1. Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil.

, 746
2. Carballo vs Encarnacion 92 Phil., 974
3. Busuego vs CA GR-48955 June 30 1987
4. La Naval Drug Corp vs CA GR-103200 August 1994
5. French Oil Mill Machinery vs CA GR-126477 September 1988
6. Go vs Cordero GR-164703 May 4, 2010
7. Rapid City vs Villa et. al GR-184197 February 11, 2010
8. Miranda vs Tuliao GR-158763 March 2006
9. Republic of the Phil vs Estipular 336 Scra 333
10. Tijam vs Sibonghanoy GR-21450 April 15, 1968

1.

BERNABE FLORES, Protestant-Appellant, v. JOSE ZURBITO ET AL., protestees.

JOSE ZURBITO, Appellee.
Rafael de la Sierra for Appellant.
Feeder Lobes for Appellee.

FACTS

This is the second time the parties hereto have been before this court in relation of
the said election protest.

First appeal:
Appellant alleged that the lower court deprived him of the right to be heard by
dismissing his protest upon the ground that the same had been signed by his attorney
instead of by himself personally.
This court revoked the order of dismissal and ordered that the record be returned to the
lower court with direction that said action be reinstated and that the lower court proceed
to hear said protest upon its merits.
The cause was remanded to the lower court in accordance with said order. It was
reinstated, a time was set for trial and witnesses were subpoenaed.
At the time fixed for the trial Jose Zurbito presented a motion for dismissal of the protest
upon the ground that all of the candidates who had been voted for, for the office of
governor, had not been given notice of said protest.
Upon a consideration of that motion the lower court found that the said candidates had
not been given legal notice of said protest and dismissed the same with costs against
the protestant.
From that order the protestant appealed to this court.
The appellant contends that the notice required by law had been given and that his
protest should have been heard upon its merits.

That an election was held in the Province of Sorsogon on the 6th day of June, 1916,
for the office of governor of said province; that said election Bernabe Flores, Jose
Zurbito, Antonio Rocha, and Rosendo Gabionsa were candidates for the office of
governor; that at the close of said election the votes were canvassed and Jose
Zurbito was proclaimed duly elected by the provincial board of canvasses on the
8th day of July, 1916; that the said Bernabe Flores on the 19th day of July, 1916,
presented a protest in the Court of First Instance against said election, alleging
that many frauds had been committed and prayed for a recanvass of the votes
and an investigation of said frauds ; that notice of said protest was given to Jose
Zurbito, Antonio Rocha, and Rosendo Gabionsa by sending to each of them a copy of
the same by registered mail (see pp. 93, 94 and 127 of record) which was received by
each of them; that in addition to said notice by registered mail a copy of the protest
was delivered to the appellee Jose Zurbito and received by him personally (Exhibit
C, p. 95); that Antonio Rocha and Rosendo Gabionsa failed to appear and answer
or defend said protest in any manner whatsoever at any time during the pendency of
the action in the court below; that a copy of said protest was delivered to Jose
Zurbito and received by him personally on the 27th day of July, 1916, (Exhibit C, p. 95);
that on the 25th day of July, 1916, the said Jose Zurbito appeared in court and
presented a motion in said protest relating to the custody of the ballot boxes
during the pendency of said protest (p.25), which motion was granted by the
court on the same day (p. 26); that on the 27th day of July, 1916, Jose Zurbito again
appeared in court, and without making any pretension whatever that he had not
appeared in said court for the purpose of defending the protest, presented another
motion praying that the same be dismissed for the reason that it was signed by
the attorney for the protestant and not by the protestant himself (p. 30); that on the
7th day of August, 1916, after hearing the respective parties, Fernando Salas, judge
granted said motion and dismissed said protest with costs against the protestant;
that form that order the protestant appealed to the Supreme Court and obtained a
reversal of the same by a decision of the Supreme Court of the 27th day of
December, 1916, (p. 107); that the cause was remanded to the lower court with
direction that the protest be reinstated and that the court proceed to hear the
same upon its merits; that at the time set for the trial after the reinstatement of the
cause Jose Zurbito again appeared and presented another motion praying that
the protest be dismissed because proper notice had not been given to the
protestee, which motion was granted on the 16th day of March, 1917, and the
present appeal was perfected from that order.
ISSUE

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction.

RULING

Jose Zurbito appeared in court on three different occasions;

first, to make a motion relating to the custody of the ballot boxes during the
pendency of the action;
second, to make a motion to dismiss the protest upon the ground that the
same had not been signed by the protestant personally, and
third, to dismiss the protest upon the ground that he had not been duly
notified of the same.

Each of the first and second appearances were sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction over his person and authority to decide the questions
presented.

Also, he had actually received notice of the protest together [with] a copy of the
protest filed in court. His appearance without objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court waived all objections to the form and manner of service of notice.

Considering, therefore, (a) that all of the candidates received actual notice of the
protest as well as a copy of the protest, and (b) that the Jose Zurbito not only
received actual notice of the protest together with a copy of the same, but
actually appeared in court and thereby gave the court jurisdiction over his
person, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the judgment dismissing the
protest be revoked and that the cause be remanded to the court whence it
came with direction that said protest be reinstated for the purpose of
deciding the issues presented by the same upon their merits.

Principles:

 While service of a copy of the protest and notice of the same is important
and necessary, the receipt of the protest and the notice may be
waived by the protestee.
 If he voluntarily appears, by a general appearance, without
specifically and explicitly objecting to the lack of notice, etc., he
thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person, and an objection
thereafter made upon the ground that no notice was received will not
avail him. It is then made too late. He has given the court jurisdiction over
his person.
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An
appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person.
He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such
appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby
gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. When the
appearance is by motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, it must be for the sole and
separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion
is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
The taking of any proceedings on the part of the defendant, other than a special
appearance or a motion of plea objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, is
equivalent to a general appearance and is a submission of the defendant’s
person to the jurisdiction of the court.
An appearance in court, either in person or by counsel, for any purpose
other than to expressly object to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, waives want of process and service of notice. Such an appearance
gives the court jurisdiction over the person.

A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of objecting to the

jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general
appearance if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a
dismissal of the action upon further ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
 2.

[ GR No. L-5675, Apr 27, 1953 ]

ANTONIO CARBALLO v. DEMETRIO B. ENCARNACION

FACTS

 In the Municipal Court of Manila, Mariano Ang filed a complaint against

Antonio Carballo for the collection of P1,860.84.
 The corresponding summons was served upon defendant Carballo for
appearance and trial on October 10, 1949.
 As counsel for him Atty. J. Gonzales entered his written appearance on
October 12, 1949.
 On the same day said counsel filed a motion for postponement of the hearing
for one month on the ground that he was sick, attaching a medical certificate
to prove his illness.
 Hearing was postponed to October 14, 1949 at which time defendant asked
for another postponement on the ground that his counsel was still sick.
  The hearing was again postponed to October 24, 1949. In said last two
postponement of the hearing, the municipal court warned the defendant
that the hearing could not wait until his counsel recovered from his illness,
and that if said counsel could not attend the trial he should obtain the
services of another lawyer.

 On the day set for hearing , namely, October 24, 1949, neither defendant nor
his counsel appeared although there was a written manifestation of defendant's
counsel requesting further postponement because he was still sick. At the
request of plaintiff's counsel, defendant was declared in default.

ISSUE
W/N defendant Carballo defaulted in the municipal court of Manila? NO
Won the judgment rendered was by default.

RULING
His counsel filed a written appearance and filed a motion or manifestation asking
for postponement of the hearing on the ground that he was ill.

In the case of Flores vs. Zurbito, (37 Phil., 746), the Court held that an appearance in
whatever form without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. It is,
therefore, clear that petitioner Carballo made an appearance in the municipal
court.

Could he then be declared in default just because he filed no answer? The answer must
be in the negative. In the case of Quinzan vs. Arellano,2 G.R. No. 4461, December
28, 1951, the Supreme Court said that in the justice of the peace court failure to
appear, not failure to answer is the sole ground for default . What really happened
in the municipal court was that the defendant though he filed no answer to the
complaint, nevertheless, he made his appearance and in writing at that , but
because of his failure and that of his counsel to appear on the date of the trial, a
hearing ex-parte was held and judgment was rendered thereafter . The judgment,
therefore, was not by default. So defendant Antonio Carballo had a right to appeal
as in fact he appealed, and the Court of First Instance should not have declared the
decision appealed from final and executory under the theory that it was not appealable.
 3.

BERNARDO BUSUEGO, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE

LAZARO, ROMEO LAZARO and VIVENCIO LOPEZ, Respondents.

FACTS

 Petitioner Bernardo Busuego commenced action  before the Pasig Court of

First Instance against Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro, Ernesto Lazaro, and
Vivencio Lopez (three of whom are respondents herein), to recover
possession of a parcel of land and a three (3) unit apartment house
standing thereon, situated at No. 260-A. Bonifacio Avenue, Bo. Jesus de la
Pena Marikina, Rizal.

 Summons was issued in the name of the four defendants and per sheriff's
return, was personally served at the address given in the complaint , upon
the defendants "through [defendant] Dr. Ernesto Lazaro, personally." 

 Defendants, through Atty. Gerardo B. Roldan, Jr., filed a motion for an

extension of fifteen (15) days to file answer, stating that "his [Atty.
Roldan's] services was secured by the defendants formally only the other
day," and that he "need[ed] sufficient time to study the case, before filing
any responsive pleading or pleadings."  

 The motion was granted by the lower court in an order dated 6 March

 Defendants through Atty. Roldan asked for another extension of ten (10)
days to answer, as "[Atty. Roldan] has not yet conferred with all of [the four
(4) defendants] which [was] necessary before any responsive pleading [could
be] filed by him." 

 The lower court granted this second extension.

 Notwithstanding the extensions granted, no answer was filed by the

defendants, for which reason, and upon motion of plaintiff Busuego, the
lower court declared the defendants in default in an order dated 20 May
1974.

 Subsequently, plaintiff's case was heard and his evidence received, and on
the basis of that evidence the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the
plaintiff.
 Almost two years later, plaintiff filed before the lower court an  ex
parte motion for execution of the default judgment , which the lower court
granted in an order dated 18 August 1976.

An Ex Parte Motion is when one side gets to meet with the judge without the
other side there.

 Romeo Lazaro, one of the defendants and a respondent herein, "on his [own]
behalf and on behalf of other defendants," filed a motion to hold execution in
abeyance praying that "for humanitarian reasons, an extension of 30 days,
within which to vacate the premises [be allowed] to give them sufficient
time to look for another place where the five families composed mostly of
little children, can reside. 

 The lower court granted Romeo's motion and accordingly, the execution of the
default judgment was held in abeyance.

 the defendants through Atty. Roldan filed with the lower court a

motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default and/or to dissolve

the writ of execution,

solely on the ground that neither the defendants nor their counsel were
ever furnished a copy of the judgment by default.

 This motion was verified by Romeo Lazaro who described himself as "one of the
defendants in the-case" and as "representing them [the defendants] in the instant
pleadings.

 Upon opposition of petitioner, the lower court denied the motion by order of 11
October 1976, finding the above-motion to be purely dilatory in nature and
plain harassment on the part of the defendants.

 the respondents, through their new counsel, Atty. Oliver Lozano, filed with
the same court an omnibus motion, which included a

1. motion to lift the order of default, a

2. second motion for reconsideration and a

3. motion to quash the writ of execution issued pursuant to the default

judgment, alleging for the first time that their failure to answer was due to
lack of notice.
  Petitioner opposed the motion contending that, the defendants could not
pretend absence of proper notice after they, through counsel, had filed the two
motions for extension of time to answer.

 the lower court denied the omnibus motion, holding the motion for
extension of time to vacate filed by respondent Romeo Lazaro for all the
defendants to be equivalent to waiver of service of summons.

 defendants filed what in effect was a third motion for reconsideration of the
judgment by default, alleging that: the lower court never acquired
jurisdiction over their persons because of lack of proper service of
summons; and that the motion for extension of time to vacate the
premises, filed by their co-defendant Romeo Lazaro, after the judgment by
default had become executory, was not equivalent to waiver of summons.

 The third motion for reconsideration having been denied, defendants brought a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, asserting that the orders,
judgment and writs complained of were all void for want of jurisdiction over
their persons.

 The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, upholding the respondents'

contention.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by the court a quo over the
persons of the respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo Lazaro and Vivencio Lazaro.

2. Whether or not Atty. Roldan or Romeo Lazaro were authorized to file any
pleading on their behalf. 

RULING

Basically, there are two (2) ways by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant or respondent:

(a) by service of summons upon the defendant; and

(b) by voluntary appearance of the defendant in court and his submission to its
authority.

With respect to service of summons, the Revised Rules of Court prescribe that a
copy of the summons be served personally upon the defendant by "handing him
a copy thereof in person or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to
him. Personal service, however, may be dispensed with and substituted service may be
availed of if the defendant cannot be served personally "within a reasonable time." 

In the present case, it appears that the sheriff had availed of substituted service in
seeking to serve the summons upon all the defendants by serving a copy thereof
"through Dr. Ernesto Lazaro personally." Perusal, however, of the sheriff's
return reveals that the sheriff failed to specify therein what prior efforts, if any,
had been exerted to serve summons upon the other defendants personally within
a reasonable period of time, and the lack of success of such efforts, before
proceeding to substituted service. Such specification in the sheriff's return is
essential for enforcement of the rule under the Revised Rules of Court that
substituted service may be resorted to only where it is not possible to serve the
defendant or defendants promptly in person.

We therefore uphold the respondent appellate court's finding that, while Ernesto
Lazaro was validly served, with respect to respondents Jose Lazaro, Romeo
Lazaro and Vivencio Lopez, there was no valid service of summons effected . We
are, nonetheless, unable to sustain its conclusion that the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the said respondents.

Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can also be acquired by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority, for voluntary
appearance is equivalent to service of summons. 

A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice.  An

appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person. While the  formal method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in
the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the
appearance of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by
simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer . This formal method of
appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such formal appearance
and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by
presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he specifically
objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. When the appearance is by motion
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it must be for
the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court.  If his
motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court .

In the case before us, the defendants appeared before the trial court a number of
times without raising any objection to the improper service of summons:
 (1) the defendants, through Atty. Gerardo Roldan, appeared in court and filed
two successive motions for extension of time to file an answer to the
complaint;

(2) more than two years after rendition of the judgment by default by the trial
court, defendants, through their co-defendant Romeo Lazaro, filed a motion for
extension of time within which to vacate the premises involved and to look
for another place to live in, raising no question concerning the jurisdiction of
the trial court over the persons of the defendants; and

(3) the defendants, through their counsel Atty. Roldan, moved for
reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court and for dissolution of the
writ of execution, again without contesting the jurisdiction of the court over
their persons.

We hold that by anyone or more of these acts, and certainly by the whole series
of acts, the defendants, respondents herein, effectively waived the initial lack of
jurisdiction over their persons and submitted to the authority of the trial court.

2. Whether or not Atty. Roldan or Romeo Lazaro were authorized to file any
pleading on their behalf. 

The affidavits concerning lack of authority of respondent Romeo Lazaro to file the
motion pleading "for humanitarian reasons" for an extension of time to locate an
alternative residence are thoroughly unpersuasive. We note, in this connection, that all
the defendants were not only immediate neighbors residing in adjacent units of a
single apartment house but also members of the same family. Ernesto Lazaro is
the father of respondents Jose Lazaro and Romeo Lazaro. Thus, the natural
tendency of Ernesto Lazaro, upon receipt of the summons issued by the trial
court, must have been to inform his children living beside him about the
summons; similarly, the natural tendency of Romeo Lazaro must have been to
inform his father and brother and other relatives living in the same apartment
house about the steps taken to defer their ejectment.

An attorney is presumed to be authorized by his client in a case in which he

appears. Thus, Atty. Roldan was correctly presumed by the trial court to have been
authorized by the defendants below to appear on their behalf when he filed the motions
for extension of time to answer and, what is more, when he filed the first motion for
reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court.

Either Atty. Roldan's 1977 affidavit is plain perjury or he was misleading and trifling with
and imposing upon the trial court back in 1974. Even when an attorney is employed
by an unauthorized person to represent a client, the client will be bound where he
has knowledge of the fact that he is being represented by an attorney in a
particular litigation and takes no prompt measure to repudiate the assumed
authority. The security and finality of judicial proceedings are matters of insistent public
policy and require that the evasions and tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants and
their counsel be firmly rejected and not permitted to overcome the presumption of
authority on the part of an attorney.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE insofar as concerns respondents Romeo Lazaro, Jose Lazaro and Vivencio
Lopez. With respect, however, to defendant Ernesto Lazaro, same decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondents.
 4.

G.R. No. 103200 August 31, 1994

LA NAVAL DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and WILSON C. YAO, respondents.

FACTS:

 Respondent Yao was the owner of a commercial building, a portion of

which is leased to herein petitioner.
 However, during the renewal of the contract of lease, the two disagreed on
the rental rate, and to resolve the controversy, they submitted their
disagreement to arbitration.
 Two arbitrators (Alamarez and Sabile) has been appointed by the parties
while the appointment of the third arbitrator (Tupang) was held in abeyance
because La Naval Drug instructed its arbitrator to defer the same until its
Board of Directors could convene and approved Tupang’s appointment.
 This was theorized by the respondent as dilatory tactics, hence, he prayed that
a summary hearing be conducted and direct the 2 arbitrators to proceed
with the arbitration in accordance with Contract of Lease and the applicable
provisions of the Arbitration law, by appointing and confirming the
appointment of the Third Arbitrator; and that the Board of Three Arbitrators be
ordered to immediately convene and resolve the controversy before it.

 petitioner denied the averments of the petition theorizing that such petition is
premature since respondent Yao has not yet formally required arbitrators
Alamarez and Sabile to agree on the third arbitrator, and that the delay in the
arbitration was due to respondent Yao's failure to perform what is incumbent
upon him, of notifying and thereafter, requiring both arbitrators to appoint the
third member of the Board of Arbitrators. According to petitioner, it actually gave
arbitrators Sabile and Alamarez a free hand in choosing the third arbitrator; and,
therefore, respondent Yao has no cause of action against it (petitioner).

 respondent Yao filed an amended petition for "Enforcement of Arbitration

Agreement with Damages;" praying that petitioner be ordered to pay interest on
the unpaid rents, at the prevailing rate of interest in commercial banks, and
exemplary damages of at least P250,000.00.

 respondent court admitted the same.

  The respondent court announced that the two arbitrators chose Mrs. Eloisa
R. Narciso as the third arbitrator and ordered the parties to submit their
position papers on the issue as to whether or not respondent Yao's claim
for damages may be litigated upon in the summary proceeding for
enforcement of arbitration agreement.
 In moving for reconsideration of the said Order, petitioner argued that in Special
Case No. 6024, the respondent court sits as a special court exercising
limited jurisdiction and is not competent to act on respondent Yao's claim
for damages, which poses an issue litigable in an ordinary civil action.
 However, respondent court was not persuaded by petitioner's submission,
hence, it denied the motion for reconsideration.
 While the appellate court has agreed with petitioner that, under Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 876, a court, acting within the limits of its special
jurisdiction, may in this case solely determine the issue of whether the
litigants should proceed or not to arbitration, it, however, considered
petitioner in estoppel from questioning the competence of the court to
additionally hear and decide in the summary proceedings private
respondent's claim for damages, it (petitioner) having itself filed similarly
its own counterclaim with the court a quo.

ISSUES:

1. WON THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON.

2. WON THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT

MATTER.

HELD:

1. As to the first issue, it was held that jurisdiction over the person must be
seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an
affirmative defense in an answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a
waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses
shall not be constructed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
The lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived
either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court;
otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that
 jurisdiction. The decisions promulgated heretofore by this Court would likewise
seemingly apply estoppel to bar the defendant from pursuing that defense by
alleging in his answer any other issue for dismissing the action.

Any ground for dismissal in a motion to dismiss, except improper venue, may, as
further set forth in Section 5 of the same rule, be pleaded as an affirmative defense
and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed.

A negative defense denies the material facts averred in the complaint essential to
establish the plaintiff's cause of action, while an affirmative defense in an allegation of
a new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint, would,
nevertheless, prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff.

2. With regard to the second issue, it was held that where the court itself clearly
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the
invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the
courts nor the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone to confer that
jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring highly meritorious
and exceptional circumstances, such as herein before exemplified, neither
estoppel nor waiver shall apply. The court must then refrain from taking up
the claims of the contending parties for damages, which, upon the other
hand, may be ventilated in separate regular proceedings at an opportune

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter.
Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be
interposed at any time, during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after
final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is
understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the
courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.

In the case at bench, the want of jurisdiction by the court is indisputable, given the
nature of the controversy. The arbitration law explicitly confines the court's
authority only to pass upon the issue of whether there is or there is no agreement
in writing providing for arbitration. In the affirmative, the statute ordains that the
court shall issue an order "summarily directing the parties to proceed with the
arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof." If the court, upon the other hand,
finds that no such agreement exists, "the proceeding shall be dismissed." The
proceedings are summary in nature.
All considered, the court a quo must then refrain from taking up the claims of the
contending parties for damages, which, upon the other hand, may be ventilated in
separate regular proceedings at an opportune time and venue. The circumstances
obtaining in this case are far, we hold, from justifying the application of estoppel
against either party.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the orders of the trial
court in question are SET ASIDE. The court a quo, in the instant proceedings, is
ordered to DESIST from further hearing private respondent's claim, as well as
petitioner's counterclaim, for damages. No costs.
 5.

G.R. No. 126477 September 11, 1998

FRENCH OIL MILL MACHINERY CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

[CA], REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], CEBU CITY, BR. 11, and LUDO & LUYM
OLEOCHEMICAL CO., Respondents.

FACTS

 Private respondent filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages

against petitioner foreign corporation and the latter's alleged Philippine
agent Trans-World Trading Company.

RTC/MTC

Complaint alleged that:

o Defendant French Oil Mill Machinery (FOMMCO) is a corporation
with principal office at, Piqua, Ohio, United States of America,
engaged in business in the Philippines through its agent Trans-
World Trading Company. FOMMCO may be served with summons
and other court processes through its agent, Trans-World Trading
Company.
o Defendant Trans-World Trading Company (Trans-World) is the
agent of FOMMCO in the Philippines, with office at Don Pablo
Building, 144 Amorsolo St., Makati, Metro Manila, where it may be
served with summons and other court processes.
 Summons was served on Trans-World which moved to dismiss the
complaint arguing that it is not petitioners agent.
o Petitioner filed a special appearance with motion to dismiss
contending the court had no jurisdiction over its person due to
improper service of summons
o argued that (a) it is not doing business in the Philippines and (b)
Trans-World is not its agent, therefore the procedure in Sections
14[2] and 17[3], Rule 14 should have been observed.
 The court a quo initially dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
over petitioner
On MFR, court reversed the order of dismissal and ruled that summons was
properly served on petitioner whom it found doing business in the Philippines with
Trans-World as its agent

Court of Appeals

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via petition for certiorari
and prohibition but to no avail.

Supreme Court

Petitioner filed this petition under Rule 45 which was initially dismissed for being
filed late but on petitioners motion for reconsideration was reinstated by the
Court.

