INTERNATIONAL SHARING SESSION

DAM OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENT &

SAFETY PROJECT (DOISP)

EVALUASI GEOLOGI DAN

GEOTEKNIK DALAM PROSES IJIN
OPERASI BENDUNGAN
Hendra Jitno PhD, CPEng, FIEAust, RPEQ
Principal Engineer – Tailings and Dams
Rio Tinto Copper, Australia

11/12/2022 1
 Riwayat Pendidikan

1. Ir – Teknik Sipil - Struktur, Institut Teknologi Bandung (1978-1983)

2. MASc – Teknik Sipil - Geoteknik, University of British Columbia, Canada
(1988-1990)
3. PhD – Teknik Sipil - Geoteknik, University of British Columbia, Canada
(1991-1995)

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 GEOTECHNICAL ASPECT – COMMON MISTAKES

1. Introduction
2. Dam failures case histories
3. Common mistakes that lead to dam failures
4. Lessons learnt

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 Overtopping & Instability – 1994 Merriespruit Tailings Dam
Drained strength
17 people dead and widespread environmental damage;
Su-400

Su-200
Su-100

Stress paths for consolidated–undrained triaxial tests on undisturbed specimens

obtained from the Merriespruit tailings dam as part of the post-failure
investigation (after Wagener et al.1998).
Axes are shear stress q= (s’1 – s’3 )/2) and mean effective stress p = (s’1 + s’3 )/2).

• A few months prior to the failure, a stability analysis was carried for
Due combination of many factors:
the failed section of the dam.
• Heavy rainfall 50-mm
• Drained strength parameters were used: f = 35° and c’ =2 kPa.
• Poor water management;
• Circular failure surfaces and the Bishop method of analysis was used.
• Freeboard is not maintained;
• Pore pressure were obtained from piezometers data.
• This leads to overtopping of the dam.
• A minimum factor of safety of 1.34 was calculated. Subsequent post-
• Followed by embankment failure;
failure analysis also resulted in FOS=1.24.
• Tailings liquefaction to unloading.
• Why did it fail?

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 Piping Failure – Teton Dam - Idaho
11:55 PM

• No evidence of appreciable
-Failed during filling of dam
leakage the day before;
-80 billion gallons – 300 million
• The dam failed due to internal
cubic meters released.
erosion (Piping) – 5 June 1976
-200 residences destroyed
• Inadequate protection of zone 1
-14 deaths
impervious core material from
-1 billion dollars in damage
internal erosion.
11:00 AM
11:50 PM
11:20 PM 11:30 PM

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Seismic Liquefaction– The Kayakari tailings dam failure due to
the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake
• Failed due to liquefaction of
the tailings.

Bird-eye view of Kayakari tailings

dam after the failure.

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 Seismic Liquefaction– The Kayakari tailings dam failure due to the
2011 Tohoku Earthquake
• 2003 Sanriku-Minami Mw7.1 Eq; 10km from epicentre.
• Did not fail despite relatively strong shaking with Peak Ground
Acceleration at rock of 0.28g.
• 2011 Tohoku Earthquake; 120km from epicentre
• Longer duration and thus larger earthquake energy (Arias Intensity)
• Failed due to liquefaction of the tailings.

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Seismic Liquefaction– The Kayakari tailings dam failure due to the
2011 Tohoku Earthquake

Loose Sand behaviour under static and dynamic loading

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Static Liquefaction– Fundao Dam – Samarco – Brazil (2015)

• On the afternoon of November 5, 2015, the Fundão Tailings Dam in Minas Gerais collapsed. The dam was 110 m high.
• The resulting flood devastated the downstream villages of Bento Rodrigues and Paracatu de Baixo;
• 19 people were killed.
• The extent of the damage - pollutants spread along 668 kilometres (415 mi) of watercourses.
• The failure of the dam released 43.7 million cubic metres of mine tailings into the Doce River, causing a toxic brown mudflow to pollute
the river and beaches near the mouth when it reached the Atlantic Ocean.

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Static Liquefaction– Fundao Dam – Samarco – Brazil (2015)

Aftermath of the Samarco tailings dam failure at Bento Rodrigues, Brazil in 2015 (Credit: Rogerio Alves/TV Senado/
Wikimedia Commons) - Wikipedia
10
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Static Liquefaction– Fundao Dam – Samarco - Brazil
• Left abutment is built above mixture of sand and slimes;
Left abutment
• D/S drained was blocked, thus increasing phreatic levels in
the dam;
• Weight of the overburden during raising causes the slimes
to squeeze out and move downstream;
• More overburden causes the slimes to move downstream,
and the sand moves as well

Left abutment

11
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Static Liquefaction– Fundao Dam – Samarco - Brazil

Figure 4-1 Stress paths for undrained loading and drained unloading of sand, Fundão test data

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Static Liquefaction– Brumadinho Dam – Brazil (2019)

2019 Brumadinho Tailings Dam Failure - Brazil

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Static Liquefaction– Fundao Dam – Samarco - Brazil

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Adk0AwcISHo&ab_channel=elvladyman

2019 Brumadinho Tailings Dam Failure - Brazil

14
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 Foundation Failure– Aznalcollar Tailings Dam

Dymax ~2.4 m
Dxmax ~55 m

Aznalcollar Dam geometry

after the failure
Sliding failure Low k marly clay

Strain softening

• Inadequate geotechnical investigation (no proper lab test);

Reconstructed dam geometry • Inappropriate data interpretation;
• Minimum instrumentation;
• Poor data collection; 15
• Inadequate understanding on the foundation behaviour

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11/12/2022
 Common mistakes that cause dam failures
Any geotechnical failure is usually due
to combination of many causes, 4 lines of defence
including but not limited to:
1. Inadequate geotechnical data –
limited geotechnical investigation;
2. Inadequate understanding of soil
behaviour (soil characterisation)
3. Incorrect design parameters,
design criteria and/or method of Geotechnical
Investigation
analyses (design);

1
Dam Design
4. No technical reviews on the design. and analysis

5. No or limited QA/QC during

construction;
Construction as
design intent 2
3
Dam performance
6. No or limited geotechnical monitoring

4
instrumentation and/or incorrect
monitoring interpretation.

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1a.Inadequate geotechnical data – incorrect field tests
• Limited numbers of field investigation due time and budget constraints;
• Incorrect method of investigations: eg coring vs wash-boring, CPTu, SCPT,
Shear Vane, MASW, seismic refraction
• Inadequate depth of drilling or CPT – refusal achieved too soon due to hard
lenses
• Incorrect field test procedures  incorrect N-values (uncalibrated energy)

lens

Hendra Jitno - 12 Nov 2022

1b.Inadequate geotechnical data – incorrect interpretation
• Incorrect interpretation from seismic tests: seismic refraction (Vp), Multi-channel
Analysis of Surface Waves - MASW (Vs)
• For the irregular distribution of low velocity and high velocity materials, the refraction
seismic tomography method does not reveal correctly the geometry and morphology
of the sedimentary lenses, while MASW2D methods provides a better resolution of
the geometry of the alluvial sedimentary sequence (Enrione et al, 2014).

lens

Hendra Jitno - 12 Nov 2022

 1c. Inadequate geotechnical data –incorrect type of lab tests
• Unconsolidated Undrained (UU) – quick, cheap but highly unreliable –
Not recommended, only good for stiff clay with correct water content;
• TX CU Compression – recommended – single stage and sheared to
large strains (>15%). Multi-stage TXCU is quick and cheaper, but not Subsoil failure mechanisms along potential failure
recommended due to limited strain. surface under embankment
• Direct Shear Test –Not really modelling failure surface due to distinct
failure surface but results are generally ok.
• Direct Simple Shear test – more realistic, particularly highly
recommended for dam with potential horizontal failure surface at the
foundation
• Test on fill materials - ensure the tests are carried out at 95%
Standard Proctor and Optimum Moisture Content
• Test to be carried out under correct in-situ stress range, after the
dam is constructed. Not before the dam is constructed.
s1

s3 s2

Direct shear test Direct simple shear test

Hendra Jitno - 12 Nov 2022 Triaxial Compression/extension test
 2a. Inadequate understanding of soil behaviour
• Poor lab testing program may lead to: Subsoil failure mechanisms along potential failure
surface under embankment
• Error in undrained shear strength;
• Error in pore pressure response
• Error in stress-strain characteristics
• Not large enough strain causing inability to
detect brittle response
• Unable to detect any problematic soils –
expansive soils, clay-shale

Effect of type of test on stress-strain Strain softening characteristics Effect of anisotropy on undrained strength
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 2b. Inadequate understanding of soil behaviour
Unexpected material Slump on mudstone (USA)
behaviour due to poor lab
testing program:
• Drastic loss of strength due
to saturation  expansive
soils
• Gradual loss of strength due
to exposure to weather,
stress relaxation  shale,
highly OC clay, mudstone Cipularang Km 118 (2020)

Shear strength reduction of

Shimajiri mudstone due to
deterioration (Shinjo and
Ito 1989)

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 3a. Incorrect method of analysis
• Selection of the method of slices affect the computed FOS.
• Spencer’s method is the simplest of the procedures that satisfy all
conditions of equilibrium.
• Morgenstern and Price’s method are the most flexible of the procedures
that satisfy all conditions of equilibrium and may be useful for cases
where interslice forces might have a significant effect on stability.

Lambda (l) is the

ratio of the normal
and shear forces
acting along the
vertical slice
boundaries

Comparison of FOS values calculated using different limit equilibrium methods. The Morgenstem-
Price solution uses a uniform distribution of l. (After Fredlund and Krahn,1977, with permission.)
Hendra Jitno - 12 Nov 2022
 3b. Incorrect method of analysis – complex geometry
• The use of Limit Equilibrium Analysis will not generally
be able to correctly “predict” the shape of failure
surface of complex geometry. However, it still can be
used to predict the correct FOS if proper soil
parameters are used.
• The use of Finite Element Analysis is able to correctly
“predict” the shape of failure surface, development of
progressive failure in the brittle foundation and the
correct FOS.
LE Analysis

FE Strength Reduction Method

FOS=1.03 (it actually failed)

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3c. Incorrect approach – drained vs undrained analysis
• Drained Analysis under steady state condition will not necessarily give the correct Factor
of Safety again instability, particularly when we are dealing with low permeability
foundation soils. It tends to overestimate the computed FOS.
• Undrained Analysis considering construction-induced pore pressure should be used in
the stability analyses particularly those involving low-permeability soils. Example of the
method is using B-bar value in conjunction with effective stress parameters.
• Alternatively using SHANSEP method for Undrained Strength Analysis

ESA: Effective Stress Analysis (Drained analysis)

USA: Undrained Strength Analysis (Undrained)

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3c. Incorrect approach – drained vs undrained analysis
• Undrained Analysis - Transient Pore Water Pressures – B_value method
In addition to static pore pressure due to ground water level or seepage, we often find cases where transient pore
pressures due to construction or earthquake loadings are significant. If this is the case, we also need to consider
them in the effective stress stability analysis:
Construction-induced pore pressures
• Skempton proposed that the pore pressures due to loading can be
presented as follow:
Du = B[Ds3 + A(Ds1 — Ds3)]
Du = pore pressure due to loadings
A and B = Skempton pore pressure coefficient
Ds1 = change in major principal stress
Ds3 = change in minor principal stress
For pore pressure increase due to embankment construction,
Ds3 = 0 (only vertical load), then the equation will be:

Du =B_bar*(Ds1) B_bar= Du/ Ds1

in which B_bar=A*B. For saturated condition, B=1, so B_bar=A

The B_bar is determined in the field by installing VWP and measuring
pp in soil layer.
3c. Incorrect approach – drained vs undrained
Undrained Strength Analysis using Stress History and Normalized Engineering Parameters (SHANSEP) Method

Figure 7.1 OCR versus Undrained Strength Ratio and Shear Strain at Failure from CK0U Tests: (a)
AGS Plastic Marine Clay (PI = 43%, LI = 0.6) via SHANSEP (Koutsoftas and Ladd 1985); and (b)
Figure 5.21 Variation of su∕𝜎′v with OCR for clays, measured in
James Bay Sensitive Marine Clay (PI = 13%, LI = 1.9) via Recompression (B-6 data from Lefebvre
ACU direct simple shear tests (after Ladd et al., 1977).
et al. 1983) [after Ladd 1991] 26
3d. Incorrect design criteria – different situation has
different risk

ANCOLD-2019

SNI 8064-2016
1.Risk

2. The same FOS has the

same chance of failure?

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3e. Incorrect design values– same FOS has the same
probability of failure?
1. Category I—facilities designed, built, and operated with
state-of-the-practice engineering. Generally these facilities
have high failure consequences;
2. Category II—facilities designed, built, and operated using
standard engineering practice. Many ordinary facilities fall
into this category;
3. Category III—facilities without site-specific design and
substandard construction or operation. Temporary facilities and
those with low failure consequences often fall into this category;
and
4. Category IV—facilities with little or no engineering.

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3e. Incorrect design values – same FOS has the same
probability of failure?
Demand
Capacity
FOS=P(y)/P(x) (Resisting Forces)

Demand – Driving Forces

(generally assumed the same) Very good data

P(y)1
Capacity P(x)

Demand Probability of failure P(y)2 Poor soil data

P(y)3

Area A=probability of failure

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3f. Incorrect design values for analysis– FOS
requirements are applicable for 33rd percentile data
The FoS is not applicable to mean property values nor the Lower bound values;
The FoS is applicable for design value which is larger than 1/3 and smaller than 2/3 of the observations
(USACE 2003) – (3-sigma rule).

Mean Value

1/3 2/3

Design Value

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3. Incorrect design values –pore pressures assumption
For effective stress analysis, all pore water pressures (static and transient pore pressures) will have to be
estimated at relevant locations in the slope. The static pore pressures are usually estimated from groundwater
conditions using one or more of the following methods:
• Phreatic Surface
The phreatic surface is the line of zero pressure (atmospheric
pressure) at the upper boundary of the seepage region.
This surface, or line in two dimensions, is defined by the free
groundwater level. This surface may be delineated, in the field, similar
by using open standpipes as monitoring wells.

• Piezometric surface.
Similar to the above method, but we should note that a
piezometric surface is not the same as a phreatic surface, as
the calculated pore water pressures will be different for the
two cases.

• Pore Water Pressure Ratio (ru= u/svo’)

This is a simple method for normalizing pore water
pressures measured in a slope according to the definition
of ru above. u = pore pressure; svo’ = the total vertical
subsurface soil stress at depth z.
 4. No technical reviews on the design
• Independent technical review by appropriate technical specialist is required to
provide an honest and objective opinion on the overall design of the dam;
• Fatal flaws can be identified in the early stage of design and this can contribute
to safer design and reducing surprises during construction;
• Potential of optimising the design thus better value for money
• The presence of 3rd party independent reviewer, if carried out properly, may
potentially speed up the process to obtain regulatory approval

5. No QA/QC during construction

• Inadequate QA/QC during construction or operation may lead to unexpected
problems.
• Poor daily and weekly report – not enough information
• No completion report consisting compilation of QA/QC report, as built
drawings and all records of deviations from the original design

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 Lessons Learnt - Can we prevent the failures?
• Plan in advance so adequate time and budget are available to undertake good quality work
• Get adequate geotechnical investigation and laboratory data;
• Engage capable consultant or expert with adequate experience to undertake design; it is
expected that the consultant knows to undertake geotechnical investigation, interpret the
data, derive appropriate design parameters, consider possible load cases and failure
mechanism, etc.
• Undertake 3rd party independent technical review (audit) during design, construction and
operation.
• Get the habit to ask our colleagues to do peer review (internal review) before reviews by
external party.
• Undertake strict QA/QC during construction and operation with proper documentation.
• Install appropriate and adequate monitoring system to understand the dam performance.
This includes rainfall gauge (!) and strong motion accelerograph in areas of high
seismicity.
• After the operation, collect the monitoring data with appropriate time interval and interpret
the results to understand the behaviour of the dams during operation.
• Undertake dam safety audit with interval depending on the hazard category of the dams.
Hendra Jitno - 12 Nov 2022
SOP IZIN OPERASI BENDUNGAN BARU
Tahapan Izin Operasi Bendungan Baru

Sidang teknis Komisi Rekomendasi dari

Kajian awal dengan
Kajian Keamanan Komisi Keamanan
melakukan verifikasi
terhadap tindak Bendungan mengenai Bendungan kepada
kelengkapan
lanjut inspeksi pembahasan Menteri PUPR untuk
dokumen
lapangan oleh pelaksanaan menerbitkan Izin
administratif dan
tim kajian Balai pengisian awal waduk Operasi Bendungan
dokumen teknis oleh
Teknik serta penyampaian
tim kajian Balai
Bendungan tindak lanjut hasil
Teknik Bendungan 8
inspeksi lapangan

2 4 6

1 3 5 7

Permohonan izin operasi bendungan
baru kepada Menteri PUPR dengan
tembusan kepada Direktur Jenderal
Sumber Daya Air, Direktur
Bendungan dan Danau, Direktur
Bina Operasi dan Pemeliharaan dan
Kepala Balai Teknik Bendungan.
Tembusan kepada Kepala Balai Teknik
Bendungan disertai dengan dokumen
administratif dan dokumen teknis
Pelaksanaan inspeksi Diskusi Sidang pleno Komisi
lapangan dilanjutkan teknis jika Keamanan Bendungan
dengan diskusi di lapangan diperlukan mengenai pembahasan
oleh Komisi Keamanan pengisian awal waduk
Bendungan, Balai Teknik dari aspek teknis dan non
Bendungan, Pembangun teknis serta penyampaian
Bendungan, Pengelola tindak lanjut sidang teknis
Bendungan dan Konsultan Komisi
Persiapan Operasi dan Keamanan Bendungan
Pemeliharaan Bendungan
34
 Terima kasih atas kehadiran rekan2 semua
Mudah2an bermanfaat

Any question?

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