THEORY FIRST

NC theory first module

NC theory first - 1] They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy
2] We have more speeches to norm over it 3] It was introduced first so it comes
lexically prior.

Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR
judge psychology 3] first and last speech 4] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to
line-by-line every 2NR standard with no 3nr response

DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR but I have to
split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention

RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces
the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew

No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] New 1ar paradigms moot any 1NC theoretical
offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested
 1AR theory first module 
1AR theory first
A] 1NC can dump 7 minutes on theory, 7-4 time skew means uplayer 1AR shells is key
to preserving fairness or else they can spam no risk shells and moot 1AC substantive
offense
B] 
Initiating Substantive Theory
NEG
 1AR theory bad 
First choice
A] Interpretation – All theoretical paradigm issues must be contextual to their
corresponding interpretations. To clarify, arguments that frame the evaluation of a
particular shell should have particular framing arguments.//Massa

B] Violation – they don’t- that’s the underview

C] Prefer –
Norming – 4 Internal links
1] 1AR theory– 1ACs are incentivized to read generic 1AR theory paradigm issues and
spam no-risk shells which makes theory a strategic tool instead of a norming one by
justifying drop the debater for shells like spec status
2] Contestation – No one engages in the nuances of a shell if they can recycle the same
reasonability block. Our model means you’re forced to discuss the model even under
paradigm issues.
3] Recourse – Generic issues put all shells on the same argumentative plane. Must be
from Texas is obviously different than 8 condo, but they’re weighed equally which is
theoretically bankrupt. Our interp forces debaters to abandon frivolous shells that
can’t be justified with specific reasons for a CI or DTD model.
4] Theoretical Abuse – It impossible to answer some arguments under generic
paradigm issues. 
Drop the debater – 1] Our interpretation indicts an omission which means the only
possible recourse is DTD 2] They’ve justified skewing every norm in debate which
means you should evaluate it based on proportionality
Competing Interps – 1] Reasonability doesn’t make sense for norming shells because it
doesn’t require debaters to defend counter norms – they just have to prove they met
a threshold. 2] Our contestation offense proves that it is always comparatively better
to debate whether the norm is good in depth
No RVIs – Our norming offense claims it’s good to have discussions about rules that
make the activity better so we should concede true ones
Second choice
Reject 1AR theory A] NO 3NR so 2ar gets to weigh however they want B] time skew- 
1NC theory first A] Abuse was self-inflicted-  B] it’s more common, so resolving it first
sets better norms B] It definitionally comes prior since it was introduced first. C]
predicated on a 1AC violation, there’s are just floating paradigm issues they can
choose to link to any shell D] baiting, they want theory to win not norm set
Negating is harder so you grant me an rvi on all 1ar shells- they get a 2ar judge
psychology advantage. 1ar theory drop the arg because they can spam no risk shells 
Use reasonability on 1ar shells. Aff skew — 1AR theory is really biased since 2ARs lbl
every argument with new answers since no 3n–some strategic advantage is needed to
check back 2AR sandbagging; 

 
 A-spec
Interp: Debaters must specify the actor of their advocacy in a delineated text in the
1AC.
Violation: You didn’t. 1AC doesn’t explicitly specify who’s going to be implementing
the plan. The word “plan” in the plantext implies that it’s a government that
implements the aff, but the solvency advocate implies that it’s a journalist
Standards – 
1] Stable advocacy – not speccing an actor allows you to shift out of neg offense in the
1ar – if I read a government crackdown DA, you’ll just say that the aff defends that the
media should implement the aff -  outweighs since the 2nr is too late to read new links
so I lose every round after the 1ar. It’s not regressive since it’s part of the advocacy
text which is limited in terms of plan action.
2] Topic education – different actors produce different solvency and advantages,
which makes specification key to nuanced topic ed – outweighs because we only have
two months to debate the topic.
3] Prep skew – I don’t know what they will be willing to clarify until CX which means I
could go 6 minutes planning to read a disad and then get screwed over in CX when
they spec something else. This means that CX can’t check because the time in between
is when I should be formulating my strat and waiting until then is the abuse. Key
fairness because I won’t be able to use the strat I formulated if you skewed my prep
and will have a time disadvantage. Can’t check also since judges don’t flow and
debaters are trained to be shifty in CX so I can’t hold you.
c/a voters and paradigm issues from above
Body not the plan
Interpretation the body not the plan should be the focus of the debate. 
Violation – They only advocate a debate about the hypothetical plan action in the
1AC. 
Standards
Presumption – the affirmative doesn’t actually solve the issue, they only suggests a
reform which doesn’t resolve any of the 1ACs impacts – vote neg on presumption 
1]Limits – plan-focus and disembodied debates explode limits – there are an infinite
amount of hypothetical actions the USFG could take 
Ground – we can’t get access to our disads or counter-advocacies that compete off of
the performance or method of the 1AC because those exist outside the hypothetical
passing of the plan – this kills neg ground crucial to developing real world
revolutionary survival strategies that challenge overarching structures of oppression
like capitalism, colonialism and anti-blackness. 
2]Topic Specific Education – disembodied debate forces a race to the bottoms where
aff’s to run to the margins defending as little as possible while never considering how
the speaker actually matters when it comes to this discussion. This forces the negative
to resort to strategies meant to undermine substantive discussions of the topic as
well 
3] Spectatorship DA - Fiat is the opposite of embodied debate because it endorses a physical
separation between the debaters themselves and the agent of change resulting in political
apathy. 
Mitchell, Gordon. 1995. (portion taken from essay: Reflexive Fiat: Incorporating the
Outward Activist Turn Into Contest Strategy, pages 1-2.)
Most mainstream conceptions of fiat contain a common structural feature, the idea that fiat is a construction which affords
debaters the latitude to make assumptions about external actors. The assumption that a specified agent will "carry out the plan"if the
affirmative team proves its desirability inscribes this externality by structurally separating the advocate from the specified agent of change.
Likewise, the idea that the negative team "has the power" to mandate an alternative course of action by the same (or another) external
actor endorses this same kind of structural separation between debater and the agent of
change. Advocacy, under this view of fiat, takes place on the plane of simulation. The power that backs a debaters' command that
"we mandate the following. . . "is a mirage, a phantasm allowed to masquerade as genuine for the purpose
of allowing the game of political simulation to take place. Debaters have no real authority
over the actors they employ to implement their ideas in plans and counterplans, yet the simulation of such authority is
recognized as an essential fiction necessary to allow the game of policy debate to unfold. One problem with approaches to fiat which feature
such a structural separation between advocate and agent of change is that such approaches tend to instill political
apathy by inculcating a spectator mentality. The function of fiat which gives debaters simulated political control over
external actors coaxes students to gloss over consideration of their concrete roles as involved
agents in the controversies they research. The construct of fiat, in this vein, serves as a political crutch by alleviating the burden of
demonstrating a connection between in-round advocacy and the action by external actors defended in plan or counterplan mandates. A
second manner in which the structural features of this sort of fiat tend to circumscribe active political involvement is through the
containment of fiat action within the spatio-temporal boundaries of the contest round. The fiction of simulated authority
evaporates when the judge issues his/her decision and the debaters disband and head to the next round.
Advocacy, resting on the ephemeral foundation of simulation, is here a casual and fleeting phenomenon that carries with
it few significant future ramifications or responsibilities. By cultivating an ethic of detachment of the actual polis, this view of
advocacy introduces a politically regressive dynamic into the academic debate process.
4] Voters – Framework is a voting issue for accessibility and revolutionary
participation in debate – this debate is about competing-interpretations which means
they need to win that their model of debate outweighs the impacts of our framework. 
Uncut Counterplans good
Uncut Consult counterplans good
 Combo Shell

Interpretation: Debaters may not justify 1ar theory is dtd, no rvi, competing interps,
no 2n theory paradigm issues ,
Violation: its all in the underview
Standard: Infinite Abuse - their norm justifies the affirmative auto winning every
round since they can read a risk free 1AR shell with DTD and Competing interps which
I can’t answer since the theory shell since they make paradigm issues like evaluate the
theory debate after the 1ar in the 1ar. 
And since I don’t have 2n paradigm issues I can’t contest it. Even if I try to uplayer the
shell and read meta theory to get an out in the 2NR I can’t since your shell is the
highest layer and nor can I go for paradigm issues like reasonability to gut check the
shell since you denied that as well. 
Norming is an independent voter since justifying the value of debate necessarily
justifies the norms of the activity being good in order for debate to be valuable.
 D-spec