ISSUES:

1. WON the FPJE is doing business in the Philippines

2. WON service of summons was proper
3. WON jurisdiction was acquired over the petitioner

RULING:

1) WON the FPJE is doing business in the Philippines – YES

General: It is not enough to merely allege in the complaint that a defendant foreign
corporation is doing business. For purposes of the rule on summons, the fact of
doing business must first be "established by appropriate allegations in the
complaint" and the court in determining such fact need not go beyond the
allegations therein.

Application: In this case, the allegations that petitioner entered into a contract with
private respondent to supply and install various machineries and equipment for
the use of the latter's oil mill factory and that the first shipment of machineries
from petitioner was received by private respondent are sufficient allegations that
petitioner is doing business for purposes of Section 14, Rule 14.

In any case, the determination that a foreign corporation is doing business is

merely tentative and only to enable the local court to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the foreign corporation through service of summons. It does not
foreclose a subsequent finding to the contrary depending on the evidence.

2) WON service of summons was proper – YES

General: Under the Rules of Court, if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines, summons may be served on (a) its resident agent
designated in accordance with law; (b) if there is no resident agent, the
government official designated by law to that effect, or (c) any of its officer or
agent within the Philippines.

Application: Private respondent alleged in its complaint that Trans-World is petitioners

agent, so that the service was made on the latter. Such general allegation is
insufficient to show the agency relationship between petitioner and Trans-World.
However, although there is no requirement to first substantiate the allegation of agency
yet it is necessary that there must be specific allegations in the complaint that
establishes the connection between the principal foreign corporation and its
alleged agent with respect to the transaction in question.

Nowhere in the case of Signetics Corporation v. CA, cited by both parties, did the court
say that if the complaint alleges that defendant has an agent in the Philippines,
summons can validly be served thereto even without prior evidence of the truth of such
factual allegation. It is only in the headnote of the reporter where the quoted statement
appears.

Certainly a portion of the decision was paraphrase to convey that statement which is
never meant nor mentioned in the ponencia and thus, was a misinterpretation of the
scope of the decision. The headnote or syllabi is not the work of the court, nor does it
state its decision. It is simply the work of the reporter, who gives his understanding of
the decision, and is prepared for the convenience of the profession in the examination
of the reports. A headnote is not a part of the courts decision.

For purposes of the rules on summons, the determination of principal-agent

relationship from the allegations in the complaint is only preliminary and is not
even conclusive as to liability. Nothing bars the court from later making a
different finding after the parties had substantiated their respective allegations
with respect to agency should the same be disputed.
As found by both courts below, petitioner treated Trans-World as its Philippine
agent in the assailed transaction. Such factual assessment is binding on this Court
and will not be disturbed as no exceptional circumstances nor cogent reasons were
shown to justify its reversal.

3) WON jurisdiction was acquired over the petitioner – NO

Petitioner fears that it could no longer contest the jurisdiction of the court once it
files an answer instead of a motion to dismiss, as the filing of the former amounts
to voluntary appearance. Suffice it to say that the filing of an answer per se should not
be automatically treated as voluntary appearance by the defendant for purposes of
summons.

It should be noted that when the appearance of defendant is precisely to object to

the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it cannot be considered as
appearance in court. The foregoing, however, need not be further discussed in this
case as petitioner did not file any answer.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

 6.

G.R. No. 164703               May 4, 2010

ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express
Liner," Petitioner,
vs.
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 164747

MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Petitioner,
vs.
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style "ACG Express Liner,"
FELIPE M. LANDICHO and VINCENT D. TECSON, Respondents.

FACTS:

 In 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation,

ventured into a business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels.

 he came to meet Tony Robinson, Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries

Australia (AFFA).

 The latter signed documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of

AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessel in Philippines.

 After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vicente Tecson , lawyers of Allan
C Go who is the owner or operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, Cordero
was able to close a deal.
 Cordero shall receive commissions totaling 22.43% of the purchase price,
from the sale of each vessel.
 However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with
Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines
that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their
company. Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by
Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there
would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
Cordero instituted a Civil Case seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and
Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in
violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his
rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions.

The trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants
Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cordero has a cause of action against the respondents for breach of
contract.

WON the court has jurisdiction.

HELD:

Motion for time to file.

Court acquired jurisdiction over Robinson when he filed Motion for time to file
appropriate response pleading.

No error committed by the trial court overruling Robinsons’ objection over

improper resort to summons by publication upon a foreign rational like him.

Yes. The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter into
another contract directly with ACG Express Liner to obtain a lower obligation, a lower
price for the second vessel resulted in AFFA’s breach of its contractual obligation to
pay in full the commission due to Cordero and unceremonious termination of
Cordero’s appointment as exclusive distributor.

Cordero was practically excluded from the transaction when Go, Robinson, Tecson and
Landicho suddenly ceased communicating with him, without giving him any explanation.
While there was nothing objectionable in negotiating for a lower price in the second
purchase of SEACAT 25, which is not prohibited by the Memorandum of Agreement,
Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho clearly connived not only in ensuring that Cordero
would have no participation in the contract for sale of the second SEACAT 25, but also
that Cordero would not be paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the first
SEACAT 25. This, despite their knowledge that it was commission already earned by
and due to Cordero. Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the
actuations of Go, Robinsons, Tecson and Landicho were without legal justification and
intended solely to prejudice Cordero.

Hence, petitions are denied.

 7.

[G.R. No. 184197 : February 11, 2010]

RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS.

ORLANDO VILLA AND LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

 Rapid City filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision

plans…. Mandamus and damages against several defendants including
spouses villa (respondents). The complaint at the RTC.

Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer, thus were
declared in Defaults.

More than eight months thereafter, respondents filed a motion to lift order of
default, claiming that on January 27, 2006 they officially received all pertinent
papers such as complaint and annexes. They denied existence of two women
helpers who allegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of summons.

The CA annulled the trial courts Orders declaring respondents in default stating “A
party who makes a special appearance in court based on the ground of invalid service
of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.”

ISSUE:

WON herein respondents submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction.

HELD:

Yes. The petition is impressed with merit. CA set aside.

Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service

of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

As an exception, there is a “special appearance”

 (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
voluntary appearance.
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made.i.e. set forth in a unequivocal
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court especially in instance where pleading or motion seeking affirmative
relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.

Respondents did not in their first motion to Lift the Order of the Default dated January
30, 2006 allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance for the purpose only to
question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, the defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall equivalent to

service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

A party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the courts
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its
authority.
 8.

[G.R. NO. 158763 : March 31, 2006]

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B.

OCON, Petitioners, v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.

FACTS:

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon,
Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and
Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the
witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1
Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel
Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago
City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila.

On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced
them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time, being at large.
September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested
The case was... appealed to this Court on automatic review where the SC, on 9
October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Sometime in. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified

petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a
certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet
dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On
25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest
against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary

investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence
of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that,
since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be
properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of
State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case
and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently,
he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda.
He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad,
but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001
and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.

On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting
the petition and ordering the
reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance
of warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision,
but the same was denied
in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.

ISSUE:

WON an accused can seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the court? YES

RULING:

Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over

the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for
bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused .

Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while

jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance.

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we

clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,

whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when
he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his
person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can
invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction
of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the
law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the
Resolution dated 12 June

2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal
Cases No. 36-3523 and No.

36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila.
 9.

[G.R. No. 136588. July 20, 2000.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. PILAR ESTIPULAR, Respondent.

FACTS
In her Petition for Reconstitution of Title, the petitioner, Pilar Estipular, declared that
she [was] the only surviving legal heir of the late Fermin Estipular, who died
intestate in Caba, La Union.

During his lifetime, Fermin was issued Certificate of Title No. 154 duly registered
in his own name by the Register of Deeds of La Union covering a parcel of land
located at Barrio Liquicia, Caba, La Union, with an area of 6.1253 hectares.

The said Certificate of Title was either destroyed or burned as a result of the
burning of the Register of Deeds of La Union during the last World War.

Further, it was alleged that the aforesaid parcel of land was declared for taxation
purposes by Fermin and his heirs; that said estate is not mortgaged to any financial
institution; nor is there any document pending registration affecting the said land.

As the land was already declared and distributed to ten persons who have succeeded
him, the petitioner prayed that the said Certificate of Title be reconstituted in accordance
with law.

"On June 15, 1994, the court a quo ordered that a Notice of Hearing be published for
two successive issues of the Official Gazette and be posted at the main entrance of the
Municipal Building of Caba, La Union at least thirty (30) days from the initial hearing set
for September 8, 1994.

A Certificate of Posting was submitted by Branch Sheriff Romeo Obiena proving that
copies of the Petition and Notice of Hearing were posted at the main entrance of
Municipal Building of Caba, La Union (Records, p. 9).

However, the National Printing Office advised the lower court to reschedule its original
date of hearing as it could not meet the schedule of publication.

On August 12, 1994, another Notice of Hearing was issued by the trial court, resetting
the initial hearing to December 7, 1994.

In view thereof, a second Certificate of Posting was issued by Branch Sheriff concerning
the administrative case. In the same manner, the National Printing Office issued a
Certificate of Publication showing that the said petition for reconstitution was published
in the Official Gazette for two successive weeks on October 17 and 24, 1994.

"On November 2, 1994, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance as
counsel for the respondent Republic and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of La
Union to appear [o]n its behalf in connection with the subject case.

The initial hearing materialized.

The petitioner and the public prosecutor appeared [i]n such hearing. The case was
called to invite private oppositors to come forthwith, but nobody registered his/her
opposition. Due to the absence of the counsel for the petitioner, the latter was allowed
to establish jurisdictional facts at the next hearing. The petitioner presented the
jurisdictional facts with the corresponding documentary requirements prescribed by law.
When the Exhibits were offered in evidence, the Public Prosecutor never interposed any
objection, hence, all the exhibits were admitted. Petitioner Pilar Estipular’s testimony
was offered to prove that she caused the reconstitution of Certificate of Title No. 154 of
the Register of Deeds of La Union.

"Two other witnesses, Davidson Estipular and Juvenal Estacio, testified for the
petitioner. The grandson of the petitioner, Davidson Estipular, stated that the land
covered by the title in question (owner’s duplicate) [was] existing and that the original
title was burned in the Register of Deeds of La Union. Mr. Juvenal Estacio, the
representative of the Register of Deeds of La Union, testified that all the pre-war records
in the said office were either burned, destroyed or stolen during the last World War.

The CA Ruling

Although the Notice of Hearing had not been posted at the main entrance of the
provincial building, the CA held that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of the law. The notice of hearing by proper publication is sufficient to
clothe the court with jurisdiction. The purpose of such publication is to apprise the
whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it
for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for
hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as
a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Since there
was a valid publication of the Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette, then it is
sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the court to hear and determine the petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the supposed substantial compliance with the requirements of Republic
Act No. 26 is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court over the case.

RULING
The Petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the parties; (2)
acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or (3)
conferred by the acquiescence of the courts. 10 Republic Act No. 26 11 lays down the
special requirements and procedure that must be followed before jurisdiction may be
acquired over a petition for reconstitution of title.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the Notice of Hearing of respondent’s Petition
for Reconstitution was not posted at the main entrance of the provincial building.
Clearly, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

The posting of said notice at the main entrances of both the municipal and the
provincial building is another equally vital requisite. The purposes of the stringent
and mandatory character of the legal requirements of publication, posting and mailing
are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land ownership claims, to apprise all
interested parties of the existence of such action, and to give them enough time to
intervene in the proceeding.

The publication of the Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette does not justify the
respondent’s failure to comply with the legal requirement of posting the Notice at the
main entrance of both the municipal and the provincial buildings. The principle of
substantial compliance cannot be applied to the present case, as the trial court’s
acquisition of jurisdiction over the Petition hinged on a strict compliance with the
requirements of the law.
True, the root of this failure may be traced to the June 15, 1994 Order of the trial court,
which failed to include a directive that the Notice of Hearing be posted at the main
entrance of the provincial building. However, this oversight cannot excuse
noncompliance with the requirements of RA No. 26. Under the circumstances, it is
clear that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because of its
own lapse, which respondent failed to cure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

PRINCIPLES:

In Section 13 of said Act, these requirements and procedure are provided as follows:

"SECTION 13. The Court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding
section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of
the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building
and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at
least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the
notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to
every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the
date of the hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost
or destroyed certificate of title if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of
the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining
properties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all
persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objection to the
petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of publication, posting and
service of the notice as directed by the court."cralaw virtua1aw library

These requirements are mandatory and compliance with them is jurisdictional.

Thus, before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction to hear and decide a reconstitution
case, compliance with the following requisites is imperative:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. [That] the notice of the petition be published, at the expense of the petitioner,
twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and posted on the main
entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing;

"2. [That] the notice state among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed
certificates of title if known, the name of the registered owner, the name of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining
properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the
property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and
file their claim of objection to the petition;

"3. [That] a copy of the notice also be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the
expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein (i.e. the occupants or persons
in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other
interested parties) whose address is known at least thirty days prior to the date of the
hearing; and

"4. [That] at the hearing, petitioner submit proof of publication, posting and service of the
notice as directed by the court."
 10.

G.R. No. L-21450             April 15, 1968

SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA
BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and
defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas
Tagalog commenced civil case in the CFI Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with
legal interest.

A writ of attachment was issued by the court, but the same was soon dissolved upon
the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. (Surety).

After trial, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs which became final
and executory and the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants.

The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a
writ of execution against the Surety's bond, against which the Surety filed a motion
for execution against its counter-bond and to relieve it of its liability.

CFI denied this motion. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, then it
appealed to CA which affirmed the decision of CFI.

After the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension
of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion. The Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS,
alleging when the action was filed in the CFI, the Judiciary Act of 1948 had
 already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the
subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.

CFI therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

ISSUE:

Whether the Surety is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the
first time upon appeal

HELD:

YES, SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking
this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss
raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways

and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public

policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but
is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The party is barred
from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
The Court frowns upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse.