provocation prejudices the person who gave it, its effects do not reach the defender who took no
part therein, because the latter was prompted by some noble or generous sentiment in protecting and saving a
relative.
‣ What one may do in his defense, another may do for him. Persons acting in defense of theres are in the same
condition and upon the same plane as those who act in defense of themselves. The ordinary man would not stand idly
by and see his companion killed without attempting to save his life. (US vs Aviado)
a. There is unlawful aggression against the person or rights of a person who is a stranger to the accused
‣ Any person not included in the enumeration of “relatives” in Art. 11[2] is considered a stranger for purposes of this
paragraph. Hence, this includes a close friend, a distant relative (beyond 4 degrees of consanguinity), a
bodyguard.
b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent and repel it
c. The person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive
‣ Even if a person has a standing grudge against the assailant, if he enters upon the defense of a stranger out of
generous motive to save the stranger from serious bodily harm or possible death, the third requisite of defense of
stranger still exists. The third requisite would be lacking if such person was prompted by his grudge against the
assailant, because the alleged defense of the stranger would be only a pretext.
‣ The defender must not impelled by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
‣ Note that under his paragraph, there is civil liability borne by the persons benefited. (Art. 101)
a. The accused does an act which causes damage to another in order to avoid an evil or injury which actually
exists, and is not brought about by the accused’s own acts
‣ The evil sought to be avoided must actually exist. If it is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the
future, this requisite is absent.
‣ The state of necessity must not be brought about by the accused himself
‣ The greater evil should NOT be brought about by the negligence or imprudence of the accused
‣ The evil which brought about the greater evil must not result from a violation of law by the actor.
‣ The instinct of self-preservation will always make one feel that his own safety is of greater importance than that of
another. This is reasonable.
a. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office
‣ The public officer acting in the fulfilment of a duty may appear to be an aggressor bust the aggression is lawful,
as necessary to fulfil his duty.
‣ Under the doctrine of self-help (Art. 429 of the Civil Code), the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force
as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property. If in protecting his possession of the property, he injured the one trying to get it from
him, he is justified under this paragraph.
‣ Under this paragraph (lawful exercise of a right), it is NOT necessary that there be unlawful aggression
against the person charged with the protection of the property. If there is unlawful aggression against such
person, then self-defence applies, as a defense of right to property.
‣ Examples of performance of duty/ lawful exercise of office — executioner of bilibid prison cannot be held liable
for homicide. Doctor who amputated the left of a patient to save him from gangrene is not liable for mutilation.
b. That the injury caused or the offend committed be a necessary consequence of the due performance
c. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful and reasonable
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - the following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall
order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor
shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and
the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his
surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in
said Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable cause.
Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. - The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears
that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if
such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been
caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be
primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the
latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
RA 9344 — JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 AS AMENDED BY RA 10630
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall
enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age
of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In
the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it
shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information in any appropriate
court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide
the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the person shall
file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said
motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned shall exert all
efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. – If it has been determined that the child taken into custody
is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will have an initial contact with the child, in consultation with the
local social welfare and development officer, has the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of his/her
parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child’s nearest relative. The child shall be subjected to a community-
based intervention program supervised by the local social welfare and development officer, unless the best interest of the
child requires the referral of the child to a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ managed by LGUs or licensed and/or
accredited NGOs monitored by the DSWD.
The local social welfare and development officer shall determine the appropriate programs for the child who has been
released, in consultation with the child and the person having custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest
relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of the following:
(a) A duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization;
(b) A barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC);
(c) A local social welfare and development officer; or, when and where appropriate, the DSWD.
If the child has been found by the local social welfare and development officer to be dependent, abandoned, neglected or
abused by his/her parents and the best interest of the child requires that he/she be placed in a youth care facility or
‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or guardians shall execute a written authorization for the voluntary commitment of
the child:
‣ Provided, That if the child has no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written authorization for
voluntary commitment, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be immediately filed by the DSWD or the
Local Social Welfare and Development Office (LSWDO) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,
otherwise known as ‘The Child and Youth Welfare Code’ and the Supreme Court rule on commitment of children:
‣ Provided, further, That the minimum age for children committed to a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ shall be
twelve (12) years old.
SEC. 20-A. Serious Crimes Committed by Children Who Are Exempt From Criminal Responsibility. – A child who is
above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and who commits parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping
and serious illegal detention where the victim is killed or raped, robbery, with homicide or rape, destructive arson, rape, or
carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or raped or offenses under Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) punishable by more than twelve (12) years of imprisonment, shall be deemed a neglected
child under Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and shall be mandatorily placed in a special facility within the youth
care faculty or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ called the Intensive Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (IJISC).
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SEC. 20-B. Repetition of Offenses. – A child who is above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and who
commits an offense for the second time or oftener:
‣ Provided, That the child was previously subjected to a community-based intervention program, shall be deemed a
neglected child under Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and shall undergo an intensive intervention program
supervised by the local social welfare and development officer:
‣ Provided, further, That, if the best interest of the child requires that he/she be placed in a youth care facility or ‘Bahay
Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or guardians shall execute a written authorization for the voluntary commitment of the
child:
‣ Provided, finally, That if the child has no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written
authorization for voluntary commitment, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be immediately filed by
the DSWD or the LSWDO pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended.
‣ RULE — WHEN THE OFFENDER ACTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES DURING THE COMMISSION OF THE
FELONY, HE IS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY BUT NOT THE CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO.
‣ Exempting circumstances are those by virtue of which, although the act is criminal, the law exempts the actor from
liability.
‣ A crime is committed, but circumstances pertaining the the offender calls for his exemption from criminal liability.
‣ Generally, there is civil liability ex delicto, EXCEPT in accident and insuperable cause Art. 12(4,7), which strictly are not
criminal
‣ These circumstances must also be proved by the defendant to the satisfaction of the court.
‣ Thus, the defense must prove that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime, because
the presumption is always in favour of sanity (People vs Bascos)
JUSTIFYING EXEMPTING
The act is legal, within the bounds of law The act is criminal
Since there is no crime, there is no criminal and civil liability ex Since there is a crime, there is a criminal, but no criminal liability.
delicto, except in state of necessity While he is exempt from criminal liability, there is a civil liability ex
delicto, except in accident and insuperable or lawful cause.
The emphasis of the law is on the act The emphasis of the law is on the actor.
1. Imbecility/Insanity
6. Insuperable or lawful cause Absence of criminal intent (dolo/deceit) and fault (culpa/negligence/imprudence)
‣ RULE — In imbecility or insanity, there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason and
discernment.
‣ Imbecility— an imbecile is one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of
children between 2 and 7 years of age. He is one who is deprived complete of reason or discernment and freedom
of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs Ambal)
‣ Insanity — It exists where there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the
accused is deprived of reason; that he acts without the least discernment, or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. (People vs Formigones)
‣ Imbecility and insanity are really the same, both pertain to complete deprivation of intelligence, reason and
discernment. However, the difference lies as expressed in Art. 12. While the imbecile is exempt in ALL cases from
criminal liability, the insane is NOT exempt if it can be shown that he acted during a lucid interval.
‣ A mere abnormality of mental faculties is NOT enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his
acts. At most, it is only a mitigating circumstance
1. Dementia praecox — a form of psychosis where homicidal attack is common because of delusions that he is
being interfered with sexually, or that his property is being taken. (People vs Bonoan)
2. Schizophrenia — a chronic mental disorder characterised by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality
and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions, it is the most common form of psychosis (formermly
called “dementia praecox”) (People vs Madarang 2000)
3. Epilepsy — It is a chronic nervous disease characterised by fits, occurring at intervals, attended by convulsive
motions of the muscles and loss of consciousness. (People vs Mancao and Aguilar)
4. Somnambulism (Sleepwalking)— This is embraced in the plea of insanity and must clearly be proven (People vs
Gimena)
5. Malignant malaria — Such illness affects the nervous system and causes among others such compilation as
acute melancholia and insanity at times (People vs Lacena)
‣ What is illnesses are NOT or doubtfully covered by “insanity”?
1. Kleptomania — Unsure, no SC case yet. In the states there are conflicting opinions on whether it is exempting or
merely mitigating. The suggestion is if the disease is strong as to be irresistible, it is exempting, but if it merely
diminishes the exercise of will-power, it is mitigating.
4. Hypnotism — debatable
‣ The court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted,
which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
‣ But the court has no power to permit the insane person to leave the asylum without first obtaining the opinion of
the Director of Health that he may be released without danger (Chin Ah Foo vs Concepcion)
‣ How must imbecility or insanity be proved?
‣ In order to ascertain a person’s mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the
condition of his mind during a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct evidence is not required,
nor a specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. Mind can be known only by
outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives, and emotions of a person and come to determine
whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, circumstantial evidence, if
clear and convincing, will suffice. (People vs Bonoan)
‣ Insanity must exist at the time of the commission of the felony
‣ Note that when we talk about exempting circumstances, it must exist during the commission of the felony.
‣ The evidence of insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution
‣ There is no presumption that the offender continuous insane at the time of the commission of the felony and the
presumption is that he acted in a lucid interval (People vs Bonoan)
‣ EXCEPT — when he has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the insane, in which case he is
presumed to continue to be insane. (People vs Bonoan)
‣ What if the insanity is merely occasional and the accused has lucid intervals?
‣ It must be proved that it existed at the time of the commission of the felony, and not during a lucid interval
‣ If the insanity is only occasional or intermittent in its nature, the presumption of its continuance does NOT arise.
He who relies on such insanity proved at another time must prove its existence also at the time of the commission
of the offense. Where it is shown that the defendant had lucid intervals, it will be presumed that the offense was
committed in one of them. (People vs Bonoan)
‣ A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child
above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be
subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. (Sec. 6, RA 9344)
‣ Those persons who are unemancipated at the time of the commission of the offense.
‣ Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the
age of 18 years. (Art. 234, Family Code, as amended by RA 6809 in 1989)
‣ NOTE — Children in conflict of the law enjoys the presumption of minority and shall enjoy all the rights of a child in
conflict with the law until proven to be 18 years old or older at the time of the commission of the offense. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor. (Sec. 7, RA 9344).
‣ How should the minority of the person be challenged?
‣ Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information in any
appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court
which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested
parties. (Sec. 7, RA 9344)
‣ How do you determine the age of a child?
‣ The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Sec. 7, RA 9344)
‣ Periods of Criminal Responsibility
2. Conditional responsibility — 15 years and 1 day to below 18 years (ages 15, 16 and 17).
4. Mitigated responsibility — 15 years and 1 day to 18 years, the offender acting with discernment AND those over
70 years (senility). In this case, it is a privileged mitigating circumstance under Art. 68
‣ NOTE — the determining line of age is the time when the felony was committed.
2. Minors over 15 (15 years and 1 day) and under 18 (those aged 16 and 17) who did not act with discernment
‣ Does the exemption cover those offenses punishable under Special Penal Laws?
‣ YES. See Sec. 4(O), RA 9344 — “Offense” refers to any act or omission whether punishable under special laws or
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
‣ It means the capacity of the child at the time of the commission of the offset to understand the differences
between right and wrong and the consequences of the wrongful act. (Sec. 4(j), Revised Rules on Children in
Conflict with the Law)
‣ To determine this all the facts of the case must be examined, the very appearance, attitude, behavior, before and
during the commission of the act, as well as, during and after the trial. (People vs Doquena)
‣ It should take into account the ability of a child to understand the moral and psychological components of criminal
responsibility and the consequences of the wrongful act, and whether a child can be held responsible for
essentially antisocial behaviour (Sec. 10 Revised Rules on Children in Conflict with the Law)
‣ The Presumption is that minors above 15 and under 18 acted without Discernment
‣ The law uses the words “unless he/she has acted with discernment” indicating that it is the exception to the
general rule that a minor over 15 but under 18 years acted with discernment. It is incumbent for the prosecution to
prove the the child acted with discernment.
‣ NOTE — the failure to allege discernment in the information is fatal to the prosecution.
‣ What are the consequences when a minor who is exempt from criminal liability, commits a felony?
1. Release of the child — The authority which will have an initial contact with the child, in consultation with the
local social welfare and development officer, has the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of
his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child’s nearest relative.
‣ What are the consequences when a minor who is NOT exempt from criminal liability (above 15 and under 18
but acts with discernment), commits a felony?
‣ SEE — discussion under “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act” in the Chapter on Special Laws
3. ACCIDENT (ART. 12[4])
‣ Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it.
‣ Basis — absence of criminal intent (dolo/deceit) and fault (culpa/negligence/imprudence). Thus there is no intentional
nor culpable felony.
‣ Elements —
c. The act is performed with due care without fault or intention of causing injury (People vs Mat-an 1992)
‣ An accident is something that happens outside the sway of human will, and although it comes about through some
act of human will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.
‣ Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory, one cannot exist with the other.
‣ Accident — pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening, an event happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly through human agency an even which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the
person to whom it happens. It occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused
by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
(Jarco Marketing vs CA 1999)
‣ Negligence — the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do It is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. (Jarco Marketing vs CA 1999)
‣ Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act.
‣ Elements —
‣ Such a force can never consist in anything which springs primarily from the man himself. It must be a race
which acts upon him from outside and by a third person. (US vs Elicanal)
‣ Thus, passion and obfuscation can never be an irresistible force as such is internal
b. Such force was irresistible such that the person was reduced to a mere instrument
‣ It must produce such an effect upon the individual that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere
instrument, and as such, incapable of committing a crime. (US vs Elicanal)
‣ It reduces the actor to a mere instrument, who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force,
fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. (People vs Loreno)
‣ A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to
the accused for escape or self-defence in equal combat (People vs Loreno)
‣ It must be such that, in spite of the resistance of the person on whom it operates, it compels his members to
act and his mind to obey. (US vs Elicanal)
‣ Elements —
a. There is a threat which causes an uncontrollable fear of an evil greater than or at least equal to, that which
he is required to commit
‣ This also presupposes that a person is compelled to commit a crime by another, but the compulsion is by
means of intimation or threat, not force or violence.
b. The threat promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed
to it.
‣ The threat or duress must be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or lim and should not
be speculative, fanciful or remote fear.
‣ The threat of future injury is NOT enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defence in equal combat.
‣ The accused must NOT have opportunity for escape or self-defense. Duress is unavailing where the accused
had every opportunity to win away if he had wanted to or to resist any possible aggression.
‣ Irresistible force — the offender uses violence or physical force to compel another person to commit a crime.
‣ Uncontrollable fear — the offender employs intimidation or threat in compelling another to commit a crime.
‣ Elements —
c. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or insuperable cause
ABSOLUTORY CIRCUMSTANCES
‣ RULE — ABSOLUTORY CAUSES ARE THOSE WHERE THE ACT COMMITTED IS A CRIME BUT FOR REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY AND
SENTIMENT, THERE IS NO PENALTY IMPOSED.
‣ Similar to exempting circumstances, there is a crime, and a criminal, but no criminal liability.
1. Spontaneous desistance in the attempted stage unless the overt act committed already constitutes a crime other
than that intended (Art. 6, par. 3)
2. Attempted or frustrated light felonies except those against persons or property (Art. 7)
4. Certain relatives who are accessories subject to the requisites provided (Art. 20)
5. Death and physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances (Art. 247)
6. In trespass, a person is not liable if he entered another’s dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to
himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall enter a
dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes,
taverns, inns, and other public places (Art. 280)
8. Marriage of the offender with the offended party in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape
(Art. 344, par. 4)
9. Instigation
13. Repeal of a law, either absolute or modification of the penalty when favourable to the offender
INSTIGATION VS ENTRAPMENT
‣ RULE — INSTIGATION IS DEEMED CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY AND IS CONSIDERED AN ABSOLUTORY CAUSE. HOWEVER,
ENTRAPMENTS ARE ALLOWED.
‣ Instigation or Inducement— the criminal intent originates from the mind of the instigator (law enforcement) and the
accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator practically
induces another to commit the offense and himself becomes a co-principal (People vs Ramos 1991)
‣ Entrapment — the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. In
entrapment the idea to commit the crime originates from the accused. Nobody induces or prods him into committing
the offenses.
‣ It is a form of entrapment which has been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the drugs law.
‣ It is commonly employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing
a crime.
‣ In buy-bust operations, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding
him to commit the offense. Its opposite is instigation or inducement wherein the police agent lures the accused into
committing the offense in order to prosecute him.
ENTRAPMENT INSTIGATION
The mens rea originated from the accused who was merely
The evil idea originated from the peace officer who induced the
trapped by the peace officer in flagrante delicto (caught in the
accused to commit the act
act)
This is not absolutely as to the offender as he authored the evil Absolutely by reason of public policy
idea
Trap for the unwary criminal Trap for the unwary innocent
The peace officer has no criminal liability for his acts are in The peace officer is a principal by inducement
accordance with law
The crime has already been committed The crime would not and could not have been committed were it
not for the instigation
Article 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. - Any legally married person who having
surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of
destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen
years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to
the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
‣ NO. It actually grants a privilege or benefit amounting to an exempting circumstance. The penalty is a mere
banishment (destierro) and is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment. Further, where
physical injuries less than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment. (People vs Coricor)
‣ SEE — People vs Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987 citing People v. Araquel, 106 Phil. 677 (1959)
‣ Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amounts to an exempting circumstance, for even
where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment
at all.
‣ A different interpretation that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances
which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel
the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation would be
illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element
of the crime charged.
‣ Only "acts or omissons constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or information, and a
circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential element
of the offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be
pleaded.
‣ Since inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not a punishable act, it cannot be qualified by either
aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances.
‣ Read also People vs Genosa which is the landmark case on BWA promulgated prior to the VAWC. In that case, the Court
ruled that the accused (who killed her husband) was NOT a battered woman (due to lack of evidence), and was not
entitled to a complete exoneration under self-defence because there was no unlawful aggression— no immediate and
unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him. Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no
self defense, complete or incomplete. The SC ruled that she was merely entitled to mitigating circumstances of diminished
will-power under paragraphs 9 and 10; and passion and obfuscation, of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. In order to
use the battered woman syndrome as a justifying circumstance, it MUST satisfy ALL the elements of self-defense.
HOWEVER, the VAWC has changed this by providing that victims of such syndrome do NOT incur any criminal and civil
liability DESPITE the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense.
SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering
from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of
the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.
‣ RULE — AN ACCUSED SUFFERING FROM BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME,
DOES NOT INCUR ANY CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY. THIS IS DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY OF THE ELEMENTS FOR
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE RPC.
‣ In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the
time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.
a. Wife
2. The woman is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behaviour by a man in order to coerce her
to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights
‣ To be classified as such, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in
an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as
a battered woman.
‣ Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the
family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility
for the batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve. (People vs Genosa)
‣ However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the
verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension
and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more
she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at
some unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control" and leads to an acute battering incident. (People vs
Genosa)
‣ At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly
remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is
almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight
back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or
intervenors are likely to get hurt. (People vs Genosa)
‣ A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his
isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his
reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally,
only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of
remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically. (People vs Genosa)
‣ The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In this phase, she and
her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her
forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," each partner may believe that
it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the
other. (People vs Genosa)
‣ A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and
common law partners are both relevant and necessary. (People vs Genosa)
‣ "How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask:
Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could
she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her
bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the
reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called 'battered wife syndrome.’
‣ To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable
person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be
consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is
essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about battered women.
‣ Acute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping responses to the trauma at the
expense of the victim's ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma. The victim ceases to believe
that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect. (People vs Genosa)
‣ Just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior of her partner, she also
believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no escape. Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive
anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship. Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only
because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be found
and hurt even more. (People vs Genosa)
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. – Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status
offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking
laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly
conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling,
mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be
imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at
the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for
in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a ‘child at risk’ and not as a ‘child in conflict with the law’. The
ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children,
and for the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars
SEC. 58. Offenses Not Applicable to Children. - Persons below eighteen (18) years of age shall be exempt from
prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy
under Presidential Decree No. 1563, and sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619, such prosecution being
inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:
‣ Provided, That said persons shall undergo appropriate counseling and treatment program.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito),
his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily
confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution;
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means
of action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however
depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.
Article 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. - When the offender is a minor under
eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this
Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court
having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two
degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall
be imposed, but always in the proper period.
Article 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. - A penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of
the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11
and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which
may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
‣ RULE — WHEN THE OFFENDER ACTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES DURING THE COMMISSION OF THE
FELONY, HIS CRIMINAL LIABILITY IS REDUCED
‣ Mitigating circumstances do not entirely free the actor from criminal liability, but serve only to reduce the penalty.
‣ They do not change the nature of the crime, but only reduces the penalty provided by law.
‣ RATIONALE — they are based on the diminution (as opposed to complete absence) of either —
1. Freedom of action
2. Intent, or
‣ The defense must sufficiently prove its existence, the burden of proof is on them.
‣ They exist only in favor of the accused on whom it is attendant and cannot be enjoyed by his co-accused.
‣ Mitigating circumstances which arise from the following shall only serve to mitigate the liability of the principals,
accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant —
‣ The circumstances which consist in the following shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only
who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein —
‣ BUT — when there are two ordinary mitigating circumstances with no aggravating circumstance attendant, the
penalty is to lowered by one degree in the proper period, regardless of whether the penalty is divisible or indivisible
(Art. 64[5])
‣ These are those enumerated under Art. 13 (except minority under paragraph 2 which was repealed and modified by
RA 9344) —
c. Praeter intentionem
d. Sufficient provocation
g. Voluntary surrender
i. Physical defects
k. Analogous circumstances
‣ They are always considered whether the penalty imposable is divisible or indivisible
a. Art. 68 (as amended by RA 9344) — Minors over 15 and under 18 years of age who acted with discernment, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed, but always in the proper period
b. Art. 69 — If the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the
same or to exempt from criminal liability, if majority of such conditions are present. The penalty is lower by one or
two degrees, on the court’s discretion
a. Art. 268, par. 3 — Voluntary release of the person illegally detained within 3 days without the offender attaining his
purpose and before the institution of criminal action. The penalty is one degree lower
b. Art 333, par. 3 — Abandonment without justification of the house who committed adultery. The penalty is one
degree lower
c. Art. 255 — Infanticide was committed by the mother of the child or either of the maternal grandparents for the
purpose of concealing her or their dishonor, the penalty is lowered.