Interp: Affirmatives must define the term “x” in a delineated card in the 1AC
There’s no fixed definition for (find a card for wtv isn’t defined)
Thomas 18 [Thomas, Ryan J.. "20. Advocacy Journalism". Journalism, edited by Tim P. Vos, Berlin,
Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2018, pp. 391-414. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501500084-020] // CHS
AD
“Partof the problem is that there is no single, agreed upon definition of advocacy journalism or what it
constitutes (Fisher 2016). While we would likely spend little time arguing about whether newspaper editorials fit the genre, we would
probably spend quite a bit more time on whether or not “interpretive journalism” joins them (Salgado & Strömbäck 2012). Political talk shows
like This Week would be a safe bet, less so comedy shows like The Daily Show. This is to say that if
drawing the exterior boundaries
of journalism is a difficult task, it is no less difficult in drawing its interior boundaries. For Fisher (2016),
“advocacy is about pleading another’s cause or arguing in support of an idea, event, or a person” (p. 712) which indicates that this is a form of
journalism where the objectivity norm does not apply. Yet this broad container encompasses a large swathe of journalistic output across time,
place, and medium, and hinges also on whether we regard objectivity as possible, desirable, both, or neither. In effort to account for the
diversity of the genre, it is important to begin with a definition that is broad and adaptable. I therefore proceed with a preliminary, working
definition of advocacy journalism as journalism that takes a point of view.”

Violation: you didn’t

Vote neg on stable ground – 1AR clarification of “advocacy” links out of disads,
counterplans, and PICs and decks clash along with critical thinking. For example, I
could read a DA about how (___) is really good and restricted by the aff, but the 1AR
can redefine (__) to exclude it. Makes it impossible for the neg to construct a 1NC
because I don’t know what links into the aff.
CX doesn’t check because A] Not flowed B] Skews 6 min of prep C] They can lie and no
way to check D] Debaters can be shady. 
Education is a voter else schools don’t fund debate
Fairness is a voter – it’s constitutive of this activity and provides incentive to play the
game which turns every other voter
Drop the debater a] deters abuse b] dta is incoherent bc we indict their advocacy
No RVIs – a] illogical you don’t win for being fair b] chills abuse checking c] incentivizes
being abusive to go for the RVI on theory
Prefer competing interps – a] reasonability is arbitrary and requires intervention b]
reasonability creates a race to the bottom where we see how abusive we can be c]
competing interps creates a race to the top to create the best norms
 E-spec

Interpretation: affirmative debaters must delineate their enforcement mechanism by

which they prioritize in the 1AC
Violation – you didn’t. The 1AC just says that (x) need/have to be (__) they don’t
specify what law or policy (agent) will pass that enforces the plan.
Negate:
1] Shiftiness- they can redefine what degree of enforcement the 1ac defends in the 1ar
which decks strategy and allows them to wriggle out of negative positions which strips
the neg of specific politics DAs, process CPs, etc. They will always win on specificity
weighing
2] Real World- policy makers will always specify what the object of change is. That
outweighs since debate has no value without portable application. It also means zero
solvency since if we can’t enforce the aff it doesn’t happen and vote neg on
presumption. We get presumption since the aff has the psychological benefit of
speaking first and last. 
This spec shell isn’t regressive- it literally determines how the affirmative is
implemented and who it affects
C/A paradigm issues and CX doesn’t check from other shells
 Hidden A prioris bad

Interpretation: All a prioris must be explicitly numbered, labeled as their own off, or
have a line break between an argument before and after it. To clarify, hidden a-prioris
are bad.
Violation: there are hidden a prioris in FW
Standards - 
Inclusion- People who can’t flow as well, process fast blips, or have a hard time
reading huge blocks of text due to disabilities get crowded out of the debate because
they always lose to auto win arguments– that outweighs since inclusion is an impact
filter
Dtd - deters future abuse, dta incoherent because whole rounds been skewed so can’t
rectify abuse
c/i, reasonability is arbitrary and allows intervention
 Must have meta-ethics

Interpretation: affirmatives must justify their standards with a metaethical

framework.
Violation: They do not defend a metaethical framework cx proves no i-meets hold the
line on 1AR responses
Standards
Resolvability: Absent a metaethical framework the only way to truly pick a framework
is through judge intervention. Metaethical frameworks ensure that rounds become
more than I liked utilitarianism better. Judge intervention is bad for fairness because
the round is no longer a question of who did the better debating, it’s who did the
judge like more.
DTD cuz DTA would justify dropping the whole AC
Fairness because competitive debate mandates equal burdens. This means the
function of the ballot is to vote for the better debater but that’s functionally
impossible if one side is skewed.
Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary
judge intervention and no RVI because u shouldn’t win for being fair 
 New affs bad

Interpretation: Debaters must disclose affirmative frameworks, advocacy texts, and

advantage areas thirty minutes before round if they haven’t read the affirmative
before
Violation: They didn’t [ screenshots ] 
Standards:
1] Clash- Not disclosing incentivizes poor strategy making, makes 3rd and 4th line
testing impossible because we don’t see the aff until the 1AC which means less in
depth education
2] Shiftiness- Not knowing enough about the affirmative coming into round
incentivizes 1ar shiftiness about what the aff is and what their framework/advocacy
entails. That means even if we could read generics or find prep, they’d just find ways
to recontextualize in the 1ar
Fairness and education are voters – its how judges evaluate rounds and why schools
fund debate
DTD – it’s key to norm set and deter future abuse
Competing interps – Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to
the bottom of questionable argumentation
No RVIs – A –forces us to go all in on theory, kills substance ed B - Discourages
checking real abuse, kills norm setting C – Encourages theory baiting D – its illogical for
you to win for proving you were fair
 Uncut No Condo

Interpretation: The negative must defend all advocacies unconditionally 

 Solvency spec v plan affs

Interp: The affirmative must either defend the whole resolution or specify their
solvency mechanism and, if applicable, the scope of their limitation. 
Vote neg –
1) Object fiat and aff shiftiness – this is the textbook example for SPEC. This isn’t
just a frivolous spec shell – Harker hasn’t read an actual solvency advocate or even
solvency evidence for their harms. Plan text in a vacuum doesn’t solve – their plan
text just says “limits” which gives us nothing. They just fiat the success of their plan
which means the neg doesn’t know what kind of overfishing policies that the aff limits
and never has a stable link to solvency deficits or case turns because they would just
say it’s not their aff. That makes them a moving target and results in unbeatable affs 
2) Ground – negs can’t generate CP competition or DA links because the plan is an
outcome, not an action. They’ll say perm do the CP to anything and no-link DAs since
they don’t advocate a stable policy which means we only get impact turns. That’s bad
for topic education and fairness – causes stale debates where we can only read
warming good, which isn’t the core of the topic. 
Use competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race
to the bottom of questionable argumentation.  
Independently, hold the line on 1ar spec. Since they refused to explain the aff in the ac
or in cx, they shouldn’t get to do so in the 1ar, so no-links and permutations should be
off the table.
Independently, vote neg on presumption – zero solvency evidence in the 1AC means
they can’t claim to solve any of their impacts, even if you buy 100% of the link chain.
 Uncut Spec status

Interp: the negative must specify the status of any kritiks, counterplans, and pics in
the 1NC
Violation: they don’t
Standards - 
1] strat skew - absent spec the 1AR is split between everything without knowing
what’s most important. Kills fairiness bc A] the 1nc can spam offs then no risk kick
them all B] 
4: paradigm issues
1] Drop the debater a] deters abuse b] better for norm setting 
2] No RVIs – a] illogical you don’t win for being fair b] chills abuse checking c]
incentivizes being abusive to go for the RVI on theory
3] Prefer competing interps – a] reasonability is arbitrary and requires intervention b] 
race to the bottom where we see how abusive we can be 
Aff
 AFC

