Da-Sein’s Body: Between Heidegger on Being and Anders on Having

Babette Babich
Fordham University

Abstract: Reading between Heidegger’s 1927 Being and Time and Anders’ 1928 Über das Haben. Sieben Kapitel
zur Ontologies des Erkenntnis, the current essay undertakes to raise Anders’ question of the body, quite specifically
as Anders writes in his title chapter, subtitled, (Posse und Possessivum), “Wir haben ein Leib. Wir haben. [We have
a body. We have.]” Exploring the erotic in this connection along with other still more ontic afflictions of the body,
permits Anders to criticize Heidegger’s ‘pseudo-concreteness.’ A reading of Reiner Schürmann’s discussion of
Heidegger, the question of the ‘who’ of Dasein but also the economic, via ‘Dasein as proprietor,’ allows a
discussion, via Anders, of Heidegger on abjection or neediness.

Da-Sein’s Body

“The body,” almost from the beginning, as Friedrich Nietzsche writes in his 1888 Götzen-

Dämmerung, Twilight of the Idols, has been trouble for philosophy: “infected with every error of

logic there is,” the body has the impudence to behave “as if it actually existed!...” (Nietzsche 1981,

35) Interrogating the ‘Being-question’ as Heidegger poses this question as a forgotten question in

Being and Time, “Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determinate character of existence”

(Heidegger 1962, 34). Given that “Dasein is in itself ‘ontological,’ because existence is

determinate for it,” Heidegger’s ‘Being question’ turns out to be a question Dasein is exceptionally

able to parse: “Dasein also possesses — as constitutive for its understanding of existence — an

understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own.” (Ibid.)

Fine and fair — Heidegger would seem to have covered both the ontic and the ontological. But

indicting Heidegger’s “pseudo-concreteness,” Günther Anders objects that neither “toothaches”

nor “sex” make an appearance in Being and Time.1 To be sure, Heidegger’s analysis presupposes

1
See Anders 1948 but see also Anders 1980. There has been some reception of Anders’ remark not usually, alas,
leading scholars to undertake to read Anders more broadly but for their own purposes as the suggestion that there
might be no sex in Heidegger is salacious enough. See Sommer 2007 who foregrounds the religious capuchin orders
by emphasizing Anders’ indictment of Heidegger (and here there is reference to Hans Jonas as well as Jacob Taubes,
as a « paulinisme sécularisé ») and Drouillard 2018 as well as Babich 2022; 2019.
bodily involvement, if not altogether straightforwardly (Theodore Kisiel spent several essays

trying to unpack this),2 quite as part of Dasein’s very intentional and not less embodied possibilities

of being-in-the-world, especially where Heidegger singularizes the inquiry (as opposed to

distinguishing between kinds/types of Dasein), the very Being at issue for Dasein “is in each case

mine.” (Ibid., 67)

In his 1928 Über das Haben, Anders thus follows Heidegger’s impetus: the body is key, reflecting

that the body, quite as distinguished from ready-to or present-at-hand things, made or natural, is

“conditio sine qua non” (Anders 1928, 88).3 At issue for Anders is the phenomenological argument

that the body is almost never in its ‘totality” a datum for consciousness per se: “body is simply

had [Leib wird schlechthin gehabt].” (Ibid.) Anders’ questioning project of the meaning of having

with respect to both Being and the body is not only phenomenologico-ontological but aesthetico-

epistemological: concerned with appearance, quite specifically with feigning of fictions, illusion.

Investigating what is given in what is represented as what it is not: the non-genuine [Unecht],

Anders’ concern, via Husserl, is with artistic, lyrical-literary and musical, perception.

The factical dimension that is Dasein’s So-sein as differentiated with regard to an array of

particularities in addition to gender is not about its what but, as Heidegger explains, qua Dasein,

“about its Being.” (Heidegger 1962, 67) For this reason, “one must always use a personal pronoun

2
See for example Kisiel 2002 and, latterly, 2014 which, intriguingly, Kisiel took to instantiate things as seemingly
non-corporeal as GPS but which as Anders himself would also emphasize can completely captivate bodily being in
the world such that even pre-GPS Anders argued that a couple walking alongside the Seine or the Hudson (his
example) with a transistor radio were on a ‘radio leash,’ as if they were dogs following a signal. See my “Transistor
Radios and Media Überveillance: From Anders’ ‘Radio-Leash’ to Contact Tracing” in Babich 2022, 168f.
3
Acknowledging his debt to Anders (as Stern), Gabriel Marcel takes this up for his own different purposes in Être et
avoir (Marcel 1949).

2
when one addresses it: ‘I am,’ ‘you are.’” (68) This would seem to point to the question concerning

Dasein qua mitsein, that is being-with other Dasein, together, in the world.4

As Reiner Schürmann rightly underlines, Heidegger never relinquishes the Being question in Being

and Time. Thus

Das Dasein, i.e., the Being of humanity is in common as in philosophical ‘definition’

comprehended as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, the living being whose being is essentially
determined by the capacity for speech. (Heidegger 1962, 48)

To use today’s popular convention, Dasein’s pronouns, quite for the most part, are they/them.

For Heidegger:

Proximally, it is not ‘I’, in the sense of my own Self, that ‘am’, but rather the Others, whose
way is that of the “they.” … Proximally Dasein is “they” and for the most part it remains
so. (167)

Although it is Anders (the husband) as opposed to Heidegger (the lover) who invoked both sex

and toothaches, Giorgio Agamben has reminded us we ought not read Heidegger apart from love5

and I have argued that love is inseparable from Heidegger’s complex relationship with Arendt.6

Here, given the intersection of husbands/wives/lovers, Bazon Brock, the shock artist-philosopher,

has informed the present speaker that Elfriede confided in him regarding Heidegger’s impotence.

One may find this ludicrous (consider the source — Brock specializes in provocation as a Fluxus

conceptual artist) but it is no more ludicrous/embarrassing as ontic bodily details go, than is

Anders’ letter to the publisher [Suhrkamp] regarding Alma Mahler-Werfel’s autobiography (she

4
Today we could say that what is at stake is Dasein’s pronouns quite in addition to Dasein with and alongside natural
(present at hand) and natured (ready to hand) things in the world. For Heidegger, “We perceive presencing in every
simple, sufficiently unprejudiced reflection on things of nature (Vorhandenheit) and artifacts (Zuhandenheit). Things
of nature and artifacts are both modes of presencing.” Heidegger 1972, 7.
5
Agamben 1999 and see too Perrin 2009.
6
See Babich 2006 and 2011 as well as Babich, “Speaking of Hannah” in 2010.

3
of the famous ‘Alma Problem’ in Mahler scholarship) to check the report, ‘attested by his wife,’

here as an indirect source, of “Werfel’s bedwetting.” (Anders 2022, 47)

Brock’s gossip — I’ll come back to this — is an instance, ‘picture book’ or nearly, of Gerede, thus

to be distinguished from Agamben’s classically hermeneutic reflection on love. What bears

reflection, and I gave a talk on this in Rochester, citing Bill Richardson via Lacan and Marilyn

Monroe (Babich 2019; Richardson 1987), Heidegger supposes himself to have explicated ‘love.’

The particularity of Heidegger’s voice is as personal and as reflexive as the tone of Bazon’s

remarks. In his Zollikon Seminars, speaking to psychoanalysts and psychologists, Heidegger

contends that he has been under- or misread, specifically by Binswanger who took up the notion

of Dasein for his own purposes (Binswanger 1942) as Heidegger writes:7

You can see this from the fact that there is a ‘supplement’ to Heidegger’s gloomy
care [düstere Sorge] in Binswanger’s lengthy book on the fundamental forms of
Dasein. It is essentially a treatise on love, a topic that Heidegger has supposedly
neglected. (Heidegger 1994, 115)8

The Body and Dasein as the Human: Who, then, is Dasein?

Is ‘Dasein,’ as Husserl claimed and as many today might also argue, simply another word for the

human being? Does Dasein correspond to Heidegger’s scholastically tinged anthropologyism, as

Husserl charged and as it would take Anders to demonstrate (negatively)9 or Heidegger’s

7
The phenomenological approach to psychotherapy had already been broached as early as 1912 by Jaspers (1968).
8
Heidegger distinguishes his approach from competing approaches taking their inspiration from his notion of
Dasein, to ask himself, with reference to himself, whether “Binswanger’s ‘psychiatric Daseinsanalysis’ forms a
section of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein?” (Heidegger 1994, 115), contending that Binswanger for his own part
had been compelled to admit that “he misunderstood the analytic of Dasein,” (ibid.) a ‘happy fault’ that Binswanger
assessed as a “productive misunderstanding” (Ibid.) Cf. here as well Binswanger 1958, Brencio 2015, Schrijvers
2017, and, again, Babich 2019.
9
Stern/Anders 1937. See also the compilation of Anders’ writings on philosophical anthropology edited by Christian
Dries and Henrik Gätjens, Anders 2018 as well as, for discussion, Bajohr 2019 and for a related essay, Bajohr 2021.

4
psychologism?10 For readers in a transhuman and posthuman era, such associations convict

Heidegger of an unfashionable ‘humanism.’ We need to be cautious given the countercharge for

the French humanist existentialists of Heidegger’s era, as Jean Beaufret wrote to Heidegger in a

post-war letter, that Heidegger had quite failed to think the human to begin with.11

For his own part, Heidegger increasingly opted to hyphenate Da-Sein, foregrounding the shift from

‘existence’ as generically parsed to the specific ‘there’ — or even ‘here’ — of being.

In his brief lecture notes on Being and Time, Schürmann (2008) highlights what belongs to the

being that is Dasein, that is: what this being has. It was this distinction that inspired Husserl to

write “on the first page of his copy of Being and Time: ‘Ist das nicht Anthropologie?’” (56).

Critically opposing a reading of Heidegger in terms of philosophical anthropology, post-Jaspers

and post-Sartre, yielding a “so called ‘ontology of human existence’” (ibid.) — i.e., reading

Heidegger as most scholars tend to read him as existentialist (a designation Heidegger repeatedly

refused), Schürmann, who is more careful than most, clarifies that

What Heidegger aimed at overcoming in Being and Time was the traditional
understanding of man as one entity, one res, among others — endowed, not with
chlorophyll as some plants, nor with wings or fins as some animals, but with
“animal rationale.” Man is that living being that possesses reason (or speech, this
is the Latin version of Aristotle’s ζῷον λόγον ἔχων). Quite correctly, Being and
Time was and continues to be seen as an attack against the uncritical division of
things into those that are merely physical and those that also have a mind, into
extended things and thinking things. (Schürmann 2008, 56).

10
See for the relation between these charges Babich 2022b.
11
See Heidegger’s 1946 “Brief über dem Humanismus” (1967, 311-360) Of course, as is quite well known if not
always adumbrated in context, a context which would also require reference to Jean Wahl and Marcel in addition, as
noted, to Anders, and, latterly Michel de Certeau, the background for Beaufret’s invitation to Heidegger to reflect on
this challenge was Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. For a discussion of French existentialism in connection
with Heidegger see Kleinberg 2005 as well as Babich 2016.

5
If it is certainly true that Heidegger influences what becomes French existentialism together with

then- and current trends in philosophical anthropology, Heidegger’s own project may be reduced

to neither and hence Schürmann underlines that Heidegger’s concern exceeds “the philosophy of

subjectivity.” (Ibid., 57) The same Schürmann who insists on using the term “man” in his notes,

a term which was only in part automatic in his day (not every author did this), observes that

“Dasein means that man cannot be understood without his world, and correlatively that the world

is always man’s world.” (Schürmann 2008, 57).12

Dasein holds the key to Being and Time, at least so Heidegger argues (for the Being question) and

substantively as Schürmann observes:

…out of the 83 sections of Being and Time, 75 deal with an analysis of what Heidegger
calls “Dasein”, for which there seems to be no English equivalent. (Schürmann 2008, 57).

A tour de force of a paragraph elaborates what Heidegger does with the subject, by way of Kant

and Hegel but also Schelling and Kierkegaard to remind us that

Dasein is thrown into the world, but there is no thrower. In its process (Vollzug),
the subject, considered in itself, is now utterly finite. This, as we shall see, is the
meaning of “wholeness or “totality” (Ganzheit). Ganzheit is not the sum total of
traits belonging to Dasein, but its finite autonomy; its utter facticity, with no
recourse to an infinite subject. Thus the title of Heidegger’s book, Being and Time,
becomes clear. The meaning of the subject’s Being is time, the subject’s Being
cannot be referred back to anything other than Dasein, out of which it would then
“enter” into time. (57-58)

Sexless Dasein: Günther Anders on the Economy of Dasein as ‘Proprietor’

In sum, Anders offers an uncompromising critique of Heidegger’s thinking overall and specifically

regarding the body (thus the language of the ‘pseudo-concrete”). Anders’ ad hominem criticisms

12
Where Schürmann speaks of ‘man’ rather than the human — just as scholars have spoken for centuries — what
would be altered supposing Dasein to be not ‘man,’ in generic sense, but ‘woman’? See the contributions to Patricia
Glazebrook’s edited collection on this question: forthcoming.

6
regarding sex (and toothaches) foreground the limits of Heidegger’s philosophic reflections when

it comes to Sorge, human concerns and human afflictions, emphasising Heidegger’s inattention to

the socio-economic order where Heidegger, and this is for Anders the occasion of an unavoidable

conceptual dissonance, emphasizes the very economic language of Sorge [care] in Being and Time.

This plays into Anders’ Frankfurt School terminology of “consumption” in his writing of The

Antiquatedness of Humanity [Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen], (1956 and cf., esp., 1980, 432)

describing the human being as an ‘eater’ — not unlike Yuval Noah Harari. The parallel with the

globalist lingo of ‘useless eaters’ to quote Klaus Schwab, is neither an accident nor a mistake, to

paraphrase the point if not the focus of Lacoue-Labarthe (1989). Thus in the 1979 introduction to

Anders’ second volume on The Antiquatedness of Humanity, referencing a television ad for butter,

riffing on both Kant’s thalers and Heidegger’s ‘standing reserve, as a variation on the philosophical

‘mountain of gold,’ Anders explains that,

99 percent of all products, most of them — even those scarcely to be named artificial, like
the butter stacked high as a mountain of butter and which celebrates its easy digestibility
— have a hunger to be consumed, since they can and dare depend solely on a corresponding
human hunger. So that accounts can balance, i.e., so that production may continue, we have
to manufacture and insinuate between the product and human, a subsequent product (of a
second degree) called demand. Formulated from our perspective: in order to be able to
continue consuming products we need to need them. However, since this necessity does
not naturally arise in us (like hunger), we have to produce it; and this must be done by way
of a specific industry, by means of which of particular means of production, mechanically
produced for this purpose, and which are now third degree products. (Anders 1980, 16)13

With reference to Heidegger, Anders writes:

As a matter of fact, Heidegger’s trick consists in re-coining every possibilitas into

potestas, every Möglichkeit into Macht. . . . It is this very characteristic, indeed,
that the words “Eigentum” (property) and “Eigentlichsein” (being proper, authentic
being) stem from the same root. The “Dasein” that, according to Heidegger, first

13
With reference to ‘consumer society,” Jean Baudrillard’s speciality concerned such “third degree products” (see
Baudrillard 2008) and Theodor Adorno speaks of the “culinary” with respect to mediatic culture, while Anders
foregrounds the economic dimensionality of ontology.

7
 finds itself as stranded good (“cast into the world”) becomes authentic by making
itself its own proprietor. (Anders 1948, 352)

As Anders explains in a footnote, “All want is wanting; thus sex, too.” (Anders 1948, 346; cf.

Anders 1980, 432): Dasein must own its own want, create itself as consumer.

Accordingly, Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world, hands or no hands, despite Heidegger’s reference

to the very bodily orientation of houses and rooms and desks and windows in the world or to streets

and railroad platforms exposed to the weather, does not highlight the body-as-lived by beings who

actually ‘have’ bodies subject to “concupiscientia” and “toothaches.” Anders refers to sexuality to

refer to everything enfleshed:

One is tempted to vary the famous French word “ni homme ni femme, c’est un
capucin” into: “ni homme, ni capucin, c’est un Dasein.’” (Anders 1948, 349)

For Anders, the capuchin, the monkishness of Dasein is not nugatory:

Heidegger retires into the cloister of his own Self, in order to become “authentic
Dasein”; since he does not know of any way of becoming “authentic” within a
definite world, a society; since, on the other hand he can’t help continuing to live
in this world which, so to speak, continues “in spite,” it is bound to become “alien”
to him: i.e., again and again it will have to “nichten” [vanish]. (Ibid., 345)

I said it was gnostic. The same concern, a Cartesian reflex, permits Anders to argue that

Heidegger’s Dasein happens ‘never to sleep.’ (Ibid., 349)

Three decades later, Anders repeats the point, emphasizing in a footnote to the text already cited

that the “economy [Wirtschaft]” is just as absent from Heidegger’s Being and Time “as hunger and

sexuality,” now reducing (the still economically tuned) ‘care’ [Sorge] to “a gloomy ‘existential’”

(1980, 432) [Remember Heidegger’s reference in the Zollikon Seminars to düstere Sorge.]

Anders had good reasons for his sustained conflicts with Heidegger given the triangle between

himself and his former teacher with another of Heidegger’s students — they first met in

Heidegger’s class — Anders’ ex-wife: Hannah Arendt. It is in this context that Anders’ metaphor

8
reads Dasein as quasi-Augustinian “angel”— which last is exactly, and by Augustinian definition,

sexless:

Nowhere is it mentioned that Dasein has (or is) a body; nowhere, that it has, as it
was called in more than two thousand years of philosophy, a twofold nature. rather
than a being as the human being had been for more than two thousand years of
thinking. (Anders 1948, 348-349)

To all this there is also the question of erotic impotence broached above, as the Fluxus artist (and,

as I already underlined: aesthetician-provocateur), Bazon Brock maintains to have been, as he, in

the way of third hand accounts, confided to the present speaker concerning Heidegger’s ‘problem.’

On Brock’s account, Elfriede claimed not to have been especially worried about Arendt other than

‘generally.’ Here the clerical notion implicit in Anders’ account, an effective monkishness or

derelict celibacy, intrudes. According to Elfriede, Heidegger after a bout of extreme illness,

grippal, Covidial we could say today, recovered his health but not, as one is rarely the ‘same’ after

recovering from any illness, his sexual potency. Such details support Heidegger’s qualms about

biography but scuttlebutt (and this is that) can be useful when it comes to talking about the place

of sex for Heidegger,14 whether one’s concern is with ‘sexing’ Dasein or casting aspersions as the

agit-artist (i.e., Brock) suggests that Heidegger’s wife, after his death (thus the parallel above with

Alma as Anders makes this, for which we surely need at least a Tom Lehrer song),15 maintained

with respect to Heidegger who, rather like a rock star, is famed for having had a good number of

infidelities (i.e., not just Arendt). This means that none of us will want to believe what Brock

reports. As in The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, we always go with the fiction. But the bodily

fact of impotence would make no difference to his recorded infidelity and this should be

14
Cf. for a different parallel, Baudrillard’s 1988 ‘Necrospective’ emphasizing the irrecusable “too late” of either
verification or historical understanding/contextualization: Baudrillard 2014, 18.
15
See the epigraph from Tom Lehrer, cited with the author’s permission, in Babich 2011/2012, 115.

9
emphasized. Sexual potency, orgasms and such, none of this, as most women are well-aware, both

for their own part and on the part of their male companions, though this gets less attention, so

discrete as women tend to be (when they are not Elfriede) in marriage, for better or for worse, or

in the having/not having of an affair. As Paul Feyerabend writes in his posthumous memoir, Killing

Time, being constitutionally incapable as Feyerabend, a friend of mine, relates the bodily fact of

physician caused impotence (wounded during the war, they botched two surgeries), such ontic

potency has nothing to do with either having an affair or being married (Feyerabend would marry

three times).

There is more.

In addition to abolishing, quite in addition to the ontological difference, the difference between

body and spirit, Anders counts off the roster of Heidegger’s omissions: of “caritas, or friendliness,

or duties, or the state” (Anders 1948, 349) For Anders, Heidegger’s Dasein is made to order for

capitalist self-realization.

There is a repetition in the printed version but what is important are the gnostic elements and

Anders reminds us that Heidegger’s account is very Horatio Alger:

It should be noted, however, that Heidegger’s description, as it stands, presupposes that

“Dasein” comes to the world as a nobody, and that, what happens to it, is up to none but to
itself — in short: it applies to the historical type of the self-made man, not to man in general
— though to a self-made man who has no longer the opportunity to rise in the world, thus
to an acosmistic self-made man. (Anders 1948, 353)

Anders began, this should be emphasized as it is easy to miss, as an over-enthusiastic

Heideggerian, to the extent — this can happen with overeager students — of annoying Heidegger

with his enthusiasm, and to some extent, I argue (Babich 2022), Anders remained so in spite of his

10
negativity. Thus Anders offers a reading of Heidegger that varies Husserlian intentionality (a

Husserlian move) by using the example noted above of hunger and its manufacture.

As he develops his reflections, Anders reminds us that the word of God, to which Israel and the

entire Judaeo-Christian world have been listening for millennia is no kind of disembodied speech

but using acoustic terminology, Anders offers a phenomenology of listening, to speak of listening,

zuhören to what is a ‘telephone voice’ (here there are overtones with owning and belonging).16 As

Anders muses, desire qua desire is difficult to maintain quite as Jacques Lacan underlined in his

seminars in Paris: an imperative something.17 With respect to desire, Anders writes: “So far as a

creature is ‘needy’ (and that it is constantly, since it depends on world), it has not what it should

have.” (Anders 1948, 347) This is of course related with considerable, if idiosyncratic, humour

(and considerable early Frankfurt School insight) regarding where Heidegger begins and where he

ends: “before economy and machine: in the middle ‘Dasein’ is sitting around [In der Mitte sitzt

das Dasein], hammering its ‘Zeug’ and thereby demonstrating ‘Sorge’ and the renaissance of

ontology.” (Ibid.)

16
See for references, Babich 2022, 139ff. Note too that Merleau-Ponty emphasizes this phenomenon of voice (with
specific reference to the radio, for references and discussion, see Babich 2017). And see, if and despite his reference
to television, he does not refer to either Arnheim or Anders or Adorno on radio, Goldblatt 1993.
17
To date, Anders’ reflection on being and having have yet to be unpacked in relation to Lacan. Anders publishes
Über das Haben a year after Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. And later, in a footnote to his essay on Heidegger’s “pseudo-
concreteness,” Anders writes: “Primarily Heidegger sees the feature ‘being in the world,’ but hardly the distances
from the objects which have not been invented by mediocre philosophers but that exist on the strength of
‘individuation’ separating one being from the other, and on the strength of ‘hunger,’ which has to bridge a metaxu in
order to ‘have’ and to ‘be.’ Entirely suppressed by Heidegger is the third fact that “Dasein” is (part of the natural)
world. Only by simultaneously dealing with the three features: Being in, being in distance, and being a part of the
world, can one claim ontological completeness.” Anders 1948, 348. See, Babich 2022 for discussion of Anders 1934-
35. The reference complex is elusive not only because contemporary scholars are as inclined to overlook footnotes as
they are to reference others but also because the text was originally published under Anders’ given name: Günther
Stern. These days Anders gets some attention because the text in question was translated by Lévinas just as other
scholars note that Deleuze refers to a certain “Stern.”

11
This difficulty, referring to “economy and machine,” yielded the strangely necessary and

inherently ambiguous section title regarding ‘eaters [Esser],’ as “Give us this day our daily

bread” becomes: “Give us this day our daily hunger.” (Anders 1980, 16) Today’s economy is a

consumer’s economy of end products “which are no longer means of production, but means of

consumption, that is: means as such that are consumed by being used up, like breadstuffs or

grenades.” (15) The age of surveillance — we call that AI today and social media is dedicated to

its apotheosis but that is only your laptop, your cell-phone, the smart meter in your home and the

street lamp on your street — is simply the latest iteration. Beyond the routine contradictions of

capital as might be noted by Marxists of the day (then and now), what was evident especially in

the United States as in post-war Western Europe, animating Herbert Marcuse’s notion of

“repressive desublimation,” entailed for Anders that a concerted “effort to maintain production

via consumption, at least in capitalism, is today’s ‘concern’ [‘Sorge’],” a concern he could

attribute to Heidegger “as an existential melancholy.” (Ibid.)18

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18
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explains in his Deathbound Subjectivity, “being given a being to have, being committed to its potentiality, is the
impotence of power. It is the failing, the guilt of having been born.” Lingis 1989, 115.

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