Can be offset by any aggravating circumstance Cannot be offset by any aggravating circumstance
Results in the benefit of lowering the imposable penalty to the Results in the benefit of lowering the imposable penalty, whether
minimum period. divisible or indivisible, by one or two degrees.
They are not considered when what is prescribed is a single Always considered whether the imposable penalty is divisible or
indivisible penalty invidivible
4. Sufficient provocation
7. Voluntary surrender
Lesser perversity of the offender
8. Voluntary plea of guilt
10. Illness diminishing the exercise of will- Diminution of intelligence and intent
power
a. Insanity/imbecility (but partial insanity may fall under illnesses diminishing the offender’s exercise of will-power)
‣ What may be absent is either one or both the last two requisites of — (1) reasonable necessity if the means
employed and (2) the lack of sufficient provocation (or as the case may be under defense of relatives and
strangers).
ii. Unlawful aggression and one other requisite is present (majority is present)— privileged mitigating under Art.
69
‣ Unlawful aggression is indispensable in self-defense, complete or otherwise. When unlawful aggression (by the
victim) alone is proved, such incomplete self-defense is to be appreciated as an ordinary mitigating
circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. When it is combined with another
element of self-defense, such incomplete self-defense becomes a privileged mitigating circumstance under
Article 69 of the same Code. Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code which provides for imposition of a penalty lower
by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law where the killing is not wholly excusable applies only where a
majority of the conditions required to justify a criminal act or exempt from liability are present. (People vs
Deopante 1996)
‣ The requisite that “That the evil sought to be avoided must actually exist” must always be present
‣ What may be absent are either or both of the last two requisites —
ii. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
i. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office
ii. That the injury caused or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
‣ The requisite that an order has been issued by a superior must always be present
‣ What may be absent are either or both of the last two requisites —
ii. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful and reasonable
‣ Requisites —
iii. The act is performed with due care without fault or intention of causing injury
‣ The first requisite must always be present, what may be absent is merely that the offender acted without
negligence
‣ Possible outcomes —
i. 3rd requisite is partially absent, as there was negligence (but no intent) — There is a culpable felony, falling
under Art. 365 punishing a felony with negligence or imprudence. In effect, there is a mitigating circumstance,
because the felony is lower than that provided for intentional felony
ii. First requisite is absent and the 3rd requisite is partially absence, as there was intent — intentional felony is
committed as the act is unlawful and with intent.
i. There is a threat which causes an uncontrollable fear of an evil greater than or at least equal to, that which he
is required to commit
ii. The threat promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it.
2. SENILITY (OVER 70 YEARS OF AGE) (ART. 13, [2])
‣ That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.
‣ NOTE — The portion on minors has already been repealed by RA 9344. Minors above 15 and under 18 acting with
discernment is a privileged mitigating circumstance under Art. 68. See discussion under “Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act” in the Chapter on Special Penal Laws
‣ The offender must at least be 70 years old (and 1 day?) when the felony was committed
‣ This is when the facts show that there is a notable and evident disproportion between the following —
‣ Intent is an internal state of mind, it must be judged by external acts, such as the means employed.
‣ It is the intention of the offender at the moment when he is committing the crime which is considered.
‣ This mitigating circumstance is only applicable to offenses resulting in physical injuries or material harm
‣ It should be appreciated where the accused had no intention to kill but only to inflict injuries when he attacked the
victim (People vs Flores)
‣ It is NOT applicable to culpable felonies or crimes where the intention of the offender is immaterial
‣ NOTE — The anti-hazing law expressly prohibits the application of this circumstance in favour of the offender.
‣ REQUISITES —
‣ Provocation pertains to any unjust, or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting,
inciting, or irritating anyone.
‣ Sufficient means adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its
gravity (People vs Court of Appeals 2001)
‣ The provocation must be sufficient but it must NOT amount to an unlawful aggression, otherwise it will be a
justifying circumstance under Art. 11
‣ To determine whether the provocation was sufficient, the following factors may be considered —
ii. Place and the time when the provocation was made
‣ “Immediate” means that no interval of time should elapse between the provocation and the commission of the
crime. (People vs Pagal)
‣ When there was already an appreciable interval of time, the conduct of the offended party could not have
excited the accused to the commission of the crime, he having had time to regard his reason and to exercise
self-control.
‣ What is the difference between Sufficient Provocation as a mitigating circumstance in itself and as an element
of Self-Defense?
‣ Sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance in itself is different from sufficient provocation as an element of
incomplete self-defence but both are considered mitigating circumstances.
2. As a mitigating circumstance in itself — it pertains to the presence on the part of the offended party/victim.
‣ REQUISITES —
a. THAT THERE BE A GRAVE OFFENSE DONE TO THE ONE COMMITTING THE FELONY, HIS SPOUSE, ASCENDANTS,
DESCENDANTS, LEGITIMATE NATURAL OR ADOPTED BROTHERS OR SISTERS OR RELATIVES BY AFFINITY WITHIN THE
SAME DEGREES
‣ The grave offense may be committed against the surviving spouse of the deceased relative
‣ The relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased
spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity (Intestate of Gonzales
Vda. De Carungcong vs People 2010)
‣ “Grave offense” does NOT have a technical meaning. It pertains to an offense of a grave nature directed
against the “honor” of the person or his relatives
‣ It need not be a crime itself. It may be any act or event which offenders the accused causing mental agony
to him and moves to him vindicate himself of such offense
‣ The question of whether a certain personal offense is grave must be decided by the court, having in mind
the social standing of the person, the time and place the insult was made. (People vs Ruiz)
i. Sarcastic remark implying that the accused was a petty tyrant (People vs Batiquin)
ii. Insulting remarks which seriously embarrassed the accused (People vs Rosel)
iii. Committing a crime against the accused’s spouse or relatives (US vs Alcasid)
b. THAT THE FELONY IS COMMITTED IN VINDICATION OF SUCH GRAVE OFFENSE WITHIN A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME
‣ The vindication need NOT be immediate, as long as it was the “proximate cause” and within a reasonable
amount of time
‣ Note that despite the wording in Art. 13(5), “immediate” used in the english text is not the correct translation.
The spanish text uses the word “proxima”.
‣ A lapse of time is allowed between the vindication ad the doing of the grave offense.
‣ Proximate allows for a lapse of time as long as the offender is still suffering from the mental agony brought
about by the offense to him.
‣ Although the grave offense (slapping of the accused by the deceased was not so immediate, it was held that
the influence thereof, by reason of its gravity and the circumstances under which it was inflicted, lasted until
the moment the crime was committed (People vs Parana)
‣ In one case, two or three days was held to be a sufficient lapse of time for mitigation (People vs Diokno)
‣ This circumstance cannot be considered in favour of the accused when he had sufficient time to recover his
serenity (People vs Santos)
‣ The provocation should be proportionate to the damage caused by the act and adequate to stir one to its
commission (People vs Lopez)
‣ What is the difference between Vindication and Provocation?
‣ As to the acts done by the offended party — In vindication, the offended party must have done a grave offense. In
provocation, the cause that brought about the provocation need not be a grave offense.
‣ As to who is the acts constituting a grave offense or sufficient are directed towards — In vindication, the grave
offense may be directed or committed against the offender’s relatives mentioned by law. In provocation, it is made
directly only to the person committing the felony.
‣ As to the time element of the grave offense/provocation — In vindication, it may be proximate, which admits of an
interval of time between the grave offense done by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the
accused. In provocation, it is necessary that the provocation or threat immediately preceded the act such that
there was no appreciable interval of time between the provocation and the commission of the crime.
6. PASSION AND OBFUSCATION (ART. 13, [6])
‣ That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
‣ When there are causes naturally producing in a person a powerful excitement, he loses his reason and self-control,
thereby diminishing the exercise of his will-power (US vs Salandanan)
‣ REQUISITES —
a. The accused acted upon an impulse so powerful that it naturally produced passion or obfuscation in him
‣ If the cause of the loss of was trivial and slight, the obfuscation is not mitigating.
b. The impulse arose out of the lawful sentiments of the offender such that it was created by unlawful or
unjust acts by the offended party.
‣ Passion or obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments of the offender. Meaning that the crime committed by
the accused must be provoked by prior unjust or unlawful acts of the injured party.
‣ My girlfriend left me for another guy, thus, I killed her out of passion. This is NOT mitigating as the
impulse arose from vicious, unworthy and immoral passions, NOT from legitimate feelings.
‣ The accused saw a naked woman which was the sexiest woman he has seen in his entire life. Claiming,
that an uncontrollable lust took over his mind and provoked passions, he raped her. This is NOT
mitigating as the impulse was created by immoral sentiments. (People vs Sanico)
‣ The exercise of a right or fulfilment of duty by the injured party is NOT a proper source of passion or
obfuscation
‣ The cause producing passion or obfuscation must come from the offended party, not from third persons
(People vs Lao)
c. Such act must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable amount of time,
during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity
‣ An appreciable amount of time must not have lapsed between the acts which created the impulse and the
crime. (but it may fall under vindication)
‣ The defense must prove that the act which produced passion or obfuscation took place at a time not far
removed from the commission of the crime
‣ Passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which is planned and calmly meditated before its
execution. It presupposes a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury in the “spur of the
moment” (People vs Pagal 1977)
‣ NO. Passion and obfuscation is absorbed by vindication. Therefore, the are incompatible with each other.
They cannot be counted separately and independently (People vs Dagatan)
‣ EXCEPT — When there are other facts, although closely connected, both may be appreciated as mitigating
circumstances.
‣ Where the deceased had eloped with the daughter of the accused, and later when the deceased saw
the accused coming, he ran upstairs in his house, there are two facts which are closely connected (1)
the elopement which is a grave offense to family of old customs; and (2) refusal to deal with him, a
stimulus strong enough to produce in his mind a fit of passion. The two mitigating circumstances of
vindication and passion or obfuscation were considered in favour of the accused. (People vs Diokno)
‣ NOTE — However, Passion or Obfuscation is compatible with praeter intentionem (People vs Cabel)
‣ What is the difference between Passion or Obfuscation and Irresistible Force?
‣ Passion or obfuscation cannot give rise to irresistible force as the latter requires a physical force, while the
former is an internal impulse created by unjust or unlawful acts.
‣ Passion or obfuscation comes from the offender himself. Irresistible Force comes from a third person.
‣ Since provocation comes from the injured party, passion or obfuscation is produced by an impulse which may
be caused by provocation.
‣ Provocation must immediately precede the commission of the crime. In passion or obfuscation an amount of
time may pass as long as the offender has not recovered his normal equanimity.
‣ In both, the effect is the loss of reason and self-control of the offender.
‣ All three of these are based on the same group, which is the overwhelming emotion that blinds a person or
causes him to lose reason and equanimity. Thus, the offender cannot be credited with three mitigating
circumstances but only one if all of these are involved in a case.
7. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER (ART. 13, [7])
‣ That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents
‣ REQUISITES —
‣ But there is no requirement that the surrender be prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
b. THAT THE OFFENDER SPONTANEOUSLY AND VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED HIMSELF BECAUSE HE ACKNOWLEDGES HIS
GUILT OR WISHES TO SAVE THE TROUBLE AND EXPENSES NECESSARILY INCURRED IN HIS SEARCH AND CAPTURE.
‣ It must be spontaneous and deliberate in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because —
ii. He wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. (People
vs Gervacio)
‣ If the surrender was not because of these two reasons, his surrender was obviously motivated by an
intention to ensure his safety, his arrest being inevitable, in such case the surrender is not spontaenous,
thus, not voluntary. (People vs Laurel)
‣ His conduct after the commission of the crime, must indicate a desire on his part to own the responsibility for
the crime (People vs Flores)
‣ “Spontaenous” emphasises the idea of inner impulse, citing without external stimulus. The conduct of the
accused, not his intention alone, after the commission of the offense, determines the spontaneity of the
surrender.
‣ It doesn’t simply mean “non-flight”. It does not matter if the accused never avoided arrest and never hid or
fled. What the law considers as mitigating is the voluntary surrender of the accused before his arrest, showing
either the acknowledgement of his guilt or an intention to save the authorities from the trouble and expense
that his search and capture would require (Quial vs CA)
‣ Voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in favour of an accused who surrenders only after a warrant of
arrest is issued and he finds it futile to continue being a fugitive from justice. (People vs Rodriguez 1982)
‣ NOTE — It seems that the court considers the motive behind the surrender.
‣ When the offender imposed a condition or acted with external stimulus, his surrender is not voluntary. It cannot
be forced by external circumstances.
‣ Such as when the culprits considered it impossible to live in hostility and resistance to the authorities in
view of the fact that the said authorities had neither given them rest nor left them in peace for a moment
(People vs Sakam)
ii. Agent of person in authority — a person who, by direct provision of law, or by election or by appointment by
competent authority is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life
and property and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority (Art. 152, as amended by RA 1978)
d. THE SURRENDER MUST BE BY REASON OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME FOR WHICH THE OFFENDER IS PROSECUTED
‣ Defendant cannot claim the circumstance of voluntary surrender because he did not surrender to the authority
or its agents by reason of the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted, but for some other crime.
(People vs Semanada)
‣ REQUISITES —
a. That the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt and entered a plea of guilt
b. That the confession of guilt was made in open court, before the competent court that is to try the case
‣ The extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not the voluntary confession or plea of guilt contemplated.
Such confession was made out of court. The confession of guilty must be made in open court. It must be
judicial (People vs Pardo)
‣ The trial on the merits had commenced and the prosecution had already presented evidence proving the guilt
of the accused when he manifested that he would change his plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty. He was
properly re-arraigned. As plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had being does not entitle the
accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance (People vs Lungbos)
‣ The benefit of plea of guilty is not deserved by the accused who submits to the law only after the presentation
of some evidence for the prosecution, believing that in the end, the trial will result in his conviction by virtue
thereof. (People vs De la Cruz)
‣ It is not necessary that all the evidence of the prosecution have been presented. Even if the first witness
presented by the prosecution had not finished testifying during the direct examination when the accused
withdrew his former plea of “not guilty” and substituted it with the plea of “guilty” it is NOT mitigating (People
vs Lambino)
‣ Withdrawal of plea of not guilty and pleading guilty before presentation of evidence by prosecution is still
mitigating
‣ All that the law requires is voluntary plea of guilty prior to the presentation of the evidence by the
prosecution. Thus, even if during arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty, he is entitled to this
mitigating circumstance as long as he withdraws his plea of not guilty and thereafter pledges guilty to the
charge before the fiscal could present his evidence.
‣ This is because the rationale of spontaneous willingness of the accused to admit to the commission of the
crime charged is absent. (People vs Fortuno)
‣ If the rule were otherwise, the accused, who naturally nourishes the hope of acquittal, could deliberately
plead not guilty in the municipal court, and upon conviction and on appeal, plea guilty so just he can avail
of the benefit of a mitigating circumstance. The accused should not be allowed to speculate (People vs
Oandasan)
‣ What if the accused wants to plea guilty during trial? Is there a way this could be considered as mitigating?
‣ YES. Plea of guilty to the offense charged in the amended information, lesser than that charged in the original
information, is mitigating.
‣ The prosecution can amend the information, with leave of court, for the accused to plead guilty to the new
information based on a lesser offense. Since this was an entirely new information and no evidence was presented
in connection with the charge made therein before the accused entered his plea of guilt. The accused is entitled to
a mitigating circumstance (People vs Ortiz 1965)
‣ But note that plea of guilty to a lesser offense itself is NOT mitigating. The plea of guilty must be to the offense
charged. The plea cannot be conditional or qualified. (People vs Noble).
‣ Except: If the accused pled guilty to the offense charged but manifested the absence of a aggravating
circumstance which was alleged in the information, and the court required the presentation of evidence on the
aggravating circumstance, which the prosecution failed to proved. In this case, the qualification did not deny
the defendant’s guilty, as it was subsequently justified. It was not the defendant’s fact that the aggravating
circumstance was erroneously alleged. (People vs Yturriaga)
‣ May voluntary plea of guilt and voluntary surrender be both appreciated as mitigating in one case?
‣ YES. These two circumstances are separate and distinct from each other. They do not arise out of the same facts
and circumstances, hence, will entitle the offender to two mitigating circumstances when both are present.
‣ REQUISITES —
a. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect
‣ Note that this paragraph does not distinguish between educated and uneducated deaf-mutes or blind persons.
b. Such defect restricts his means of action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings.
‣ The offender’s being deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering from some physical defect must relate to the
offense because the law requires that the defect has the effect of restricting his means of action, defense or
communication to his fellow human beings.
‣ The fact that appellant suffers from a physical defect, a severed left hand, does not mean that he should
automatically be credited with the mitigating circumstance contained in paragraph 8, Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code. In order for this condition to be appreciated, it must be shown that such physical defect limited his
means to act, defend himself or communicate with his fellow beings to such an extent that he did not have
complete freedom of action, consequently resulting in diminution of the element of voluntariness. Such cannot
be appreciated in the case at bar where the appellant's physical condition clearly did not limit his means of
action, defense or communication, nor affect his free will. In fact, despite his handicap, appellant nevertheless
managed to attack, overcome and fatally stab his victim. The fact that he had only one hand in no way limited
his freedom of action to commit the crime (People vs Deopante 1996)
‣ Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving
him of the consciousness of his acts.
‣ REQUISITES —
a. That the illness of the offender must diminish the exercise of his will-power
‣ This may cover illnesses of the mind, body, nerves, or the moral faculty. (People vs Francisco)
b. That such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts
‣ It must merely limit, not deprive the offender of conscious of his acts.
‣ If the illness deprives the offender completely of intelligence, then it is exempting under insanity.
‣ Such as —
a. Offender was over 60 years old and with failing sight is analogous to senility (People vs Reantillo 1938)
b. Restitution in malversation of public funds is analogous to voluntary plea of guilty (Nizurtado vs SB 1994)
c. Testifying for the prosecution is analogous to plea of guilty (People vs Navasca 1977)
‣ But some older cases say it may mitigate in property crimes (such as theft) as analogous to incomplete state of
necessity (People vs Agustin 1966; People vs Macbul)
‣ By virtue of RA 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, minority is always at least a privileged mitigating
circumstance
b. Minors over 15 years but under 18 acting without discernment — exempting circumstance
c. Minors over 15 years but under 18 acting with discernment — privileged mitigating under Art. 68
‣ It is necessary that there be present a majority of the elements of the mitigating circumstance for Art. 69 to apply.
‣ When the circumstance only requires two elements, the presence of one is considered a majority. This is a privileged
mitigating circumstance which cannot be offset by any aggravating circumstance and is considered even if the penalty
prescribed is single and indivisible under par. 1 of Art. 63. (People vs Oanis)
‣ If there is only one or less than majority of the elements present, the incompleteness is a mitigating circumstance
under Art. 13, and can be offset by a generic aggravating circumstance.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion of insurrection, or
attempted coup d’ etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or
attempted coup d’ etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation of this Act shall be considered as a
distinct and separate offense.
‣ RULE — WHEN THE OFFENDER ACTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES DURING THE COMMISSION OF THE
FELONY, HIS CRIMINAL LIABILITY IS INCREASED
‣ They are based on the offender’s greater perversity manifested in the commission of the felony as shown by —
4. The time, or
‣ If aggravating circumstance (this includes both qualifying and generic) are not alleged in the information, they
cannot be taken into consideration. (Sec. 8, Rule 110, Rules of Criminal Procedure)
‣ Even if the qualifying circumstance was proven by the prosecution, but was not alleged, it cannot be taken into
account, even as a generic aggravating circumstance (Rugas vs People 2004)
‣ RATIONALE — Due process considerations and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him so that he can adequately prepare for his defense.
‣ Aggravating circumstances which arise from the following shall only serve to aggravate the liability of the principals,
accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant —
‣ The circumstances which consist in the following shall serve to aggravate the liability of those persons only who had
knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein:
‣ They may be —
a. Generic Aggravating — Circumstances under Art. 14 that apply to all kinds of crimes
‣ These are the circumstances in Art. 14, par 1, 2, 3 (dwelling), 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20 (except by means
of motor vehicles)
b. Specific Aggravating — Circumstances under Art. 14 that apply only to particular kinds of crimes
i. Insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party (Art. 14[3]) — applies only to crimes against
persons and crimes against honor
ii. Superior strength or weakening of defense (Art. 14[15]) — applies only to crimes against persons and
crimes against property
iv. Ignominy (Art. 14[17])— applies only to crimes against chastity and crimes against persons (but it has been
recognized as aggravating in light and grave coercion and treason)
v. Cruelty (Art. 14[21])— applies only to crimes against chastity and crimes against persons (but it has been
recognized as aggravating in treason)
2. SPECIAL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES — INCREASES THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY, AS THE CASE MAY BE
‣ Unlike generic aggravating circumstances, these CANNOT be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances (People vs
De Leon 2009)
‣ Unlike qualifying circumstances, these do not change that character of the offense charged but guides the court in
imposing the proper penalty.
‣ Such as —
‣ When advantage is taken by the public officer of his official position (Art. 62[1a] as amended by RA 7659)
3. QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES — MERELY SERVES TO CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE CRIME
‣ Those that change the nature of the crime (however the practical effect is also to increase the imposable penalty)
‣ Such as —
‣ Art. 248 — homicide qualified to murder by the following circumstances —
a. Treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
c. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means
involving great waste and ruin.
d. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of
a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
f. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at
his person or corpse.
‣ See Art. 62 (1,2) — Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by
law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken
into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. The same rule shall apply with respect to any
aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the
commission thereof.
‣ Such as —
‣ “That the crime be committed by means of fire” under Art. 14(12) is in itself a crime of arson (Art. 321) or
crime involving destruction. (Art. 324). It is not to be considered to increase the penalty for such crimes.
‣ That the crime be committed by means of “derailment of a locomotive under Art. 14(12) is not considered as
aggravating in the crime described in Art. 330 known as “damages and obstruction to means of
communication”. Art. 330 already punishes the act of damaging any railway resulting in derailment of cars.
‣ See Art. 62 (1,2) — Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by
law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken
into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. The same rule shall apply with respect to any
aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the
commission thereof.
‣ Such as —
‣ “That the act be committing in the dwelling of the offended party” under Art. 14(3) or “that the crime be
committed after an unlawful entry under Art. 14(18), or “that as a means to the commission of a crime, a
wall, roof, floor, door, or window, be broken under Art. 14(19) is included by Art. 299 in defining robbery in
an inhabited house. It shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty for that kind
of robbery.
‣ Abuse of confidence is not aggravating in qualified theft committed with grave abuse of confidence (Art.
310)
c. Inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof
‣ These are circumstances which necessarily accompany the commission of the crime.
‣ See Art. 62 (1,2) — Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by
law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken
into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. The same rule shall apply with respect to any
aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the
commission thereof.
‣ Such as —
‣ Taking advantage of public position is inherent in crimes where the offenders, who are public officers
‣ This is when an aggravating circumstance may be absorbed by other aggravating or qualifying circumstance
‣ Such as —
‣ Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength, aid of armed mend, by a band, means to weaken the
defense, nocturnity, craft, age and sex
These are the circumstances These are circumstances in the RPC These are circumstances These may be circumstances
enumerated under Art. 14 or provided for in special laws which in the RPC or provided —
imposed
2. Inherent in the crime
3. Inherent in other
aggravating
circumstances
3. Insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex (Art. 14[3])
7. Crime committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or where public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship (Art. 14[5])
25. Motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means (Art. 14[20])
26. Cruelty (Art. 14[21])
‣ Basis — greater perversity of the offender, as shown by his personal circumstance, and also, by the means used to
secure the commission of the crime.
‣ NOTE — this has already been superseded by the amendment of RA 7659 to Art. 62. It is now treated as a special
aggravating circumstance. (see discussion in special aggravating circumstances)
2. IN CONTEMPT OR WITH INSULT TO THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES (ART. 14[2])
‣ That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to the public authorities.
‣ Basis — greater perversity of the offender, as shown by his lack of respect for the public authorities
‣ REQUISITES —
‣ BOADO — Public authority covers not only persons in authority but also their agents and other public officers.
It should have broad application and should not merely be limited to persons in authority as used and defined
under Art. 148 and 152
‣ REYES — Public authority covers merely those “persons in authority”, as defined under Art. 152. It does NOT
cover their agents.
‣ Persons in authority— those directly vested with jurisdiction to govern and execute laws.
‣ Agents of persons in authority — those who, by direct provision of law, or by election or appointment, is
charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property. This also
include sonar person who comes to the aid of persons in authority.
c. The public authority’s presence has not prevented the offender from committing the act
‣ This is what would make the crime “in contempt of or with insult” to such public authority
d. Such public authority is not the person against whom the crime is committed
‣ In this case, the crime is not anymore committed “in contempt of or with insult” too him, but a crime directly
committed against him.
‣ NOTE — If the crime was direct against the public authority then the crime committed may fall under direct
assault and as such, this aggravating circumstance will be absorbed as an inherent element in direct assault.
e. The offender has knowledge of the person’s being one of public authority
‣ The rationale of the aggravating circumstance is because the offender shows disrespect in committing the
felony notwithstanding the presence of the public authority. Thus, his knowledge of the identity of the public
authority is material.
3. INSULT OR IN DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY (ART. 14[3])
‣ That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age,
or sex
‣ Basis — greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the personal circumstances of the offended party. Those
generally considered of high station in life, on account of rank, age or sex deserve to be respected. Therefore,
whenever there is a difference in social condition between the offender and the offended party, any of these
circumstances sometimes is present. (People vs Rodil)
‣ REQUISITES —
a. The crime committed is classified as a “crime against persons” or “crimes against honor”
‣ Thus, when the crime is one against property, this is not aggravating since the mere fact that the thing belongs
to a person of high rank does not make it more valuable that the things belonging to another person of low
rank.
b. The offender must have deliberately intended the insult or disrespect against the offended party’s rank,
age, or sex
‣ There must be specific proof which shows that the offender’s intent was to deliberately insult or disrespect.
‣ There must be knowledge of the offended party’s rank, age, or sex as the case may be
‣ Thus, these circumstances cannot co-exist with passion or obfuscation where the offended has partially lost
his control or reason
‣ The mere fact that the victim is a woman does not mean this circumstance is present, there must be some
other aspect of the crime which specially insult or disrespect her womanhood
‣ Rank refers to a high social position or standing, it should be given its plain, ordinary meaning.
‣ Such as — a grade in the armed forces, high relative position in civil or social life
‣ Not aggravating when the rank, age or sex is an integral element of the crime committed.
‣ Such as — Direct assault, when being a woman is indispensable in the commission of the crime
4. DWELLING OF THE OFFENDED PARTY (ART. 14[3])
‣ That is be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation.
‣ Basis — greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the place of the commission of the crime. It reveals the
offender’s greater perversity in deliberately invading the tranquility of one’s residence. The law accord the sanctity of
privacy and sacredness of peace in one’s abode. It also violates the abuse of confidence which the offended party
reposed in the offender by opening his home to him.
‣ What is a “dwelling”?
‣ “Dwelling” must be a building or structure exclusively used for rest and comfort. It includes dependencies,
staircase, and an enclosure connected to the house.
‣ Thus, if the house is also a store, then it cannot be considered a dwelling. A market stall where the offended party
slept is not a dwelling.
‣ REQUISITES —
a. The offended party must be inside his dwelling when the crime was committed
‣ A person may have multiple dwellings, commission of the crime in any of them is aggravating.
‣ NOTE — The offender need NOT be inside the dwelling. He need not enter. It is sufficient that the crime was
committed against a person inside his own dwelling. The attack may be made from outside the house. (People
vs Ompaid 1969)
‣ It is not necessary that the house is owned by the offended party. He may be a lessee, boarded or bed spacer.
‣ What if the offended party was attacked as a guest while staying at another’s house?
‣ Guest — this is still aggravating as the offended party has made the house his dwelling even for a
temporary period. (People vs Basa)
b. The offended party must NOT have given sufficient and immediate provocation
‣ Thus, dwelling is still considered aggravating when the provocation was not sufficient, or not immediate to the
commission of the crime, or when it was not given by the offended party. (People vs Tiguman)
‣ NOTE — the prosecution must prove that no provocation was given by the offended party, this cannot be
presumed. (People vs Pakah)
c. The offender must NOT reside in the same dwelling as the offended party
‣ Obviously in this case, the rationale is lost. (See — US vs Rodriguez, People vs Caliso, People vs Morales)
‣ EXCEPT — if adultery is committed in the dwelling of the husband, even if it is also the dwelling of the
unfaithful wife. it is aggravating because it is a breach of the latter’s fidelity she owes to her husband (US vs
Ibanez)
‣ Not aggravating when crime could only be committed in the dwelling of the offended party
‣ Such as — trespass to dwelling, robbery with force upon things in an inhabited house (Art. 299)
5. ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE (ART. 14[4])
‣ That the act be committed with abuse of confidence XXXX
‣ Basis — the greater perversity of the offender as shown by the means and ways employed
‣ REQUISITES —
b. The offender abused such trust and such abuse of confidence facilitated the commission of the crime
‣ The mere fact that confidence was interposed by the victim in the offender does not mean it is aggravating.
Such confidence interposed must facilitate the commission of the crime. It must have been an integral part on
the accomplishment of the crime.
‣ The abuse of confidence must exist at the time the crime was committed.
‣ Not aggravating when abuse of confidence is an integral element in the crime charged
‣ Such as — malversation (Art. 217), qualified theft (Art. 310), estafa by conversion or misappropriation (Art. 315)
qualified seduction (Art. 337)
6. OBVIOUS UNGRATEFULNESS (ART. 14[4])
‣ That the act be committed with XXXX obvious ungratefulness.
‣ Basis — the greater perversity of the offender as shown by the means and ways employed
‣ That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or where public authorities are
engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship.
‣ Basis — the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the place of the commission of the crime, which must be
respected.
‣ REQUISITES —
‣ Regardless of whether official functions are being held when the crime was committed
iii. Place where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties
‣ This pertains to the very place or office where the public authorities are principally engaged in the exercise
of their functions
‣ NOTE — The public authorities must actually be in the actual performance of their duties when the crime
was committed. This is unlike the other three places enumerated under this paragraph.
‣ Such as — a church or temple (but not a cemetery, unless its a church inside one)
‣ Regardless of whether religious functions are being held when the crime was committed
b. The offender must have the intention to commit the crime when he entered the place
‣ SEE — People vs Jaurigue, 76 Phi. 174
‣ In this case, the offender committed killed the victim while inside a chapel because the latter placed his
hand or her thigh. The court did not appreciate the aggravating circumstance of “place of religious worship”
since there is no evidence to show that the defendant had murder in her heart when she entered the
chapel.
‣ REYES — This ruling seems to be applicable to the other places in this paragraph.
‣ What is the difference when the crime is committed under Art. 14. par. 5 (in the place where the public
authorities are engaged in the discharged of their duties) and Art. 14, par. 2 (in contempt of, or with insult to
public authorities)?
‣ Similarities — in both, the public authorities are engaged in the performance of their duties
‣ Differences —
‣ Art. 14, par. 5 — the public authorities are in the very place or office where their duties are principally
performed. The public authority may also be the offended party.
‣ Art. 14, par. 2 — the public authorities are performing their duties outside their office. The public authority
cannot be the offended party here.
8. NOCTURNITY (ART. 14[6])
‣ That the crime be committed in the night time XXXXXX whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of
the offense.
‣ NOTE — Nocturnity, uninhabited place and band are three distinct and separate aggravating circumstance which may
be considered separately. (People vs Cunanan)
‣ REQUISITES —
‣ Nighttime is that period of darkness beginning at end of dusk and ending at dawn.
‣ The crime must have begun at night, not at daytime. (People vs Luchico)
‣ It must begin and end in the darkness of the night. (US vs Dowdell)
‣ The crime must also be committed in the darkness of the night. Thus, when it was nighttime, but the place was
well-lit, it is not aggravating. (People vs Joson, People vs Bato 1967)
‣ BUT — the mere fact that flashlights were used does not negate the application of this aggravating
circumstance. (People vs Berbal 1989)
‣ Impunity means “to prevent being recognized” or to “secure himself from detection and punishment”
‣ There must be a deliberate intent by the offender in taking advantage of this circumstance, and NOT merely
incidental to the commission of the crime.
‣ In itself nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance, and becomes one only where it is specially sought by the
offender or taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime or to avoid discovery and thus
minimize the risk of capture. (People vs Tapales 1979)
‣ NOTE — this is a “soft” requisite, there are several cases where the Court said that as long as the circumstance
facilitated the commission of the crime, it may already be appreciated. I guess it depends on how the
circumstance contributed to the commission of the crime, how big a factor it played, on a case-to-case basis.
‣ An uninhabited place is on where there are no houses at all, a place at a considerable distance from town, or
where houses are scattered at a great distance from each other.
‣ This aggravating circumstance should NOT considered when the place where the crime was committed could
be seen and the voice of the deceased could be heard from a nearby house. (People vs Laoto)
‣ TEST — whether or not, in the place of the commission of the offense, there was a reasonable possibility of the
victim receiving some help
c. It must be especially sought and taken advantage for by the offender to insure the commission of the
crime or for the purpose of impunity
a. The crime was committed by a band (at least 4 malefactors acting together in the commission of the
offense)
ii. At least 4 armed men must take direct part in the execution of the acts constituting the crime
‣ Thus, if there were 4 armed mean but one of them is merely a principal by inducement, they do not form a
band
d. It must be especially sought and taken advantage for by the offender to insure the commission of the
crime or for the purpose of impunity
‣ NOTE — abuse of superior strength and use of firearms, are absorbed in aggravating circumstance of “by a
band” (People vs Escabarte 1988)
11. CONFLAGRATION, SHIPWRECK, EARTHQUAKE, EPIDEMIC OR OTHER CALAMITY OR MISFORTUNE (ART. 14[7])
‣ That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or
misfortune.
‣ Basis — the time of the commission of the offense. The reason for the existence of this circumstance is found in the
debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted,
adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them. (US vs Rodriguez)
‣ REQUISITES —
i. Conflagration (fire)
ii. Shipwreck
iii. Earthquake
iv. Epidemic
v. Other calamity or misfortune — this must be of a similar nature to the first four circumstances ejusdem generis
‣ The mere fact that the crime was committed during a calamity or misfortune does not automatically make it
aggravating.
12. AID OF ARMED MEN OR PERSONS WHO INSURE OR AFFORD IMPUNITY (ART. 14[8])
‣ That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
‣ REQUISITES —
a. That armed men took part, directly or indirectly, in the commission of the crime
b. That the accused availed himself of their aid and relied upon them when the crime was committed or relied
upon them to insure or afford impunity
‣ The casual presence of the armed men near the place where the crime was committed does not constitute an
aggravating circumstance when it appears that the accused did not avail of himself of their aid or rely upon
them to commit the the crime.
‣ NOTE — Actual aid is not necessary, it is enough that the accused relied upon their aid
‣ It has been held that this aggravating circumstance is absent when the accused, as well as those who
cooperated with him in the commission of the crime, acted under the same plan and for the same purpose.
(People vs Piring, People vs Candado 1978)
‣ The armed men must merely “aid” the accused in the sense that the accused was the originator of the plan
and was the mastermind. The armed men are merely “hencemen”. This is the case even if all the acts of
execution were committed by the armed men by the inducement of the accused.
‣ What is the difference between par. 8 “with the aid of armed men” and par. 6 “committed by a band”?
‣ With the aid of armed men (Art. 14, par. 8) — it is not necessary that the armed men facilitated the commission of
the offense, as long as the accused relied upon their aid for accomplishing the crime or to afford impunity. Also the
armed men need not be at least 4.
‣ Committed by a band (Art. 14, par. 6) — there must at least be 4 armed men who directly facilitated the
commission of the offense
‣ NOTE — “aid of armed men” is absorbed by “committed by a band”. This is because the former necessarily
inheres in the latter.
13. RECIDIVISM (ART. 14[9])
‣ That the accused is a recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.
‣ Basis — the greater perversity of the offender as shown by his inclination to crimes
‣ REQUISITES —
‣ This means the offender is charged with another felony after committing a previous one.
‣ NOTE — There is limit or maximum period of interval between the first and subsequent felony.
‣ The offender is charged with a later felony, after being convicted by final judgment of a previous one.
‣ What is controlling is the time of the trial, and NOT the time of the commission of the crime.
‣ At the time of the trial for the felony, the accused must have been previously convicted by final judgement of
another felony.
‣ Trial does NOT merely pertain to the start of the prosecution, such as the date of arraignment. It is employed in
its general sense. It is meant to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from arraignment until
after sentence is announced by the judge in open court. (People vs Lagarto)
‣ The conviction must be by final judgement, meaning the appeal has lapsed or has been resolved already.
‣ NOTE — a pardon does not obliterate the fact that the accused was previously convicted of a felony. It does
not prevent a former conviction from being considered as an aggravating circumstance
c. The previous conviction by final judgment was for a felony committed PRIOR to the felony he is currently
being charged and tried
‣ Thus, there is no recidivism if the subsequent conviction was for felony committed BEFORE the felony in the
prior conviction. (People vs Baldera)
‣ NOTE — the time criteria to be observed is (1) the time of the conviction by final judgment, and (2) the time
when the felony was committed. Everything must be prospective.
d. That both the first and the second offences are embraced in the same title of the RPC
‣ Both felonies must be punished under the same title of the RPC
‣ Such as — robbery and theft are under title 10 referring to crimes against property
‣ Thus, if either was crime punished under special specials, there is no recidivism
‣ Neither is there recidivism if the crime is a felony but punished under different titles in the RPC
‣ Such as — physical injuries (crime against persons) and kidnapping (crimes against liberty)
14. REITERACION OR HABITUALITY (ART. 14[10])
‣ That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or
for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
‣ Basis — the greater perversity of the offender as shown by his inclination to crimes
‣ REQUISITES —
i. An offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater sentence than that attached for the new offense
ii. Two offenses to which the law attaches with lighter sentences than that attached for the new offense
‣ NOTE — The penalty “attached” by law is the determining factor, and not the duration of the sentence actually served
by the offender. Also, there is no distinction as to the crime to which the penalties are imposed, it may be any other
crime in the RPC or special penal laws.
‣ What is the difference between reiteracion (par. 10) and recidivism (par. 9)?
‣ Similarities — Both are based on the inclination of the offender to commit crimes
‣ Differences —
‣ Reiteracion (par. 10) — It is necessary that the offender has served out his sentence for the prior offenses.
Also, the prior and subsequent offense need NOT be in the same title of the RPC. It applies to all crimes
punished under the RPC or special penal laws
‣ Recidivism (par. 9) — It is enough that there is conviction by final judgment in the prior offense (regardless
whether sentence has been served). Also, both the prior and subsequent offense must be felonies punished
under the same title of the RPC.
(can be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances) (cannot be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances)
Increases the imposable penalty to the maximum period Another additional, distinct and separate Increases the
penalty is to be imposed upon the habitual imposable penalty to
delinquent the maximum period
1. That the offender on trial 1. The accused is on trial 1. That the offender had been convicted 1. The offender
for a subsequent felony
for a new offense
of any of following the crimes of — (a) commits a
serious or less serious physical subsequent
2. That he was previously 2. That he previously
injuries, (b) robbery, (c) theft, (d) felony after
convicted by final served sentence for
estafa, (e) falsification
conviction by
judgment of another either following —
final judgment of
felony 2. That after conviction or after serving
a. An offense to which the the prior felony
‣ Basis — the greater perversity of the offender as shown by the motivating power itself.
‣ REQUISITES —
b. The offender offers a price, reward, or promise to the another who accepts it as the primary consideration
for the commission of the crime
‣ When this aggravating circumstance is present, there must be two or more principals, the one who gives or
offers the price, reward, or promise, and the one who accepts it, both are principals.
‣ The price, reward or promise must be the motivating factor and primary consideration of the acceptor. It must
be a promise previous to the commission of the crime, and not merely as an afterthought in the form of a
reward
‣ NOTE — this aggravating circumstances affects BOTH the offender induced and the offender who makes the
offer. (People vs Canete 1984)
16. INUNDATION, FIRE, POISON, EXPLOSION, STRANDING OF A VESSEL OR INTERNATIONAL DAMAGE THERETO, DERAILMENT OF A
LOCOMOTIVE, OR BY THE USE OF ANY OTHER ARTIFICE INVOLVING GREAT WASTE AND RUIN (ART. 14[12])
‣ That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or international
damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin.
‣ REQUISITES —
i. Inundation (flooding)
ii. Fire
iii. Poison
iv. Explosion
vii. By the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin
‣ When the presence of this aggravating circumstance already qualifies the crime, it cannot be used as a generic
aggravating circumstance anymore, as it is already included by the law in defining such crimes.
‣ Such as — when any of such circumstances are used as a means to kill another person, its qualifies homicide
to murder. (Art. 248)
17. EVIDENT PREMEDITATION (ART. 14[13])
‣ That the act be committed with evidence premeditation
‣ Basis — has reference to the ways of committing the crime because it implies a deliberate planning of the act before
executing it.
‣ REQUISITES —
a. The time when the offender determined to commit the crime must be proven and established
‣ The prosecution must establish how and when the plan to commit the crime was hatched
‣ The date and, if possible, the time when the offender determined to c commit the crime is essential, because
the lapse of time for the purpose of the last requisite is computed from such date and time.
b. Acts manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination
‣ The premeditation must be evident. It must be based on external acts and not presumed from mere lapse of
time
‣ The criminal intent evident form outward acts must be notorious and manifest, and the purpose and
determination must be plain and have been adopted after mature consideration on the part of the persons who
conceived and resolved upon the perpetration of the crime, as a result of deliberation, meditation and reflection
sometime before its commission.
c. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will
‣ The execution of the crime must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out
the criminal intent.
‣ This is the essence of premeditation. The crime must be preceded with thinking and reflection before arriving at
a calm judgment.
‣ The offender must have na opportunity to cooly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning and the
consequences of what he planned to do, an interval long enough for his conscience and better judgment to
overcome his evil desire and scheme.
‣ Evident premeditation contemplates cold and deep meditation and tenacious persistence in the
accomplishment of the criminal act.
‣ Mere determination to commit the crime does not of itself establish evidence premeditation for it must appear,
not only that the accused made a decision to commit the crime prior to the moment of execution, but also that
his decision was the result of meditation, calculation, or reflection or persistent attempt.
‣ The amount of sufficient lapse of time depends on the circumstances of each case.
‣ Such as — robbery (except in robbery with homicide, where it may be aggravating SEE — People vs Nabual 1969)
‣ Can evident premeditation be taken into consideration if there was mistake in blow (aberratio ictus)?
‣ NO. SEE — People vs Hilario, G.R. No. 128083, March 16, 2001
‣ Evident premeditation, however, may not properly be taken into account when the person whom the defendant
proposed to kill was different from the one who became his victim. When the person decided to kill a different
person and premeditated on the killing of the latter, but when he carried out his plan he actually killed another
person, it cannot properly be said that he premeditated on the killing of the actual victim. Thus premeditation
was not aggravating in the case of People vs. Guillen, where the accused had deliberately intended to
assassinate former President Manuel Roxas but he killed instead Simeon Varela and wounded others. This
doctrinal rule applies here.
18. CRAFT, FRAUD OR DISGUISE (ART. 14[14])
‣ That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed.
‣ NOTE — this circumstance is characterized by the intellectual or mental rather than the physical means to which the
criminal resorts to carry out his design.
‣ This applies when any of the following means is employed in the commission of the crime —
a. Craft — involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the accused. It is usually done in order not to
arouse the suspicion of the victim.
b. Fraud — insidious words or machinations used to induce the victim to act in a manner which would enable the
offender to carry out his design
c. Disguise — resorting to any device for the purpose of enabling the offender to conceal his identity
19. ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH OR WEAKENING OF DEFENSE (ART. 14[15])
‣ That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense.
‣ NOTE — this aggravating circumstance applies only to crimes against persons and property (Reyes)
‣ Advantage of superior strength — means to use purposely excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked. The offender must deliberately take advantage of his superior strength
‣ Thus, when the offender acts with passion or obfuscation or when the crime arose unexpectedly, the offender may
have superior strength but did not take advantage of it.
‣ It is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the offender, assessing a
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of by him
in the commission of the crime.
‣ Such as — superior physical strength, numerical superiority, offender uses a powerful weapon which is out of
proportion to the defense available to the offended party
‣ Superior strength should not be taken into consideration in the case of a husband killing his wife, as sex is inherent
in the crime of parricide. It is generally accepted that the husband is stronger than the wife. (People vs Galapia
1978)
‣ NOTE — superior strength is absorbed and inherent in treachery, superior strength absorbs band.
‣ Weakening of defense —
‣ REQUISITES —
b. The offender deliberately and consciously employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime
to insures its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make
‣ The mode of attack must be consciously and deliberately adopted to insure the execution of the crime without
risk to the offender. The accused must make some preparation to kill the accused in such manner as to insure
the execution of the crime or make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself
‣ It is not necessary that the mode of attack insures the consummation or accomplishment of the offense. The
offense need not be consummated for treachery to be appreciated.
‣ Thus, treachery is not applicable when the decision to kill was sudden or merely a chance encounter. It is NOT
applicable and cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation
c. At the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself
‣ Such as — deliberately surprise attack, shooting the victim from behind of from a great distance, killing a victim
while bound and tied and unable to defend himself, killing a victim who is asleep, killing a child or infant
c. By a band
e. Nocturnity
‣ How is treachery appreciated when an assault took place over a certain period of time?
a. When the assault was continuous — treachery must be present at the beginning of the assault
b. When there was an interruption in the assault — it is sufficient that teacher was present at the moment the fatal
blow was given
21. IGNOMINY (ART. 14[17])
‣ That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
‣ REQUISITES —
‣ BUT — it has been recognized has aggravating in light and grave coercion (a crime against security) (People vs
Cantong) and treason (People vs Racaza)
b. The offender employed means brought about circumstances brought which add ignominy to the natural
effects of the act
‣ Ignominy — are circumstances pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material
injury caused by the crime. (People vs Acaya 1988)
‣ It must tend to make the effects of the crime more humiliating or to put the offended party to shame
‣ Such as — raping a woman in front of his husband, raping a woman then letting her leave naked.
‣ NOTE — It has been held that the commission of rape during robbery with homicide may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance under ignominy (par. 17) or cruelty (par. 21)
‣ SEE — People vs Tapales, G.R. No. L-35281, September 10, 1979
‣ Indeed, the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide does not include Rape. However, there can be no
question that Rape committed on the occasion of Robbery with Homicide increases the moral evil of the crime.
Moreover, it is incorrect to state that there is no law which considers Rape as an aggravating circumstance
simply because it is not specifically enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code as an aggravating
circumstance.
‣ Rapes, wanton robbery for personal gain, and other forms of cruelties are condemned and their perpetration
will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary
wrongs to the main criminal objective, under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
‣ This Court's consistent ruling, therefore, which holds that when Rape and Homicide co-exist in the commission
of Robbery, it is paragraph 1 of Article 294 which applies, the Rape to be considered as an aggravating
circumstance
‣ Is “posthumous sodomy” considered an ignominious circumstance?
‣ NO. It is considered “scoffing” since the victim was already dead. Scoffing is a qualifying circumstance for murder.
‣ SEE — People vs Butler, G.R. No. L-50276, January 27, 1983
‣ The aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the
accused since it is established that he mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an
anal intercourse with her after she was already dead. This act of the accused in having anal intercourse with
the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse.
‣ NOTE — The court was incorrect in considering Scoffing as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Scoffing
is NOT an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 but rather a qualifying circumstance under Murder in Art.
248
22. UNLAWFUL ENTRY (ART. 14[18])
‣ That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry. There is an unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way
not intended for the purpose
‣ This is appreciated when a crime is committed after the offender unlawfully enters into a building or structure
by a way not intended for the purpose
‣ Unlawful entry — means that an entrance is effected by a way not intended for the purpose
‣ Such as — entering through a window, which is not the proper place for entrance into a house
‣ NOTE — the unlawful entry must be a means to effect entrance and NOT exit or escape
‣ Not aggravating because it is inherent in the following crimes — robbery with force upon things, trespass to
dwelling
23. BROKEN WALL, ROOF, FLOOR, DOOR, OR WINDOW (ART. 14[19])
‣ That as a means to the commission of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken
‣ This is appreciated when the offender breaks a wall, roof, floor, door, or window or parts thereof as a means to
the commission of a crime
‣ NOTE — It is NOT necessary that the offender should have entered the building or made for the purposes of entry.
Also, the breaking of a part of the building must be utilized as a means to the commission of the crime, and NOT as a
means to escape
24. AID OF PERSONS UNDER FIFTEEN YEARS OF AGE (ART. 14[20])
‣ That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age or
‣ NOTE — This paragraph has been superseded Sec. 20(c) of RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630 which imposes a
special aggravating circumstance. (See the discussion on “special aggravating circumstances” for that)
25. MOTOR VEHICLES, MOTORIZED WATERCRAFT, AIRSHIPS, OR OTHER SIMILAR MEANS (ART. 14[20])
‣ by means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means.
‣ This is appreciated when the offender employs the use of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or
other motorized means of transportation as a means to commission of the crime
‣ NOTE — it must be utilized as a means to the commission of the crime, and NOT as a means to escape. The
motor vehicle must be used to facilitate the commission of the crime or where it is shown that the offense could
not have been committed without its use.
26. CRUELTY (ART. 14[21])
‣ That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary
for its commissions.
‣ REQUISITES —
b. The injury caused is deliberately increased or augmented by causing some other wrong
‣ This means that the accused, at the time of the commission of the crime, had a deliberate intention to prolong
the suffering of the victim
c. The other wrong is unnecessary for the execution of the purpose of the offender
‣ There is cruelty when the offender enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing
him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act. (People vs Dayug)
‣ NOTE — Cruelty cannot be appreciated when the victims as already dead when the unnecessary acts were
committed (similar rule with ignominy)
‣ The victim must still be alive in order to unnecessarily prolong his physical suffering. (People vs Pacris 1991)
‣ BUT — It the victim was already dead, the unnecessary and cruel acts may constitute “scoffing or outraging the
corpse” of the victim, which is a qualifying aggravating circumstance for murder under Art. 248.
‣ What is the difference between cruelty (par. 21) and ignominy (par. 17)?
Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. - Mitigating
or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or
increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
1(a). When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to be
imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any group who belongs to an organized/
syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually
helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. (as amended by RA 7659)
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5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects :
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be
found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be
found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which
he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in
conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be a habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the
date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or
falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
Article 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another offense; Penalty. - Besides the
provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment,
before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy
years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching the said age,
unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
Article 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. - In
cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall
be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused
intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused
intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty
person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either
of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in
its maximum period.
Section 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the
commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws, shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance:
‣ Provided, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime charged:
‣ Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a
maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed under the preceding section for illegal possession of firearms,
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion of insurrection, or
attempted coup d’ etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or
attempted coup d’ etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation of this Act shall be considered as a
distinct and separate offense.
‣ The amount of the increase depends on the case, but usually it is increased to the maximum period.
‣ They do not change that character of the offense charged but merely guides the court in imposing the proper penalty.
7. Exploitation of Children for Commission of Crimes (Sec. 20[c] of RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630)
9. Committing a crime under the influence of dangerous drugs (Sec. 25, RA 9165)
‣ TEST — Did the accused abuse his office in order to commit the crime?
‣ The offender who is a public official or employee must use the influence, prestige, and ascendancy which his office
gives him in realizing his purpose.
‣ Thus, the offender’s being a public officer does NOT ipso facto mean that crime is aggravated
‣ Example — When the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of
either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document. (Layno vs People 1992)
‣ Not aggravating when the offender could have perpetrated the crime without the public office
‣ Such as — falsification of document committed by public officers (Art. 171), Malversation (Art. 217), other crimes
which can only be committed by public officers (Art. 204 to 245)
2. ORGANIZED OR SYNDICATED CRIME GROUP (ART. 62[1A] AS AMENDED BY RA 7659)
‣ The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any group who belongs to an organized/
syndicated crime group.
‣ Organized/syndicated crime group — means a group of 2 or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually
helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
3. MULTI-RECIDIVISM OR HABITUAL DELINQUENCY (ART. 62[5])
‣ REQUISITES —
a. That the offender had been convicted of any of the following crimes (FRETS) —
i. Falsification
ii. Robbery
iii. Estafa
iv. Theft
b. That after conviction or after serving his sentence, he again committed, and within 10 years from his last release or
first conviction, he was again convicted of any of the said crimes for the second time.
c. That after his conviction or after serving his sentence for the second offense, he again committed, and within 10
years from his last release or last conviction, he was again convicted of any of the said crimes for the third time of
oftener
‣ NOTE —
‣ The subsequent crime must be committed after conviction of the former crime. (People vs Ventura 1931)
‣ The date when the crime was committed is immaterial. What is important is the date of conviction and the date of
release
‣ The rule on habitual delinquency applies to accomplices and accessories, as well as in the frustrated and
attempted stages.
‣ When the offender is deemed a habitual delinquent, he will be sentenced to the penalty for the last crime he is found
guilty and an additional penalty of —
a. Upon a third conviction — additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
b. Upon a fourth conviction — additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods
c. Upon a fifth or additional conviction — additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.
‣ BUT — The total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender cannot exceed 30 years.
3. Estafa
4. Theft
As to the Period of Time The accused must be found guilty the third time No period of time between the former conviction
the Crimes are or oftener of an of the crime specified and the last conviction is fixed by law
Committed
As to the Number of The accused must be found guilty the third time The second conviction for an offense embraced in
Crimes Committed or oftener of any of the crimes specified the same title of the RPC is sufficient
As to their Effects An additional penalty is imposed and may not be May be offset by any ordinary mitigating
offset by any ordinary mitigating circumstances circumstance and serves to increase the penalty
to its maximum period
a. Compound crime — when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
b. Complex crime proper — when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other
6. ERROR IN PERSONAE (ART. 49)
‣ In case there is a mistake in identity, such that the the felony committed is different from that which the offender
intended to commit, the lesser penalty is imposed in its maximum period
‣ REQUISITES —
a. The crime committed is one involving error in personae, NOT to aberratio ictus (where Art. 48 applies) or praeter
intentionem (where Art. 4 and 13[3] applies)
b. It only applies when the intended crime and the crime actually committed are punished with different penalties
7. EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN FOR COMMISSION OF CRIMES (SEC. 20[C] OF RA 9344 AS AMENDED BY RA 10630)
‣ Sec. 20(c) of RA 9344 provides for a special aggravating circumstance by increasing the imposed the penalty
prescribed by law for the crime to its maximum period
‣ NOTE — This supersedes the generic aggravating circumstance in Art. 14, par. 20 pertaining to “aid of persons
under 15 years of age”.
‣ NOTE — Under RA 9344, a child refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.
8. USE OF AN LOOSE FIREARM IN THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY (SEC. 29, RA 10591)
‣ Loose firearm — refers to either any of the following—
a. Unregistered firearm
e. Registered firearms in the possession of an individual other than the licensee and those with revoked licenses in
accordance with the rules and regulations
‣ The use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the RPC or special
laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance increasing the penalty to its maximum period
a. If the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm has maximum penalty which is lower than that
the penalty for illegal possession of firearm — the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be
imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime charged
b. If the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
which is equal to penalty for illegal possession of firearm — the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the RPC or special laws.
c. If the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat — such violation shall
be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat.
d. If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm — the violation shall be
considered as a distinct and separate offense.
9. COMMITTING A CRIME UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS (SEC. 25, RA 9165)
‣ A positive finding for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the commission of a
crime by an offender, and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable.
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
Article 15. Their concept. - Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or
mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are
the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party in the spouse,
ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the
offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstances when the offender has
committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony
but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
‣ RULE — WHEN THE OFFENDER ACTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES DURING THE COMMISSION OF THE
FELONY, HIS CRIMINAL LIABILITY IS DECREASED OR INCREASED, AS THE CASE MAY BE
‣ Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to
the nature and effect of the crime and other conditions attending its commission.
‣ As such they are treated as mitigating or aggravating (even exempting) and the rules which apply to such
circumstances also apply to alternative circumstances
‣ These are —
1. Relationship
2. Intoxication
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
1. RELATIONSHIP
‣ This is when the offended party is either any of the following of the offender —
a. Spouse
b. Ascendant
c. Descendant
‣ The relationship of stepfather or stepmother and stepson or stepdaughter. (People vs Bersabal 1925)
‣ The law does not say. Jurisprudence provides the answer and it depends on the crime committed
AGGRAVATING — never
AGGRAVATING —
AGGRAVATING — in general,
regardless of the degree
MITIGATING —
1. In general, where the offended party is a relative
of a higher, or at least equal degree of the
1. Robbery (Art. 294-302)
offender (People vs Alisub 1940)
2. Usurpation (Art. 312)
EXEMPTING —
b. Homicide or murder
1. Theft
3. In rape, where the offended party is the daughter
of the offender
2. Estafa
b. Homicide or murder
2. INTOXICATION
‣ Pertains to alcoholic intoxication. It does NOT include use of illegal substances or dangerous drugs.
‣ Intoxication means that at the time of the commission of the crime, the offender has taken such quantity of alcoholic
drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degree of control. The offender’s mental faculties must be
affected by his drunkenness.
i. Intoxication is habitual
ii. If it is intentional or subsequent to the plan to commit a felony (meaning the offender purposely drank alcohol
as a stimulant to commit the crime)
‣ But the offender must deliberately take advantage of his learning in committing the crime
‣ This is when the offender has the lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of his acts
‣ EXCEPT — in the following cases, the low degree of instruction is NOT mitigating —
iii. Treason — because love for country should be a natural feeling of every citizen
2. Individual criminal responsibility — This is when conspiracy is not proved. In the absence of conspiracy, unity of
criminal purpose, and intention immediately before the commission of the crime, or community of criminal design, the
criminal responsibility arising from the different acts direct against one and the same person is individual, not collective,
and each of the participants is liable only for the act committed by him.
3. Quasi-collective criminal responsibility — This is when some of the offenders in the crime are principals, and the
others are accomplices. Thus, conspiracy exists in a limited extent (only amongst the principals)
‣ This is when the crime being conspired upon has actually been committed, and commenced by overt acts.
‣ The mere act of conspiracy being punished by law is immaterial. All felonies may committed by conspiracy and such
leads to conspiracy being a mens of incurring criminal liability.
‣ When conspiracy is only a manner of incurring criminal liability, it is not punishable as a separate offense.
‣ In this aspects, conspiracy is similar with culpa, both are either crimes per se or means of committing a crime
‣ Example — When people conspire to commit rebellion, the it is actually committed, they are not liable for conspiracy to
commit rebellion (which is subsumed), they are liable for rebellion itself, and conspiracy will be a means of incurring
criminal liability for the acts of others
‣ NO. Conspiracy presupposes the existence of malice since it involves a meeting of the minds of the co-conspirators
on the manner and mode of committing a crime.
b. Moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime
‣ It is one that is deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed. The concerted acts of the
parties to achieve the same objective signify conspiracy.
‣ In implied conspiracy, the co-conspirator must do an act which shows his unity of purpose and design with the other
offenders.
‣ It is essential for liability to attach that the conspirator actually participated in the commission of the crime
‣ His mere approval or presence without more will not make the alleged conspirator liable because there would be
no basis for deducing conspiracy as to him as there is absent criminis particeps.
‣ Since conspiracy is instantaneous or spur of the moment, if he did not participate, it shows that he had no intent
to join in the commission of the crime.
‣ Mere knowledge or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to participate, is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance
of common design and purpose
‣ TEST — WHETHER THE ACTS OF THE OFFENDERS SHOW UNITY IN DESIGN AND COMMON PURPOSE AIMED AT THE ATTAINMENT
OF THE SAME OBJECT, TO COMMIT A PARTICULAR CRIME
‣ Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy and may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime.
‣ When the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another
part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, thought apparently
independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action
and concurrence of sentiments, conspiracy is present (Siton vs CA 1991)
‣ It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that there must be unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful
objective.
‣ It is not necessary for the co-conspirators to perform equally each and every part of the acts constituting the offense,
as long as the parts played by each of the principals in the conspiracy contribute to the realisation of the common
design, they are all liable equally.
‣ The quantity or quality of the participation of a co-conspirator is immaterial in the determination of the penalty for the
act of one is the act of all.
‣ YES. If by their acts, they have impliedly agreed to instantaneously pursue a common design and united purpose
‣ The criminal liability arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not
collective, and each of the participants is liable only for the act committee by him.
‣ A co-conspirator may be acquitted while the others convicted. If the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged
conspirators should be individually responsible for their respective acts (People vs Figueroa 2000)
‣ One who joins in a conspiracy adopts in effect the criminal design of his co-conspirators and he can no longer
repudiate the conspiracy after it has materialized.
‣ The act of one is deemed the act of all and each of them will be deemed equally guilty as co-principals of the crime
committed.
2. Principals by induction
‣ When there is conspiracy, it is not necessary to ascertain the specific act of each conspirator
‣ The criminal liability of one is the same as the criminal liability of the other
‣ EXCEPT — IN THE FOLLOWING CASES, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE CONSPIRATORS MAY BE DIFFERENT —
1. WHEN ONLY ONE OR SOME OF THE CONSPIRATORS COMMITTED ANOTHER CRIME, WHICH IS NOT PART OF THE INTENDED
CRIME, ONLY THEY ARE LIABLE FOR SUCH ACTS.
‣ Generally, the liability of the conspirators is only for the crime agreed upon. An unplanned crime committed will be
the liability only of the one who committed it. (People vs Sinoc 1997)
‣ This is especially true if the conspirator tried to stop the other from committing a crime not part of the intended
one.
‣ EXCEPTION TO EXCEPTION — In the following cases, even if the crime committed was not part of the
intended conspiracy, all the co-conspirators are liable —
a. When the other crime was committed in their presence and they did not prevent its commission indicating
their approval thereof
b. When the other crime is the natural consequence of the crime planned (such as homicide resulting from
physical injuries
‣ Because a composite crime or special complex crime is indivisible. I cannot be split into different parts, one
part to be deemed covered by the conspiracy and the other outside the conspiracy
‣ When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony and
special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing,
UNLESS it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.
‣ In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence to prove, or even remotely suggest, that appellant
attempted to prevent the killing. Therefore, the basic principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the
act of all," applies in this case. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate
and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective
effort to achieve their common criminal objective.
‣ Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,28 since all the conspirators are
principals. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to
dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission
thereof.
2. WHEN MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES CAN ONLY BE APPRECIATED AGAINST SOME OF THE OFFENDERS
‣ SEE — Art. 62 [3,4]
‣ If the mitigating or aggravating circumstances can only be appreciated or applied against some of the offenders,
then it will apply only to mitigate or aggravate their criminal liability, even if they are in conspiracy with the other
offenders
‣ Such as —
‣ The element of relationship will only qualify the crime from homicide to parricide with regard to the person in
whom such circumstance is present. (People vs Patricio)
‣ In the crime of murder where treachery is an element of the crime, all the offenders must at least have
knowledge of the employment of conspiracy, if not, only those who had knowledge of such circumstance
may be charged with murder, the others, only homicide.
‣ Mitigating and aggravating circumstances which arise from the following shall only serve to mitigate or aggravate
the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant —
‣ The circumstances which consist in the following shall serve to mitigate or aggravate the liability of those persons
only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein —
‣ The existence of the conspiracy cannot be presumed, and must be proven by the prosecution
‣ EXCEPT — Conspiracy is presumed when the crime is committed by a band. (People vs Cinco 1991)
MULTIPLE CONSPIRACIES
1. The “wheel” or “circle” conspiracy — there is a single person or group (the “hub”) dealing with individually with two or
more other persons or groups (the “spokes”)
2. The “chain” conspiracy — usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is
successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as the legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. (People vs Estrada 2002)
Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices.
Article 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. - The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a
felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony. XXXXX
SUBJECTS OF CRIMES
1. ACTIVE SUBJECTS — THE OFFENDERS
‣ Art. 16 enumerates the active subjects of the crime —
‣ NOTE — The exception to the rule (this when in crimes against persons or property) that light felonies are
punishable only when they are consummated does NOT apply to accessories. Accessories are not liable for
light felonies, even if they are committed against persons or property.
‣ Juridical persons cannot be liable for crimes because felonies are committed only by means of dolo or culpa, a
juridical persons cannot act with malice or negligence.
a. Natural person
b. Juridical person
c. State
‣ SEE — Arts. 50-57, the penalties are applied differently depending on the degree of criminal participation and the
stage of the criminal execution
‣ The rebel division of persons criminality responsible rests upon the very nature of their participation in the commission of
the crime.
‣ When a crime is committed by many, without being equally shared by all, a different degree of responsibility is imposed
upon each other and every one of them.
‣ They are persons who They are persons who 1. They have knowledge of the commission of the crime but did not
either —
are not principals but participated therein either as principals or accomplices
cooperate in the
1. Take a direct part in the 2. They merely take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
execution of the
execution of the act
following manners —
offense by previous or
2. Directly force or induce simultaneous acts a. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
others to commit it
effects of the crime
3. Cooperate in the b. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
commission of the instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery
ii. Whenever the author of the crime is guilty of any of the ff. —
(1) Treason
(2) Parricide
(3) Murder
PRINCIPALS
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
KINDS OF PRINCIPALS
‣ NOTE — Conspiracy is a common element in all kinds of principals, this is because, for them to be considered as
principals, it is a requisite that they should have participated in the criminal resolution by express or implied conspiracy.
Principals are conspirators, only that their participation as conspirators are different.
‣ They personally take part in the execution of the act constituting the crime by personally taking part in its execution by
acts which directly tended to the same end
‣ Principals by direct participation are necessarily in conspiracy (express or implied) with each other by participating in
the criminal resolution and committing the crime intended together or with unity of purpose and design.
2. PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION
‣ Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
‣ REQUISITES —
a. The inducement must be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime
‣ There must exist, on the part of the inducer, the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to
secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest
kind of temptation to commit the crime
‣ A thoughtless expression or act, without any expectation or intention that it would produce the result, is not an
inducement to commit a crime.
b. The inducement must be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor
(person induced)_
‣ This means that without such inducement, the crime would not have been committed
‣ The inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in procuring the criminal act that
without it, the act would not have been performed.
‣ If the person who actually committed the crime had a reason of his own to commit the crime, it cannot be said
that the inducement was influential in producing the criminal act.
‣ The material executor of the crime must have no personal reason to commit the crime.
‣ These are the persons who cooperates in the commission of the offense by performing other acts (other than the acts
of execution), without which, the crime would not have been accomplished.
‣ The cooperation must be indispensable, if not, then such person is only an accomplice.
ACCOMPLICES
Article 18. Accomplices. - Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
2. He cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material
or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way
3. There is a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice
‣ They do not fall under the classification of principals and thus, are not conspirators
‣ They do not participate in the criminal resolution, they merely concur in the criminal design and purpose of the
principals or conspirators
‣ An accomplice does not enter into a conspiracy with the principal by direct participation. He does not have
previous agreement or understanding with the principal to commit the crime. But he participates to a certain point
in the common criminal design
‣ Before there could be an accomplice, there must be a principal by direct participation. The principal originates the
criminal design, the accomplice merely concurs with the principal in his criminal purpose.
‣ Accomplices come to know about the criminal plan after the principals have reached the decision, and only then
do they agree to cooperate in its execution.
‣ NOTE — If conspiracy is not proved, in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered that of
an accomplice rather than that of a principal. (People vs Clemente 1967) When the quantum of proof required to
establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether the offender acted as principal or accomplice will
always be resolved in favour of the latter. (People vs Ballesta 2008)
‣ They must have knowledge (even at least in the general sense) in the criminal design
‣ It is not always required that accomplices know the specific details of the crime to be committed. It is sufficient
that they had a general knowledge of a criminal design or purpose
‣ It the person had no knowledge of the criminal design of the principal, then he cannot be considered an
accomplice
‣ BUT NOTE — in certain exceptional instances, even if the accused was held to be a co-conspirator, the court
classified them as mere accomplices rather than co-principals. This is when their participation in the crime was very
minor and not indispensable to the commission of the crime. (SEE — People vs Nierra 1980, People vs Anin 1975)
2. HE COOPERATES IN THE EXECUTION OF THE OFFENSE BY PREVIOUS OR SIMULTANEOUS ACTS, WITH THE INTENTION OF
SUPPLYING MATERIAL OR MORAL AID IN THE EXECUTION OF THE CRIME IN AN EFFICACIOUS WAY
‣ Such as — lending a gun to a killer, knowing that such person has a plan to kill another
‣ Such previous or simultaneous acts of the accomplice merely supplies material or moral aid to the principals
‣ His acts must not constitute the principal and important elements of the crime
‣ The cooperation must merely be necessary and NOT indispensable, otherwise he will be a principal by
indispensable cooperation
‣ Such acts must not be the direct acts of execution to the commission of the crime
‣ The accomplice must not inflict the fatal blow or commit the direct acts of execution of the crime, otherwise he will
be a principal by direct participation
3. THERE IS A RELATION BETWEEN THE ACTS DONE BY THE PRINCIPAL AND THOSE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PERSON CHARGED AS
ACCOMPLICE
‣ It is not enough that a person entertains an identical criminal design as that of the principal. There must be a relation
between the criminal act of the principal by direct participation and that of the person charged as accomplice.
ACCESSORIES
Article 19. Accessories. - Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without
having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide,murder, or an attempt
to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be
imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories
falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
Article 58. Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain accessories. - Those accessories falling within the terms of
paragraphs 3 of Article 19 of this Code who should act with abuse of their public functions, shall suffer the additional
penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute
temporary disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave felony.
2. They merely take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners —
a. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime
b. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery
c. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory either —
ii. Whenever the author of the crime is guilty of any of the following —
(1) Treason
(2) Parricide
(3) Murder
‣ There must be actual knowledge of the crime. Knowledge is usually obtained after the fact.
‣ NOTE — Such knowledge may be proved by mere circumstantial evidence (People vs Dalena 1954)
‣ The commission of the crime itself must first be proved beyond reasonable doubt
‣ If the principal is acquitted because it was found that no crime was committed, the accessories should also be
acquitted.
‣ The accessory must not have participated in the commission of the crime as principals and accomplices. The
accessory takes part in the crime subsequent to its commission.
‣ Generally NO. The liability of the accessories is subordinate and subsequent to the principals. If the court finds
that the crime was not committed, the accessory must also be acquitted.
‣ EXCEPT — When the principal is acquitted by virtue of an exempting circumstance (remember that in such
case there is a crime and a criminal)
‣ Can the accessories be convicted even if the principal has not been convicted?
‣ Generally NO. The liability of the principals must first be litigated before the accessory may be convicted. The
criminal proceedings (arraignment, trial and conviction) of an accessory during the pendency of a separate case
against the principal are void.
‣ EXCEPT — When the principals are still at large and has not be apprehended (in this case, the determination of
the liability may proceed independently of that of the principal)
2. THEY MERELY TAKE PART SUBSEQUENT TO ITS COMMISSION IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING MANNERS —
a. BY PROFITING THEMSELVES OR ASSISTING THE OFFENDER TO PROFIT BY THE EFFECTS OF THE CRIME
‣ This contemplates two acts —
‣ When is profiting by the effects of the crime punished as the act of principal, and not the act of accessory?
‣ When a person knowingly acquired or received property taken by the brigands. (Art. 307)
b. BY CONCEALING OR DESTROYING THE BODY OF THE CRIME, OR THE EFFECTS OR INSTRUMENTS THEREOF, IN ORDER TO
PREVENT ITS DISCOVERY
‣ The accessory must conceal or destroy the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof
‣ Body of the crime pertains to the “corpus delicti”. It means that a specific offense was in fact committed by
someone.
‣ Such as — assisting in the burial of the victim, hiding the weapons used in the crime
‣ The purpose of such acts of concealment or destruction must be to prevent the discovery of the crime
‣ Thus, where the effects or instruments of the crime were place in a visible area, it negatives the liability of the
person as an accessory
‣ NOTE — concealment of the principal himself is NOT included here, it is included in par. 3
c. BY HARBORING, CONCEALING, OR ASSISTING IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPALS OF THE CRIME, PROVIDED THE ACCESSORY
IS EITHER —
‣ The public officer harbours, conceals or assists in the escape of the principals (NOT accomplices) by abusing
his public office.
‣ In this case, the public officer will suffer the additional penalty of absolute perpetual disqualification if the
principal offender shall be guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute temporary disqualification if he shall be
guilty of a less grave felony. (Art. 58)
ii. Private persons, but only whenever the author of the crime is guilty of any of the following —
(1) Treason
(2) Parricide
(3) Murder
‣ The principal need not be a habitual delinquent. But the accessory must know that the principal was a
habitually guilty of other crimes
‣ NOTE — Under this paragraph, the public officer or private persons must have committed actual and intentional
acts or omissions which results in harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal. Mere silence
with regard to witnessing the crime is not sufficient.
2. The accessory does not cooperate in the commission of the offense by acts either prior thereto or simultaneous therewith
3. The participation of the accessory in all cases always takes place after the commission of the crime
a. Spouse
b. Ascendant
c. Descendant
d. Legitimate, natural, and adopted brother and sister or relative by affinity within the same degrees (Art. 20)
‣ EXCEPT — Accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of Art. 19 pertaining to “profiting themselves
or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime” are NOT exempt as accessories
‣ Thus only accessories under par. 2 and 3 are exempt from criminal liability if they are related to the principals. This
includes the public officer abusing his office.
‣ Such as — if son helps his father bury the body of the victim who the father killed, the son is exempt from criminal
liability as an accomplice.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both,
shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the
identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity,
authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal
cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or
suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and
conviction;
(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a
judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing
proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to
affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding
the prosecution of a criminal offender;
(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of
any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the investigation
of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a
person from appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the
offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in
confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background information and not for publication and publishing
or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or to the court.
If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be
imposed.
Section 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee, he shall in addition to the penalties
provided thereunder, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
a. Preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the
identity of any offender/s by means of —
a. Bribery
b. Misrepresentation
c. Deceit
d. Intimidation
e. Force
f. Threats
b. Altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity,
authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal
cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases
c. Harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or
suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and
conviction;
d. Publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a
judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes
e. Delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing
proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts
f. Making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to
affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases
g. Soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding
the prosecution of a criminal offender
h. Threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of
any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the investigation
of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a
person from appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases
i. Giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the
offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in
confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background information and not for publication and publishing
or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or to the court
1. If any of such acts is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.
2. If any of such acts is committed by a public official or employee, he shall in addition to the penalties provided
thereunder, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
FENCING
Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated:
(a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000
pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory
penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.
(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the property robbed or stolen
is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property involved is more
than 200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos.
(d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the
property involved is over 50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos.
(e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value is over five (5) pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos.
(f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
Section 4. Liability of Officials of Juridical Persons. If the fence is a partnership, firm, corporation or association, the
president or the manager or any officer thereof who knows or should have known the commission of the offense shall be
liable.
Section 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has
been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For purposes of this Act, all stores, establishments or
entities dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article item, object of anything of value obtained from an unlicensed
dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit
from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store, establishment or entity
is located. The Chief of Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police shall promulgate such rules and
regulations to carry out the provisions of this section. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by
this section or who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall upon
conviction be punished as a fence. lawphi1.net
ELEMENTS OF FENCING
1. The offender has intent to gain for himself or for another
2. The offender shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
3. The offender knows or should be known to him that such property is derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft
PENALTY OF FENCING
‣ PD 1612 penalizes any person guilty of fencing penalized depending on the value of the thing involved.
‣ Presumption of Fencing — Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the
subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
V. PENALTIES IN GENERAL
CONCEPT OF PENALTY
‣ Penalty is the suffering that is inflicted by the State for the transgression of a law
‣ In its general sense, penalty signifies pain, especially considered in the juridical sphere, it means suffering undergone,
because of the action of human society, by one who commits a crime.
2. Must be commensurate with the offense — different crimes must be punished with different penalties
7. Must be correctional
2. Self-dense — the State has a right to punish the criminal as a measure of self-defense so as to protect society from the
threat and wrong inflicted by the criminal
3. Reformation — the object of punishment in criminal cases is to correct and reform the offender
4. Exemplarity — the criminal is punished to serve as an example to deter others from committing crimes
5. Justice — the crime must be punished by the State as an act of retributive justice, a vindication of absolute right and
moral law violated by the criminal
2. Correction of reformation — as shown by the rules which regulate the execution of the penalties consisting in
deprivation of liberty
3. Social defense — show by its inflexible severity to recidivists and habitual delinquents
‣ Such as — burning at the stake, whipping, breaking on the wheel, breaking on the wheel
Article 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. - A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish criminal action
except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is
extinguished by his express waiver.
Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. -
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive,
nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall
also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
Article 266-A. Rape. - XXXXXX
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage is void ab initio. (As amended by RA 8353)
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.
CIVIL CODE
Article 2034. There may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising from an offense; but such compromise shall not
extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty. (1813)
‣ RULE — A PARDON OF THE OFFENDED PARTY DOES NOT EXTINGUISH CRIMINAL LIABILITY
‣ This is because a crime is an offense against the State
‣ In criminal cases, the intervention of the offended party is limited to being witnesses for the prosecution.
‣ Only a pardon by the President may extinguish criminal liability. (Art. 36, 89)
‣ There may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising from an offense, but such compromise shall not extinguish
the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty. (Art. 2034, Civil Code)
‣ EXCEPT — IN THE FOLLOWING CASES, A PARDON OF THE OFFENDED PARTY WILL EXTINGUISH CRIMINAL LIABILITY —
1. In the following crimes, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him —
‣ Generally YES. A pardon by marriage will also benefit the co-principals, accomplices and accessories of the crime
(Art. 344)
‣ EXCEPT — In rape, the pardon does NOT extend to the other criminal participants
‣ REYES — Since rape is not a crime against persons, marriage extinguishes the criminal liability only of the
husband, not the others.
‣ In this case, there is no extinguishment of criminal liability. The criminal action is merely barred.
‣ Under Art. 344, the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse.
‣ The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution if he or she has consented or pardoned the offenders.
‣ NOTE — the pardon here is merely “forgiveness” in the general sense, express or implied.
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
XXXXXX
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects
4. By absolute pardon;
XXXXXX
Article 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. - Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon
2. By commutation of the sentence; and XXXXXX
Article 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditional pardon. - Any person who has been granted conditional
pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance
with any of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be
applied to him.
Article 96. Effect of commutation of sentence. - The commutation of the original sentence for another of a different
length and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former.
Article 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. - Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next
preceding article the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed
by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has
not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason.
Article 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any
of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher than six
years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence.
3. Pardons — an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.
4. Remit fines and forfeitures — prevents the collection of fines or the confiscation of forfeited property. But it cannot
have the effect of returning property which has been vested in third parties or money in the public treasury.
‣ EXCEPT —
1. In cases of impeachment
‣ SEE — Art. 9C — “Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.”
‣ RATIONALE — the power of executive clemency is tacit admission that human institutions are imperfect and that there
are infirmities in the administration of justice. The power therefore exists as an instrument for correcting these infirmities
and for mitigating whatever harshness might be generated by a too strict application of the law.
‣ NO. A pardon can be extended only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the person withdraws
his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final. (People v. Salle 1995)
‣ Does a pardon also restore the convict’s civil and political rights (which are wiped by the accessory penalties)
‣ Generally, a pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage
‣ EXCEPT— when such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. (Art. 36, RPC)
‣ Does a pardon extinguish the civil liability arising because of the crime?
‣ NO. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence. (Art. 36, 133, RPC)
‣ Does the pardon wipe away the fact of the commission of the crime? (in other words, does it amount to an
acquittal?)
‣ NO. Pardon implies guilt. While it is a recognized mode of extinguishing criminal liability (Art. 89[4]), it does not erase
the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves
forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
‣ While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness
and not forgetfulness
‣ The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving
the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based
on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a "new man",
and "as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;" is to ignore the difference between the crime and the
criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one never
found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his conviction.”
‣ A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what
has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for
what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been
done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required.
‣ YES. The President has the prerogative to impose conditions on the pardon, the violation of which results in the
revocation of the pardon.
‣ Any person who has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the
conditions imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in the
revocation of the pardon. (Art. 95, RPC)
‣ What is the consequence if the pardoned convict violates the conditions of his pardon?
‣ The pardon is revoked and a new sentence is imposed on him. It is considered as “other cases of evasion of service
of sentence” under Art. 159 of the RPC.
‣ The pardoned convict who violates any conditions of the pardon shall serve —
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period — if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon
is 6 years or less
2. The unexpired portion of his original sentence — if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon is more
than 6 years (Art. 159, RPC)
‣ Where conditional pardon has been granted, who determines whether the condition has been violated?
‣ The President, and the President alone, NOT the courts. The convict's acceptance of the conditional pardon carries
with it acceptance of the President's authority. If a condition of the pardon provides that the accused must not commit
a violation of any penal law, it is the President who has the sole discretion to determine whether there is such
violation. There is no need for judicial determination or conviction for the revocation of the pardon.
‣ The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
‣ The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such
breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
‣ In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code
which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President
has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice
is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
‣ Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Sec. 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
‣ IT DEPENDS —
2. Conditional Pardon — has no force until accepted by the condemned. The condition may be less acceptable to
him than the original punishment, and may in fact be more onerous. (Cabantag v. Wolfe 1906)
Covered
EXCEPT —
1. Adultery (Art. 344)
1. In cases of impeachment
2. Concubinage (Art. 344)
As to the Effect Cannot affect the civil liability ex Offended party can waive the civil liability
on Civil Liability delicto
When Granted Can only be granted upon conviction Can be granted before or after the institution of the criminal action
by final judgment
To Whom it Benefits only the grantee of the The pardon benefits all the principals, accomplices and accessories to the
Benefits pardon crime
EXCEPT —
Article 24. Measures of prevention or safety which are nor considered penalties. - The following shall not be considered
as penalties:
1. The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as well as their detention by reason of insanity or imbecility,
or illness requiring their confinement in a hospital.
2. The commitment of a minor to any of the institutions mentioned in Article 80 and for the purposes specified therein.
3. Suspension from the employment of public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings.
4. Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise of their administrative disciplinary powers, superior
officials may impose upon their subordinates.
5. Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil laws may establish in penal form.
‣ NOTE — These are not penalties because they are not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings or in a judgment of
conviction. They are merely preventive or safety measures.
Article 25. Penalties which may be imposed. - The penalties which may be imposed according to this Code, and their
different classes, are those included in the following:
Scale
Principal Penalties
Capital punishment:
Death.
Afflictive penalties:
Reclusion perpetua,
Reclusion temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Prision mayor.
Correctional penalties:
Prision correccional,
Arresto mayor,
Suspension,
Destierro.
Light penalties:
Arresto menor,
Public censure.
Penalties common to the three preceding classes:
Fine, and
Bond to keep the peace.
Accessory Penalties
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or calling.
Civil interdiction,
Indemnification,
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense,
Payment of costs.
Article 26. Fine - A fine, whether imposed as a single of as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty,
if it exceeds 6,000 pesos; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed 6,000 pesos but is not less than 200 pesos; and a
light penalty if it less than 200 pesos.
RA 9346 — AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES (June 24, 2006)
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand
One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby
repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death
Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.
b. Reclusion perpetua
c. Reclusion temporal
d. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
f. Prision mayor
g. Prision correccional
h. Arresto mayor
i. Suspension
j. Destierro
k. Arresto menor
l. Public censure
m. Fine
2. ACCESSORY PENALTIES — THOSE THAT ARE DEEMED INCLUDED IN THE IMPOSITION OF PRINCIPAL PENALTIES (THEY ARE
IMPOSED BY OPERATION OF LAW)
c. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or calling
d. Civil interdiction
e. Indemnification
g. Payment of costs
a. Death
b. Reclusion perpetua
c. Perpetual absolute or special disqualification
d. Public censure
2. Divisible — those which have fixed duration and are divisible into three periods
5. Pecuniary — fine
2. Afflictive
a. Reclusion perpetua
b. Reclusion temporal
c. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
e. Prision mayor
f. Fines exceeding P6,000
3. Correctional
a. Prision correccional
b. Arresto mayor
c. Suspension
d. Destierro
e. Fines P200 to P6,000
4. Light
a. Arresto menor
b. Public censure
‣ Are Fines which are exactly “P200” correctional penalties or light penalties? (NOTE — according to Art. 26, a fine
of exactly P200 is a correctional penalty. However, under Art. 9 it is merely a light felony)
‣ IT DEPENDS —
‣ Under Article 90, "light offenses prescribe in two months". The definition of "light offenses" is in turn to be found in
Article 9, which classifies felonies into grave, less grave, and light, and defines "light felonies" as "those infraction
of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos or both is
provided ". The offense charged in punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos (Article 195).
Hence, it is a "light offense" under Article 9 and prescribes in two months under Article 90.
‣ While Article 90 provides that light offense prescribe in two months, it does not define what is meant by "light
offenses" , leaving it to Article 9 to fix its meaning. Article 26, on the other hand, has nothing to do with the
definition of offenses, but merely classifies fine, when imposed as a principal penalty, whether singly or in the
alternative into the categories of afflictive, correctional, and light penalties.
‣ As the question at issue is the prescription of the crime and not the prescription of a penalty, Article 9 should
prevail over Article 26.
‣ Article 90 could not have intended that light offenses as defined by Article 9 would have two prescriptive periods
— two months if they are penalized by arresto menor and/or a fine of less than P200. and ten years if penalized by
a maximum fine of P200.
‣ Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. As it
would be more favorable to the herein accused to apply the definition of "light felonies" under Article 9 in
connection with the prescriptive period of the offense charged, being a light offense, prescribed in two months
a. Reclusion perpetua — when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code
b. Life imprisonment — when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code
4. In cases where after reducing the penalty by one or more degrees, and destierro is the proper penalty
‣ NOTE — No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. (Art. 21)
DURATION OF PENALTIES
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty years and one day to forty years.
Reclusion temporal. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years.
Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. - The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and temporary
disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. - The duration of the penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and
destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when the suspension is imposed as an accessory
penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.
Arresto mayor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six months.
Arresto menor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days.
Bond to keep the peace. - The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover such period of time as the court may
determine. (As amended by RA 7659)
Article 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace. - It shall be the duty of any person sentenced to give bond to keep the
peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such person will not commit the offense sought to be
prevented, and that in case such offense be committed they will pay the amount determined by the court in the judgment,
or otherwise to deposit such amount in the office of the clerk of the court to guarantee said undertaking.The court shall
determine, according to its discretion, the period of duration of the bond.
Should the person sentenced fail to give the bond as required he shall be detained for a period which shall in no case
exceed six months, is he shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed thirty days, if
for a light felony.
DURATION OF PENALTIES
PENALTY DURATION
Temporary disqualification EXCEPT — when Disqualification is an accessory penalty, in which case its duration is the same
as that of the principal penalty
Suspension EXCEPT — when Sisqualification is an accessory penalty, in which case its duration is the same
as that of the principal penalty
Destierro
Has a specific duration of 20 years and 1 day to 40 years Has no definite term
Article 28. Computation of penalties. - If the offender shall be in prison, the term of the duration of the temporary
penalties shall be computed from the day on which the judgment of conviction shall have become final.
If the offender be not in prison, the term of the duration of the penalty consisting of deprivation of liberty shall be
computed from the day that the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the enforcement of the
penalty. The duration of the other penalties shall be computed only from the day on which the defendant commences to
serve his sentence.
‣ RULE — The director of prisons or the warden should compute the duration of the penalties imposed upon convicts by
observing the following rules —
b. When the offender is not in prison when judgment became final and executory — computed from the day that
the offender is placed at the disposal of the judicial authorities for the enforcement of the penalty
2. Duration of penalties which do NOT consist in deprivation of liberty — computed only from the day on which the
defendant commences to serve his sentence
‣ NOTE — “final and executory” means the day of entry of judgment, when the appeal period has lapsed or when the
appeals have been exhausted (not the day of the judgment of conviction by the trial court).
Article 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. – Offenders or accused who have
undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty,
with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily
in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he
shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths
of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years. 1âwphi1
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment
of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released
immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under
review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the
actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance:
‣ Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu
proprio order the rearrest of the accused:
‣ Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are
excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is
lestierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (As amended by RA 10592)
RA 9344 — JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006
SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the law shall be credited in the services of his/her
sentence with the full time spent in actual commitment and detention under this Act.
b. For children in conflict with the law (it is not necessary that he agrees to abide by the disciplinary rules)
2. Only 4/5 of the time spent in preventive imprisonment is creditable — if the detention prisoner does NOT agree to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners
‣ EXCEPT — In the following cases, the time spent in preventive imprisonment is NOT creditable —
2. When the offender has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime
3. When the offender, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence, has failed to surrender voluntarily
‣ NOTE — The time spent in preventive detention is only creditable to penalties which consist of “deprivation of liberty”,
hence, only those consisting of imprisonment
‣ The rule on crediting should also apply to the penalty of destierro. (People vs Batasa 1979)
‣ If the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua the credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty should be deducted
from 30 years. 1â
1. The accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced
‣ NOTE — Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release is the actual period of
detention with good conduct time allowance
a. Recidivist
b. Habitual delinquent
c. Escapee
‣ NOTE — It seems that the rules on agreeing to abide by the same disciplinary rules does NOT apply in this case.
1. This is without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under
review.
2. If the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the
rearrest of the accused
‣ What if the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro?
Article 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The penalties of perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if conferred by popular
election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall
last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
Article 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. - The penalties of perpetual or
temporal special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected;
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence
according to the extent of such disqualification.
Article 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage. - The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the
offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any
popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold
any public office during the period of his disqualification.
Article 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public office, profession or calling, or the right of suffrage. -
The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the
offender from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the
sentence.
The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during the period of his
suspension.
Article 34. Civil interdiction. - Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of
parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to
manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Article 37. Cost; What are included. - Costs shall include fees and indemnities in the course of the judicial proceedings,
whether they be fixed or unalterable amounts previously determined by law or regulations in force, or amounts not
subject to schedule.
Article 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. - Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with
which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be
property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed.
Article 107. Indemnification; What is included. - Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those
caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
PENALTY EFFECT
Perpetual or 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if
Temporary Absolute conferred by popular election
Disqualification
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office
(Art. 30)
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
mentioned
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held
Perpetual or Perpetual or temporal special disqualification for public office, profession or calling —
Temporary Special
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected
Disqualification
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of
(Art. 31, 32)
the sentence according to the extent of such disqualification
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage —
1. The deprivation of the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature
of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such
office
2. The offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification
Suspension 1. The offender is disqualified from holding such office or exercising such profession or calling or right of
suffrage during the term of the sentence.
(Art. 33)
2. The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another having similar functions during
the period of his suspension
Civil Intediction The offender, during the time of his sentence, is deprived of —
(Art. 34) 1. The rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward,
2. Marital authority
4. The right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos
Indemnification Includes the consequential damage caused the injured party and those suffered by his family or by a third
person by reason of the crime.
Confiscation and Forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed
Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or
Instruments of the NOTE — Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the accessory penalty of
Crime forfeiture or confiscation. Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor
of the Government, unless they be property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles
which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.
Payment of Costs Includes fees and indemnities in the course of the judicial proceedings — whether they be fixed or
unalterable amounts previously determined by law or regulations in force, or amounts not subject to
schedule.
Article 38. Pecuniary liabilities; Order of payment. - In case the property of the offender should not be sufficient for the
payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following order:
1. The reparation of the damage caused.
2. Indemnification of consequential damages.
3. The fine.
4. The cost of the proceedings.
SUBSIDIARY PENALTY
Article 39. Subsidiary penalty. - If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in the paragraph 3 of
the nest preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos,
subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his
fine referred to in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of
the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall
be counted against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the
culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light
felony.
3. When the principal imposed is higher than prision correccional, no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon
the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of
fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the
same deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him,
from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve. (As amended by RA 5465, April 21, 1969).
1. Subsidiary penalty is only for the “fine” and NOT the other pecuniary liabilities, such as the reparation of the damage
caused, indemnification, and costs of the proceedings.
2. The judgment of conviction must impose the subsidiary imprisonment, otherwise he cannot be made to serve such
subsidiary penalty. (It is not considered an accessory penalty deemed imposed by law)
3. The convict cannot choose to serve the subsidiary penalty instead of paying the fine. This is because the subsidiary
personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him, from the fine in
case his financial circumstances should improve.
4. Principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional — no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed
‣ This means, subsidiary penalty may be imposed only when the following principal penalties are imposed—
a. Prision correccional
b. Arresto mayor
c. Arresto menor
d. Suspension
e. Destierro
f. Fine only
‣ NOTE — Even if the penalty imposed is not higher than prision correccional, if the accused is a habitual delinquent
who serves an additional penalty of 12 years and 1 day, of reclusion temporal, there is NO subsidiary penalty.
(People vs Concepcion)
7. Principal penalty imposed is prision correccional or arresto and fine — the subsidiary imprisonment should —
b. Not continue for more than one year (Thus, maximum of 365 days)
c. A fraction or part of a day should be considered as a day (It should be counted in favour of the convict)
5. Grave or less grave felony and the principal penalty imposed be only a fine — the subsidiary imprisonment shall
not exceed six months
6. Light felony and the principal penalty imposed be only a fine — the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed 15
days
7. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is
of fixed duration — The convict in serving the subsidiary penalty shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as
those of which the principal penalty consists.
‣ If the penalty is a fine and public censure, no subsidiary penalty may be imposed as the penalty of censure has no
fixed duration and is not to be executed by confinement.
‣ NOTE — the “penalty imposed” means the actual penalty imposed by the court in the judgment of conviction, and NOT
the penalty imposed by the RPC which pertains to the “imposable penalty”
3. When the penalty is a fine and a penalty not to be executed by confinement and which has not fixed duration (such as
public censure
4. When the subsidiary penalty is not stated and imposed in the judgment of conviction
Article 40. Death; Its accessory penalties. - The death penalty, when it is not executed by reason of commutation or
pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty years
following the date sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal; Their accessory penalties. - The penalties of reclusion perpetua
and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the
case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to
the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Article 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision mayor, shall carry with it that of temporary
absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall
suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Article 43. Prision correccional; Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of
suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in the article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
Article 44. Arresto; Its accessory penalties. - The penalty of arresto shall carry with it that of suspension of the right too
hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.
Article 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. - Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with
which it was committed. XXXXX
Article 73. Presumption in regard to the imposition of accessory penalties. - Whenever the courts shall impose a penalty
which, by provision of law, carries with it other penalties, according to the provisions of Articles 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 of
this Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed upon the convict.
Article 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases. - In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty higher
than another given penalty, without specially designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty should be that of
death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40, shall be considered as the next higher penalty.
Death when not 1. Perpetual absolute disqualification during 30 years following the date sentence
executed
2. Civil interdiction during 30 years following the date sentence
(Art. 40)
3. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime
Reclusion Perpetua 1. Civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be
and Reclusion
2. Perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the
Temporal
principal penalty
(Art. 41)
3. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime
Prision Correccional 1. Suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling
(Art. 43) 2. Perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage if the duration of said imprisonment
exceeds 18 months.
Arresto Mayor and 1. Suspension of the right too hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.
Arresto Menor
2. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime
(Art. 44)
‣ NOTE —
‣ All of the accessory penalties enumerated must still be served, even though the convict has been pardoned as to the
principal penalty. EXCEPT — when such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
‣ Distinguish reclusion perpetua imposed as a penalty in itself, and reclusion perpetua imposed when death penalty is
not executed. They have different accessory penalties.
What principal penalties have NO accessory penalties?
1. Death
2. Destierro
3. Fine
4. Public Censure
‣ BUT NOTE — They still shall carry with it the accessory penalty of forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instruments or tools with which it was committed. (So technically, all penalties have accessory penalties)
Article 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic review of the Death Penalty Cases. - The
death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty
person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of
age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not
obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review and judgment by the Court en banc, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also
be forwarded within ten (10) days from the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter. (As amended by RA 7659)
1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
RA 9346 — AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES (June 24, 2006)
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand
One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby
repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death
Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.
2. RA 7659 — restored the imposition of the death penalty (effective December 31, 1993)
3. RA 9346 — prohibited and suspended the imposition of the death penalty (enacted June 24, 2006)
3. When upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for
the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
‣ REYES — Since the Supreme Court consists of 15 members, a vote of at least 8 members is required to impose the
death penalty. SEE — RA 296 — “Whenever the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case shall
be determined by eight Justices of the Court. When eight Justices fail to reach a decision as herein provided, the
penalty next lower in degree than the death shall be imposed.”
‣ This is one of the exceptional cases where the Supreme Court may review questions of facts. Also, exceptionally it
allows an appeal to the Supreme Court by a mode other than petition for review on certiorari
‣ In mandating mandatory review of the Supreme Court of death, reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment, does
the Constitution thereby proscribe intermediate review by the Court of Appeals?
‣ NO. Court of Appeals may review the case, but it should merely render and NOT enter judgment before elevating it to
the Supreme Court.
‣ Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The practice finds justification in the 1987
Constitution. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it
does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate
appeal or review in favor of the accused.
‣ While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate
review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the
Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.
‣ Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an
accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of
Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of
Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment
imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate
the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.
PLURALITY OF CRIMES
‣ Plurality of crimes consists in the successive execution by the same individual of different criminal acts upon any of which
no conviction has yet been declared.
2. Real or material plurality — there are different crimes committed. The offender is punished for each and every
offense committed
a. Compound crime — when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
b. Complex crime proper — when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other
2. Special Complex or Composite Crimes — when the law specifically fixes a single penalty for two or more offenses
committed
3. Continued (continuous or continuing) Crimes — a single crime consisting of a series of facts but all arising from one
criminal resolution. It is a continuous unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an
unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.
Concept It is made up of two or more crimes being It is made up of two or more crimes which are
punished in distinct provisions of the RPC but considered only as components of a single
alleged in one information either because they indivisible offense being punished in one provision of
were brought about by a single felonious act or the RPC.
because one offense is a means for committing
the other offense or offenses
Penalty Penalty for the most serious crime shall be It is the penalty specifically provided for the special
imposed in its maximum period complex crime that shall be applied according to the
rules on imposition of the penalty
‣ This pertains to “compound crimes” and “complex crimes proper”. Both are referred to as “complex crimes”
‣ In complex crime, although two or more crimes, are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of
the law, as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Hence, only one
penalty is imposed by law
‣ The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only
serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime. (Ivler vs San Pedro 2010)
‣ RATIONALE — The offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes through separate and
distinct acts. (People vs Hernandez 1956) The spirit of Art. 48 is intended to favour the offender.
‣ NOTE — Basis of the penalty imposed is the gravity of the crime, not the gravity of the penalty. Thus, apply the
classification of crimes according to their gravity in Art. 9 (grave, less grave or light)
‣ BUT — the penalty is imposed in its maximum period, regardless of the existence of any generic mitigating
circumstances, it thus constitutes a special aggravating circumstance as well.
‣ What if the there are 2 felonies are committed which constitute a complex crime punishable by imprisonment
and fine, respectively, and the the fine is an afflictive penalty and the imprisonment is merely correctional?
‣ REYES —The penalty of imprisonment must be imposed. Fine is not included in the list of penalties in the order of
severit, and it is the last in the graduated scales in Art. 71
‣ The severity of the penalty must not be judged by the classification of each of the penalties involved but by the
nature of the penalties. (People vs Yongco 1971)
‣ EXCEPT — IN THE FOLLOWING CASES, THE RULE ON COMPLEX CRIMES DOES NOT APPLY —
1. When the crimes committed are punished by the RPC and Special Penal Laws
2. When the law specifically fixes a single penalty for two or more offenses committed
3. When the law specifically fixes a single penalty when two offenses result from a single act
6. When the crimes involved are subject to the rule of absorption of one crime by the other
‣ There must be singularity of criminal act arising out of a singular criminal impulse (People vs Pineda 1967)
1. Light felonies — if produced by the same act should be punished as separate offenses (People vs Turla 1927)
‣ Examples —
‣ A person throwing a grenade at one person but killing several people (People vs Guillen 1950)
‣ Placing a time-bomb in a plane, killing persons, constitutes a complex crime of multiple murder and destruction of
property (People vs Largo)
‣ Where one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter's body through and wounded another. (People vs
Balotol)
‣ What if a person uses an automatic machine gun and kills several people in a single instance or event, is this a
complex crime?
‣ Generally NO. When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
This is the case even though the multiple shots came from one pull of the tiger.
‣ When the accused fired a single burst from an automatic gun resulting in numerous killings from a number of
bullets fired, there is no complex crime; but each death is treated as many offenses as the number of victims. This
is in view of the special characteristic or mechanism of automatic machine guns and the offender knew this fact,
despite the single criminal impulse. (People vs Desierto; People vs Pineda 1976)
‣ Where the six defendants, with others (armed with pistols, carbines and also a submachine gun and Garand rifles),
fired volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding several others, each of the said accused is "guilty of as
many crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven). (People vs Macaso)
‣ At the commencement exercises of an elementary school, "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of
shots" — from a pistol. Two persons lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on also died. This Court
there ruled that there were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by appellant Juan Mones. (People vs
Mones)
‣ The spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule — who were asleep — were killed by one burst of
machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst of machinegun fire, two of the couple's children — also asleep —
were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal,
this Court declared that "appellant must be declared guilty of four murders. (People vs. Desierto)
‣ EXCEPT — When there are several offenders but no conspiracy and it cannot be determined who killed whom
‣ In this case, the crimes are considered as a complex crime. When several accused shot and killed many persons
and there is no evidence who killed who, there being a single criminal impulse, and conspiracy is NOT proven
(People vs Lawas 1955)
‣ REYES — the “single-criminal impulse”, “same motive” or the “single-purpose” theory has no legal basis, for Art. 48
speaks of a single act. However the theory is acceptable when it is not certain who among the accused killed or
injured each of the victims.
2. That one or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the other
3. That both or all the offenses must be punished under the same statute
‣ NOTE — “necessary” does NOT mean “indispensable”. If the crime committed was indispensable in committing the
other, the it would constitute an inherent element in the subsequent crime which is absorbed. When in the definition of a
felony, one offense is a means to commit the other, there is no complex crime.
‣ Examples —
‣ What if the subsequent offense was committed to conceal the prior offense?
‣ No complex crime. It will be considered as separate crimes. This is because the prior offense was not necessary to
commit the subsequent offense.
‣ Such as —
‣ What if the offenders commit forcible abduction and subsequent rapes the victim multiple times?
‣ The crime is complex crime of forcible abduction and rape AND separate crimes of rape
‣ Where the four accused forcibly abducted Maggie de la Riva and each of them raped her, this Court held "that
even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been
consummated, so that each of the three succeeding crimes of the same nature cannot legally be considered as
still connected with the abduction. In other words, they should be detached from, and considered independently
of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.
‣ Where the complaining witness was forcibly abducted by the four accused and violated on board by a truck by
one of them with the assistance of three others, and after reaching a house in the evening, the four of them
alternatively ravished her inside the house three times each and one each the following morning, the crimes
committed are complex crime of forcible abduction with rape and 16 counts of separate rapes.
‣ The reason for such ruling is that when the first act of rape was committed in the truck, the crime of forcible
abduction was already consummated so that each if the succeeding rapes committed in the house cannot be
legally considered as still connected with the abduction.
‣ Complex crime proper cannot exist when the crimes involved are punished under different statutes (People vs Araneta
1926)
2. WHEN THE LAW SPECIFICALLY FIXES A SINGLE PENALTY FOR TWO OR MORE OFFENSES COMMITTED
‣ These are referred to as “Special Complex or Composite crimes”
‣ This includes —
a. Rape with homicide (Art. 266[B]) (BUT — the rape must be consummated, otherwise they are separate offenses)
e. Kidnapping with murder or homicide (Art. 267, last par., as amended by RA 7659)
‣ NO difference. Both will be punished as kidnapping with murder or homicide under Art. 267, last par.
‣ Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the rule was that where the kidnapped
victim was subsequently killed by his abductor, the crime committed would either be a complex crime of
kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code, or two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and
murder. Thus, where the accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed
by his abductor, the crime committed was the complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of The
Revised Penal Code, as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of committing the murder. On the
other hand, where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was subsequently slain as an
afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were committed.
‣ However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a last paragraph which
provides —When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
‣ This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of "special complex crime" of kidnapping with
murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where
the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the
victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where
the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely
sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed
under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the
last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.
‣ What if the victim was kidnapped and during the detention was raped countless times?
‣ The crime committed is merely kidnapping and rape as a special complex crime (and not kidnapping and multiple
and separate crimes of rape)
‣ Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping
with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape.
‣ This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659
punishes these acts with only one single penalty.
‣ In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was
raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed the special complex crime of kidnapping with
rape.
‣ It having been established that Mirandilla’s act was kidnapping and serious illegal detention (not forcible
abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped AAA several times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. We hold
that the separate informations of rape cannot be considered as separate and distinct crimes
‣ BUT NOTE — for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should NOT have taken the
victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape as an ordinary
complex crime under Art. 48. Moreover, if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped
several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the
forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes
distinct and separate count of rape.
‣ What if death is involved in a burning, is the counted as a special complex crime of or merely a single crime of
arson or homicide?
‣ In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated
whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the
malefactor:
a. If the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion
of arson — the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed
b. If the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted
to as the means to accomplish such goal — the crime committed is murder only
c. If the objective is to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted
to as a means to cover up the killing — then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed
homicide/murder and arson.
‣ NOTE — In either case, there is NO such thing as a complex crime of arson with homicide
‣ Intent is to rob — the crime is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294
‣ Intent it to kill and the robbing was a mere an afterthought — the crime is homicide and robbery separately
a. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life.
‣ The original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It
is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. If a robber
tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of
robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are
guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a
criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the
conspiracy once it has materialized.
‣ Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was
committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate
witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the
homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.
‣ There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence.
‣ BUT — It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide
is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers;
the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of
the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or
on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.
The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide.
‣ Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal
property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the
accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in court.
c. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated.
3. WHEN THE LAW SPECIFICALLY FIXES A SINGLE PENALTY WHEN TWO OFFENSES RESULT FROM A SINGLE ACT
‣ Such as — one act causing less serious physical injuries with serious slander of deed is punished as the crime of “Less
serious physical injuries and circumstances adding ignominy” under Art. 265, par. 2
4. WHEN THE LAW IMPOSES “ANOTHER PENALTY IN ADDITION” TO THE CRIME
‣ This includes —
a. Malicious obtention or abusive service of search warrant with perjury (Art. 129)
e. Abandonment of persons in danger (Art. 275) and crimes against minors (Art. 276 to 278) with any other felony
‣ Such as — the common element of “damage” in both falsification of private documents and esfafa. These two crimes
cannot be complexed.
‣ SEE — Batulanon vs People, G.R. No. 139857, September 15, 2006
‣ There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document as both crimes require damage as an
element which if used for one renders the other incomplete, hence the query is as to which crime was committed
first.
‣ it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with
estafa.
‣ If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estate — the proper crime to be
charged is falsification.
‣ If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document — the proper crime to be charged is
estafa.
6. WHEN THE CRIMES INVOLVED ARE SUBJECT TO THE RULE OF ABSORPTION OF ONE CRIME BY THE OTHER
‣ This exception applies to Complex Crimes Proper, when —
a. The prior crime committed was indispensable in committing the other, then it would constitute an inherent
element in the subsequent crime
‣ When in the definition of a felony, one offense is a means to commit the other, there is no complex crime.
‣ Examples —
‣ When the crime is committed by force or violence, such in direct assault, rebellion, rape, etc — slight
physical injuries are absorbed (People vs Apiado 1929)
‣ In murder where the killing of a person is qualified by the circumstance that it was committed by means of
fire or by means of explosion (Art. 248, par. 3) the “fire and explosion: are in themselves felonies defined and
penalized under Art. 321 and 324, as arson and crimes involving destruction, there is NO complex crime.
The crime is simply murder and the arson and destruction is absorbed.
b. The prior crime committed is considered an aggravating circumstance of the subsequent crime
‣ Such as — when trespass to dwelling (Art. 280) is a direct means to commit a graver offense, such as rape,
homicide or murder. There is no complex crime of trespass to dwelling with rape, homicide, or murder. The
trespass to dwelling will be considered as an aggravating circumstance of unlawful entry under Art. 14, par. 18
or breaking a part of the dwelling under Art. 14, par. 19
‣ Does rebellion absorb all crimes committed during such rebellion?
‣ NO. Rebellion only absorbs those crimes committed in its furtherance (meaning, for political ends) such as murder,
arson, robbery or other common crimes. BUT not those not committed in furtherance of the rebellion, these are
counted as separate crimes.
‣ Of course, not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it
happens to be committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were
done for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable
and would not be absorbed by the rebellion. But ever then, the individual misdeed could not be taken with the
rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other;
and the individual crime would not be a means necessary for committing the rebellion as it would not be done
in preparation or in furtherance of the latter.
‣ This appears with utmost clarity in the case where an individual rebel should commit rape; certainly the latter
felony could not be said to have been done in furtherance of the rebellion or facilitated its commission in any
way. The ravisher would then be liable for two separate crimes, rebellion and rape, and the two could not be
merged into a juridical whole.
‣ SEE — Ivler vs San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010
‣ Article 48 does not apply to acts penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The conceptual
distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code must be inviolate. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to
stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
necessary means for committing another.
‣ This ruling secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by
the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to
quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a
single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep
intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
‣ When the first criminal act was committed, it must be shown that the offender already intended to commit the
subsequent series of acts. Otherwise, if each act was independent in the sense that it arose from different criminal
resolutions, each must be considered as a separate offense.
‣ Such kind of crimes is not found in the RPC but is provided for under jurisprudence
‣ NOTE — Distinguish this from “transitory crimes” or “moving crimes” which are procedural matters pertaining to
venue.
‣ REQUISITES —
1. There are a series of acts (regardless of the period of time over which it occurred)
2. Such acts arise out of a singular criminal purpose and resolution to attain a definite objective
‣ Examples —
‣ When the offenders, intending to rob the gas station, stole all the cash from the cash register but, in the process, also
tok there money and valuables of the employees of the gas station, the offenders are guilty only of one count of
robbery. (People vs De Leon 2009)
‣ Where the robbery that took place in several houses belonging to different persons, when not absolutely unconnected,
was held not to be taken as separate and distinct offenses. They formed instead, component parts of the general plan
to despoil all those within the vicinity. The perpetrated acts were not entirely distinct and unconnected from one
another. Thus, the single offense or crime.(People vs Dela Cruz 1950)
‣ When the offender misappropriates several amounts collected by him from different persons. There is one crime only
because the different and successive appropriations are but the different moments during which one criminal
resolution arises and a single defraudation develops. (Regis vs People)
‣ A thief who takes from the yard of the house, two roosters belonging to different persons commits only one crime.
While in taking the two roosters, there were two acts, however there is a unity of thought and action in taking the
roosters. (People vs De Leon)
1. That only a single act is performed by 1. That at least two offenses are 1. There are a series of acts (regardless
the offender
committed
of the period of time over which it
occurred)
other
criminal purpose and resolution to
b. One or more grave and one or attain a definite objective
punished under the same statute 3. All of such acts violates the same
c. Two or more less grave felonies criminal offense as defined
Penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period Only one penalty is imposed despite the
number of acts performed
Article 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. - In
cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall
be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused
intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the accused
intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty
person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either
of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in
its maximum period.
CASES WHERE THE CRIME COMMITTED IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT INTENDED BY THE OFFENDER
1. Error in personae — mistake in identity
APPLICABILITY OF ART. 49
1. It only applies to cases involving error in personae, NOT to aberratio ictus (where Art. 48 applies) or praeter intentionem
(where Art. 4 and 13[3] applies)
2. It only applies when the intended crime and the crime actually committed are punished with different penalties
3. It only applies when the intended crime and the crime actually committed are punished with different penalties
RULE IN ART. 49
‣ RULE — IN CASE THERE IS A MISTAKE IN IDENTITY, SUCH THAT THE THE FELONY COMMITTED IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH
THE OFFENDER INTENDED TO COMMIT, THE LESSER PENALTY IS IMPOSED IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD
1. If the penalty for the felony committed is higher than the intended felony — the penalty corresponding to the latter
shall be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty for the felony committed is lower than than the intended felony — the penalty for the former shall be
imposed in its maximum period
‣ NOTE — In both cases, the lower penalty is imposed, in its maximum period
Penalty for Error in Personae (Art. 49) Penalty for Ordinary Complex Crimes (Art. 48)
Lesser penalty is imposed in its maximum period Penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its
maximum period
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the aims sought
are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the
same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of
impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the
result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender,
shall impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.
B. GRADUATION OF PENALTIES
Article 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. - The penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a
felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of such felony.
Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is general terms, it shall be understood as applicable to the
consummated felony.
Article 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. - The penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.
Article 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. - A penalty lower by two degrees than
thatprescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
Article 52. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in consummated crime. - The penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the consummated shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a consummated
felony.
Article 53. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories to the commission of a consummated felony. - The penalty lower by
two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the
commission of a consummated felony.
Article 54. Penalty to imposed upon accomplices in a frustrated crime. - The penalty next lower in degree than prescribed
by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in the commission of a frustrated felony.
Article 55. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of a frustrated crime. - The penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the frustrated felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the commission of a frustrated
felony.
Article 56. Penalty to be imposed upon accomplices in an attempted crime. - The penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for an attempt to commit a felony shall be imposed upon the accomplices in an attempt to commit the
felony.
Article 57. Penalty to be imposed upon accessories of an attempted crime. - The penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the attempted felony shall be imposed upon the accessories to the attempt to commit a felony.
Article 60. Exception to the rules established in Articles 50 to 57. - The provisions contained in Articles 50 to 57, inclusive,
of this Code shall not be applicable to cases in which the law expressly prescribes the penalty provided for a frustrated or
attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or accessories.
Article 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder or homicide. - The courts, in view of the facts of the case, may
impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated crime of parricide, murder or homicide, defined and penalized in the
preceding articles, a penalty lower by one degree than that which should be imposed under the provision of Article 50.
The courts, considering the facts of the case, may likewise reduce by one degree the penalty which under Article 51
should be imposed for an attempt to commit any of such crimes.
‣ Example — when Art. 249 prescribes a penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide, that penalty is intended for the
principal in a consummated homicide
‣ EXCEPT — THE RULES IN ARTICLES 50 TO 57 DOES NOT APPLY IN CASES IN WHICH THE LAW EXPRESSLY PRESCRIBES THE
PENALTY PROVIDED FOR A FRUSTRATED OR ATTEMPTED FELONY, OR TO BE IMPOSED UPON ACCOMPLICES OR ACCESSORIES
‣ In certain instances, the law itself would provide for specific penalties for frustrated or attempted felonies, or the
accomplices or accessories. In such case, the penalty imposed is controlling, and not the rules in Art. 50 to 57.
‣ Example — Art. 297 prescribes the penalty for frustrated and attempted robbery, Art. 268 prescribes a penalty
against the one who furnished the place for the preparation of the crime of slight illegal detention (in this case, the
accessory is treated as a principal)
How do you determine what does a degree mean or two degrees mean for purposes of lowering the degrees?
Article 61. Rules for graduating penalties. - For the purpose of graduating the penalties which, according to
the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any
frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degrees shall be that
immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.
2. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible
penalties to be imposed to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the
lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.
3. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of
another divisible penalty, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the medium and minimum periods of
the proper divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective graduated scale.
4. When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to different divisible
penalties, the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately following the minimum
prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty prescribed, if possible; otherwise from
the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned respective graduated scale.
5. When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the four preceding rules,
the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those guilty as principals of the
frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and accessories.
Article 71. Graduated scales. - In the case in which the law prescribed a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees
than another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is comprised the given penalty.
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Destierro,
8. Arresto menor;
9. Public censure,
10. Fine.
SCALE NO. 2
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
2. Temporal absolute disqualification
3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling,
4. Public censure,
5. Fine.
Article 72. Preference in the payment of the civil liabilities. - The civil liabilities of a person found guilty of two or more
offenses shall be satisfied by following the chronological order of the dates of the judgments rendered against him,
beginning with the first in order of time.
b. Penalty prescribed is composed of two indivisible penalties — such as death and reclusion perpetua
c. Penalty prescribed is composed one divisible penalties imposed in its full extent — such as prision mayor
d. Penalty prescribed is composed more than one divisible penalties imposed in its full extent — prision mayor and
prison correccional
e. Penalty prescribed is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another divisible
penalty — such as such as death, reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal in its maximum period
f. Penalty prescribed is composed of several periods, corresponding to different divisible penalties — such as
prision mayor medium and minimum to prision correccional maximum
g. Penalty imposed is a single divisible penalty in a specific period — such as prision mayor minimum
‣ NOTE — In all of these mentioned cases, the entire penalty imposed by law, whether it may consist of three penalties
(death, reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal), or just one or two penalties (just prison mayor), or even just a period of
one penalty (prision mayor in its maximum) is considered as a “degree” in itself. This penalty prescribed is the “starting
point” for the graduation of penalties by degrees
2. PERIOD — ONE OF THE THREE EQUAL PORTIONS OF A PARTICULAR PENALTY, AS USED FOR TWO PURPOSES
a. Period of the penalty prescribed by law (for purposes of applying the rule on graduation in Art. 61)
‣ This is when the law prescribes a penalty and refers to a period which may either be the minimum, medium and
maximum.
‣ BUT — the concept of periods only apply when the penalty imposed is a divisible penalty “Indivisible” penalties
pertain to death, reclusion perpetua and public censure. The others are “divisible” penalties
‣ Example — reclusion temporal as a divisible penalty may be divided into reclusion temporal in its maximum,
medium or minimum, as the case may be. The law may prescribe the penalty of prison mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.
b. Period of the penalty to be imposed by the Court (for purposes of applying the rules in Art. 62-69)
‣ After the court determines the proper penalty prescribed by law, taking into consideration the degrees it is lowered
according to Art. 61, the next step to divide such penalty into 3 periods — which will also be referred to as
“minimum, medium and maximum” for purposes of considering the mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Single and indivisible That immediately following that If penalty prescribed is — death
Two indivisible penalties Penalty next lower in degree is If penalty prescribed is — reclusion perpetua to death
Two indivisible penalties and the If penalty prescribed is — reclusion temporal in its
maximum period of another maximum period to death
divisible penalty Penalty next lower in degree The penalty next lower in degree is — prision mayor in its
(Art. 61[3]) shall be composed of the maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
medium and minimum periods period
of the proper divisible penalty
Single indivisible penalty and the and the maximum period of that If penalty prescribed is — reclusion temporal in its
maximum period of another immediately following in said maximum period to reclusion perpetua
divisible penalty respective graduated scale. The penalty next lower in degree is — prision mayor in
(Art. 61[3]) its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period
3 periods corresponding to Penalty next lower in degree is If penalty prescribed is — prision mayor in its medium
Different Divisible Penalties the penalty consisting in 3 period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period
periods down the scale
(Art. 61[4]) The penalty next lower in degree is — prision correccional
in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum
REYES — “several periods” in Art.
period
61[4] means 3 periods
2 periods Penalty next lower in degree is If penalty prescribed is — prision mayor in its medium
the penalty consisting in 2 period to maximum period
(Art. 61[5])
periods down the scale
The penalty next lower in degree is — prision correccional
in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period
1 period Penalty next lower in degree is If penalty prescribed is — arresto mayor in its maximum
the penalty consisting in 1 period
(Art. 61[5])
period down the scale
The penalty next lower in degree is — arresto mayor in its
minimum period
EFFECT OF RA 9346 ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE GRADUATION RULES
‣ SEE — People vs Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006
‣ This case comprehensively explains it
C. PERIODS OF PENALTIES
Article 76. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties. - The legal period of duration of divisible penalties shall be
considered as divided into three parts, forming three periods, the minimum, the medium, and the maximum in the manner
shown in the following table:
TABLE SHOWING THE DURATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND THE TIME INCLUDED IN EACH OF THEIR PERIODS
PENALTIES TIME INCLUDED IN IN TIME INCLUDED IN ITS TIME INCLUDED IN ITS TIME INCLUDED IN ITS
ITS ENTIRETY MINIMUM PERIOD MEDIUM PERIOD MAXIMUM PERIOD
Reclusion temporal From 12 years and 1 From 12 years and 1 day From 14 years, 8 months From 17 years, 4 months
day to 20 years to 14 years and 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and and 1 day to 20 years
4 months
Prision mayor, Absolute From 6 years and 1 day From 6 years and 1 day From 8 years and 1 day From 10 years and 1 day
and Special Temporary to 12 years to 8 years to 10 years to 12 years
Disqualification
Prision correccional, From 6 months and 1 From 6 months and 1 day From 2 years, 4 months From 4 years, 2 months
Suspension and Destierro day to 6 years to 2 years and 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and and 1 day to 6 years
2 months
Arresto Mayor From 1 month and 1 day From 1 to 2 months From 2 months and 1 day From 4 months and 1 day
to months to 4 months to 6 months
Arresto Menor From 1 to 30 days From 1 to 1days From 11 to 20 days From 21 to 30 days
Article 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties. - In cases in which the law prescribes
a penalty composed of three distinct penalties, each one shall form a period; the lightest of them shall be the minimum
the next the medium, and the most severe the maximum period.
Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one of the forms specially provided for in this Code, the periods shall be
distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules.
Article 65. Rule in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three periods. - In cases in which the penalty prescribed
by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into
three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of the three portions.
ACT NO. 4103 AS AMENDED BY RA 4225 AND RA 4203 — AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
AND PAROLE FOR ALL PERSONS CONVICTED OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS;
TO CREATE A BOARD OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if
the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to
those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason,
rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one
year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Sec. 5
hereof. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
Sec. 3. There is hereby created a Board of Pardons and Parole to be composed of the Secretary of Justice who shall be
its Chairman, and four members to be appointed by the President, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
who shall hold office for a term of six years: Provided, That one member of the board shall be a trained sociologist, one a
clergyman or educator, one psychiatrist unless a trained psychiatrist be employed by the board, and the other members
shall be persons qualified for such work by training and experience. At least one member of the board shall be a woman.
Of the members of the present board, two shall be designated by the President to continue until December thirty,
nineteen hundred and sixty-six and the other two shall continue until December thirty, nineteen hundred and sixty-nine. In
case of any vacancy in the membership of the Board, a successor may be appointed to serve only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the respective members. (As amended by Republic Act No. 4203, June 19, 1965.)
Sec. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole is authorized to adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary for
carrying out its functions and duties. The Board is empowered to call upon any bureau, office, branch, subdivision,
agency or instrumentality of the Government for such assistance as it may need in connection with the performance of its
functions. A majority of all the members shall constitute a quorum and a majority vote shall be necessary to arrive at a
decision. Any dissent from the majority opinion shall be reduced to writing and filed with the records of the proceedings.
Each member of the Board, including the Chairman and the Executive Officer, shall be entitled to receive as
compensation fifty pesos for each meeting actually attended by him, notwithstanding the provisions of Section two
hundred and fifty-nine of the Revised Administrative Code, and in addition thereto, reimbursement of actual and
necessary travelling expenses incurred in the performance of duties: Provided, however, That the Board meetings will not
be more than three times a week. (As amended by Republic Act No. 4203, June 19, 1965.)
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence to look into the physical, mental and moral record of
the prisoners who shall be eligible to parole and to determine the proper time of release of such prisoners. Whenever any
prisoner shall have served the minimum penalty imposed on him, and it shall appear to the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence, from the reports of the prisoner’s work and conduct which may be received in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed, and from the study and investigation made by the Board itself, that such prisoner is fitted by his
training for release, that there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating
the law, and that such release will not be incompatible with the welfare of society, said Board of Indeterminate Sentence
may, in its discretion, and in accordance with the rules and regulations adopted hereunder, authorize the release of such
prisoner on parole, upon such terms and conditions as are herein prescribed and as may be prescribed by the Board. The
said Board of Indeterminate Sentence shall also examine the records and status of prisoners who shall have been
convicted of any offense other than those named in Sec. 2 hereof, and have been sentenced for more than one year by
final judgment prior to the date on which this Act shall take effect, and shall make recommendation in all such cases to
the Governor-General with regard to the parole of such prisoners as they shall deem qualified for parole as herein
provided, after they shall have served a period of imprisonment not less than the minimum period for which they might
have been sentenced under this Act for the same offense.
Sec. 6. Every prisoner released from confinement on parole by virtue of this Act shall, at such times and in such manner
as may be required by the conditions of his parole, as may be designated by the said Board for such purpose, report
personally to such government officials or other parole officers hereafter appointed by the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence for a period of surveillance equivalent to the remaining portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or
until final release and discharge by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence as herein provided. The officials so designated
shall keep such records and make such reports and perform such other duties hereunder as may be required by said
Board. The limits of residence of such paroled prisoner during his parole may be fixed and from time to time changed by
the said Board in its discretion. If during the period of surveillance such paroled prisoner shall show himself to be a law-
abiding citizen and shall not violate any of the laws of the Philippine Islands, the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may
issue a final certificate of release in his favor, which shall entitle him to final release and discharge.
Sec. 7. The Board shall file with the court which passed judgment on the case, and with the Chief of Constabulary, a
certified copy of each order of conditional or final release and discharge issued in accordance with the provisions of the
next preceding two sections.
Sec. 8. Whenever any prisoner released on parole by virtue of this Act shall, during the period of surveillance, violate any
of the conditions of his parole, the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may issue an order for his re-arrest which may be
served in any part of the Philippine Islands by any police officer. In such case the prisoner so re-arrested shall serve the
remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to prison, unless the Board
of Indeterminate Sentence shall, in its discretion, grant a new parole to the said prisoner. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
Sec. 9. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to impair or interfere with the powers of the Governor-General as set forth in
Sec. 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code or the Act of Congress approved August 29, 1916 entitled “An Act to
declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine
Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for those Islands.”
Sec. 10. Whenever any prisoner shall be released on parole hereunder he shall be entitled to receive the benefits provided
in Sec. 1751 of the Revised Administrative Code.
RA 9346 — AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES (June 24, 2006)
SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.
‣ In sentencing a convict, there is a need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence.
It is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the
accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical,
mental and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether
punishable by the RPC or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the court deems proper within
the legal range of the penalty specific by the law, must be deemed mandatory. (Romero vs People 2011)
‣ The purpose is to uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness. (People vs Onate 1977)
MAXIMUM That which could be properly imposed under the RPC, Must not exceed the maximum
TERM considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. term fixed by said law
MINIMUM TERM Within the range of the penalty 1 degree lower than that Must not be less than the
prescribed by the RPC without considering the mitigating or minimum term fixed by said law
aggravating circumstances
‣ NOTE —
‣ The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence. They are NOT considered in fixing the minimum. (People vs Temporada 2008)
‣ For special laws, it is anything within the inclusive range of the prescribed penalty. Courts are given the discretion in
the imposition of the indeterminate penalty. Courts are given discretion in the imposition of the indeterminate penalty.
The modifying circumstances are not considered unless the special law adopts the same terminology as those used in
the RPC.
ii. MIN — Anywhere within the range of prision mayor without reference to any of its period
ii. MIN — Anywhere within the range of prison mayor without reference to any of its period
2. Under Special Laws — a penalty of imprisonment of 1 year and 1 day to 5 years for illegal possession of firearms
b. MIN — Shall not be less than the minimum of 1 year and 1 day
a. Death
b. Reclusion perpetua
c. Life imprisonment
b. Misprision of treason
c. Rebellion
d. Sedition
e. Espionage
f. Piracy
a. Was granted a conditional pardon by the President but violated the terms thereof
b. Is a habitual delinquent
‣ NOTE — Recidivists and those who committed crimes while on parole are entitled to indeterminate sentence, they are not
disqualified.
2. There is reasonable probability that he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
‣ BUT — Even if a person has already served the minimum but he is not fit for release eon parole, he shall continue to serve
until the end of the maximum term.
‣ The board may issue a final certificate of release in his favor, for his final release and discharge.
1. The board may issue an order for his arrest which may be served in any part of the Philippines by any police officer
2. The prisoner shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally
committed to prison
Article 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. - Mitigating
or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or
increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included
by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of
increasing the penalty.
(a) When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to
be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any group who belongs to an organized/
syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or
mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it
must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private
relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the
liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.
4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall
serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the
execution of the act or their cooperation therein.
5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects :
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he
be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be
found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of
which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximumperiod to reclusion temporal
in its minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in
conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be a habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten years from
the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or
falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. (As amended by RA 7659)
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be
observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the court shall reasonably
allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the
penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.
Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. - In cases in which the penalties prescribed
by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of
which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application
of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in
its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its
minimum period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its
maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class
against the other according to their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall
impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the
number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater
penalty than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and
nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the
crime.
Article 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites of exemption of the fourth circumstance of Article 12 are
present. - When all the conditions required in circumstances Number 4 of Article 12 of this Code to exempt from criminal
liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have been guilty of a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if of a less grave felony.
Article 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. - When the offender is a minor under
eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this
Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court
having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two
degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall
be imposed, but always in the proper period.
Article 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. - A penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of
the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11
and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which
may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking.
Article 70. Successive service of sentence. - When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed
successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first
imposed, or should they have been served out.
For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the penalties shall
be determined in accordance with the following scale:
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10 Temporal absolute disqualification.
11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or calling,
and
12. Public censure.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be
more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other
penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum
period.
Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty
years. (As amended).
1. The maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall NOT be more than 3 times the length of the time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him.
‣ NOTE —
‣ If the sum total of all the penalties does not exceed the most severe of all the penalties, multiplied by 3, then the 3-fold
rule does NOT apply.
‣ The 3-fold rule applies only when the convict has to serve continuous imprisonment for several offenses. If the convict
already served sentence for one offense, that imprisonment will NOT be considered.
‣ Example — A person is sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 month, and 1 day for homicide; 17 years, 4 months and 1 day in
another case; 14 years and 8 months in a third case, and 12 years in a fourth case. The total is 59 years, 8 months and 2
days. The most severe of those penalties is 17 years, 4 months and 1 day. Three times that penalty is 52 years and 3 days.
But since the law has limited the duration of the maximum term of imprisonment to not more than 40 years, the accused
will have to suffer 40 years only.
F. APPLICATION OF FINES
Article 66. Imposition of fines. - In imposing fines the courts may fix any amount within the limits established by law; in
fixing the amount in each case attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but
more particularly to the wealth or means of the culprit.
Article 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees. - Whenever it may be necessary to increase
or reduce the penalty of fine by one or more degrees, it shall be increased or reduced, respectively, for each degree, by
one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without however, changing the minimum.
The same rules shall be observed with regard of fines that do not consist of a fixed amount, but are made proportional.
Article 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. - No penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final
judgment.
A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances or
incidents than those expressly authorized thereby.
In addition to the provisions of the law, the special regulations prescribed for the government of the institutions in which
the penalties are to be suffered shall be observed with regard to the character of the work to be performed, the time of its
performance, and other incidents connected therewith, the relations of the convicts among themselves and other
persons, the relief which they may receive, and their diet.
The regulations shall make provision for the separation of the sexes in different institutions, or at least into different
departments and also for the correction and reform of the convicts.
Article 79. Suspension of the execution and service of the penalties in case of insanity. - When a convict shall become
insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended only
with regard to the personal penalty, the provisions of the second paragraph of circumstance number 1 of Article 12 being
observed in the corresponding cases.
If at any time the convict shall recover his reason, his sentence shall be executed, unless the penalty shall have
prescribed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The respective provisions of this section shall also be observed if the insanity or imbecility occurs while the convict is
serving his sentence.
Article 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. - The death sentence shall be executed with preference to
any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution. The death sentence shall be
executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the
person under the sentence during electrocution as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution.
If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the execution.
As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the method of carrying out the sentence shall be changed to
gas poisoning.
The death sentence shall be carried out not later than one (1) year after the judgment has become final
Article 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance to the culprit. - The court shall designate a working
day for the execution but not the hour thereof; and such designation shall not be communicated to the offender before
sunrise of said day, and the execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least eight hours following the
notification, but before sunset. During the interval between the notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in so far as
possible, be furnished such assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by priests or
ministers of the religion he professes and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to make a will and confer with members
of his family or persons in charge of the management of his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care
of his descendants.
Article 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. - The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman
while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case,
the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in
Article 40.
In all cases where the death sentence has become final, the records of the case shall be forwarded immediately by the
Supreme Court to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power. (As amended by RA 7659)
Article 84. Place of execution and persons who may witness the same. - The execution shall take place in the penitentiary
of Bilibid in a space closed to the public view and shall be witnessed only by the priests assisting the offender and by his
lawyers, and by his relatives, not exceeding six, if he so request, by the physician and the necessary personnel of the
penal establishment, and by such persons as the Director of Prisons may authorize.
Article 85. Provisions relative to the corpse of the person executed and its burial. - Unless claimed by his family, the
corpse of the culprit shall, upon the completion of the legal proceedings subsequent to the execution, be turned over to
the institute of learning or scientific research first applying for it, for the purpose of study and investigation, provided that
such institute shall take charge of the decent burial of the remains. Otherwise, the Director of Prisons shall order the
burial of the body of the culprit at government expense, granting permission to be present thereat to the members of the
family of the culprit and the friends of the latter. In no case shall the burial of the body of a person sentenced to death be
held with pomp.
Article 86. Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor. - The penalties
of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision mayor, prision correccional and arresto mayor, shall be executed and
served in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative Code in force or which may be provided by
law in the future.
Article 87. Destierro. - Any person sentenced to destierro shall not be permitted to enter the place or places designated
in the sentence, nor within the radius therein specified, which shall be not more than 250 and not less than 25 kilometers
from the place designated.
Article 88. Arresto menor. - The penalty of arresto menor shall be served in the municipal jail, or in the house of the
defendant himself under the surveillance of an officer of the law, when the court so provides in its decision, taking into
consideration the health of the offender and other reasons which may seem satisfactory to it.
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability
which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Upon the recommendation of the social worker who has
custody of the child, the court shall dismiss the case against the child whose sentence has been suspended and against
whom disposition measures have been issued, and shall order the final discharge of the child if it finds that the objective
of the disposition measures have been fulfilled.
The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall not affect the civil liability resulting from the commission of the
offense, which shall be enforced in accordance with law.
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has
willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the
law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend
the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the law shall be credited in the services of his/her
sentence with the full time spent in actual commitment and detention under this Act.
SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
child in conflict with the law, and upon application at any time, place the child on probation in lieu of service of his/her
sentence taking into account the best interest of the child. For this purpose, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968,
otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976", is hereby amended accordingly.
PROBATION LAW
PD 968 (1976) AS AMENDED BY RA 10707 (2015) — ESTABLISHING A PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Title and Scope of the Decree. This Decree shall be known as the Probation Law of 1976. It shall apply to all
offenders except those entitled to the benefits under the provisions of Presidential Decree numbered Six Hundred and
three and similar laws.
Section 3. Meaning of Terms. As used in this Decree, the following shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be
construed thus:
(a) "Probation" is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions
imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer.
(b) "Probationer" means a person placed on probation.
(c) "Probation Officer" means one who investigates for the court a referral for probation or supervises a probationer or
both.
Section 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted
and sentenced a defendant for a probationable penalty and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided, That when a judgment of conviction
imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition of
a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision before
such decision becomes final. The application for probation based on the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court
where the judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such
case has since been re-raffled. In a case involving several defendants where some have taken further appeal, the other
defendants may apply for probation by submitting a written application and attaching thereto a certified true copy of the
judgment of conviction.
The trial court shall, upon receipt of the application filed, suspend the execution of the sentence imposed in the
judgment.
This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of probation should he seek a review of the modified decision
which already imposes a probationable penalty.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable
Section 5. Post-sentence Investigation. No person shall be placed on probation except upon prior investigation by the
probation officer and a determination by the court that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as
that of the defendant will be served thereby.
Section 6. Form of Investigation Report. The investigation report to be submitted by the probation officer under Section 5
hereof shall be in the form prescribed by the Probation Administrator and approved by the Secretary of Justice.
Section 7. Period for Submission of Investigation Report. The probation officer shall submit to the court the investigation
report on a defendant not later than sixty days from receipt of the order of said court to conduct the investigation. The
court shall resolve the petition for probation not later than five days after receipt of said report.
Pending submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, the defendant may be allowed on
temporary liberty under his bail filed in the criminal case; Provided, That, in case where no bail was filed or that the
defendant is incapable of filing one, the court may allow the release of the defendant on recognize the custody of a
responsible member of the community who shall guarantee his appearance whenever required by the court.
Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. In determining whether an offender may be placed on probation,
the court shall consider all information relative, to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition
of the offender, and available institutional and community resources. Probation shall be denied if the court finds that:
(a) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an
institution; or
(b) there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another crime; or
(c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.
Section 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:
a. sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
b. convicted of any crime against the national security;
c. who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than six (6)
months and one (1) day and/or a fine of more than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00);
d. who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
e. who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to
Section 33 hereof.
Section 10. Conditions of Probation. Every probation order issued by the court shall contain conditions requiring that the
probationer shall:
(a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such place as may be specified in
the order within seventy-two hours from receipt of said order;
(b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified by said officer.
(c) devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment without the prior written approval of the
probation officer;
(d) undergo medical, psychological or psychiatric examination and treatment and enter and remain in a specified
institution, when required for that purpose;
(e) pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;
(f) attend or reside in a facility established for instruction, recreation or residence of persons on probation;
(g) refrain from visiting houses of ill-repute;
(h) abstain from drinking intoxicating beverages to excess;
(i) permit to probation officer or an authorized social worker to visit his home and place or work;
(j) reside at premises approved by it and not to change his residence without its prior written approval; or
(k) satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or
incompatible with his freedom of conscience.
Section 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at which time the court
shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the
conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the
offense under which he was placed on probation.
Section 12. Modification of Condition of Probation. During the period of probation, the court may, upon application of
either the probationer or the probation officer, revise or modify the conditions or period of probation. The court shall notify
either the probationer or the probation officer of the filing such an application so as to give both parties an opportunity to
be heard thereon.
The court shall inform in writing the probation officer and the probationer of any change in the period or conditions of
probation.
Section 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. The probationer and his probation program shall be under the control
of the court who placed him on probation subject to actual supervision and visitation by a probation officer.
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court, control over him shall be
transferred to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of that place, and in such a case, a copy of the probation
order, the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished said Executive Judge. Thereafter, the
Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that
was previously possessed by the court which granted the probation.
Section 15. Arrest of Probationer; Subsequent Disposition. At any time during probation, the court may issue a warrant for
the arrest of a probationer for violation of any of the conditions of probation. The probationer, once arrested and detained,
shall immediately be brought before the court for a hearing, which may be informal and summary, of the violation
charged. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing. In such a case, the provisions regarding release
on bail of persons charged with a crime shall be applicable to probationers arrested under this provision. If the violation is
established, the court may revoke or continue his probation and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the court shall
order the probationer to serve the sentence originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the
terms and conditions thereof shall not be appealable.
Section 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and upon consideration of the report and
recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he
has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to totally extinguish his criminal liability as to the offense for which probation was granted.
The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy of such order
Section 17. Confidentiality of Records. The investigation report and the supervision history of a probationer obtained
under this Decree shall be privileged and shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the Probation
Administration or the court concerned, except that the court, in its discretion, may permit the probationer of his attorney
to inspect the aforementioned documents or parts thereof whenever the best interest of the probationer make such
disclosure desirable or helpful: Provided, Further, That, any government office or agency engaged in the correction or
rehabilitation of offenders may, if necessary, obtain copies of said documents for its official use from the proper court or
the Administration.
Section 24. Miscellaneous Powers of Regional, Provincial and City Probation Officers. — Regional, Provincial or City
Probation Officers shall have the authority within their territorial jurisdiction to administer oaths and acknowledgments
and to take depositions in connection with their duties and functions under this Decree. They shall also have, with respect
to probationers under their care, the powers of a police officer. They shall be considered as persons in authority.
CONCEPT OF PROBATION
‣ Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender.
‣ It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the
state the time, effort, and expenses to jettison an appeal. (Francisco vs CA 1995)
‣ It is a disposition under which a defendant after conviction and sentence is released subject to conditions impose dby the
court and to the supervision of a probation officer.
‣ Probation is NOT an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose granted rests upon the discretion of the trial court. Its
grant is subject to certain terms and conditions that may be imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant the
probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under proper
circumstances. (Soriano vs CA 1999)
‣ Purpose of probation
1. To promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment;
2. To provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a
prison sentence; and
‣ It may be granted even if the sentence is a fine only but with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
‣ BUT — No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal
from the judgment of conviction
‣ EXCEPT — when a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and
such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to
apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final.
‣ The application for probation based on the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court where the judgment
of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such case has
since been re-raffled. In a case involving several defendants where some have taken further appeal, the other
defendants may apply for probation by submitting a written application and attaching thereto a certified true
copy of the judgment of conviction
‣ NOTE — This is the ruling in the case of People vs Colinares 2011, and it was incorporated in the Probation
Law by RA 10707 in 2015.
‣ The probation officer conducts an investigation and submits a report to the court not later than 60 days from receipt of
the order to conduct the investigation.
‣ Factors to consider —
1. All information relative to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition of the offender
1. The offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an
institution
2. There is undue risk that during the period of probation, the offender will commit another crime
a. Files an appeal (except if a non-probationable penalty was initially imposed and was modified to a probationable
penalty on appeal)
‣ NO. They are entitled to probation at any time. (See Sec. 42, RA 9344)
‣ EXCEPT — In drug-trafficking or drug pushing, even minors are disqualified to avail of probation (Padua vs People
2008)
3. Life imprisonment
5. Espionage
6. Piracy
OTHERS 1. When offender files an appeal (except if a 1. When offender granted a conditional pardon by the
non-probationable penalty was initially President but violated the terms thereof
CONDITIONS OF PARDON
1. Mandatory Conditions —
a. Probationer presents himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision, at such place as may
be specified in the order, within 72 hours from receipt of the order
b. He reports to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified by said officer
2. Discretionary or Special Conditions — additional conditions listed, which the courts may additionally impose on the
probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside prison
‣ NOTE — A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the
consequences thereof and explain that upon his (1) failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said
order or (2) his commission of another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was
placed on probation.
‣ Once a serious violation of the condition of the parole occurs, the court will order the arrest of the probationer and may —
1. Revoke the probation (if revoked the probationer will serve the sentence originally imposed)
PERIOD OF PROBATION
1. Penalty is imprisonment not more than 1 year — not exceeding 2 years
‣ NOTE —
‣ Once the period of probation lapses, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he
has fulfilled the terms and conditions of the probation.
‣ The probation is not coterminous with its period. There must be an order issued by the court discharging the
probationer. (Bala vs Martinez 1990)
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES
Article 90. Prescription of crime. - Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe
in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto
mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the
rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by RA 4661, approved June 19,
1966).
Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing
of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
ACT NO. 3326 – AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL
ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with
the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month,
or both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)
after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve
years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall
prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of the law not included in
the Penal Code.
‣ NOTE — One of the ways of how criminal liability is extinguished is through prescription. Prescription of felonies under
the RPC is governed by Art. 90 of the RPC. Prescription of criminal offenses under special laws is governed by Act No.
3326, in the absence of provisions of such special laws.
PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION
1. Felonies under the Revised Penal Code — depends on the maximum imposable penalty of the felony involved —
a. Death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal — 20 years
2. Criminal Offences punished by Special Laws — apply the proper prescriptive period under the special law concerned,
in the absence thereof, Act No. 3326 governs —
a. Offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than 1 month, or both — 1 year
b. Offenses punished by imprisonment for more than 1 month, but less than 2 years — 4 years
c. Offenses punished by imprisonment for 2 years or more, but less than 6 years — 8 years
e. Treason — 20 years
‣ An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which
will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the
plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action. Thus, we held
in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive
act or acts.
2. Criminal Offenses punished by Special Laws — no similar provision like the RPC
‣ NOTE — The running of the prescription of an offense punished by a special law is NOT tolled by the absence of the
offender from Philippine soil. (Romualdez vs Marcelo 2006)
‣ SALVADOR —When the wheels of justice begin to run, the prescriptive period is interrupted.
‣ Under the RPC, the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The SC has
interpreted this to pertain to the filing a complaint with the proper officer for investigation.
‣ Since one way of instituting a criminal action is by filing a complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of
conducting the requisite PI for offenses where a PI is required, the filing of the complaint (with the office of the
prosecutor or the ombudsman) would interrupt the period of prescription.
‣ For offenses which a PI is not required, the filing of the information or complaint directly with the MTC and MCTC or
with the office of the prosecutor, shall likewise interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged because it is
a mode by which a criminal action is instituted.
‣ NOTE — This rule covers both offenses under the RPC and Special Penal Laws which do not provide for their own
rules
‣ In these cases the interruption of the prescriptive period only arises upon the institution of judicial proceedings which
is upon filing of the information in court. (See Act No. 3326, Sec. 2 and Zaldivia vs Reyes and Jadewell vs Lidua 2013)
‣ SEE — Zaldivia vs Reyes, G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992
‣ Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation."Both parties agree that this provision
does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall
be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a
preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the
case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
‣ Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner (violation of municipal
ordinance) commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July
11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
‣ SEE — Jadewell Parking Systems vs Lidua, G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013
‣ For an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is interrupted only by the
filing of the complaint or information in court. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that
among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against
the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section
1 of Rule 110. For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by
the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
‣ This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription
shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in
Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a
matter of fact, it does.
‣ At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights"
under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
‣ The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the
case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their
prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period.
‣ Is prescription interrupted even if the court where the action is later filed, is without jurisdiction (or even
dismissed without prejudice)?
‣ YES. The running the prescriptive period is interrupted with the filing of the action even if the court in which the action
was first filed is without jurisdiction
‣ SEE — Arambulo vs Laqui, G.R. No. 138596. October 12, 2000 citing People vs Olarte, G.R. No. L-22465
February 28, 1967
‣ In the landmark case of People vs. Olarte, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, finally resolved the
then conflicting views as to whether or not the filing of a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes
of preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period for the crime.
‣ In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for the Bench and Bar, this Court has
reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is,
and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint with the Municipal
Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt
the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information
is filed can not try the case on the merits.
‣ Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal code, in declaring that
the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information without distinguishing
whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on
the merits. Second , even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender.
Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint.
‣ And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, thereby indicating
that the court in which the complaint or information is filed must have the power to convict or acquit the
accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in
the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or
acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie case had been shown.
‣ It is clear from the Olarte case that the filing of the complaint or information for purposes of preliminary
investigation represents the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. This is one of the reasons why
such filing is deemed as having interrupted the period of prescription for the prosecution of a crime. This
period of prescription commences to run again when the proceedings terminate without conviction or acquittal,
if the court (or prosecutor) should discharge the accused because no prima facie case has been shown.
‣ It is thus evident that petitioners first premise that the period of prescription commenced to run again when the
Quezon City prosecutors Office recommended the filing of a criminal complaint against her is incorrect. When
the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of libel charges against petitioner, the proceedings against her
were not terminated, precisely because a prima facie case for libel was found against her. Instead of
terminating the proceedings against petitioner, the resolution of the city prosecutor actually directed the
continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner by the filing of the appropriate information against her
and by the holding of trial on the merits. As such, when the information for libel was filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court, the period of prescription for the crime was still suspended.
‣ Another important teaching in Olarte is that it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. This is because in criminal prosecutions, the
only thing that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint.
‣ In the case at bench, private respondents were not remiss in their right to seek grievance against respondent
as they filed their complaint before the city prosecutor forty-two days after the alleged crime of libel occurred.
It was the Office of the City Prosecutor that committed an error when it filed the complaint with the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
‣ What if the investigative proceedings are void, does it produce the effect of interruption of prescription?
‣ NO. (See Disini vs SB)
‣ It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is
filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.\
‣ While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before
"investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of
the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should
be sufficient to toll prescription.
‣ Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control. In this case, the Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City
Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
‣ SEE — Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corp., G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008
‣ While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before"
investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of
the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
"proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of
investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should
be sufficient to toll prescription.
‣ Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control.
‣ The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised
Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor
for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription
did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up
to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman
‣ Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit.
There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the
interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. is not controlling in special laws. In
Llenes v. Dicdican, Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, Brillante v. CA, and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, cases
involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et. al., the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts
the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
cases.
‣ In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court
categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of
the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP
Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes,
should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like
the accused delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES
Article 92. When and how penalties prescribe. - The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.
Article 93. Computation of the prescription of penalties. - The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant
should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition
treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.
‣ Prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture of the right of the government to execute the final sentence, after the
lapse of a certain time
‣ The penalties must be imposed by final sentence. Hence, if the convict appealed and thereafter fled to the mountains, the
penalty imposed upon him would never prescribe, because pending the appeal, the sentence is not final.
‣ If what is involved is a special law which does not have its own rules on prescription of penalties then we have to apply
the provision of the Revised Penal Code which allows the application of said code in suppletory character. (De Castillo vs
Torrecampo 2002)
‣ If the accused was never arrested to serve his sentence, the prescriptive period cannot commence to run.
‣ SEE — Del Castillo vs Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033. December 18, 2002
‣ Escape in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner
from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom.
‣ In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of the judgment for
his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has
ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But
it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive.The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving.
Petitioners guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is
therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
1. Death, reclusion perpetua or 1. Offenses punished only by a fine 1. Death and reclusion perpetua —
reclusion temporal — 20 years or by imprisonment for not more 20 years
years
years
4. Penalty is arresto mayor — 5
3. Offenses punished by 4. Arresto mayor —5 years
years
5. Treason — 20 years
6. Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances — 2
months
Article 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. – Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving
his sentence. (As amended by RA 10592)
Article 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditional pardon. - Any person who has been granted conditional
pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance
with any of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be
applied to him.
Article 96. Effect of commutation of sentence. - The commutation of the original sentence for another of a different length
and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former.
Article 97. Allowance for good conduct. – The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive
imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or
detention center or any other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days for each month of good
behavior during detention;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a reduction of twenty-three days
for each month of good behavior during detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
twenty-five days for each month of good behavior during detention;
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of thirty days for each
month of good behavior during detention; and
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in addition to
numbers one to four hereof, for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances for good conduct. (As amended
by RA 10592)
Article 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. – A deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to
any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances
mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a
proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-
fifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement
notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence. (As amended
by RA 10592)
Article 158. Evasion of service of sentence on the occasion of disorder, conflagrations, earthquakes, or other calamities. -
A convict who shall evade the service of his sentence, by leaving the penal institution where he shall have been confined,
on the occasion of disorder resulting from a conflagration, earthquake, explosion, or similar catastrophe, or during a
mutiny in which he has not participated, shall suffer an increase of one-fifth of the time still remaining to be served under
the original sentence, which in no case shall exceed six months, if he shall fail to give himself up to the authorities within
forty-eight hours following the issuance of a proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of such
calamity.
Convicts who, under the circumstances mentioned in the preceding paragraph, shall give themselves up to the authorities
within the above mentioned period of 48 hours, shall be entitled to the deduction provided in Article 98.
Article 99. Who grants time allowances. – Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief
of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall
grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked. (As amended by RA 10592)
Article 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. - The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears
that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or
if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented
shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to
the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been
caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by
special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be
primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the
latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
Article 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. - In default of the
persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for
the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of
the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which
such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeeper's employees.
Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed
by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Article 104. What is included in civil liability. - The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code
includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Article 105. Restitution; How made. - The restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever possible, with allowance
for any deterioration, or diminution of value as determined by the court.
The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third person who has acquired it by
lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the proper person, who may be liable to him.
This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the third person in the manner and
under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its recovery.
Article 106. Reparation; How made. - The court shall determine the amount of damage, taking into consideration the
price of the thing, whenever possible, and its special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall be made
accordingly.
Article 107. Indemnification; What is included. - Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those
caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
Article 108. Obligation to make restoration, reparation for damages, or indemnification for consequential damages and
actions to demand the same; Upon whom it devolves. - The obligation to make restoration or reparation for damages and
indemnification for consequential damages devolves upon the heirs of the person liable.
The action to demand restoration, reparation, and indemnification likewise descends to the heirs of the person injured.
Article 109. Share of each person civilly liable. - If there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall
determine the amount for which each must respond.
Article 110. Several and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories of a felony; Preference in payment.
- Notwithstanding the provisions of the next preceding article, the principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within
their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiaries for those
of the other persons liable.
The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices,
and, lastly, against that of the accessories.
Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person by whom payment has been
made shall have a right of action against the others for the amount of their respective shares.
Article 111. Obligation to make restitution in certain cases. - Any person who has participated gratuitously in the
proceeds of a felony shall be bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation.
Article 112. Extinction of civil liability. - Civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this Code shall be
extinguished in the same manner as obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.
Article 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. - Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next
preceding article the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed
by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has
not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason.