Rule 1.02 G.R. No.
1203             Islands, and directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court
May 15, 1903
In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from
the practice of law.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.
W. A. Kincaid for defendant.
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause
in the Court of First Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day
of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended as a member
of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas
Artes" Club, after he had been notified that the said organization
was made for the purpose of evading the law then in force in said
city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes"
during the time of and after its organization, which organization
was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A.
Kincaid, made answer to these charges, denying the same, and
filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimony given by
said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H. D.
Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the
said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court
below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid
made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made an
order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine
a certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the
conclusion that they were such as to justify the court below in
arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the
accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas
Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his
suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for
the purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime
constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer
of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his
office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme
which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a
violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the
United States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa,
and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as the acts
with which he is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional
and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we
are of opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the
suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in
the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from the 7th day of
February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be
suspended from the practice of law for a term of one year from
February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
Rule 1.03 A.C. No. 4497
September 26, 2001
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FLORANTE E. MADROÑO,1 respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is the administrative complaint 2 for disbarment
of respondent, Atty. Florante E. Madroño filed by spouses
Venustiano and Rosalia Saburdino. Complainants allege that
respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous
complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of
dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine
National Police stationed at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while
his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher. Respondent is a former
judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong,
Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three
separate administrative cases against respondent.
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,3 complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed
charges of grave threats and acts unbecoming a member of the
judiciary against respondent. Respondent was therein found guilty
of pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant, who was
unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation. Respondent was
accordingly dismissed from the service with prejudice to
reemployment in government but without forfeiture of retirement
benefits.
Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated
cases of Sealana-Abbu v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC
and Sps. Saburnido v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No. MTJ-90-486.4 In
the first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Sealana-
Abbu charged that respondent granted and reduced bail in a
criminal case without prior notice to the prosecution. In the second
case, the spouses Saburnido charged that respondent, in whose
court certain confiscated smuggled goods were deposited, allowed
other persons to take the goods but did not issue the
corresponding memorandum receipts. Some of the goods were lost
while others were substituted with damaged goods. Respondent
was found guilty of both charges and his retirement benefits were
forfeited.
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent
has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against
them, namely:
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,5 for serious irregularity, filed by
respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent claimed
that Venustiano lent his service firearm to an acquaintance who
thereafter extorted money from public jeepney drivers while posing
as a member of the then Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,6 for falsification, filed by respondent
against Venustiano Saburnido and two others. Respondent averred
that Venustiano, with the help of his co-respondents in the case,
inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of
Venustiano's firearm.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,7 for evasion through negligence under
Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent against
Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent alleged that Venustiano
Saburnido, without permission from his superior, took into
custody a prisoner by final Judgment who thereafter escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95 33, 8 filed by respondent against Rosalia
Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent
alleged that Rosalia Saburnido served as chairperson of the Board
of Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections despite being
related to a candidate for barangay councilor.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed
against Venustiano Saburnido had been dismissed while the case
against Rosalia Saburnido was still pending.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against
them in retaliation, since they had earlier filed administrative cases
against him that resulted in his dismissal from the judiciary.
Complainants assert that due to the complaints filed against them,
they suffered much moral, mental, physical, and financial damage.
They claim that their children had to stop going to school since the
family funds were used up in attending to their cases.
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in
the administrative cases in which he was dismissed and his
benefits forfeited did not constitute moral turpitude. Hence, he
could not be disbarred therefor. He then argues that none of the
complaints he filed against complainants was manufactured. He
adds that he "was so unlucky that Saburnido was not
convicted."9 He claims that the complaint for serious irregularity
against Venustiano Saburnido was dismissed only because the
latter was able to antedate an entry in the police blotter stating
that his service firearm was lost. He also points out that
Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner escaped during his
watch. As for his complaint against Rosalia Saburnido, respondent
contends that by mentioning this case in the present complaint,
Rosalia wants to deprive him of his right to call the attention of the
proper authorities to a violation of the Election Code.
In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases
against them were meant only to harass them. In addition, Rosalia
Saburnido stressed that she served in the BEI in 1995 only
because the supposed chairperson was indisposed. She stated that
she told the other BEI members and the pollwatchers that she was
related to one candidate and that she would desist from serving if
anyone objected. Since nobody objected, she proceeded to dispense
her duties as BEI chairperson. She added that her relative lost in
that election while respondent's son won.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1996, 10 we referred this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP
noted that respondent and his counsel failed to appear and present
evidence in the hearing of the case set for January 26, 2000,
despite notice. Thus, respondent was considered to have waived
his right to present evidence in his behalf during said hearing.
Neither did respondent submit his memorandum as directed by
the IBP.
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that
complainants submitted convincing proof that respondent indeed
committed acts constituting gross misconduct that warrant the
imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to
disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or
private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer
of the court.11 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code
provides:
RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall be
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondent's act of filing multiple complaints against
herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the
legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly
undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as
complainants were instrumental in respondent's dismissal from
the judiciary. We see in respondent's tenacity in pursuing several
cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has
been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to
exact revenge.
Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public
perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross misconduct
for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do.x x x
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find
that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline
respondent.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. 12 While we will
not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also
not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end.13 In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient
sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not
primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the
public and the legal profession.14
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño is found
GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one year with a WARNING that a repetition the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent's
suspension is effective upon his receipt of notice of this decision.
Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's record as an
attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Rule 1.03 G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been
commuting to this Court for more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson
filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case
27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs,
ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of
money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs.
Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial
court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of
P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was
denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in
Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on
October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in
which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On
January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-
19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to obtain a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing
the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions
were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9,
1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners Castañeda and
Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff
executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda
and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance
of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife,
Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the
sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon
which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was
his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share
in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon
and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the
satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that
wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the
judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only
against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to
her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and
resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal
partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ
of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of
Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the latter's
final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of
title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out
any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what
the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon City court
countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court
lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the
Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the respondents'
certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners.
But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as
the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order
which it later lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court
finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the
restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the
Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court
under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing
the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition
and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966;
reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents
then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying
for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also
dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this
Court (L-27140).1äwphï1.ñët We dismissed the petition in a
minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where
they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave due
course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After
hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from
enforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment
from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is
made permanent pending decision on the merits in
Civil Case No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court
to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986 on
the merits without unnecessary delay. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and
Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid
decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere
with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of
possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal
court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted
the restraining order it had previously issued against the
enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court
of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife was a
party in one case and the husband was a party in another case
and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners
would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin
judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties
would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the
present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted
for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the
present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership
benefited from the husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of
Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until the
claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely
determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu
Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The
assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with
her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business
that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of
the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties.
Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of possession
may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely
determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of
the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter
also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval
between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of
possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have
supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the
present case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership
of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of
execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued,
and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P.
San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the respondents
Agos to raise the question that part of the property is unleviable
because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is
normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made
and the properties advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives
in the very properties in question; (4) her husband had moved to
stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in
1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a
preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the
writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on
April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had
impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied
upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to
prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and
his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon
the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied
upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging
business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had
every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings
hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars
them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two
fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and
ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is
merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting
neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when
only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of
the community.3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule
that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and
which may never arise.4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the
impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live
together in the same house5 which is conjugal property. By the
Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the
house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment
of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by
Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The
absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate
husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect
divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the
dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary
justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their
victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to
thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice
of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel,
maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of
the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to
another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel
who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who
seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very
ends of justice.6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his
exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed
himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of
conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour
and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged
and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot
countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent
futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,
ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of
the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he
finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is
his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A
lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his
client, and temper his clients’ propensity to litigate. A
lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior
to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. 7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts
for purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate
further delay in the disposition of the case below which might
again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end,
we have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986
(the mother case of the present case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years
ago) but trial on the merits has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a
counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint
where they impleaded new parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos
filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint,
which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has
yet been taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted
supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20,
1974, grants an extension to the suspension of time to file answer.
(Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint,
supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are
all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied
upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that
the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and
the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the
replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's
inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same
issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in
striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting
preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein-
before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of
action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January
5, 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ
of seizure, seized and took possession of certain machineries,
depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of
P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to
state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of
seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the
conjugal properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the
sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate
the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the
properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was
annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of
P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the
sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-
19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out
of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and
because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no
obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the auction
sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no
third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the
bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23,
Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the
vendees Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the
cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08
out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on
January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause
of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly
suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the
preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its
life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are
baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver that the
action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were
compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than
P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction
enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to
the Castañedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the
properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use
being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the
unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of
which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of
the complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution
of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad
faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused
the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause
more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two
of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers acquired the
properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two
other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while
the defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels
bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank
also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional
damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the
aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph
averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs,
Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land
they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them
also in bad faith, while Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in
bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and
Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with
knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending
litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of
action of the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action would
depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original
complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their
rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of
the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castañedas and
their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is
also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground
that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the
transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have
already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the
original complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow
that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and
the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining
cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review
is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the
petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble
costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu
Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let
a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty.
Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
RULE 3.01 A.C. No. L-1117             such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to
March 20, 1944
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for
complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with
malpractice for having published an advertisement in the Sunday
Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the
annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having
published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his
attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for
"the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat
the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation
he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in
the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the
thereof. misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the
respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant
violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being
a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of
Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most
worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced
but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended

from the practice of law for the period of one month for advertising
his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because
there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more
elaborate and insistent.