Guypeters 1996

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The policy process in

developed and less developed
political systems
a
B. Guy Peters
a
Department of Political Science, University of
Pittsburgh, 15260, Pittsburgh, PA
Version of record first published: 26 Jun 2007.
To cite this article: B. Guy Peters (1996): The policy process in developed and less
developed political systems, International Journal of Public Administration, 19:9,
1639-1668
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INT'L. J. OF PUB.ADMIN., 19(9), 1639-1668 (1996)
THE POLICY PROCESS IN DEVELOPED AND LESS

DEVELOPED POLITICAL SYSTEMS
B. Guy Peters
Department of Political Science
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA
15260
ABSTRACT
The author argues that we do not really know how different

the policymaking systems of developed and developing nations are.
In his view, policymaking in less developed regimes is different
from that which occurs in more affluent countries. However, the
differences are frequently overstated. After analyzing several
problems of the policymaking process, Peters concludes that the
differences are larglely those of degree rather than of
fundamentally different types of policy problems and processes. He
concludes that what may matter is the degree of difficulty
governments encounter in policymaking, and in some ways the less
developed countries may actually enjoy some real advantages. At
the same time, however, they have more informational, financial
and ideological barriers that impose political limitations on policy
learning.
1639
Copyright O 1996 by Marcel Dekker, Inc.

1640 PETERS
INTRODUCTION
Political scientists have devoted a great deal of attention to

understand the policy-making process. This is natural, since the
main leverage that our discipline has on the outcomes of the
policy-making process is understanding the means by which
policies come into being. Process' characteristics are sets of both
independent and dependent variables for the study of policy in
political science. As independent variables, they have produced a

literature assuming that the nature of the process employed will
determine the nature of the policies adopted,") or at least that there
is a close link between the content of policies and the way in
which the policy-making process functions.(*)
As dependent variables there is a sense that a number of factors

will determine the nature of the policy-making process. There is
at the broadest level of generalization a "textbook policy process"(3)
which tends to describe the means by which governments make
policy in generic terms applicable in almost any circumstances.
Jones,(4)for example, describes the policy process in the United
States as occurring in some seven stages that would be identifiable
for almost every policy area in almost any country. Other more
analytic versions of the stages model(5)also have been advanced,
depending primarily upon the manner in which knowledge is
utilized within the policy process. Finally, other generic models
of the policy procesd6) depend upon communications and the
democratic resolution of real or potential conflicts. The danger
with such generic models is that by working at such a level of
generality they fail to identify the subtle differences that do exist
in real world policymaking. Still, the models do provide very
useful means of beginning an inquiry into policymaking.
One of the potentially most significant factors in shaping

differences in the policy process is the level of socio-economic
POLICYMAKING SYSTEMS 1641
development of the society in which the political system functions.

It is, in fact, usually assumed that the policy process in less
developed systems will be significantly different from that found
in industrialized countries, even if all the countries in question are
nominally democratic. Further, the socio-economic differences are
assumed to pervade the policy process and the administration of
policy, regardless of the type of policy under consideration. This
paper will examine that assumption about the policymaking
process, with the argument being that the differences by level of

socio-economic development frequently are overstated. There may
be more variance in policy process across policy areas than there
is across c o ~ n t r i e s .The
~ nature of the political forces and the
nature of the technical production of the programs may push
policies toward similarities across countries.
This discussion is to some extent a question of whether the glass

is half full or half empty. The similarities between the two types
of political systems are perhaps as great as are the differences,
although the differences may be more readily apparent. Further,
the differences between countries within the two groups may be as
great as the differences between some countries in the two
different groups. A great deal of comparative politics, for
example, has been built on the differences among European, Latin
~merican@) and other political systems, which viewed in a larger
context may appear rather similar. This is a natural outcome of
professional specialization in those regions, but we do need to
remember, however, that comparative politics is about identifying
and cataloging similarities as well as differences that exist among
the countries being in~estigated.'~)
What is particularly interesting is that many of the assumptions

made about the difficulties of policymaking in the less developed
countries are as true of the developed world as they are of the less
1642 PETERS
developed. There are almost certainly some differences between

policymaking in Chad and that done in France, but the task is
difficult anywhere. What may matter is the degree of difficulty
governments encounter in policymaking, and in some ways the less
developed countries may actually enjoy some real advantages as
we will note below. Therefore, we need to examine carefully the
nature of policymaking in these different types of regimes and try
to better understand the real nature of the comparisons that should
be made.
THE NATURE OF THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS
A number of scholars have commented on the difficulties of

making policy in the less developed world. One of the clearest
statements of this type is provided by John Sloan("), who argued
that "formulating public policy in Latin America is choice-taking
in a situation usually characterized by:
1) multiple and competing goals,

2) scarce resources;
3) escalating demands;
4) limited information; and
5) uncertain outcomes."
Sloan is almost certainly correct about each of these five

points,('') but these points are not so much a description of
policymaking in lesser developed countries as they are
characterizations of public policymaking almost anywhere.
Indeed, the analytic and conceptual apparatus of the policy
sciences('*)in the developed countries have been developed largely
to deal with just the types of difficulties enumerated above.
Multiple and Conflicting Goals
In the first place few if any political systems are able to pursue
comprehensive policy goals in a single-minded and coordinated
manner. This absence of coherence is perhaps especially evident
in the United States with its decentralized and fragmented
government,(13)but also can be found true even in countries
presumably more centralized and capable of effective
governance.(14) The powers of ideology, executive leadership,

political influence, and party unity appear to pale in comparison to
the pressures exerted by interest groups and professional values.
Almost regardless of the political system, there is a tendency
toward segmentation and fragmentation.
That fragmentation usually occurs across policies and programs.

In the United States there is the familiar example of the federal
government simultaneously subsidizing tobacco production and
then advising American citizens not to smoke the product. Other
examples of incoherence in policy abound there, but are by no
means limited to the United States. Other industrialized countries
also experience many of the same difficulties, and find it difficult
to coordinate policies that have links to powerful social interests.
For example, the "poverty trap" resulting from the failure to
coordinate tax and social policies persists in the United Kingdom
despite the widespread recognition of its existence and its manifest
unreasonablene~s.('~)
At times the problem or multiple and competing goals occurs

within a single program. The process of writing legislation
frequently involves compromise and accommodation among a
number of interests, so that the laws themselves may contain
inconsistencies and multiple goals. For example, tax policy is
expected to meet a number of different goals, some of which may
not be obtainable ~imultaneously.('~)The same programs may be
1644 PETERS
expected to raise government revenue, promote economic

development, subsidize housing, redistribute income to law income
citizens, and manage the macro economy. Clearly no single
program can do all this at once. Even defense programs may
experience fragmentation and internal conflict,"? especially when
they begin to serve a number of purposes such as regional
economic development, especially after the end of the Cold
War.''') Thus, we need to remember that even individual
programs reflect the divisions that exist in society and in

government.
In some ways the problem of multiple goals may be mare deeply

ingrained in the governments of more affluent countries than in
developing countries. The experience of the post-war period, until
at least the first oil shock, was that government had the resources
to do almost everything that they and their citizens wanted to
do.(19) A series of more conservative governments have attempted
to break that pattern of policymaking, but have been less than
totally successful. This generous pattern of policymaking has been
deeply ingrained in the expectations of citizens, and also
institutionalized through devices such as neocorporatisrn~.~~) The
(relative) affluence of these industrialized regimes still makes
incoherence among policies more affordable than it is for less
affluent regimes, the latter having to make more conscious choices
among their policy priorities.
The need to make conscious choices among policy alternatives is

especially evident in the choice between short-term goals and long-
term developmental goals. If resources are scarce then the money
or personnel or whatever used for one purpose are clearly taken
away from other uses. Money used for long-term investments can
not be used for the short-term legitimation expenditures, often so
important for the survival of a sitting go~ernrnent.~')
This need to
make choices between short-term gratification and longer-term
growth again is not confined to the developing world. Policy

debates in the United States, for example, have begun to focus on
the need to invest in education, economic infrastructure, and other
necessities for development and redevelopment. However, the
continuing demands for social expenditures and subsidies for other
politically important groups make funds for investment difficult to
come by, especially in a period of budget deficits. Most
developed democracies have the advantage of fully legitimated
political systems in which short-term deprivations may be more

acceptable, but citizens who have become accustomed to private
affluence as well as public benefits are difficult to persuade about
the need for sacrifice.(22)
Another important point of comparison is that governments in

most industrializing countries are also more centralized and often
more authoritative (if not authoritarian) political systems.
Everything else being equal, political systems of that type should
be able to make the allocative decisions required for effective
governance. Even if they are not one-party and/or authoritarian
regimes their centralization should make those decisions more
authoritative. Further, the relative absence of autonomous social
organizations in these societies may remove competitors in the
decision-making process.
On the other hand, centralization of policy choice may have

numerous negative consequences for a government. If an incorrect
choice is made, no matter how coherent and integrated it is, it is
still incorrect. More decentralized and incoherent political systems
may have the ultimate advantage of multiple sources of information
and even multiple programs, functioning in essence as policy
experiment^."^) This possibility for multiple programs and
feedback may lead ultimately to error correction. Even in the
short run, they will not get it right all the time, but neither are
they likely to get it all wrong.
1646 PETERS
In summary, attempts at pursuing multiple policy goals abound

in the policymaking process whether in more or less developed
countries. The nature of policymaking appears to be to divide
government into numerous functionally divided subsections and
then to pursue policies that benefit that relatively narrow segment
of the society. This strategy of subdivision is more true in some
countries (the United States?) than it is in others (Norway?,
Germany?), but is probably true to some extent everywhere. A
major task for policy-makers, therefore, is to achieve as much

coordination and cost-control as possible while still permitting
government to serve its numerous and powerful constituencies.
Scarce Resources
It is obvious that the governments of developing countries must

struggle continuously with the problem of scarce resources, scarce
especially in comparison to the demands being made on those
resources. Continuing public and private sector debt crises and
attempts at imposing expenditure restraints in the public sector
indicate clearly that financial control is a crucial element in
governing less developed political systems. Both the generally
lower level of economic resources in the society as a whole and
problems in extracting those resources for public use make the task
of a minister of finance in a less developed nation an unenviable
responsibility.
The above having been said, the task of the minister of finance
is not to be coveted in almost any political system at present. The
public deficit and spending problems constitute a major part of the
1992 campaign for the presidency in the United States, and there
is certainly a sense of a real and growing debt crisis in the public
sector in the US. Further, the United States is far from alone in
its current difficulties in funding public expenditures, and Italy,
Canada,(24) and even Germany have experienced substantial public
expenditure problems in the past several years. To some extent

the recent successes of parties on the political right, or even the
libertarian right in unlikely countries such as Sweden, indicates the
extent of the difficulties citizens believe that they are experiencing
with the resource demands coming from the public sector. Only
in the decades of the 1960s and early 1970s did the governments
of the industrialized countries really experience a period of "treble
affl~ence""~) in which there was not a zero-sum relationship
between public and private expenditure.
There are certainly undeniable difficulties in the situation of a

Germany and that of many poorer countries in Latin America,
Africa, or Asia. The problem in Germany may be one of facing
negative popular and business reactions if there is a tax increase to
fund spending, or some alteration in international competitiveness
of capital if there are new business taxes. This is a different
problem than that of the real inadequacy of a tax base, or the
administrative problems encountered in extracting revenues in less
developed societies.'26)The basic point, however, remains that all
policymaking--public and private but especially public--must be
understood in the context of resource scarcity, and that the analytic
tools of policy analysis have been developed to assist in addressing
the problems of scarcity.
Escalating Demands
The third factor presumed to be different between developed and

less developed policymaking is the escalating demands placed on
the governments of the "Third World" countries. Again, this point
is certainly true, and those governments do confront a number of
growing problems--economic development, the environment,
population growth and over-urbanization to mention but a few--that
severely strain their already inadequate resource bases. Equally ,
I
true, however, is the counter point that the governments of the
I
1648 PETERS
I
more developed world also face escalating demands, and also (as I
noted above) function with resource bases that, however rich in
relative terms, are still inadequate relative to the range of demands
placed upon them. 1
I
One of the most difficult problems faced by political leaders in I

developed countries is that the pattern of governing and
policymaking established during the 1950s and 1960s is difficult to
break. During the period of great affluence and rapid economic

growth, public money was used as a means of purchasing political
peace at what seemed then a very cheap price. Although critics on
the political right at that time warned of the day of reckoning to
come, for politicians in government it then appeared substantially
easier simply to spend the money that rolled in to the treasury
from the fiscal dividend of growth and make as many segments of
the society as possible happy by spending. That established and h
effective pattern of governing made any notion of sacrifice and of

a government not reacting to demands appear ludicrous and mean-
1
spirited. The reaction of many citizens to government is "What
have you done for me recently ? "
The question of what government has been doing recently is a

real one for government leaders in another way. The welfare state
is a significant part of the policy legacy of these states, but is not
sufficient to legitimate the state any longer. The creation of this
form of state structure occurred sufficiently long in the past that
these important benefits are now simply expected by the public.
The public may become somewhat alarmed if benefits are
threatened, but even some severe cuts do not appear to have
aroused the type of reaction that might have been expected. Thus
programs that have served to legitimate an expanded state, and
with it expanded taxes and interventions, have been in many ways
a part of the political background, with governments n0.w forced
to think of new and innovative ways to whet the palate of their
citizens.
This difficulty is compounded by the fact that governments by

now have done most of the easy things. Constructing the welfare
state for example, took an immense political struggle in many
countries,(2n but the technology of providing social insurance
benefits such as pensions or sickness insurance is really very
simple. Even the technology involved in delivering health care is
relatively simple for the administrators, if not necessarily for the
people actually delivering the services. The social and economic
problems that remain for government to solve in the industrialized

democracies are now more complex, involving changing values,
culture and behavior rather than simply providing money to people
and institutions.
The nature of the changing tasks of government is captured well

by Nelson's analogy(28) of the "Moon and the Ghetto". It is
common to praise the government of the United States for its
success it placing several astronauts on the moon. To Nelson, that
was indeed an impressive accomplishment, but in some ways it
involved only the application of well-understood principles of
physics and engineering. On the other hand, the challenges of
attempting to solve problems such as those encountered in ghettos
or in other areas of social deprivation or disorganization extend
well beyond the available methodologies for effective social
intervention. Governments certainly do have some "tools" that
they can apply to these problems, but they do not have the relative
certainty that are enjoyed by engineers, agronomists, or social
security clerks when they deliver policies.
In addition to the obvious problems of social disorganization in

ghettos and slums governments now confront a variety of other
social problems such as family policy, juvenile suicide and the like
for which they are truly ill-~repared.'~~) That absence of an
accepted technology to solve pressing problems in turn means that
politicians who are attempting to make a name for themselves
1650 PETERS
through the advocacy of successful public programs are also in

some difficulty. They are in the position of having relatively little
to offer, or being connected possibly to failed or failing programs.
Everything else being equal, blame avoidance is at least as
important as credit claiming(30)in political survival. The political
problems of developing successful programs for seemingly
intractable policy problems are themselves seemingly intractable,
and many politicians divert their attention to serving constituency
interest^'^') rather than attempting to be active legislators.
Limited Information
A fourth characteristic of policymaking in less developed

societies that Sloan mentions is the limited information available
to those governments. It is assumed that because both of the less
developed technical infrastructure and the greater difficulties in
collecting accurate information that policy-makers in these societies
will be operating with a less adequate view of the true nature of
their problems, and also with a less complete view of the resources
at their disposal. Again I would argue that this is a difference of
degree as much as a difference of type. The governments of the
more affluent countries of the world also must make policies with
less than complete information, and do so when facing some of the
intractable problems mentioned above. The tasks that confront
decision-makers in less developed countries are not enviable, but
neither are they unique.
The apparent capacity of the governments in much of the first

world would appear to belie the above argument. Those
governments collect mountains of statistics about the economy, the
society, and almost anything else about which government would
have to make policy decisions, Further, those governments and
their individual agencies have developed their own analytic
organizations to provide them with information in a form necessary
for making "good" That (relative) wealth of information

extends to the implementation of public programs, and it is
difficult (but not impossible) for citizens to evade public programs
such as taxation.(33)
In addition, government decision makers in wealthier countries

are not confined to official sources of information but rather have
access to the information prepared by a number of private
organizations. Those private organizations may have policy goals

they are attempting to reach through the provision and/or
manipulation of information, but with an appropriate number of
grains of salt decision-makers can make good use of the "free"
data and advice. Even if the information available from the
private sector is biased, the probabilities are that the existence of
multiple information sources will minimize errors in policymaking.
In such situations politics becomes at least in part a contest of who
can generate the best information, and with that create a winning
policy making coalition .(34) Less affluent regimes tend to have
fewer and more centralized sources of information, and by virtue
of those also a higher probability of errors.(35)
All that having been said, there are some common features of
policymaking that make the information resources of even the most
affluent and best advised government appear inadequate. Perhaps
most important is the simple reality that all policymaking is
prospective, and involves making predictions about future events
and the state of target populations or variables. For example,
making economic policy through the budgetary process involves
making predictions about the state of economy eighteen months or
two years in the future. Those predictions are often inaccurate,
even with the best of advisors and the most sophisticated of
econometric analyses.(36)If those policies selected do not match the
changed circumstances after the time has elapsed the intervention
may exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problem.
1652 PETERS
Even if policymakers could predict accurately the state of their

targets, which they may be able to for programs (education,
transportation) that have much more stable targets than does
economic policy, they still must predict the performance of their
instruments. That, for example, may involve making predictions
about the willingness of individuals in the society to take up the
benefits that are offered. In most industrialized democracies there
has been a tendency to adopt more indirect instruments for
reaching policy goals. In part to reduce the visibility of

government for political reasons.(3n Those choices, in turn, will
require greater dependence upon citizen behavior for the programs
to be successful. Attempts to stimulate the economy through tax
credits, for example, will not succeed if individual citizens and
businessmen decide to hold on to their money rather than invest it
in new enterprises or new houses.
Given the prospective nature of most policymaking, it may be

useful to consider this as a form of "fuzzy" decision-making, or
ad3') referred to it, "fuzzy gambling". The concept of fuzzy sets
in mathematics is a method of coping with sets the members of
which can not be determined a priori. Decision-making for many
public problems fits this model. Policymakers may not have
sufficient trials of certain types of policies to calculate the
probabilities of certain desirable or undesirable outcomes
occurring. For example, despite the several decades of experience
with nuclear power, we actually have limited knowledge about the
probabilities of accidents like Three Mile Island or Chernobyl
occurring. Therefore, regulatory policy for nuclear power is really
a form of "gambling" .(39)
Even for policy areas for which there is apparently more

information the data available is often not as good as might be
hoped for "good" p~licymaking.(~~) Even widely accepted
indicators used for policy such as the unemployment rate or
poverty rates may not be as valid as would be hoped, and the

governments of the more affluent governments may actually be at
greater risk from this particular problem, given that they have
greater availability of these indicators and perhaps somewhat
uncritical reliance on them.
A final factor limiting the capacity of governments, even in the

industrialized countries, making adequate policies prospectively is
that many of them depend upon the behavior of other actors for
their success. This is more clearly seen in reference to foreign
and defense policies,(41) including trade relations such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement, but is true also for many
domestic policies. From the perspective of information, in many
instances other actors have an incentive to hide available data and
disguise their true intentions. Again, this deceptive behavior is
especially true in foreign affairs, but bargaining in domestic
politics is likely to produce many of the same behaviors. Making
policy therefore often involves making educated guesses about how
"adversaries" will respond to the decisions made by an actor.
So far we have been singing hymns of praise to the availability

and utilization of information in policymaking. Everything else
being equal policies made with adequate information will be better
than those made with little or no information. We should
remember, however, that some notable policymaking successes
have occurred when government knew very little about the means
by which it would reach its goals. The best example of this is the
"technology forcing legislation" contained in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970.(42)Congress wanted to reduce air pollution
coming from a variety of sources, mainly automobiles, but the
automobile manufacturers argued that they did not have the means
to reach the standards proposed. Congress adopted those standards
anyway, leaving it up to the manufacturers to find the means of
attaining the standards. In the end the manufacturers reached and
1654 PETERS
even exceeded the legislated standards. This may be a case of

legislators being lucky, but it also points to the necessity to push
beyond existing information and technology if there is a good
social reason to do so.
There are other disadvantages that countries of the Third World

face in their attempts to make effective responses to social and
economic problems. One of the most significant of these is the
more common occurrence of ideological regimes among these

countries, Almost by definition, ideological regimes tend to limit
the sources and types of information that they employ. The
ideology then serves as a filter for information and tells the
government what to attend to and what to disregard.
Unfortunately, reality rarely comes in such neat ideological
packages and there is a risk of exacerbating tendencies toward
error in societies that can least afford those errors.(43)
In summary, information is a crucial asset in making public

policy. It is a scarce resource, even in societies that presumably
have the technical and information resources necessary to design
the "best" responses to policy problems. There are real
differences between the information capacities of First and Third
World countries, but again these may be more of type than of
degree. In particular, the First World countries appear to have the
special advantage of having multiple sources of information that
can be used for error correction and validation of the premises
upon which decisions are made. The more centralized regimes and
societies of many Third World countries do not provide for
multiple sources, and therefore may be more subject to faulty
decision-making.
Uncertain Outcomes
The argument for the uncertainty of outcomes after policymaking

is somewhat similar to that for the availability and use of
information. Again, there are some important differences between

First and Third world countries, but there are also some important
similarities. Both sets of government decision-makers face
significant difficulties in ensuring that the policy decisions they
make are translated into effective actions. This is in part the
(now) classic problem of implementation,(44)but may extend
beyond that to questions of adequate policy formulation.(45)There
may more constraints on the options available to decision-makers
in Third World countries, but again those will be of degree rather

than type.
One of the principal barriers to effective policymaking in Third

World countries is the relative pliability of the societies, and the
ease of gaining popular compliance. ~ i g d a l ( and
~ @others(47)have
argued that the societies of many Third World countries are more
powerful than any policy that a government would adopt, and
hence those policies are not likely to be effective if they run
counter to basic tendencies in the society. On the other hand, the
citizens of first world countries are assumed to accept what their
governments do and comply with laws, even if they do not always
agree. This may be true in general, but there are marked
differences in the extent of compliance. The differences appear to
arise both across countries and across policy areas. For example,
there is a large, if anecdotal, literature arguing that the citizens of
the Mediterranean countries are less likely to comply with
government dictates than are the citizens of other European
countries.(48) Likewise, there is a extensive literature on tax evasion
that points out that this form of civic disobedience appears to be
widespread even within "fully legitimated" regimes.(49)
A second factor affecting the uncertainty of policy outcomes is

the element of time. We have already noted that governments can
not have good information about the future. That problem is
compounded because of the time element involved in measuring
1656 PETERS
and evaluating policy outcomes. It may take years for the effects
of some policies to materialize,(s0)while the immediate positive
effects of other policies may decay rapidly. The governments of
more affluent regimes may be able to live with this uncertainly,
but those of less affluent regimes may not be able to. That would
be true not only for fiscal reasons but also because the less fully
legitimated regimes might not be able to accept policy failures as
well.
The uncertainty of outcomes is compounded by the number of

organizations generally involved in making policy. An agency
making social policy, for example, must take into account what
those agencies responsible for health, housing, employment, and
all the other allied policies are doing if they are to be successful.
Likewise, even in unitary regimes, central government must take
into account the behaviors and preferences of subnational
governments,(51)a factor that is even more true in federal
governments.(") There are very few "single, lonely organizations"
making policy in modern governments, and limited information
about the other actors make the necessary cooperation and
coordination difficult.(s3)The increased sense of scarcity in most
countries makes the likelihood of competition over resources even
more likely, and cooperation perhaps even less likely.
Further, the increasing globalization of world economies implies

that an increasing number of policy outcomes will depend upon
decisions made beyond the borders of a single country, not to
mention those influenced by decisions made outside the boundaries
of any single organization. The impact of the international
environment now extend beyond the dependencia arguments
traditionally applied to the Third World. Even the most affluent
countries now are not able to control fully their own economic and
even social policies.
LEARNING AS A MEANS OF COPING
To this point we have been painting something of a bleak picture

about the capacity of governments to make and implement policy
effectively. It is rather easy to find reasons for such pessimism,
given the number of policy failures that tend to occur when
governments act. In fairness, however, the catalog of problems
above points to the difficulty of acting effectively in the complex,
multi-actor, prospective arena within which governments must act.

The tasks assigned to governments by their societies are difficult,
and the resources available to overcome those difficulties tend to
be very limited.
We have already pointed to the fact that information is one of the

scarce resources of government. One means in which
governments can minimize their own difficulties, and maximize the
use of scarce information is to address the problems as problems
of learning. We must begin again by being somewhat pessimistic,
given that the record of governments as learning organizations is
not very good.(54) The persistence of institutional patterns of
and the similar persistence of interest group demands
may make any sort of fundamental change difficult. Change is
threatening to most humans, and therefore substantial political
pressure must be brought to generate desirable policy changes.
That bit of pessimism aside, there is also some reason for hope.
First, international organizations are becoming even more useful
conduits for policy learning among governments. Secondly, there
is an academic recognition of the importance of learning and
information sharing('@ and the increasing development of
methodologies for effective policy learning. Finally, governments
themselves appear to be becoming more interested in effective
learning from other governments-- within their own borders or
16.58 PETERS
outside--and have become more willing to copy programs

explicitly.
In the above positive trends we can identify the governments of

less developed countries may actually have some advantages.
Although their cultures, as has been pointed out, are deeply
entrenched, their policies and pplicymaking systems appear to be
less solidified, so that they may be willing to accept change with
perhaps less resistance than would be expected in more developed

regimes. In addition, these governments (rightly or wrongly)
believe that they have much to learn from more developed systems
and are therefore less likely to resist learning and the spread of
policy innovations. Further, governments in the less developed
countries appear to be developing more analytic and advice
capacities for their leaders so that the internal processes of
adaptation may be eased. While there is little cause for euphoria,
there is also little cause for complete pessimism either.
On the other hand, some of the mechanisms associated with

learning may put less developed regimes at a disadvantage. First,
a great deal of error has been introduced into policymaking by the
imposition of policies, whether by international organizations into
the Third World or by consultants into more developed
governments.(57 The governments of less developed countries will
be less able, everything else being equal, to resist foreign
transplants whether desirable or not. Further, for indigenous
attempts at policy change, trial and error tends to be the principal
form of learning, and that may be especially expensive when
resources are relatively scarce and political legitimacy is relatively
low. One major program failure may mean the loss of significant
portions of the available discretionary expenditure, and perhaps of
political power. Finally, the instability of governments in many
less developed countries may mean that the prospects of learning
are diminished as one government replaces another and with the
losers goes their accumulated wisdom about policy. This problem

is exacerbated because of the tendency toward ideological or
personalistic regimes and the consequent tendency to reject almost
everything associated with the previous regime. Finally, it may be
that from the perspective of a poor nation the apparent success of
economies and governments in wealthier countries may make
almost all their programs appear attractive, whether actually
beneficial or not.
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to show that public policymaking in

less developed regimes is different from that which occurs in more
affluent countries but that the differences are not nearly as stark as
they are sometimes assumed to be. The differences are largely
those of degree rather than of fundamentally different types of
policy problems and processes. In all regimes making effective
public policy is an extremely difficult task, and many of the same
constraints affect policymakers in the most affluent and the poorest
regimes. Everything else being equal we would all probably
prefer to be policymakers in First World countries than in the
Third World, but a policy-maker moved from one location to
another might be surprised with the many similarities as well as
with the many differences.
In all the similarities and differences in policymaking between the

First and Third World countries, the role of information and
uncertainty is a crucial element. Governments in First World
countries can benefit from multiple sources of information, both
public and private. They encounter some of the uncertainties
familiar to governments in the Third World, but have the luxury
of relatively abundant resources with which to overcome those
difficulties in decision-making. They often must use biased and
1660 PETERS
self-serving information, but do have multiple sources that serve

as checks on one another.
Learning is a basic means of overcoming the policymaking

problems of governments whether in a First and Third World
country. This process combines new information with existing
patterns of thought in the expectation of producing enhanced
understanding of the problems and opportunities faced by a
government. Governments of the Third World appear to be

particularly at a disadvantage in policy learning. They often lack
the informational and financial resources required for learning to
be possible, and have ideological and transitional barriers that
impose political limitations on learning. It may be in this capacity
to utilize information and to develop new conceptualizations that
can be acted upon readily that policymalung in First and Third
World countries differ most fundamentally.
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THE POLICY PROCESS IN DEVELOPED AND LESS

The author argues that we do not really know how different

Copyright O 1996 by Marcel Dekker, Inc.

Political scientists have devoted a great deal of attention to

political science. As independent variables, they have produced a

As dependent variables there is a sense that a number of factors

One of the potentially most significant factors in shaping

development of the society in which the political system functions.

process, with the argument being that the differences by level of

This discussion is to some extent a question of whether the glass

What is particularly interesting is that many of the assumptions

developed. There are almost certainly some differences between

THE NATURE OF THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS

A number of scholars have commented on the difficulties of

1) multiple and competing goals,

Sloan is almost certainly correct about each of these five

Multiple and Conflicting Goals

governance.(14) The powers of ideology, executive leadership,

That fragmentation usually occurs across policies and programs.

At times the problem or multiple and competing goals occurs

expected to raise government revenue, promote economic

programs reflect the divisions that exist in society and in

In some ways the problem of multiple goals may be mare deeply

The need to make conscious choices among policy alternatives is

growth again is not confined to the developing world. Policy

political systems in which short-term deprivations may be more

Another important point of comparison is that governments in

On the other hand, centralization of policy choice may have

In summary, attempts at pursuing multiple policy goals abound

major task for policy-makers, therefore, is to achieve as much

It is obvious that the governments of developing countries must

expenditure problems in the past several years. To some extent

between public and private expenditure.

There are certainly undeniable difficulties in the situation of a

The third factor presumed to be different between developed and

One of the most difficult problems faced by political leaders in I

break. During the period of great affluence and rapid economic

effective pattern of governing made any notion of sacrifice and of

The question of what government has been doing recently is a

This difficulty is compounded by the fact that governments by

problems that remain for government to solve in the industrialized

The nature of the changing tasks of government is captured well

In addition to the obvious problems of social disorganization in

through the advocacy of successful public programs are also in

interest^'^') rather than attempting to be active legislators.

A fourth characteristic of policymaking in less developed

The apparent capacity of the governments in much of the first

for making "good" That (relative) wealth of information

In addition, government decision makers in wealthier countries

organizations. Those private organizations may have policy goals

Even if policymakers could predict accurately the state of their

reaching policy goals. In part to reduce the visibility of

Given the prospective nature of most policymaking, it may be

Even for policy areas for which there is apparently more

poverty rates may not be as valid as would be hoped, and the

A final factor limiting the capacity of governments, even in the

So far we have been singing hymns of praise to the availability