Digest | Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v.

Palomar
Monday, 7 August 2023 1:12 pm

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, DEFINED

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-
appellant.

FACTS
1. In 1960 Caltex conceived a promotional scheme to raise patronage for its
products, named, "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"

2. Eligibility to participate are as follows:

a. Dealers, the advertisig agency and their immediate families are prohibited to
participate
b. All motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers may request entry forms at
any Caltex station
c. Upon accomplishment, the participant shall deposit the entry stub to a
sealed can provided in the station
d. No registration fee is to be paid nor purchase of Caltex products required to
be made.

3. To drive participation, among the media to be utilized for publicizing the contest
would be the mails. As such, Caltex representatives, requested advance
clearance from the postal authorities.

4. The Postmaster General, declined to grant the requested clearance and opined
that the contest/ scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-Lottery provisions of
the Postal Law.

5. Caltex sought reconsideration and contended that there being involved no

consideration, the contest was not a lottery.

6. The Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration and assuming arguendo, it does not, falls under the term "gift
enterprise." He, as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud
order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".

7. Caltex filed a petition for declaratory relief before the trial court, praying "that
judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be
violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of
the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public"

8. Trial court ruled that the contest does not violate the Postal Law and the
respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.

9. The Postmaster General appealed contending that there is no room for

declaratory relief as he simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given
set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest

ISSUE
1. Whether the petition for the declaratory relief shall prosper
2. Whether the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law

HELD

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HELD
1. YES. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.

To the Court's mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation as

any other. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court,
which was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked,
declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a
statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity arising under
the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder"

The requisites for a declaratory relief petition to prosper are:

(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination

2. NO. The provisions of the Postal Law, subject of the case at bar, condemns as
absolutely non-mailable, those concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme
for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind".

The term "lottery" extends to all schemes of distribution of property/ prize by

chance. The three essential elements of which are: consideration, prize, and
chance.

The proposed contest at bar, does not possess the element of consideration. The
law does not prohibit gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no
consideration is derived from the party receiving the chance, directly or indirectly.

Neither the contest falls as a "gift enterprise" as it is applied to an

arrangement which goods are sold for their market value but by way of
inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. Equally impressive
authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive
statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and
consideration.

The principle of noscitur a sociis, state that the term under a construction should
be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the
word associated therewith.

Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the

term "gift enterprise" be so construed.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

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Digest | People v. Mapulong
Tuesday, 8 August 2023 10:50 am

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, WHEN APPLIES

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS
1. Sometime August 1962, in Manila, accused Mario Mapa y Mapulong willfully and
unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-
made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with 6 rounds of
ammunition, without the necessary license or permits

2. The accused admits having possession of the unlicensed firearms and

ammunitions.

3. Counsel for the accused presented the following exhibits

a. Appointment as a secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste, a Batangas
Governor
b. Letter instruction to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay,
and Quezon City on a confidential mission
c. The oath of office as a secret agent
d. A certificate as a secret agent

4. Counsel likewise stated that he was willing to submit the case on the question of
whether a secret agent of a duly qualified and appointed Governor is exempt
from the licensing requirement

5. The court then rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 1 year
to 1 day to 2 years, with costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from
him are forfeited in favor of the Government."

ISSUE
Whether a secret agent is exempted from the licensing requirements

HELD
No. The exemption is only on those firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails,"
are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public
servants for use in the performance of their official duties.

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is
not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is
to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."

The conviction of the accused must stand.

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Digest | Daoang v. The
Municipal Judge
Tuesday, 8 August 2023 11:55 am

SUBJECT OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988

RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father,
ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO
AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

FACTS
1. The case is a petition for review on certiorari on the decision of the
municipal court which pronounces minors, Quirino Bonilla, child of
Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy and Wilson Marcos, child of
Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales as children by adoption of
Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, and the children's surname be
changed to "Agonoy."

2. On 1971, the Agonoy spouses filed the said petition before the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.

3. Petitioners, namely, Rodericka and Rommel Daoang, through their

father, filed an opposition thereto on the ground that the spouses
Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, who died in
1971. As such, spouses Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under Art. 335
of the Civil Code.

4. The municipal court granted the petition for the adoption holding that "to
add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would
violate to the legal maxim that what is expressly included would
naturally exclude what is not included".

5. Hence, this petition to which they contend that the adoption would
introduce a foreign element in the family, but would also result in a
reduction of legitimes.

ISSUE
Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

HELD
No. The words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. It
reads:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
children by legal fiction;

The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as
pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a

statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted;
stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.

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doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the
Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain
classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which
was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the
Civil Code of the Philippines, disqualified persons who have legitimate or
legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero
and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have
legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of
the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to
"children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.Under such article, the spouses
Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they
have legitimate grandchildren.

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to
persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by
creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none
exists by blood relationship. The present tendency, however, is geared more
towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his
opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to
promote that objective. Under the Child and Welfare Code now in force,
having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by
legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court

of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

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Digest | Alonzo v. IAC
Tuesday, 8 August 2023 4:12 pm

DUTY OF THE COURTS TO INTERPRET THE LAW

AND RENDER JUSTICE

G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

FACTS
1. Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel
of land in Tarlac.
2. In 1963, Celestino Padua transferred by way of absolute sale his
undivided share to Carlos and Casimira Alonzo
3. In 1964, Eustaquia Padua, sold her share to the same vendees.
4. One of the co-heirs, in 1976, sought to redeem the area sold to
Spouses Alonzo. His complaint was dismissed due to his American
citizenship
5. In 1977, another co-heir, Tecla Padua filed another complaint on the
same grounds under Art. 1088 which allow the redemption of
heridetary rights sold to a stranger before partition by reimbursing the
selling price, provided such redemption is exercised within 30 days
from the written notice of sale by the vendor
6. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
redemption right had lapsed. The trial court held that although there
was no written notice of the sale, there was actual knowledge by the
co-heirs of the sale.
7. The IAC reversed the trial court ruling stating that actual notice would
not suffice as substitute the written notice requirement of the law.

ISSUE
Whether the actual notice by the co-heirs bar them from exercising the
redemption right when Art. 1088 require written notice.

HELD
YES. We test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative
intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To
be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary
when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the
will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly

apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them." While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the
power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the

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power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the
legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there,
we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment.
In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that
vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction,
hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is
within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter
thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the
lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within
the intent of the lawmakers.

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private

respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their
brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such
notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their
palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its
purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners
are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and
sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in
1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.

While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such
sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and
1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs
were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period
started running and ultimately expired.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the
strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied
pursuant to existing jurisprudence.
What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in
view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way
that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we
have done in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court

is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

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Digest | Endencia v. David
Friday, 11 August 2023 4:07 pm

INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, AN EXCLUSIVE

PROVINCE AND JURISDICTION OF THE JUDICIARY,
NOT THE LEGISLATIVE

G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-
appellant.

FACTS
1. Justice Pastor Endencia and Justice Fernando Jugo filed a joint
appeal for the refund of the sums of PhP 1,744.45 and PhP 2,345.46
representing income tax from their salary against Saturnino David,
Collector of Internal Revenue

2. On the ground that such deduction constituted diminution of their

compensation and in violation of the Constitutional provision that
members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall
receive compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office as decided in Perfecto v.
Meera.

3. Respondent assail that RA 590, was the Congress response to a

previously decided case, Perfecto v Meera which ruled that salaries of
judges are exempt from income taxes as it results to diminution
prohibited in the Constitution.

4. In section 13, RA 590, says that "no salary received by public officer
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and such
payment is declared as not a diminution of compensation

5. The SolGen, argued that the law was enacted to counteract the SC's
decision and authorize and legalize collection of taxes from salaries of
judicial officers.

ISSUE
Whether RA 590 is valid, hence, the collection of taxes likewise valid

HELD
No. Without violating the principle of separation of powers, the
Legislative may not interpret the Constitution as such power is within
the province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. Neither can they pass
any declaratory act so as to give it binding weight with the courts.

The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional

provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a
declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional
inhibition.

If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion
of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case
ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this
would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court
decisions.

The Court believed that the collection of income tax is an actual and evident

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The Court believed that the collection of income tax is an actual and evident
diminution thereof.

When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for
exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is
already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental law,
not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and
preserve his independence of judicial thought and action.

In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may
justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his
ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. The framers of the
Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from
paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation,
thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.

We further hold that the interpretation and application of the

Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in
such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby
tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said
statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said
statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a
case by the highest court of the land.

In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is

hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.

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Digest | Nifatan v.
Commissioner of Inter
Revenue
Friday, August 11, 2023 10:15 PM

INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE

INTENT OF THE FRAMERS

FACTS
1. The Petitioners, duly appointed and qualified judges presiding in
Branches 52, 19, and 53 of the Regional Trial Court, moved for the
prohibition of the Respondents from withholding taxes from their
salary.

2. Petitioners argue that the taxes withheld constitute decrease of their

salaries contrary to the provision of the 1987 Constitution that during
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased

3. The Court reaffirmed the Chief Justice's previous directive to

continue with the deduction of withholding taxes

ISSUE
Whether the withholding of taxes constitute diminution/ deduction of taxes,
contrary to the Constitution

HELD
No. The deliberation of the Constitutional Commission disclosed that the
true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to
make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the

fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were
guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

Such intention renders the decision in Perfecto v. Meera and Endencia v.

David, discarded.

The framers during the interpellations grounded the decision to tax the
salaries of members of the Judiciary on the principle of uniformity in
taxation and equal protection clause.

In the same wise, Ople stated that the exemption from income tax kind of
economic immunity denied to the Legislative and Executive branches, so
as to give substance to the equality among three branches of the
government.

The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have
expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of
Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people,
through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the
spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of
maintaining the government and should share the burden of general
income taxation equitably.

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income taxation equitably.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

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Digest | People v. Concepcion
Sunday, August 13, 2023 10:17 PM

THE PRIMARY RULE OF ASCERTAINING THE INTENT

OF THE LEGISLATURE IN INTERPRETING A STATUTE

G.R. No. L-19190 November 29, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant.

FACTS
1. Sometime 1919, President of the Philippine National Bank,
Venancio Concepcion, authorized credit in favor of Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C in the amount of PhP 300,000 without
collateral security

2. The authorization was to undercut a memorandum limiting

discretional power of bank manager to grant loaned and discount
negotiable documents to PhP 5,000, which may be increased to
PhP 10,000

3. Venancio Concepcion, husband of a partner in Puno y Concepcion

was charged with violation of Sec. 5 of Act 2747, to wit:
"The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to
any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to
agents of the branch banks." Section 49 of the same Act provides:
"Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall
be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment."

4. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year and 6 months, with

fine.

5. In 1921 the act was repealed by Act 2938, it is contended, by the

appellant, that the repeal of these sections of Act No. 2747 by Act
No. 2938 has served to take away the basis for criminal
prosecution.

ISSUE
1. Whether the conviction stands after repeal by the Legislature before
judgement was rendered.

2. Whether the granting of the credit was a loan or a discount

HELD
1. Yes. The contention of the defendant-appelant that the repeal
served to take away the basis for criminal prosecution fails.

In the cases of United States v. Cuna, where an Act of the

Legislature which penalizes an offense, such repeals a former Act
which penalized the same offense, the repeal does not have the
effect of depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and
sentence offenders charged with the violations of the old law.

2. The PhP 300,00 was a loan. Contrary to the arguments that it was
merely a concession of a credit, the "credit" of an individual means
his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence or trust
reposed by a lender that he will pay what he may promise.
(Donnell vs. Jones) A "loan" means the delivery by one party and
the receipt by the other party of a given sum of money, upon an

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the receipt by the other party of a given sum of money, upon an
agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned, with or
without interest. (Payne vs. Gardiner) The concession of a "credit"
necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit of the
amount fixed in the "credit"

Further, amount was loan as evidenced by the demand notes

signed by the firm "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." which were not
discount paper but were mere evidences of indebtedness, because
(1) interest was not deducted from the face of the notes, but was
paid when the notes fell due; and (2) they were single-name and not
double-name paper.

It was further held that the loan is an indirect loan.

In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary

rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is
plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director
of the bank. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition
of the familiar maxim that no man may serve two masters — that
where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost
always suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is
financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business
venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a
member, falls within the prohibition.

A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a director of

a bank is a member, is an indirect loan to such director

On a review of the evidence of record, with reference to the decision

of the trial court, and the errors assigned by the appellant, and with
reference to previous decisions of this court on the same subject,
we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that no reversible error was
committed in the trial of this case, and that the defendant has been
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
information. The penalty imposed by the trial judge falls within the
limits of the punitive provisions of the law.

Judgment is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the

appellant. So ordered.

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Digest | Tañada v. Yulo
Sunday, August 13, 2023 11:00 PM

DETERMINATION OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT THROUGH

THE LETTERS OF THE STATUTE

G.R. No. L-43575 May 31, 1935

JUAN TAÑADA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice,
EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of the
Thirteenth Judicial District,
and SANTIAGO TAÑADA, Justice of the Peace of Alabat,
Tayabas, respondents.

FACTS
1. Sometime 1911, Juan Tañada, was appointed as justice of peace in
Alabat, Tayabas by the Governor-General. He served in the position
until 1934.

2. He requested to be transferred from the justice of peace in

municipality of Alabat to Perez.

3. Petitioner reached the age of 65 in October 5, 1934. The Judge of

First Instance in Tayabas, with orders from the Department of Justice,
directed petitioner to cease to act as justice of peace

4. Petitioner surrendered his office under protest.

5. Sec 203 of the Administrative Code provides that the present

justice and auxiliary justice of the peace who shall, at the time this Act
takes effect, have completed 65 years of age, shall cease to hold
office on January 1, 1933; and the Governor-General, with the advise
and consent of the Philippine Senate, shall make new appointments
to cover the vacancies occurring by operation of this Act.

6. Whereas, Section 206 of Act No. 3899 provides that a justice of

peace shall hold office during good behavior unless his office be
lawfully abolished or merged.

7. The Solicitor General contends that meaning of the language used in

Act 3899 means that a justice of peace appointed prior to the
approval of the Act and completed 65 years of age in September
1934, is not affected by the cessation on January 1933 contemplated
in Sec 203.

ISSUE
1. Whether petitioner is excluded from the mandatory cessation from
office, when he reached 65 in October 1934?

2. Whether the transfer amounts to a new appointment which brings

petitioner under the cessation of office by reaching age of 65?

HELD
1. No. The Court agreed that a justice of the peace like the petitioner
who became sixty-five years of age on October 5, 1934, was not
included in a law which required justice of the peace sixty-five years
of age to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933.

In substantiation of what has just been said, it is of course

fundamental that the determination of the legislative intent is the
primary consideration. However, it is equally fundamental that that

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 primary consideration. However, it is equally fundamental that that
legislative intent must be determined from the language of the
statute itself. This principle must be adhered to even though the
court be convinced by extraneous circumstances that the
Legislature intended to enact something very different from that
which it did enact. An obscurity cannot be created to be cleared up
by construction and hidden meanings at variance with the language
used cannot be sought out. To attempt to do so is a perilous
undertaking, and is quite apt to lead to an amendment of a law by
judicial construction. To depart from the meaning expressed by the
words is to alter the statute, is to legislate not to interpret.

The thought was expressed by the same court in another case, when
it said that court are bound to follow the plain words of a statute
as to which there is no room for construction regardless of the
consequences. (Commissioner of Immigration vs. Gottlieb)

By liberal construction of statutes, courts from the language use, the

subject matter, and the purposes of those framing them are able to
find their true meaning. There is a sharp distinction, however,
between construction of this nature and the act of a court in engrafting
upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes
ought to have been embraced. The former is liberal construction and
is a legitimate exercise of judicial power. The latter is judicial
legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of powers among the
three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and
the judicial.

2. No. The transfer is the legal right of the Governor-General from one
municipality to the other, without the consent of the Philippine Senate.
The transfer simply amounted to an enlargement or change of
jurisdiction grounded on the original appointment.

Accordingly, the writ will be granted and the petitioner Juan Tañada will be
placed in possession of the office of justice of the peace of Perez, Tayabas.
So ordered, without special pronouncement as to the costs.

Statutory Construction Page 15

Digest | Floresca v. Philex Mining
Corporation
Monday, 14 August 2023 11:31 am

THE LETTER OF THE LAW V. THE PROVISION OF THE CONSITUTION

THE COURT "DO AND MUST LEGISLATE"

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and
NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA,
JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN
S. FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL
MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR.
all surnamed LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed
ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch
XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

FACTS
1. Petitioners are heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation.

2. In 1967, petitioners allege that with gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure
to take required precautions of the protection of the men working underground, Philex
allowed the collapsed of underground support and approximately 500,000 cubic feet of
ores, rock, mud, and water, blasted, flowed and filled the tunnels and blocked all avenues
of exit

3. Thereby, trapping within 21 workers, where many were still alive but was not rescued due
to Philex's decision to abandon rescue operations

4. Philex filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that causes of action are based on an
industrial accident, covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act hence, the Court of
First Instance has no jurisdiction.

5. Petitioners contented that the causes of action are based on the Civil Code provisions
allowing award of actual, moral and exemplary damages

6. The Judge of the Court of First Instance dismissed the case as it falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission over compensation claims for
work-related death injuries, irrespective of the employers negligence

7. Hence, the petition

ISSUE
1. Whether the claims arising from an industry-related injury or death is exclusively
restricted under Workmen's Compensation Act

HELD

Statutory Construction Page 16

HELD
No. This Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured
worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for
higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.

The case at bar pronounces exemptions thereto, the Supreme Court hold that although the
other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may
not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became
cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the
deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware
of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which
awarded a lesser amount for compensation. However, should the petitioners be successful in
the civil action in the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act
should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Further, on the issue of exclusive right to compensation provided for in Workmen's

Compensation Act, the Court ruled that constitutional principles as implemented by the
aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive
provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code (predecessor: Sec 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act) Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of the
workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the
liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.

The Labor Code provides "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions
of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "

More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all
labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent
living of the laborer."

It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.

The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New
Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining
employees.

"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law
insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law
killeth; its spirit giveth life."

The Court likewise discussed the myth that the courts cannot legislate.

That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that
"No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity
or insufficiency of the laws."

Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in
certain instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to
fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is
finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor
has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.

Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial
department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison), which was re-stated by Chief Justice
Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is"

Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He
legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " Both the 1935 and 1973

Statutory Construction Page 17

legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " Both the 1935 and 1973
Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or
constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act.

WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND

SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.

Statutory Construction Page 18