Interpretation: the negative must concede the affirmative framework 

Violation - they read [framing]
Standards - 
1] topic ed – they turn the debate into framing instead of substantive education, kills
topic ed
2] ground loss – moots the 6 minute 1AC, forces restart because i need to gain offense
under their FWK 
3] prep skew – they can prep any phil framing vs the aff pre round and i only get prep
A] sequencing – it’s a prerequisite to me being able to engage with it
B] engagement – impossible to predict, kills engagement and hurts education on their
philosophy
Voter for fairness and education. Fairness controls the internal link to proper and
good education which is the greatest thing we gain from debate on portability, DTD
because DTA is incoherent since the arg skewed the entire round already. No RVI’s
don’t win for being fair and takes away from topic ed even more
 1AC theory 1st

Aff theory first and dtd (a) It’s a 7-4 time investment meaning it’s probably more true
and a bigger investment (b) neg theory moots the entire ac - it’s key to give the aff a
chance if the neg is abusive since they can already uplayer
Aff gets rvis (a) stops 2nr brute forcing on theory (b) stops friv theory because the 1nc
to 1ar time trade off is strategic
 No alt advocacies (squo)
The negative must not read alternative advocacies ie. must defend squo:
[A] Reciprocity- They get access to infinite alternative advocacies while I only get one
whole aff
[B] Predictability- I can’t predict every alternative advocacy which means they win
every debate and it skews our ability to test their desirability
[C] Negation Theory- Negating requires a complete absence of an existing action not
an alternative
Negate [is to]: to deny the existence of

That’s Dictionary.com- “Negate” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/negate. VHS AI

[4] Our interpretation is that the 1AC should be get to weigh its framework:
[A] Fairness – arbitrary frameworks moot the 1AC – there are infinite parts of the 1AC
they could problematize which forces 1ar restart. Fairness o/w—debate’s a
competitive game and they presuppose fair evaluation of their arguments.
[B] Pedagogy – Critiques require an understanding of virtue, without the AC
framework we can’t interrogate oppressive norms – making any liberation fail.
Butler 01 [Judith Butler, 2001, What is Critique? SJ JH] *brackets in original text
For Foucault, critique is “a means for a future or a truth that it will not know nor happen to be, it oversees a domain it would not want to
police and is unable to regulate.” So critique will be that perspective on established and ordering ways of knowing which is not immediately
assimilated into that ordering function. Significantly, for Foucault, this exposure of the limit of the epistemological field is linked with the
practice of virtue, as if virtue is counter to regulation and order, as if virtue itself is to be found in the risking of established order. He is not shy
about the relation here. He writes, “there is something in critique that is akin to virtue.” And then he says something which might be considered
even more surprising: “this critical attitude [is] virtue in general.” (25)¶ There are some preliminary ways we can understand Foucault’s effort to
cast critique as virtue. Virtue is most often understood either as an attribute or a practice of a subject, or indeed a quality that conditions and
belongs to an ethics which is not fulfilled merely by following
characterizes a certain kind of action or practice. It
objectively formulated rules or laws. And virtue is not only a way of complying with or conforming with preestablished
norms. It is, more radically, a critical relation to those norms, one which, for Foucault, takes shape as a
specific stylization of morality. Foucault gives us an indication of what he means by virtue in the introduction to The Use of
Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, Volume Two.[6] At this juncture he makes clear that he seeks to move beyond a notion of ethical philosophy
that issues a set of prescriptions. Just as critique intersects with philosophy without quite coinciding with it, so Foucault in that introduction
seeks to make of his own thought an example of a non-prescriptive form of moral inquiry. In the same way, he will later ask about forms of
moral experience that are not rigidly defined by a juridical law, a rule or command to which the self is said mechanically or uniformly to submit.
The essay that he writes, he tells us, is itself the example of such a practice, “to explore what might be changed, in its own thought, through the
Moral experience has to do with a self-transformation prompted by
practice of a knowledge that is foreign to it.” (9)
a form of knowledge that is foreign to one’s own. And this form of moral experience will be different
from the submission to a command. Indeed, to the extent that Foucault interrogates moral experience here or elsewhere, he
understands himself to be making an inquiry into moral experiences that are not primarily or fundamentally structured by prohibition or
interdiction.
 CCP bad

Interp: The negative may only defend counterplans that are exclusive of the aff
advocacy.
Violation: they read consult counterplan
Standards: 
Under normal means fiat, we would necessarily consult with all relevant parties
before taking the action. The AC fiat has already assumed that any consultation that
should happen has already happened. 
Consult counterplans are un-debatable. If they have evidence that the entity that we
consult will agree to the plan anyway, then it is impossible for me to challenge the
counterplan on substantive grounds because they get 100% of the plan’s benefits and
the additional benefits of making another agent happy. Debatability is key to fairness
because if I can’t engage their position, then it becomes impossible for me to win the
round, since they capture all of my benefits.
That justifies intrinsic permutations., aff should only be accountable for the intrinsic
results of accepting the resolution – if the negs impact could be prevented by an
additional action that is not mutually exclusive with accepting the resolution, it is not
a reason to vote neg. 
Voter for fairness and education. Fairness controls the internal link to proper and
good education which is the greatest thing we gain from debate on portability, DTD
because DTA is incoherent since the arg skewed the entire round already
Counterplans bad
 Colt bad (make better)
Overview
Reject 1nc spec shells they’re infinitely regressive because they can cherry pick
anything that i didn’t spec in the 1AC
The name - colt peacemaker args metaphorize racism and are material policing in the
debate space - Judges have an obligation to reject racism on face
Shell proper
C/I - i’ll defend violation
CX checks
The interp is just a complicated way of saying you can’t flow and don’t know how to utilize cross X
You can ask the aff what offense is in cross and it’s literally all solved, or the fiat implications of the ROTB, i
don’t have to do the work for you 
Reciprocity
You’re making me waste time in the 1ac on all this whereas the NC doesn’t have to in your interp it’s not
reciprocal and means there's less time for me to talk plan action or K advocacy in the 1ac 
They don’t actually explain how i was being abusive or if i was skewing out of 1nc
offense in cross so they have no abuse in this round specifically, no real warrants in
the actual spirit of the shell 2nr is too late This permits reasonability, you can decide
off of cross if we’re being abusive, solves all neg offense. so default reasonability in theory,
the judge is a referee not a rule setter
 Uncut – Floating piks

Interpretation: If the negative reads an alternative advocacy, they must specify

whether it can result in any part of the aff, and if it can, which parts of the aff it can
result in.
 Must Defend Squo

1: Interpretation: If the aff defends the whole resolution, the negative must only
defend the status quo
2: Violation - they don’t, CX proves
3: Standards – 
1] predictability - negs can be literally anything, zero ability for the aff to prep which
kills fairness bc A] 7-4 time skew B] they know the aff 30 minutes ahead of the round
AND core topic lit, we’re just now seeing neg C] forces negs to be tied to a topical
stasis point, means more in depth education, 
4: paradigm issues
1] Drop the debater a] deters abuse b] better for norm setting 
2] No RVIs – a] illogical you don’t win for being fair b] chills abuse checking c]
incentivizes being abusive to go for the RVI on theory
3] Prefer competing interps – a] reasonability is arbitrary and requires intervention b] 
race to the bottom where we see how abusive we can be 
 PICS bad (make better)

Reject pics generally 

Firstly, Offense – 
Aff Ground – The PIC uses 1AC ground to weigh versus the aff itself, we lose all 1AC
offense which moots 6 minutes forces 1ar restarts with 7-4 time skew makes aff
impossible
colonization – PICs colonize the affirmative performance by isolating a particular
instance which is tiny and incredibly difficult for us to turn especially when it already
includes our identity
Infinitely regressive – Inevitably leads to worse and worse PIC out of obscure objects.
Makes the aff an impossible speech because you can get pic’d out of literally any
singular word in the 1AC
Second, Defense – 
Competition – PIC doesn’t compete, means the aff is best option since the neg is just a
wannabe
Justifies intrinsicness - PIC justifies affirmative making intrinsic perms [insert intrinsic perm]
 Refusal alts bad

interp: the negative may not read refusal alternatives or advocacies

violation - they do
standards: 
1] clash – refusal limits critical education A] nullifies the 1AC because they can get
offense off of just “nuh uh” and B] it forms as a hidden way to exclude k affs without
engaging 
2] justifies intrinsic perms - refusal is just revise and resubmit which justifies intrinsic
perms because the aff can just do the revision in the 1AR and that solves both neg and
aff impacts which would be net better in real world
3] refusal just gets rephrased as a floating PIK which is abusive, either A] they
shouldn’t get to make it a floating PIK in the 2AR OR B] the affirmative should get to
revise in the 1AR to leverage against the PIK C] that’s a reason to vote aff, we’ve
started critical discussion which justifies the perm
Voter for fairness and education
1AR theory is DTD and no RVI A] only way to reconcile mooted 1AC and resolve 7-4
time skew B] they get 2NR to dump responses on theory with no risk RVIs 
competing interpretations bc reasonability invites judge intervention and no brightline
can be formed in the amount of time a debate takes
 Spec bad
Overview 
Reject 1nc spec shells they’re infinitely regressive because they can cherry pick
anything that i didn’t spec in the 1AC
1nc spec solves, i shouldn’t necessarily have to do it for you OR lose, you’re wasting
time on theory when you could’ve read substance which increases neg ground and
solves harms
Counterinterp: we only have to spec if they ask
Standards: 
Time skew: you could’ve just asked me and we’d both be happy little campers but
now i have to waste time on theory which splits the 1ar
Ground - 1NC spec = more neg ground they can use my lack of spec to gain cp offense
Outweighs their issues because [EVALUATE]
Now shell proper 
Counter interpretation--i’ll defend the violation
They don’t actually explain how i was being abusive or that i was being shifty in cross
so they have no abuse in this round specifically, no real warrants in the actual spirit of
the shell AND 2nr is too late This permits reasonability, you can decide off of cross if
we’re being abusive, solves all neg offense the judge is a referee
TT/Tricks
NEG
 Contradictions negate
Contradictions affirm/negate
1. Presumption – If we have a contradictory claim without a tiebreaker, we have
equal offense and you vote on presumption.
2. Disadvantages – Assumes they overcame a disadvantage and thus did the
better debating if we have a contradiction, means you should force them to
answer which side is harder.
A2: tricks
 AT: Truth Testing
Interp: AC’s should have a weighing mechanism that allows for offense/defense
comparison
They violate with truth testing - makes it impossible to debate. 
TT kills fairness-leads to strat skew bc tons of spikes
Mangus 8 (Mangus, Michael. UC Santa Barbara department of Communication. "Value Comparison".
http://ldtheoryjournal.blogspot.com/2008/04/value-comparison-michael-mangus.html?m=1. 15 Apr
2008. Accessed 25 Sep 2017 SM)
a. groundwork. controversial as he may be, jason baldwin captured the view of a large number of coaches, judges and debaters when he asserted in a recent vbd interview that “The most
important element of my view of burdens is that it’s the RESOLUTION that debaters are supposed to be trying to prove true or false.” [http://victorybriefsdaily.com/2007/01/22/the-

the most fundamental

winningest/emphasis italic in original; changed for formatting reasons]. however, i believe that the emphasis in that sentence has been misplaced.

question is not whether or not we ought to debate about a resolution, but rather whether we endeavor
to prove that resolution true or false. while there has been some discussion on this (including this thread from the ldep
message board that i uncovered in researching this article: http://www.ldep.org/viewtopic.php?t=20), it seems to me that the truth-paradigm is still dominant in

how rounds are decided. b. the rise of the a priori. this is perhaps most evident in the rise of what many debaters call 'a priori' arguments – arguments which attempt

to prove the resolution true or false independent of any substantive (synthetic?) application or practical implementation.
examples of these that seem particularly common are definitional strategies which impact to either tautology or contradiction. this

leads to some pretty awful debates: “corporations are composed of individuals, so the resolution is tautological – they're the same thing!” vs. “no you have it all wrong, that
makes the resolution incoherent – it must be rejected!” also common are skeptical arguments that deny some assumption behind affirmation of the resolution. one example is a language k

these strategies are

which asserts that indeterminacy means we can't make objective truth claims: if we dont know what the terms in the topic mean, then you cant affirm it!

problematic in a number of ways: 1. aff strategy skew. i am a huge fan of the spread, of tricky arguments, and of very fast debate. however, negative
spreads have become horizontal rather than vertical. in other words, instead of making 40 answers to
the affirmative case, negatives have taken to running multiple 'a priori' off-case positions. while i believe that off-case
debate is good, aff's are in a rough place when it comes to answering these particular types of horizontal

spread because each issue is a gateway argument – the affirmative must answer each position to win
the debate, but they will be hard pressed to garner offense on them. in other words, if you prove language does in fact have meaning
and causality does in fact exist and zeno's paradox is in fact resolvable, you will at best break even. the 1ar might be forced to spend 1.5-2 minutes answering back

arguments that they have no chance of impact-turning – half of a speech dedicated to defense. while many theory arguments are similarly gateway questions,
there is a fundamental difference. when you, for example, run a case that is not topical, you have made a direct choice to engage a particular topic area and should be prepared to defend that
that topic area is legitimate affirmative ground. however, you do not choose the resolution and all the accompanying assumptions thereof; it's a burden imposed on you by the topic, not by

your own volition. moreover, theory arguments have impacts that can be turned: education, fairness, etc. are all implications of debatable desirability. truth, on the other
hand, is not an impact that you can prove good/bad – your only option is defense: deny the internal links (no, that is not
true). 2. neg strategy skew. to compensate for these horizontal a priori spreads, affirmatives have

increasingly relied on hidden a priori spikes in the 1ac. as a consequence, we have some very prominent debaters who win rounds by
presenting a claim in the 1ac, a warrant in the 1ar, and an impact in the 2ar. arguments are insufficiently
developed and negatives have little to no indication of what arguments in the aff are important. while critical
thinking and strategic prediction are valuable skills, its unreasonable to expect a negative to read and answer every sentence of

the 1ac. even when spikes can be isolated, answering them is problematic because they are often so
vague that a complete response is impossible.

Resolvability—cant weigh truth claims

Mangus 8 (Mangus, Michael. UC Santa Barbara department of Communication. "Value Comparison".
http://ldtheoryjournal.blogspot.com/2008/04/value-comparison-michael-mangus.html?m=1. 15 Apr
2008. Accessed 25 Sep 2017 SM)
3. irresolvable
debates. instead of reaching a sort of strategically-skewed synthesis, these two forces instead create debates
that leave judges dumbfounded. the affirmative will drop an overview that “proves” the resolution
contradictory while the negative will drop a spike that “proves” the resolution tautological. if the judge is
lucky, one of these arguments will somehow respond to or undermine the other and a decision can be rendered with some degree of fairness.
oftentimes, however, there
is no comparison between the arguments and no obvious interaction between
them. even in the first case, this is not the pinnacle of substantive debate. in the latter case, it is a direct
invitation for judge intervention. this is not isolated to the lower brackets of tournaments either – many high-powered
prelims and elimination rounds feature these strategies.

Outweighs their burden

1 Fair version solves -- they can READ THEIR BURDEN UNDER MY INTERP – it just
reconceptualizes what offense links 
2 Outweighs the burden independently – this is functionally a topicality interp. It
questions what offense can link to the advocacy – this also means that this isn’t an
offensive counterinterp, since it indicts the practice of the Aff independently.   
DTD, skew from the arg messes up the whole round so DTA can’t resolve the harms
c/i cause reasonability 
Proper - 
no constitutivism - rules of the activity, the burdens, and the res don’t dictate the role
of the ballot. The rotb is determined based on framing of the neg tied to the res
No one definition - other definitions of “negate” include "to nullify," "to render
ineffective," or "to show to be false." 
Truth is too narrow, philosophical and ethical implications of the res matter too not
just it’s logical truth or falsity
1. Comparative worlds comes first –
a. Topic lit – The topic literature is not central to truth testing but rather a
comparative worlds paradigm this outweighs their warrants because it is
the only stasis for pre-round prep and strategy.
b. Truth testing collapses to comparative worlds – under truth testing you
compare two different truth statements which inevitably leads to
consequence weighing.
c. Counter-Definitions - The Cambridge English Dictionary defines affirm as
“to publicly show your support for an opinion or idea:” Prefer for context
because it’s the most common interpretation in debate e.g “vote aff if
the plan is a good idea”
2. A PRIORIS*
a. IF AFFIRMING: Negating affirms because it assumes the aff’s validity
before refuting it i.e to beat back a kant framework you first have to
understand Kant as a functional framework
b. IF NEGATING: Affirming negates because of the good Samaritan paradox
– to remove a problem dictates that the problem exists in the first place.

A2 Log con 1] Ought is “used to express duty or moral obligation”- That’s

Dictionary.com1. Prefer our definition
A] Framers intent- people who wrote the rez wanted debates to be about
political implications of elimination not feasibility
B] Common Usage – Our definition is the first on the list and most commonly
used in the debate community.
New 1AR definitions are fair game-
A] Limits - We can’t be expected to define every word in the aff
B] Clash - Creates more nuanced contextual debates which is better for
philosophical deliberation

1
“ought” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ought
A2 Resolved A Priori –
1. Presumption – Resolved is past tense meaning the aff has already happened so
there’s no reason to do the aff again
2. Nonunique – I am firmly determined as well

A2 Multiple Worlds –
1. No Warrant – The multiverse theory has never been proven – that’s why it is a
theory and not a scientific law
2. Blindness - We have no epistemic knowledge about other worlds – means we
know nothing about them even if they exist
3. Nontopical - The resolution is about this world
4. Infinitely unfair – there is a world where they always win so actively hack
against them because that’s infinite abuse

A2 Indexicals –
1. Indexicals trigger permissibility because everything is permissible under a
certain index
2. Misunderstanding – Indexicals misunderstand how framework debate works – I
can attack a framework without using a lens of another i.e util bad because
induction fails doesn’t assume Kantianism
3. Metaethics – we can have a metaethical debate that destroys presupposition of
normative frameworks
4. INDEPENDENT VOTER – Indexicals justifies racism insofar as a KKK members
index would be considered in the same weight as Malcolm X’s
 A2 urban dict / wikipedia
Reading Definitions from urban dictionary is a voting issue for evidence ethics- Urban
dictionary is an open forum so literally anyone can add a definition into the site for
them to use. Even they could add it. That encourages shoddy manipulation of the site
in order to get the ballot which outweighs on magnitude since they could craft any
type of offense w urban dictionary and b] probability since it encourages tampering in
the circuit. The fact that most definitions are anonymous also allows them to be
incorrect without being held accountable which o/w since it creates a structural
incentive to do it
Reading evidence from Wikipedia is a voting issue for evidence ethics; anyone can edit
or change Wikipedia that doesn’t require explicit credentials so we don’t know who
wrote their evidence or what their qualifications are. Evidence ethics is DTD since it’s a
D-rule issue and a pre-req to determining the rest of the debate.  
 A2: Universalizability
1] Universal ethics is impossible and violent -- ethics is informed by social location and
subject position– a rich white person might have an obligation not to steal but that
doesn’t mean someone stealing to feed their family is bad
2] Indigenous people are excluded from their conception of reason – indigenous
agency destabilizes settler sovereignty which necessitates the relegation of the native
to the nonhuman – the inevitable 1AR pivot to “we recognize ALL agency” is a settler
ruse of inclusion that creates cruel optimism in the possibility of Western theory to
provide liberation 
 A2: Apriori ethics
1] Beginning a priori assumes the position of a disembodied calculator that isn’t
accessible to natives who are tied to their identity
2] A priori knowledge can’t exist – if two people disagree about a priori claims you
have to devolve to empirical claims to resolve them
3] All of the ideal theory bad args answer this
On induction fails – it doesn’t take out the k because it’s a metaphysical structure not
an empirical one, independently if I drop a pen I know it falls.
 A2: Inescapability/regress
1] Presupposes we need to keep asking why is this good or bad – even if that process
leads us to unconditional human worth, our argument is the decision to avoid regress
solves the problem of regress because we can choose to recognize genocide is bad full
stop
2] I can choose to be a smagent – guess it's not binding!
3] Tailoring objection – you can tailor your rule to be specific to your circumstances
which makes any action or maxim universalizable
 A2: evaluate after X args

Reject evaluate after arguments 

1 - they rely on the rest of the round playing out so it’s impossible
2 - it’s already too late to because i'm giving my speech and your ballot isn’t signed so
clearly what i say matters
3 - it wasn’t warranted in the aff so even if you did it, it wouldn’t be something to vote
aff on and you’d just vote neg on presumption
4 - it’s silencing
 A2 dogmatism

1 - dogmatism negates on regress because the aff is predicated evidence against it 
2 - dogmatism negates on presumption because the aff is evidence against the status
quo, which proves the squo good so even absent negative offense you vote on
presumption
3 - dogmatism negates on quantity, they give the 2AR which is evidence against the
entire rest of the round so you negate because them speaking last means they’re
dogmatic
 A2 bindingness
no way to prove practical reason exists – neuroscience can be proven which is a disad
to the syllogism
a. Tailoring Objection – universal maxims are not concrete which means agents
can contort them to fit their specific situations and permit any action.
 A2 principle of explosion

1 - fails, Principle isn’t true in logic because it violates the principle of non-
contradiction
2 - the Principle of Explosion can be used to prove anything, which means that it does
not provide a useful tool for reasoning
 A2: paradoxes
A2: Liars paradox
1 - The liar paradox is problematic, leads to a self-contradiction.

2 - If we assume that the statement "this statement is false" is true, then it must be false because it
claims to be false. 

But if we assume that it is false, then it must be true because it does not meet its own criteria for
being false. This creates a self-referential contradiction that cannot be resolved.

A2: paradox of material implication

1 - paradox fails because it does not accurately reflect our intuitive understanding of logical
implication in certain cases. 

2 - evidence specifically doesn’t mean vote aff, no premises will always be true and any 1ar offense
proves so it negates too

A2 Menos Paradox
[1] Fallacy of Equivocation: There is a distinction between unknown knowledge we know to look for
(such as a buried treasure) and complete knowledge, such as where that treasure is.

[2] Empirically denied: People learn new things all the time. Columbus didn’t know America existed.

A2 Good Samaritan Paradox

[1] I can just say that “I ought to do what I am doing”, so I don’t always have to do defend the status
quo.

[2] The resolution uses the moral ought since it ascribes an obligation to an actor, the GSP only proves
a logical reason not a normative one to negate.

[3] INDEPENDENT VOTER FOR ACCESSABILITY – GSP argues that a sexual violence survivor ‘wanted it’
if they say no and try to fight back this makes the space exclusive for survivors.
 A2: AFC interps / preempts

Reject pre-emptive violations because it proves theory baiting and a bad model of
debate, means they can make the interp literally anything like an entire 6 minute 1ac
of “interp the neg can’t talk” and win on a tech level even if it’s stupid
Their model of debate allows people to read morally disgusting frameworks on the aff
like racism or genocide good and the neg can’t contest it, turns debate into a right
wing echo chamber, neg framework competition is important for activist education
AT: Standards - 
On time skew - winning fw doesn’t moot ur offense just learn how to weigh under
different frameworks, it’s not my fault you don’t use diverse aff impacts, doesn’t force
1ar restart
On topic ed - ld is a framework event, topic ed comes out from engagement in how
framework influences topic choices, 
(time frame on topic ed)2 months is a long time, if you break consistently that’s over
60 rounds, other rounds solve your offense
(inclusion on topic ed) there’s no novices in this round, in round abuse outweighs
potential abuse, plus nonunique, just spend time with your novices and teach them
that’s your job as a varsity
 MISC
A2 Log con
1] Ought is “used to express duty or moral obligation”- That’s Dictionary.com 2. Prefer our definition

A] Framers intent- people who wrote the rez wanted debates to be about political implications of
elimination not feasibility

B] Common Usage – Our definition is the first on the list and most commonly used in the debate
community.

New 1AR definitions are fair game-

A] Limits - We can’t be expected to define every word in the aff

B] Clash - Creates more nuanced contextual debates which is better for philosophical deliberation

2
“ought” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ought
A2 Resolved A Priori –
Presumption – Resolved is past tense meaning the aff has already happened so there’s no reason to
do the aff again

Nonunique – I am firmly determined as well

A2 Multiple Worlds –
No Warrant – The multiverse theory has never been proven – that’s why it is a theory and not a
scientific law

Blindness - We have no epistemic knowledge about other worlds – means we know nothing about
them even if they exist

Nontopical - The resolution is about this world

Infinitely unfair – there is a world where they always win so actively hack against them because that’s
infinite abuse

A2 Indexicals –
Indexicals trigger permissibility because everything is permissible under a certain index

Misunderstanding – Indexicals misunderstand how framework debate works – I can attack a

framework without using a lens of another i.e util bad because induction fails doesn’t assume
Kantianism

Metaethics – we can have a metaethical debate that destroys presupposition of normative

frameworks

INDEPENDENT VOTER – Indexicals justifies racism insofar as a KKK members index would be
considered in the same weight as Malcolm X’s
AFF
TOPICALITY
 Topicality [long]

Interpretation and violation - the affirmative should defend the hypothetical

implementation of a topical plan – they don’t. 
The roll of the ballot is to vote for the team that does the better debating on the
assigned topic 
“Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum
Army Officer School 2005 (“# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, 5-12,
http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will
carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter
Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from
the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more
paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we
do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a
A formal
business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.

resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.
 standards
1. Predictable limits- there are virtually infinite amounts of critical thought to be
drawn on that can mixed and matched in any way- that destroys the ability of
the neg to predict and prepare effectively
2. Ground- 
1. absent a consistent and stable advocacy statement there is no sufficient
condition for negative victory even if we disprove the 1ac
2. Nontopical affs have a strategic incentive to make descriptive value
statements that can not be proven wrong- 
3. The resolution was chosen because of literature controversy, they
arbitrarily pick an area that doesn’t have the same depth of controversy 
4. any ground the cite in the 2ac is concessionary, unpredictable and is
beaten by perms- predictable strategies are the only gateway to effective
engagement with the 1ac
3. Deliberative dialogue - the resolution provides fair, limited balance of ground to
both the aff and the neg – discarding the opportunity of focus provided by the
resolution turns debate into a monologue which guts all benefits of the
activity. 
Hanghoj 08 – PhD, assistant professor, School of Education, University of Aarhus, also affiliated with the Danish Research Centre on
Education and Advanced Media Materials, located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern
Denmark [Thorkild, PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming, PhD Dissertation Institute of Literature, Media and
Cultural Studies University of Southern Denmark 2008, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/
Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf]

3.3.1. Balancing teaching and gaming 

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be
debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks
and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively
imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying
debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that
tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned,
education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of
representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these
different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy.
According to Bakhtin, all
forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces
(Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force
involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of
centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal
forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in
the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the
head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin,
1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces.
Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly
determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting
procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create
virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues.
Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation
between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way,
the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student
presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario.
Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game
facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal
orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game
scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as
a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with
the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything
new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse
becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone
who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin,
1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing
knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a
descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of
communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of
“monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same
time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be
dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61). 

4. Switch Side Debate: The argument the affirmative reads is literally a Kritik. This
affirmative strategy is abusive, as it can be clearly read as core neg ground,
severing the entirety of prep and forcing us to read aff on neg. Their infinite neg
pref only leads to radical views where we never look at both sides of the issue
and just assume violent solutions.
5. Governmentality as a Heuristic - Debating about government policies is a
valuable heuristic — we can learn about the state without being it. Their radical
framework eliminates the potential for political agency and oversimplifies
complex, contingent relationships. Instead of rejecting government policies in
general, we should analyze particular policies. 
Zanotti 13 — Laura Zanotti, Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech, holds a Ph.D. in
International Relations from Florida International University, 2013 (“Governmentality, Ontology,
Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political,
Volume 38, Issue 4, November, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via SAGE Publications Online,
p. 299-300)
Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that, notwithstanding their critical stance, scholars who use
governmentality as a descriptive tool remain rooted in substantialist ontologies that see power and
subjects as standing in a relation of externality. They also downplay processes of coconstitution and the
importance of indeterminacy and ambiguity as the very space where political agency can thrive. In this
[end page 299] way, they drastically limit the possibility for imagining political agency outside the
liberal straightjacket. They represent international liberal biopolitical and governmental power as a
homogenous and totalizing formation whose scripts effectively oppress ‘‘subjects,’’ that are in turn
imagined as free ‘‘by nature.’’ Transformations of power modalities through multifarious tactics of
hybridization and redescriptions are not considered as options. The complexity of politics is reduced to
homogenizing and/or romanticizing narratives and political engagements are reduced to total
heroic rejections or to revolutionary moments.
By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of
political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the
contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for
resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’
to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found
instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of
governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach
questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions
with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good
or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways
with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed,
hijacked, and tinkered with.

Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites

historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching
demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly,
theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of
subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political
transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of
oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also foster an ethics of political engagement,
to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous
attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’83 Such ethics of
engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained.
Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards
are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political
choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad,
but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is
dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to
hyper- and pessimistic activism.’’84
 Three Impacts – 
a. Procedural fairness-  debate is a competitive game which loses meaning
without substantive constraints- Everybody comes to debate for different
reasons, but the fact that the other team is here and has presented a 1ac means
they not only rely on fair adjudication of their arguments but also that they
have bought into the game.
b. Advocacy skills- Defending the topic is hard because it requires you to admit
you could be wrong—that generates competitive respect and dialogue-that’s
key to effective advocacy skills
Talisse 2005 – philosophy professor at Vanderbilt (Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4,
“Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”) *note: gendered language in this article refers to
arguments made by two specific individuals in an article by Iris Young 
Nonetheless, the deliberativist conception of reasonableness differs from the activist’s in at least one crucial
respect. On the deliberativist view, a necessary condition for reasonableness is the willingness not only to offer
justifications for one’s own views and actions, but also to listen to criticisms, objections, and the justificatory reasons that can be
given in favor of alternative proposals. In light of this further stipulation, we may say that, on the deliberative democrat’s view,
reasonable citizens are responsive to reasons, their views are ‘reason tracking’. Reasonableness, then, entails an
acknowledgement on the part of the citizen that her current views are possibly mistaken, incomplete, and in need of
revision. Reasonableness is hence a two-way street: the reasonable citizen is able and willing to offer justifications for her views and actions,
but is also prepared to consider alternate views, respond to criticism, answer objections, and, if necessary, revise or abandon her views. In
short, reasonable citizens do not only believe and act for reasons, they aspire to believe and act according to the best reasons; consequently,
they recognize their own fallibility in weighing reasons and hence engage in public deliberation in part for
the sake of improving their views.15 ‘Reasonableness’ as the deliberative democrat understands it is constituted by a willingness to
participate in an ongoing public discussion that inevitably involves processes of self-examination by which one at various moments rethinks and
revises one’s views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations offered by one’s fellow deliberators. Hence
Gutmann and Thompson write: Citizens who owe one another justifications for the laws that they seek to
impose must take seriously the reasons their opponents give. Taking seriously the reasons one’s opponents give means that, at
least for a certain range of views that one opposes, one must acknowledge the possibility that an opposing view may be shown to be correct in
the future. This acknowledgement has implications not only for the way they regard their own views. It imposes
an obligation to
continue to test their own views, seeking forums in which the views can be challenged, and
keeping open the possibility of their revision or even rejection.16 (2000: 172) That Young’s activist is not
reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and
disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’
(106); activist tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of
institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption that questions of justice are essentially
settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its implementation requires. He also
believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo
or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the injustice of the institutions that govern
their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at enlisting other citizens in
support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed. The activist implicitly holds that there could be no
reasoned objection to his views concerning justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems
unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to
reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse
because he has judged on a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully
corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and
hence no need to be reasonable. According to the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The
deliberativist recognizes thatquestions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a
notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of

implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to
work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it
is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s
own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as
evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter
the activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of
power wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve. That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of
public deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue;

reasonableness hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom
one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of
justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that
Hence the deliberative democrat concludes
there could be no rational opposition to his views, he is literally unable to be reasonable.
that activism, as presented by Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement. The
dialogical conception of reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the
activist’s reply to the charge that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist
denied this charge on the grounds that activism is aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal
good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view, the problem with
interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or
deplorable) of the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory
as fixed dispositions that are non-cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons. Insofar
as the activist sees his view of justice
as ‘given’ and not open to rational scrutiny, he is engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist
rejects. The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what
reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some
degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best
available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of
those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold
opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of
politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept
this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action;
discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the
truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for
discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of
criticism that the activist must face. To
the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably
decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon
that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political
activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops,
and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage
in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence
those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their
pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a
self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon
that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a
more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that
‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but
devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which
individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of
deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that
he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the
requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests
that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have
the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate
only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point,
and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’
(Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal;
it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of
justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

c. Dogma- Contestability and contestation are vital to escape the legitimacy of

problematic hierarchies – this is the only way to challenge dogma
Krebs & Goddard 15 (Stacie E. Goddard is Jane Bishop Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College & Ronald R.
Krebs is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy”, Security Studies,
24:1, 5-36)

There are few social settings in which legitimation does not feature prominently. Although exasperated parents may eventually command their
children to “do as I say!”, at even a fairly young age children resist parental orders they think morally wrong or otherwise illegitimate.27 In
hierarchical societies, the  dominated—whether on the basis of class, ethnicity, caste, religion, or
gender—refuse to grant legitimacy to their subordination.28 Superiors in a bureaucracy do at times issue orders without
explaining themselves, but they too typically justify their decisions to secure their underlings’ buy-in. Certainly the powerful, more
often than the weak, can say patently absurd or contradictory things and still get their way. But, in most social
circumstances, even the powerful must explain themselves in terms that others comprehend and find acceptable. Those who do not care to
legitimate their claims are rejected or ignored. At
the extreme such an individual “is quickly regarded as a fanatic, the
prey of interior demons, rather than as a reasonable person seeking to share his convictions.”29 Public
battles over the national interest, the threat environment, and the need for public sacrifice are often
intense. Because the stakes in these legitimation contests are high, for both moral principles and
material interests, few are willing to engage in open-ended deliberation that may well result in
outcomes they did not initially favor.30 Rather they deploy whatever resources they can for strategic advantage, and that
includes rhetorical maneuver.31 That competition cannot be divorced from the material—having a megaphone
undoubtedly matters if one wishes to be heard—but it also necessarily takes place in the realm of
language, spoken and symbolic. While rationalists and realists might argue that appeals resonate based
only on how they accord with audiences’ already formed interests, in reality people commonly
recognize as legitimate some stances that they do not favor, suggesting that the attribution of
legitimacy is at least somewhat distinct from the politics of interest .32 Our model of legitimation rests
on four analytical wagers: tha't actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting
meaning to political action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation ; and that the power of
language emerges through contentious dialogue. We term this model “pragmatic” because it centers analysis on
specific rhetorical deployments in particular political and social contexts.33 In combination, these four
wagers distinguish our pragmatic model from other approaches to language common in the study of
politics and international relations. First, while our model treats political actors as strategic, it does not
reduce legitimation to self-interest. Actors are embedded in a social environment that simultaneously makes possible and
confines strategic action. Even scheming elites cannot stand outside structures of discourse . They too
operate with a given “cultural tool-kit,” in Ann Swidler's words, that includes rhetorical resources.34 To conceive
of speakers and audiences as social creatures is not to imagine them as cultural dopes, mindlessly
following culture's purported dictates. Rather, as they seek to make sense of their world, and as they respond to
others’ meaning-making efforts, they are equally subject to, and empowered by, the shared resources embedded in
their culture. This stands in contrast to the many realists who see public rhetoric as a mere fig leaf
covering the naked pursuit of interest and who assume that elites easily bend the masses to their
ends. It is not the case then that where there is a will, there must always be a rhetorical way. Second,
legitimation exerts effects on politics by imparting meaning to action. Rationalist approaches to
public rhetoric, in contrast, flatten language to a medium for the communication of information that, when
costly, reveals such information to be credible. However, rationalists thereby overlook the care with which
speakers construct public arguments , audiences’ attention to rhetorical contest, and the ensuing
intense debates over the interpretation of legitimation , over what a given speaker means and what it
portends. Our pragmatic model emphasizes that whether public claims-making is legitimate renders a signal meaningful, even if
it does not entail material costs. It has a constitutive effect on grand strategy by shaping public expectations ,
defining the issues at stake, distinguishing signals from noise, and laying the basis for policy debate.35
Threats are constructed, not merely revealed, in the course of legitimation. The rationalist bargaining model has
seized upon one aspect of the dynamics of public rhetoric, while overlooking its much more fundamental role in the making of meaning in
global politics. Third, weconceive of political actors as less socialized and more strategic than in many
constructivist accounts. Constructivists informed by the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas have viewed persuasive
rhetoric as central to normative change in international relations, and they have argued that persuasion
is most likely when speakers and listeners are both committed to the open exchange of ideas.36 While
Habermas recognizes that politics is often a site of strategic action, he envisions and directs humanity toward a politics
in which power and rank are left at the door, in which agonistic competition is replaced by deliberation and ultimately consensus. Our
pragmatic model, in contrast, theorizes language use as necessarily deeply shot through with power and
marked by contest. Moreover, we do not presuppose universal standards by which audiences judge
arguments persuasive. In Habermas's account, actors can be moved by the “unforced force of the better
argument,” but this presumes that they are already in agreement on fundamentals, that they have already
attained substantial zones of consensus.37 We, however, see legitimation as taking place before particular, not
universal, audiences, and claimants adapt to the audience's “distinctive and particular passions and
their particular commitments, sentiments, and beliefs .”38 Finally, a pragmatic model of legitimation rests on a
dialogical view of politics, in which various articulations compete for dominance. An earlier post-positivist
linguistic turn in international relations deconstructed authoritative texts to unearth the unarticulated
“common sense” assumptions that inform and structure policy.39 Following Michel Foucault, these scholars pointed out
how discursive formations define the key categories of social and political life and thus constitute the
range of legitimate politics. We concur with their foundational insight that discourse is both the product, and productive, of power.
But we take issue with their implicit assertion, in Iver Neumann's formulation, that “there is nothing outside of discourse and, for this reason,
the analysis of language is all that we need in order to account for what is going on in the world.”40 Rather, legitimation
proves
powerful through a complex interplay between text and context, between what is said and where and
when it is said. Existing discursive formations do not eliminate all space for choice and contingency,
and thus agency. Scholars of international relations routinely treat legitimation as a mask for power
and interests, cast legitimation as an idealized alternative to power, reduce public rhetoric's effects to
the revelation of information, or see public rhetoric as an exercise in manipulation. To place one's
analytical bets on legitimation as pragmatic performance is not to deny that rhetorical exchange
takes place in the shadow of material power, reflects elite strategizing, or involves the communication
of information. It is, however, to insist that legitimation is a form of power, that strategizing elites cannot
escape the bonds of legitimacy, that rhetorical exchange goes beyond signaling resolve and reservation
values, and that the outcome of rhetorical contestation cannot be boiled down to the distribution of
material power alone.

These impacts outweigh - effective deliberative training coupled with institutional

knowledge is key to effective challenges to oppression and hegemonic structures—the
content of debates is irrelevant, it’s about repeatedly practicing the form of switch-
side skepticism
Hahn, 16—Ph. D. in Communication from the University of Pittsburgh (Taylor, “TEACHING WHAT
MATTERS: A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS ON LIBERAL ARTS EDUCATION AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS-AUSTIN,” http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/30348/1/T.%20Hahn%20Dissertation%20-%20ETD
%20submission.pdf)
My analysis of the Solutions controversy has revealed one such opportunity: the potential for argument-laden curriculum reform that
can trouble neoliberalism within and beyond academia. In this section, I establish how argument across the curriculum
can rejuvenate a form of liberal arts education that focuses on holistic learning rather than job-based training and
maximized economic benefit. I begin by showing that argument and deliberation are skillsets that hinder
neoliberalism. I then show that the Solutions controversy has opened space for reform initiatives that promote these skillsets. Finally, I
conclude the chapter by exploring various means of promoting argument and deliberation training across undergraduate curriculum. Rhetorical
scholars have shown neoliberalism and democracy to be inherently oppositional ideologies.7 Stephen Rosow describes these ideologies as two
“fault lines of collision” where a promotion of one necessarily subjugates the other.8 As such, scholars
interested in troubling
neoliberal trends in academia should focus their efforts toward the development of democratic
citizenship. This focus, if successful, will necessarily trade off with the prevailing neoliberal ideologies that
have grown to permeate classrooms and civil society alike.9 In its final chapter, this dissertation lays out how
argument and deliberation training across the undergraduate curriculum might offer a means of
facilitating this shift toward democracy. This position is based upon the litany of compelling evidence
showing argument and deliberation skills to be supportive of democratic principles. These skills are
important because, at their core, argument and deliberation facilitate self-governance among and
between citizens.10 Fostering of these skillsets in academia is essential to supporters of democratic
citizenship since those students that learn these skills in school will then carry them into their
personal, public, and professional lives.11 Furthermore, academia offers a starting point for social reform
by familiarizing students with the act of civic argument and deliberation. As chapter five demonstrated, these
skills remain heavily underappreciated in American society. This is due, in part, to these skills being far less necessary in
societies where citizens are not expected to critically analyze and arbitrate their own lives.12 While the mass-media indicates that Americans
are indeed in charge of their lives and decisions, the evidence presented in chapter five demonstrates the ways that neoliberal
sensibilities have dramatically hampered public willingness to deliberate on contentious topics. President
Obama’s recent statements to undergraduate students demonstrate the commonlyunderstood trend in society where anything considered
controversial or contentious is preferably avoided.13 For this reason, a social reemergence in argument is extremely kairotic. Calls for
curriculum reform are supported by evidence showing that citizens
trained in argument and deliberation are
capable of encountering and peacefully deliberating about opposition and difference within their
society.14 Without this training, those public arguments that do exist are far less likely to propagate
communal understanding and empathy. Instead, when citizens turn away from oppositional arguments in
political, philosophical, or social arenas, we have the full realization of Deborah Tannen’s “argument culture” where the
only forms of public deliberation are combative and hostile.15 This type of hostile, combative argument
is symptomatic of neoliberalism.16 Dave Hill explains that neoliberalism’s “commodification of humanity and
society, come to play in the enforcement and policing of consent, the delegitimizing of deep dissent, and
the weakening of oppositional centers and practices and thought.”17 Neoliberalism makes anything outside of these
goals superfluous. The current trend of delegitimizing oppositional advocacy is one place where academics can intervene to empower the polis.
This intervention can take place in several arenas — in their publications, academics can explore new means of prompting student advocacy
and deliberation. In everyday workplace conversations, academics can demonstrate positive forms of deliberation and argument with other
academics through reasoned, learned disagreement. In the classroom, academics can engage their students in critical thinking education
through pedagogy that prioritizes cognitive development focused on learning how to question claims and assumptions, construct arguments,
and engage others within civil society. Finally, in the public sphere, educators can participate in deliberative exercises such as town halls and
debates, using these events to demonstrate the public good fostered within academia. These initiatives would require individualized actions
from educators, but they would not require a complete departure from existing efforts within academia. Attempts to halt neoliberalist
ideologies in academia are ongoing. A number of educators and courses are already providing the critical thinking and deliberation skills
mentioned in this chapter. However, many of these initiatives occur in elective coursework or token extra-curricular activities designed to
demonstrate an institution’s commitment to society.18 At present, these courses and activities do not go far enough to combat neoliberalism.
Rosow explains: Undergraduate higher education, in particular, is struggling to understand what role the university might now play in the
education of democratic citizens, now that this function has become ancillary to its basic logic and structure. Symptomatic is the way many
colleges and universities have turned, for example, to the idea of “civic engagement,” which encourages students to particulate in community
service programs. Portland State University in Oregon, for example, has gone so far as to require participation in civic engagement projects as
part of the curriculum. However, for most universities this is an extracurricular add-on to programs, for example those in universities that
participate in the American Democracy Project (ADP)...Many of these projects are valuable, but often civic engagement does not distinguish
voluntary community service programs from political projects.19 While more effort is needed, this is not to say that the types of argument,
deliberation, and engagement that currently exist in curricula across the country are not useful.20 There are many examples of institutes and
scholars who should be applauded for their successes.21 For some students, momentary emersion within civic engagement and deliberation is
enough to unlock an eagerness to promote democratic citizenship.22 However, formost students, a deeper, more immersive
form of civic training is necessary.23 For example, instructors at the Benjamin Franklin Transatlantic Fellows Institute have found that
most students require multiple workshops focused on deliberation and repeated access to civic engagement opportunities
prior to fully understanding their own independent agency to inspire and promote change through
reasoned discourse.24 Though difficult, fostering the skills necessary for students to critically analyze and deliberate on issues they find
important requires educators to increase their focus on these goals. Realizing these changes would require a substantial review of how
curriculum is developed and what learning outcomes are prioritized in current systems of higher education. Despite the difficulty of achieving
such a goal, I believe an argument-laden curriculum to be valuable enough to warrant the extensive effort necessary for meaningful reform.
Focusing higher education on the promotion of argument and deliberation within all contexts of our student’s lives is a major step toward
questioning existing social trends. For example, while
the argument-laden curricula I propose would not explicitly focus
on neoliberalism in academia, promoting heightened levels of deliberation in the classroom can result in an
organic emergence of student-led inquiry on the economic and monetary paradigms within higher
education.25 Put otherwise, the simple act of facilitating deliberation in the classroom, regardless of the
issues being discussed, can prompt healthy skepticism which is readily translatable to other issues
and contexts.26 Brownyn Davies shows that an education focused on critical thinking can be an emancipatory
method of questioning neoliberalism. We must give to our students a doubled gaze, to enable them to
become critically literate, to become citizens at once capable of adapting and becoming appropriate
within the contexts in which they find themselves and as responsible citizens capable of critique; citizens
who can understand the constitutive work that discourse does and who can work creatively, imaginatively, politically, and with passion to break
open the old where it is faulty and to envisage the new. Even more urgent is the task of giving them some personal tools for withstanding the
worst effects of neoliberalism, for seeing both the pleasure and the danger of being drawn into it, for understanding the ways in which they are
subjected by it. They need to be able to generate stable narratives of identity and to understand the way neoliberal discourses and practices
will work against that stability.27 Application of Davies’ doubled gaze has the potential to radically change pedagogical approaches. Throughout
academia, scholars have pointed to the ways that training students to interrogate social structures can radically alter
neoliberalist systems of power.28 By this, I mean that utilizing and examining various forms of critical inquiry
within the classroom produces the potential for students to question neoliberalism in multiple aspects
of American society.29 By teaching students how to deliberate, colleges and universities can train
students to appreciate and expect a healthy level of skepticism toward the existing norms of
knowledge production grounded in canonical truth and neoliberalism. These current norms, outlined in
chapter five, have resulted in existing systems of higher education that skirt argument and civic
deliberation in favor of a myopic focus toward economic goals and absolute certainty of one’s
position. The goal of my proposed reform is to educate students in argument and deliberation skillsets, thus rejuvenating liberal arts
education and checking neoliberal ideologies in academia. Are these changes possible? There are some positive signs that argument and
deliberation skills offer a potential means of slowly reforming both academia and society at large.
Any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular,
struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counter-hegemony to
take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine
the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space
within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed.