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Giroux v. Commt. Representing the Petitioners with Respect to the Initiative Program Proposing
an Amendment to the Ohio Constitution Entitled the Right to Reproductive Freedom with
Protections for Health and Safety, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2786.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} In this original action under Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio
Constitution, relators, Jennifer Giroux and Thomas E. Brinkman Jr. (collectively,
“Giroux”), challenge an initiative petition to place a proposed constitutional
amendment on the November 7, 2023 ballot. Respondents in this case are the
committee proposing the amendment and its individual members1 (collectively, “the
committee”) and Secretary of State Frank LaRose. Because Giroux has not shown
that Ohio law requires invalidation of the petition, we deny the challenge.
Background
{¶ 2} The people of Ohio have reserved to themselves the right to propose
constitutional amendments by initiative petition. Ohio Constitution, Article II,
Sections 1 and 1a. At issue here is a petition proposing a constitutional amendment
titled “Right to Reproductive Freedom with Protections for Health and Safety.” The
full text of the proposed amendment reads:
1. The committee members are Nancy Kramer, Aziza Wahby, David Hackney, Jennifer McNally,
and Ebony Speakes-Hall.
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In State ex rel. DeBlase v. Ohio Ballot Bd., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-1823, __
N.E.3d __, ¶ 3, 28 (lead opinion), this court denied a writ of mandamus to the relators
who were seeking to force the Ohio Ballot Board to divide this same proposed
amendment into multiple petitions.
{¶ 3} To qualify the proposed amendment for the November 7 ballot, the
committee had to obtain signatures from a certain number of electors from at least
half the counties in Ohio and file the signed petition with the secretary of state at least
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125 days before the election. See Ohio Constitution, Article II, Sections 1a and 1g.
The parties to this challenge agree that the committee has met these requirements.
On July 25, the secretary of state certified that the petition contains enough valid
signatures and that it otherwise satisfies Ohio law for placement on the ballot. The
secretary declared that he will direct the boards of elections to place the proposed
amendment on the November 7 ballot.
{¶ 4} On July 28, Giroux filed this challenge alleging that the petition does
not comply with R.C. 3519.01(A), which provides that an initiative petition “shall
include the text of any existing statute or constitutional provision that would be
amended or repealed if the proposed law or constitutional amendment is adopted.”
According to Giroux, the petition is invalid and may not be placed on the November
7 ballot, because it does not include the text of at least four existing statutes that
would be amended or repealed by implication if the proposed constitutional
amendment is adopted. The committee and the secretary of state do not dispute that
the petition does not include the text of any existing statutes. Ohio Right to Life has
filed a brief as amicus curiae urging this court to sustain Giroux’s challenge.
{¶ 5} The secretary of state does not take a position on the merits of Giroux’s
challenge. But the committee argues that (1) this court lacks jurisdiction over this
challenge pursuant to Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution; (2) R.C.
3519.01(A) does not require the text of any potentially implicated statutes to be
included in the petition; (3) Giroux’s reading of R.C. 3519.01(A) would render that
statutory division unconstitutional; and (4) this action is barred under the doctrine of
laches.
{¶ 6} Giroux has filed a motion for leave to file a letter from the attorney
general to the secretary of state as rebuttal evidence. The committee opposes the
motion, but the secretary of state takes no position on it. Under S.Ct.Prac.R.
12.06(B), a relator “may file a motion for leave to file rebuttal evidence within the
time permitted for the filing of relator’s reply brief.” See also S.Ct.Prac.R. 14.01(C)
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(“In all challenge proceedings filed under this rule [addressing petition challenges],
these rules shall govern the procedure and the form of all documents”). Giroux’s
motion was timely filed under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.06(B). Because the evidence Giroux
seeks to file is relevant to relators’ response to one of the committee’s arguments, we
grant the motion.
Analysis
This court has jurisdiction
{¶ 7} Giroux invokes this court’s jurisdiction under Article II, Section 1g of
the Ohio Constitution, which provides that this court “shall have original, exclusive
jurisdiction over all challenges made to petitions and signatures upon such petitions
under this section.” (Emphasis added.) The committee argues that this court lacks
jurisdiction over this case because Giroux’s challenge is premised not on an alleged
failure to comply with one of Article II, Section 1g’s requirements but on an alleged
failure to comply with R.C. 3519.01(A). The committee contends that this court’s
Article II, Section 1g jurisdiction does not extend to “this wholly statutory claim.”
{¶ 8} According to the committee, Giroux is trying to use R.C. 3519.01(A)
to expand this court’s constitutionally defined jurisdiction. The committee invokes
the well-established rule “ ‘that when the jurisdiction of a particular court is
constitutionally defined, the legislature cannot by statute restrict or enlarge that
jurisdiction unless authorized to do so by the constitution.’ ” ProgressOhio.org, Inc.
v. Kasich, 129 Ohio St.3d 449, 2011-Ohio-4101, 953 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 3, quoting Smith
v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 328, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976). But Giroux does not argue that
R.C. 3519.01(A) expands this court’s jurisdiction. Giroux argues that Article II,
Section 1g gives this court original, exclusive jurisdiction over challenges alleging
that a petition fails to comply with statutory law.
{¶ 9} The committee concedes that R.C. 3519.01(A) was passed under the
authority of Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution, which authorizes the
General Assembly to pass laws “to facilitate [the] operation” of Article II, Section
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1g’s provisions. In Ohio Manufacturers’ Assn. v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act,
147 Ohio St.3d 42, 2016-Ohio-3038, 59 N.E.3d 1274, ¶ 1, 8, this court exercised
jurisdiction over a challenge brought under Article II, Section 1g alleging failures to
comply with several statutes passed under that constitutional authority. Moreover,
this court has held that a petition challenge under Article II, Section 1g “ ‘extends to
any defect of the petition of such character as would render it insufficient to require
submission to a vote of the electorate as provided by Section 1a, Article II.’ ”
(Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481, 2004-Ohio-
5586, 817 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 25, quoting State ex rel. Schwartz v. Brown, 32 Ohio St.2d 4,
10, 288 N.E.2d 821 (1972); see also Ohio Renal Assn. v. Kidney Dialysis Patient
Protection Amendment Commt., 154 Ohio St.3d 86, 2018-Ohio-3220, 111 N.E.3d
1139, ¶ 27 (sustaining a challenge under Article II, Section 1g based on a failure to
comply with a statutory requirement). Accordingly, we conclude that Giroux’s
challenge here properly invokes this court’s jurisdiction under Article II, Section 1g.
A petition proposing a constitutional amendment is not required to include the text
of an existing statute
{¶ 10} Giroux argues that the petition does not comply with R.C. 3519.01(A),
which provides, “A petition shall include the text of any existing statute or
constitutional provision that would be amended or repealed if the proposed law or
constitutional amendment is adopted.” According to Giroux, the petition is invalid
because it does not include the text of at least four existing statutes that relators say
would be amended or repealed if the proposed constitutional amendment is adopted.
We deny Giroux’s challenge because R.C. 3519.01(A) does not require a petition
proposing a constitutional amendment to include the text of an existing statute.
{¶ 11} A fair reading of a text requires evaluation of the context in which the
words are written. Great Lakes Bar Control, Inc. v. Testa, 156 Ohio St.3d 199, 2018-
Ohio-5207, 124 N.E.3d 803, ¶ 9; Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 56 (2012) (“words are given meaning by their context”). R.C.
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these circumstances that “the distributive canon has the most force,” Encino
Motorcars, L.L.C. v. Navarro, __ U.S. at __, 138 S.Ct. at 1141, 200 L.Ed.2d 433
(2018). As we have explained, “existing statute” and “proposed law” are natural
pairs. So too are “existing constitutional provision” and “proposed constitutional
amendment.” Thus, the natural reading of the statute is that a petition for a proposed
constitutional amendment “shall include the text of any existing * * * constitutional
provision,” R.C. 3519.01(A)—not any existing statute—“that would be amended or
repealed” by its adoption, id.
{¶ 15} This understanding of R.C. 3519.01(A) is bolstered by the problems
inherent in the interpretation that Giroux asks us to adopt. Giroux asserts that R.C.
3519.01(A)’s use of the disjunctive “or” requires pairing all the terms, not just the
most natural ones. Under Giroux’s reading of R.C. 3519.01(A), “existing statute”
must be paired with both “proposed law” and “proposed * * * constitutional
amendment.” The same would be true for “existing * * * constitutional amendment.”
It is true that “or” usually is disjunctive. In re Estate of Centorbi, 129 Ohio St.3d 78,
2011-Ohio-2267, 950 N.E.2d 505, ¶ 18. But “statutory context can overcome the
ordinary, disjunctive meaning of ‘or.’ ” Encino Motorcars at __, 138 S.Ct. at 1141.
Employing the disjunctive meaning of “or” here leads to a nonsensical result,
suggesting that a proposed law could amend or repeal a constitutional provision, or
that a constitutional amendment could amend or repeal a statute. Reading R.C.
3519.01(A) in the manner Giroux proposes is simply illogical. Applying the
distributive-phrasing canon avoids this “contradiction in terms,” Huidekoper’s
Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. 1, 67, 2 L.Ed. 347 (1805).
{¶ 16} The fair and natural reading of R.C. 3519.01(A) does not require a
petition proposing a constitutional amendment to include the text of an existing
statute. Accordingly, the petition at issue here does not fail to comply with R.C.
3519.01(A).
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Conclusion
{¶ 17} We grant Giroux’s motion for leave to file rebuttal evidence.
{¶ 18} We deny Giroux’s challenge under Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio
Constitution because R.C. 3519.01(A) does not require a petition proposing a
constitutional amendment to include the text of an existing statute. Because the
challenge fails for this reason, we need not address the committee’s remaining
arguments.
Challenge denied.
KENNEDY, C.J., and DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and
DETERS, JJ., concur.
FISCHER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.
_________________
FISCHER, J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 19} I agree with the court’s decision to grant the motion for leave to file
rebuttal evidence filed by relators, Jennifer Giroux and Thomas E. Brinkman Jr.
(collectively, “Giroux”), and to deny Giroux’s challenge to an initiative petition to
place a proposed constitutional amendment on the November 7, 2023 ballot.
Because I would apply a different analysis in reaching the conclusion that the
challenge must be denied, I respectfully concur in judgment only.
{¶ 20} Giroux argues that R.C. 3519.01(A) requires an initiative petition
proposing a constitutional amendment to include the text of any existing statute that
would be amended or repealed by implication if the proposed measure is adopted.
According to Giroux, a statute is amended or repealed by implication when its
provisions are clearly irreconcilable with a new constitutional provision.
{¶ 21} Since “amended” and “repealed” are not statutorily defined terms,
this court must determine their ordinary meanings—that is, how they “would
commonly be understood” in the context in which they are used, State v. Allen, 159
Ohio St.3d 75, 2019-Ohio-4757, 147 N.E.3d 618, ¶ 4. The ordinary meanings of
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have identified all the statutes that would be in conflict with the proposed
constitutional provision, would-be proponents of constitutional amendments will
not be able to either.
{¶ 25} For these reasons, I cannot approve of Giroux’s reading of R.C.
3519.01(A). Because Giroux has not shown that the proposed constitutional
amendment would amend or repeal any existing statute, I agree with the court’s
decision to deny the challenge but respectfully concur only in the court’s judgment.
_________________
The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman, for relators.
McTigue & Colombo, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, and J. Corey Colombo;
and Elias Law Group, L.L.P., Ben Stafford, and Tina Meng Morrison, for
respondents Committee Representing Petitioners, Nancy Kramer, Aziza Wahby,
David Hackney, Jennifer McNally, and Ebony Speakes-Hall.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Hanning Smith, Heather L.
Buchanan, and Michael A. Walton, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent
Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose.
Michael Gonidakis, urging sustaining of the challenge for amicus curiae,
Ohio Right to Life.
_________________
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