293902-LAM-SAF-As-70006 Rev 0 - Fire and Explosion Hazard Assessment

Fire & Explosion Hazard Assessment
For:
Prinos Area Field Development Project

Project Number: 293902
Date: 21/02/2017
Document No: 293902-LAM-SAF-AS-70006
Revision No: 0
293902-LAM-SAF-AS-70006 Fire & Explosion Hazard Assessment Rev. 0
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 7
1.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................... 14
2.0 PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................... 15
2.1 Objectives .............................................................................................................. 15
2.2 Scope ..................................................................................................................... 15
3.0 ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................... 16
4.0 DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................................................... 18
5.0 FACILITY OVERVIEW......................................................................................................... 20
5.1 Facility Layout ........................................................................................................ 20
5.2 Open Drain System ................................................................................................ 21
5.3 ‘Burn Down’ Philosophy ......................................................................................... 21
6.0 PROCESS FIRE METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................... 22
6.1 Fire Hazard Analysis Approach .............................................................................. 22
6.1.1 Fire Hazard Analysis Project Information ................................................................ 22
6.1.2 Fire Hazard Analysis Output Information ................................................................ 23
6.2 Study Assumptions................................................................................................. 23
6.3 Frequency Analysis Approach ................................................................................ 24
6.3.1 Identification of Isolatable Sections ........................................................................ 24
6.3.2 Leak Frequency Analysis ....................................................................................... 24
6.3.3 Ignited Events Frequency Analysis ......................................................................... 24
6.4 Discharge Modelling ............................................................................................... 25
6.5 Consequence Modelling Approach ......................................................................... 25
6.5.1 Jet Fires ................................................................................................................. 25
6.5.2 Pool Fires ............................................................................................................... 26
6.5.3 Flash Fires ............................................................................................................. 26
7.0 BLAST OVERPRESSURE METHODOLOGY ..................................................................... 27
7.1 Approach to the Development of Design Accidental Loads .................................... 27
7.1.1 Overview ................................................................................................................ 27
7.1.2 Codes and Standards............................................................................................. 28
7.1.3 Good Practice and Engineering Judgment ............................................................. 28
7.1.4 Oil and Gas UK Guidance for Design Accidental Load Determination .................... 30
7.1.5 Estimation of the DALs – DNVGL Offshore Standard Methodology ........................ 32
7.1.6 Estimation of the DALs – Frequency Exceedance Basis ........................................ 33
8.0 PROCESS FIRE RESULTS ................................................................................................. 34
8.1 Leak Frequency Analysis ....................................................................................... 34
8.2 Discharge Modelling ............................................................................................... 35
8.3 Determination of Credible Events ........................................................................... 36
8.3.1 Jet Fires ................................................................................................................. 36
8.3.2 Pool Fires ............................................................................................................... 39
8.3.3 Flash Fires ............................................................................................................. 40
8.4 Uncertainty in Analysis ........................................................................................... 41
8.4.1 Leak Frequency ..................................................................................................... 41
8.4.2 Ignition Probability .................................................................................................. 41
8.4.3 Modelling Limitations .............................................................................................. 42
8.5 Conclusions on Process Fires ................................................................................ 42
9.0 NON-PROCESS FIRES ....................................................................................................... 43
9.1 Non-Process Fire Hazards ..................................................................................... 43
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9.2 Non-Process Hydrocarbon Fires ............................................................................ 43

9.2.1 Diesel Fires ............................................................................................................ 43
9.2.2 Flammable Chemical Fires ..................................................................................... 43
9.3 Non-Process Non-Hydrocarbon Fires ..................................................................... 44
9.3.1 Scope ..................................................................................................................... 44
9.3.2 Electrical Fires........................................................................................................ 44
9.3.3 Miscellaneous Fires................................................................................................ 46
9.4 Conclusions on Non-Process Fires ........................................................................ 46
10.0 SEA POOL FIRES AND FLASH FIRES .............................................................................. 47
10.1 Sea Pool Fires........................................................................................................ 47
10.1.1 Riser & Pipeline Releases ...................................................................................... 47
10.1.2 Process Spills......................................................................................................... 47
10.2 Flash Fires ............................................................................................................. 49
10.3 Conclusions on Sea Pool Fires and Flash Fires ..................................................... 50
11.0 BLAST OVERPRESSURE RESULTS ................................................................................. 51
11.1 DNVGL Offshore Standard Methodology Results ................................................... 51
11.2 DNVGL Explosion Risk Analysis Results ................................................................ 51
11.2.1 Determination of the DALS ..................................................................................... 51
11.2.2 Ventilation Analysis ................................................................................................ 52
11.2.3 Explosion Overpressures ....................................................................................... 52
11.2.4 Dynamic Pressures ................................................................................................ 52
11.3 Conclusions on Blast Overpressures ...................................................................... 53
12.0 DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................... 54
12.1 Passive Fire Protection .......................................................................................... 54
12.2 Active Fire Protection ............................................................................................. 55
12.3 Blast Overpressure Protection ................................................................................ 56
13.0 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 58
APPENDIX A. MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS ......................................................................... 61
A.1 HOLE SIZE SELECTION ASSUMPTIONS .......................................................................... 62
A.2 PARTS COUNT ASSUMPTIONS ........................................................................................ 64
A.3 PROCESS RELEASE FREQUENCY ASSUMPTIONS........................................................ 65
A.4 PIPELINE AND RISER MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS ....................................................... 66
A.5 WELL RELEASE AND BLOWOUT ASSUMPTIONS .......................................................... 68
A.6 IGNITION PROBABILITIES ASSUMPTIONS ...................................................................... 69
A.7 DETECTION / ISOLATION ASSUMPTIONS ....................................................................... 70
A.8 CONSEQUENCE MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................ 71
A.9 HUMAN IMPAIRMENT CRITERIA ASSUMPTIONS ........................................................... 73
A.10 PLANT IMPAIRMENT CRITERIA ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................. 75
APPENDIX B. MARKED-UP PFD ............................................................................................ 76
APPENDIX C. MARKED-UP P&IDS ........................................................................................ 77
APPENDIX D. FAILURE CASE DEFINITION .......................................................................... 85
D.1 IDENTIFICATION OF ISOLATABLE SECTIONS ................................................................ 85
D.2 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS................................................................... 85
D.3 OPERATING CONDITIONS, COMPOSITIONS AND INVENTORIES ................................. 85
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APPENDIX E. FREQUENCY ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 87

E.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 87
E.2 LEAK FREQUENCY RESULTS .......................................................................................... 87
E.1 FREQUENCY OF JET FIRES / POOL FIRES ..................................................................... 89
E.2 FREQUENCY OF FLASH FIRES ........................................................................................ 90
APPENDIX F. DISCHARGE DURATION ANALYSIS .............................................................. 91
F.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 91
F.2 DISCHARGE MODELLING ................................................................................................. 91
F.3 MASS INVENTORIES CALCULATION ............................................................................... 92
F.4 INITIAL RELEASE FLOWRATES & THEORETICAL RELEASE DURATIONS .................. 92
F.5 TIME VARYING DISCHARGE MODELLING RESULTS ..................................................... 93
APPENDIX G. FLAMMABLE DISPERSION RESULTS ........................................................... 95
G.1 CONSEQUENCE RESULTS ............................................................................................... 95
G.2 FLASH FIRE EXCEEDANCE CURVES AND CREDIBLE EVENT ...................................... 99
APPENDIX H. JET FIRE RESULTS ...................................................................................... 104
H.1 JET FIRE FLAME LENGTHS ............................................................................................ 104
H.2 JET FIRE FLAME LENGTH EXCEEDANCE CURVE AND CREDIBLE EVENT ............... 104
H.3 JET FIRE PLOT PLANS.................................................................................................... 107
H.4 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECT DISTANCES................................................................. 111
H.5 INITIAL THERMAL RADIATION EFFECT AREAS ........................................................... 115
H.6 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECT AREA AT 5 MINUTES ................................................. 121
H.7 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECT AREA AT 15 MINUTES ............................................... 122
APPENDIX I. TOPSIDES POOL FIRE RESULTS ................................................................... 123
I.1 RAINOUT / POOL FORMATION MODELLING ................................................................. 123
I.2 REVIEW OF POTENTIAL POOL FIRE RELEASE SCENARIOS ...................................... 124
I.3 IDENTIFIED RAINOUT / POOL FIRE CASES & CHARACTERISTICS ............................ 125
I.4 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECT AREAS......................................................................... 126
I.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................... 129
APPENDIX J. SEA SURFACE POOL FIRE RESULTS......................................................... 131
J.1 PROCESS SPILL – METHODOLOGY .............................................................................. 131
J.2 PROCESS SPILL – RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS ........................................................... 133
J.3 SUBSEA RELEASE – METHODOLOGY .......................................................................... 134
J.4 SUBSEA RELEASE – RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS ....................................................... 134
APPENDIX K. DNVGL OFFSHORE STANDARD OVERPRESSURE CALCULATIONS ...... 138
K.1 DEFINITION OF THE EXPLOSION VOLUME ................................................................... 138
K.2 EXPLOSION CURVE DETERMINATION .......................................................................... 139
K.3 DESIGN ACCIDENTAL LOAD CHARACTERISTICS ....................................................... 140
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APPENDIX L. DNVGL ASSUMPTION REGISTER ............................................................... 142

APPENDIX M. DNVGL EXPLOSION RISK ANALYSIS ......................................................... 143
APPENDIX N. FIRE AND EXPLOSION – SECE COMPONENTS ASSESSMENT ................ 144
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report summarises the Fire and Explosion Hazard Assessment (FEHA) carried out for
the Prinos Lamda facility.
The basic objective of the FEHA is to quantify the risks associated with Major Accident
Events (MAEs) that have fire or explosion outcomes and, hence, to provide a basis
against which fire or blast protection / mitigation aspects of the design can be developed.
The inputs to the analysis are defined, the methodology described and the results
presented and discussed. From these, recommendations are derived for the Passive Fire
Protection (PFP), Active Fire Protection (AFP) and Blast Overpressure Protection required
on the Prinos Lamda facility.
Fire Hazards
Conclusions drawn based on the fire analysis are separated between process fires, non-
process fires and sea fires. Refer respectively to sections 8.0, 9.0 and 10.0 for details on
the findings summarised below.
Process Fire Hazards
 As per the findings of the frequency analysis, the main potential source of release
and fire event originates from the manifold area (both production and gas lift).
Releases from risers or Christmas trees only marginally contribute to fire events,
although could occur as a result of escalation;
 The most likely event to occur upon ignition of a release is a jet fire (or a flash fire
followed by a jet fire in case of a delayed ignition). The dimensioning credible jet
fire events at the 5 and 15 minute impact thresholds are identified using frequency
exceedance curves and are described in Table 1;
 Topsides pool fires are less likely to occur due to the high momentum of the fluids
on release. Pools may form locally however for large releases, upon inventory
depletion (reduced momentum) or upon direct impingement of the release causing
rainout to occur. Due to modelling limitations, no event exceeding the 10-4 per year
threshold was identified, although pool formations are considered to be credible
scenarios;
 Flash fires are not anticipated to affect equipment or structure, but short term
effects on personnel are addressed as part of the Quantitative Risk Assessment
(Ref. [1]) The credible flash fire events for the 2F and 5D weather conditions are
identified using frequency exceedance curves and are described in Table 2;
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Table 1 - 5-Minute and 15-Minute Impact Thresholds Credible Jet Fire Events
5-Minute Credible Jet Fire Event: Gas lift header, 6.5mm release
Flame Length in still air (m) 4.85
Flame Emissive Power (kW/m2) 83.79
Flowrate (kg/s) 0.15
Radiation Levels Effect Distances (2F Weather Conditions)
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
8.46 8.10 7.20 6.40
Radiation Levels Effect Distances (5D Weather Conditions)
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
7.32 7.05 6.13 5.23
Radiation Levels Effect Areas (2F Weather Conditions)
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
66.58 56.61 32.21 16.00
Radiation Levels Effect Areas (5D Weather Conditions)
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
58.88 50.41 30.39 13.07
15-Minute Credible Jet Fire Event: Gas lift import riser, 1.5mm release
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
3.39 3.33 3.13 Not Reached
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
3.31 3.26 3.10 Not Reached
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
5.77 5.71 5.45 Not Reached
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
5.66 5.60 5.39 Not Reached
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Table 2 - Credible Flash Fire Event

Credible Flash Fire Event:
Production Riser Release, 30mm hole size
100% LFL effect distances – 2F Weather Conditions
Max Distance Max Width Min Distance Effect Area
(m) (m) (m) (m2)
65.3 8.2 -0.1 420.5
(m) (m) (m) (m2)
129.0 24.0 -0.1 2434.0
100% LFL effect distances – 5D Weather Conditions
(m) (m) (m) (m2)
68.7 6.4 -0.1 345.3
(m) (m) (m) (m2)
148.5 15.1 -0.1 1762.5
Non-Process Fire Hazards
From the review of non-process fires, no credible non-process hydrocarbon fire event is
identified as risks are driven by process hydrocarbon events. Non-process non-
hydrocarbon fire events are considered credible scenarios. However, those are mitigated
by good practices and design measures in place.
To further reduce the risk to ALARP levels, it is recommended that UPS battery charging
be inhibited upon loss the ventilation to prevent hydrogen accumulation within the
electrical room.
Sea Fire Hazards
Sea pool and flash fires hazards have been reviewed to identify potential impacts to the
Lamda platform.
 Sea pool fires, either from topsides process spills or subsea releases are not
considered credible events. This is achieved by combining low frequency of
occurrence, suitable prevention measures (in particular for subsea releases) and
very low ignition probabilities. It should be noted however that, although the event
probability is very low, a sea surface fire caused by a subsea release could have a
significant impact on the facility and personnel (potentially preventing evacuation
by either vessel or liferaft);
 Flash fires from subsea releases are more likely to occur due to the gas buoyancy,
increasing the probability of ignition. Riser and pipeline routing, coupled to
prevailing winds, are however anticipated to reduce the probability for the event
occurring. No significant damage to the platform is anticipated from a flash fire
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event, although. some damage may occur on unprotected items. The event may
cause injuries or fatalities, which are addressed as part of the Quantitative Risk
Assessment (Ref. [1]).
Explosion Hazards
Conclusions drawn based on the explosion analysis are summarised below and are based
on assessments carried out using the DNVGL Offshore Standard methodology and CFD
analysis. Refer to section 11.0 for details on the findings summarised below.
 The ventilation results show that the platform has good ventilation with a 95% Air
Change per Hour (ACH) exceedance in excess of 12 ACH;
 The Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) overpressure results for a 10-4 per year
event frequency were calculated to be zero in all cases. This is due to the good
ventilation (reducing the gas accumulation), relatively small clouds (due to the
small platform footprint limiting the length of the flame) and low ignition probabilities
(due to the small number of ignition sources contained within the flammable clouds
formed);
 For the purposes of detailed design, the Design Accidental Load (DAL)
characteristics calculated using the DNVGL Offshore Standard methodology
should be used, and are summarised in Table 3. Indeed, based on the generated
exceedance curves using the CFD analysis, a Ductility Level Blast (DLB) design
overpressure of 400 mbar corresponds to a 1.4x10-5 per year event, which is
considered to be generally acceptable. This is in line with the Oil and Gas UK
guidance (Ref. [37]), which recommends to use a design overpressure event with
an exceedance frequency between 10-4 and 10-5 per year.
Table 3 - Recommended Blast Overpressure DAL Characteristics
DAL pressure (barg) Pulse Duration (ms) Dynamic Pressure (barg)
DLB 0.400 200 0.134
SLB 0.134 430 0.045
Design Recommendations
Design recommendations are made within section 12.0 of this report based on the
calculated results and conclusions that are drawn. In summary, the recommendations
arising from the study are:
FEHA-1 Apply PFP to equipment as set out in Table 4.
FEHA-2 Provide AFP to equipment as set out in Table 5.
FEHA-3 Include Blast Overpressure Protection in the design of equipment as set out
in Table 6.
FEHA-4 The UPS battery charging capability shall be inhibited on loss of ventilation
to the Local Electrical Room (including HVAC trip or closure of fire dampers
due to smoke or gas detection at HVAC inlet).
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Table 4 - Passive Fire Protection Recommendations
SECE Name Location PFP Recommendations
SECE-01 - Production Riser Production Deck J15 (on topsides exposed portion of the
Hydrocarbon riser and supports)
Containment
SECE-01 - Gas Lift Riser Production Deck J15 (on topsides exposed portion of the
Containment
SECE-03 - Separation Barrier Production / J15 (integrity to be maintained following

Structure (Gridline E) Mezzanine Deck credible blast event)
SECE-03 - Primary Structure Production / Passive Fire Protection on Critical

Structure Mezzanine / Drilling Members (failure causing escalation or
Decks Primary impairing other SECEs) - J15 rating or
Structure (south of H15 for members not impacted by
Gridline E) credible jet fire events
SECE-03 - Critical secondary Production, As per supported SECEs

Structure structural elements Mezzanine and
supporting other Drilling Decks
SECEs (preventing
failure or escalation -
South of Gridline E)
SECE-03 - Local Instrument and Production Deck Minimum fire rating shall be in
Structure Electrical Rooms and Mezzanine accordance with the requirements of
Decks the DNVGL Offshore Standard DNVGL-
OS-A101 (Ref. [37]) and are included
within the Passive Fire Protection
Schedule (Ref. [25]
SECE-04 - Breathing Air System - Production / J15 rating on the lines listed in Table 80
Escape, Connection Manifolds Mezzanine / Drilling within Appendix N
Evacuation and supply lines Decks
and Rescue
SECE-08 - Firewater System - Dry Production and J15 for piping supports only on the lines
Active Fire Deluge Network - Mezzanine Decks listed in Table 80 within Appendix N
Protection Wellbay Area
SECE-09 - Production Export Riser Production Deck J15 (including supports)

ESD System ESDV (ESDV-1638)
SECE-09 - Gas Lift Import Riser Production Deck J15 (including supports)
Table 5 - Active Fire Protection Recommendations
SECE Name Location AFP Recommendations
- Wellbay Area Mezzanine Deck Provide firewater deluge (including

manually activated foam capability) at
minimum 20L/min/m2 to provide cooling
of equipment, prevent escalation over
the platform endurance period and
extinguishment of pool fires.
- Well Conductor Area Production Deck Provide firewater deluge (including

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SECE-03 - Local Electrical Room Production Deck Provide gas flooding system to the local
Structure and Local Instrument and Mezzanine electrical room and local instrument
Room Deck room to control and mitigate the
consequences of fire events.
SECE-04 - Primary Muster Point Production Deck Provide water curtain at minimum
Escape, 45L/min/m to segregate area against
Evacuation potential heat radiation, smoke and gas
and Rescue dispersion from the production area
SECE-09 - Xtree topsides Mezzanine Deck Firewater Deluge with Foam Capability,
ESD System shutdown valves 20L/min/m2 to provide cooling of
devices equipment and prevent escalation over
the platform endurance period
Table 6 - Blast Overpressure Protection Recommendations
Design
Criticality
SECE Target Location Accidental
Level
Load
N/A Well Conductor Production Deck I DLB
N/A Christmas Trees Mezzanine Deck I DLB
SECE-01 -
Hydrocarbon
Production Export and
Containment Inc. Production Deck I DLB
Gas Lift Risers
Structural Supports
(SECE-03)
Separation Barrier Production and
SECE-03 - Structure I DLB
(Gridline E) Mezzanine Decks
Primary Structure (South Production, Mezzanine
of Gridline E) and Drilling Decks
Critical secondary
structural elements
As per
supporting other SECEs Production, Mezzanine
SECE-03 - Structure supported
(preventing failure or and Drilling Decks
SECEs
escalation - South of
Gridline E)
SECE-04 - Escape, Escape Route – North Mezzanine to Drilling
I DLB
Evacuation and Rescue East Staircase Deck
SECE-04 - Escape,
Secondary Muster Point Drilling Deck I DLB
Evacuation and Rescue
SECE-04 - Escape, Marine Evacuation
Drilling Deck I DLB
Evacuation and Rescue System
Breathing Air System -
Connection Manifold on
SECE-04 - Escape, Drilling Deck and supply Production Deck and
I DLB
Evacuation and Rescue lines (from Energean Drilling Deck
Force or West Hose
Station)
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Design
Criticality
Level
Load
Firewater Ringmain –
SECE-08 - Active Fire Production, Mezzanine
Connection to Drilling I DLB
Protection and Drilling Deck
Deck
Firewater System - Dry
SECE-08 - Active Fire Production and
Deluge Network - Wellbay II SLB
Protection Mezzanine Decks
Area
SECE-09 - ESD Xtree topsides shutdown
Mezzanine Deck I DLB
System valves devices
SECE-09 - ESD
Gas Lift Import Riser Production Deck I DLB
System
ESDVs
All items listed in Table 6 shall be designed as appropriate using the blast overpressure or
dynamic pressure presented in Table 3, following the guidance provided within the Blast
Overpressure Protection Philosophy (Ref. [5]).
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1.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Energean Oil and Gas intends to increase production from its Prinos concession area
and has therefore initiated the Prinos Exploration Area field development project,
comprising of an additional wellhead platform with interconnecting flow lines and
associated risers and topsides. The platform, Lamda, (for the Epsilon field) will be sited
approximately 3.5 kilometres west of the existing Prinos Delta complex.
The summary specifications for the Lamda topsides are as follows:
 Top Deck – 41.4m * 22.1m

 Topsides Weight – 750te
 4 Decks – Cellar Deck, Production Deck, Mezzanine Deck and Drilling Deck
Crude oil from Lamda will be transported via a 10” nominal bore (NB) pipeline to the new
Mezzanine Deck to be installed on Prinos Delta. Lift gas and Injection water will be
delivered from Prinos Delta to Lamda in two further dedicated 6” NB pipelines.
Lamda is designed to function as a NUI, remotely operable under all weather conditions.
The installation is designed with the minimal facilities required to safely control
production and to enable drilling and well interventions.
The sketch below gives an overview of the project.
Lamda Future Water Injection to Omicron

Platform Future Gas lift to Omicron
Future
Omicron
Platform
Hatched Area:
Future Production Existing Exclusion
Pipeline to Delta Zone
Production Pipeline to Delta
Water Injection to Lamda

Gas Lift to Lamda
Delta
Umbilical from Prinos Delta
Platform
Figure 1 Field Layout
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2.0 PURPOSE
2.1 Objectives
This report represents the Fire and Explosion Hazard Assessment (FEHA) for the Prinos
Lamda facility. The basic objective of the FEHA is to quantify the risks associated with
Major Accident Hazards that have fire or explosion outcomes and, hence, to provide a
basis against which protection / mitigation aspects of the design can be developed.
Specific objectives include:
 Review the process and riser hydrocarbon failure cases, and subsequent fire and
explosion scenarios for the Prinos Lamda facility.
 Identify and quantify where applicable accidental loads resulting from potential fire
and explosion events.
 Identify escalation / propagation potential to structures and hydrocarbon inventories

and evaluate the consequences.
 Identify potential requirements for additional risk reduction measures to prevent

and / or mitigate effects of the identified fire scenarios.
 Provide input to the Quantitative Risk Assessment (Ref. [1]).
The risks quantified in this FEHA are for assets rather than personnel, including escalation
potential and fire and explosion loads to safety and environmental critical equipment. The
fire and explosion risks to personnel are based on the same scenarios, but are quantified
more explicitly by the QRA (Ref. [1]).
2.2 Scope
The scope of work includes all equipment and operations associated with the Prinos
Lamda platform and Connected Infrastructure.
Non-process fires are also included in the scope.
The study considers the facility producing at maximum operating conditions, which
correspond to the early field life basis.
The scope is limited to assessing the risks associated with the facilities during normal
operations, hence excluding commissioning, construction, maintenance and SIMOPS
activities.
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3.0 ABBREVIATIONS
ACH Air Change per Hour
AFP Active Fire Protection
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
API American Petroleum Institute
BS British Standard
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
CMPT Centre for Marine and Petroleum Technology
DAL Design Accidental Load
DLB Ductility Level Blast
DNVGL Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd
EC European Community
EER Emergency, Escape and Rescue
EN European Norm
ESD Emergency Shutdown
ESDV Emergency Shutdown Valve
FBR Full Bore Rupture
FEHA Fire and Explosion Hazard Assessment
FLACS FLame ACceleration Simulator
HCRD HydroCarbon Releases Database
HPU Hydraulic Power Unit
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
ISO International Organization for Standardization
LER Local Electrical Room
LFL Lower Flammable Limit
LIR Local Instrument Room
MAE Major Accident Event
MC Multi-Component
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MTO Material Take-Off
NB Nominal Bore
NUI Normally Unattended Installation
OGP International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (formerly E&P Forum)
OS Offshore Standard
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
PARLOC Pipeline And Riser Loss Of Containment
PC Pseudo-Component
PDMS Piping Design Management System
PFD Process Flow Diagram
PFP Passive Fire Protection
PHAST Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
RP Recommended Practice
SDV Shutdown Valve
SECE Safety and Environmental Critical Element
SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations
SIP Self-Installing Platform
SLB Strength Level Blast
SPT SPT Offshore Ltd. – Substructure Supplier
SSIV Subsea Safety Isolation Valve
TUTU Topsides Umbilical Termination Unit
UK United Kingdom
UKOOA UK Offshore Operators Association
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
WOAD Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank
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4.0 DEFINITIONS
Connected Within the safety zone or within a nearby zone of a greater distance
Infrastructure from the installation at the discretion of the Member State:
(Ref. [28])
a) any well and associated structures, supplementary units and
devices connected to the installation;
b) any apparatus or works on or fixed to the main structure of

the installation;
c) any attached pipeline apparatus or works.
Drag Load The drag load on a small obstacle due to the movement of gas past
(Ref. [38]) a small obstacle less than 0.3m in the direction of flow.
Dynamic Representative peak out of balance loads over target area, includes
Pressure drag, pressure difference and gas acceleration effects.
(Ref. [38])
Frequency Frequency is the rate which expresses how often a particular event
occurs within a stated time period. It is defined as the reciprocal of
the average time between events, and thus often expressed in terms
such as 1 per 1,000 years.
(Ductility and The ductility level blast is the design level overpressure used to
Strength) Level represent the extreme design event. Permanent deformation is
Blast allowed but not failure such that escalation to other areas can occur.
(Ref. [38])
The strength level blast represents a more frequent design event
where it is required that the structure does not deform plastically and
that the SECEs remain operational.
Likelihood Likelihood indicates, in general terms, the possibility of something

happening.
Major Accident in relation to an installation or connected infrastructure:

(Event) (Ref. [28])
a) an incident involving an explosion, fire, loss of well control, or
release of oil, gas or dangerous substances involving, or with
a significant potential to cause, fatalities or serious personal
injury;
b) an incident leading to serious damage to the installation or

connected infrastructure involving, or with a significant
potential to cause, fatalities or serious personal injury;
c) any other incident leading to fatalities or serious injury to five

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or more persons who are on the offshore installation where

the source of danger occurs or who are engaged in an
offshore oil and gas operation in connection with the
installation or connected infrastructure; or
d) any major environmental incident resulting from incidents

referred to in points a), b) and c).
For the purposes of determining whether an incident constitutes a

major accident under points a), b) or d), an installation that is
normally unattended shall be treated as if it were attended.
Major (Accident) A situation with the potential to result in a major accident

Hazard (Ref. [28])
Major An incident which results, or is likely to result, in significant adverse

Environmental effects on the environment in accordance with Directive 2004/35/EC
Incident (Ref. [29])
(Ref. [28])
Pressure The pressure difference across an obstacle greater than 0.3m in the
Difference direction of flow, calculated from the pressure time histories at the
(Ref. [38]) front and back of the obstacle.
Probability Probability is the ratio of the number of chances that a particular

event may occur to the total number of chances, and is expressed as
a number in the range 0 to 1.
Risk Assessment Risk assessment is the process of estimating the likelihood of an

occurrence of specific consequences (undesirable events) of a given
severity.
Safety and Part of an installation, including computer programmes, the purpose

Environmental of which is to prevent or limit the consequences of a major accident,
Critical Element or the failure of which could cause or contribute substantially to a
(SECE) (Ref. [28]) major accident.
Safety Zone The area within a distance of 500 metres from any part of the
(Ref. [28]) installation, established by the Member State.
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5.0 FACILITY OVERVIEW
5.1 Facility Layout
The Prinos Lamda platform is divided into 4 main fire zones, which are further subdivided
as follows:
 Fire Zone 1: Cellar Deck
 Fire Zone 2A: Production Area at Production Deck (South of Gridline E)
 Fire Zone 2B: Production Area at Mezzanine Deck (South of Gridline E)
 Fire Zone 3A: HVAC Room
 Fire Zone 3B: Transformer Room
 Fire Zone 3C: Local Instrument Room (inc. airlock)
 Fire Zone 3D: Deleted due to layout changes
 Fire Zone 3E: LER / LIR Area at Production and Mezzanine Deck (North of Gridline
E)
 Fire Zone 3F: Local Electrical Room (inc. airlock)
 Fire Zone 4: Drilling Deck
The above zones are depicted on the Fire & Gas Detection / Fire Zone Drawings (Ref. [13]
to [16]). A fire wall is located on Gridline E and provides segregation between Fire Zones 2
and 3.
For this FEHA, the process and riser equipment which have been considered as possible
sources of fire and explosion hazard, have been identified and located on the facility.
These areas, and the fire zones (FZ) they correspond to, are:
 Production area (contained in FZ2A / FZ2B); and
 Subsea (risers / pipelines only).
Following an assessment of the different areas on the Prinos Lamda platform, the releases
in the above areas are considered as “the most potential to cause major hazards” due to
the nature of released fluids (hydrocarbons) and the locations of potential leak sources.
As such, the Fire and Explosion Hazard Assessment has been conducted for releases
from these locations. Non-process fires (hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon) are described
and discussed qualitatively in Section 9.0.
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5.2 Open Drain System
The Open Drains Tank (T-1000) collects rainwater, firewater, wash down water, spillage of
liquids and solids from contaminated deck areas, equipment drip pans and bunded areas.
It recovers hydrocarbon liquids before disposing of the cleaned water. The open drain
system is designed to:
 Prevent movement and spreading of liquid spills across the deck areas so as to
limit the extent and escalation of potential pool fires;
 Prevent overboard discharge of oil-contaminated water to the sea to meet

environmental standard of zero discharge to sea;
 Prevents connection of fire zones via open drains systems by including drain traps
and seals on connections to the header from sources where hydrocarbons and gas
clouds may be present (on loss of containment).
The Open Drains Tank is fitted with a tilted plate pack which reduces the oil in water
content to approximately 10 mg/l. The separated oil is pumped into the export system via
the Closed Drains Drum (V-1000) and Closed Drain Drum Pump (P-1000).
The separated water may contain low levels of oil and is disposed to the North West
platform leg, fitted with a manually operated Skim Pump (P-1002). Further oil and water
separation is achieved in the SIP leg where oily water is collected on the water surface
and is removed via the Skim Pump to the export system via the Closed Drains Drum (V-
1000).
All open drains which can contain oil or oil-contaminated water will be routed to the Open
Drains Tank (T-1000). Deluge water (where applicable) will be collected in the bunded
areas and routed to the open drains tank. High flow-rates will be diverted to the SIP leg.
Areas with potential contamination (drilling deck accommodating well services) shall be
fitted with provision for a diverter valve to allow routing of section to the open drains or SIP
leg to avoid flooding of the open drains vessel.
Rainwater and wash down water from non-contaminated areas (areas not including any
hydrocarbon containing equipment) will be either allowed to run over the side of the decks
or collected and piped directly overboard through separate pipe drains routed below the
lowest deck area.
5.3 ‘Burn Down’ Philosophy
As per the basis of design (Ref. [12]), fires should normally be controlled through isolation,
shutdown and containment. Emergency blowdown systems have not been adopted
considering the limited gas inventories, the minimum facilities and relative limited
consequences following production loss.
The intent of the fire and explosion protection is to design the facility such that the integrity
of the escape, evacuation and rescue systems is protected from credible accidental
events.
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6.0 PROCESS FIRE METHODOLOGY
6.1 Fire Hazard Analysis Approach
The following approach has been followed for the review:
 Review the list of credible flammable major accident events (MAEs) on the Prinos
Lamda platform based on the Hazard Register and Safety Critical Element
Identification (Ref. [6]), taking into account current process and design changes.
 Review the process isolatable sections on the Prinos Lamda facility based on the
Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) (Ref. [11]);
 Define the inventory size, fire properties and location of the flammable material
based on project input data, i.e. operating conditions, compositions and volumes
from the Heat and Material Balance (Ref. [9]) and piping length measurements
from the 3D model (Ref. [26]);
 Determine jet fire, pool fire and flash fire characteristics (where applicable) for each
flammable process isolatable inventory;
 Determine if discharge characteristics allow scenarios to last for longer than

considered thresholds for escalation (refer to Appendix A);
 Determine frequency of occurrence of jet fire, pool fire and flash fire (where
applicable) for each flammable process isolatable inventory, based on detection
and isolation assumptions (refer to Appendix A);
 Assess the impact of identified credible fire events on Safety and Environmental
Critical Elements and personnel (addressed within the QRA, Ref [1]).
6.1.1 Fire Hazard Analysis Project Information
The main inputs to this study include the following project information:
 Piping and Instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) (Ref. [11]);
 Process Heat and Mass Balance – for stream compositions and operating
conditions during early field life (Ref. [9]);
 PDMS 3D Model (Ref. [26]);
 Plot Plans (Ref. [17] to [19]);
 Process Flow Diagram (PFD) (Ref. [10]);
 Equipment List (Ref. [55]);
 Environmental conditions (Ref. [27]);
 Design Safety Philosophy, Fire Protection Philosophy and Fire and Gas Philosophy
(Ref. [2] to [4]);
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 ESD, Relief & Vent Philosophy and Drainage Philosophy (Ref. [7] and [8]).
6.1.2 Fire Hazard Analysis Output Information
The outputs from the various models include:
 Leak frequency analysis of the facility isolatable sections;
 Jet fire / pool fire dimensions and durations;
 Radiation effect distances and areas for jet and pool fires;
 Flammable dispersion distances for flash fires;
 Frequency exceedance curves;
 Credible jet fire / pool fire and flash fire events (where applicable).
Smoke, flammable gas and toxic gas dispersion modelling has not been conducted within
this study but has been considered in the Smoke and Gas Dispersion and Toxic Gas
Dispersion Study (Ref. [20] and [22]).
Additionally, gas dispersion and radiation (where applicable) from the platform vents has
not been reviewed in this study but has been considered in the Flaring and Venting
Review (Ref. [21]).
6.2 Study Assumptions
In addition to the project input data listed in section 6.1.1, several additional assumptions
are made to perform this analysis. The assumptions are listed below, and are described in
detail within Appendix A.
 Hole Size Selection Assumptions;
 Parts Count Assumptions;
 Process Release Frequency Assumptions;
 Pipeline and Riser Modelling Assumptions;
 Well Release and Blowout Assumptions;
 Ignition Probability Assumptions;
 Detection / Isolation Probabilities;
 Consequence Modelling Assumptions;
 Impact Criteria (Human & Plant Vulnerability).
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6.3 Frequency Analysis Approach
6.3.1 Identification of Isolatable Sections
The first step of the frequency analysis consists in defining isolatable sections of pipework
and equipment susceptible to lead to a hydrocarbon releases. To each of those sections
can then be assigned a number of release scenarios, each with its own frequency of
occurrence and associated consequence level.
Simplification / reduction in the number of isolatable sections has been considered based
on similar inventory sizes, operating conditions and fluid compositions. The complete
process is described within Appendix D.
6.3.2 Leak Frequency Analysis
The primary aim is to establish the leak frequency associated with each isolatable section
identified on the facilities. The following methodology is applied:
 A parts count is carried out based on the facilities P&IDs (Ref. [11]), and
associated to each isolatable section (refer to Appendix A for details on Parts
Count Assumptions);
 A set of historical release frequency data is selected to generate leak frequencies

associated to each isolatable section (refer to Appendix A for details on Process
Release, Pipeline and Riser Release and Well Release and Blowout Assumptions);
 Where applicable, considerations for intermittent usage of isolatable sections is

taken into account and factored into the leak frequency analysis;
 Representative hole sizes are selected to associate consequence modelling results

to the different release categories (refer to Appendix A for details on Hole Size
Selection Assumptions).
For more details and calculations associated to the Prinos Lamda facility, refer to
Appendix E.
6.3.3 Ignited Events Frequency Analysis
Further analysis is undertaken based on the leak frequency analysis outcome to generate
frequency of occurrence of ignited events based on the probability of ignition (immediate
or delayed) of a release, and the ability to detect and isolate the inventory. Details on
Detection / Isolation and Ignition Probability Assumptions are presented in Appendix A.
The potential resulting events from an accidental release are presented on Figure 2 below.
Refer to Appendix E for more details.
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Figure 2 - Potential Outcomes from an Accidental Release
6.4 Discharge Modelling
A review of discharge and mixture parameters is carried out within Appendix F to identify
the relevant consequence modelling parameters and models to be selected, associated to
each considered isolatable sections identified (refer to Appendix D). It also allows
identifying scenarios requiring time-varying discharge modelling to be carried out.
6.5 Consequence Modelling Approach
6.5.1 Jet Fires
The jet fire consequence results were modelled using PHAST 7.11. The following should
be noted in regards to the modelling:
 The risk model assumes that the release continues at the initial flow rate until the
inventory is isolated, at which time the pressure will begin to be reduced by the
release.
 The isolation time is as stated in the Modelling Assumptions in Appendix A.
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 The model takes account of isolation to generate two different time dependent
release rate profiles for each process release scenario:
o Local Isolation. This is the case where the ESDs are closing properly.
o Failure to isolate: This is taken as representative of “Complete isolation

failure”. This is the case where the ESD between the two adjacent sections
fails, resulting in the release of the inventory from both sections, and the
release is assumed constant over time.
 The subsequent jet fire calculations are based on the results from PHAST
consequence analysis software. It should be noted that the focus here is on the
flame size, and that the modelling does not take into account the obstructions /
impingement or variation with weather / stability.
The discharge and fire modelling assumes that the initial release rate (and hence fire size)
will be sustained until isolation occurs. This will be conservative for the larger (Large and
FBR) releases, where the initial release rate will be much higher than the inflow rate to the
section and, hence, not sustainable. However, this conservatism will have very little
influence on the identification of fire events leading to MAEs that are the focus of this
study, since durations of 5 minutes or more are assumed to be required for significant
impacts. Any releases that will be depleted before the isolation will tend to have durations
of less than 2 minutes.
6.5.2 Pool Fires
Similar to the jet fire modelling, the pool fire modelling is conducted using PHAST 7.11.
Similar considerations for isolation apply as for the jet fire modelling (refer to section
6.5.1). Additionally, when pool formation is identified to occur, consideration is given to the
drainage capability on the platforms to prevent liquid accumulation and reduce the scale
and duration of pool fire events.
On the Prinos Lamda topsides, the inventory is stored under a relatively high pressure with
a significant portion of gas in the production fluids. As a result, jet fire from a two-phase
non-impinged release is more likely to occur than a pool fire, with flash vaporisation initially
arising upon release and a fine spray of droplets dispersing.
6.5.3 Flash Fires
Similar to the jet fire modelling, the flash fire modelling is conducted using PHAST 7.11.
Inventory dispersion distance to LFL and half LFL are calculated and used to determine
the consequences associated to flash fires occurrences. The following considerations
apply:
 The modelling does not take into account congestion and impingement by
obstacles.
 The modelling does not consider potential detection and isolation. It is assumed the
cloud would reach its maximum size before isolation can occur (refer to Appendix
E).
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7.0 BLAST OVERPRESSURE METHODOLOGY
7.1 Approach to the Development of Design Accidental Loads
7.1.1 Overview
The approach to the development of the explosion Design Accidental Loads (DALs) has
been to follow the Oil and Gas UK Fire and Explosion guidance (Ref. [38]).
The approach prescribes a risk based decision making framework as described in the
industry guidelines published by UKOOA (Ref. [39]). The Prinos Lamda platform design is
not new or unusual when compared to other platforms of its type and consequently the
explosion risks are well understood. As a result, normal, established practice can be
applied to the determination of the DALs to be used on the facility.
Therefore, the decision of which DALs to adopt for the Prinos Lamda platform is
considered to be a Type A decision as shown in blue on Figure 3 and should be subject to
the application of the following decision bases in order of precedence:
1. Codes and Standards
2. Good Practice
3. Engineering Judgement
Figure 3 - Oil and Gas UK Decision Making Framework
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The chosen decision bases are described in more detailed in the sections that follow and,
where appropriate, examples of how they have been demonstrated during the detailed
design phase of the Prinos Area Field Development project.
7.1.2 Codes and Standards
The codes and standards which are relevant to the blast loading to be used for the project
have been outlined within the Design Safety Philosophy (Ref. [2]) and the Blast
Overpressure Protection Philosophy (Ref. [5]) and are listed below:
1. BS EN ISO 13702 – Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Control and Mitigation
of Fires and Explosions on Offshore Production Installations – Requirements and
Guidelines (Ref. [35]);
2. API RP 2FB – Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities against
Fire and Blast Loading (Ref. [36]);
3. DNVGL-OS-A101 – Safety Principles and Arrangements (Ref. [37]).
The approach advocated by the codes is broadly similar in that they require the
determination of the size and the effects of the explosion hazard the results from which
can be used in the design. The DNVGL standard also provides a methodology to
determine a DAL based on the facility’s layout, which is further described in Section 7.1.5.
In order to determine the design accidental loads, the use of modelling techniques to
determine the explosion overpressures that may be experienced within an offshore
module is recommended. In increasing order of sophistication, the modelling techniques
used can either be empirical, phenomenological or numerical. Both the DNVGL standard
approach and a Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) approach have been applied.
In addition, the codes provide guidance for good practice, including control of ignition
sources and fire and gas systems, which can be used in the prevention and mitigation of
explosion events. Good practice is discussed in further details in Section 7.1.3.
7.1.3 Good Practice and Engineering Judgment
There are a number of design practices which can be employed to reduce the effects or
likelihood of an explosion. Table 7 presents a list of design principles (Ref. [35]) which
should be adopted for equipment layout, in order to minimise explosion effects due to
overpressure and drag forces.
Table 7 - Design Principles for Good Practice and Engineering Judgement
Measure Implementation on Prinos Lamda
Locate equipment in hydrocarbon service in The process area is open on three sides; and is
areas which are well ventilated, where the well ventilated.
consequences of an explosion are limited or
where the structure can be designed to Results from the CFD explosion risk analysis,
withstand the forces generated by an including a ventilation study (refer to Appendix
explosion M) show that the air change rate significantly
exceeds 12 ACH for 95% of the time.
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Minimise number of ignition sources. There are no open flames within the processing
area. Items of equipment will be suitably rated
for the hazardous areas in which they are
installed. Non-rated equipment will be located in
over pressurised enclosures located in safe
areas. The maintenance vent tip is remote from
the processing area.
Orientate horizontal vessels so that the Most of the vessels / tanks are located on the
longest dimension is in the direction of main cellar deck, which is anticipated to contain
vent flow. hydrocarbon only on an intermittent basis.
The process area is open on three sides; any

explosion would be expected to be vented
without being significantly impeded.
Subsequently there is no predominant main vent
flow.
Orientation of the vessels is not considered to be

a significant mitigation measure.
Do not obstruct the openings in the module All openings along the module boundary are
boundaries. largely unobstructed.
Maximise openings, particularly in floors and SPT is the technology holder of the SIP structure
ceilings if possible. design. The floor and ceiling of the main
production area have been plated. The topside
Consider grated floors and ceilings. comprises a lattice structure with top and bottom
plated decks and four integrated leg interfaces at
the corners.
The Production deck and Drilling deck are plated

and complete the horizontal elements of the
primary framing. Grating is therefore not
considered viable. The mezzanine deck and the
cellar deck, respectively within and underneath
the production area, are both grated.
From a safety point of view, the upper deck

plating provides segregation of the Drilling Deck
from the Process Area.
Recognise that the accuracy of any The numerical method employed is one of the
predictions of explosion overpressures is not most accurate available for an explosion
fully known, and in particular depends on the analysis. Despite this the choice of DALs for the
predictive tool being used. Prinos Lamda facility will be conservative. This is
discussed further in Section 11.0.
Make critical equipment / structures / walls / The safety and environmental critical equipment,
floors as strong as reasonably practicable, including relevant structures, walls and floors will
and do not limit the design to a calculated be designed to the values given in Section 11.0.
explosion overpressure.
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Consider mitigation by venting, water sprays, Due to the open nature of the platform it would
chemicals and dilution. be expected that an explosion would be easily
vented. Additional water sprays, chemicals and
dilution are not considered to be required taking
into account the significant vent paths and the
design loads presented in Section 11.0.
Design collapse in a cascade fashion such Practicality of this mitigation measure is limited
that failure occurs first in less critical by the reduced footprint of the facility and the
directions. design loads presented in Section 11.0.
Avoid long narrow modules. Minimise flame The processing area (South of gridline E) has for
path. approximate dimensions 29m by 19m,
corresponding to an aspect ratio of 1.5. This is
not considered to be a long narrow module and
has minimised the flame path as far as
practicable.
As can be seen in Table 7, good practice principles are being used where practicable on
the Prinos Lamda platform to mitigate against any potential explosion hazards.
7.1.4 Oil and Gas UK Guidance for Design Accidental Load Determination
DUCTILITY AND STRENGTH LEVEL BLASTS
Two levels of explosion loading are recommended for explosion assessment (Ref. [38]).
They are the ductility level blast (DLB) and the strength level blast (SLB). The SLB is
recommended for the following reasons:
 The SLB may detect additional weaknesses in the design not identified by the DLB
(robustness check);
 An SLB event could give rise to a DLB by escalation – this should ideally not occur
as elastic response of SLB and supports should be maintained;
 The prediction of equipment and piping response in the elastic regime is much
better understood than the conditions which give rise to rupture. The SLB enables
these checks to be made at a lower load level often resulting in good performance
at the higher level (strength in depth);
 The SLB is a low consequence event important for the establishment of operability;
 This load case offers a degree of asset protection.
The following guidance is also considered in this analysis (Ref. [38]):
 A probability of between 10-4 and 10-5 per year is considered reasonable for the
ductility level design event (DLB);
 The SLB may be identified from a space averaged peak overpressure exceedance
curve, as that overpressure corresponding to a frequency one order of magnitude
more frequent or with a magnitude of one third of the DLB overpressure whichever
is the greater;
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 If the general level of dynamic pressure loads is not known, then it is acceptable to
take a load equal to one third of the smoothed peak overpressure at the location for
loads on the relevant SECEs and piping. The duration should be chosen so that
the impulse is matched to the positive phase of overpressure trace. This load must
also be applied in the reverse direction. In open area, these loads should also be
applied in the vertical plane.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPULSE AND PEAK OVERPRESSURE

The relationship between impulse and peak overpressure, introduced within the Fire and
Explosion Guidance, will be used to determine pulse durations associated to
overpressures (Ref. [38]). The equation governing the impulse is as follows (also shown in
Figure 4):
And the relationship between impulse, pulse duration and overpressure is:
Where:
I = Impulse (Pa.s)
P = Peak overpressure (Pa)
t = Pulse duration (s)
Figure 4 - Generic variation of impulse with overpressure (Ref. [38])
If an overpressure simulation is available then a point may be positioned on the chart in

Figure 4. This will serve to calibrate the model for the specific situation. A line may then be
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drawn through this point parallel to the line given. This new line may then be used for
extrapolation of nominal impulse and duration.
CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT
In accordance with the guidance from Oil and Gas UK, a SECE criticality assessment
should be performed (Ref. [38]). The criticality levels are defined as follows:
Criticality 1 Items whose failure would lead to direct impairment of the TR or

emergency escape and rescue (EER) systems including the associated
supporting structure.
Performance standard – These items must not fail during the DLB or SLB,
ductile response of the support structure is allowed during the DLB.
Criticality 2 Items whose failure could lead to a major hydrocarbon release and
escalation affecting more than one module or compartment.
Performance Standard – These items must have no functional significance

in an explosion event and these items and their supports must respond
elastically under the strength level blast (SLB).
Criticality 3 Items whose failure in an explosion may result in module wide escalation,
with potential for inventories outside the module contributing to a fire due
to blowdown and or pipework damage.
Performance Standard – These items have no functional significance in an

explosion event and must not become or generate projectiles.
SECEs of criticality 1 and 2 should be assessed against the SLB, SECEs of criticality 1 will
be assessed against the DLB.
7.1.5 Estimation of the DALs – DNVGL Offshore Standard Methodology
The DNVGL offshore standard on Safety Principles and Arrangements (Ref. [37]) provides
a step-by-step methodology to determine DLB design explosion loads based on limited
design data and generic explosion curves.
 The first step consists in defining relevant explosion volumes, which typically
corresponds to the limits of the congested area where an explosion could occur.
 The second step is determining which of the provided explosion curves is

applicable to the identified explosion volume. This is driven by the physical
characteristics of the volume such as the typical level of congestion, the presence
of solid decks, blast walls and weather cladding.
 Finally, the design accidental load can be read off the curve by determining the
blast load associated to the explosion volume.
The above methodology is established to ensure escalation out of the area may only occur
less frequently than once per 10000 years (i.e. 10-4 per year event occurrence).
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7.1.6 Estimation of the DALs – Frequency Exceedance Basis
The approach to determining the explosion DALs may be carried out using an exceedance
basis.
The severity of an explosion is dependent on a number of factors including the size of the
gas cloud, its location within the platform, the extent of the congestion within the gas cloud
and the ignition location. Any combination of these factors can lead to a single explosion
event. Subsequently, there can be a wide range of explosion overpressures associated to
the different combinations of factors listed above.
Intuitively, it would be expected that the very large overpressures would occur less often
than those explosions resulting in very small overpressures. This is partly due to the fact
that the number of combinations of the factors described are very few for large explosions
when compared to smaller explosions and also because the frequency at which small
leaks occur is higher than for large leaks.
It would be unreasonable to design to either of largest or smallest overpressures and

therefore a methodology which prescribes a value in between these extremes is required.
It can be seen that for a given combination of the factors described above there will be an
associated frequency at which an explosion will occur and a corresponding overpressure.
It is also noted that there are many pairs of frequency / overpressure values.
Using this information, curves can be generated by determining the cumulative frequency
above which a certain overpressure is exceeded.
Guidance given by Oil and Gas UK (Ref. [38]), is that a frequency of between 10-4 and 10-5
per year may be used as being representative of a Ductility Level Blast.
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8.0 PROCESS FIRE RESULTS
8.1 Leak Frequency Analysis
Identification of isolatable section and input to the Frequency Analysis is included within
Appendix D. The parts count methodology and the results of leak and ignited events
frequency per facility and for individual cases are detailed in Appendix E. Key highlights
from the results are:
 The overall leak frequency is 0.097 leaks per year;
 By release size, the contributions are:
o Tiny: 57.0%
o Small: 27.1%
o Medium: 14.1%
o Large: 1.4%
o Full Bore: 0.5%
 By location, the contributions are:
o Topsides: 96.3%
o Splash Zone: 1.1%
o Subsea: 2.6%
Refer to Table 23 within Appendix E for the summary of leak frequency (per year) by hole
size and isolatable section. The contribution of the total release frequency by isolatable
section is presented in Table 8 below.
Table 8 - Contribution per Isolatable Section to Leak Frequency

Section Percentage Contribution
Isolatable Section Description
No. to Overall Leak Frequency
1 Wellhead / Xmas Tree 0.4%
2 Production Header 56.3%
3 Pig Launcher 0.1%
4 Gas Lift Manifold 38.4%
5a Export Riser (Topsides) 0.5%
5b Export Riser (Splash Zone) 0.6%
5c Export Riser (Subsea) 1.3%
6a Gas Lift Import Riser (Topsides) 0.6%
6b Gas Lift Import Riser (Splash Zone) 0.6%
6c Gas Lift Import Riser (Subsea) 1.3%
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Table 25 to Table 27 within Appendix E present the frequency of occurrence of ignited

events per isolatable section per facility.
8.2 Discharge Modelling
A review of discharge durations for each release scenario has been performed and is
detailed in Appendix F.
Based on the findings of this analysis, a number of case durations have been identified to
exceed the considered escalation thresholds of 5 and 15 minutes (refer to Impact Criteria
Assumption in Appendix A). Where inventories have been found to be depleted at a given
time, no release flowrate is being reported in Table 8 below. Note that non-isolated events
are considered to last indefinitely using the initial release flowrate, this is further discussed
in Appendix F.
Table 9 - Release Flowrates per Release Scenario (Initial and Threshold Impact Criteria)
Inventory Hole Size Initial Release Release Flowrate Release Flowrate

Notes
No. (mm) Flowrate (kg/s) @ 5min (kg/s) @ 15min (kg/s)
1.5 0.11 0.11 0.11 1

1 6.5 2.11 2.11 2.11 2
30 44.90 - - 3
1.5 0.07 0.07 0.07 1
6.5 1.23 1.23 1.23 2
2/3 30 26.26 - - 3
100 291.80 - - 3
250 1823.77 - - 3
1.5 0.05 0.04 0.03 4
6.5 0.94 0.15 0.01 4
4 30 19.99 - - 3
100 222.16 - - 3
150 499.86 - - 3
1.5 0.07 0.07 0.07 1
6.5 1.23 1.23 1.23 1
5a/b/c 30 26.26 26.26 26.26 2
100 291.80 291.80 291.80 2
250 1823.77 - - 3
1.5 0.05 0.05 0.05 1
6.5 0.94 0.94 0.94 1
6a/b/c 30 19.99 10.68 4.25 4
100 222.16 4.45 - 4
150 499.86 - - 4
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Notes:
1. Theoretical discharge duration based on initial release flowrate far exceeding the
threshold criteria, flowrate assumed constant over time. Refer to Appendix F for
more details;
2. Consequence modelling software limitations not allowing to perform time-varying

discharges on the inventory. Flowrate conservatively assumed constant over time.
Refer to Appendix F for more details;
3. Theoretical discharge duration based on initial release flowrate much lower than
the threshold criteria. Inventory assumed depleted before reaching thresholds
when isolated. Refer to Appendix F for more details;
4. Flowrates calculated using the consequence modelling software time-varying

discharge model. Refer to Appendix F for more details.
8.3 Determination of Credible Events
8.3.1 Jet Fires
Detailed flame length variations with time and radiation effect distances and areas for each
release scenario are detailed within Appendix H, refer to Table 40 and Table 43 to Table
62.
Based on the consequence modelling results (refer to Appendix H) and associated

frequency analysis (refer to Appendix E), jet fire flame lengths exceedance curves have
been generated for the Lamda facility. This is found to be generally consistent with
associated radiation level effect distances and areas, and has therefore been used as a
basis to determine the credible design event. Table 41 to Table 42 present the contributing
scenarios by decreasing order of magnitude at each time threshold.
Note that, based on the small platform footprints, all topside cases are grouped to
generate a single exceedance curve at 5 and 15 minutes. This is considered acceptable
as the release frequencies associated to the gas lift and production flowlines / header are
the main contributors to the frequencies Additionally, those inventories are susceptible to
affect the risers or Xmas trees as they are connected to them.
It should be noted that limited pool fire scenarios were identified from the modelling
results, mainly due to consequence modelling software limitations. This is further
discussed in Appendix I. As a result, the total ignited event frequency calculated within
Appendix E has been associated to jet fire scenarios.
The cumulative frequency curves generated for jet fires at the 5-minute and 15-minute
thresholds are shown in Figure 5. Due to the very similar results obtained for both
thresholds, Figure 6 show truncated curves containing only the part of the curves where
results are diverging.
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Figure 5 – Jet Fire Flame Length Exceedance Curves – 5min & 15min Thresholds
Figure 6 Truncated Jet Fire Flame Length Exceedance Curves - 5min & 15min
Thresholds
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Based on a credible event frequency of occurrence of 10-4 per year, the dimensioning 5-
minute threshold credible event is determined to be associated to a 6.5mm isolated
release from the gas lift header. The dimensioning 15-minute threshold credible event is
determined to be associated to a 1.5mm isolated / not isolated release from the gas lift
import riser. Detailed event characteristics are presented in Table 10 and Table 11
respectively. It should be noted that there are other credible scenarios with lower
consequences (smaller impact distances). Only the dimensioning events are reported in
this section. Refer to Appendix H for the complete list of events.
Table 10 - 5-Minute Threshold Jet Fire Credible Event Characteristics
Case: Gas lift header, 6.5mm release

4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
8.46 8.10 7.20 6.40
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
7.32 7.05 6.13 5.23
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
66.58 56.61 32.21 16.00
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
58.88 50.41 30.39 13.07
The 5-minute credible jet fire event has significant radiation effects. As a result, potential
for escalation on unprotected piping, equipment or small structural members should be
considered.
Table 11 - 15-Minute Threshold Jet Fire Credible Event Characteristics
Case: Gas lift import riser, 1.5mm release

4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
3.39 3.33 3.13 Not Reached
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
3.31 3.26 3.10 Not Reached
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Case: Gas lift import riser, 1.5mm release

4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
5.77 5.71 5.45 Not Reached
4.73kW/m2 6kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 35kW/m2
5.66 5.60 5.39 Not Reached
The 15-minute credible jet fire event has limited radiation effect distances / areas. As a
result, potential for escalation on large structural members is considered to be limited.
8.3.2 Pool Fires
Pool fires are considered less likely to occur than jet fires, there is no liquid hydrocarbon
storage on the platform, and pools may form due to rainout of liquid fractions from two-
phase inventories (production fluids). However, upon ignition, should the inventory not be
depleted, a jet fire would be anticipated to occur concurrently to the pool burning, the
former generating worse consequence levels. Nevertheless, pool fire risks have been
reviewed within Appendix I. It discusses the main modelling limitations and workarounds
applied to identify release cases leading to pool formation.
From the consequence modelling results, the scenarios leading to pool formation, and
their associated characteristics, are described in Table 63 to Table 65 within Appendix I.
Associated thermal radiation effect areas are summarised in Table 66 to Table 73.
The assessment (detailed in Appendix I), whilst including some conservatism, highlights
the possibility for pool fire to occur on the platform. Indeed, the frequency of occurrence
associated to identified event is significant, despite not reaching the 10-4 per year event
threshold. This should be considered in relation with the following inherent limitations:
 Releases have been modelled unimpinged to generate conservative effect

distances. Impingement of releases, not identified above as leading to pool fire,
may cause rainout as a fraction of the cloud would likely be grounded;
 Two time-varying gas lift scenarios were identified to cause rainout. This highlights
the impact of reducing pressures and cooling of the fluids on release, which would
increase the liquid fraction. Current modelling limitations described within sections
F.5 and I.1 do not allow identifying potential additional scenarios where rainout
could occur. It should however be noted that such pool formation from depleting
inventories would be anticipated to lead to lower consequence impacts on the
topsides (smaller release rates preventing large sustainable pool fires);
 The calculated burn rates, in combination with the provision of the open drain
system, would rapidly deplete isolated inventories. For a prolonged event to occur,
escalation to nearby equipment / isolatable sections, or alternatively failure of
isolation, would be required.
Considering the worse consequence levels associated to the conservative assessment of

jet fires (refer to Appendix H), and the likelihood that jet fires occur concurrently to pool
fires (should the inventory not be depleted), no additional credible impact is identified.
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8.3.3 Flash Fires
Detailed flammable dispersion results are presented in Appendix G for 50% and 100%
LFL, for both weather conditions, for each release scenario, refer to Table 32 to Table 35.
It should be noted that the modelling considers horizontal releases only and does not take
into account congestion and impingement by obstacles.
Based on the consequence modelling results (refer to Appendix G) and associated

frequency analysis (refer to Appendix E), dispersion distances to LFL exceedance curves
have been generated for the Lamda facility. Note that, similarly to the approach adopted
for jet fires, all topside cases are grouped to generate a single exceedance curve.
The cumulative frequency curve generated for flash fires on the topsides for both weather
Figure 7 – Topsides - LFL Flammable Dispersion Effect Distance - 2F & 5D Weather

Conditions
conditions is shown in Figure 7.
Based on a credible event frequency of occurrence of 10-4 per year, the credible event is
determined to be associated to a 30mm release from the production export riser for both
considered weather conditions. Detailed event characteristics are presented in Table 12.
Table 12 - Credible Flammable Dispersion Event - 2F & 5D Weather Conditions

(m) (m) (m) (m2)
65.3 8.2 -0.1 420.5
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(m) (m) (m) (m2)
129.0 24.0 -0.1 2434.0
(m) (m) (m) (m2)
68.7 6.4 -0.1 345.3
(m) (m) (m) (m2)
148.5 15.1 -0.1 1762.5
It should be noted that actual flash fire distances are anticipated to vary between the LFL
and half LFL values, in particular due to non-homogeneous mixing with air.
Note that this analysis does not consider potential impingement or shielding by obstacles,
nor does it consider the largely prevailing wind that may disperse the release away from
the facilities.
Flash fires are not likely to have any impact on piping, equipment or structural members
due to the short exposure duration to the flame. Some damage may however occur for
small, unprotected items.
8.4 Uncertainty in Analysis
8.4.1 Leak Frequency
A detailed P&ID parts count has been conducted, including a contingency factor of 20% to
account for piping leakage or parts count increase due to small design changes. On the
basis that no additional main equipment items (vessels, etc.) is added, the potential
increase in leak frequency would be expected to be moderate (no more than 10% and
potentially much less). Concerning the leak frequency database used (as described in
Appendix A), there is inherent uncertainty in leak frequency data, typically assumed to be
of the order of a factor of 2. It should be noted that the interpretation of the exceedance
curves is robust, although sensitive, to changes of more than a factor of 2 in the frequency
so this aspect should have no real influence on the predicted results. Also assuming that
the installation is operated to high-standards of containment integrity (maintenance,
inspection, etc., due to the high hydrogen sulphide content), the release frequencies in
practice should be lower than the values estimated in this study.
The details about the isolatable section definitions and parts count conducted are included
in Appendix D and Appendix E,.
8.4.2 Ignition Probability
The ignition model discussed in Appendix A, Appendix E and Appendix F also include
inherent uncertainty, as for the leak frequency. The approach is intended to be
conservative in using the OGP curves. Nevertheless, as for the leak frequency, the
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interpretation of the exceedance curves is robust, although sensitive, to changes of more

than a factor of 2 in the frequency. Also assuming that the installation is operated to high-
standards of containment integrity (maintenance, inspection, etc., with ignition source
control implemented in design through material selection), the ignition probability in
practice should be lower than the values estimated in this study.
8.4.3 Modelling Limitations
The analysis has been conducted using PHAST which is a free field based model. As
such, it does not explicitly account for the influence of the geometry on the characteristics
of the fire, particularly the potential for impingement, reflection etc. This approximation
introduces a degree of uncertainty in the assessment of the fire impact potential to the
targets of interest.
Additionally, consequence modelling software limitations related to multi-component

mixtures in association to time-varying releases and rainout of releases are discussed
within Appendix F and Appendix I respectively.
8.5 Conclusions on Process Fires
From the modelling of process fire events, the following findings have been identified:
 The main potential source of release and fire event originates from the header and
flowlines associated to the production fluids and gas lift. Releases from risers or
Christmas trees only marginally contribute to fire events, although could occur as a
result of escalation;
 The most likely event to occur upon ignition of a release is a jet fire (or a flash fire
followed by a jet fire in case of a delayed ignition). Dimensioning credible jet fire
events have been identified using frequency exceedance curves for both 5-minute
and 15-minute time thresholds (refer to section 8.3.1 and Appendix H for details
and jet fire envelope shown on plot plans);
 Pool fires are less likely to occur due to the high momentum of the fluids on
release. From the consequence analysis results, pools may form from several
release cases. Additionally, it is considered likely that additional cases may lead to
pool formation upon inventory depletion or upon direct impingement of the release
(refer to section 8.3.2 and Appendix I for details on potential pool fires).;
 Credible flash fires have been identified (refer to section 8.3.3 and Appendix G).
They are not anticipated to cause escalation on piping, equipment or structure, but
some damage on unprotected items may occur. Additionally, short term effects on
personnel are addressed as part of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (Ref. [1]).
Adequate active and passive fire protection measures, commensurate with the findings
above, should be considered for the design and are listed in section 12.0.
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9.0 NON-PROCESS FIRES
9.1 Non-Process Fire Hazards
A number of non-process hazards that may lead to potential fire events have been
identified in the Hazard Register and Safety Critical Element Identification report (Ref. [6]).
Those are segregated into hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon events in the following
sections. Risks are assessed qualitatively to determine if further assessment, including
quantified analysis, is required. Unlike process hazards, it should be noted that risk
quantification is not always possible nor advisable due to lack of validated theoretical
models or subjective estimation of relevant input data.
9.2 Non-Process Hydrocarbon Fires
9.2.1 Diesel Fires
The only diesel user on the platform is the pedestal crane [HOLD 2]. Thus, no diesel is
anticipated to be stored on the platform apart from the crane day tank. Stored diesel is not
considered to be a significant fire hazard given that it is stored below its flash point and at
atmospheric pressure, and requires a high energy source for ignition. As a result, diesel is
classified as a non-hazardous liquid within the operational temperature range.
Diesel fires on the Prinos Lamda platform are considered to have a very low probability of
occurrence and to carry negligible potential to result in immediate fatalities.
9.2.2 Flammable Chemical Fires
Chemicals on the Prinos Lamda platform are provided from Prinos Delta via the umbilical.
The following chemicals are considered in the design (Ref. [41] to [44]):
 Corrosion Inhibitor;
 Demulsifier;
 Asphaltene Inhibitor;
 Scale Inhibitor; and
 Methanol.
Apart from the methanol, these chemicals have high flash points and are not classified as
flammable materials, making them difficult to ignite in normal circumstances.
Additionally, batch corrosion protection / treatment of the pipeline is envisaged during

commissioning. The considered chemical is classified as flammable (Ref. [45]). However,
the use of the chemical will not occur during normal operations, and will be subject to a
Permit to Work, standard operating procedure and job risk assessment processes. As a
result, the chemical is not considered further in this study.
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The potential for significant leaks is limited as no storage takes place on board (leaks may
only occur from tubing or the umbilical supply). In the unlikely case where there would be a
leak followed by an ignition, these are fires with limited frequency and inventory and are
primarily hazards to personnel in the immediate vicinity, rather than having the potential to
burn for a sufficient duration to cause escalation or impacts to assets. The frequency will
be sufficiently low that ‘design’ fires at 10-4 or 10-5 per year frequency will be negligible in
terms of size / duration. Potential fire hazard impacts from a chemical fire will be bounded
by the process fire hazards in the same area.
That is to say the fires events associated with the production pipework will be more
significant in frequency and duration and therefore the passive fire protection
recommendations made will be sufficient to cover chemical fires. The control of these
hazards would be through standard means such as containment integrity, ignition control
and manual fire protection.
9.3 Non-Process Non-Hydrocarbon Fires
9.3.1 Scope
The focus of the analysis below is to identify specific features of the Prinos Lamda platform
that would lead to the non-process fire risk being significantly greater than industry
average and whether there are sufficient hazard management measures to reduce the risk
to be verified at ALARP.
9.3.2 Electrical Fires

LOCATION AND FREQUENCY OF ELECTRICAL FIRES
The Prinos Lamda platform has the following locations where electrical fires could occur:
 Local Electrical Room (including battery and UPS identified as hydrogen explosion
hazard, Ref. [6]);
 Local Instrument Room;
 Transformer Room;
 HVAC Room;
 Electrical appliances and cables located around the platform (e.g. electric motors).
It is important to estimate the frequency of the fires which may be significant. A survey
(Ref. [40]) of gaseous use in fire extinguishing revealed 20 electrical fires in 95 installation
years which initiated gaseous systems. Of these:
 2 occurred in control rooms and interface rooms
 2 occurred in radio and telecom rooms
 12 occurred in electrical switchgear rooms
 4 occurred in battery/UPS rooms

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Thus, for these locations an overall frequency of 0.21 per installation year for fires which
initiate fire extinguishing systems can be estimated. In none of these 20 incidents did
escalation occur, hence the damage was localised.
In addition to these locations, there will also be electrical appliances (heaters, lamps,
motors, welding equipment) and associated cabling around the installation. A survey of
WOAD for an eleven-year period (Ref. [40]) revealed 24 incidents on Norwegian
installations related to these appliances and cabling. Based on 340 installation years this
equates to a frequency of 0.07 fires per installation year. Again, all these events were
small-scale with no escalation to surrounding areas. Combining this frequency with that for
switchgear rooms etc. gives an overall fire frequency of 0.28 per installation year.
Measures for controlling the frequency of electrical fires include:
 Maintenance management systems;
 Detailed design measures such as material selection (e.g. low flame propagation
materials) and electrical overload protection systems adjusted in order to limit the
risk of fire by overheating (Ref. [46]).
CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTRICAL FIRES
It is considered very unlikely that electrical fires will escalate to large-scale non-process
fires. Of the 44 electrical fires discussed above, very few did more than burn the electrical
insulation around the fire source. Thus, it is considered that the consequence zone of an
electrical fire will be very limited. Injuries and fatalities are likely to be confined to
personnel working directly with the electrical equipment which ignites or in the immediate
area.
However, fires in critical locations, while not causing direct injuries and fatalities, could still
have significant effects on the installation. For example, a fire in the emergency switchgear
module occurred on Statfjord C in 1990. The fire prevented operation of a range of
emergency equipment and prompted a precautionary evacuation of 134 people to nearby
installations. Thus, consideration needs to be given to protection of critical electrical and
instrument systems to reduce risks of fire damage disabling the installation. The platform’s
Local Instrument Room and Local Electrical Room are protected with the following
mitigation measures:
 ‘Fire & Gas Detection’ SECE-07: provision of smoke detection (including High
Sensitivity Smoke Detectors) within the equipment rooms
 ‘Active Fire Protection’ SECE-08: provision of total flooding systems (Ref. [3]);
 Passive Fire Protection: all equipment room partitions and boundaries are rated as
a minimum in accordance with the requirements of the DNVGL Offshore Standard
(Ref. [37]);
 Redundant escape route network helps prevent personnel entrapment in a fire

event.
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The above measures are consistent with recognised industry good practices. Additionally,
it is recommended that UPS battery charging be inhibited upon loss the ventilation to
prevent hydrogen accumulation within the electrical room.
9.3.3 Miscellaneous Fires
A comprehensive review of fires during an 11-year period was undertaken in WOAD

(Ref. [40]). Whilst this looked specifically at the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, it is still
considered relevant for the Prinos Lamda platform in the absence of relevant local data.
The review reveals a number of fires that do not fall into any of the categories discussed
so far in this report. These include:
 47 events involving hot work igniting fire blankets, oil spills, paint, uncovered
drains/sumps, rubbish, rags, hoses/cables, insulation material etc.
 7 events involving ignition of lube oil in pumps
 5 events involving ignition of gas cutting bottles/hoses
 7 events of pump exhausts igniting boxes, cables, oil etc.
 5 other events including self-ignition of iron sulphide, vent stack ignited by lightning
etc.
Over 340 installation years, these 71 events equate to a frequency of 0.21 fires per
installation year. Of this, hot work incidents account for 0.14 fires per installation year.
None of the events above caused fatalities or injuries and none escalated. However, such
events could cause occupational type accidents and interruptions to operations.
These events highlight the importance of precautions surrounding hot work, ensuring that
combustible material has either been removed or securely covered up, and that firefighting
equipment is readily to hand.
9.4 Conclusions on Non-Process Fires
With the Safety and Environmental Critical Elements and additional mitigations described
in this section, no features specific to the platform have been identified which would lead
to significant risks from this set of hazards.
From the review of non-process fires, no credible non-process hydrocarbon fire event is
identified as risks are driven by process hydrocarbon events. Non-process non-
hydrocarbon fire events are considered credible scenarios. However, those are mitigated
by good practices and design measures in place.
To further reduce the risk to ALARP levels, it is recommended that UPS battery charging
be inhibited upon loss the ventilation to prevent hydrogen accumulation within the
electrical room.
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10.0 SEA POOL FIRES AND FLASH FIRES
10.1 Sea Pool Fires
Sea pool fires may occur from either subsea hydrocarbon releases or from process spills,
where hydrocarbon may fall to sea. The following sections summarise the findings of the
review of those scenarios, which are further detailed within Appendix J.
10.1.1 Riser & Pipeline Releases
A sea surface pool fire from a subsea release may only occur as a result of a failure of the
production riser or pipeline that may cause hydrocarbon to form a pool on the sea surface.
The findings of the review are as follows:
 The frequency of occurrence of pool fires has been estimated to be equal to

3.03x10-5 per year, which is below the credible event threshold of 10-4 per year;
 Additional mitigating factors are included in the design which may further reduce
the probability of a leak occurring, thus reducing sea pool fire occurrences (e.g.
dropped object and third party impact protection, environmental conditions, etc.)
For further details refer to Appendix J;
 Potential consequences associated to subsea releases leading to pool fires can be

very significant. Appendix J presents calculation of equilibrium pool diameters and
flame heights for those events. Despite the low frequency of occurrence, those
risks, in particular to the environment, are mitigated by the preparation of an
emergency response plan.
As a result, sea pool fires due to subsea spills are not considered to be credible design
events.
10.1.2 Process Spills
The production deck of the Prinos Lamda platform is fully plated. A production fluid
release, if raining out and forming a pool as identified within section 8.3, would be
expected to be handled to some extent by the open drain system. Nevertheless, it may be
possible in some instances for some hydrocarbon to fall to sea. This may occur due to the
release exceeding the open drain system capacity, or rainout occurring on the sea surface
from a topsides release. The later is discussed in Appendix I.
An analysis of the potential effects of a process release has been carried out. A release
from the production header and flowlines has been considered, which is the highest
contributor to the leak frequency (refer to Appendix E). Refer to Appendix J for details on
the assumptions, consequence models and results. However, a sea surface pool fire due
to a platform topsides release is not considered a credible design event for the following
reasons:
 Limited inventory is present on the topsides that could fall to the sea and form a
pool (refer also to Appendix D). As a result, the pool thickness, when spreading,
would decrease rapidly below the minimum pool thickness capable of supporting a
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stable flame (Ref. [38] & [48]). Calculation results have determined that ignition
may only occur within 20 minutes of the spill reaching the sea surface (see also
Figure 8 below). For further details refer to Appendix J;
 The likelihood of an ignition source on or near the sea surface spill is very low (Ref.
[38]);
 Once ignited, the low spill volume is calculated to be burnt within 90 seconds.
Refer to Appendix J for further details;
 Emulsification and dispersion of hydrocarbons due to weather conditions - 25%

water emulsions are not considered ignitable (Ref. [38]);
 High flashpoint of crude oil (due to high concentration of heavy components)

combined with sea cooling effect means that the likelihood of reaching flammable
conditions for a sea-surface spill is unlikely (particularly as the lighter hydrocarbon
evaporate over time). Therefore, for a topsides process release to create a sea-
surface pool fire, either the release needs to be ignited, fall into the sea and form
an ignited sea-surface pool, or form a sea-surface pool and then pilot ignition
occurs by flaming material from above;
Figure 8 shows the pool diameter and thickness variation over time. It should be noted that
the pool thickness falls below the 0.8mm threshold after less than 20 minutes.
Figure 8 - Sea Surface Pool Diameter and Thickness Variation over Time from
Topsides Release
Based on the above, process spills are not considered as credible events susceptible to
last long enough to cause significant damage to the platform structure or equipment.
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There is no need for additional protection to be applied against sea pool fire events from
process spills.
10.2 Flash Fires
There is potential for subsea gas releases arising from gas lift import riser, and to a lesser
extent the production export riser, and associated pipelines to migrate to the surface and
impact the facility. However, similarly to pool fire events described in section 10.1, the
likelihood of an ignition source on or near the sea surface spill is anticipated to be very
low.
In accordance with the Quantitative Risk Assessment assumptions, small pipeline and
riser releases below the sea surface are assumed to dissipate as they pass through the
sea and not form a flammable / toxic mixture above the sea surface (Ref. [1]). A subsea
release in the riser / pipeline would be expected to generally continue for durations well in
excess of the platform endurance time of 15 minutes [HOLD 4] (Ref. [24]), especially as
the probability of detection would likely be greatly reduced.
The consequences of a subsea riser or pipeline leak involves an estimate of gas

dispersion distance and the flame envelope of a flash or ‘diffuse’ gas fire on the sea. A
subsea leak is expected to expand on riser through the water to form a diffuse release
area on the sea surface of a diameter approximately equal to 20% of the water depth (i.e.
approximately 8 metres) (Ref. [40]).
Detailed flammable dispersion results are presented in Appendix G for 50% and 100%
LFL, for both weather conditions, for each release scenario, refer to Table 32 to Table 35.
It should be noted that the modelling considers vertical releases on the sea surface and
does not take into account impingement by obstacles.
Based on the consequence modelling results (refer to Appendix G) and associated

frequency analysis (refer to Appendix E), dispersion distances to LFL exceedance curves
have been generated for the Lamda facility subsea releases. The cumulative frequency
curve generated for flash fires on the topsides for both weather conditions is shown in
Figure 9.
Flash fire events are not anticipated to cause significant impact to the facility, although
some damage may occur on unprotected items. Short term effects (e.g. on personnel) are
addressed within the Quantitative Risk Assessment (Ref. [1]).
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Figure 9 – Subsea - LFL Flammable Dispersion Effect Distance - 2F & 5D Weather

Conditions
10.3 Conclusions on Sea Pool Fires and Flash Fires
Based on the analysis above, the following findings have been identified:
 Sea pool fires, either from topsides process spills or subsea releases are not
considered credible events. This is achieved by combining low frequency of
occurrence, suitable prevention measures (in particular for subsea releases) and
very low ignition probabilities. It should be noted however that, although the event
probability is very low, a sea surface fire caused by a subsea release could have a
significant impact on the facility and personnel (potentially preventing evacuation
by either vessel or liferaft);
 Flash fires from subsea releases are more likely to occur due to the gas buoyancy,
increasing the probability of ignition. Riser and pipeline routing, coupled to
prevailing winds, are however anticipated to reduce the probability for the event
occurring. No significant damage to the platform is anticipated from a flash fire
event, although. some damage may occur on unprotected items. The event may
cause injuries or fatalities, which are addressed as part of the Quantitative Risk
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11.0 BLAST OVERPRESSURE RESULTS
11.1 DNVGL Offshore Standard Methodology Results
The offshore standard methodology has been applied to determine DAL characteristics for
the considered platform volume subject to explosions. The details of the assessment are
available in Appendix K.
The methodology allows determining the DLB DAL overpressure, which has been
calculated to be 400 mbar. Following the guidance from the Oil and Gas UK, the
associated SLB DAL characteristics and dynamic pressures have been calculated (see
Section 7.1.4). The overall DAL characteristics are summarised in Table 13.
Table 13 - DNVGL Offshore Standard Methodology DAL Characteristics
DLB 0.400 200 0.134
SLB 0.134 430 0.045
It is noted that according to the OGP report on vulnerability of plant / structure, 400 mbar
overpressure corresponds to the threshold for piping support collapse and piping break, if
not designed to withstand blast loads (Ref. [34]).
11.2 DNVGL Explosion Risk Analysis Results
11.2.1 Determination of the DALS
The study was performed by DNVGL using version 10.3 of the CFD software FLACS and
DNVGL in-house tool EXPRESS. FLACS was used to:
 Carry out the ventilation and dispersion analyses in order to determine the
flammable cloud volumes associated with releases from the hydrocarbon
inventories;
 Determine the explosion overpressures for the differing flammable cloud volumes
on specific targets.
EXPRESS was used to generate explosion exceedance curves based on the response
surfaces developed from the consequence simulations (ventilation, dispersion and
explosion) as well as leak frequency and ignition data.
A number of assumptions are associated to the calculations. Those are included within the
study assumption register, in Appendix L.
The first revision of the analysis included a sensitivity case on the presence of the blast
wall to determine the effects on ventilation and resulting blast overpressures. It was
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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identified that the presence of a blast wall had negligible impact on the results. The
sensitivity has therefore been removed and the base case model include a fire and blast
wall. The full analysis report is available in Appendix M.
11.2.2 Ventilation Analysis
The ventilation results show that the platform has good ventilation, with a 95% ACH
exceedance equal to 30, in excess of 12 ACH which is generally accepted as a minimum
required to ensure sufficient ventilation.
11.2.3 Explosion Overpressures
The overpressure results for a 10-4 per year event frequency were calculated to be zero in
all cases. This is due to the good ventilation (reducing the gas accumulation), relatively
small clouds (due to the small platform footprint limiting the length of the flame) and low
ignition probabilities (due to the small number of ignition sources contained within the
flammable clouds formed).
Results were also presented for a 10-5 per year event frequency. It is noted that the
pressures calculated for the 10-5 per year event frequency are greater than the 0.4 barg
overpressure which was calculated using the DNVGL Offshore Standard methodology to
progress the mechanical design basis.
The explosion loads and pulse durations have been calculated for the three main target
areas. The loads and durations are given in Table 14.
Table 14: Explosion Loads
SLB SLB
DLB Pulse (10-3 /yr Pulse DLB Pulse (10-4 /yr Pulse
Target (10-4 /yr), Duration, or 1/3rd Duration, (10-5 /yr), Duration, or 1/3rd Duration,
barg ms DLB), ms barg ms DLB), ms
barg barg
Blast Wall 0 N/A N/A N/A 0.95 50 0.32 79
Production Deck 0 N/A N/A N/A 0.93 54 0.31 81
Ceiling (underneath
0 N/A N/A N/A 0.83 57 0.28 84
Drilling Deck)
11.2.4 Dynamic Pressures
Dynamic pressures have been presented for the production area. These can be
considered as generic values across the area and are given in Table 15.
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Table 15: Dynamic Pressures
Target DLB SLB DLB SLB

(10-4 /yr), (10-3 /yr or 1/3rd DLB), (10-5 /yr), (10-4 /yr or 1/3rd DLB),
barg barg barg barg
Production Area 0 N/A 0.6 0.2
11.3 Conclusions on Blast Overpressures
The ventilation results show that the platform has good ventilation with a 95% ACH
exceedance in excess of 12 ACH. As a result, the CFD overpressure results for a 10-4 per
year event frequency were calculated to be zero in all cases.
For the purposes of engineering design, it is recommended that the DAL characteristics
calculated in Table 16 using the DNVGL Offshore Standard methodology presented in this
report are used.
Table 16 – Recommended Blast Overpressure DAL Characteristics
DLB 0.400 200 0.134
SLB 0.134 430 0.045
Indeed, based on the generated exceedance curves using the CFD analysis, a DLB
design overpressure of 400 mbar approximately corresponds to a 1.4x10-5 /yr event, which
is considered to be reasonable. This is in line with the Oil and Gas UK guidance (Ref.
[38]), which recommends to use a design overpressure event with an exceedance
frequency between 10-4 and 10-5 per year.
Recommendations on blast overpressure protection which shall be applied to Safety and

Environmental Critical Elements located in a potentially blast affected area, are presented
in section 12.3.
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12.0 DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS
A review of the Lamda platform Safety and Environmental Critical Elements has been
carried out in Appendix N to determine the requirements for fire or blast overpressure
protection. Christmas trees and well conductors, not part of the SECEs, have also been
included in the assessment.
Sections 12.1 to 12.3 only present the requirements for components where passive fire
protection, active fire protection or blast overpressure protection has been identified.
Components not included do not require protection, and justification is included within
Appendix N.
12.1 Passive Fire Protection
This section presents the recommendations for Passive Fire Protection (PFP), based
upon the analysis of credible fire scenarios presented in sections 8.0 to 10.0. As
mentioned previously, the key fire protection philosophy is to prevent escalation of fires
between different fire zones, so focus is given to the PFP required to achieve this aim.
This will be both PFP for Safety and Environmental Critical Elements (SECEs) such as
barriers and unprotected critical equipment with significant failure consequences.
PFP recommendations are presented in Table 17. Further detailed description of areas
to be protected are presented within Appendix N and the Passive Fire Protection
Schedule (Ref. [25]).
FEHA-1 Apply PFP to equipment as set out in Table 17.
Table 17 - Passive Fire Protection Recommendations
SECE-01 - Production Riser Production Deck J15 (on topsides exposed portion of the
Containment
SECE-01 - Gas Lift Riser Production Deck J15 (on topsides exposed portion of the
Containment
SECE-03 - Separation Barrier Production / J15 (integrity to be maintained following

Structure (Gridline E) Mezzanine Deck credible blast event)
SECE-03 - Primary Structure Production / Passive Fire Protection on Critical

Structure Mezzanine / Drilling Members (failure causing escalation or
Decks Primary impairing other SECEs) - J15 rating or
Structure (south of H15 for members not impacted by
Gridline E) credible jet fire events
SECE-03 - Critical secondary Production, As per supported SECEs

Structure structural elements Mezzanine and
supporting other Drilling Decks
SECEs (preventing
failure or escalation -
South of Gridline E)
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SECE-03 - Local Instrument and Production Deck Minimum fire rating shall be in
Structure Electrical Rooms and Mezzanine accordance with the requirements of
Decks the DNVGL Offshore Standard DNVGL-
OS-A101 (Ref. [37]) and are included
within the Passive Fire Protection
Schedule (Ref. [25]
SECE-04 - Breathing Air System - Production / J15 rating on the lines listed in Table 80
Escape, Connection Manifolds Mezzanine / Drilling within Appendix N
Evacuation and supply lines Decks
and Rescue
SECE-08 - Firewater System - Dry Production and J15 for piping supports only on the lines
Active Fire Deluge Network - Mezzanine Decks listed in Table 80 within Appendix N
Protection Wellbay Area
SECE-09 - Production Export Riser Production Deck J15 (including supports)

SECE-09 - Gas Lift Import Riser Production Deck J15 (including supports)
12.2 Active Fire Protection
In addition to the Passive Fire Protection requirements, this section presents the
recommendations for Active Fire Protection (AFP), based upon the analysis of credible
fire scenarios presented in sections 8.0 to 10.0.
Table 18 presents the firefighting equipment provided on the Lamda platform. AFP
recommendations for specific equipment / area protection are presented in Table 19.
Further detailed description of areas to be protected are presented within Appendix N.
Table 18 – Lamda Platform Firefighting Equipment
Equipment No. Name Location
SH-1001 / SH-1002 Hydrants Cellar and Mezzanine Decks

and
SH-1007 / SH-1008
SH-1003 to SH-1006 Hydrants (c/w foam capability) Production and Drilling Decks
and
SH-1009 to SH-1012
SA-1001 Deluge Skid (c/w foam capability) & Production Deck (north of gridline
Dry Deluge Network E) & Production Area (area
coverage)
SX-1001 to SX-1012 Dry Powder Fire Extinguishers All Decks

and
SX-1019 to SX-1023
SX-1013 to SX-1016 CO2 Fire Extinguishers Local Electrical Room and Local
Instrument Room
SG-1001 and SG-1002 Gaseous Flooding Systems Local Electrical Room and Local
Instrument Room
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FEHA-2 Provide AFP to equipment as set out in Table 19.
Table 19 - Active Fire Protection Recommendations
- Wellbay Area Mezzanine Deck Provide firewater deluge (including

- Well Conductor Area Production Deck Provide firewater deluge (including

SECE-03 - Local Electrical Room Production Deck Provide gas flooding system to the local
Structure and Local Instrument and Mezzanine electrical room and local instrument
Room Deck room to control and mitigate the
consequences of fire events.
SECE-04 - Primary Muster Point Production Deck Provide water curtain at minimum
Escape, 45L/min/m to segregate area against
Evacuation potential heat radiation, smoke and gas
and Rescue dispersion from the production area
SECE-09 - Xtree topsides Mezzanine Deck Firewater Deluge with Foam Capability,
ESD System shutdown valves 20L/min/m2 to provide cooling of
devices equipment and prevent escalation over
the platform endurance period
12.3 Blast Overpressure Protection
This section presents the recommendations for Blast Overpressure Protection, based
upon the analysis of explosion events presented in section 11.0. The key protection
philosophy is to prevent escalation of explosion events between different fire zones and to
prevent significant escalation within the explosion affected area. Blast overpressure
protection is therefore focused on Safety and Environmental Critical Elements (SECEs)
such as barriers and unprotected critical equipment with significant failure consequences.
Blast overpressure protection recommendations associated to specific equipment are

presented in Table 20, further detailed descriptions are presented within Appendix N.
FEHA-3 Include Blast Overpressure Protection in the design of equipment as set out
in Table 20.
The items in Table 20 and any equipment or support associated with them that is critical to
their function shall be designed for the DAL outlined in section 11.1. It is noted that, should
the blast loads be less than the operational loads, then the blast criteria can be ignored.
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Table 20: Targets to be Designed for Blast
Design
Criticality
Level
Load
N/A Well Conductor Production Deck I DLB
N/A Christmas Trees Mezzanine Deck I DLB
SECE-01 -
Hydrocarbon
Containment Inc. Production Deck I DLB
Gas Lift Risers
Structural Supports
(SECE-03)
Separation Barrier Production and
(Gridline E) Mezzanine Decks
Primary Structure (South Production, Mezzanine
of Gridline E) and Drilling Decks
Critical secondary
structural elements
As per
supporting other SECEs Production, Mezzanine
SECE-03 - Structure supported
(preventing failure or and Drilling Decks
SECEs
Gridline E)
SECE-04 - Escape, Escape Route – North Mezzanine to Drilling
I DLB
Evacuation and Rescue East Staircase Deck
SECE-04 - Escape,
Secondary Muster Point Drilling Deck I DLB
Evacuation and Rescue
SECE-04 - Escape, Marine Evacuation
Drilling Deck I DLB
Evacuation and Rescue System
Connection Manifold on
SECE-04 - Escape, Drilling Deck and supply Production Deck and
I DLB
Evacuation and Rescue lines (from Energean Drilling Deck
Force or West Hose
Station)
Firewater Ringmain –
SECE-08 - Active Fire Production, Mezzanine
Connection to Drilling I DLB
Protection and Drilling Deck
Deck
SECE-08 - Active Fire Production and
Deluge Network - Wellbay II SLB
Protection Mezzanine Decks
Area
SECE-09 - ESD Xtree topsides shutdown
System valves devices
SECE-09 - ESD
System
ESDVs
All items listed in Table 20 shall be designed as appropriate using the blast overpressure
or dynamic pressure presented in section 11.1, following the guidance provided within the
Blast Overpressure Protection Philosophy (Ref. [5]).
FEHA-4 The UPS battery charging capability shall be inhibited on loss of ventilation
to the Local Electrical Room (including HVAC trip or closure of fire dampers due to
smoke or gas detection at HVAC inlet).
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13.0 REFERENCES
[1] Quantitative Risk Assessment, 293902-LAM-SAF-AS-70016, Rev 0
[2] Design Safety Philosophy, 293902-LAM-SAF-PH-70000, Rev 0
[3] Fire Protection Philosophy, 293902-LAM-SAF-PH-70020, Rev 0
[4] Fire and Gas Philosophy, 293902-LAM-SAF-PH-70021, Rev 0
[5] Blast Overpressure Protection Philosophy, 293902-LAM-SAF-PH-70023, Rev 0
[6] Hazard Register & Safety Critical Element Identification, 293902-LAM-SAF-RP-

70040, Rev 1
[7] ESD, Relief & Vent Philosophy, 293902-LAM-PRO-PH-60112, Rev A
[8] Drainage Philosophy, 293902-LAM-PRO-PH-60115, Rev 0
[9] Heat and Material Balance, 293902-LAM-PRO-HB-60005, Rev 0
[10] Process Flow Diagram, 293902-LAM-PRO-PF-60000, Rev 0
[11] Prinos Lamda Process P&IDs, 293902-LAM-PRO-PI-60020, -60024, -60026, -

60027, -60030, -60034, -60044, Rev B (Parts Count) and Rev 0
[12] Design Basis, PRE-GEN-DB-PJM-0012, Rev D
[13] Fire & Gas Detection / Fire Zone Drawing – Production Deck, 293902-LAM-SAF-HZ-
70103, Rev 0
[14] Fire & Gas Detection / Fire Zone Drawing – Mezzanine Deck, 293902-LAM-SAF-HZ-
70104, Rev 0
[15] Fire & Gas Detection / Fire Zone Drawing – Cellar Deck, 293902-LAM-SAF-HZ-
70105, Rev 0
[16] Fire & Gas Detection / Fire Zone Drawing – Drilling Deck, 293902-LAM-SAF-HZ-
70117, Rev A
[17] Lamda SIP – Plot Plan Production Deck, 293902-LAM-PIP-PP-50030, Rev 1
[18] Lamda SIP – Plot Plan Mezzanine Deck, 293902-LAM-PIP-PP-50031, Rev 1
[19] Lamda SIP – Plot Plan Cellar Deck, 293902-LAM-PIP-PP-50032, Rev 1
[20] Smoke & Gas Dispersion, 293902-LAM-SAF-SR-70007, Rev A
[21] Flaring and Venting Review, 293902-LAM-SAF-SR-70008, Rev B
[22] Toxic Gas Dispersion Study, 293902-LAM-SAF-SR-70009, Rev A
[23] Firewater Study Report, 293902-LAM-SAF-SR-70012, Rev A
[24] Escape Evacuation & Rescue Analysis, 293902-LAM-SAF-SR-70013, Rev A

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 58 of 153
[25] Passive Fire Protection Schedule, 293902-LAM-SAF-SC-70062, Rev 0
[26] Prinos Lamda PDMS Model, 293902-LAM-PIP-MO-50000, Rev 14
[27] Metocean Criteria – Kavala, Greece, RP_A15183_P1r1, Rev 1
[28] Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament, Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas
Operations, 12 June 2013
[29] Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament, Environmental Liability with

regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 21 April 2004
[30] OGP Process Release Frequencies, Report No. 434-1, March 2010
[31] OGP Blowout Frequencies, Report No. 434-2, March 2010
[32] OGP Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies, Report No. 434-4, March 2010
[33] OGP Ignition Probabilities, Report No. 434-6.1, March 2010
[34] OGP Vulnerability of Plant / Structure, Report No. 434-15, March 2010
[35] Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Control and Mitigation of Fires and
Explosions on Offshore Production Installations – Requirements and Guidelines, BS
EN ISO 13702:2015
[36] Recommended Practice for the Design of Offshore Facilities Against Fire and Blast
Loading, API Recommended Practice 2FB, First Edition, April 2006
[37] Safety Principles and Arrangements, DNVGL Offshore Standard, DNVGL-OS-A101,

July 2015
[38] Oil & Gas UK (formerly UKOOA), Fire and Explosion Guidance, Issue 1, May 2007
[39] UKOOA, Industry Guidelines on A Framework for Risk Related Decision Support,
Issue 1, May 1999
[40] A Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment of Offshore Installations, Centre for Marine
and Petroleum Technology, London, 1998
[41] Material Safety Data Sheet – Scale Inhibitor, EC-6187A MSDS ENG Nalco
[42] Material Safety Data Sheet – Corrosion Inhibitor, Cortron CK990-G Champion
Technologies
[43] Material Safety Data Sheet – Emulsion Breaker, EC-2173A MSDS ENG Nalco
[44] Material Safety Data Sheet – Deposit Inhibitor, EC-3019A MSDS ENG Nalco
[45] Material Safety Data Sheet – Corrosion Inhibitor, EC1602A MSDS ENG NALCO
(batch treatment)
[46] Electrical Philosophy & Basis of Design, 293902-LAM-ELE-DB-20000, Rev 0
[47] Prinos Lamda ERA Study, 1ZV0IER-3, Rev 1, 20 November 2016
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 59 of 153
[48] Handbook for Fire Calculations and Fire Risk Assessment in the Process Industry
(September 2003), Scandpower Risk Management AS & SINTEF
[49] Pipelines and Umbilical Basis of Design, 293902-SPL-SUB-DB-90010, Rev 0
[50] Prinos Area Field Layout Sheet 1 to 3, 293902-SPL-SUB-DR-90100-001 to -003,

Rev 0
[51] Technical Query - Wellhead Equipment, 293902-TQ-0067, Rev 1
[52] Pipelines Protection and Trenching Assessment, 293902-SPL-SUB-RP-90016, Rev

0
[53] PHAST FAQ: Handling Rainout for 2-Phase Releases using the Phast MC Model
[54] DNVGL User Guide – Multi-Components in Phast v7.0, Rev 1
[55] Master Equipment List, 293902-GEN-PJM-LR-10002, Rev 1
[56] Lamda SIP – Plot Plan Drilling Deck, 293902-LAM-PIP-PP-50033, Rev 1
[57] Lamda SIP – Elevation Looking East, 293902-LAM-PIP-PP-50034, Rev 0
[58] Lamda SIP – Elevation Looking South, 293902-LAM-PIP-PP-50035, Rev 0
[59] Lamda SIP – Elevation Looking West, 293902-LAM-PIP-PP-50036, Rev 0
[60] Lamda SIP – Elevation Looking North, 293902-LAM-PIP-PP-50037, Rev 0
[61] Assumption Register for Prinos Lamda Wellhead Platform ERA Study, 1ZV0IER-1,
Rev 1
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX A. MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS
The modelling assumptions included within this Appendix have been taken from the
Quantitative Risk Assessment report (Ref. [1]).
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Energean Prinos Lamda

ASSUMPTION SHEET
A.1 HOLE SIZE SELECTION ASSUMPTIONS Rev: 0
Description:
The following graph shows a representative distribution of leak frequency by hole size. It can be
seen that historically the majority of leaks (~80%) are less than 10mm in diameter.
The harm probability is sensitive to changes in release rates that are less than 10 kg/s, and the
majority of leaks are from hole sizes that are expected to give a release rate in that range. A
combination of high harm probability sensitivity and a large proportion of leaks in a single data
range cause this to be an area of the QRA with the potential to be very conservative. Increased
resolution in leak frequency distribution from holes with a diameter of 0-10mm is desirable to
remove some of this conservatism.
For the QRA the hole sizes presented in the OGP’s analysis of the HCRD used are as follows:
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HCRD Data Range OGP Data Range QRA Data Representative

(mm) Range (mm) Hole Size
1 mm – 3 mm < 3 mm 1.5 mm
< 10 mm
3 mm – 10 mm 3 mm – 10 6.5 mm
mm
10 mm – 25 mm
10 mm – 50
10 mm – 50 mm 30 mm
mm
25 mm – 50 mm
50 mm – 75 mm
50 mm – 150
75 mm – 100 mm 50 mm – 150 mm 100 mm
mm
> 100 mm
> 150 mm > 150 mm Full bore rupture
n/a NOT USED NOT USED
References:
[1] Hydrocarbon release database, available online at https://www.hse.gov.uk/hcr3/.[Accessed:
24/07/2013]
[2] OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory: Process Release Frequencies Report 434-1
[3] Failure Frequency Guidance: Process Equipment Leak Frequency Data for use in QRA. DNV,
2012
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Page 63 of 153

ASSUMPTION SHEET
Rev: 3
A.2 PARTS COUNT ASSUMPTIONS
Description:
Items which do not normally have fluid passing through them are not counted, e.g. a blank flange
after an isolation valve.
For liquid only systems, connections above the working level are not counted, e.g. vents, relief
valves (if these only normally ‘see’ air or nitrogen).
For equipment not in continuous operation, a utilisation factor is applied to account for how often
the equipment ‘sees’ process fluid.
For instrument connections, the associated valve is not counted as the instrument failure frequency
data includes the instrument and the associated valve. If more than one instrument connections are
linked to the same connection, only one instrument connection is counted.
It is assumed that all connections are flanged. Where a valve lies on a ‘boundary’ between two
identified nodes, ‘½ a valve’ and a flange are counted in each node.
Where a valve lies on a boundary of a node but not between two nodes, one valve and one flange
are counted.
The parts count has been performed on Prinos Lamda P&IDs (refer to Appendix D and Appendix
E).
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ASSUMPTION SHEET
Rev: 1
A.3 PROCESS RELEASE FREQUENCY ASSUMPTIONS
Description:
Release frequency data is taken from the OGP [1]. The OGP contains historical release data for the
British North Sea.
The data on process leak frequency provided by the OGP are considered appropriate to the Prinos
Lamda platform, and are used accordingly. The frequency analysis is based on a detailed parts
count of the equipment provided in the P&IDs (refer to Parts Count Assumptions). The parts count
is carried out for each of the isolatable sections identified as part of the failure case definition (refer
to Appendix D).
References:
[1] Process Release Frequencies, OGP Report 434-1 – March 2010
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ASSUMPTION SHEET
Rev: 1
A.4 PIPELINE AND RISER MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS
Description:
Base Data
The frequencies and distributions presented below for risers and offshore pipelines are taken from
Riser & Pipeline data OGP Report No. 434-04 [2]. They are derived from DNV’s re-analysis of the
data presented in PARLOC 2001 ([1], [3]); the re-analysis was performed because of recognised
errors in the frequencies given in PARLOC 2001 itself.
Failure frequencies
 The frequency of pipeline failures associated with external loads causing damage in safety
zone, for diameter ≤ 16 inch of 7.9x10-4 per year is used in this assessment;
 Riser: 9.1x10-4 per year for steel riser with a diameter ≤ 16 inch
Hole Size Distributions
Hole Size Subsea Pipeline Riser
Small (< 20 mm) 74% 60%
Medium (20 – 80 mm) 16% 15%
Large (> 80 mm) 2% 15% (assumed)

25%
Full Rupture 8% 10% (assumed)
Release Location Distribution for Risers

 Above water 20%
 Splash zone 50%
 Subsea 30%
Consequences
Large pipeline and riser releases below the sea surface are assumed to result in a gas cloud above
the sea surface; if ignited this will result in a flash fire. Unignited releases from sour streams will
result in a toxic cloud.
Small pipeline and riser releases below the sea surface are assumed to dissipate as they pass
through the sea and not form a flammable/toxic mixture above the sea surface.
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Riser releases above the sea will behave in a similar manner to releases from topsides equipment
i.e. immediately ignited releases will form a jet fire. All releases that are not immediately ignited will
form a gas cloud on the platform which, if ignited after a delay, will cause a flash fire or vapour
cloud explosion.
Any fire or explosion occurring will occur in the vicinity of the platform since this is assumed to be
where ignition sources are most likely to be present.
Impact on Personnel
Personnel may be affected by either an unignited toxic cloud, or a fire/explosion. All unaffected
personnel will make their way to the primary muster.
The probability of immediate fatality to a person in the open from each of toxic exposure, fire and an
explosion is estimated based on the proportion of the platform that is likely to be affected.
References:
[1] PARLOC 2001: The Update of Loss of Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines, Published by
Energy Institute, London, 5th Edition, July 2003.
[2] Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies, OGP Report No. 434 – 4 March 2010
[3] DNV 2006. Riser/Pipeline Leak Frequencies, Technical Note T7, rev. 02, unpublished internal
document.
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ASSUMPTION SHEET
A.5 WELL RELEASE AND BLOWOUT ASSUMPTIONS Rev: 2
Description:
Base Well Release and Blowout Data
Producing wells
The frequency of blowout from a producing well is:

 2.6x10-6 per well per year excluding external causes
 3.9x10-5 per well per year for external causes
The frequency of well releases from a producing well is:
 2.9x10-6 per well per year excluding external causes
 0 per well per year from external causes
The OGP report [1] does not provide examples of external causes that resulted in a blowout. As a
conservative approach, because blowouts due to external causes are not considered elsewhere in
the QRA the production blowout and well release frequency is taken as the sum of these i.e.
4.45x10-5 per well per year.
Coiled tubing well intervention
The frequency of blowout from each well coiled tubing intervention is 7.8x10 -5 per intervention. All
blowouts occur at the topsides
Workover well intervention
The frequency of blowout from each workover well intervention is 1.0x10-4 per intervention. All
blowouts occur at the topsides
Impact on Personnel
Personnel may be affected by toxic exposure, fire or explosion. Ignited blowouts are conservatively
assumed to lead to 100% fatality. Vulnerability of personnel due to toxic exposure is addressed in
the Toxic Gas Gas Dispersion Study Report.
References:
[1] Blowout Frequencies, OGP Report 434-2, March 2010
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ASSUMPTION SHEET
Rev: 1
A.6 IGNITION PROBABILITIES ASSUMPTIONS
Description:
a. Immediate ignition probabilities are based on data in OGP 434 – 6.1 [1], and the relevant
curves are selected according to the following table:
MAH Phase Curve Description
Topside All Curve 19 Offshore Process – Gas – Open Deck NUI
Riser All Curve 27 Offshore Engulf – Blowout / Riser
Curve 19 is used for the produced mixed phase fluids due to the amount of gas present during
normal production (gas lift) and the operating pressures.
b. Immediate Ignition occurs within 30s;

c. From the IP Research Report [2], a probability of delayed ignition of 70% (0.7) (the maximum
in the Cox, Lees and Ang correlations) is considered appropriate for a relatively congested
module;
d. 20% of delayed ignition are assumed to lead to vapour cloud explosions, 80% to flash fires.
References:
[1] OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory, Report no. 434 – 6.1, March 2010, Ignition
Probabilities.
[2] Ignition Probability Review, model Development and Look-up Correlations, 2006. IP Research
Report pg. 105.
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Page 69 of 153

ASSUMPTION SHEET
A.7 DETECTION / ISOLATION ASSUMPTIONS Rev: 3
Description:
a. Isolation is considered for Escape, Evacuation and Rescue purposes – consequence modelling
for immediate fatalities is carried out using the initial release rate, and no consideration is given
to the duration of fires;
b. Detection / Isolation is also considered to determine the duration of fires and potential impact
/escalation to equipment;
c. If a release is isolated, then generally personnel will not be required to evacuate and will shelter
in the Primary Muster Point until the event decays;
d. The probability that a release will be successfully detected and therefore isolation will
commence is considered to vary depending on release size. It is assumed to be 50% (0.5) for
1.5 mm and 6.5 mm releases, and 90% (0.9) for 30 mm and above releases;
e. The probability that a release will be successfully isolated and therefore escalation fully
prevented is estimated to be 0.98 for all topsides events [1];
f. There is no SSIV capability. As such there is no riser isolation capability;
g. Evacuation to the standby vessel is considered to occur in all release events. Evacuation risks
are quantified for all 30 mm and above releases. All other events from which personnel survive
is assumed to lead to 100% evacuation success (controlled escape with minor event ongoing,
using the diverse escape route network);
h. Detection / Isolation, if successful, is assumed to take place within 30 seconds.
References:
[1] CMPT. Spouge, J. 1999. A Guide to Quantitate Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations.
Section IX.5.3.4
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ASSUMPTION SHEET
Rev: 3
A.8 CONSEQUENCE MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS
Description:
a. Consequence modelling is carried out using Phast v.7.11;
b. As a conservative approach all releases have been assumed to be unisolated for the purposes
of consequence modelling of immediate fatalities;
c. Immediate ignition of gas and volatile liquid releases cause a jet/spray fire;
d. Ignition of flammable liquid releases causes a pool fire;
e. Delayed ignition of gas releases results in flash fires and vapour cloud explosions where
confinement exists and flash fires only where unconfined (risers);
f. Unignited releases from sour streams result in an acutely toxic cloud forming;
g. All consequences have been assessed using the Process conditions shown on the Heat &
Material Balance [3];
h. In modelling the releases no benefit is taken of any obstructions in the release path;
i. The following input values are used for all releases:
Input Value Source
Wind speed (m.s-1) 2, 5 Generic Value
Stability Class F, D Generic Value
Atmospheric Temperature (C) 10 Generic Value
Sea Surface Temperature (C) 12.5 Winter Case [4]
Solar Radiation Flux (kW.m-2) 0.5 Generic Value
Relative Humidity 70% Generic Value
Surface Roughness (mm) 0.2 Generic Value for

‘Open Water’
Surface Temperature (C) 10 Generic Value
Release Height (m) 1 (topsides releases) Generic Value
0 (sea surface releases)
Gas jets orientation Horizontal and un-impinged Generic Value

(topsides)
Vertical and un-impinged (sea

surface)
Averaging times Default consequence modelling Generic Values

package averaging times
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Subsea releases:
a. Subsea releases reach sea temperature before reaching the sea surface;
b. Subsea releases that have delayed ignition form a Vapour Cloud Explosion at deck level;
c. CMPT indicates that the diameter of a plume at the sea surface is 20% of the water depth to
the release point and is independent of release rate. Since the sea depth at Prinos Lamda is
approximately 40m, a surface diameter of 8m has been used;
d. No absorption of large leaks within the sea is assumed to occur. i.e. the entire released
inventory from a large subsea leak is assumed to reach the sea surface;
e. Small subsea releases are assumed to be dissipated within the water and not form a flammable
cloud above the sea surface. Therefore they are not modelled.
References:
[1] A Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessments for Offshore Installations, CMPT 1999
[2] Dispersion of Subsea Release, Review of Prediction Methodologies, HSE books, 1995
[3] Heat and Material Balance – 293902-LAM-PRO-HB-60005, Rev. 0
[4] Design basis – PRE-GEN-DB-PJM-0012, Rev. D
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ASSUMPTION SHEET
Rev: 2
A.9 HUMAN IMPAIRMENT CRITERIA ASSUMPTIONS
Description:
The impairment criteria for ignited releases are as follows. These values are used for the
calculation of harm probabilities and to determine relevant radiation contours for the fire
hazard analysis.
Harm Probability Impact Criteria Reference
Jet / Pool Fire
100% fatal 35 kW/m2 [1]
70% fatal 12.5 kW/m2 [1]
Escape Impeded 6 kW/m2 [1]
Vapour Cloud Explosion
100% fatal Originating Event Area
Flash Fire
100% fatal Lower Flammable Limit [1]
Hydrogen Sulphide
100% fatal 1000 ppm UK HSE SLOD [2]
50% fatal 600 ppm UK HSE SLOT [2]
Hydrogen Sulphide:
The HSE provides the following calculation for dangerous toxic loads and the parameters
following for hydrogen sulphide:
With:
 n=4
 SLOT DTL = 2.1012 ppmn.mins
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 SLOD DTL = 1.5.1013 ppmn.mins
An exposure time of 15 minutes is used to provide an approximate lethal concentration of

interest. Personnel are unlikely to be exposed for 15 minutes before reaching the standby
vessel, as such this is considered to provide a conservative basis for the consequence
analysis.
References:
[1] Vulnerability of Humans, OGP Report 434-14, March 2010
[2] Toxicity levels of chemicals: Assessment of the Dangerous Toxic Load (DTL)
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ASSUMPTION SHEET
Rev: 0
A.10 PLANT IMPAIRMENT CRITERIA ASSUMPTIONS
Description:
The basis of this study is to determine the potential fire loads and impacts associated with
different areas, with the emphasis on quantifying the potential loads rather than defining
criteria for acceptability. However, to put the potential impacts into some context, it is
noted that:
 Jet fire hazard ranges are defined in terms of fire size (which corresponds to a
radiation flux of 200-300 kW/m2).
 It is considered that significant damage to unprotected equipment (vessels,

pipework, etc) or small structure member requires exposure to a jet fire load for a
minimum of 5 minutes. The basis for the 5-minute threshold is taken from the OGP
data (Ref. [1]). This document details failure times for various unprotected
equipment items subject to fire loading. Hence, jet fire exceedance curves
illustrating the jet fire sizes against frequency are produced for representative
durations starting at 5 minutes.
 Similarly, it is considered that significant damage to large structure members

requires exposure to a jet fire load for a minimum of 15 minutes.
 The 5-minute and 15-minute thresholds are based on major damage or escalation.
It is important to note that significant jet fire impacts to personnel and to minor
equipment (including unprotected cables) will occur at durations of less than 5
minutes.
 The same considerations apply for pool fires, but here the pool diameter is taken
as representative of the fire size. In this case, 10 to 15 minutes may be a more
appropriate threshold for escalation/impacts.
References:
[1] Vulnerability of Plant / Structure, OGP Report 434-15, March 2010
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APPENDIX B. MARKED-UP PFD

APPENDIX C. MARKED-UP P&IDS
Note:
The parts count is included on the P&ID mark-ups.

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APPENDIX D. FAILURE CASE DEFINITION
D.1 IDENTIFICATION OF ISOLATABLE SECTIONS
Isolatable sections on the Prinos Lamda platforms have been identified based on
reviewing the PFD and P&IDs (Ref. [10] and [11]) to identify hydrocarbon containing
pipework and equipment. Table 21 below lists all identified sections, which have been
identified within Appendix B and Appendix C.
Table 21 - Identification of Isolatable Sections on Prinos Lamda
Inventory Description Comments

No.
1 Wellhead / Xmas Tree

Includes flowlines from the Xmas trees wing valves and
2 Production Header
header up to the production export riser ESDV-1638.
3 Pig Launcher Production riser export pig launcher (V-1002)
From the import riser ESDV-1609 up to the individual Xmas
4 Gas Lift Manifold
trees and supply to the gas heater (H-1000).
From riser ESDV-1638 to pipeline up to riser ESDV-3011 on
Prinos Delta.
5a/b/c Export Riser
Note that the isolatable section is split between areas located
on the topsides, splash zone and subsea.
From riser ESDV-3020 on Prinos Delta to pipeline up to riser
ESDV-1609.
6a/b/c Gas Lift Import Riser
Note that the isolatable section is split between areas located
on the topsides, splash zone and subsea.
D.2 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS CONSIDERATIONS
Operation of the production pig launcher can only be done manually. It has been assumed
conservatively within the Quantitative Risk Assessment that such an operation would
occur every two weeks, and would last for four hours (Ref. [1]). This factor is taken into
account when determining leak frequency per year for the sections (refer to Appendix E).
D.3 OPERATING CONDITIONS, COMPOSITIONS AND INVENTORIES
Representative operating conditions, compositions and isolatable sections volumes have

been reviewed to provide a conservative set of inputs for consequence modelling.
Compositions have been taken from the Heat and Material Balance (Ref. [9]), considering
‘Early Life – Summer’ case. The case considers the maximum hydrocarbon content and
highest pressures, which is deemed conservative.
Piping lengths have been estimated from the PDMS Model (Ref. [26]) to determine the
isolatable section inventories. To determine overall inventories associated to individual
tree flowlines, the platform has been considered fully loaded, with 9 well producing.
Inventory, operating conditions and relevant composition stream for each relevant
isolatable section are presented in Table 22 below.
Table 22 - Isolatable Sections Inventories, Operating Conditions and Compositions
Operating Conditions
H&MB
Volume
Isolatable Section Stream Comments
(m3) Pressure Temperature (Ref. [9])
(barg) (°C)
Volume per tree /

1 - Wellhead / Xmas Tree 4.31 65 75 1
downhole pipework
2 - Production Header 2.43 18.9 70.9 3
3 - Pig Launcher 0.08 18.9 70.9 3
4 - Gas Lift Manifold 0.84 123.8 28.5 11
5a/b/c - Export Riser 201.17 18.9 70.9 3
6a/b/c - Gas Lift Import Riser 72.53 123.8 28.5 11
Consequence results from inventory 3 has been taken as representative for inventories 3
and 4. It is considered that the pig launcher section cannot be remotely isolated in case of
an ignited release, is used intermittently, and represents a negligible addition to the
production header inventory.
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APPENDIX E. FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
E.1 INTRODUCTION
The basic aim of this frequency analysis deliverable is to assign a frequency to each of the
failure cases considered within the fire hazard analysis. The analysis considers initial
release frequency, but also frequency of occurrence of ignited events, taking into account
the probabilities of detection and isolation as stated in Appendix A.
The focus of this analysis is on the process hazards, noting that in this context, this
includes riser / pipeline. The frequency of non-process hazards, such as equipment fires,
are addressed directly within the Fire and Explosion Hazard Assessment and not covered
in this appendix.
E.2 LEAK FREQUENCY RESULTS
This section presents the derived frequency results based on the hole size approach. The
analysis considered the platform fully loaded (including 9 single completion producers,
Ref. [51]).
Table 23 and Table 24 respectively list:
 The failure cases in terms of the contribution to the leak frequency, as well as
summarising the overall frequency; and
 The leak frequency associated with each release area.
The total predicted leak frequency is 0.097 leaks per year, where:
 57.0% of the predicted leaks are ‘Tiny’ leaks;
 27.1% are ‘Small’ leaks;
 14.1% are ‘Medium’ leaks;
 1.4% are ‘Large’ leaks;
 0.5% are ‘Full Bore’ releases.
It should be noted that
 The highest contributors are the manifolds / headers (56.3% and 38.4% of the
overall release frequency associated to the production header and gas lift manifold
respectively).
 The leak frequency breakdown by release location shows that topsides releases
dominate the leak frequency contribution (96.3%). This is expected as limited items
are present in other areas.
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Table 23 - Summary of Leak Frequency (per year) by Hole Size and Isolatable Section
Section Release Leakage Frequencies Distribution (/yr) Total
Isolatable Section Description Type %
No. Location Tiny Small Medium Large Full Bore (/yr)
1 Wellhead / Xmas Tree (Note 1) Topsides Process 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.01E-04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.01E-04 0.4%
2 Production Header Topsides Process 3.27E-02 1.40E-02 7.19E-03 7.81E-04 1.07E-04 5.47E-02 56.3%
3 Pig Launcher (Note 2) Topsides Process 4.27E-05 2.10E-05 1.20E-05 2.56E-06 4.64E-07 7.88E-05 0.1%
4 Gas Lift Manifold Topsides Process 2.23E-02 9.50E-03 5.37E-03 1.55E-04 0.00E+00 3.73E-02 38.4%
5a Export Riser (Note 3) Topsides Riser 1.83E-04 2.05E-04 6.10E-05 3.74E-05 2.71E-05 5.13E-04 0.5%
5b Export Riser (Note 3) Splash Zone Riser 0.00E+00 3.28E-04 8.19E-05 8.19E-05 5.46E-05 5.46E-04 0.6%
5c Export Riser (Note 3) Subsea Riser 0.00E+00 8.98E-04 2.01E-04 6.81E-05 1.09E-04 1.28E-03 1.3%
6a Gas Lift Import Riser (Note 3) Topsides Riser 2.05E-04 2.13E-04 6.66E-05 4.60E-05 2.18E-05 5.52E-04 0.6%
6b Gas Lift Import Riser (Note 3) Splash Zone Riser 0.00E+00 3.28E-04 8.19E-05 8.19E-05 5.46E-05 5.46E-04 0.6%
6c Gas Lift Import Riser (Note 3) Subsea Riser 0.00E+00 8.98E-04 2.01E-04 6.81E-05 1.09E-04 1.28E-03 1.3%
Total 5.54E-02 2.63E-02 1.37E-02 1.32E-03 4.83E-04 9.72E-02 100%
Total % 57.0% 27.1% 14.1% 1.4% 0.5% 100%
Notes:
1. The complete leak frequency associated to Wellhead / Xtrees has been added conservatively within the ‘Medium’ size category. This
demonstrates that the leak frequency contribution is negligible compared to the other contributors (in particular manifold / header).
2. The pig launcher is assumed to be used once every two weeks (4 hour shift). This is factored into the leak frequency contribution from
this isolatable section.
3. The frequency contribution associated to riser / pipeline has been segregated between the different platform locations in accordance
with the Quantitative Risk Assessment approach.
Table 24 - Summary of Leak Frequency (per year) by Location (Ranked)
Release Full
Tiny Small Medium Large Total %
location Bore
Topsides 5.54E-02 2.39E-02 1.31E-02 1.02E-03 1.56E-04 9.36E-02 96.3%
Subsea 0.00E+00 1.80E-03 4.02E-04 1.36E-04 2.18E-04 2.55E-03 2.6%
Splash Zone 0.00E+00 6.56E-04 1.64E-04 1.64E-04 1.09E-04 1.09E-03 1.1%
E.1 FREQUENCY OF JET FIRES / POOL FIRES
When calculating the frequency of occurrence of jet fires / pool fires associated to each
scenario, the following parameters are taken into account:
 Initial leak frequency for the scenario;

 Detection and isolation probabilities as per assumptions in Appendix A;
 Ignition probability based on ignition probability curves in Appendix A and initial
release flowrates from the consequence modelling results (refer to Appendix F).
Note that the probability does not distinguish immediate or delayed ignition.
From the above parameters can be determined the frequency of occurrence of isolated
(successful detection and isolation) and non-isolated (failure of detection or isolation)
ignited events. The frequency of occurrence of isolated / non-isolated ignited events are
presented in Table 25 and Table 26 respectively.
Table 25 - Isolated Ignited Event Frequency (per year) by Hole Size and Isolatable Section
Event Frequency Distribution (/yr) Total
Tiny Small Medium Large Full Bore (/yr)
1 - Wellhead / Xmas Tree 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 8.83E-06 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 8.83E-06
2 - Production Header 1.60E-05 1.50E-05 1.59E-04 1.72E-05 2.36E-06 2.09E-04
3 - Pig Launcher 2.09E-08 2.26E-08 2.65E-07 5.64E-08 1.02E-08 3.75E-07
4 - Gas Lift Manifold 1.09E-05 5.59E-06 7.96E-05 3.42E-06 0.00E+00 9.95E-05
5a - Export Riser (Topsides) 8.97E-08 2.21E-07 1.34E-06 8.26E-07 5.97E-07 3.08E-06
5b - Export Riser (Splash Zone) 0.00E+00 3.53E-07 1.81E-06 1.81E-06 1.20E-06 5.17E-06
5c - Export Riser (Subsea) 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
6a - Gas Lift Import Riser
1.00E-07 1.25E-07 9.87E-07 1.01E-06 4.81E-07 2.71E-06
(Topsides)
6b - Gas Lift Import Riser
0.00E+00 1.93E-07 1.21E-06 1.81E-06 1.20E-06 4.42E-06
(Splash Zone)
6c - Gas Lift Import Riser
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
(Subsea)
Table 26 - Non-Isolated Ignited Event Frequency (per year) by Hole Size and Isolatable
Section
5c - Export Riser (Subsea) 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
1.05E-07 1.30E-07 1.32E-07 1.36E-07 6.43E-08 5.67E-07
(Topsides)
0.00E+00 2.01E-07 1.62E-07 2.42E-07 1.61E-07 7.66E-07
(Splash Zone)
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
(Subsea)
E.2 FREQUENCY OF FLASH FIRES
When calculating the frequency of occurrence of flash fires associated to each scenario,
the following parameters are taken into account:
 Initial leak frequency for the scenario;
 Ignition probability based on ignition probability curves in Appendix A and initial

release flowrates from the consequence modelling results (refer to Appendix F).
Note that the probability only includes delayed ignition (70% as per the ignition
probability assumptions, refer to Appendix A).
Detection and isolation is not considered as the gas cloud is assumed to reach its
maximum size before isolation can occur.
From the above parameters can be determined the frequency of occurrence of delayed
ignited events. The frequency associated to Prinos Lamda events are presented in Table
27.
Table 27 - Delayed Ignited Event Frequency (per year) by Hole Size and Isolatable Section
5c - Export Riser (Subsea) 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 8.30E-06 4.29E-06 6.84E-06 1.94E-05
1.43E-07 1.79E-07 7.70E-07 7.85E-07 3.72E-07 2.25E-06
(Topsides)
0.00E+00 2.75E-07 9.47E-07 1.40E-06 9.32E-07 3.55E-06
(Splash Zone)
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.65E-06 4.29E-06 6.87E-06 1.58E-05
(Subsea)
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APPENDIX F. DISCHARGE DURATION ANALYSIS
F.1 INTRODUCTION
The PHAST software package allows calculating discharge condition at the release point
and which can then feed into a range of consequence scenarios including unignited cloud
dispersion, jet fires, etc.
When determining consequences, the default model considers a constant release flowrate
until inventory depletion. Whilst this normally allows generating worst case consequence
results, it can underestimate the duration of an event. An additional functionality of PHAST
is the ability to calculate consequence characteristics for a release at a given time, through
an incremental time-varying release approach. However, some limitations apply, which will
be discussed in section F.5.
When considering a particular release scenario associated to an isolatable section, three

cases are considered within this study:
 The initial release flowrate is so large that inventory depletion will occur long before
potential escalation can occur;
 The initial release flowrate is so low that the release can be assumed constant for
the duration leading to escalation;
 The initial release flowrate leads to a duration close or over the time considered for
escalation.
In the last case, modelling the scenario as a time-varying discharge is considered to

determine more precisely impacts of events at the considered escalation thresholds. A
review of the release flowrates is carried out accordingly in the following sections.
Note that the analysis below assumes that the initial release rate (and hence potential fire
size) will be sustained until isolation occurs. This will be conservative for the larger
releases, where the initial release rate will be much higher than the inflow rate to the
section and, hence, not sustainable. However, this conservatism will have very little
influence on the identification of fire events leading to escalation that are the focus of this
study, since durations of 5 minutes or more are assumed to be required for significant
impacts. Any releases that will be depleted before the isolation will tend to have durations
of less than 2 minutes.
F.2 DISCHARGE MODELLING
In order to determine the fluid properties and appropriate modelling for the failure cases
defined in Appendix D, the molar gas fraction, at atmospheric conditions, for each
isolatable section has been considered. The purpose of calculating the liquid/vapour
fractions for non-single phase mixtures was to allow for better characterisation of the
mixtures in determining the significant consequences of a release.
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Cases were classified for further consequence modelling using the following criteria:
 Cases with gas fraction greater than 70% are treated as vapour.
 If the gas fraction is less than 15%, the case is treated as liquid.
 All other cases are treated as 2-phase.
Table 28 below summarises the gas mole fraction of each isolatable inventory and
selected modelling (vapour / liquid / 2-phase). Note that the pig launcher inventory is not
included as the production header consequences are taken to be representative.
Table 28 - Isolatable Section Gas Mole Fraction

Isolatable Section Description Gas Mole Fraction Modelling
1 - Wellhead / Xmas Tree 40.98 2-phase
2 - Production Header 10.79 Liquid
4 - Gas Lift Manifold 100.00 Vapour
5a/b/c - Export Riser 10.79 Liquid
6a/b/c - Gas Lift Import Riser 100.00 Vapour
F.3 MASS INVENTORIES CALCULATION
PHAST consequence modelling provides mass release rates associated to the different
release scenarios. In order to determine where time-varying discharges would need to be
considered (i.e. inventory not depleted or alternatively unaffected by isolation), mass
inventories have been extracted from the PHAST results and are presented in Table 29
below for each modelled inventory.
Table 29 - Isolatable Sections Mass Inventory

Volume Mass (kg)
(m3) PHAST Calculated
1 - Wellhead / Xmas Tree 4.307 1677.88
2 - Production Header 2.425 625.58
4 - Gas Lift Manifold 0.840 135.48
5a/b/c - Export Riser 201.174 59764.40
6a/b/c - Gas Lift Import Riser 72.531 11697.87
F.4 INITIAL RELEASE FLOWRATES & THEORETICAL RELEASE DURATIONS
Table 30 presents the initial release flowrates and calculated theoretical durations
considering the isolatable section inventories to determine the requirement for time-
varying discharge modelling. No credit has been taken for blowdown of the risers from the
Delta platform. This is conservative but would have limited impact on the results as the
risers have little contribution to the overall leak frequency (refer to Appendix E).
Additionally, the ignition probability associated to each scenario is included, as it feeds into
the frequency analysis (refer to Appendix E).
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Table 30 - Initial Release Flowrates per Release Scenario

Hole Initial Release Theoretical Ignition
Requirement for Time
Inventory Size Flowrate Release Probability
Varying Discharge
(mm) (kg/s) Duration (s) (Ref. [33])
No, assumed constant
1.5 0.11 14949.04 1.00E-03
release over 900s
1 6.5 2.11 796.11 Yes 5.00E-03
No, considered depleted
30 44.90 37.37 2.5E-02
before 5 min threshold
1.5 0.07 9528.18 1.00E-03
release over 900s
6.5 1.23 507.42 Yes 2.20E-03
30 26.26 23.82 2.50E-02
2/3 before 5 min threshold
100 291.80 2.14 2.50E-02
250 1823.77 0.34 2.50E-02
1.5 0.05 2710.36 Yes 1.00E-03
6.5 0.94 144.34 Yes 1.20E-03
30 19.99 6.78 1.68E-02
4
100 222.16 0.61 2.50E-02
150 499.86 0.27 2.50E-02
1.5 0.07 910268.40 1.00E-03
release over 900s
6.5 1.23 48475.83 2.20E-03
release over 900s
5a/b
(Note) 30 26.26 2275.67 Yes 2.50E-02
100 291.80 204.81 Yes 2.50E-02
250 1823.77 32.77 2.50E-02
1.5 0.05 1195625.17 1.00E-03
release over 900s
6a/b 6.5 0.94 63672.29 1.20E-03
release over 900s
(Note)
30 19.99 2989.06 Yes 1.68E-02
100 222.16 269.02 Yes 2.50E-02
150 499.86 119.56 Yes 2.50E-02
Note: Subsea releases are very unlikely to be detected quickly. They are modelled as
continuous sources in the modelling software and are not considered for time varying
discharge.
F.5 TIME VARYING DISCHARGE MODELLING RESULTS
Due to the production fluid composition complexity, including both light and heavy
hydrocarbons in addition to some water, those are modelled using PHAST
multicomponent mixture model. The model is founded on the more rigorous calculation of
mixture properties and phase equilibria. The simpler pseudo-component model
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approaches mixtures by calculating thermodynamic behaviour and properties associated

to an averaged pure component. Only the gas lift inventories have been modelled using
pseudo-component modelling.
Current modelling software limitations do not allow PHAST to run time varying discharges
for multicomponent modelled mixtures. This is mainly due to the complex equilibrium
calculations within the inventories being released and is subject to ongoing research and
development. It has therefore been conservatively assumed that the associated release
would have their consequences assumed constant over time.
Based on the findings presented in Table 30, additional modelling has been carried out on
identified scenarios. Since those scenarios relate to isolated cases, the detection /
isolation time must be considered (30s as per detection / isolation assumption in Appendix
A).
The times of interest are therefore selected to be 4 minutes 30 seconds (270 seconds)
and 14 minutes 30 seconds (270 seconds) to generate conservative consequence results
representative of the 5 and 15 minute thresholds respectively. Table 31 presents the
results and PHAST calculated release duration for each considered scenario.
Table 31 - Time Varying Discharge Results

Hole Release Release Time Varying
Inventory Size Flowrate @ Flowrate @ Discharge Release Comment
(mm) 270s (kg/s) 870s (kg/s) Duration (s)
1 6.5 2.11 2.11 - Assumed Constant
2/3 6.5 1.23 1.23 - Assumed Constant
1.5 0.04 0.03 17252
4
6.5 0.15 0.01 919
5a/b 30 26.26 26.26 - Assumed Constant
(Note) 100 291.80 291.80 - Assumed Constant
30 10.68 4.25 3724
Depletion occurs before
6a/b 100 4.45 - 335
15-minute threshold
(Note)
Depletion occurs before
150 - - 149
5-minute threshold
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APPENDIX G. FLAMMABLE DISPERSION RESULTS
G.1 CONSEQUENCE RESULTS
Table 32 to Table 35 below present the dispersion distances and effect areas for LFL and
half LFL concentrations associated to each isolatable section (including both topsides and
subsea releases), for both considered weather conditions (2F and 5D).
Table 32 - Flammable Dispersion - Half LFL - 2F Weather Conditions

FLAMMABLE DISPERSION EFFECT AREA FOR 2F WEATHER CONDITIONS (50% LFL) @ 1m height
(topsides) & 0m height (subsea)
Hole Size Max Distance Max Width Min Distance Effect Area
Inventory
(mm) (m) (m) (m) (m2)
1.5 6.2 0.5 0.0 2.6
1 6.5 33.8 3.1 0.0 83.7
30 183.9 25.5 -0.7 3701.4
1.5 4.6 0.4 0.0 1.5
6.5 21.1 2.4 0.0 40.2
2/3 30 128.3 24.5 0.0 2472.5
100 400.4 108.2 0.0 34041.4
250 901.2 306.1 0.0 216685.1
1.5 3.7 0.3 0.0 0.9
6.5 17.2 1.3 0.0 18.3
4 30 103.2 7.5 -0.8 609.0
100 374.6 34.4 0.0 10108.2
150 566.6 57.0 0.0 25364.0
1.5 4.7 0.4 0.0 1.5
6.5 21.3 2.4 0.0 40.4
5a / 5b 30 129.0 24.0 -0.1 2434.0
100 401.6 105.2 -2.1 33361.1
250 901.2 306.1 0.0 216685.1
1.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
5c
30 518.6 894.4 0.0 364291.4
(0m effect)
100 2010.8 4978.8 -25.6 7962935.9
250 6804.6 16752.3 -2668.2 124635273.9
1.5 3.7 0.3 0.0 0.9
6.5 17.4 1.3 0.0 18.4
6a / 6b 30 103.7 7.5 -0.3 609.6
100 379.4 34.4 -1.2 10291.9
150 569.8 57.1 0.0 25553.0
1.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6c
30 383.5 20.7 -0.1 6247.2
(0m effect)
100 629.7 26.3 -0.6 13036.1
150 761.8 27.7 -0.3 16574.4
Note: Red cells: finite inventory dispersion not reaching steady state before emptying inventory (not taking
into account detection / isolation time). Distances replaced by further distance reached by infinite
inventories.
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Table 33 - Flammable Dispersion - LFL - 2F Weather Conditions
FLAMMABLE DISPERSION EFFECT AREA FOR 2F WEATHER CONDITIONS (100% LFL) @ 1m height
Inventory
(mm) (m) (m) (m) (m2)
1.5 3.5 0.3 0.0 0.8
1 6.5 16.0 1.2 0.0 15.4
30 91.8 9.2 -0.7 665.8
1.5 2.7 0.2 0.0 0.4
6.5 11.0 0.9 0.0 7.9
2/3 30 65.0 8.3 0.0 426.0
100 226.7 42.9 0.0 7631.3
250 521.0 129.2 0.0 52865.8
1.5 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.2
6.5 8.2 0.7 0.0 4.2
4 30 45.9 3.7 -0.8 134.4
100 177.4 12.1 0.1 1690.6
150 274.8 19.1 0.0 4133.0
1.5 2.7 0.2 0.0 0.4
6.5 11.1 0.9 0.0 8.0
5a / 5b 30 65.3 8.2 -0.1 420.5
100 227.4 41.7 -2.1 7510.6
250 534.2 163.9 0.0 68756.5
1.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
5c
30 392.2 706.7 0.0 217694.1
(0m effect)
100 1545.0 3941.0 -25.1 4859797.0
250 5804.4 14254.0 -2040.4 87823847.5
1.5 1.9 0.2 0.0 0.2
6.5 8.2 0.7 0.0 4.2
6a / 6b 30 46.1 3.7 -0.3 133.3
100 178.4 12.3 -1.2 1728.4
150 276.7 19.5 0.1 4228.1
1.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6c
30 108.6 15.0 0.0 1280.4
(0m effect)
100 221.2 22.1 -0.6 3856.7
150 325.5 23.8 -0.2 6077.1
inventories.
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Table 34 - Flammable Dispersion - Half LFL – 5D Weather Conditions
FLAMMABLE DISPERSION EFFECT AREA FOR 5D WEATHER CONDITIONS (50% LFL) @ 1m height
Inventory
(mm) (m) (m) (m) (m2)
1.5 6.0 0.4 0.0 2.0
1 6.5 34.1 2.2 0.0 57.9
30 212.4 18.7 -0.3 3127.7
1.5 4.6 0.3 0.0 1.1
6.5 20.0 1.4 -0.1 22.8
2/3 30 147.6 15.1 -1.4 1764.4
100 498.9 81.3 0.0 31849.7
250 1112.1 249.9 0.0 218227.9
1.5 3.7 0.3 0.0 0.8
6.5 16.0 1.2 -0.1 14.7
4 30 111.4 6.4 0.0 559.8
100 407.7 29.3 -0.3 9389.7
150 608.9 50.1 -3.5 24077.6
1.5 4.7 0.3 0.0 1.1
6.5 20.1 1.4 0.0 22.8
5a / 5b 30 148.5 15.1 -0.1 1762.5
100 501.7 80.2 -1.4 31685.2
250 1112.1 249.9 0.0 218227.9
1.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
5c
30 260.1 80.3 -0.5 16427.8
(0m effect)
100 995.3 449.4 0.0 351315.9
250 2878.1 1661.7 0.0 3756196.6
1.5 3.7 0.3 0.0 0.8
6.5 16.2 1.2 0.0 14.9
6a / 6b 30 111.8 6.4 -0.2 563.0
100 411.7 29.3 -1.1 9514.1
150 618.3 50.2 -1.7 24423.0
1.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6c
30 146.4 25.8 -0.4 2971.1
(0m effect)
100 457.8 30.5 -0.6 10971.1
150 615.6 31.4 -0.7 15205.1
inventories.
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Table 35 - Flammable Dispersion - LFL – 5D Weather Conditions
FLAMMABLE DISPERSION EFFECT AREA FOR 5D WEATHER CONDITIONS (100% LFL) @ 1m

height (topsides) & 0m height (subsea)
Inventory
(mm) (m) (m) (m) (m2)
1.5 6.0 0.4 0.0 2.0
1 6.5 34.1 2.2 0.0 57.9
30 212.4 18.7 -0.3 3127.7
1.5 4.6 0.3 0.0 1.1
6.5 20.0 1.4 -0.1 22.8
2/3 30 147.6 15.1 -1.4 1764.4
100 498.9 81.3 0.0 31849.7
250 1112.1 249.9 0.0 218227.9
1.5 3.7 0.3 0.0 0.8
6.5 16.0 1.2 -0.1 14.7
4 30 111.4 6.4 0.0 559.8
100 407.7 29.3 -0.3 9389.7
150 608.9 50.1 -3.5 24077.6
1.5 4.7 0.3 0.0 1.1
6.5 20.1 1.4 0.0 22.8
5a / 5b 30 148.5 15.1 -0.1 1762.5
100 501.7 80.2 -1.4 31685.2
250 1112.1 249.9 0.0 218227.9
1.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
5c
30 260.1 80.3 -0.5 16427.8
(0m effect)
100 995.3 449.4 0.0 351315.9
250 2878.1 1661.7 0.0 3756196.6
1.5 3.7 0.3 0.0 0.8
6.5 16.2 1.2 0.0 14.9
6a / 6b 30 111.8 6.4 -0.2 563.0
100 411.7 29.3 -1.1 9514.1
150 618.3 50.2 -1.7 24423.0
1.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6.5 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6c
30 146.4 25.8 -0.4 2971.1
(0m effect)
100 457.8 30.5 -0.6 10971.1
150 615.6 31.4 -0.7 15205.1
inventories.
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G.2 FLASH FIRE EXCEEDANCE CURVES AND CREDIBLE EVENT
Table 36 and Table 37 below present the contributing scenarios, on the topsides, ranked by decreasing dispersion distances for LFL
concentrations, for both considered weather conditions (2F and 5D). The resulting exceedance curves are shown on Figure 10.
Table 36 – Topsides - Exceedance Flammable Dispersion Distances - LFL - 2F Weather Conditions

Topsides Cases - Effect Distances (100% LFL) vs Frequency (any direction, 2F Weather Conditions)
Leak Size Max Distance Max Width Min Distance Effect Area Event Frequency Cumulative
Inventory
(mm) (m) (m) (m) (m2) (/yr) Frequency (/yr)
Export Riser 250 534.2 163.9 0.0 68756.5 1.39E-06 1.39E-06
Production Fluids 250 521.0 129.2 0.0 52865.8 1.83E-06 3.23E-06
Gas Lift Riser 150 276.7 19.5 0.1 4228.1 1.30E-06 4.53E-06
Gas Lift Manifold 150 274.8 19.1 0.0 4133.0 0.00E+00 4.53E-06
Export Riser 100 227.4 41.7 -2.1 7510.6 2.04E-06 6.57E-06
Gas Lift Riser 100 178.4 12.3 -1.2 1728.4 2.18E-06 2.21E-05
Gas Lift Manifold 100 177.4 12.1 0.1 1690.6 2.64E-06 2.48E-05
Wellhead / Xtree 30 91.8 9.2 -0.7 665.8 6.83E-06 3.16E-05
Export Riser 30 65.3 8.2 -0.1 420.5 2.44E-06 3.40E-05
Gas Lift Riser 30 46.1 3.7 -0.3 133.3 1.72E-06 1.59E-04
Gas Lift Manifold 30 45.9 3.7 -0.8 134.4 6.21E-05 2.21E-04
Wellhead / Xtree 6.5 16.0 1.2 0.0 15.4 0.00E+00 2.21E-04
Export Riser 6.5 11.1 0.9 0.0 8.0 5.03E-07 2.21E-04
Production Fluids 6.5 11.0 0.9 0.0 7.9 2.15E-05 2.43E-04
Gas Lift Riser 6.5 8.2 0.7 0.0 4.2 4.54E-07 2.43E-04
Gas Lift Manifold 6.5 8.2 0.7 0.0 4.2 7.97E-06 2.51E-04
Export Riser 1.5 2.7 0.2 0.0 0.4 1.28E-07 2.51E-04
Gas Lift Riser 1.5 1.9 0.2 0.0 0.2 1.43E-07 2.74E-04
Table 37 – Topsides - Exceedance Flammable Dispersion Distances - LFL – 5D Weather Conditions

Topsides Cases - Effect Distances (100% LFL) vs Frequency (any direction, 5D Weather Conditions)
Inventory
Export Riser 250 628.6 137.0 -5.2 68211.5 1.39E-06 1.39E-06
Gas Lift Riser 150 287.4 18.0 -1.7 4076.3 1.30E-06 4.53E-06
Gas Lift Manifold 150 285.9 17.7 -3.4 4026.8 0.00E+00 4.53E-06
Export Riser 100 259.0 34.0 -1.3 6954.9 2.04E-06 6.57E-06
Gas Lift Riser 100 186.2 11.4 -1.0 1672.8 2.18E-06 2.21E-05
Gas Lift Manifold 100 185.3 11.3 -0.2 1651.3 2.64E-06 2.48E-05
Wellhead / Xtree 30 99.2 7.6 -0.3 595.8 6.83E-06 3.16E-05
Export Riser 30 68.7 6.4 -0.1 345.3 2.44E-06 3.40E-05
Production Fluids 30 68.3 6.4 -1.4 348.4 1.23E-04 1.57E-04
Gas Lift Riser 30 47.4 3.3 -0.2 124.2 1.72E-06 1.59E-04
Gas Lift Manifold 30 47.3 3.3 0.0 123.0 6.21E-05 2.21E-04
Export Riser 6.5 10.1 0.8 0.0 6.1 5.03E-07 2.21E-04
Production Fluids 6.5 10.1 0.8 -0.1 6.2 2.15E-05 2.43E-04
Gas Lift Riser 6.5 8.0 0.6 0.0 3.8 4.54E-07 2.43E-04
Export Riser 1.5 2.7 0.2 0.0 0.4 1.28E-07 2.51E-04
Gas Lift Riser 1.5 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.43E-07 2.74E-04
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Figure 10 – Topsides - LFL Flammable Dispersion Effect Distances – 2F and 5D Weather Conditions
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Page 101 of 153

Table 38 and Table 39 below present the contributing scenarios, from subsea releases, ranked by decreasing dispersion distances for LFL
concentrations, for both considered weather conditions (2F and 5D). The resulting exceedance curves are shown on Figure 11.
Table 38 – Subsea - Exceedance Flammable Dispersion Distances - LFL – 2F Weather Conditions

Topsides Cases - Effect Distances (100% LFL) vs Frequency (any direction, 2F Weather Conditions)
Inventory
Export Riser 250 628.6 137.0 -5.2 68211.5 1.39E-06 1.39E-06
Gas Lift Riser 150 287.4 18.0 -1.7 4076.3 1.30E-06 4.53E-06
Export Riser 100 259.0 34.0 -1.3 6954.9 2.04E-06 6.57E-06
Table 39 – Subsea - Exceedance Flammable Dispersion Distances - LFL – 5D Weather Conditions

Topsides Cases - Effect Distances (100% LFL) vs Frequency (any direction, 5D Weather Conditions)
Inventory
Export Riser 250 628.6 137.0 -5.2 68211.5 1.39E-06 1.39E-06
Gas Lift Riser 150 287.4 18.0 -1.7 4076.3 1.30E-06 4.53E-06
Export Riser 100 259.0 34.0 -1.3 6954.9 2.04E-06 6.57E-06
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Figure 11 – Subsea - LFL Flammable Dispersion Effect Distances – 2F and 5D Weather Conditions
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APPENDIX H. JET FIRE RESULTS
H.1 JET FIRE FLAME LENGTHS
Table 40 summarises, for all release scenarios, the modelled flame lengths in still air for
process releases, initially and during inventory depletion (for isolated cases). Refer also to
Appendix F for the review of discharge characteristics and duration of release.
Jet fire flame lengths vary upon release velocity, mass flowrate and weather conditions
(e.g. at higher wind speeds and less stable weather conditions, flame lengths tend to be
shorter). Jet fire lengths in still air have been considered a conservative estimate of the
‘average’ jet fire length.
Table 40 - Jet Fire Flame Length (in Still Air) and Decay for All Release Scenarios
FLAMELENGTH RESULTS (m)
Initial Flame
Flame Length
Flame Length @
Inventory Hole Size (mm) @ 15minutes
Length 5minutes
(m)
(m) (m)
1.5 2.3 2.3 2.3
1 6.5 8.4 8.4 8.4
30 31.6 - -
1.5 3.4 3.4 3.4
6.5 12.1 12.1 12.1
2/3 30 44.6 - -
100 122.9 - -
250 264.7 - -
1.5 3.8 3.5 3.1
6.5 14.1 4.9 1.7
4 30 54.4 - -
100 155.1 - -
150 220.2 - -
1.5 3.4 3.4 3.4
6.5 12.1 12.1 12.1
5a/b 30 44.6 44.6 44.6
100 122.9 122.9 122.9
250 264.7 - -
1.5 3.8 3.8 3.8
6.5 14.1 14.1 14.1
6a/b 30 54.4 42.3 21.3
100 155.1 25.4 -
150 220.2 - -
H.2 JET FIRE FLAME LENGTH EXCEEDANCE CURVE AND CREDIBLE EVENT
Table 41 and Table 42 below present the contributing scenarios ranked by decreasing
flame lengths, for both considered thresholds (5 and 15 minutes). As flame lengths are
reported in still air, no distinction exists between curves obtained using 2F or 5D weather
conditions. The resulting exceedance curves are shown on Figure 12. Frequency of
occurrence associated to each reported scenario is taken from the results in Appendix E.
Note that, based on the small platform footprints, all topside cases are grouped to
generate a single exceedance curve at 5 and 15 minutes. This is considered acceptable
as the release frequencies associated to the gas lift and production flowlines / header are
the main contributors to the frequencies Additionally, those inventories are susceptible to
affect the risers or Xmas trees as they are connected to them.
Table 41 - Exceedance Jet Fire Flame Length - 5min Threshold

Topsides Jet Fire Scenarios - Flame Length vs Frequency @ 5 minutes (any direction)
Leak Size Flame Event Cumulative
Inventory
(mm) Length (m) Frequency (/yr) Frequency (/yr)
Production Fluids (non isolated) 250 264.68 3.17E-07 3.17E-07
Production Riser (non isolated) 250 264.68 2.41E-07 5.58E-07
Gas Lift Manifold (non isolated) 150 220.17 0.00E+00 5.58E-07
Gas Lift Riser (non isolated) 150 220.17 2.25E-07 7.83E-07
Gas Lift Manifold (non isolated) 100 155.14 4.57E-07 1.24E-06
Production Riser (isolated) 100 122.93 2.63E-06 6.91E-06
Gas Lift Riser (isolated) 30 42.3 2.20E-06 4.49E-05
Wellhead / Xtree (non isolated) 30 31.6 1.18E-06 4.61E-05
Gas Lift Manifold (non isolated) 6.5 14.07 5.81E-06 5.47E-05
Gas Lift Riser (non isolated) 6.5 14.07 3.31E-07 5.50E-05
Gas Lift Riser (isolated) 6.5 14.07 3.18E-07 5.53E-05
Production Fluids (non isolated) 6.5 12.11 1.57E-05 7.10E-05
Production Fluids (isolated) 6.5 12.11 1.51E-05 8.61E-05
Production Riser (non isolated) 6.5 12.11 5.97E-07 8.67E-05
Production Riser (isolated) 6.5 12.11 5.74E-07 8.73E-05
Gas Lift Manifold (isolated) 6.5 4.85 5.59E-06 9.28E-05
Table 42 - Exceedance Jet Fire Flame Length - 15min Threshold

Inventory
Gas Lift Manifold (non isolated) 150 220.17 0.00E+00 5.58E-07
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Page 105 of 153

Inventory
Wellhead / Xtree (non isolated) 30 31.6 1.18E-06 4.38E-05
Figure 12 – Jet Fire Flame Length Exceedance Curve
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H.3 JET FIRE PLOT PLANS

The following figures show the envelope of the flame lengths associated to credible jet fire events plotted on each level of the facility. The outline of the production and gas lift headers / flowlines has been extracted
from a review of the platform 3D model on 29th November 2016 including allowances for full platform loading (9 producers).
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H.4 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECT DISTANCES
Table 43 to Table 50 below present the heat radiation effect distances for the different
considered radiation levels (refer to Impact Criteria Assumptions in Appendix A)
associated to each isolatable sections, for both considered weather conditions (2F and
5D).
Table 43 – 4.73kW/m2 Radiation Effect Distances (Any Direction – 2F Weather Conditions)

4.73KW/M2 HEAT RADIATION EFFECT DISTANCES (2F WEATHER CONDITIONS)
Inventory Hole Size (mm) Initial (m) At 5 minutes (m) At 15 minutes (m)
1.5 6.17 6.17 6.17
1 6.5 21.99 21.99 21.99
30 80.51 - -
1.5 6.53 6.53 6.53
6.5 24.92 24.92 24.92
2/3 30 99.66 - -
100 294.36 - -
250 667.24 - -
1.5 3.39 3.16 2.77
6.5 15.41 8.46 2.87
4 30 74.77 - -
100 228.22 - -
150 332.02 - -
1.5 6.53 6.53 6.53
6.5 24.92 24.92 24.92
5a/b 30 99.66 99.66 99.66
100 294.36 294.36 294.36
250 667.24 - -
1.5 3.39 3.39 3.39
6.5 15.41 15.41 15.41
6a/b 30 74.77 56.29 39.22
100 228.22 47.30 -
150 332.02 - -
Table 44 – 6kW/m2 Radiation Effect Distances (Any Direction – 2F Weather Conditions)

6KW/M2 HEAT RADIATION EFFECT DISTANCES (2F WEATHER CONDITIONS)
1.5 5.77 5.77 5.77
1 6.5 20.59 20.59 20.59
30 75.55 - -
1.5 6.21 6.21 6.21
6.5 23.62 23.62 23.62
2/3 30 94.09 - -
100 277.16 - -
250 627.16 - -
1.5 3.33 3.11 2.72
6.5 14.84 8.10 2.87
4 30 70.51 - -
100 211.98 - -
150 307.37 - -

1.5 6.21 6.21 6.21
6.5 23.62 23.62 23.62
5a/b 30 94.09 94.09 94.09
100 277.16 277.16 277.16
250 627.16 - -
1.5 3.33 3.33 3.33
6.5 14.84 14.84 14.84
6a/b 30 70.51 53.19 37.46
100 211.98 45.11 -
150 307.37 - -
Table 45– 12.5kW/m2 Radiation Effect Distances (Any Direction – 2F Weather Conditions)
12.5KW/M2 HEAT RADIATION EFFECT DISTANCES (2F WEATHER CONDITIONS)
1.5 4.78 4.78 4.78
1 6.5 17.15 17.15 17.15
30 63.27 - -
1.5 5.41 5.41 5.41
6.5 20.37 20.37 20.37
2/3 30 80.25 - -
100 234.37 - -
250 527.31 - -
1.5 3.13 2.93 2.58
6.5 13.35 7.20 2.87
4 30 59.68 - -
100 170.69 - -
150 244.58 - -
1.5 5.41 5.41 5.41
6.5 20.37 20.37 20.37
5a/b 30 80.25 80.25 80.25
100 234.37 234.37 234.37
250 527.31 - -
1.5 3.13 3.13 3.13
6.5 13.35 13.35 13.35
6a/b 30 59.68 45.29 33.05
100 170.69 39.63 -
150 244.58 - -
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Page 112 of 153

Table 46 – 35kW/m2 Radiation Effect Distances (Any Direction – 2F Weather Conditions)

1.5 3.86 3.86 3.86
1 6.5 13.92 13.92 13.92
30 51.69 - -
1.5 4.80 4.80 4.80
6.5 17.20 17.20 17.20
2/3 30 66.91 - -
100 193.37 - -
250 431.69 - -
1.5 Not Reached Not Reached Not Reached
6.5 11.48 6.40 Not Reached
4 30 47.39 - -
100 128.71 - -
150 185.44 - -
1.5 4.80 4.80 4.80
6.5 17.20 17.20 17.20
5a/b 30 66.91 66.91 66.91
100 193.37 193.37 193.37
250 431.69 - -
6.5 11.48 11.48 11.48
6a/b 30 47.39 35.74 28.71
100 128.71 34.18 -
150 185.44 - -
Table 47 – 4.73kW/m2 Radiation Effect Distances (Any Direction – 5D Weather Conditions)

4.73KW/M2 HEAT RADIATION EFFECT DISTANCES (5D WEATHER CONDITIONS)
1.5 5.32 5.32 5.32
1 6.5 18.94 18.94 18.94
30 69.24 - -
1.5 5.87 5.87 5.87
6.5 22.66 22.66 22.66
2/3 30 91.59 - -
100 272.60 - -
250 577.29 - -
1.5 3.31 3.09 2.70
6.5 15.32 7.42 2.45
4 30 74.82 - -
100 226.04 - -
150 327.45 - -
1.5 5.87 5.87 5.87
6.5 22.66 22.66 22.66
5a/b 30 91.59 91.59 91.59
100 272.60 272.60 272.60
250 577.29 - -
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1.5 3.31 3.31 3.31
6.5 15.32 15.32 15.32
6a/b 30 74.82 56.54 34.72
100 226.04 42.33 -
150 327.45 - -
Table 48 – 6kW/m2 Radiation Effect Distances (Any Direction – 5D Weather Conditions)

6KW/M2 HEAT RADIATION EFFECT DISTANCES (5D WEATHER CONDITIONS)
1.5 4.95 4.95 4.95
1 6.5 17.65 17.65 17.65
30 64.65 - -
1.5 5.54 5.54 5.54
6.5 21.29 21.29 21.29
2/3 30 85.74 - -
100 254.56 - -
250 539.82 - -
1.5 3.26 3.04 2.66
6.5 14.83 7.05 2.45
4 30 71.06 - -
100 211.38 - -
150 305.04 - -
1.5 5.54 5.54 5.54
6.5 21.29 21.29 21.29
5a/b 30 85.74 85.74 85.74
100 254.56 254.56 254.56
250 539.82 - -
1.5 3.26 3.26 3.26
6.5 14.83 14.83 14.83
6a/b 30 71.06 53.87 32.89
100 211.38 40.02 -
150 305.04 - -
Table 49 – 12.5kW/m2 Radiation Effect Distances (Any Direction – 5D Weather Conditions)

1.5 4.04 4.04 4.04
1 6.5 14.47 14.47 14.47
30 53.30 - -
1.5 4.70 4.70 4.70
6.5 17.88 17.88 17.88
2/3 30 71.23 - -
100 209.78 - -
250 446.51 - -
1.5 3.10 2.90 2.51
6.5 13.55 6.13 2.45
4 30 61.56 - -
100 174.53 - -
150 248.69 - -
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1.5 4.70 4.70 4.70
6.5 17.88 17.88 17.88
5a/b 30 71.23 71.23 71.23
100 209.78 209.78 209.78
250 446.51 - -
1.5 3.10 3.10 3.10
6.5 13.55 13.55 13.55
6a/b 30 61.56 47.11 28.35
100 174.53 34.28 -
150 248.69 - -
Table 50 – 35kW/m2 Radiation Effect Distances (Any Direction – 5D Weather Conditions)

35KW/M2 HEAT RADIATION EFFECT DISTANCES (5D WEATHER CONDITIONS)
1.5 3.19 3.19 3.19
1 6.5 11.49 11.49 11.49
30 42.60 - -
1.5 3.95 3.95 3.95
6.5 14.61 14.61 14.61
2/3 30 57.39 - -
100 167.17 - -
250 357.25 - -
6.5 11.89 5.23 2.45
4 30 51.57 - -
100 136.46 - -
150 190.34 - -
1.5 3.95 3.95 3.95
6.5 14.61 14.61 14.61
5a/b 30 57.39 57.39 57.39
100 167.17 167.17 167.17
250 357.25 - -
6.5 11.89 11.89 11.89
6a/b 30 51.57 39.86 23.99
100 136.46 28.69 -
150 190.34 - -
H.5 INITIAL THERMAL RADIATION EFFECT AREAS
associated to each isolatable sections, for both considered weather conditions (2F and
5D). Note that these tables present initial effect area, as an input to the Quantitative Risk
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 51 – Initial 4.73kW/m2 Radiation Effect Areas (Any Direction – 2F Weather Conditions)
INITIAL 4.73 KW/M2 EFFECT AREAS FOR 2F WEATHER CONDITIONS
Hole Size Downwind Crosswind Offset Distance Effect Area
Inventory
(mm) Semi-Axis (m) Semi-Axis (m) (m) (m2)
1.5 3.6 4.9 2.5 55.73
1 6.5 12.8 17.1 9.2 686.78
30 46.0 61.2 34.6 8833.49
1.5 3.7 3.7 2.8 43.31
6.5 12.9 14.7 12.1 592.83
2/3 30 51.8 63.6 47.9 10343.37
100 161.6 202.2 132.8 102623.68
250 381.4 481.7 285.8 577265.26
1.5 1.8 1.0 1.6 5.77
6.5 6.6 7.8 8.8 161.81
4 30 39.9 49.4 34.8 6200.65
100 145.4 157.8 82.8 72099.85
150 220.0 229.5 112.0 158660.50
1.5 3.7 3.7 2.8 43.31
6.5 12.9 14.7 12.1 592.83
5a/b 30 51.8 63.6 47.9 10343.37
100 161.6 202.2 132.8 102623.68
250 381.4 481.7 285.8 577265.26
1.5 1.8 1.0 1.6 5.77
6.5 6.6 7.8 8.8 161.81
6a/b 30 39.9 49.4 34.8 6200.65
100 145.4 157.8 82.8 72099.85
150 220.0 229.5 112.0 158660.50
Table 52 – Initial 6kW/m2 Radiation Effect Areas (Any Direction – 2F Weather Conditions)
INITIAL 6 KW/M2 EFFECT AREAS FOR 2F WEATHER CONDITIONS
Inventory
1.5 3.4 4.4 2.4 46.14
1 6.5 11.4 15.1 9.2 541.17
30 41.1 54.1 34.4 6987.54
1.5 3.6 3.3 2.6 37.04
6.5 12.2 13.1 11.4 504.04
2/3 30 47.7 56.5 46.4 8476.31
100 145.7 179.0 131.4 81940.68
250 343.2 427.3 284.0 460743.95
1.5 1.8 1.0 1.6 5.71
6.5 6.3 6.8 8.6 134.12
4 30 36.1 43.9 34.4 4978.69
100 129.5 140.7 82.4 57262.75
150 195.8 204.8 111.6 125919.36
1.5 3.6 3.3 2.6 37.04
6.5 12.2 13.1 11.4 504.04
5a/b 30 47.7 56.5 46.4 8476.31
100 145.7 179.0 131.4 81940.68
250 343.2 427.3 284.0 460743.95
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Inventory
1.5 1.8 1.0 1.6 5.71
6.5 6.3 6.8 8.6 134.12
6a/b 30 36.1 43.9 34.4 4978.69
100 129.5 140.7 82.4 57262.75
150 195.8 204.8 111.6 125919.36
Table 53 – Initial 12.5kW/m2 Radiation Effect Areas (Any Direction – 2F Weather Conditions)
INITIAL 12.5 KW/M2 EFFECT AREAS FOR 2F WEATHER CONDITIONS
Inventory
1.5 2.9 3.1 1.9 28.09
1 6.5 9.0 10.6 8.1 298.49
30 31.9 37.6 31.4 3761.01
1.5 3.2 2.2 2.2 21.80
6.5 10.6 9.4 9.8 312.93
2/3 30 40.5 40.6 39.8 5162.40
100 119.0 126.8 115.4 47405.73
250 269.3 299.9 258.0 253764.26
1.5 1.7 1.0 1.5 5.45
6.5 5.5 4.3 7.9 74.10
4 30 27.0 30.1 32.7 2549.42
100 90.2 97.7 80.5 27666.74
150 135.1 142.3 109.5 60387.97
1.5 3.2 2.2 2.2 21.80
6.5 10.6 9.4 9.8 312.93
5a/b 30 40.5 40.6 39.8 5162.40
100 119.0 126.8 115.4 47405.73
250 269.3 299.9 258.0 253764.26
1.5 1.7 1.0 1.5 5.45
6.5 5.5 4.3 7.9 74.10
6a/b 30 27.0 30.1 32.7 2549.42
100 90.2 97.7 80.5 27666.74
150 135.1 142.3 109.5 60387.97
Table 54 – Initial 35kW/m2 Radiation Effect Areas (Any Direction – 2F Weather Conditions)
Inventory
1.5 2.4 1.8 1.5 13.88
1 6.5 7.4 6.5 6.5 151.10
30 26.1 23.3 25.6 1912.36
1.5 2.9 1.3 1.9 12.15
6.5 9.0 4.9 8.2 137.88
2/3 30 33.6 23.9 33.3 2522.96
100 97.3 78.2 96.1 23901.54
250 218.3 188.5 213.4 129272.82
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Inventory
1.5 Not Reached Not Reached Not Reached Not Reached
6.5 4.6 1.6 6.9 22.80
4 30 18.3 15.9 29.1 910.84
100 53.1 54.8 75.6 9142.24
150 79.4 80.4 106.1 20046.88
1.5 2.9 1.3 1.9 12.15
6.5 9.0 4.9 8.2 137.88
5a/b 30 33.6 23.9 33.3 2522.96
100 97.3 78.2 96.1 23901.54
250 218.3 188.5 213.4 129272.82
6.5 4.6 1.6 6.9 22.80
6a/b 30 18.3 15.9 29.1 910.84
100 53.1 54.8 75.6 9142.24
150 79.4 80.4 106.1 20046.88
Table 55 – Initial 4.73kW/m2 Radiation Effect Areas (Any Direction – 5D Weather Conditions)
INITIAL 4.73 KW/M2 EFFECT AREAS FOR 5D WEATHER CONDITIONS
Inventory
1.5 3.3 4.2 2.0 44.21
1 6.5 11.8 14.8 7.2 546.22
30 42.3 53.0 26.9 7049.57
1.5 3.4 3.6 2.5 38.44
6.5 12.4 14.4 10.3 561.90
2/3 30 53.8 64.1 37.8 10822.77
100 168.5 203.3 104.1 107622.00
250 354.2 427.6 223.1 475850.40
1.5 1.8 1.0 1.5 5.66
6.5 6.6 7.4 8.8 151.94
4 30 38.2 49.4 36.7 5918.86
100 137.6 158.9 88.4 68716.93
150 208.2 228.3 119.2 149340.72
1.5 3.4 3.6 2.5 38.44
6.5 12.4 14.4 10.3 561.90
5a/b 30 53.8 64.1 37.8 10822.77
100 168.5 203.3 104.1 107622.00
250 354.2 427.6 223.1 475850.40
1.5 1.8 1.0 1.5 5.66
6.5 6.6 7.4 8.8 151.94
6a/b 30 38.2 49.4 36.7 5918.86
100 137.6 158.9 88.4 68716.93
150 208.2 228.3 119.2 149340.72
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Table 56 – Initial 6kW/m2 Radiation Effect Areas (Any Direction – 5D Weather Conditions)
INITIAL 6 KW/M2 EFFECT AREAS FOR 5D WEATHER CONDITIONS
Inventory
1.5 3.0 3.7 2.0 34.75
1 6.5 10.5 13.1 7.2 430.27
30 37.8 46.9 26.9 5567.91
1.5 3.2 3.2 2.3 32.90
6.5 11.1 12.7 10.2 443.41
2/3 30 48.1 56.6 37.7 8543.42
100 150.7 180.2 103.8 85331.33
250 317.5 379.5 222.3 378539.76
1.5 1.7 1.0 1.5 5.60
6.5 6.2 6.4 8.6 126.32
4 30 34.9 43.8 36.1 4811.63
100 123.4 141.8 88.0 54972.81
150 186.2 203.9 118.8 119307.85
1.5 3.2 3.2 2.3 32.90
6.5 11.1 12.7 10.2 443.41
5a/b 30 48.1 56.6 37.7 8543.42
100 150.7 180.2 103.8 85331.33
250 317.5 379.5 222.3 378539.76
1.5 1.7 1.0 1.5 5.60
6.5 6.2 6.4 8.6 126.32
6a/b 30 34.9 43.8 36.1 4811.63
100 123.4 141.8 88.0 54972.81
150 186.2 203.9 118.8 119307.85
Table 57 – Initial 12.5kW/m2 Radiation Effect Areas (Any Direction – 5D Weather Conditions)
Inventory
1.5 2.5 2.7 1.5 20.94
1 6.5 7.7 9.0 6.8 216.60
30 27.1 32.0 26.2 2726.37
1.5 2.8 2.3 1.9 20.30
6.5 9.4 9.2 8.5 269.76
2/3 30 36.7 39.3 34.6 4524.95
100 109.3 123.7 100.5 42490.36
250 234.4 262.8 212.1 193528.21
1.5 1.7 1.0 1.4 5.39
6.5 5.6 4.0 8.0 69.64
4 30 27.3 30.0 34.2 2571.26
100 88.6 98.9 85.9 27531.65
150 131.9 142.8 116.7 59203.28
1.5 2.8 2.3 1.9 20.30
6.5 9.4 9.2 8.5 269.76
5a/b 30 36.7 39.3 34.6 4524.95
100 109.3 123.7 100.5 42490.36
250 234.4 262.8 212.1 193528.21
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Inventory
1.5 1.7 1.0 1.4 5.39
6.5 5.6 4.0 8.0 69.64
6a/b 30 27.3 30.0 34.2 2571.26
100 88.6 98.9 85.9 27531.65
150 131.9 142.8 116.7 59203.28
Table 58 – Initial 35kW/m2 Radiation Effect Areas (Any Direction – 5D Weather Conditions)
INITIAL 35 KW/M2 EFFECT AREAS FOR 5D WEATHER CONDITIONS
Inventory
1.5 2.1 1.6 1.1 10.49
1 6.5 6.2 5.6 5.3 109.56
30 21.6 20.1 21.0 1366.27
1.5 2.5 1.3 1.5 10.23
6.5 7.7 5.5 6.9 133.37
2/3 30 29.2 24.8 28.2 2269.15
100 85.8 78.4 81.3 21157.91
250 184.5 166.9 172.8 96748.33
6.5 4.8 1.5 7.1 21.77
4 30 20.4 15.7 31.2 1006.08
100 55.8 56.8 80.6 9954.94
150 79.8 82.9 110.5 20801.51
1.5 2.5 1.3 1.5 10.23
6.5 7.7 5.5 6.9 133.37
5a/b 30 29.2 24.8 28.2 2269.15
100 85.8 78.4 81.3 21157.91
250 184.5 166.9 172.8 96748.33
6.5 4.8 1.5 7.1 21.77
6a/b 30 20.4 15.7 31.2 1006.08
100 55.8 56.8 80.6 9954.94
150 79.8 82.9 110.5 20801.51
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H.6 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECT AREA AT 5 MINUTES
Table 59 and Table 60 below present the heat radiation effect distances for the different
associated to each scenario exceeding the 5-minute threshold, for both considered
weather conditions (2F and 5D).
Table 59 - Radiation Effect Areas @ 5 minutes (Any Direction – 2F Weather Conditions)

Hole
4.73 kW/m2 6 kW/m2 Effect 12.5 kW/m2 Effect 35 kW/m2 Effect
Inventory Size
Effect Area (m2) Area (m2) Area (m2) Area (m2)
(mm)
1.5 55.73 46.14 28.09 13.88
1
6.5 686.78 541.17 298.49 151.10
1.5 43.31 37.04 21.80 12.15
2/3
6.5 592.83 504.04 312.93 137.88
1.5 5.53 5.47 5.24 Not Reached
4
6.5 66.58 56.61 32.21 16.00
1.5 43.31 37.04 21.80 12.15
5a/b 6.5 592.83 504.04 312.93 137.88
(Note) 30 10343.37 8476.31 5162.40 2522.96
100 102623.68 81940.68 47405.73 23901.54
1.5 5.77 5.71 5.45 Not Reached
6a/b 6.5 161.81 134.12 74.10 22.80
(Note) 30 3357.13 2707.59 1406.57 487.57
100 1963.49 1683.94 1026.67 412.04
Table 60 - Radiation Effect Areas @ 5 minutes (Any Direction – 5D Weather Conditions)

Hole
Inventory Size
(mm)
1.5 44.21 34.75 20.94 10.49
1
6.5 546.22 430.27 216.60 109.56
1.5 38.44 32.90 20.30 10.23
2/3
6.5 561.90 443.41 269.76 133.37
1.5 5.43 5.37 5.17 Not Reached
4
6.5 58.88 50.41 30.39 13.07
1.5 38.44 32.90 20.30 10.23
5a/b 6.5 561.90 443.41 269.76 133.37
(Note) 30 10822.77 8543.42 4524.95 2269.15
100 107622.00 85331.33 42490.36 21157.91
1.5 5.66 5.60 5.39 Not Reached
6a/b 6.5 151.94 126.32 69.64 21.77
(Note) 30 3211.83 2630.13 1431.03 550.56
100 1706.37 1447.76 897.52 418.56
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H.7 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECT AREA AT 15 MINUTES
Table 61 and Table 62 below present the heat radiation effect distances for the different
associated to each scenario exceeding the 15-minute threshold, for both considered
weather conditions (2F and 5D).
Table 61 - Radiation Effect Areas @ 15 minutes (Any Direction – 2F Weather Conditions)

Hole
Inventory Size
(mm)
1.5 55.73 46.14 28.09 13.88
1
6.5 686.78 541.17 298.49 151.10
1.5 43.31 37.04 21.80 12.15
2/3
6.5 592.83 504.04 312.93 137.88
1.5 5.10 5.04 4.84 Not Reached
4
6.5 7.21 7.21 7.21 Not Reached
1.5 43.31 37.04 21.80 12.15
5a/b 6.5 592.83 504.04 312.93 137.88
(Note) 30 10343.37 8476.31 5162.40 2522.96
100 102623.68 81940.68 47405.73 23901.54
1.5 5.77 5.71 5.45 Not Reached
6a/b
6.5 161.81 134.12 74.10 22.80
(Note)
30 1390.89 1191.14 723.13 291.35
Table 62 - Radiation Effect Areas @ 15 minutes (Any Direction – 5D Weather Conditions)

Hole
Inventory Size
(mm)
1.5 44.21 34.75 20.94 10.49
1
6.5 546.22 430.27 216.60 109.56
1.5 38.44 32.90 20.30 10.23
2/3
6.5 561.90 443.41 269.76 133.37
1.5 5.00 4.94 4.72 Not Reached
4
6.5 6.32 6.32 6.32 6.32
1.5 38.44 32.90 20.30 10.23
5a/b 6.5 561.90 443.41 269.76 133.37
(Note) 30 10822.77 8543.42 4524.95 2269.15
100 107622.00 85331.33 42490.36 21157.91
1.5 5.66 5.60 5.39 Not Reached
6a/b
6.5 151.94 126.32 69.64 21.77
(Note)
30 1208.65 1024.43 634.58 295.00
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APPENDIX I. TOPSIDES POOL FIRE RESULTS
I.1 RAINOUT / POOL FORMATION MODELLING
Multi Component Modelling Limitations
Frequently, two-phase releases will rainout. As introduced within Appendix F, the well
fluids are modelled using PHAST ‘Multi Component’ (MC) model, to allow better
characterisation of the mixture which includes both light and heavy hydrocarbons. A
current limitation of the MC model in PHAST is that it does not support rainout. This means
that liquid is retained in the cloud until the dispersion ends or all the droplets have
evaporated. Modelling rainout correctly would require rigorous MC droplet
thermodynamics, pool spreading and evaporation, and time-varying cloud compositions.
Development work on these is still ongoing.
To determine whether a case, run using the MC model, should have led to rainout, the
following should be considered:
 If the cloud becomes grounded while there is still liquid in the cloud then it is likely
that the case would have rained out;
 If the plume does not become grounded, there are no hard rules as to whether
such a case would have rained out. There are however several factors to consider:
o Volatility. If the released mixture contains a significant fraction of sub-cooled

liquid components (i.e. a liquid below its boiling point), then some rainout
would normally be expected;
o Released liquid mass rate. There will be a correlation between rainout and
the amount of liquid released. Large releases and releases with a high
liquid fraction are most likely to rain out;
o Release elevation. In near-ground releases droplets have less opportunity

to evaporate before rainout.
o Droplet size. For droplets of 30 μm or less then liquid would be expected to

stay in suspension in the cloud and thus to experience no rainout. Larger
droplets will fall to the ground quickly. Small droplets closely follow the
plume centreline, and therefore if the centreline doesn’t touch the ground it
is likely that rainout would not have occurred.
A suggested workaround is to assess whether rainout occurs when modelling the release
using the ‘Pseudo-Component’ (PC) model, which does allow rainout to occur. This
approach has been applied on the production fluids.
Pseudo-Component Modelling Limitations
From the description above, it could be argued that using the PC model may be more
appropriate than the MC Model to cope for a wider range of possible outcomes. However,
PC predictions do not match the actual behaviour of mixtures in key respects, especially
for a wide range of component volatilities. For example, as shown in Figure 13, at a given
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pressure a mixture might be two-phase across a range of temperatures, but under PC

logic the bubble point and dew point temperatures for a mixture are identical. This is the
essence of the Pseudo-Component approach, as this is how a pure component would
behave.
Figure 13 - Multi-Component Phase Equilibrium (Ref. [54])
Thus a 2-phase or 100% liquid mixture may, according to PC logic, be a vapour. That is
the case of the Prinos production fluids, the Pressure / Temperature point of the inventory,
whilst giving a very large liquid mole fraction (>90%) in MC modelling, is associated to a
vapour state only in PC modelling.
An alternative is provided in the documentation (Ref. [54]) which is to consider the saturate
liquid vessel conditions by specifying the pressure and letting PHAST calculate the
temperature associated to the bubble point. This approach has been applied to identifying
rainout scenarios and potential pool fire occurrences.
I.2 REVIEW OF POTENTIAL POOL FIRE RELEASE SCENARIOS
The following isolatable sections have been modelled, considering all associated release
scenarios, using the Pseudo-Component approach to identify rainout:
 The Production Header;
 The Export Riser;
 The Wellhead / Xmas Tree.
The following scenarios were identified, through consequence modelling, to lead to rainout
and pool fire events:
 Production Header / Export Riser 100mm Release;

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 Production Header / Export Riser 250mm Release;
 Time Varying Discharge - Gas Lift Riser 100mm at 5 minutes (Note 1)
 Time Varying Discharge - Gas Lift Header 6.5mm at 15 minutes (Note 1 & 2)
Notes:
1. This is considered to occur due to the reducing inventory pressure and the low fluid
temperature associated to atmospheric expansion;
2. Whilst some rainout occurs, no pool fire event has been identified from the
modelling calculations, as the spilt material vaporised after being grounded. This
case is therefore not considered further for pool fire calculations.
It should be noted that, where rainout occurs, the spread of a forming pool will be directly
linked to the duration of the spill. Apart from the gas lift cases, the identified scenarios
causing rainout are associated to large releases, quickly depleting the isolated section.
However, it does not consider the time for detection and isolation, during which the release
is assumed to be continuing at its initial release flowrate. Therefore, where rainout is
identified, an additional conservative scenario is modelled considering no isolation to
determine worst case consequences.
Additionally, it is considered that the Wellbay / Xtree area, due to its high congestion,
inventory sizes, and potential for escalation, is an area prone to liquid rainout on release.
As a worst-case scenario, a pool fire encompassing the whole well bay area (measured to
be approximately 11.7 by 7.1 metres, equivalent to a circle of 10.3 metre diameter) has
been modelled based on the liquid fraction of the well fluid flashed at atmospheric
pressure using PHAST standalone pool fire model.
I.3 IDENTIFIED RAINOUT / POOL FIRE CASES & CHARACTERISTICS
Table 63 to Table 65 below present the main characteristics of the identified pool fire
scenarios.
Table 63 - Pool Fire Scenarios - Main Characteristics (1 of 3)
Liquid Spill Rainout Distance Maximum Pool

Rate (kg/s) (unimpinged) (m) Release Diameter (m)
Scenario
Duration (s)
2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D
2 - Production Header - 100mm
14.32 8.28 52.01 58.28 6.15 5.04 3.81
Release
2 - Production Header - 250mm
397.37 374.00 77.25 83.19 0.98 10.38 10.00
Release
5a/b - Export Riser - 100mm
14.32 8.28 52.01 58.28 510.19 21.20 16.12
Release
5a/b - Export Riser - 250mm
397.37 374.00 77.25 83.19 81.63 83.64 80.10
Release
Production Fluids - 100mm
14.32 8.28 52.01 58.28 N/A 21.20 16.12
Unisolated
Production Fluids - 250mm
397.37 374.00 77.25 83.19 N/A 111.68 108.35
Unisolated
6a/b - Gas Import Riser - Not
0.19 0.19 11.19 12.05 1.61 1.51
100mm Release @ 5min Calculated
Wellhead / Xtree Area Not Calculated 10.30 10.30
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Flame
Flame Length Flame Angle
Emissive
Scenario (m) (°)
Power (kW/m2)
2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D
2 - Production Header - 100mm Release 7.98 6.57 38.90 56.53 69.82 64.76
2 - Production Header - 250mm Release 13.19 12.86 34.24 51.48 84.23 83.44
5a/b - Export Riser - 100mm Release 21.68 17.92 29.66 48.77 100.71 94.12
5a/b - Export Riser - 250mm Release 56.27 54.61 21.49 38.93 138.89 137.56
Production Fluids - 100mm Unisolated 21.68 17.92 29.66 48.77 100.71 94.12
Production Fluids - 250mm Unisolated 68.80 67.37 19.93 36.99 148.00 147.03
6a/b - Gas Import Riser - 100mm Release @
1.85 1.71 46.01 60.87 46.63 44.61
5min
Wellhead / Xtree Area 40.80 40.80 34.28 51.31 270.47 270.47

Burn Rate (kg/s) Burn Rate per unit pool
Scenario
area (kg/m2s)
2F 5D 2F 5D
2 - Production Header - 100mm Release 0.81 0.46 0.041 0.040
5a/b - Export Riser - 100mm Release 14.32 8.28 0.041 0.041
Production Fluids - 100mm Unisolated 14.32 8.28 0.041 0.041
0.03 0.02 0.015 0.011
5min
Wellhead / Xtree Area 21.69 21.69 0.260 0.260
I.4 THERMAL RADIATION EFFECT AREAS
associated to each identified pool fire scenario, for both considered weather conditions (2F
and 5D).
Table 66 – 4.73kW/m2 Pool Fire Radiation Effect Areas (2F Weather Conditions)
Pool Fire Radiation Effect Area - 4.73kW/m2 - 2F Conditions
Downwind Crosswind Offset
Scenario semi axis semi axis Distance Area (m2)
(m) (m) (m)
6a/b - Gas Import Riser - 100mm Release
2.95 3.07 11.73 28.45
@ 5min
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Table 67 – 4.73kW/m2 Pool Fire Radiation Effect Areas (5D Weather Conditions)
Pool Fire Radiation Effect Area - 4.73kW/m2 – 5D Conditions
(m) (m) (m)
2.42 2.73 12.42 20.76
@ 5min
Table 68 – 6kW/m2 Pool Fire Radiation Effect Areas (2F Weather Conditions)
Pool Fire Radiation Effect Area - 6kW/m2 - 2F Conditions
(m) (m) (m)
2.66 2.75 11.75 22.98
@ 5min
Table 69 – 6kW/m2 Pool Fire Radiation Effect Areas (5D Weather Conditions)
Pool Fire Radiation Effect Area - 6kW/m2 – 5D Conditions
(m) (m) (m)
2.18 2.43 12.46 16.64
@ 5min
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Table 70 – 12.5kW/m2 Pool Fire Radiation Effect Areas (2F Weather Conditions)
Pool Fire Radiation Effect Area – 12.5kW/m2 - 2F Conditions
(m) (m) (m)
2.09 1.91 11.94 12.54
@ 5min
Table 71 – 12.5kW/m2 Pool Fire Radiation Effect Areas (5D Weather Conditions)
Pool Fire Radiation Effect Area – 12.5kW/m2 – 5D Conditions
(m) (m) (m)
1.71 1.64 12.73 8.81
@ 5min
Table 72 – 35kW/m2 Pool Fire Radiation Effect Areas (2F Weather Conditions)
Pool Fire Radiation Effect Area – 35kW/m2 – 2F Conditions
(m) (m) (m)
1.80 1.80 12.23 10.18
@ 5min
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Table 73 – 35kW/m2 Pool Fire Radiation Effect Areas (5D Weather Conditions)
Pool Fire Radiation Effect Area – 35kW/m2 – 5D Conditions
(m) (m) (m)
6a/b - Gas Import Riser - 100mm Release Not Not Not
N/A
@ 5min Reached Reached Reached
I.5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Table 74 presents the estimated frequency of occurrence associated to the identified

scenarios. The flash fire frequency of occurrence has been used for this assessment.
Immediately ignited events have been assumed to lead to jet fires, which are generating
worse consequences. Even in case of pool formation, the consequence effects will be
driven by the jet fires.
Table 74 - Pool Fire Scenarios – Estimated Frequency of Occurrence

Frequency
Scenario Comments
(/yr)
2 - Production Header - 100mm Release 1.18E-05
2 - Production Header - 250mm Release 1.62E-06
Isolated Event Frequencies
5a/b - Export Riser - 100mm Release 1.80E-06
5a/b - Export Riser - 250mm Release 1.23E-06
Production Fluids - 100mm Unisolated 1.82E-06 Unisolated Event Frequencies,
note that jet fires would have
Production Fluids - 250mm Unisolated 3.81E-07 worst consequences (conservative
scenarios)
1.92E-06 Isolated Event Frequency
5min
Isolated and Unisolated Event
Wellhead / Xtree Area 6.83E-06
Frequency (conservative)
Overall Frequency of Occurrence 2.74E-05
The assessment, whilst including some conservatism, highlights the possibility for pool fire
to occur on the platform. Indeed, the frequency of occurrence associated to identified
event is significant, despite not reaching the 10-4 per year event threshold. This should be
considered in relation with the following inherent limitations:
 Releases have been modelled unimpinged to generate conservative effect

distances. Impingement of releases, not identified above as leading to pool fire,
may cause rainout as a fraction of the cloud would likely be grounded;
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 Two time-varying gas lift scenarios were identified to cause rainout. This highlights
the impact of reducing pressures and cooling of the fluids on release, which would
increase the liquid fraction. Current modelling limitations described within sections
F.5 and I.1 do not allow identifying potential additional scenarios where rainout
could occur. It should however be noted that such pool formation from depleting
inventories would be anticipated to lead to lower consequence impacts on the
topsides (smaller release rates preventing large sustainable pool fires);
 The calculated burn rates, in combination with the provision of the open drain
system, would rapidly deplete isolated inventories. For a prolonged event to occur,
escalation to nearby equipment / isolatable sections, or alternatively failure of
isolation would be required.
Considering the worse consequence levels associated to the conservative assessment of

jet fires (refer to Appendix H), and the likelihood that jet fires occur concurrently to pool
fires (should the inventory not be depleted), no additional credible impact is identified.
Finally, rainout distances calculated from the modelling highlights the momentum of the
unimpinged releases. In such cases, rainout could occur on the sea surface. Such a
scenario is reviewed within Appendix J.
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APPENDIX J. SEA SURFACE POOL FIRE RESULTS
J.1 PROCESS SPILL – METHODOLOGY
Modelling of the sea surface pool formation, spread and thickness variation over time
following a topsides production fluids release has been performed (Ref. [48]). The
modelling uses the following assumptions:
 The inventory considered conservatively includes the liquid phase from the
production header and associated flowlines (refer to Appendix D).
 All liquid hydrocarbon material released falls from the platform instantaneously and
forms a pool on sea surface. In reality the hydrocarbons are likely to form a two-
phase spray, or may fall in multiple ways (e.g. off the side, down SIP leg etc.) that
will reduce the size of any pool formed significantly;
 The thickness of the pool formed is constant across the pool. In reality, pool
thickness varies across the pool and breaking or steep waves will spread the pool
formation and could potentially break up and emulsify the hydrocarbons. The pool
can be considered non-flammable in wind speeds of 15 m/s or greater (Ref. [38]),
and when the thickness falls below 0.8mm (Ref. [48]);
 The height of the Prinos Lamda platform is likely to result in the vast majority of
hydrocarbons reaching the sea plunging from a height of approximately 10m (Ref.
[17]). Such spills may break up and begin to emulsify on landing (Ref. [38]).
The methodology applied has been taken from the Handbook for Fire Calculations and
Fire Risk Assessment in the Process Industry (Ref. [48]). For the purpose of this
assessment, the process spill is considered to be instantaneous with a delayed ignition.
The case considered here assumes that a topsides release is directed away from the
platform, causing rainout and pool formation to occur on the sea surface.
Spreading laws are applied for successive regimes, defined as follows.
 Phase 1: The gravitational and inertial forces are respectively the prevailing
spreading and retarding force. The pool starts to spread.
 Phase 2: Once slicks are sufficiently large and have been spreading for a
sufficiently long time. The gravitational and viscous shear forces are respectively
the prevailing spreading and retarding force.
 Phase 3: Once slicks have thinned sufficiently so that surface tension becomes the
dominant spreading mechanism. The surface tension and viscous shear forces are
respectively the prevailing spreading and retarding force.
To each of these phases is associated an equation to estimate the spreading diameter of

the pool, as follows:
Where:
k1 = A constant (k1 = 1.14 reported to be a good value)
ρw = Density of water (kg/m3), taken as 1025 kg/m3
ρL = Density of liquid fuel (kg/m3), taken as 742 kg/m3 (Ref. [9])
g = Gravity constant (9.81 m/s2)
VL = Volume of liquid fuel released instantaneously (m3), taken as 2.23
m3 (liquid phase of the production header and pig launcher isolated
inventories, Ref. [9]).
t = Time from start of the release (s)
νw = Viscosity of sea water (m2/s), approximately 1.31x10-6 m2/s
fr = Interphasial tension (N/m), in the range 0.005 – 0.02 N/m, taken as
0.01 N/m
Phase 1 applies as long as D1 < D2; phase 2 then applies until D2 < D3 where phase 3
applies.
Ignition can occur if the pool thickness is above a threshold of 0.8mm (Ref. [48], calculated
as the volume spilled over the surface area of the pool assumed circular). For
instantaneous spills, the duration of the fire is calculated using the following formula:
Where:
g’ = Effective acceleration due to gravity (m/s2), calculated as per
equation below
vf = Fuel regression rate (m/s), as per equation below
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The effective acceleration of gravity (g’) is calculated as follows:
The relationship between the fuel regression rate and burning rate per unit pool surface
area is calculated as follows. Note that the burning rate is obtained from the consequence
modelling results.
Where:
mf = Burning rate per unit pool surface area (kg/m2s)
J.2 PROCESS SPILL – RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS
Figure 14 below shows the evolution of the pool diameter and thickness over time.
Figure 14 - Pool Diameter and Thickness over Time
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It should be noted that:
 The pool thickness drops below the 0.8mm threshold in less than 20 minutes;
 The above modelling does not consider ignition of the pool (considered to be very
unlikely and can only occur within that time). If ignited the burnt fuel would reduce
the pool thickness more rapidly. The duration from the equation in section J.1 is
calculated to be less approximately 87 seconds;
 The platform structure, if impacted, would be unlikely to fail in the given time
causing structural collapse of the facility. Some level of damage to small equipment
items may however occur.
J.3 SUBSEA RELEASE – METHODOLOGY
The following approach has been adopted to assess the risks associated to pool fires from
subsea releases:
 The frequency of occurrence of sea surface pool fires due to subsea releases has
been estimated from the data presented in Appendix E;
 Coarse assessment of the potential consequences has been carried out based on
the simple correlations from industry experiments (Ref. [48]);
 Additional mitigation factors have been identified based on the facilities design and
industry guidance (Ref. [38]).
J.4 SUBSEA RELEASE – RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS
Probability Assessment
The probability of pool formation on the sea surface has been taken as associated to
release from the production export riser only. Note that this differs from the assessment of
subsea based flash fires which includes the contributions from the gas lift import riser.
The full ignition probability is conservatively taken into account in this assessment. In
accordance with the Quantitative Risk Assessment assumptions, small pipeline and riser
releases below the sea surface are assumed to dissipate as they pass through the sea
and not form a flammable / toxic mixture above the sea surface (Ref. [1]).
Table 75 presents the probabilistic calculations associated to the subsea export riser
releases.
Table 75 - Sea Surface Pool Fires - Subsea Contributions

Event Distribution Total
5c – Export Riser (subsea) –
0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.01E-04 6.81E-05 1.09E-04 3.78E-04
Release Frequency (/yr)
Ignition Probability
0 0 0.063 0.1 0.1 -
(refer to Appendix A)
Pool Fire Frequency (/yr) 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.27E-05 6.81E-06 1.09E-05 3.03E-05
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A sea surface pool fire from a subsea release is not considered a credible event, for the
following reasons:
 The frequency of occurrence of such events is below the credible event threshold
of 10-4 per year;
 Additional mitigating factors that can reduce the probability of a leak occurring
include:
o Location of the riser within the SIP leg: subsea riser releases would likely
be confined to the interior of the leg and not able to spread freely on the sea
surface (Ref. [17]);
o Pipeline, riser, spool protection: the probability of failure due to dropped

objects, trawl boards, etc. should be reduced using a combination of
protection measures such as concrete mattresses, rock dumping or
trenching and backfilling (Ref. [49] and [52]);
 In the case of subsea pipeline failure in shallow water (<200 m), the oil droplets,
using the gas momentum, are likely to break the surface in a location above the
original failure and then spread radially. However, the pool may then be carried
along by tidal currents and wind, providing significant opportunity for emulsification
and reducing the ignitability of any resulting pool (Ref. [38]). In the case of Prinos
Lamda, a potential plume would be likely to be driven away from the platform as:
o The risers and pipelines are routed through the platform south-east leg and
towards South East (Ref. [50]).
o The prevailing wind direction is from the North East (Ref. [27]);
o The prevailing current is towards South West (Ref. [27]);
 The pool thickness varies across the pool and breaking or steep waves will spread
the pool formation and could potentially break up and emulsify the hydrocarbons.
The pool can be considered non-flammable in wind speeds of 15 m/s or greater
(Ref. [38]), and when the thickness falls below 0.8mm (Ref. [48]);
 Should an ignitable pool form, the ignition probability at or near the sea surface is
likely to be very low:
o Unlikely for ignition sources to be present in the area;
o Pool flashpoint will increase over time as the lighter hydrocarbons

evaporate.
As a result, the probability of occurrence of a sea surface pool fire from a subsea release
is anticipated to be extremely unlikely. This is therefore not considered to be a credible
design event.
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Consequence Assessment
A continuous spill considering delayed ignition has been considered within this section.
Subsea releases are less likely to be detected and may last for a significant amount of
time before isolation is initiated.
Based on the Handbook for Fire Calculations and Fire Risk Assessment in the Process
Industry (Ref. [48]), in such a case the pool diameter would increase with time, but will
however soon attain an equilibrium diameter after ignition. This is due to the fuel burn rate,
dependent on the pool area, exceeding the fuel release rate.
The diameter would be sustained as long as the release rate is maintained. Usually the
duration of the release until isolation would be significantly larger than the time necessary
to consume the remainder of oil after isolation and the fire duration can be considered
equal to the duration of the spill.
The following equations have been used to determine the spills equilibrium diameters and
associated flame height based on still conditions (Ref. [48]):
Where:
Deq = Equilibrium diameter (the spill rate equals the burning rate) (m)
vL = Leak rate of the liquid fuel (m3/s)
vf = Fuel regression rate (m/s), as per equation in section J.1
Where:
L = Average visible flame height (m)
D = Diameter (m)
ρ0 = Density of ambient air (kg/m3)
g = Acceleration due to gravity (m/s2)
mf = Burning rate per unit pool area (kg/m2s), obtained from
consequence modelling results
Table 76 presents the results from the above described calculations for each subsea
release case.
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Table 76 – Sea Pool Fire Consequence Modelling Results

Equilibrium Equivalent
Case Flame Height (m)
Diameter (m) Circular Area (m2)
30mm Release 28.9 656.6 39.5
100mm Release 96.4 7295.1 91.3
250mm Release 240.9 45594.3 172.6
The above results show that, whilst a pool fire from a subsea release is very unlikely to
occur, potential consequences can be very significant and an emergency spill response
plan has to be in place to prevent damage to the environment.
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APPENDIX K. DNVGL OFFSHORE STANDARD OVERPRESSURE CALCULATIONS
K.1 DEFINITION OF THE EXPLOSION VOLUME
The explosion volume is defined by the limits of the congested process area. Table 77
below describes the individual boundaries that have been selected. Refer also to Figure
15 showing the top view plan boundaries for clarity. Coordinates have been determined
by measurement on the Navisworks 3D model on April 22nd, 2016.
Table 77 - Explosion Volume Boundaries Definition
Coordinates
Boundary (Northing / Easting /
Description
Limit Elevation as
applicable)
Top Bottom of the drilling deck Elevation: 20m
Bottom Top of production deck steel Elevation: 12.5m
North Surface of the fire wall Northing: 123.6m
South Inner edge of the South escape route Northing: 96.8m
East Outer edge of the South East platform leg Easting: 116.4m
West Outer edge of the South West platform leg Easting: 98.6m
Notes:
1. As per the DNVGL Offshore Standard, the border/limit where the process area
borders open air (either to the side or up) should be the natural border where no
more piping and equipment are placed. It is accepted that limited / open support
structure and railing is outside this border.
2. Future equipment, in particular located on the East laydown area, is not taken into
account for this analysis (not anticipated to be present during normal operations).
3. It is noted that the TUTU and the HPU are located West of the selected boundary.
This is considered acceptable due to the limited dimensions of the equipment, the
absence of any other significant equipment alongside of the boundary.
Using the above defined items as boundaries, the explosion volume has been determined
to be approximately equal to 3577.8 m3.
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Figure 15 - Explosion Volume Boundaries (Top View)
K.2 EXPLOSION CURVE DETERMINATION
The explosion DAL pressure curve to be associated to the identified volume is determined
by selecting a number of parameters from available choices. Those are summarised below
in italic, as follows:
 Congestion density: High to normal (associated to production operation);
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 Confinement level: Confined (presence of a blast wall and of a solid deck 6 metres
or more above)
 Weather cladding: No windwalls
From the DNVGL Offshore Standard, curve ‘B’ is therefore applicable for the explosion
volume, as presented on Figure 16 below.
Figure 16 - Explosion DAL Pressure Curves (Ref. [37])
K.3 DESIGN ACCIDENTAL LOAD CHARACTERISTICS
The pressure curve has been interpolated over a range between approximately 1500 m 3
and 5500 m3 to allow determining the DAL characteristics for the calculated explosion
volume.
For the explosion volume, the DLB DAL overpressure has been calculated to be 400
mbar. Additionally, as per the standard, the associated pressure pulse duration varies
between 0.05 and 0.2 s. The higher and lower DAL pressures have a shorter and longer
duration within this range, respectively. Due to the relatively small calculated overpressure,
the longest pulse duration has conservatively been assumed.
Following the guidance from the Oil and Gas UK, the associated SLB DAL characteristics
and dynamic pressures have been calculated (see Section 7.1.4). The overall DAL
characteristics are summarised in Table 78.
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Table 78 - DNVGL Offshore Standard Methodology DAL Characteristics
DLB 0.400 200 0.134
SLB 0.134 430 0.045
It is noted that according to the OGP report on vulnerability of plant / structure, 400 mbar
overpressure corresponds to the threshold for piping support collapse and piping break, if
not designed to withstand blast loads (Ref. [34]).
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APPENDIX L. DNVGL ASSUMPTION REGISTER
(12 Pages)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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PRINOS LAMDA EXPLOSION RISK ANALYSIS
Assumption Register For

Prinos Lamda Wellhead
Platform ERA Study
ode
Prepared for : Offshore Design Engineering Ltd

Prepared by: DNV GL
DNV GL Report No.: 1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
Date: 20–11-2016
ode
ODE Document No : Assumption Register — Explosion Risk Analysis Rev. 1

1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
Prinos Lamda Wellhead platform
Project name: Prinos Lamda Explosion Risk Analysis

Report title: Assumption Register For Prinos Lamda Wellhead
Platform ERA Study
Customer: ode
Date of issue: 2016-11-20

DNVGL Project No.: 10016868
Organisation unit: London SHE Risk
Report No.: 1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
:
Applicable contract(s) governing the provision of this Report:
Objective:
Assumption Register for Prinos Lamda ERA Study
Prepared by: Verified by: Approved by:
Tarek Bengherbia Gabriele Ferrara Gabriele Ferrara

Principal Consultant Principal Consultant Principal Consultant
Copyright © DNV GL 2015. All rights reserved. This publication or parts thereof may not be copied, reproduced or transmitted in any
form, or by any means, whether digitally or otherwise without the prior written consent of DNV GL. DNV GL and the Horizon Graphic
are trademarks of DNV GL AS. The content of this publication shall be kept confidential by the customer, unless otherwise agreed in
writing. Reference to part of this publication which may lead to misinterpretation is prohibited.
DNV GL Distribution: Keywords:

☐ Unrestricted distribution (internal and external)
☐ Unrestricted distribution within DNV GL
☐ Limited distribution within DNV GL after 3 years
☐ No distribution (confidential)
☐ Secret
Revision Log
Rev. No. Date Reason for Issue Prepared by Verified by Approved by
0 10-03-2016 Assumption Register Tarek Bengherbia Gabriele Ferrara Gabriele Ferrara
1 20-11-2016 Assumption Register Tarek Bengherbia Gabriele Ferrara Gabriele Ferrara
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1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
Table of contents
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 3
2 ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................................................. 3
Geometry Modelling 3
Congestion Factors 3
Meteorological data 4
Time Dependent Ignition Modelling 5
Isolation and blowdown times 7
Time varying releases 7
Selection and characterisation of representative segments 7
Frequency of Release 8
3 REFERENCES.............................................................................................................. 10
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1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
1 INTRODUCTION
This Note aims at describing the main assumptions defined for the Explosion Risk Analysis for Prinos
Lamda Wellhead platform.
2 ASSUMPTIONS
Both the deterministic (consequences) and probabilistic (risk) aspects of the explosion risk analysis
(ERA) will be performed for the Prinos Lamda wellhead platform. This includes the key analysis steps of
selecting the appropriate failure cases and the geometry modelling.
The following aims to summarise the key assumptions / inputs that will be defined:
 The geometry model: As per assumption 2.12.1.
 Congestion factor per area: As per assumption 2.22.1.
 Meteorological data: As per assumption 2.3
 Time dependent ignition modelling: As per assumption 2.4
 Ignition source: As per assumption 2.4.1
 Ignition source shutdown: As per assumption 2.4.2
 Isolation and blowdown times: As per assumption2.5
 Time varying releases: As per assumption 0
 Selection of representative segments: As per assumption 2.7
 Gas detection level is assumed to occur at 20% LFL.
 Density of gas detectors: Number of detectors per square metre deck area (per module / fire
area) is assumed to be 0.04 per m3 (or 1 detector covering 27 m3, hence an approximate 3 x 3
x 3 m3 volume).
Geometry Modelling
The FLACS geometry model for the Prinos Lamda Explosion Risk Analysis is based on the following files
and drawings provided by ODE:
 Microstation dgn files;
 Navis Model;
 Layout drawings
Congestion Factors
Based on DNV GL data base for a similar platform, the as build model will contain on average a
congestion factor of 2.56 m/m3. This factor is defined as the sum of lengths of all objects in the area
(including pipes, tubing, structure, cabling, support, etc.), divided by the total volume of the area
considered. DNV GL proposes to use this factor for Prinos Lamda wellhead platform. The distribution of
dimensions of the objects (boxes and cylinders) follows DNV GL’s standard database as given in
Table 2-1 below.
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1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
Table 2-1: Congestion distribution

Sum
(m/m3)
Box side dimension
-
Boxes (m) 0.025 0.075 0.15 0.35 0.75 1
Congestion factor
1.41
(m/m3) 0.72 0.18 0.23 0.16 0.07 0.06
Cylinder diameter (m) 0.03 0.10 0.18 0.30 0.58 0.79 -
Cylinders Congestion factor
1.15
(m/m3) 0.23 0.09 0.22 0.43 0.17 0.01
Total (m/m3) 2.56
Meteorological data
The metocean data was received from ODE (Ref. 1 & 2), where:
 The representative air temperature is based on a mean value of 15.8C.
 The above is also assumed as the mean deck and sea surface temperatures.
 Based on Table 2-2 below, the prevailing wind direction is from North East and the selected
predominant wind speed is 5m/s.
Table 2-2: Wind probabilities.

337.5 22.5 67.5 112.5 157.5 202.5 247.5 292.5 Total
22.5 67.5 112.5 157.5 202.5 247.5 292.5 337.5
29 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 29 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001
27 28 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.001
26 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 25 0 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0.003
23 24 0 0.006 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.007
22 23 0 0.006 0.001 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.009
21 22 0 0.018 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.019
20 21 0 0.016 0 0 0.004 0 0 0 0.021
19 20 0 0.036 0.004 0 0.007 0.006 0 0 0.054
18 19 0 0.077 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.003 0 0 0.095
17 18 0.001 0.109 0.004 0 0.016 0.004 0 0 0.135
16 17 0.001 0.150 0.010 0 0.019 0.003 0 0 0.185
15 16 0.013 0.243 0.018 0.001 0.025 0.012 0.001 0 0.314
14 15 0.010 0.348 0.027 0.001 0.042 0.016 0.006 0 0.451
13 14 0.030 0.451 0.036 0.009 0.048 0.024 0.013 0.001 0.612
12 13 0.034 0.784 0.061 0.007 0.071 0.062 0.012 0 1.033
11 12 0.048 1.152 0.089 0.019 0.077 0.083 0.031 0.003 1.503
10 11 0.085 1.702 0.132 0.027 0.077 0.094 0.046 0.012 2.175
9 10 0.121 2.379 0.216 0.028 0.104 0.129 0.068 0.024 3.070
8 9 0.205 3.117 0.362 0.039 0.180 0.183 0.104 0.036 4.226
7 8 0.369 3.778 0.637 0.067 0.246 0.330 0.159 0.043 5.629
6 7 0.568 4.315 0.937 0.089 0.348 0.513 0.177 0.119 7.068
5 6 0.881 4.537 1.168 0.153 0.634 0.866 0.373 0.205 8.817
4 5 1.262 4.342 1.510 0.263 1.085 1.372 0.615 0.362 10.810
3 4 1.525 3.614 1.777 0.475 1.528 1.820 0.866 0.717 12.321
2 3 1.522 2.558 1.931 0.981 1.875 1.925 1.128 0.891 12.811
1 2 1.553 1.977 1.878 1.553 1.989 1.998 1.283 1.033 13.265
0 1 1.931 2.024 1.970 1.881 2.062 1.974 1.809 1.714 15.366
Total 10.161 37.741 12.774 5.596 10.456 11.420 6.693 5.160 100.000
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1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
Time Dependent Ignition Modelling

The DNV GL ExpressFire probabilistic tool used for the Explosion Risk Analysis applies the Time
Dependant Ignition Intensity Model (TDIIM), to calculate internal ignition probabilities. This model is
detailed by Ref. 3 & 4.
The ignition probabilities (intensities) used in the TDIIM model are given in Table 2-4, which includes the
basis and proposed adjustments to account for the age and maintenance regimes that will apply.
Note that, the ignition sources can be shut down following detection of a leak, which is accounted for in
the TDIIM modelling.
The number of hot work hours in classified areas (i.e. within the process area) per year is:
 40 hours class A (welding, grinding)
 0 hours class B (use of non-ex electrical equipment etc.)
All hot work class A in the process areas are assumed to be performed with a protective ‘habitat’ and the
model enables a reliability to be assigned to a habitat in eliminating ignition potential. 0% reliability will
be assumed (default).
2.4.1 Ignition Sources

The Time Dependant Ignition Intensity Model (TDIIM) used in ExpressFire corresponds to the calculation
of delayed ignition probabilities.
The TDIIM is based upon research completed after the BFETS Phase 2 full scale experiments. The model
was developed as part of the DNV ExpressFire software and is the standard approach used in the North
Sea for explosion modelling and recommended in NORSOK Z-013 and by UKOOA for probabilistic
explosion analysis. It is used to give results based on the transient cloud size development, the number
of local ignition sources and the equipment ignition probabilities.
Within the TDIM model ignition, sources within each module are grouped into the following categories:
 Hot Works;
 Electrical Equipment;
 Rotating Machinery;
 Pumps;
 Turbines; and
 Compressors.
 Personnel; and
 Other Ignition Sources.
The number of ignition sources is based upon counting each type of ignition source within all of the
flammable clouds simulated during the dispersion simulations for each ‘representative segment’. The
counting within the flammable cloud is based upon the information (equipment list, P&IDs, layouts, etc.)
supplied by the client.
The number of ignition sources is confirmed prior to the commencement of the ExpressFire simulations.
The ignition sources to be used for this study are given Table 2-3 below.
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1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
Table 2-3:Ignition Sources

Age Factor Ignition source Number of sources
1 Hot Works 40
2 Electrical Equipment 1
3 Pump 2
4 Compressor 0
5 Other 1
6 Personnel 1
7 Other equipment 1
8 Cranes 1
9 Generator/Turbine 0
Each ignition source has continuous gas ignition intensity and discrete gas intensity. Hot works are taken
as a continuous gas ignition source with a frequency based upon the annual percentage of Hot Works.
The ignition source intensities for the other equipment / ignition source types are given in Table 2-4
below.
Table 2-4: Ignition Source Intensity in TDIIM
Ignition source Continuous gas intensity Discrete gas intensity

Hot Works - -
Electrical Equipment 2.60E-06 2.70E-08
Pump 9.60E-05 2.10E-07
Compressor 2.30E-03 5.10E-06
Other 1.30E-06 1.70E-08
Personnel 3.00E-06 4.00E-08
Other equipment 2.60E-06 2.10E-09
Cranes 9.60E-05 2.10E-07
Generator/Turbine 3.50E-03 6.20E-06
2.4.2 Ignition Source Shutdown

As discussed in Assumption 2.4, the probabilistic ExpressFire calculations use the Time Dependent
Ignition Intensity Model (TDIIM) and allow for each source to be shut down after leak detection.
Based on DNV experience of typical North Sea platforms:

 Electrical equipment: 90% shutdown after 20 seconds;
 Pump: 100% shutdown after 20 seconds;
 Compressors and Turbines: 100% shutdown after 120 seconds;
 Personnel: All the personnel to have left the area after 60 seconds;
 Other: cannot be shutdown (e.g. lightning and static);
 Other equipment: includes equipment that is possible to shut down but not included in any
group. It is assumed that they are 100% shut down after 20s.
ode

1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
Isolation and blowdown times

The basis of the assumed isolation and blowdown times for topsides releases is:
 Automatic detection and ESD / SDV initiation is assumed.
The ESD/SDV valves are assumed to close around 30s after detection.
Time varying releases

The discharge calculations conducted within the risk model are based on the variation of the release rate
with time. The duration of the release, is based on combination of the release rate profile and the
isolatable inventory assigned to each section (or to the inventory of two sections in the case of partial
isolation). Note that for partial isolation, where two inventories are combined, the model treats the
combined inventory as being at the conditions defined for the section from which the release initially
occurs.
Selection and characterisation of representative segments

The dispersion scenarios will be run for leaks originating in the Production Area. In particular, the
releases will be modelled as originated from the Production Header. The Production Area on the Prinos
Lamda Wellhead Platform is the area with the highest explosion risk due to a combination of:
 Confinement due to the presence of two plated decks and a blastwall
 Congestion due to the presence of pipework
 Presence of several failure cases that can potentially result in the accumulation of gas in the area
A combination of release rates, leak directions, wind direction and wind speed will be selected in order to
study the dispersion behaviour of accidental releases originating from the Production Header. The
selection of these conditions will aim at including the potential worst cases in terms of the amount of
flammable mass accumulating in the Production Area. In total, 24 dispersion scenarios will be run. The
DNV GL method (based on obtaining a mathematical representation of all the possible release
combinations) will eventually allow taking into account the contribution of combinations not explicitly
modelled.
The releases from the Production Header are assumed to be representative of any other release
occurring in the Production Area. In order to obtain the final figure of the explosion risk, the overall
frequency of release of all the other failure cases belonging to the Production Area will be assigned to the
modelled releases.
Table 2-5 below summarizes the isolatable sections that contribute to the explosion risk in the Production
Area, data set received from ODE on 24th of October 2016. As already mentioned, the frequency of all
these sections will be assigned to the representative releases (Production Header).
The composition of the releases to be modeled in the CFD dispersion scenarios will be evaluated by
“flashing” the stream number 2 (Epsilon Single Well - post choke) of the Heat and Material Balances [5].
In order to minimise the amount of water in the stream, the case Early Life – Summer will be
ode

1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
conservatively considered. The DNV GL code PHAST will be used to calculate the expansion of the stream
from process conditions to atmosphere.
The Blowout releases will be modelled with a flow rate of 5.5 kg/s [6].
Table 2-5: Isolatable sections that contribute to the explosion risk in the Production Area
Description Isolatable Section ID Inventory (m3) [6] stream
Production Blowout - 1
1
(Xtrees)
Production Header 2 2.425 2
Pig Launcher 3 0.075 3
Gas Lift Manifold 4 0.840 11
Export Riser (Topsides) 5a/b/c 201.174 3
Gas Lift Import Riser 11
6a/a/b/c 72.531
(Topsides)
Frequency of Release
The release frequencies for the isolatable sections listed in Table 2-5 are presented in Table 2-6 below.
Table 2-6: Release frequencies
Leakage Frequencies Distribution

Id Isolatable Section Full
Tiny Small Medium Large Total
Bore
1 Production Trees (9 off) 4.01E-04 4.01E-04
2 Production Header 3.27E-02 1.40E-02 7.19E-03 7.81E-04 1.07E-04 5.47E-02
3 Pig Launcher 4.27E-05 2.10E-05 1.20E-05 2.56E-06 4.64E-07 7.88E-05
4 Gas Lift Manifold 2.23E-02 9.50E-03 5.37E-03 1.55E-04 0.00E+00 3.74E-02
5a Export Riser (Topsides) 1.83E-04 2.05E-04 6.10E-05 3.74E-05 2.71E-05 5.13E-04
5b Export Riser (Splash Zone) 0.00E+00 3.28E-04 8.19E-05 8.19E-05 5.46E-05 5.46E-04
5c Export Riser (Subsea) 0.00E+00 8.98E-04 2.01E-04 6.81E-05 1.09E-04 1.28E-03
6a Gas Lift Import Riser (Topsides) 2.05E-04 2.13E-04 6.66E-05 4.60E-05 2.18E-05 5.53E-04
6b Gas Lift Import Riser (Splash Zone) 0.00E+00 3.28E-04 8.19E-05 8.19E-05 5.46E-05 5.46E-04
6c Gas Lift Import Riser (Subsea) 0.00E+00 8.98E-04 2.01E-04 6.81E-05 1.09E-04 1.28E-03
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1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
Well Intervention
The blowout frequencies associated to the well interventions are:
• 7.8x10-5 per coiled tubing intervention; and
• 1.0x10-4 per workover intervention.
Table 2-7 below summarizes the Number of Rig Intervention and Coiled Tubing operations per year that
will be used to evaluate the effective Well Intervention release frequencies [6].
Table 2-7: Number of Rig Intervention and Coiled Tubing operations per year
Number of
Activity Interventions per
year
Coiled Tubing 4
Rig Intervention 0.5

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1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
3 REFERENCES
[1] Metocean Criteria – Kavala Greece – BMT ARGOSS Report - rp_a15183_p1r1.pdf
[2] Wind data - bmt_a15183_aegean_sea_results_winds-2.xls
[3] Time Dependant Ignition Intensity Model (TDIIM), DNV-report 96-3629, rev. 04
[4] JIP guideline for use of JIP Ignition Model, DNV report no. 99-3193, rev.0.
[5] H&MB - 293902-LAM-PRO-HB-60005-Rev 0 - Heat and Material Balance
[6] e-mail form ODE to DNV GL on the 11/03/2016.

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1ZV0IER-1, Rev. 1
About DNV GL
Driven by our purpose of safeguarding life, property and the environment, DNV GL enables organizations
to advance the safety and sustainability of their business. We provide classification and technical
assurance along with software and independent expert advisory services to the maritime, oil and gas,
and energy industries. We also provide certification services to customers across a wide range of
industries. Operating in more than 100 countries, our 16,000 professionals are dedicated to helping our
customers make the world safer, smarter and greener.
APPENDIX M. DNVGL EXPLOSION RISK ANALYSIS
(69 pages)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 143 of 153

PRINOS LAMDA ERA STUDY
Prinos Lamda ERA Study

ODE Ltd
Report No.: 2, Rev. 2

Document No.: 1ZV0IER-3
Date: 2016-02-20
Project name: Prinos Lamda ERA Study DNV GL Limited Oil & Gas
Report title: Prinos Lamda ERA Study London SHE Risk
Customer: ODE Ltd, Palace House
Customer contact: Vincent GANTHY 3 Cathedral Street
Date of issue: 2016-02-20 SE19DE London
Project No.: 10016868 United Kingdom
Organisation unit: London SHE Risk Tel: +44 (0)20 3816 4000
Report No.: 002, Rev. 2
Document No.: 1ZV0IER-3
Applicable contract(s) governing the provision of this Report:
Objective:
Carry out an Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA) for the Prinos Lamda Wellhead platform and provide the
explosion loads for all targets within the platform.
Prepared by: Verified by: Approved by:
Tarek Bengherbia Gabriele Ferrara Gabriele Ferrara

Principal Consultant Principal Consultant Principal Consultant
[Name] [Name]
[title] [title]
[Name] [Name]
[title] [title]
Copyright © DNV GL 2017. All rights reserved. Unless otherwise agreed in writing: (i) This publication or parts thereof may not be
copied, reproduced or transmitted in any form, or by any means, whether digitally or otherwise; (ii) The content of this publication
shall be kept confidential by the customer; (iii) No third party may rely on its contents; and (iv) DNV GL undertakes no duty of care
toward any third party. Reference to part of this publication which may lead to misinterpretation is prohibited. DNV GL and the Horizon
Graphic are trademarks of DNV GL AS.
DNV GL Distribution: Keywords:

☐ Unrestricted distribution (internal and external) [Keywords]
☐ Unrestricted distribution within DNV GL Group
☐ Unrestricted distribution within DNV GL contracting party
☐ No distribution (confidential)
Rev. No. Date Reason for Issue Prepared by Verified by Approved by

0 29-04-2016 Issue for comments Tarek Bengherbia Gabriele Ferrara Gabriele Ferrara
1 20-11-2016 Second Issue Tarek Bengherbia Gabriele Ferrara Gabriele Ferrara
2 20-02-2017 Final Issue Tarek Bengherbia Gabriele Ferrara Gabriele Ferrara
DNV GL – Report No. 002, Rev. 2 – www.dnvgl.com Page i

Table of contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 3
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 4
Background 4
Study Objectives 4
Scope of Work 4
2 KEY ASSUMPTIONS ....................................................................................................... 5
3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS.............................................................................................. 5
Geometry Model 5
Anticipated Congestion Density 5
Ventilation analysis 6
Dispersion analysis 9
Explosion analysis 11
4 PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 15

Leak frequencies 15
Gas detection 16
ESD and Blowdown 16
Ignition sources and shutdown times for ignition sources 16
Probabilistic Results 18
5 CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................... 19
6 REFERENCES.............................................................................................................. 20
APPENDIX A DNV Methodology for Probabilistic Explosion Analysis

APPENDIX B CFD FLACS 3D model- Geometry Presentation
APPENDIX C Explosion Scenarios
APPENDIX D Exceedance Curves – Geometry model with a Blast Wall.
APPENDIX E Prinos Lamda ERA for a configuration with and without a Blast Wall
DNV GL – Report No. 002, Rev. 2 – www.dnvgl.com Page ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report presents the results from the explosion risk assessment carried out for the Prinos Lamda
Wellhead platform.
The overall objective of the explosion analyses is to provide the explosion loads for the Blast Wall, LER
wall, deck and ceiling in the production area. Ventilation, dispersion and explosion simulations (which
together form the basis of the consequence analysis) were carried out using the FLACS CFD software
version 10.3. These simulations were performed for a representative segment in the production area.
The probabilistic assessment was conducted using DNV GL’s in house program EXPRESS. The
assessment takes into account the consequence analysis from FLACS (ventilation, dispersion and
explosion), leak frequency data, number of ignition sources, process parameters and facility specific
information (e.g. ESD parameters).
Based on the assessment, no loads were observed for all targets within the platform for the 10-4
frequency (events/year). For the 10-5 frequency, the DLB loads are between 0.83 barg and 0.95 barg.
The calculated explosion risk is low due to a combination of the following factors:
- Good ventilation
- Relatively small clouds (the size of the platform is limited and this limits the maximum length of
the flame)
- Low overall ignition probability
DNV GL – Report No. 002, Rev. 2 – www.dnvgl.com 3

1 INTRODUCTION
Background
Offshore Design Engineering Limited (ODE), hereafter referred to as the CLIENT, are carrying out the EPC
activity for the Prinos Lamda Wellhead platform. As part of the EPC activities, DNV GL has been asked to
perform a probabilistic explosion analysis for the platform.
The platform is open and consists of the following decks:

- Drilling deck;
- Mezzanine deck;
- Production deck; and
- Cellar deck.
DNV GL has previously carried out the ERA for 60% geometry model, to investigate the effect of the
Blast Wall on the explosion loads, /1/, a summary of the results is provided in Appendix E. The design
has since progressed. This study will address the impact of the recent design changes on the explosion
loads for the geometry model with Blast Wall.
Study Objectives
The overall objective of the probabilistic explosion overpressure analysis is to evaluate the explosion risk
on the Prinos Lamda Wellhead platform.
In particular, the key objectives of the study are to:
 Provide explosion design overpressure loads (static and dynamic) on specific targets of the Prinos
Lamda Facility;
 Provide recommendations to reduce the explosion design accidental loads if required.
The design loads will be evaluated by determining the explosion overpressure exceedance curves for
various target locations of interest. The explosion design accidental loads are inputs into the structural
analysis.
Scope of Work
The scope of work of this analysis includes the following tasks:
 Build the 3D geometry model of the wellhead platform in FLACS software.
 Perform ventilation simulations to determine the leak positions and wind directions that can
potentially lead to the largest flammable cloud volumes, as well as to provide input for the
probabilistic analysis.
 Perform CFD gas dispersion simulations for release scenarios as an input into the CFD explosion
analysis;
 Perform CFD explosion simulations to determine the explosion overpressure at key targets within
the wellhead platform;
 Determine the explosion risk (in the form of exceedance curves) for the key targets; and
 Provide conclusions and recommendations on the explosion risk throughout the facility.

All of the simulations have been carried out using the latest version of FLACS (V10.3) software with the
risk calculations carried out with DNV GL’s in-house tool EXPRESS.
2 KEY ASSUMPTIONS
All the assumptions used for the probabilistic explosion analysis are given in the Assumptions Register, /2/.
Key assumptions of the analysis are:
 The geometry model for the Wellhead platform is based upon the 60% CAD model provided to
DNV GL in October 2016. The model was verified for analyses during the geometry review
meetings.
 The leak frequency data was provided to DNV GL which is based on the new updated inventories,
/5/.
3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
The CFD explosion analysis is performed for a geometry model with a Blast Wall.
Geometry Model
The 3D geometry model was built using the FLACS CAD module (CASD), which was based on the CAD files
supplied by ODE.
A geometry review meeting was held with ODE on the 17th of October 2016. This was to ensure that the 3D
model was an accurate representation of the Prinos Lamda CAD model. Details about the 3D model used in
the analyses are given in Appendix B.
Anticipated Congestion Density

After the model was imported to the FLACS software, a congestion density assessment was performed to
determine the amount of small bore piping, cable trays and other box structures that exist in the CAD
model. It was found that the existing congestion density is of an order of 2 m/m3.
Based on DNV GL data base for similar platforms, the as build model should contain on average a
congestion factor of 2.6 m/m3. This factor is defined as the sum of lengths of all objects in the area
(including pipes, tubing, structure, cabling, support, etc.), divided by the total volume of the area
considered. DNV GL proposed to use this factor for Prinos Lamda wellhead platform. This was agreed with
ODE during the geometry verification meeting.
The distribution of dimensions of the objects (boxes and cylinders) follows DNV GL’s standard database as
given in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1: Congestion distribution
Sum
(m/m3)
Box side dimension (m) 0.025 0.075 0.15 0.35 0.75 1 -
Boxes
Congestion factor
1.41
(m/m3) 0.72 0.18 0.23 0.16 0.07 0.06
Cylinder diameter (m) 0.03 0.10 0.18 0.30 0.58 0.79 -
Cylinders Congestion factor
1.15
(m/m3) 0.23 0.09 0.22 0.43 0.17 0.01
Total (m/m3) 2.56
Ventilation analysis
Ventilation simulations were carried out to determine the ventilation flow within the production deck
area. Eight FLACS ventilation simulations were carried out for each geometry configuration, covering the 8
main wind directions (N, NE, E etc.).
It should be noted that all the wind directions indicated in the report are with respect to the platform, i.e.,
wind from North is the same as wind from Platform North, etc.
3.3.1 Wind statistics

The wind data used for the ventilation simulations were provided by ODE Ltd, /3/, /4/. The percentage
distribution of the wind speeds for the various wind directions is given in Table 3-2. It should be noted
that:
 The representative ambient temperature used in the study is based on the annual mean value of
15.8 Co.
 The average wind speed is about 5 m/s.
 The predominant wind direction is wind from North East with a percentage occurrence of around
37%, see Table 3-2.

Table 3-2: Percentage distribution of wind speeds for different wind directions
337.5 22.5 67.5 112.5 157.5 202.5 247.5 292.5 Total
22.5 67.5 112.5 157.5 202.5 247.5 292.5 337.5
29 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 29 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001
27 28 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.001
26 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 25 0 0.001 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0.003
23 24 0 0.006 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.007
22 23 0 0.006 0.001 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.009
21 22 0 0.018 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.019
20 21 0 0.016 0 0 0.004 0 0 0 0.021
19 20 0 0.036 0.004 0 0.007 0.006 0 0 0.054
18 19 0 0.077 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.003 0 0 0.095
17 18 0.001 0.109 0.004 0 0.016 0.004 0 0 0.135
16 17 0.001 0.150 0.010 0 0.019 0.003 0 0 0.185
15 16 0.013 0.243 0.018 0.001 0.025 0.012 0.001 0 0.314
14 15 0.010 0.348 0.027 0.001 0.042 0.016 0.006 0 0.451
13 14 0.030 0.451 0.036 0.009 0.048 0.024 0.013 0.001 0.612
12 13 0.034 0.784 0.061 0.007 0.071 0.062 0.012 0 1.033
11 12 0.048 1.152 0.089 0.019 0.077 0.083 0.031 0.003 1.503
10 11 0.085 1.702 0.132 0.027 0.077 0.094 0.046 0.012 2.175
9 10 0.121 2.379 0.216 0.028 0.104 0.129 0.068 0.024 3.070
8 9 0.205 3.117 0.362 0.039 0.180 0.183 0.104 0.036 4.226
7 8 0.369 3.778 0.637 0.067 0.246 0.330 0.159 0.043 5.629
6 7 0.568 4.315 0.937 0.089 0.348 0.513 0.177 0.119 7.068
5 6 0.881 4.537 1.168 0.153 0.634 0.866 0.373 0.205 8.817
4 5 1.262 4.342 1.510 0.263 1.085 1.372 0.615 0.362 10.810
3 4 1.525 3.614 1.777 0.475 1.528 1.820 0.866 0.717 12.321
2 3 1.522 2.558 1.931 0.981 1.875 1.925 1.128 0.891 12.811
1 2 1.553 1.977 1.878 1.553 1.989 1.998 1.283 1.033 13.265
0 1 1.931 2.024 1.970 1.881 2.062 1.974 1.809 1.714 15.366
Total 10.161 37.741 12.774 5.596 10.456 11.420 6.693 5.160 100.000
3.3.2 Ventilation results

Eight ventilation simulations were performed for the average wind speed of 5m/s, for the eight main
wind directions - N (00), NE (450), E (900), SE (1350), S (1800), SW (-1350), W (-900) and NW (-450).
The ventilation results are presented in terms of the Air Changes per Hour (ACH). The air change is
calculated as the volumetric air flow rate per hour within the Production Deck area divided by the total
volume. The calculations is based on the simulated wind speed (5m/s) and a linear
interpolation/extrapolation for all wind speeds listed in Table 3-2 (since the variation of the volumetric
air flow is linear with the upwind air speed)
The ACH is shown in Figure 3-1 for each wind direction. It is noted that the wind from the North direction
gives the lowest ventilation rate, with wind from the West and East giving the highest. Wind from North
gives the lowest ventilation due to the location of the Blast Wall and LER room which act as a
considerable blockage, causing the flow to separate, creating a region of low speed and recirculating flow
behind.

N
160
140
NW 120 NE
100
80
60
40
20
W 0 E
SW SE
Figure3-1: Air change per hour within the Production Deck and the ceiling.
3.3.3 Air change exceedance results

The ventilation rate exceeds 12 ACH for 95% of the time. Based on the IP 15 criterion, /6/, it can be
concluded that the platform has good ventilation. Results are presented in Table 3-3 below.
Table 3-3: 95% ACH exceedance

Case study Area 95% ACH
exceedance
Geometry model with a Production deck 30

Blast Wall

Dispersion analysis
The dispersion scenarios were run for leaks originating in the Production Area. In particular, the releases
were modelled as originated from the Production Header. The Production area on the Prinos Lamda
Wellhead Platform is the area with the highest explosion risk due to a combination of:
• Confinement due to the presence of two plated decks and a Blast Wall
• Congestion due to the presence of pipework
• Presence of several failure cases that can potentially result in the accumulation of gas in the area
A combination of release rates, leak directions, wind direction and wind speed was selected in order to
study the dispersion behaviour of accidental releases originating from the Production Header. The
selection of these conditions aimed at including the potential worst cases in terms of the amount of
flammable mass accumulating in the Production area. The DNV GL method (based on obtaining a
mathematical representation of all the possible release combinations) eventually allows taking into
account the contribution of combinations not explicitly modelled.
The releases from the Production Header were assumed to be representative of any other release
occurring in the Production area. In order to obtain the final figure of the explosion risk, the overall
frequency of release of all the other failure cases belonging to the Production Area was assigned to the
modelled releases.
A total of 24 dispersion scenarios were carried out.
 The gas stream used in the analyses is stream # 2 (Epsilon Single Well - post choke), taken from
Heat and Material Balances report, /7/.
 Discharge calculation was performed using DNV GL Phast using stream #2 for the given pressure
and temperature. The final composition used in the CFD analyses is given in Table 3-4. Note that
the Hydrogen Sulphide was ignored since it has no effect on the explosion calculations.
Table 3-4: Gas composition used for dispersion analysis

Component Mole fraction
N-BUTANE 0.07
ETHANE 0.13
METHANE 0.60
PROPANE 0.14
N-HEXANE 0.02
N-PENTANE 0.04
Results from the simulations for both configurations are given in Table 3-5. The maximum gas cloud (Q9)
recorded from the simulation is approximately 1700m3 (case number 21) corresponding to
approximately 25% filling fraction. Figure 3-2 provides the extent and locations of flammable clouds for
Case (21) corresponding to a leak pointing North with wind from North at wind speed of 12 m/s. The
results are presented in terms of ERLFL which is a measure of the fuel concentration compared to the
LFL concentration. The LFL value varies with gas type and oxygen concentration in the mixture. In our
case, 100 ERLFL represents a lean mixture around LFL, and the 450 ERLFL represents the upper
flammability limits. The greenish part is the near stoichiometric value.

Table 3-5: Release scenarios performed for dispersion analysis
Release Conditions Wind Conditions With Blast Wall
Leak jet Wind dir.

Leak rate Wind speed Time at
Case no. direction (to (from Q9 (m3)
(kg/s) (m/s) max Q9 (s)
platform platform
angle) angle)
1 20 Up N 7 481 1391
2 20 Down NE 3 405 860
3 20 N N 8 407 1205
4 20 E E 2 414 1171
5 20 S S 4 411 823
6 20 W W 2 415 836
7 40 Up N 10 456 1113
8 40 Down NE 5 405 642
9 40 N N 2 448 890
10 40 E E 5 407 1065
11 40 S S 5 452 663
12 40 W W 4 119 627
13 80 Up N 10 478 1183
14 80 Down NE 5 416 524
15 80 N N 12 416 1591
16 80 E E 5 122 843
17 80 S S 8 20 614
18 80 W W 5 114 560
19 100 Up N 12 466 1121
20 100 Down NE 10 405 588
21 100 N N 12 412 1673
22 100 E E 7 114 802
23 100 S S 20 106 817
24 100 W W 10 107 578

Figure3-2: Plan and elevation views of the flammable cloud (Q9). Case (21) corresponds to a
leak pointing North with wind from North at wind speed of 12 m/s. (ERLFL value of around
250 represents a near Stoichiometric mix).
Explosion analysis
Dispersion simulations give the extent of the maximum steady-state equivalent stoichiometric gas cloud
within the production deck. These cloud sizes are then used in the DNV GL methodology for explosion
consequence analysis. A total of 35 explosion scenarios were performed within the production deck, this
takes into account different gas cloud sizes, cloud locations, cloud shapes and ignition locations.
Local overpressures are measured on panels located on the Blast Wall, south wall, Production deck and
the ceiling. Note that panels of the same size (4 m x 4 m) are used for all target areas, which allows the
comparison between pressure loading on different panels.
The maximum local pressure (overpressure) for each target are used to create response surfaces for the
target, which is a statistical technique used to determine the response (e.g. overpressures) caused by
different explosion scenarios. These response surfaces, along with the response surfaces from dispersion
simulations are used as input to DNV GL EXPRESS tool for probabilistic analysis.
A summary of the explosion scenarios performed for both models is given in Table 3-6 and details of the
gas cloud sizes and locations as well as the ignition locations are presented in Appendix C.
Note that a maximum Q9 value of 4000 m3 was used in the assessment. This value was not reached in
the dispersion simulations and is mainly used for curve fitting purposes.
Table 3-6: Summary of explosion scenarios
Parameter Value
Number of explosion scenarios simulated 35
Volume of monitor region (m3) 6950
Maximum fill fraction 0.58
Minimum fill fraction 0.03
Maximum cloud volume (m3) 4000
Minimum cloud volume (m3) 200

3.5.1 Explosion results for the model with Blast wall
The overpressures recorded on the Blast Wall, ceiling and production deck are shown in Figure 3-3 to
Figure 3-5 respectively. The FLACS results for all the simulated gas clouds are presented in blue diamond
shape. The Figures also show the response surfaces used in in the probabilistic assessment.
Figure3-6 through Figure3-7 show the pressure contours for explosions from a 2400 m3 cloud. The size
and location of the gas cloud used in this simulation is shown in the black box. The small cross illustrates
the approximate location for the ignition source. Both plan view at production deck (+13m elevation)
and an elevation view (cross the platform) are shown. Note that, the gas cloud sizes and locations as
well as the ignition locations used for each explosion scenario are presented in Appendix C Table C1.
20
15
Pressure (barg)
10
FLACS results
Response surface
5
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Cloud Volume (m3)
Figure 3-3: Explosion response surface for the Blast Wall. FLACS results for all the simulated
cases are presented in blue dots.

20
18 FLACS results
16 Response surface, f1
14
Pressure (barg)
12
10
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Cloud Volume (m3)
Figure 3-4: Explosion response surface for the Ceiling. FLACS results for all the simulated
cases are presented in blue dots.
14
FLACS results
12 Response surface
10
Pressure (barg)
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Cloud Volume (m3)
Figure 3-5: Explosion response surface for the Production deck. FLACS results for all the
simulated cases are presented in blue dots.

Gas
cloud
Ignition Gas cloud

point
Ignition
point
Figure3-6: Pressure contours obtained from a 2,400 m3 cloud. The cloud location and ignition
point are marked-(case 08, ignition South West). Configuration with a Blast Wall.
Ignition Gas cloud

point
Gas cloud
Ignition point
Figure3-7: Pressure contours obtained from a 2,400 m3 cloud. The cloud location and ignition
point are marked-(case 07, ignition South East). Configuration with a Blast Wall.

4 PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS
The probabilistic explosion analysis was performed using DNV GL’s in-house EXPRESS. The EXPRESS
program uses the response surfaces developed from the consequence simulations (ventilation, dispersion
and explosion) as well as leak frequency and ignition data to derive exceedance curves for selected
targets. This section presents the input data used in the probabilistic analysis.
Leak frequencies
The release frequencies for the isolatable sections used in the assessment are listed in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1: Isolatable sections that contribute to the explosion risk in the Production Area
Isolatable
Description Inventory (m3) Total frequency
Section ID
Production Blowout (Xtrees) 1 - 4.01E-04
Production Header 2 2.425 5.47E-02
Pig Launcher 3 0.075 7.88E-05
Gas Lift Manifold 4 0.840 3.74E-02
Export Riser 5a/b/c 201.174 2.33E-3
Gas Lift Import Riser 6a/a/b/c 72.531 2.37E-3
As already mentioned, a properly selected process segment (the Production Header indicated as
“representative segment”) was used in the consequence assessment aiming at representing the
consequences of the whole group of segments. In order to recover the overall explosion risk figure, the
representative segment was then assigned the frequency of release of all the other segments.
The releases from the Production Header were assumed to be representative of any other release
occurring in the Production Area. In order to obtain the final figure of the explosion risk, the overall
frequency of release of all the other failure cases belonging to the Production Area was assigned to the
modelled releases.
Conservatively, the frequencies of those segments with no potential for gas accumulation on the
Production Area (the subsea sections of the risers) were also considered in the final run.
4.1.1 Producing Wells

The overall frequency of release from producing wells is 4.45x10-5 per well per year.
4.1.2 Well Intervention

The blowout frequencies associated to the well interventions are:
• 7.8x10-5 per coiled tubing intervention; and
• 1.0x10-4 per workover intervention.
Table 4-2 below summarizes the Number of Rig Intervention and Coiled Tubing operations per year that
will be used to evaluate the effective Well Intervention release frequencies, /8/.

Table 4-2: Number of Rig Intervention and Coiled Tubing operations per year
Activity Number of
Interventions per year
Coiled Tubing 4
Rig Intervention 0.5
Gas detection
Emergency shutdown is set to a gas detection level of 20% LFL gas concentration on all detectors. The
gas cloud growth is modelled in EXPRESS, and detection is activated when the volume of the 20% LFL
cloud reaches the average distance between two detectors. In EXPRESS, the detectors were modelled as
evenly distributed over the volume in each module.
Gas detectors were assumed 3 meters apart, meaning a gas detector density of 0.04 gas detectors per
m3 for all areas, /2/.
ESD and Blowdown

All ESD valves in the analysis were set to be totally closed 30 seconds after gas detection. Blowdown was
assumed to be manual.
Ignition sources and shutdown times for ignition sources

The time dependent ignition model (TDIM) was used in the analysis. The model is part of the DNV
EXPRESS software used for calculating the probabilistic explosion risk. Within the TDIIM model, ignition
sources are grouped into the following categories:
 Hot Works;
 Electrical Equipment;
 Pumps;
 Cranes;
 Personnel;
 Other Ignition Sources.
The total number of ignition sources for each category used in the study is specified in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3: Ignition sources used in probabilistic calculations
Item Ignition source Total
1 Hot Work 40
2 Electrical equipment 2
3 Pump 1
4 Compressor 0
5 Other 1
6 Personnel 1
7 Other Equipment 1
8 Generator/Turbine 0
9 Crane 1
4.4.1 Ignition Source Shutdown

The probabilistic EXPRESS calculations use the Time Dependent Ignition Intensity Model, /10/ and allow
for each source to be shut down after leak detection.
The ignition shutdown times used are as follows:
- Pumps and electrical engines: These items are assumed to be 100% shut down after 20 seconds.
- Electrical equipment: The total deck area in each monitor region (explosion area) is accounted
for. 90% of the discrete electrical equipment shuts down 20 seconds after gas detection.
- Other: This ignition source is defined as lightning, static electricity, and other unknown sources.
These ignition sources cannot be shut down and therefore are acting during the entire simulation.
- Other Equipment: Includes equipment that is possible to shut down but not included in any other
group. It is assumed that they are 100% shut down after 20 s.
- Personnel: Based on the layout drawings and an average speed of 1 m/s to a typical Module, it is
assumed that personnel would take 60 seconds to evacuate the process area of each deck.

Probabilistic Results
The probabilistic analyses have been carried out according to the NORSOK Z-013 standard, /9/, utilising
the response surfaces developed from the ventilation, dispersion and explosion results. The probabilistic
analyses takes into account the wind rose data, leak frequencies and equipment ignition probabilities.
Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 provides the explosion loads and dynamic pressure for the targets considered in
the study. The DLBs are given for a 1 in 10,000 year event and 1 in 100,000 year event.
The main findings are:
 No DLB loads are observed for any targets for the 10-4 frequency (events/year);
 The predicted DLB loads for 10-5 frequency (events/year) are between 0.83 barg and 0.95 barg.
Table 4-4: Explosion Loads

SLB (10-3 SLB (10-4
DLB (10-4 ev/year DLB (10-5 ev/year
Pulse Pulse Pulse Pulse
ev/year), or 1/3rd ev/year), or 1/3rd
Target duration, duration, duration, duration,
DLB), DLB),
ms ms ms ms
barg barg
barg barg
Blast wall 0 NA NA NA 0.95 50 0.32 79

Production 81
0 NA NA NA 0.93 54 0.31
deck
Ceiling 0 NA NA NA 0.83 57 0.28 84
Table 4-5: Dynamic pressure

DLB (10-4 SLB (10-3 yr or DLB (10-5 SLB (10-4 yr or
ev/year), 1/3rd DLB), ev/year), 1/3rd DLB)
barg Barg barg barg
Production deck 0 NA 0.6 0.2

5 CONCLUSIONS
Explosion Risk Analysis was performed using 3D Computational Fluid Dynamics simulations for
ventilation, dispersion and explosion. GEXCON FLACS software V10.3 has been used for the assessment.
The Probabilistic assessment has been performed using DNV GL EXPRESS tool.
Based and the assessment, no DLB loads for the 10-4 frequency were observed for all targets within the
platform. For the 10-5 frequency, the DLB loads are between 0.83 barg and 0.95 barg.
The calculated low explosion risk is due to a combination of the following factors:
- Good ventilation
- Relatively small clouds (the size of the platform is limited and this limits the maximum length of
the flame)
- Low overall ignition probability

6 REFERENCES
/1/ Prinos Lamda Explosion ERA Study report. DNV GL - Report No. 001 Rev. 0
/2/ Assumption register – Prinos Lamda Explosion Risk Analysis
/3/ Metocean Criteria – Kavala Greece – BMT ARGOSS Report - rp_a15183_p1r1.pdf
/4/ Wind data - bmt_a15183_aegean_sea_results_winds-2.xls
/5/ Updated Leak Frequencies.xls
/6/ IP Code Part 15 Area Classification Code 2005 3rd Edition
/7/ H&MB - 293902-LAM-PRO-HB-60005-Rev 0 - Heat and Material Balance
/8/ e-mail from ODE to DNV GL on the 11/03/2016
/9/ NORSOK Z-013 “Risk and Emergency Preparedness Assessment”, Rev. 3, Oct. 2010
/10/ Time Dependant Ignition Intensity Model (TDIIM), DNV-report 96-3629, rev. 04

APPENDIX A
DNV Methodology for Probabilistic Explosion Analysis
The DNV methodology follows the NORSOK Z-013, Annex G guidelines for explosions, /9/. The
methodology comprises of:
 Geometry modelling
 Ventilation simulations
 Dispersion simulations
 Explosion simulations
 Probabilistic analysis
These are described below.
Geometry Modelling
Geometry modelling involves producing a three dimensional (3D) model of the installations into the
FLACS graphical interface. This can be done either by converting and importing existing 3D computer
models into FLACS or, if no prior model exists, creating the model using plot plans of the facilities
supported by photographs if the facilities exist and/or client input.
The first step for studies in which 3D models already exist is to import the model in FLACS. It should be
noted that objects in the three dimensional model will be represented in FLACS as a combination of
primitive objects, namely cubes and cylinders in a Cartesian system. As a result, the FLACS model needs
to be checked for consistency against plot plans of the facilities and any dummy objects are deleted.
If 3D models are not available, general arrangement drawings and plot plans are used to manually build
the model. Note that only the large pieces of equipment and major piping are included in the model at
this stage.
An important step of geometry modelling involves adding anticipated congestion to the FLACS model.
Anticipated congestion comprises the small-bore piping, small diameter objects, and cable trays etc.
which were not modelled by hand. These small-scale objects are generally not present even when
complete 3D models exist but they have a significant influence on explosions since they generate
turbulence which in turn increases the overpressures obtained in the explosion simulations. DNV holds a
statistical database of different offshore and onshore installations and this is used in defining the
congestion density added to different structures.
Ventilation simulations
Ventilation studies are carried out to gain a qualitative understanding of the airflow patterns that exist
within different modules or areas of interest on the installations and also to derive quantitative data such
as air flowrates and air change per hour rates for each area of interest. Eight ventilation simulations are
generally carried out in which the wind direction is varied and the external wind speed is kept constant.
The main numerical output of the ventilation simulations is the flowrate for winds coming from each wind
direction.
DNV GL – Report No. 002, Rev. 2 – www.dnvgl.com A21

Dispersion simulations
Dispersion studies are carried out to calculate the volume of flammable gas clouds generated as a result
of gas leaks occurring in the area of interest. The dispersion scenarios consist of a combination of leak
rates, leak directions and wind directions which give the largest gas clouds.
The first step is to select a segment within a module or area which is used as representative for all the
segments. Representative segments are selected based on the failure cases identified in a failure case
study. Two key indicators are used in the selection process, namely the segment inventory and the leak
frequency associated with each individual segment. Segments with large leak frequencies and
inventories are prioritised and singled out. This is illustrated below.
Obtain segment
characteristics
Select (composition,
representative Define scenarios
operating
segments temperature,
pressure etc.)
Steps in the definition of dispersion scenarios
Dispersion simulations are carried out for each of the representative segments within the areas of
interest to determine the maximum steady state stoichiometric cloud size for each representative
segment for all of the combinations of wind and leak directions. The studies are carried out based on the
following considerations:
The dispersion analysis is used to identify the maximum steady state stoichiometric flammable cloud size
within the interest area from the representative segment; and
The analysis is also used to identify how and where the flammable gas cloud forms as well as the
contour of the LFL and UFL boundaries, for input into the explosion analysis.
The maximum stoichiometric flammable cloud is based upon the Q9 equivalent volume approach. For the
CFD simulations, the gas inside the interest area (and additional subsections and areas outside the
interest area) is monitored and then converted into an equivalent stoichiometric gas cloud size. This
representative cloud is denoted by Q9 and is automatically calculated as part of the FLACS simulation.
The Q9 cloud size is defined as the equivalent stoichiometric gas cloud that is most likely to give the
same explosion overpressures as the original non-stoichiometric gas cloud (i.e. the Q9 cloud is smaller
than the non-homogenous flammable cloud but will have a higher flame acceleration and volume
expansion giving similar pressures).
This method has been developed to reduce the dependency of explosion simulations on ignition location
and cloud shape and lessen the requirements for the number of explosion simulations required. This is in
agreement with NORSOK Z-013 and industry practice and has been used by DNV worldwide for explosion
simulations since GexCon introduced the concept into FLACS in 2005.

From DNV’s internal experience, industry experience and academic sources, for typical process areas, it
is known that the largest flammable gas clouds occur when the relation R between the flow of gas (Qg)
and the flow of air (Qa) is approximately the inverse of the moles of air to fuel for a stoichiometric
mixture. Mathematically the R value is expressed as:
Qg
R
Qa
Based on the ventilation conditions and the R value, a number of gas dispersion scenarios are simulated
for each of the relevant segments. The leak and wind directions are chosen to simulate the releases
which are expected to form the largest steady state stoichiometric flammable clouds. The leak directions
selected are generally the conditions which results in the majority of the flammable cloud staying within
the interest area.
The dispersion simulations are typically run for a total of up to 500 seconds for each case, including
about 100 seconds for the stabilisation of the wind flow field within the modules and around the platform.
The gas leak is initiated after this and the leak rate is ramped up from 0 to the leak rate specified and
then kept constant until the time where the flammable cloud approaches steady state. The leak is then
shut down and the cloud allowed to disperse for another 50-100 seconds. This is completed to allow the
rich areas of the cloud to lean out, which can sometimes allow the cloud to reach a larger maximum size
than during the release.
Explosion
Around thirty explosion simulations are typically carried out per area of interest for a combination of
cloud sizes, cloud shapes, cloud locations and ignition points. The maximum cloud size calculated in the
dispersion simulations are split into three smaller categories, typically 30%, 15% and 7.5%. The cloud
locations and ignition locations are varied, since different combinations of these two factors yield
different explosion overpressures. Deterministic explosion loads are obtained at monitor points and
monitor panels, and these are used to generate explosion response curves which plot the pressures
obtained at the target points against the filling fraction of the different cloud categories.
Explosion simulations are conducted for the defined areas of interest based on the findings of the
dispersion study. Response surfaces are derived which characterise the static or dynamic pressures that
are used as input into the EXPRESS probabilistic analysis
Maximum flammable Select cloud

gas cloud Define scenarios location and
for different ignition location
(From Dispersion cloud sizes for each scenario
simulations)
Steps in the definition of explosion scenarios

The FLACS software allows pressures to be read either at a point or across a surface. Prior to running the
simulations, a matrix of monitor points is created which covers the area of interest. Additional monitor
points are positioned around specific targets such as Safety Critical Equipment. Monitor panels are also
added to monitor pressures on targets such as Blast walls or decks. For each cloud category, different
combinations of cloud location, cloud orientation and ignition points are simulated. The position of the
gas clouds reflects the findings of the dispersion study, and ignition points are chosen in order to
maximise the pressures recorded at target points.
The main explosion analysis results generally consist of the maximum local panel pressures on the main
blastwalls and floors and at monitor points dispersed throughout the region of interest. The following
methodology is used to determine the maximum pressures:
 Extract pressure from each of the FLACS simulations for each of the selected areas; and
 Analyse all of the panel pressures for each of the selected areas across every time step to determine
the maximum local panel pressures throughout the explosion simulation.
The pressures are then plotted for different cloud categories, as illustrated in the figure below.
3
Cloud category 1 –
100% Q9 cloud
2.5
2
Cloud category 2 –
P (barg)
33% Q9 cloud
1.5
FLACS results
1
Response
surface, f1
0.5 Linear part, f1
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Filling
Typical explosion response curve
EXPRESS
In the probabilistic study, output from the CFD simulations are combined with frequency data obtained
from the frequency analysis and information specific to the installations being studied, such as ignition
sources or shutdown philosophies. DNV uses the internally developed software EXPRESS to generate
probabilistic results such as overpressure Exceedance curves.
EXPRESS is a model for calculation of explosion risk in gas process modules/areas. The EXPRESS
program includes consequence models for a transient general gas leak including the depressurization of
the ESD segment, leak rate calculations, gas dispersion modelling, gas detection, ignition, as well as
explosion pressure models. It uses the Monte Carlo method to select various random combinations of

parameters (wind directions, wind speeds, leak directions etc.) which are used in conjunction to the
dispersion and explosion response curves to calculate ignition probabilities and overpressures.
A total of 30,000 individual combinations are carried out to generate the Exceedance curves. The
schematic below summarises the sequence through which the inputs are selected by the Monte Carlo
process.
Leak rate Wind direction Wind speed Leak direction
Dispersion Response Curve
Cloud size at ignition Ignition probability
Explosion Response Curve
Schematic of the Monte Carlo simulations
For each Monte Carlo simulation, EXPRESS picks up a random leak rate, wind direction, wind speed and
leak direction. This specific combination is used in conjunction with the dispersion response curve to
calculate a cloud size at ignition together with an ignition probability. Using this cloud size, an
overpressure is determined using the explosion response curve.
Due to its general consequence model and the inclusion of explosion mitigation efforts in the models,
EXPRESS is ideal to determine the most effective explosion mitigation strategy. The following effects
may be investigated:
 Air ventilation. The effect of opening wind walls, louvers, etc. may be obtained through changes
in ventilation and cloud size, and give the total effect on the pressure exceedance curves.
 Confinement. The effect of plated or grated decks, wall configurations, etc. may be obtained
through changes in the explosion pressure and partly cloud size, and give the total effect on the
pressure exceedance curves.
 Protection systems. Gas detection settings, shutdown, blowdown, and shutdown of ignition
sources may be modelled in detail with the transient model. The effect changed philosophy or
settings may be found by simple parameter changes in EXPRESS.
 Ignition sources. Different ignition sources are easily implemented in EXPRESS and the influence
on the pressure exceedance curves may be obtained.

The following table presents the input data used in EXPRESS program.
Input table into Express

Variables Variable in EXPRESS Unit Comment, type
of data (single
or distribution)
Name Project name - For identification
Case name - For identification
Time Data Time step s delta t
Total simulation time min 60 min max
Installation Data Age - New
Maintenance Level - Standard
Technology Level - New
Module Data Module length m Single
Module width m Single
Module height m Single
Ventilation rate Q/u From FLACS, 8
wind directions
Manning Level - Correction factor
to ignition
sources
Release Data Density kg/m3 Single
Molar mass kg/kmol Single
Cp / Cv - Single
Compressibility - Single
Gas detection Auto-detection? - Yes
Max. Detection time if gas detector S Distribution
fail
Detection level Gas, mass Single
fraction
Detector Density Nr. of Single
detectors/m3
VTLeak model Segment Volume m3 Single
data Operating pressure bar Single
Operating temperature C Single
Delay Emergency Shut Down time s Single
Delay Blow Down time s Delay ESD and
delay BD times
are measured
from detection
time. Single
Blow down definition time min Single
Blow down definition pressure bar Single
Size of Ignitable Model Constant Kcont is using a fix - Single
Cloud value
Model Constant Kint is using a fix - Single
value
Leak Rate q is generated from kg/s Distribution
discrete prob. Distribution
Mass Fraction of Stoichiometric kg/kg Single
mixture
Density of Stoichiometric HC-air kg/m3 Single
mixture
Explosive Cloud Model Uncertaint Ee is generated - Distribution
Size Model Data from discrete prob. distribution
Constant P3 is generated from - Single
discrete prob. Distribution

Maximum Reported Erfac*Fuel kg Single
Erfac*Fuel Report Interval kg Single
F3 equation is C1= - Single
used P2= - Single
Number of leak direction used Nr. 6 leak directions
Wake wind degree Single
Explosion Load Model Coefficient Kp is using a fix - Single
Model Data value
Model Cloud Location l is using a fix - distribution
value
Model Ignition Location is using a - distribution

fix value
Maximum Report Explosion bar Single
Pressure
Report Overpressure Interval bar Single
p1 Coefficient = - F1 equation is
used.
ProExp Number of simulations Nr. Single
Simulation Input Random Sequence Seed - Single
Data
Ignition Sources Immediate ignition probability - distribution
Data
Lag times s distribution
Ignition Sources Electrical equipment m2 Continuous and
Data Discrete ignition
sources
Other m2 Continuous and
Discrete ignition
sources
Personnel m2 Continuous and
Discrete ignition
sources
Other Equipments m2 Continuous and
Discrete ignition
sources
Hot Work h/year Continuous and
Discrete ignition
sources
Pump (all pumps) Nr. Continuous and
Discrete ignition
sources
Compressor Nr. Continuous and
Discrete ignition
sources
Turbine air inlet Nr. Continuous and
Discrete ignition
sources
Turbine exhaust Nr. Continuous and
Discrete ignition
sources
Furnace Nr. Continuous and
Discrete ignition
sources

APPENDIX B
Geometry verification presentation
This presentation was updated based on comments from the geometry verification meeting.
DNV GL – Report No. 002, Rev. 2 – www.dnvgl.com B-28

3D Flacs Geometry model-V01
17-10-2016
Ungraded
1 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016 SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER

 This presentation provides some snap shot of the 3D Flacs model.
– Slide 3 to 17 shows model comparison of the Flacs model with Navis model
– Slide 18 to 24 shows models comparison though different cutting plans
– Slide 25 to 29 shows model comparison with the plot plans.
 ODE to confirm the decks elevation presented in slide 26 to 29. in general, it is

observed that the decks were raised by 2m.
Ungraded
2 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Flacs model compared with Navis Model
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3 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Navis Model – view from South East
Ungraded
4 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Flacs Model – view from South East- Future Equipment removed
Ungraded
5 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Navis Model – view from East
Ungraded
6 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Flacs Model – view from East - Future Equipment removed
Ungraded
7 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Navis Model – view from North East
Ungraded
8 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Flacs Model – view from North East - Future Equipment removed
Ungraded
9 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Navis Model – view from North
Ungraded
10 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Flacs Model – view from North
Ungraded
11 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Navis Model – view from North West
Ungraded
12 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Flacs Model – view from North West
Ungraded
13 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Navis Model – view from West
Ungraded
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Flacs Model – view from West
Ungraded
15 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Navis Model – view from South West
Ungraded
16 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Flacs Model – view from South West
Ungraded
17 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Cutting plans through the 3D model-
comparison Navis vs Flacs models
Ungraded
18 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Navis - Cutting plan through Production Deck
Blast/Fire wall LER
A1001
Future VSD
Switch room –
Removed
Water Tank –
Removed
Pump
Chemical Tank
– Removed
Ungraded
19 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Flacs - Cutting plan through Production Deck
Blast/Fire wall LER
Ungraded
20 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Navis - Cutting plan through Mezz Deck
Ungraded
21 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Flacs - Cutting plan through Mezz Deck
Ungraded
22 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Navis - Cutting plan through Cellar Deck
Ungraded
23 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Flacs - Cutting plan through Cellar Deck
Ungraded
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Comparison with plot plans
Ungraded
25 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Cellar Deck
Deck Elevation: from drawings =>TOS =7.250m, from the DGN is
9.250m.
ODE confirmed: 3D model elevations superseded the plot plan elevations,
due to the platform being raised by 2 metres
Ungraded
26 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Production Deck
12.50m.
ODE confirmed: 3D model elevations superseded the plot plan elevations, due
to the platform being raised by 2 metres .
Ungraded
27 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Mezz Deck
16.30m.
ODE confirmed: 3D model elevations superseded the plot plan elevations, due to
the platform being raised by 2 metres
Ungraded
28 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

Drilling Deck
Deck Elevation: from drawings =>Tos =18.00m, from the DGN is
20.00m.
ODE confirmed: 3D model elevations superseded the plot plan elevations, due
to the platform being raised by 2 metres
Ungraded
29 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

www.dnvgl.com
SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER
Ungraded
30 DNV GL © 2017 07 March 2016

APPENDIX C
Explosion Scenarios
Table C 1: Explosion scenarios for the model with Blast Wall
Case Fill Cloud Cloud Cloud position Cloud Size Cloud Ignition Position
no. fraction, mass volume (X,Y,Z) (DX, DY,DZ) Location
Vf/V* (kg) (m3) [m] [m]
1 0.58 281.8 4000 97 97.5 12.5 20 26 7.5 Production deck South central
2 0.58 281.8 4000 97 97.5 12.5 20 26 7.5 Production deck South east
3 0.58 281.8 4000 97 97.5 12.5 20 26 7.5 Production deck South west
4 0.58 281.8 4000 97 97.5 12.5 20 26 7.5 Production deck North centre
5 0.58 281.8 4000 97 97.5 12.5 20 26 7.5 Production deck North east
17 0.17 81.2 1152 102 109.5 12.5 11 14 5 Production deck South east
18 0.17 81.2 1152 102 109.5 12.5 11 14 5 Production deck South west
19 0.17 81.2 1152 102 109.5 12.5 11 14 5 Production deck North centre
20 0.17 81.2 1152 102 109.5 12.5 11 14 5 Production deck North east
21 0.10 48.7 691.2 102 110.5 12.5 10. 13 5 Production deck South central
22 0.10 48.7 691 102 110.5 12.5 5
10. 13 5 Production deck South east
23 0.10 48.7 691 102 110.5 12.5 5
10. 13 5 Production deck South west
24 0.10 48.7 691 102 110.5 12.5 5
10. 13 5 Production deck North centre
25 0.10 48.7 691 102 110.5 12.5 5
10. 13 5 Production deck North east
26 0.06 29.2 415 103 114.5 12.5 5
9 9 5 Production deck South central
27 0.06 29.2 415 103 114.5 12.5 9 9 5 Production deck South east
28 0.06 29.2 415 103 114.5 12.5 9 9 5 Production deck South west
29 0.06 29.2 415 103 114.5 12.5 9 9 5 Production deck North centre
30 0.06 29.2 415 103 114.5 12.5 9 9 5 Production deck North east
31 0.03 14.1 200 102 117.5 12.5 6.5 6 5 Production deck South central
32 0.03 14.1 200 102 117.5 12.5 6.5 6 5 Production deck South east
33 0.03 14.1 200 102 117.5 12.5 6.5 6 5 Production deck South west
34 0.03 14.1 200 102 117.5 12.5 6.5 6 5 Production deck North centre
35 0.03 14.1 200 102 117.5 12.5 6.5 6 5 Production deck North east
DNV GL – Report No. 002, Rev. 2 – www.dnvgl.com C-29

APPENDIX D
Exceedance Curves
1.E-04
Blast wall
1.E-05
Exceedence frequency (1/year)
1.E-06
1.E-07
1.E-08
0 5 10 15 20
Pressure (barg)
Figure D 1: Exceedance curve for the Blast Wall
1.E-04
Ceiling
1.E-05
1.E-06
1.E-07
1.E-08
0 5 10 15 20
Pressure (barg)
Figure D 2: Exceedance curve for the Ceiling
DNV GL – Report No. 002, Rev. 2 – www.dnvgl.com D-1

1.E-04
Production Deck
1.E-05
1.E-06
1.E-07
1.E-08
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Pressure (barg)
Figure D 3: Exceedance curve for the Production Deck

APPENDIX E
Prinos Lamda ERA for a configuration with and without a Blast
Wall
In the Prinos Lamda Explosion Risk Analysis (ERA) report /1/ results for two configurations were
presented. The configurations were as follows
- A geometry model without a Blast Wall, referred to as a base case model.

- A geometry model with a Blast Wall, referred to as a sensitivity case.
A full consequence assessment and probabilistic analysis has been carried out for both configurations.
A summary of the results is provided in this appendix. Full details about the assessment are presented in
the ERA report /1/.
Ventilation results
Results from the ventilation assessment show that a little difference in the ACH was observed, Table E-1.
This mainly because the Blast Wall and the LER room are almost of the same size, which results almost
in the same obstruction for the air flow.
Table 6-1: 95% ACH exceedance

Case study Area 95% ACH
exceedance
Geometry model with a Production deck 35.5

Blast Wall
Geometry model without a Production deck 38

Blast Wall
Dispersion results
The dispersion scenarios were run for leaks originating in the Production Area. A total of 24 dispersion
scenarios were carried out for each geometry configurations.
Results from the simulations for both configurations were found to be almost similar for all the simulated
scenarios. Results from the assessment are given in Table E-2. The maximum gas cloud (Q9) recorded
from the simulation is approximately 1500 m3 for configuration with Blast Wall (case number 5)
corresponding to 20% filling fraction. For the configuration model without a Blast Wall, approximately
2000 m3 of (Q9) clouds were recorded (case number 9) corresponding to approximately 30% filling
fraction.

Table E-2: Release scenarios performed for dispersion analysis
Release Conditions Wind Conditions With Blast Wall Without Blast wall
Case no. Leak rate Leak jet Wind dir. Wind speed Time at Q9 (m3) Time at Q9 (m3)
(kg/s) direction (to (from (m/s) max Q9 (s) max Q9 (s)
platform platform
angle) angle)
1 20 Up N 7 397 1041 410 1407
2 20 Down NE 3 360 745 359 1023
3 20 N N 8 358 894 369 1031
4 20 E E 2 361 683 361 710
5 20 S S 4 121 1496 131 1648
6 20 W W 2 353 235 353 220
7 40 Up N 10 393 894 403 1308
8 40 Down NE 5 357 633 355 797
9 40 N N 2 381 1138 384 2067

10 40 E E 5 355 733 355 791
11 40 S S 5 91 789 92 868
12 40 W W 4 333 836 221 773
13 80 Up N 10 415 1273 419 1199
14 80 Down NE 5 65 678 66 731
15 80 N N 12 382 1187 375 1205
16 80 E E 5 361 1443 361 1603
17 80 S S 8 71 613 17 746
18 80 W W 5 256 823 600 955
19 100 Up N 12 403 1145 17 538
20 100 Down NE 10 359 586 354 652
21 100 N N 12 379 1215 383 1054
22 100 E E 7 355 831 355 879
23 100 S S 20 60 753 60 843
24 100 W W 10 353 1141 83 924
Probabilistic results
The probabilistic analyses have been carried out according to the NORSOK Z-013 standard, /9/, utilising
the response surfaces developed from the ventilation, dispersion and explosion results. The probabilistic
analyses take into account the wind rose data, leak frequencies and equipment ignition probabilities.
The main findings the assessment are:
 No DLB loads are observed for any targets for the 10-4 frequency (events/year) for both
geometry configurations;

 The predicted DLB loads for 10-5 frequency (events/year) for both geometry configurations are
between 1.15 barg and 1.8 barg.
Table E-3: Explosion Loads

DLB at 10-4 DLB at 10-5
Pulse Pulse
freq, freq,
duration duration
(ms) (ms)
barg barg
Model with Blast Blast wall 0 NA 1.79 38.87

wall NA
Production deck 0 1.75 43.12
Ceiling 0 NA 1.53 45.48
Model without LER south wall 0 NA 1.53 47.55
Blast wall NA
Production deck 0 1.19 50.42
Ceiling 0 NA 1.15 50.83
Exceedance Curves obtained for both configurations

Model without a Blast Wall
1.E-02
1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Pressure (barg)
Figure E 1: Exceedance curve for Blast Wall

1.E-02
1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
1.E-07
1.E-08
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Pressure (barg)
Figure E 2: Exceedance curve for the Ceiling

1.E-02
1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
1.E-07
1.E-08
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pressure (barg)
Figure E 3: Exceedance curve for the Production Deck

Model with a Blast Wall
1.E-02
1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
1.E-07
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Pressure (barg)
Figure E 4: Exceedance curve for the Blast Wall
1.E-02
1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
1.E-07
1.E-08
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Pressure (barg)
Figure E 5: Exceedance curve for the Ceiling

1.E-02
1.E-03
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
1.E-07
1.E-08
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Pressure (barg)
Figure E 6: Exceedance curve for the Production Deck
Conclusion
Results from the assessment show that the presence of the Blast Wall has little effect on the overall
results, consequence and the explosion loads.

About DNV GL
Driven by our purpose of safeguarding life, property and the environment, DNV GL enables organizations
to advance the safety and sustainability of their business. We provide classification and technical
assurance along with software and independent expert advisory services to the maritime, oil and gas,
and energy industries. We also provide certification services to customers across a wide range of
industries. Operating in more than 100 countries, our 16,000 professionals are dedicated to helping our
customers make the world safer, smarter and greener.

APPENDIX N. FIRE AND EXPLOSION – SECE COMPONENTS ASSESSMENT
Table 79 provides an assessment of the Lamda platform SECE components that may require fire and / or blast overpressure protection.
Christmas trees and well conductors, whilst not part of the platform SECEs, are also included as part of this assessment.
Table 79 - Assessment of Fire and Blast Overpressure Protection Requirements for Lamda Topsides Equipment
Blast Overpressure Protection

Fire Protection Recommendation
Recommendation
SECE Component Location Notes
Criticality Design Accidental
Active / Passive Measure and Rating
Level Load
Firewater Deluge with manually
N/A Well Conductor Production Deck activated Foam Capability, 10L/min/m2, I DLB
refer to SECE-08
Firewater Deluge with manually
N/A Christmas Trees Mezzanine Deck activated Foam Capability, 20L/min/m2, I DLB
refer to SECE-08
Wellhead Control Panel Production and

N/A None Recommended N/A None recommended a), r)
and Hydraulic Power Unit Mezzanine Decks
Production Header and Production and

None recommended III None recommended a), s)
Flowlines Mezzanine Decks
Gas Lift Header and Production and

None recommended III None recommended a), s)
Flowlines Mezzanine Decks
SECE-01 -
Hydrocarbon Mezzanine, Production
Closed Drains Header None recommended N/A None recommended a)
Containment and Cellar Decks
Inc. Structural Closed Drains Drum and
Supports (SECE-03) Cellar Deck None recommended N/A None recommended a), b)
Pump
Maintenance Vent Drilling Deck None recommended N/A None recommended a)
Pig Launcher (inc.
Drilling, Mezzanine and
protection frame if None recommended N/A None recommended a)
Production Decks
applicable)
Passive Fire Protection (topsides
Production Export Riser Production Deck I DLB
exposed surface) - J15 rating

Recommendation
Level Load
Passive Fire Protection (topsides
exposed surface) - J15 rating
SECE-02 - Ignition Production and
HVAC Systems None recommended N/A None recommended b)
Control Mezzanine Decks
Separation Barrier (Gridline Production and
Passive Fire Protection - J15 rating I DLB c)
E) Mezzanine Decks
Cellar Deck None recommended N/A None recommended b)
Passive Fire Protection on Critical
Production Deck Members (failure causing escalation or
Primary Structure (south impairing other SECEs) - J15 rating or I DLB
of Gridline E) H15 for members not impacted by
credible jet fire events
Production Deck
Primary Structure (north None recommended I None recommended b)
of Gridline E)
Mezzanine Deck Members (failure causing escalation or
SECE-03 - Structure Primary Structure (south impairing other SECEs) - J15 rating or I DLB
of Gridline E) H15 for members not impacted by
Primary Structure credible jet fire events
Mezzanine Deck
Primary Structure (north None recommended I None recommended b)
of Gridline E)
Drilling Deck Primary Members (failure causing escalation or
Structure (south of impairing other SECEs) - J15 rating or I DLB
Gridline E) H15 for members not impacted by
credible jet fire events
Drilling Deck Primary

Structure (north of None recommended I None recommended b)
Gridline E)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 145 of 153


Recommendation
Level Load
Critical secondary
structural elements
supporting other SECEs Production, Mezzanine As per supported
As per supported SECEs
(preventing failure or and Drilling Decks SECEs
Gridline E)
Bulkheads, Roofs and Floor ratings to
be in accordance with the DNVGL
Offshore Standard as a minimum (Ref.
Local Instrument Room Production Deck [37]). None recommended b)
Gas Flooding System to provide
mitigation and extinguishment of
potential fire events
Bulkheads, Roofs and Floor ratings to
be in accordance with the DNVGL
Offshore Standard as a minimum (Ref.
Local Electrical Room Mezzanine Deck [37]) None recommended l)
Gas Flooding System to provide
mitigation and extinguishment of
potential fire events
Cellar Deck None recommended I None recommended b), q)
Production Deck
Primary Structure (south None recommended None recommended d), o)
of Gridline E)
SECE-04 - Escape, Escape Routes to the Production Deck
Evacuation and muster points and Primary Structure (north None recommended I None recommended b), q)
Rescue Evacuation Routes of Gridline E)
Mezzanine Deck
Primary Structure (south None recommended None recommended d), o)
of Gridline E)
Mezzanine Deck
Primary Structure (north None recommended I DLB p), q)
of Gridline E)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 146 of 153


Recommendation
Level Load
Drilling Deck None recommended I None recommended b), d), q)
Water Curtain - 45L/min/m, refer to
Primary Muster Point Production Deck I None recommended b), e)
SECE-08
Secondary Muster Point Drilling Deck None recommended I DLB t)
Marine Evacuation System Drilling Deck None recommended I DLB t)
Emergency lighting
All Decks None recommended I None recommended d), h)
including floodlights
Cascade Air Skid & Main Production Deck None recommended I None recommended b)
Manifold
Connection Manifolds and All Decks Passive Fire Protection - J15 rating I DLB f)
supply lines
Public Address and

All Decks None recommended None recommended d)
General Alarm System
SECE-05 - VHF Marine Radio Base

Local Instrument Room None recommended None recommended b)
Communication Station
Systems Crane Radio System Drilling Deck None recommended None recommended b)
Local Instrument and
Telephone System None recommended None recommended b)
Electrical Rooms
Antennas Drilling Deck None recommended None recommended b), n)
Navigational Aids including

SECE-06 - Marine lights and fog detection / Drilling Deck None recommended None recommended b)
Traffic Navigation warning system
System
Automatic Identification
Local Electrical Room None recommended None recommended b)
System
SECE-07 - Fire and Field Detectors and
All Decks None recommended None recommended d)
Gas Detection Manual Alarm Callpoints
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 147 of 153


Recommendation
Level Load
Field Marshalling Cabinets All Decks None recommended None recommended d)
F&G Control logic and

Production Deck (LIR) None recommended None recommended b)
system cabinets
Providing firewater to the Dry Deluge
Network (including foam capability to
Firewater System - Deluge
Production Deck the wellbay area). None recommended b)
Skid
No protection required from external
fires
Providing firewater to the Deluge Skid

Firewater System - and hydrants.
All Decks I DLB b), m)
Firewater Ringmain No protection required from external
fires
Providing equipment protection and

Firewater System - Dry fire extinguishment capability to the
Production and
Deluge Network - Wellbay wellbay area. II SLB g)
Mezzanine Decks
SECE-08 - Active Area Passive Fire Protection on piping
Fire Protection supports - J15 rating
Providing segregation of the primary

muster point against potential heat
Production and radiation, smoke and gas dispersion
Deluge Network - Water None recommended b)
Mezzanine Decks from the production area.
Curtains
fires
Provide coverage of outdoor working

areas to control / mitigate small scale
fires (foam capability to be provided for
Hydrants All Decks None recommended d)
plated decks)
fires
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 148 of 153


Recommendation
Level Load
Provide protection of the Local
Production and Instrument and Electrical Room.
Gaseous flooding systems None recommended b)
Mezzanine Decks No protection required from external
fires
Provide coverage of outdoor working

areas to control / mitigate small scale
Portable Firefighting
All Decks fires None recommended d)
Equipment
fires
ESD Field marshalling
cabinets
ICSS cabinets Local Instrument Room None recommended None recommended b)
Xtree topsides shutdown Firewater Deluge with Foam
valves devices Capability, 20L/min/m2
Xtree downhole shutdown
Downhole None recommended None recommended b)
valve
Production Export Riser
Production Deck Passive Fire Protection - J15 rating I DLB c)
SECE-09 - ESD ESDV
System
Gas Lift Import Riser ESDV Production Deck Passive Fire Protection - J15 rating I DLB c)
Field ESD pushbuttons All Decks None recommended None recommended d)

Safety Instrumented Mezzanine, Production
None recommended None recommended k)
Systems and Cellar Decks
ESD / PSD hard wired
consoles
Safety network bus and
fibre optic connections
SECE-10 - Lifting
Pedestal Crane Drilling Deck None recommended None recommended b)
Equipment
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 149 of 153


Recommendation
Level Load
UPS system including
battery charger, inverter,
Local Electrical Room None recommended None recommended b), l)
transformer, individual
SECE-11 - UPS battery banks
Emergency Power Supply Mezzanine, Production
None recommended None recommended i)
Cables and Cellar Decks
Bunded Areas, Drip Trays
All Decks None recommended None recommended j)
and Drain Boxes
SECE-12 - Open
Open Drain Tank Cellar Deck None recommended None recommended b)
Drains System
Mezzanine, Production
Open Drain Headers None recommended None recommended j)
and Cellar Decks
Notes:
a) Component is not protected due to limited potential for escalation and in line with the adopted ‘burn down’ philosophy (refer to section
5.3);
b) The component is protected by location from credible fire and / or explosion events (SECE-03);
c) The fire integrity of the barrier shall be maintained following credible blast overpressure event (the item must not fail during a DLB
event, and only ductile response of the supporting structure is allowed, as per section 7.1.4);
d) Component redundancy ensures availability of system during credible fire and / or explosion events, preventing total loss of
functionality;
e) Prevent potential heat radiation, smoke and gas dispersion towards the primary muster point from production area events;
f) Only air supply connections (from third party) and the connection manifolds required in an emergency shall be protected from credible
fire and / or explosion events (i.e. not including the connection manifolds within the production area). Piping is protected either by
location (SECE-03) or through piping design (refer to Table 80 summarising the relevant lines requiring protection);
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 150 of 153

g) Passive fire protection only required on piping supports to prevent loss of deluge functionality during credible fire and / or explosion
events;
h) Emergency lighting equipment is provided with integrated battery power supply. Associated power supply cabling does not require
protection;
i) The Uninterruptible Power Supply provides power to:
 The ICSS and telecommunication systems, protected by location (SECE-03), not requiring protection;
 Meters & analysers, non-safety critical, not requiring protection;
 CCTV system, non-safety critical, not requiring protection;
j) The open drains system pipework is not normally exposed to hydrocarbons. Bunds and trays are designed to provide containment of
small spillage, not credible causes for Major Accident Hazards. Failure of open drain headers located above the production deck is not
considered critical (fully plated production deck would provide containment of any associated spillage). SECE-03 provides protection to
the headers located underneath the production deck;
k) Final elements associated to Safety Instrumented Systems loops fail safe, and are protected as applicable (refer to other SECE
components, e.g. ESD valves part of SECE-09);
l) Blast overpressure protection from credible external events is afforded by location (SECE-03). Dilution ventilation provides mitigation
against internal events. Interlock of battery charging to loss of ventilation (from any relevant cause including HVAC trip or fire dampers
shutdown) shall be implemented to prevent hydrogen accumulation;
m) Lines associated to the connection points located on the drilling deck and connection at the west hose station shall be protected as
stated through piping design (refer to Table 80 summarising the relevant lines requiring protection). Other part of the firewater ringmain
are protected by location (SECE-03);
n) Equipment should be protected from credible fire and explosion events by location. Nevertheless, redundant equipment (e.g. portable
radios) are available to prevent total loss of functionality;
o) Escape route network functionality shall be maintained through redundancy, through other parts of the facility where the network is
protected by location (SECE-03);
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 151 of 153

p) North-East staircase providing access between the Mezzanine Deck and Drilling Deck shall be protected from credible blast events.
Other parts of the escape route network are protected by location (SECE-03);
q) Criticality I has been determined considering that the associated escape route network would be required following a credible blast
event originating from the production area. No blast overpressure protection requirement (unless otherwise stated above) is required as
the network is protected by location (SECE-03);
r) The HPU and Wellhead Control Panel are not considered safety critical. The ESDVs and Christmas trees shutdown valves fail safe
upon loss of hydraulic supply;
s) A level 3 criticality is associated to the production and gas lift headers and flowlines. The associated inventories are not considered to
be significant enough to allow for escalation to more than one module;
t) Secondary Muster Point and Marine Evacuation System structure shall be protected against credible blast events originating from the
production area (structural steel and plating).
Table 80 below summarises the breathing air and firewater lines requiring protection from fire and / or blast overpressure protection.
Table 80 - Fire and Blast Overpressure Protection - Breathing Air and Firewater Lines
Blast Overpressure
Service Line Number From To Fire Protection
Protection
Breathing Air 3”-BA-1601-AC5-N Hose Station No 1 (West) 3"-BA-1600-AC5-N
3”-BA-1603-AC5-N Connection from Energean Force 3"-BA-1600-AC5-N J15 DLB
3”-BA-1604-AC5-N 3"-BA-1600-AC5-N Connection Manifold Secondary Muster Point
Firewater 6”-WF-1700-A7-N Hose Station No 1 (West) 6"-WF-1706-A7-N
6”-WF-1702-A7-N 6"-WF-1700-A7-N 6"-WF-1706-A7-N

No Requirement DLB
6”-WF-1704-A7-N Future Drill Rig Connection 6"-WF-1706-A7-N
6”-WF-1705-A7-N Future Drill Rig Connection 6"-WF-1706-A7-N
3"-WF-1730-A7-N & J15

6”-WF-1709-A7-N SA-1001 Deluge Skid SLB
2”-1733/1734/1735/1736-A7-N (Piping Supports
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 152 of 153

Blast Overpressure
Service Line Number From To Fire Protection
Protection
Only)
3”-WF-1730-A7-N 6"-WF-1709-A7-N 2"-WF-1731/1732-A7-N
2”-WF-1731-A7-N 3"-WF-1730-A7-N Wellhead area spray nozzles
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 153 of 153

293902-LAM-SAF-As-70006 Rev 0 - Fire and Explosion Hazard Assessment

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293902-LAM-SAF-As-70006 Rev 0 - Fire and Explosion Hazard Assessment

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Fire & Explosion Hazard Assessment

Prinos Area Field Development Project

9.2 Non-Process Hydrocarbon Fires ............................................................................ 43

APPENDIX E. FREQUENCY ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 87

APPENDIX L. DNVGL ASSUMPTION REGISTER ............................................................... 142

Process Fire Hazards

Table 2 - Credible Flash Fire Event

Non-Process Fire Hazards

Sea Fire Hazards

DAL pressure (barg) Pulse Duration (ms) Dynamic Pressure (barg)

DLB 0.400 200 0.134

SLB 0.134 430 0.045

Table 4 - Passive Fire Protection Recommendations

SECE Name Location PFP Recommendations

SECE-03 - Separation Barrier Production / J15 (integrity to be maintained following

SECE-03 - Primary Structure Production / Passive Fire Protection on Critical

SECE-03 - Critical secondary Production, As per supported SECEs

SECE-09 - Production Export Riser Production Deck J15 (including supports)

Table 5 - Active Fire Protection Recommendations

SECE Name Location AFP Recommendations

- Wellbay Area Mezzanine Deck Provide firewater deluge (including

- Well Conductor Area Production Deck Provide firewater deluge (including

SECE Name Location AFP Recommendations

Table 6 - Blast Overpressure Protection Recommendations

1.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The summary specifications for the Lamda topsides are as follows:

 Top Deck – 41.4m * 22.1m

The sketch below gives an overview of the project.

Lamda Future Water Injection to Omicron

Production Pipeline to Delta

Water Injection to Lamda

 Identify escalation / propagation potential to structures and hydrocarbon inventories

 Identify potential requirements for additional risk reduction measures to prevent

 Provide input to the Quantitative Risk Assessment (Ref. [1]).

Non-process fires are also included in the scope.

ACH Air Change per Hour

AFP Active Fire Protection

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

API American Petroleum Institute

CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics

CMPT Centre for Marine and Petroleum Technology

DAL Design Accidental Load

DLB Ductility Level Blast

DNVGL Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd

EER Emergency, Escape and Rescue

ESD Emergency Shutdown

ESDV Emergency Shutdown Valve

FBR Full Bore Rupture

FEHA Fire and Explosion Hazard Assessment

FLACS FLame ACceleration Simulator

HCRD HydroCarbon Releases Database

HPU Hydraulic Power Unit

HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

ISO International Organization for Standardization

LER Local Electrical Room

LFL Lower Flammable Limit

LIR Local Instrument Room

MAE Major Accident Event

MTO Material Take-Off

NUI Normally Unattended Installation

P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

PARLOC Pipeline And Riser Loss Of Containment

PDMS Piping Design Management System

PFD Process Flow Diagram