Rule 1.

02 either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving the complainant
legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and this is the opinion of some members of
the court. The majority, however, have inclined to follow the recommendation of the investigator, the
A.C. No. 932             June 21, 1940
Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the circumstances stated in the report of said investigator and the
fact that immediately after discovering his mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by making
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent, the parties sign another document cancelling the previous one.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant. The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
LAUREL, J.:
G.R. No. 1203            May 15, 1903
This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General against the respondent
Roque Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action be taken In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law.
against him.

Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.

It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for W. A. Kincaid for defendant.
some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the legal
advice of the respondent, who was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of
Occidental Negros. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that PER CURIAM:
he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his wife on the
afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and the respondent right then and there Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First Instance, in
prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was stipulated, among other things, that the contracting the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended as a member of
parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the same time the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. After
the execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to
shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such could contract another and First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been
subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in force in said
respondent stood up and, pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if city; and,
this document turns out not to be valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on
June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and after its
that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as the evidence on this point is organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the law.
not clear and the same is not material in the resolution of the present case, we do not find it
necessary to make any express finding as to whether the full amount or any portion thereof was paid
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer to these
or, as contended by the respondent, the service were rendered free of charge.
charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimony given by
said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H. D. Terrell, 1 wherein he was charged
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he had the idea with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court
that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were
marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said true, and thereupon made an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine
document he realized that he had made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the Islands, and directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of
contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.
Exhibit A.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they were such as to
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the accused in
and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of such a nature and
acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital character as to warrant his suspension from practice.
foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment
by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law. The
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating or
admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued
evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer of
enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to society.
the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for which he may be
When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be
removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which
entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment
of this professional privilege should be declared terminated. In the present case, respondent was
1
the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify
disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United States, vs. Terrell was
acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as the acts
with which he is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not
criminal in their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the suspension of
said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from
the 7th day of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of law for a
term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
Rule 1.03
A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995
RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner, vs. ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of
malpractice and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law.
I
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal
Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the
ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as counsel, appealed the decision to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid
the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply
with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV
No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal
(Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R.
CV No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for being
contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to increase by 300% the rentals for an old
house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review,
prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment.
2
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the
records remain with it. However, on November 10, 1987, the said court ordered the records in CA-
G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a quo.
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or
Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that
the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA
dismissed the petition for annulment or novation explaining that —
. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38),
there is no other means whereby the defeated party may procure final and
executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation,
unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law,
or (b) it has been obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no allegation in the present
complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were secured
through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion
for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the motion. Again,
respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral Arguments on April 14, 1988.
In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument and in a
resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration of the February 12
Resolution.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084) questioning
the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated January 4,
1989, we denied the petition for having been filed and paid late on December 12, 1988 and November
12, 1988, respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise denied with
finality.
Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.
On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that the case
was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 and therefore the motion for execution
was premature. On August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the
issuance of the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October 18, 1988.
On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1,
Bangued, Abra for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against the MTC,
Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul the writ of execution issued in MTC Civil
Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the writ of
execution was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition
to annul the decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA.
On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the implementation of the
writ of execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in
SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of
Execution.
was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due process,
or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud."
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):

From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition for Certiorari,
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for
Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an
want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained
Appeal and/or Review by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 17040).
by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).

II
Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew very well
that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution.
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client
"within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to
. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial court for
attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to allow his client to dictate
execution, the function of the trial court is ministerial only; the trial court is merely
the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and has no jurisdiction
either to modify in any way or to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the
law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226
claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and
SCRA 250 [1993]).
meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility
310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary
restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]). Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC
judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Implementing (1) Civil Case No. 344 — Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of
said Canon are the following rules: the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional Trial Court, Abra;

Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause. (2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 — Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Abra;
xxx xxx xxx
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 — An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or
Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of Appeals;
Rule 12.04. — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.
(4) G.R. No. 86084 — Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme
Court;
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory
motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying
the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 (5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 — Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with
Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. the Court of Appeals; and,
1971]).
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 — Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent 1, Bangued, Abra.
thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment
rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory even pending its Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same
appeal with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping.
rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC
which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA, there

3
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping exists when, by
reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable
resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 272 (1976), this Court
explained that:
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and
improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of
justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who
filed such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a
final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an
attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions
as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275).
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable
judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to
institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he perceives to be truly contestable
under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on
Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a
mockery of the judicial processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally
frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused
procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation, IBP Committee
on Bar Discipline, p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 1.04
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH
DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding
the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed have been the better part
of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled their differences in an
extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and
son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity.
Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same
reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
4
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent,
as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980.
Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc.
and later as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm
administrator was on a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power,
telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations
of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with
third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be
assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper
floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted
to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June
and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the
fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under
the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter,
for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical
expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due
notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands
for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private
respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands,
however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity),
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case
No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential,
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, 1 holding that
petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but
ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to
serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as
required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu
City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner filed
this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was
illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages,
thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these
issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as the
exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary
amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature
of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as
farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a modification of
the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive
Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which reason the NLRC was required to submit its own
comment on the petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed
its comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of
the Executive Labor Arbiter.8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of
the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this
case could very well go down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first
of its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake, the
only child and therefore the only heir against his own father.9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted
that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of
the complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with each other, were
personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the
complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal relationship to come in
the way.10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just cause
therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges the NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the
case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as
farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at
Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings
of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution
by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults
herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic
notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page references
to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every and all
reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of,
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a
judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact that
the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity
of the judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes
certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the
facts of and evidence submitted in the case.12
5
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who
conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later transferred to
Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case, presents no procedural
infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a
public officer's functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of
technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the long-
standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice.
For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial
technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere
procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be
dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process.14 Article 282 of
the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly terminate an employment,
to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person
of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e)
other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving
devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
corresponding separation pay rates provided by law. 15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the
continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-
employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed
separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work
authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment.17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred in
affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment
and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual
findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC,18 as even decisions of
administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so
warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to
December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a
justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of
Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19,
1986 at 20-44).
 This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to
Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon
the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only
administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not
really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances
involved and basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family
relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable reason for
petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to
December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal
without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as
follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee
tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation,
1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment.
In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for
abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and
some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more
interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184
SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of
employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied
by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want
to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First,
petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda
Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family relations. Second he has
some medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work,
petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to
assume again his employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a
complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these
are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the
hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that
private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered
6
part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was
fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to
necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact
remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the
attending physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of
petitioner, there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear,
deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to
constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment.22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be
classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the
discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to
go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. His
duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office
premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his
work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and,
while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite
successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner
was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984,
this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of
which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal, hence the
supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It
goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as
farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator,
petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual
stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein
for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the termination of
his employment. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is
undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground
to terminate an employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of
returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll, reported him
as an employee of the hacienda for social security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with
the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983
when he became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the
latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee.
According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time
until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a
son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was only in
April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was
angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition
regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have
burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In
addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and
thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the
novel position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of
the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's
illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding abandonment of
work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued performance of various services related to
the operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his
father's accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued
since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume
his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With these, petitioner
contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary,
pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued
service as farm administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made
there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some
overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of
returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may
have been, was not without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge. As to what
convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent
neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after
January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no
longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by his position as
farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some
farm machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm
equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip
Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-
1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil.31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal
activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his
child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, considering the nature of these
transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private
respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled
by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the
terms, specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had
abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or
even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or
expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard
to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel
him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —
7
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda.
Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter,
BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-
ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing
payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-
member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name,
place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being
herein given the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and
stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but
to turn the same over to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by
reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding
the stoppage of his salaries and benefits,33 the issuance of withholding tax reports,34 as well as
correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work, 35 and, specifically, his
filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private respondent,
ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work.
We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the presence of petitioner's
counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said
counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera
of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the proceedings, which involves
the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-
examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension, xxx xxx xxx
allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch
as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. The change in description
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the
of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be
Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected
deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances
by him during the month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers,
above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out
the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of
of concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be necessary and
employment, the positions last held by them and such other information as may be
required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
required by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.

Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was denied
converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his
his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the
son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have determined that no abandonment took place in
grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as private respondent controverts the
this case, the monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration
applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he
for services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character
in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the
that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard
certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of
put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any
Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto.41
positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very
concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his employment 38 does not
square with the elements constitutive of abandonment. Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that
notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second sentence of
Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of the
known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's
due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing.39 Private respondent,
prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements
in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a
Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any
power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of
of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in
tenure in favor of the employee.42
this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner
who allegedly abandoned his employment.40
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins
as follows:
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall
furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his
the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records
served at the worker's last known address. somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure, the
xxx xxx xxx
other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not
complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The
against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the
and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires. respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision
Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in
writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69.
In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be
cause, he must not be rewarded
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due
dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
process. The public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do
even worse and render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed.

8
 However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. In the
present case, however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but
his dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment
because he has a justifiable excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of
Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and
back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent
for violation of the due process requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there
was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's
report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section
11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought
to be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to
security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells
out the relief available to an employee in case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall
not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to
his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of just
cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application
of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some cases certain events may have
transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and
declares that where there are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of
back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more particularly
when managerial employees are concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is
therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the law
accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed
from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement.
(Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC,
173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement,
differences should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The
Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate
freely in a competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference
between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file
workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be
appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties
(Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
9
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm
administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and
private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-
employer relationship is hardly possible.49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from
employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent
against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one for diverse
injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation,
provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the
proximate cause thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or
not they should be adjudicated.51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral
damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy,52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this
petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the
aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the
dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring
employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for
fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely
negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal how their actuations
seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that
either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the
other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to
petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the
Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There
was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable
excuse for his absence, or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without
notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He
should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from
date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six
months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence
(Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be dismissed,
for both parties are equally at fault.54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints
the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their
responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts,
preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous
ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to
conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is
often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He
should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation.56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall
encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On this
point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed
duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared
toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the
equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less
than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all
efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so,
or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are
barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make. The
task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth
and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such
situations. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the
bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may
have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this
dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking,
instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges
victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition and extended
explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to
an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE.
Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3)
years, without qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1)
whole year.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29543      November 29, 1969
GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant, vs. JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS, MUNICIPAL
COURT OF MANILA and UDHARAM BAZAR CO., respondents-appellees.
10
Moises C. Nicomedes for petitioner-appellant.
Tomas Lopez Valencia for respondents-appellees.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
We dismiss as frivolous petitioner-appellant's appeal from the lower Court's Order of dismissal of her
petition for a writ of certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction against respondent judge's order
denying her motion for a bill of particulars as the defendant in a simple collection case.
The origin of the case is narrated in the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated August 16, 1968 certifying
the appeal to this Court as involving purely questions of law:
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Gloria Pajares from the order dated July 21, 1962
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Estrella Abad Santos of the Municipal Court
of Manila and respondent Udharam Bazar & Co.
There is no dispute that on April 25, 1962, the Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares
before the Municipal Court of Manila for recovery of a certain sum of money. The lawsuit was
docketed in the inferior court as Civil Case No. 97309 and was eventually assigned to the
sala of the respondent Judge Abad Santos.
In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co. averred, among others, as follows:
"2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from the plaintiff quantities of ready made
goods and delivered to her in good condition and same were already sold, but did
not make the full payment up to the present time;
"3. That defendant is still indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P354.85,
representing the balance of her account as the value of the said goods, which is
already overdue and payable."
Instead of answering the complaint against her, Gloria Pajares, however, moved for a bill of
particulars praying the inferior court to require the Udharam Bazar & Co. to itemize the kinds
of goods which she supposedly purchased from the said company, the respective dates they
were taken and by whom they were received as well as their purchase prices, alleging that
without this bill she would not be able to meet the issues raised in the complaint.
After due hearing, the inferior court denied the motion of Gloria Pajares for a bill of
particulars. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied too by the said court, she
then brought the incident on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging in
support of her petition that in denying her motion for a bill of particulars, the respondent
judge acted in grave abuse of discretion.
But on July 19, 1962, herein respondent Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for a writ of certiorari, as well as the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, for
the reasons: (1) that the allegations of the complaint filed by the said company in the
inferior court, particularly paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof, are clear, specific and sufficiently
appraise the defendant, now herein petitioner Gloria Pajares, of the nature of the cause of
 action against her so as to enable her to prepare for her defenses; and (2) that things asked No error was therefore committed by the lower court in summarily dismissing appellant's petition
for in the motion for a bill of particulars are evidentiary matters, which are beyond the pale for certiorari against respondent judge's order denying her motion for a bill of particulars, as
of such bill. Convinced that the said motion of the company is well founded, the lower court pretended by appellant in her lone assignment of error. Well may we apply to this appeal, the words
accordingly dismissed the petition on April 21, 1962. of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in an analogous case,2 that "the circumstances surrounding this litigation
definitely prove that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation
unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by the court below,
could well devote to meritorious cases."
Gloria Pajares undertook the present appeal to this Court, contending under her lone
assignment of error to maintain her such appeal that the lower court erred in dismissing her
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, in its order dated July 21, 1962, as Here, this simple collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for over seven years. Had
amended by its order dated August 18, 1962. appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and ask from her creditor
the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that
she has incurred by way of filing fees in the Court of First Instance, premiums for her appeal bond,
The only genuine issues involved in the case at bar are: (1) whether the allegations of the
appellate court docket fees, printing of her appellant's brief, and attorney's fees would have been
complaint sufficiently appraise Gloria Pajares of the nature of the cause of action against her;
much more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled with
and (2) whether the items asked for by the said Gloria Pajares in her motion for a bill of
the same debt, burdened by accumulated interests, after having spent uselessly much more than the
particulars constitute evidentiary matters. To our mind these are purely legal questions. A
amount in litigation in this worthless cause.
perusal of the brief of the parties has shown that no genuine factual questions are at all
involved in this appeal.
As we recently said in another case,3 the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that
needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more
It is plain and clear that no error of law, much less any grave abuse of discretion, was committed by
faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an
respondent judge in denying appellant's motion for a bill of particulars in the collection case instituted
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
in the Municipal Court of Manila by private respondent-appellee for the recovery of her indebtedness
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
of P354.85 representing the overdue balance of her account for ready-made goods ordered by and
delay" and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected
delivered to her in 1961. Appellee's complaint precisely and concisely informed appellant of the
to disciplinary action."
ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action against her, in accordance with the
requirements of the Rules of Court.1
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, and petitioner-appellant's counsel shall pay treble
costs in all instances. This decision shall be noted in the personal record of the attorney for petitioner-
It was therefore improper for appellant, through her counsel, to insist on her motion that appellee as
appellant in this Court for future reference. So ordered.
plaintiff "submit a bill of particulars, specifying therein in detail the goods represented by the alleged
amount of P354.85, giving the dates and invoice numbers on which they were delivered to the
defendant, the amount due on each such invoice and by whom they were received." These particulars
sought all concerned evidentiary matters and do not come within the scope of Rule 12, section 1 of
the Rules of Court which permits a party "to move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of
any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularly to enable him to prepare
his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial."

Since appellant admittedly was engaged in the business of buying and selling merchandise at her stall
at the Sta. Mesa Market, Quezon City, and appellee was one of her creditors from whom she used to
buy on credit ready made goods for resale, appellant had no need of the evidentiary particulars
sought by her to enable her to prepare her answer to the complaint or to prepare for trial. These
particulars were just as much within her knowledge as appellee's. She could not logically pretend
ignorance as to the same, for all she had to do was to check and verify her own records of her
outstanding account with appellee and state in her answer whether from her records the outstanding
balance of her indebtedness was in the sum of P354.85, as claimed by appellee, or in a lesser
amount.

The record shows, furthermore, that a month before appellee filed its collection case, it had written
appellant a demand-letter for the payment of her outstanding account in the said sum of P354.85
within one week. Appellant, through her counsel, wrote appellee under date of March 23, 1962,
acknowledging her said indebtedness but stating that "Due to losses she has sustained in the
operation of her stall, she would not be able to meet your request for payment of the full amount of
P354.85 at once. I would therefore request you to be kind enough to allow her to continue paying you
P10.00 every 15th and end of the month as heretofore."
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