bw vero of the etry Politica Resin in International Relations STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA or Puiosopny [Notice This PDF venice was dined Uy rogue to mam ners ofthe Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy #0 SEP Jontentcontebutors. Ite solely fr ther fair wie. Unathorszed aistibution i probived. To Ieaen how to join the Friends ofthe |SeP Sore and obtain authorised PDF versione of SEP entre, plese visit p/n stanford dene Stor Beylptino Pirpy ‘ppt pt: Mie abe tetra ein yeahh Political Realism in International Relations nthe discipline of international selations there are contending general theories oF theoretical perspectives. Realism, alo known as polities! reals, isa view of international polit that stresses its competitive and conflictual sig, Is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism, which tends to emphasize cooperation. Realist consider the principal actors in the inemstional arena to be states, which ane concened with their own security, atin pursuit of ther ova national interests, and strapgle for power, The negative side of the relists” emphasis on power and sell Interest i often tei skepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations among states. National polis isthe realm of authority and Jaw, whereas intemutionl politics, hey somtimes claim, is a sphore ‘without justice, characterized by ative or potential cone mong states. Not all relists, however, deny the preseace of ethics in ineratonsl fons, The distinction should be drawn between classical reliem— represented by such tweateth-cemury theorists as Reinhold Niebohr and Hans Morgenti—and radical or extreme reali, While classical reals emphasizes the concept of tional intrest, it is aot the ‘Machiavellian doctrine “hat anything is usted by reason of sate” (Bull 1995, 189). Nor does it involve the glorication of war or confit The classical realists donot reject the possiblity of moral judgment in Jmesnaionl polis. Rather, they te tcl of moralism—abstact moral liscourse that doesnot take into account political reales. They assign supreme value o succesful polieal ation based on pence: the ability to jade the ritness ofa given aston trom among posible alteratives ‘on the bass of ts key politcal consequences,PouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS Realism encompasses varity of approaches and claims long ‘heoresical ation, Among its founding fathers, Thucydides, Mochiavel and Hobbes ae the names most usualy mentioned. Twenith-oentry lasical realism has today been largely replaced by neoeaism, which is ‘an atempt to construct a more scentife approach to the study of ‘etecrational eations, Hoth casial realism and neorealim have been subjected to cides fom IR theorists representing liberal, cetca, and postmodern perspectives. 4+ 1. The Roots af the Realist Tradition + 1 Thucydides and the Fenporance of Power + L2 Machiavelli's Critique ofthe Moral Teation + Li Hobbes's Anatchie State of Natire + 2. Twentieth Century Classical Realism © 2. E.H. Car's Challenge to Utopian Iealism + 22 Hans Morgenthau’ Realist Principles + 3. Neoeaism + 3.1 Kenneth Wale’ International System, + 32 Objections w Neorealism ‘+ 4. Conclusion: The Ceuionary and Changing Character of Realism + Bibliogaphy + Academie Tools + ther Inert Resources + Related Entries 1. The Roots of the Realist Tradition 1.1 Thucydides and the Importance of Power Like other catia! political doors, Thusyides (460-111 BCE) saw Politics as involving moral questions. Most importantly he asks whether 2 Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien relations among «an alo be guided bythe orm of sie. His History ofthe Peloponnesian War isin Sat neither 3 ‘work of poltcal philosophy or a sustained theory of interational Jatons. Much of his Work, which presents partial account ofthe armed conflict between Athens and Spars that took place from 431 to 404 BCE, consists of paired speeches by personages who argve oppoting sides ofan issue, Nevertheless, ifthe History is described a the ony scknowledgod classical text in intemtional relation, and if i neptes theorists fiom Hobbes co contemporary international relations scholars this is because itis more than a chronicle of evens, and a theoretical ‘ottion can be extrapolated from it. Realism is expressed in the very frat speech of the Atbenians recorded inthe Hisory—a spesch piven atthe debate that took place in Spara just before the war: Moreover, a realist perspective is implied in the way Thucydides explain th cause of the Peloponnesian War, and ako in the famous "Melian Dialogue,” in the statements made hy the Athenian envoys les 10 which power i eric 1.14 Genera Fetes of Realism i International Relations International relations realists emphasize the constraints imposed on poles by the nature of human beings, whom they consider epost, nd by the absence of intemational government. Together these factors contnbute 3 coniic-hased paradigm of international relatos, in which the key actors ae sues, in which power and security Become the main Issues, and in which thee is ite place for morality. The set of premises conceming state actors, egosm, anarchy, power, security, and malty that define the realist tation at all resent in Theyds, (1) Human nature is a tating pont fr cassical political realism, Reaists view humas beings a inherely egoisic and sentrested to the extent ‘hat self-interest overcomes moral principles. At the debate in Spar, eseibed in Book I of Thueyéides’ History, the Athenians afer the ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox 3PouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS priory of seltinterest over morality, They say thal considerations of right ‘and wrong have “never turned people aside from the opportunities of saggnindizement offered by superior strength” (cap. 1 pa. 75). (2) Realiss, and especially today’s neoeaiss, consider the absence of overmmest, litelly anarchy, to be the primary determinant of ral pica outcomes, Te lick of common rule-making snd forcing autbority means, they argue, thatthe international arena is essentially a selhelp system. Bach state is responsible for its own survival and ie fee to define is own interests and to pursue power. Anarchy thus leas to a stuaton in which power asthe overriding role in shaping interstate relations. Inthe words ofthe Athenian envoys at Mos, without any common authority that can enforce onl, “the independent states survive [only] when they are powerful” (597), (2) Insofar as realists envision the world of states as anarchic, they Hewise view securiy aa ental ste, To atan security, sates ty 10 increase their power and engage in power-alancing for the purpose of keting potential aggressors, Ware are fought to prevent competing ratioas from becoming militarily stronger. Thucydides, while dlistingushing between the immediate and underlying causst of the Peloponnesian War, does ot soe its real cause ia any of the particular evens that immediately preceded its outbresk He instead locates the cause of the war in the changing disbution of power between the 160 blocs of Greek ciy-sates: the Delian League, under the leadership of Athens. and the Peloponnesian League, under the leadership of Sparta, According to him, the growth of Athenian power made the Spartans sisi for their security, and thus propelled them to war (1.23) (4) Realits are generally skeptical about the relevance of morality 10 ‘nterationl politics. Tis can lea! them to claim that thee i. place for ‘morality in intemationl relations, or that there is 2 teasion between 4 Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien demands of morality and requirements of succesful polities action, oF that states hive their ow morality that is different from customary ‘morality or that meray. employed all. merely used instrumentally to justify states? conduct. A clear case of the sjetion of ethical norms in ‘elations among states can be found inthe “Median Dialogue” (585-113), ‘This dialogue relates to the evens of 616 BCE, when Athens invaded the island of Melos, The Atbeniancavoys prevented the Meliss with a choice, destaction or surrender, and fom the outset asked them net to appeal to jastce, but to thnk only about their survival. Inthe envoys ‘words, "We both know thi the decisions about justice are mad in umn iscussons only when both sides are under equal compulsion, but when ‘one side is stranger, it gts at mvc ai an, and the weak must accept that” (5.89). To be “under equal compulsion” means tobe under the force of law, and thus tobe subjected to a common lnwgiving authority (Kora ‘Karpowicr 2008, 234), Since such an authority above states des nt exis, the Athenians argue that in this lawless condition of international anarchy, ‘the only right isthe right of the stronger to dominate the weaker, They explcily equate right with might, and exclude considerations of justice Som foreign ata 1.1.2 The “MelianDislogue”—The Fst Realis-dalst Debate ‘We can thus find strong support fra relist perspective inthe ssterents of the Atbeians. The question remains, however, to what extent their lism coincides with Thucydides’ own viewpoint. Although substatal passages ofthe “Melia Dialogue.” as well as other parts ofthe History Suppot realitic reading, Thueydies’ postion cannot be deduced fom such selected fragments, bu rar must be assessed onthe basis of the wider cootext of his book. Infact, even the “Melian Ding islt proves us witha numberof contending views ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox 5PouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS Political realism is ually contrasted by IR scholar with ideaism ot liberalism, a theoretical perspective that emphasizes intemationsl norms, Interdependence among Sates, and interatonal cooperation. The “Metin Dialogue” whichis one ofthe most frequently commeated-upon pars of ‘Thucydides’ History, presen the classe debate between the ideals snd realist views: Can interatinal polities be based on a moral order derived ‘oom the principles of justice, or will i forever remain the arena of conflicting national interests and power? For the Matias, who employ idealistic arguments, the chose is between wat and subjection (586). They are courageous and love their county ‘They do not wish to lose ther feedom, at in spite ofthe fact thal they sre military weaker than the Athenins, they are prepared to defend themselves (8.100; $112). They base their arguments on an appeal to justice, which they associate with fumes, ad regard the Athenians at ‘unjust (5.90, 5.109) They ae pious, believing that gods will suppor their just cause and compensate for their weakness, and tt in alliances thinking tat tei ales, the Spartans, who are als related to them, will help them (5.108; 5.112). Henee, oe can identify im the speech of the Meliss cements ofthe idealistic or liberal worldview: te belie that rations have the right to exerise politi independence, hat they have mutual obligations w one another and will ery ut such obligations, and thats war of aggression s unjust, What the Melins nevertheless lick are resources and foresight In thir decision to defend themselves, they are ded more by their hopes than by the evidence at hand or by prudent calculations “The Athenian arguments based on key relist concepts such as security nd power, and is informed not by wha the worl! shoul he, bt by what tis. The Athenians disregard any moral alk and urge the Metian to look st the facts—that i, to recognize their military inferiority, to consider the otemal consequences of thei decision, and to think about theie own ® Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien survival (87; 5.101, There appeats ta be 4 powerful relist loge bind ‘he Athenian arguments. Their poston, based on security concerns and selfnterest, semingy involves reliance on rationality, intlignce, and foresight. However, ypon close examination, their logic proves to be Seriously awed. Melos, 2 tlavely weak stat, does not pose any real security threat to ther. The eventual desteution of Mees does ot change ‘he course of the Peloponnesian War, which Athens will ose afew years Inter In the History, Thucydides shows that power, i itis unestained by ‘moderation and a sense of jstice, brings about the uncooled dsie for ore power, There se logical imis to the size of an empl. Drank ‘withthe prospect of glory and gan after conquering Melos the Athenians engage in a war against Sicily. They pay no atetion to the Melian argument that considerations of jase are useful to all inthe longer eun (5.90), And, as the Athenians overestimate their stength and inthe end lose the war, their selfntereted logic proves to be very shortsighted indeed, 11s wopian to ignore the realty of power in international relations, butt Js equally blind to ely on power alone. Thucydides appears to support either the naive idealism of the Means nor the cynicism of thir ‘Aenian opponents. He teaches us to be on guard “agains naive reaming on interationl pois.” on the one hand, and “agains the otter pernicious extreme: unrestnined cynicism," on the other (Donnelly 2000, 193). IF he can be regarded as politial realist his ccalism nonetheless prefigues neither reafpoit, in which tration ethics is denied, nor todays selenite neoreais, in which moral questions are largely ignored, Thucydides’ realism, neither immoral nor amoral, ean rather be compared o that of Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, and other ‘enteth-ceaary catia! realists, who, although sensible othe demands ‘Scan 2017 EpirioxPouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS fof ational interest, would not deny that potest actors on the Intemational scene are subject to moral judgment 1.2 Machiavelli's Critique of the Moral Tradition ‘Mealsm in international ration, lke realism, can lay claim to long teadtion, Unsatsied with the world as they have found it idealists have allvays tied to answer the question of "what ought 10 be” in politics, Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were all political idealists who believed hat there were some universal moral valet on which pial fe could be based. Building on the work of his predecessors, Cicero developed the ‘dea of a natural moral law that was applicable to both domestic and iemationa polis. His ideas conceming righteousness in war were are further in the wings ofthe Christian thinkers St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. In the late fillenth century, when Niccld Machiavelli was born, th idea tht pots, including the relations among ates, shouldbe vious, nd that the methods of warfre should remain subordinated to ethical standards stil predominated in political erature Machiavelli (1469-1527) challenged this well-established moral tation, thos positioning himself as a politcal innovator, The novelty of his approach lies in his ertique of classical Westera politcal thought as unrealistic, and in is separation of politics trom etic. He thereby lays ‘he foundations for modem polis. In chapter XV of The Prince, Machiavelli announces that in departing from the teachings of etler thinkers, he seeks “the efectual truth of the matter rather than the ‘imagine’ one.” The “effectual th” is for him the only trth worth seeking. I represents the sum ofthe practical conditions that be believes ‘ae rquired to make both the individual andthe country prosperous and stroag. Machiavelli replaces the aeient vine (a moral quality of the ‘ndvial, suc a josticeosel-testain) with vr, biy o vigor. Asa * Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien prophet of sired, he promises to lead both nations and indvidils to catly glory and power ‘Machivellanism is a radical type of political realism that is applied to ‘both domestic and inteatinal aus, Iisa doctrine which deties the relevance of morality in pois, and claims tht all means (oral and ‘mmoral) are justified to achieve certain politcal ends, Although Machiavelli never uses the phrase ragione di stato or its Preach ‘auivlet, raison d'éat, what ltimately counts for him is precisely tht: ‘whatever ood forthe state, ater than ethical Sraples or noms ‘Machiavelli jstied immoral actions in polities, bat never refused to mit that they are ev, He operated within the single framework of ‘cational morality, 1¢ became a specific tsk of his ninetenth-centry followers to develop the doctrine ofa double cis: one public and one private, co push Machiavellian realism to even further extemes, and to ‘apply tt international relations. By asserting that duty than of minttining isl,” Hegel gave an ethical sanction to the ae’: promoton of its own interest and advantage aginst oer states (Meinecke 357). Thus he overtured the tational morality. The good of ‘he state was perversely interpeted as the highest moral value, with the extension of national power regarded as nation’s right and. duty Referring lo Machaveli, Heinrich von Treitscke declared th the sate was power, precisely inorder to assert itself as against other equally Independcot powers, and that he supreme mor duty ofthe sate Was to foster this power. He considered interational agreements to be binding only insofar a it was expedient for the stat. The idea ofan autonomous ctbics of ste behavior and the coneept of realpolitik were thus introdveed, Tralional ethics was denied and power polities was associated witha “higher” type of morality. These concepts, along with ‘he bli inthe superiority of Germanic culture, served as weapons with the state as no higher ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox °PouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS ‘which German saesmen, fom the eighteenth century to the end of the Second World War, justified ther pois of conquest and extermination. “Machiavelli often praised for his prudetial advice co leaders (which as eauted him to be reguded as 4 founding master of modern poieal strategy) and for his defense ofthe republican form of goverment. There sre cernniy, many aapects of his though that merit such praise Nevertcles, itis also posible to see him as the thinker who bears foremost esponsibility forthe demoraization of Europe. The argument of the Athenian envoys presented in Thucydies' “Melia Dialogue,” that of ‘Theasynachus in Plato's Republic or that of Carneades, to whom Cicero refers—all ofthese challenge the sient and Cristian views of the anity of politics and ethies. However, before Machiavelh, this amoral or ‘immoral mode of thinking had never prevailed in the mainsteam of Wester poltical tought. It was the force and timeliness of his justification of resorting to evil as lepitimate means of achieving poltial ds that persuaded so many ofthe thinker ad poislpratiiners who followed him, The elles of Michelin idea, such the notion that the employment ofall possible means was permissible in war, would be seen on the baletelds of modern Europe. as mas cizen armies fought sgainst cach other to the biter end without regard forthe rules of justice ‘The tension between expediency sn morality lost its validity inthe sphere of polities, The concep of «double ethics, private and publi, ‘futher damage to traditional, tstomary ethics was invented, The ocuine of raion dtr ultimately led othe poies of Lebensraum, two word wats, and the Holocaust a rete Perhaps the greatest problem with ealsm in iteration relations is dat ‘tha endeney to lip nto is exireme version, which accepts any policy ‘hat can benefit the sate at dhe expense of other sates, no matter how morally problematic the pliy is. Even if they do not explicitly raise ethical questions, in the works of Waltz and of many other of today's 10 Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien neorealists, double ethics i presupposed, and words such realpolitik no longer have the negative connotations that they had for classical reais, sch as Hane Morgetnas 1.3 Hobbes's Anarchic State of Nature ‘Thomas Hobbes (1588-1683) was par ofan intellectual movement whose goal wast fie the emerging modern scones from the consents ofthe classical and scholastic heritage. Acconling to classical. poial piilosophy, on which the ideals perspective is based, human beings can ‘conto her desires through reason and can work fr the benefit of thes even a the expense of thee own benefit. They ae thus both rational abd ‘moral agents, capable of distinguishing berween sight and wrong, and of king moral choices. They ave also atually social. With great skill Hobbes stacks these views, His human beings, extremely ividualisic er than moral or social, are subject to “a perpetual and rests desire of power after power. that ceases only in death” (Leviathan X12). They ‘herefre inevitably struggle for power. fasting out such ideas, Hobbes conuibutes to sme of the basic conceptions fundamental tothe relist ‘eation in iterations relations, and especially to neoreaism, These ‘nhide the characterization of human nature aegis, the concept of Jteratona anarchy, nd the view tat politics, rooted nthe struggle for power canbe rationalized and studied scientifically. (One of the most widely known Hbbesian concepts i tha ofthe anarchic sate of nue, seen as entailing a sate of war—and “sich a war ais of ‘every man against every man” (XII 8). He drives his notion ofthe tate of ‘war from his views of both human nature and the condition in which individuals exist. Sine in the state of nature there is no government snd everyone chjoys equal status, every individual has 2 ight to everyting, there ae no eostsins onan individuals behavior. Anyone may at any time use force, and all must constantly be ready to counter such force ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox aPouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS with fore, Hence, driven by acquis and motivated to compete for scarce goods, individuals are ap fo “invade fone another for gain. Being suspicious of one another and driven by fer, they ae also likely to engage in preemptive actions and invade one another to ensure their own safely. Filly, individaals ae also deven by ride and desice fr glory. Whether for gin safety, o reptation, power secking individuals will iv “endenvor lo destoy of sub one snot” (XIIL 3), In such uncertain conditions where everyone is © potential sggressor, making war on others ie a more advanagcous strategy than peaceable behavoe, and one needs to learn that domination over others is necessary fr one's ow continue survival ivenes, having no moral restans, Hobbes is primanly concemed wit the rltonship tetween individuals and he state, and his comments aboot relations among sates are scarce. Nevertheless, what he says about the lives of individuals in the sate of rate can also be iaterpeted as 2 description of how states exist i relation to one another. Once states ar established, the individual drive for power becomes the isis forthe sles’ behavior, which often maifets ‘ssf in their efforts to dominate other sts an poopes, Sates, “Tr theit ‘own security” writes Hobbes, “enlarge thes dominions upon all pretences of danger and fear of invasion or assistance that may be given to iavaders, [and] endeavour as much as they ean, to subdue and sveaken their neighbors” (XIX 4), Accordingly, te quest and struggle for power ies at the core of the Hobbesian vision of relations among states, The same would later be true ofthe mods of iteration rations developed by Hans Morgemtau, who was deeply inuenced by Hobbes and adopted the ame view of human nature, Similaly, the neorealst Kenneth Waka ‘would follow Hobbes lead regarding international anarchy (he fact dat sovereign states are not sobject to ay higher common soversign) a the sential clement of ntratona relations, 2 Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien By subjecting themselves toa sovereign, individuals escape the war ofall against all which Hobbes associates withthe state of mature; however, this ‘war continues to dominate relations among stats. This dos not mean that states ate alvays Sighting, but rather that they havea disposition to fight (XII 8) With each state deciding fr itself whether or nat use Toee, ‘war may break out at any time, The achievement of domestic security through the creation ofa state is then paralleled by a conton of inter state insecurity. One can argue that if Hobbes were fully consistent, he ‘would agree withthe notion that, to escape tis condition, stats sould also enter into contract and submit themsshes to a world sovereign. Aliouph the idea of word sate would find support among some of today’s realists, this isnot a postion tke by Hobbes himsel. Ie does not propos tala socal conttamoag nations be implemented to bring international snare to an end. This is because the condition of insecurity in which states ae placed docs not necessarily Ia to insecurity fr their citizens, As long a8 an aed conflict of eter type of host between sats does not actully breakout, individuals within sate ean foot atively secre ‘The denial of the existence of universal moral principles inthe among sates brags Hobbes clase tothe Machiavellians and the followers ofthe doctrine of raison d'dat. His theory of etenation relations, which asumes tha independent stats, like independent individual, are enemies by nature, social and selfs, and that there sno moral iitation on ther behavior, isa great challenge tothe idealist potcal vison based ‘ow human sociability and tthe concept ofthe international jurisprudence that is built on this vision, However, whit separates Hobbes fom Machiavelli and. associates im more with clatsical reais is his insistence on the defensive charter of foreign poi. His political theory oes not pt forward the invitation to do whatever may be advantageous {or the state. His approach to international relations is pradental and ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox BPouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS pce: sovereign sates, ike inivideals, should be disposed towards peace which s commended by reason, ‘What Waltz and other ncorcalist readers of Hobbes’s works sometimes overlook is that he does ot perceive intemtional anarchy as an vironment without aay rules, BY suggesting that certain dictates of reason apply even in the slate of nate, he allio thal more peace and ‘cooperative inteatinal relations are posible. Neither does he deny the existence of international lw. Sovereign states can sign treaties with one another to provide a legal basis for thir relations. At the same tins however, Hobhes seems aware that international rules wil often prove inellecive in esting the srugle for power: States wil interpre them to ther own advantage, and so ntrational aw will be obeyed or ignore according 10 the interests of the sates affected. Hence, iteratonal relaons will aways cond co ea preetious afar. This grim view of bal pois lies athe eve of Hobbes reais, 2. Twentieth Century Classical Realism ‘Twentith-century reali was bor in response tothe idealist perspecsive that dominated international elation scholarship inthe aftermath of the First Word War, The idealists of the 19208 and 1930s (aso called liberal Internationalist or utopians) had the goal of building peace in order to prevent another world confict. They saw the solution so interstate problems as being the eration ofa respected system of inteational lw, backed by international organizations. This interwar idealism resid in ‘he founding of the League of Nations in 1920 and inthe Kellogg-Brand Pact of 1928 outlawing war and providing forthe peaceful setlemen of disputes. US. President Woodrow Wilson, scholars such as Norman Angel, Alfed Zimmer, and Raytnond B, Fosdick, and ober prominent ‘deaiss of the era, gave their intellectual support to the League of Nations. Instead of focusing on what some might see asthe inevitability of u Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien conflict between sates and peoples, they chose to emphasize the common terest tat could unite humanity, and attempted to appeal to rationality and mol. For them, war didnot originate in an egeistic human nature buttather in imperfect social conditions and pliticl arrangement, which could be improved. Yet their ideas were already being eftcized in the carly 1980s by Reinhold Nicbubr and within few years by F, H. Cat ‘The League of Nations, which the United States never joined, and fom ‘which Japan and Germany withdrew, could not prevent the outbreak ofthe ‘Second World Wat. This fast, pethps more than any theoretical argument, ‘produced strong telist eaction. Although the United Nations, founded ‘in 1985, can sll be regarded a a produc of idealist poiea thinking, the isciplne of ntematinal relations was profoundly ftusncedin the ital years ofthe postwar period by the works of “clasial” realists such as John H. Here, Hans Morgemhau, George Kennan, and Raymond Aron. ‘Then, during th 1980s and 1960s, classical realism came under challenge of scholars who tied to intoduce a more scienite approuch tothe study of iteration pois, During the 1980s i pave way to another rend i smteroationl relations theory—neoreaism, ‘Since itis impossible within te scope of tis ticle to introduce al of the *hinkers who contbuted wo the development of twenteth-century elassical seals, B.H Care and Hans Morgenthau, a perhaps the most invent] mong them, have been selected for discussion here 2.1 E.H. Car's Challenge to Utopian Idealism In his main work on international relations, The Twenty Years Crisis, ist published in July 1939, Edward Hallet Care (1892-1982) atacks the ‘Meals potion, which he describes at “utopias,” He characterizes this ‘poston as encompassing faith in reason, confidence in progress, a sense fof mora rectitude, and a belie in an underlying harmony’ of interes Acconing tothe idealists, wars an sheration nthe course of noma fe ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox 8PouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS and the way to prevent it isto edvcate people for peace, and to build systems of collective security such as the League of Nations or today's ‘United Nations. Carr challenges idealism by questioning its claim o moral universalism and its idea of the harmony of interests. He declares that “morality can only be celutive, not rivers” (19) and states that the Aderine ofthe harmony of iterests i invoked by privileged groups “to {sty and milan their dominant position” (1), ‘Cur uses the concept ofthe relativity of thought, which he traces to Marx and other modern theorists, to show that standards by which polices ate dyed ave the produce of cteunstances and interes, His central ies is ‘hal the interes of a given party lays determine what this party regards 1s moral principles, and hence, these principles are not uiversal. Car observes that politicians, fr example often use the language of justice 19 cloak the parcular interests of their ow counties, of reas negative images of other people to juaity acts of aggression, The existence of such Instances of morally discrediting a potential enemy or morally jusiying one's own postion shows, he argues, that moral ideas are derived fom cual policies. Policies ae nt, as the idealists would have it ase on Some universal norms, independent of interests ofthe partes involved 1 specific moral standards are de facto founded on interests, Car's ngument goes, there are als interes underlying what are reparded 3s shsolate principle or universal moral valves, While the idealists tend 0 regard such values, such as peace or justice, as universal and claim that upholding them is inthe intrest of all, Carr argues agaist this view. According t0 him, thee ae nether universal values aor universal Imecets He claims tha those who refer to universal interests ae in fact acting in thee own interests (71) They think that what is Best fr them is best for everyone, and idetily their own interests with the universal interest of he word at ge. 16 Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien ‘The idealist concep ofthe harmony of interest i based on the notion that ‘human beings can rationally recognize tht they have some interests in ‘ommon, and that cooperation is therefore posible, Care const this ‘dea with he reality of confit of interests. According to Bim, the word is tom apart by the particule interests of diferent individuals and groups, ln such sconfctul environment, order is based on power, not on marty Purter, morality sell isthe prosuct of power (61). Like Hobbes, Car regards morality as constructed by the paricular Tegal system that is enforced by a coercive power. Intemational moral norms ae imposed on ‘er counties by dominant nations or groupe of nations that present ‘themselves a the international commurity af 3 whole. They ae invented ‘o perpetuate those nations’ dominance, ‘Values that idealists view as good forall, such as peace, social justice, prospvty. and international order, are eparded by Car as more status quo rotons. The powers tht are sitited with the status quo repand the rangement in place a jas and therefore preach peace, They’ try toll everyone around their idea of what is good, "Jost as ube raling clas in a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its ow security and predominance, .. so international peace becomes a special vested Interest of predominant powers” (76). On tbe ote hand, the unsatisfied powers consider the same arrangement a unjust, ad so prepare for war. Hence, the way to obtain peace, if it eannat be simply enforced, i 10 satisfy the unstisied powers. “Those who pratt most by (interationl] fonder can inthe Ioger run only hope to maintain it by making scent ‘concessions to make it tolerable to those who prof by it least” (152). The logical conclusion o be drawn by the reader of Car's bok isthe policy of appeasement (Cor was a sophisticated thinker. He recognized himself thatthe logic of “pore realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which snakes any kind of iatmational society impossible” (87). Although he ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox "PouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS emolshes what be calls “the current utopia” of idealism, he a the same time atempts to build “a new utopia" a realist word order (bid). Tus, he acknowledges that human beings need certain fundamental universally scknowledged norms and values, and contradicts his owa argument by Which he tries to deny universality to any noes or values. To make further objections, the fact thatthe language of universal moral vals ean be misused in polis for the Renefit of ene party or anotber and tht such ‘values can only be imperecly implemented in politcal institutions does ot mean that such vals donot exist. Tete i «deep yearning in many human beings, both privileged and unpivileged, for peace, order, prosperity, and justice. The legitimacy of idealism consist inthe constant auempt 1 rele upon and uphold these values, Ialsts fil in their attempt they do ot pay enough atemion tothe realty of power. On the lotber hand, inthe world of pure realism, in which all values are made relative to interests, if tums into nothing more than a power game and is bese The Tent Years Crisis tooches on number of universal ideas, bu it also reflects the spit of its time. While we can fault the interwar idealists for thse inability to consractineritional insinons strong enough to prevent the outbreak f the Second Wold Wa, this book indicates tat imerwar relists were likewise unprepared to meet the challenge, Cart ‘requcnly refers to Germany under Navi rule as if t were a county hike anyother He says that should Germany cease to be an unsatistied power and “become supreme in Europe.” it would adopt a language of Intemational slidaiysinar to that of other Western powers (79). Tae inability of Carr and other realists to recognize the perilous nature of Navi, and thei bei that Germany could be sais by terra concessions, helped to foster a political environment in which the later was to grow in power, annex Czechoslovakia at will, and be marly opposed in September 1939 by Poland alone. ry Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien ‘A theory of interatonal relations isnot ost an intellectual enterprise t has practical consequences. It inlences our thinking and political practice. On th practical sid, the realists ofthe 19305, to whom Carr gave intellectual suppor, were people opposed tothe system of eolective Sccuity embodied inthe League of Nations. Working within the foreign policy establishments af the day, they conibuted to ts weakness, Once ‘hey hid weakened the League they pursued a policy of appeasement and accommodation with Germany as an alesative to elective security (Aswor 46). After the annexation of Czechoslovakia, when the fare fof the anieLeague realist conservatives gathered around Neville (Chamberlain ad ofthis policy became clea, they tried to rebuild the very security system they had eater demolished, Those who supported collective security were labeled seas 2.2 Hans Morgenthau's Realist Principles Hans J. Morgethas (1904-1980) developed realism ite a comprehensive Jteratonal relations theory Inuenced by the Protestant theologian aod polieal writer Reinhold Nicbubr, as well as by Hobbes, be places Sellshness and powerlust atthe centr of his picture of human existence ‘The insatiable humin lst for power, timeless and universal, which he ‘dents with animus dominand, the dese to dominate, is fr him the sain cause of conflict, As he asters in his main work, Poe among Nations: The Sougsle for Power and Peace, ist published in 1988, “international poles, ike al poles, isu stugele for power” 25). ‘Morgenthau systematizes reais i interatinal relations on the basis of ‘x principles that he inchades inthe svond edition of Plies among Nations. As a tonaist, he opposes the so-called scientists (he Scholars who, especially in the 1980s, wied to reduce the discipline of Stematonl relation to branch of behavioral science). Nevertheless, in the fst principle he sates that realism is base on objective laws that ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox reyPouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS have their rots in unchanging human nature (4) He wants to develop reals into both theory of intational politics and a poiical art, 2 tefl oo of foreign poi. ‘The keystone of Morgenha’s relist theory isthe concep of power on “of Ieerest defined in terms of pos the assumption that polities leaders “thnk and act in terms of interest Aeneas power” (5). This concept defies the autonomy of politics, and allows for the analysis of foreign policy regurdess of the diferent motives, preferences, abd intellectual and moral qualities of individual politicians, Parhermore, itis the foundation of a rational picture of polities which informs his second principle: Although, as Morgenthau explains in the third principle, interest defined as Power isa universally valid catgory and indeed an escatial clement of politics, various thing can be associated with interest or powers ferent times and in different czcumtances. Ils content ad the manner of i use ae determined hy the plier ultra environment nthe fourth principle, Morgenthau consiers the relationship between realism and chic. He says that while realists are aware of the moral Sppiticance of poiea action, hey ae algo aware ofthe tension between orally andthe requirements of success politcal ation. “Univers moral principles," he assers, “cannot be applied to the aetons of states in their abstract univers fomlaton, bot .they mst be fleredthrovgh the concrete circumstances of time and plas” 9). These principles must be accompanied by pence for as he cautions “there an be no political morality without prdence; that i, without coasderaton ofthe poiteal consequences of semingly moral action” (bid). Prudence, and not conviction of one’s own moral or ideological superioiy, should guide poical aston. This is stressed in the Hfth 2» Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien principle, where Morgenthau again emphasizes the ides that all state cor, including our own, must be looked at solely as politcal emites pprsuing their respective interests defined in tees of power. By taking ‘his pot of view vis-bvis is counterparts and thus avoiding ideological confrontation, a state woul then be able o pursue policies that respected the interests of oer states, while protecting and promoting is own Insofar as power, oF interest defined as power, isthe concept that defines politics, politics is an autonomous sphere, as Mergenthan say in his sxth principle of realism. It cannot be subordinated to eis. However, ethics oes sill play a soe i pois. “A man who was nothing but ‘political rman’ would be & beast, for he Would be completely lacking i moral estan. A an who was nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool fore ‘would be completely lacking in prudence” (12). Political ar requires that ‘hese two dimensions of human life, power and morality, be taken into consideration, While: Morgenthau's six principles of realism contain repetitions and inconsistencies, we can nonetheless obtain from them the following picture: Power or interest isthe central concept that makes politics into an sutonomous discipline. Rational sate actors pursue their national interests ‘Therefore, a rational theory of international plies ean be constacted. ‘Such a theory i not concerned wi the moray, religious belies, msives or ideological preferences of intividua politcal leaders. I also indicates that in onder to avoid const, states should avoid moral cosades or ‘Meological confontations, and look for compromise based solsly on satisfaction of thee mutual interest, ‘Although he defines polities as an autonomous sphere, Morgenthau does ot follow the Machiavellian route of completely removing cthis fom politics. He suggests that although human beings are politcal animals ‘who pursue their interests, they afe moral animals. Depeived of any ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox aPouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS morality, they would descend the level of beats or sub-hamans. Even if it isnot guided by universal moral principles, political action thts has for “Morgenthas « moral significance, Ukimately directed toward the objective of uaional survival, it also involves prudence. The elective protection of eltizens’ lives fom harm isnot mecely a forefal physical action; it has rwdenil and moral dimensions Morgenthau regards realism as 2 way of thinking about international relations and 2 useful tol for devising policies. However, some of the basi conceptions of ie thoory, and especially the idew of conflict as Stemming fom human nature, 8 wel asthe concept of power self, have provoked extiism, Iterationa politics, ike all polite, is for Morgenthau a strogele for power because of the basic human Ist for power. But regarding every Individual as being engage ins perpetual quest for power—the view that he shares with Hobbes-—is 2 questionable premise. Human nature cannot be revealed by observation and experiment. It eannot be proved by any empirical research, bot only disclosed by philosophy, imposed on us as & rater of tli and inculcatod by education “Morgenthau himself reinforces the bli in the human drive for power by Introducing. 4 normative aspect of his theory, which is rationality, A rational foreign policy i considered“ hea good frei pie” (7), But he defines rationality as a process of calculating the costs and benefits of all aliratvepoticis inorder to determine thei eae uy. ie. thie ability to maximize power. Statesmen "think and actin terms of interest defined as power” (5) Only intellectual weakness of poly makers can res in foreign polices that devise fom a raion coune aimed at minimizing risks ané maximizing benbis. Hence, rather than presenting an actual port of human aus, Morgenthau emphasizes the pursuit of power andthe rationality of this pursuit, and sos itupas «norm, 2 Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien ‘As Raymond Aron and oer scholars have notied, power, the fundamental concept of Morgentha’s realism, is ambiguous. It can be citer a means or an end in politics. Bu if power is only @ means for ‘ainng something else, i does not define the nature of international poles inthe way Morgenthau claims. It des nt allow us to understand the scons of states independemly from the motives and ideologies! preferences of thir politcal leaders. It cannot serve asthe basis for etning poles as an autonomous sphere. Morgeahau's principles of realism are thus opea to doubt. “Is this te," Aron asks, “that stats, ‘whatever their repime, pursue the same kind of fos policy” (S97) and thatthe foreign policies of Napoleon or Stain ae esenilly identical to ‘hose of Hier, Louis XVI or Nichols M,amounting to 9 more than the struggle for power? “If one answers yes. then the proposition is incontestable, but nt very instructive" (98). Accordingly it i useless to define actions of states by exclusive reference to power, sceuity or ational interest. Intemational polis cannot be studied independently of ‘he wide historial and cultural context Although Carr and Morgenthau concentrate primarily on international ons, ter realism can also be applied to domestic politics. To be a classical eealis isin goneal to perceive poles «conflict of itrests nd stuggle for power, and to seek peace by recognizing common Interest and tying to satiny them, rather than by moralcing, Bernard Wiliams and Raymond Geass, infvenal representatives of the new politcal realism, a movement in contemporary politcal theory, exiicize ‘What they desribe as "politcal moraism” and stess the autonomy of polis apaist this. However, politcal theory realism and international relations realism seem like (wo separate research programs. As rated by several schors (Wilt Scheverman, Alison MeQueeo, Terty Narn. _Dancan Bell) those who contribute to realism in political theory give ile sfteotion to thse who work on realism in nterstonal pls. ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox 2PouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS 3. Neorealism In spit of ts ambiguitie and weaknesses, Morgemhas's Politic among Nations Yecame & standacd textbook aod infuenced thinking about ‘mecnaional polis for a generation or 0, ALthe same time there Was an atempt to develops more methodologically rigorous approsch 0 ‘theorizing about international tsi, I the 1950s nd 1960s lng nll. of scientists trom diferent feds entsred the discipline of Ineratonat Relations and tempted to replace the “wisdom literature” of classical realists with scientiic concepts and reasoning (Brown 25) This in cum provoked «counterattack by Morgenthau and scholars associated with the so-aled English Sehoo!, especially Hedley Bull, who delended = traditional approach (Bl 1968), Asa result, the IR discipline has been divided into two min strands: teaitionl oe non-posiivst and scientie or positivist (eo-poitivi). At a Inter stage the think stand: postpostviom has been added, The ‘eaitionlists ruse noxmative questions and engage with history, pllosophy and law. The scemists or postvss stress a descriptive and explanatory form of inquiry. rather than a normative one. They have tablished a strong presence inthe Geld. Akeady by the mih19606, the rajvty of American students i international relations were teained in ‘quantitative research, game theory, and other new research tectniques of the social sciences. This, along with the changing interational nvironment hada signiicant effect onthe discipline. “The relist assumption was thatthe sae isthe Key actor in intrational polities, nd hat elations among stats are the core of stl iternatonal relations. However, with the receding of the Cold War daring te 1970s, fone could witness the growing importance of interational and non- goverimental organization, aswell sof multinational corporations. This development led toa revival f idealist thinking whic became known as 4 Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien eoibealsm or pluralism, While accepting some hasieassumpions of realism, the leading plurals, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, have proposed the concept of complex interdependence to describe thie more Sophisticated picture of global poies. They would argue tha there can be ropes in international relations and thar the ature doesnot need % look Tike the past, 3.1 Kenneth Waltz’ International System, he reals response came most prominenly trom Kenneth N, Waltz who reformulate realism in international relations in a new and distinctive ‘way. In is book Theory of Intemational Polis, st published in 1979 he responded tothe liberal challenge and attempted o eute the does of the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau with is more seintiie pproach, which has became known at sir realism of neoralsm ‘Whereas Mongentat rooted his theory inthe struggle for power, whch he re to human nature, Walz made an effort 19 avo any philosophical discussion of human nature, and set out instead to build a theory of Iternstional polities analogous to micoceonoaies, He angus that tales {in the international sytem ae like firms in domestic economy and have the same fndamental intrest to survive, “Intemational, the cnvironment of states’ actions or the structure of thir system, is set by the {act that some states prefer survival over other ends obtainable inthe shot ‘un and act with lative eticieny to achieve tha end” 3). ‘Walz maintains that by paying atenton t the individu sate, and to leological, moral and economic issue, both tational Uherals and ‘lassicl realiste make the same mistake. They fil to develop a serious account ofthe iteraionl system—one that canbe abstracted fom the ‘wider socio-political domain, Waa acknowledges tht such an abstraction sir reality and omits many of the factors that were importa classical reslsm, I doesnot allow forthe analysis ofthe development of for ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox 2sPouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS specifi foreign policies, However, it also hat wily. Notably, tsi in understanding the primary determinants of intestinal politics. To be sure, Walt’ neoeait theory cannot be applied to domestic pois. It cannot serve to develop policies af states concerning thei interasonal or domestic affairs, His theory helps only to explain why states behave in similar ways despite their diferent forms of government and diverse political ideologies, and why, despite tei growing interdependenee, the ‘overl pitreof international reltions i unlike to chang. According to Wal, the uniform behavior of states over cents can be explained by the constants on their behavior that ae imposed by the structure ofthe ternational system. A system's srctre is detned fst bythe principle by which itis organized, the by the dtferetation ofits tants, and finally by the distribution of capabilities (power) across uns Anarchy, or the absense of central authori, i for Walt the ordering principle of the international system. The unit ofthe international system ae sates, Walt recogiaes the existence of nonstate ctr, but dismiss them as relatively unimportant, Since all sates wast to survive, and sanarcy presupposes selfhelp system in which each stale has to take cae of itself, hee i no division of labor or functional ditferetition ‘among. them, While functionally smila, they ate nonetheless Uistingushod by their relative capabilities (he power each of them represents) ta perform the same felon, ‘Consequonly, Wel sees power and state behavior in a diferent way fom ‘he classical realists. For Morgeathau power was both a mcans and an ee, nd rational state behavior was understood a simply the course of ation ‘hat would accumulate the most power. ln conta, nearest assume that the fundamental interest of each sate is security and woul! therefore ‘concent onthe distribution of power, What also sts neorealism apart fiom classical realism is methodological rigor and scientiic sel ‘conception (Guzinni 1998, 127-128). Walz insists on empirical testability 26 Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien of knowledge and on falsification a « methodological eal, which, as he himself admis, can have only a limited application in international ‘The disufbation of capabilites among stats can vary; however, anarchy, the ordering principle of itenationl relations, remains unchanged. Tis as lasting effec onthe behavior of sates that become socialize nto the logic of sel-belp. Trying to refute neoliberal ideas concerning the fects ofiterdependence, Wal idemtites two reasons why the anarchic Jtemationl system limits cooperation: insecurity and unequal gains. In ‘he contest of anarchy, each sate is uncertain about the intentions of ‘others andi lai tha the possible gins resting from cooperation may favor other states more than ill, and thus le it to dependence on tere. "State donot willingly pace themseles in situations of increased dependence. Ina selP-elp system, considerations of security subordinate economic pais to politica interest." (Walt 1979, 107 Because of is theories elegance and mehodlogialsgor, neorelism has become very influential within the discipline of iterstionl relations Is the eyes of many scholars, Morgnthan's realism has come tobe seen as stachtonisio—"an intresting and important episode in the history of inking about the subject, no doubt, but one scarcely to be seen a 3 serious contribution of the rigorously scenic theory” (Wiliams 2007, 1D. However, while inally gaining more acceptance than classical lis, nercalism has alo provoked strong critiques on a number of fronts. 3.2 Objections to Neorealism 1 1979 Wale wrote that i the nuclear age the intemationl bipolar stem, based on two supepowers—ihe United States and the Soviet ely to persist (176-7, With the fl of Union-—was no oly stable but ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox 2PouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS the Bestin Wall and the subsequent disinegation of the USSR this prediction was proven wrong. The bipolar world tuned out to have been ‘more precarious than mast realist analysts had supposed Ils end opened new possibilities and challenges seated to globalization. This bas led many ities 10 argue that aeorealism, Uke clasial cals, cannot sdequately account for changes in word polities, “The new debate between international (cocalists and (neoiberals is no longer concerned with the questions of morality and human nature but With the extent to which state behavior is influenced by the anarchic structure ofthe iterations sytem rather than by iastiations, learning nd other fats that ate conductive to cooperation, In it 1989 book Inerntional Institutions and State Power, Rober. Keohane accepts Wiltz’ emphasis on system-level theory and his general assumption that states are self-interested actors that rationally purse ther goals. However, by employing game theory he shows tat states can widen th perepton of thee seliteest though economic cooperation and involvement i al insittions. Paters of intelependence can thus affect ‘world politics. Keohane calls for systemic theories that would be able to ea beter with factors affecting tate interaction and with change. CCitcal theorists, such as Robert W, Cox, aso focus on the alleged inability of neoralsn to deal wih change. In thei view, neoreabits take 8 parol, historically determined state-based stot of iterations relations and assume ito be uivesally vali. In contrast, rial theorists believe that by analyzing the interplay fides, material factors, and socal forces, one can understand how this structure as come about, and how it ray eventually change. They contend that neoreaism ignores both the historical process during which identities and interests are forme ad the diverse methodoigical posites, It optimates the existing sats 0 of strategic relations among stats and considers the scientific method as 2 Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien the only way of obtaining Knowledge. It represents a exclusionary practice, an interest in domination and control While realists are concsmed with relations among sass the focus for critical theorists s social emancipation. Despite thee diference,exitial ‘theory, postmdernisn and feminism ll ake issue with the notion of state sovereigny and envision new political communities that would be less exclusionary vis-vis marginal and disenfranchised groups. Critical ‘heory argues apuns state-based exclusion and denies that the interests af county's eizens take precedence over thse of outsides. It insists tat poiiians should give as much weight tothe interests af foreigners as they give to those of ther compatriots and envisions poltialstsctares beyond the “Torsess”nation-stte, Postmodernism questions the stit's ‘claim to be a legitimate focus of human loyalties and is right to impose Social and politcal boundaries. I supports cultural diversity and stresses ‘he interests of minores. Feminism pues that she realist theory exhibits masculine bias and avocates the inclusion of woman and alteative ‘ales into public ie, Since critical theorise and otter sltemative theoretical perpestiver question the existing stats quo, make knowledge dependent on power, and emphasize identity formation and social change, they aze_ not ‘eadtional of non-posivst. They are somtimes eae “reflec “post posiivist” (Weaver 165) and represent a radical departure fom the seorealist an neoliberal “rationalist” or "psivist™ international relation theories, Constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, uy to build abridge [betmeen these two approaches by onthe ane hand, taking the present state system and anazchy seriously, and onthe other hand, by foeasing om the formation of identies and interests. Countering neoreaist ideas, Wend argues that selehelp does not follow logically or casully Som the inciple of anarchy. It is socially constructed. Wendt’ idea that states ‘dents and interests ae socaly constructed has earned bis position the ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox 2PouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS abel “consiructivism’. Consequently, im his view, “sehelp and power politics are institutions, sod not essai fetes of anarchy, Anarchy is Svhat sates make of i” (Wendt 1987 395). There ie no single logic of snarchy but rather several, depending on the roles with which states identify themselves and eachother. Power and interests are consttated by ‘eas and norms, Went eli that neoreaism cannot account for charge ‘in world polite, but his norm-hased consrlvism cn, ‘A similar conclusion, although derived ina traditional way. comes ffom ‘he non-posiivst theorists of the English school (aterationsl Society approach) who erphasze both systemic and normative consis on the behavior of sates. Referring tothe classical view of the human being a an individual that is basically social and rational, capable of cooperating and Jeaming ffom past experiences, these theorists emphasize that stats, ike individuals, have lepimateinereste that thers can recognize and rerpect and that they can recognize the general advantages of observing Principle of reciprocity im their mutual relations (Jackson and Strensen 167), Therefore, states ean hind themselves o lhe sates by treaties snd develop some common values with ther states. Hence the structure ofthe Intemational system isnot unchangeable asthe acreaists claim. It isnot 1 permanent Hobbesian anarchy, permeated by the danger of war. An narhiciteeational system based on pure postr celations among ators «an evolve into a more cooperative ad peaceful interational society i which state behaviors shaped by commonly shared values and norms. A practical expression of interational society are international organizations ‘hat uphold the rule of law in interasona latins, especialy the UN, 4. Conclusion: The Cautionary and Changing Character of Realism ‘An unintended and unfortunate consequence of the debate about oorealism is that neoreaism and a lage part of its ertque (wih the w Staxvono ENevevorea:a oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien notale exception ofthe English Schoo) hasbeen expressed in abstract Scicaitic ané_plilosophical terms. ‘This bas made the theory of ftematona poice almost inaccessible to layperson and has eivided the discipline of international relation into incompatible pats. Whereas classical realism was a theory aimed at supporting diplomatic practice and providing guide o be followed by thoe seking to understand and deal ‘with poteatil threats, today's theories, concerned with vasious grand pictures and projec, are ill-suited to perform this tsk. This is perhaps the ‘main reason Why there has been a renewed interest in clasial realism, nd particularly inthe ideas of Morgsnthan. Rather than being seen as an obsolete form of prescient realist thought, superseded by neorealist ‘theory hi thinking is now considered to be more complex and of greater ‘ontemporrytelevance thin was erie recognized (Wiliams 2097, 1-9) 1s uneasily in the orthodox picture of realism he i usually associated wi, I recent yeas, scholars have questioned prevailing naratves about clear ‘heoreticl tations in the discipline of itematonal relations ‘Thucybdes, Machiavelli, Hobbes and other thinkers have become subject ‘o re-examination as 2 means of challenging prevailing uses of their legacies in the discipline and exploring ether lineages and orientations. ‘Moegembau has undergone a similar process of reinterpretation. A number of scholars (Hactmut Bebe, Mariel Cozete, Amelia Heath, Sean Molloy) ave endorsed the importance of his thought a source of change forthe ‘andar interpretation of realism, Marielle Cozste stresses Morgenba't critical dimension of realism expressed in hs commitment to “speak tach to power” and to “unmask power’s claims to tuth and moet,” andi his tendency to aster diferent claims at ferent ines (Covete 10-12) ‘She writes: “The protection of bumaa life and freedom ace given ental Jmportance by Morgenthau, and constitu a “wanscendent standard of thie Which should always animate scenic enquiies” (19). This shows ‘he flexibility of his classical realism and reveals his normative ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox aPouTICAL RaaLis 18 IYRRRNATIONAL RELATIONS assumpions hased on the promotion of universal moral values, While Morgenthas assumes that sites are powerrented ators, hea the same time acknowledges that international polities would be mere pernicious han it scully is were it not for moral restints and the work of Intecraionllaw(Behr ané Heath 333). Another avenue forthe development of a realist theory of international relations is ofered by Robert Gilpin’ seminal work War and Change ir World Polite. 1 this work were to guin greater prominence in IR Scholarship instead of engaging in Siess theoretical debates, we Would be better prepared today “Yor rapid power sits and geopolitical change (Weblo, 2011 505), We would be able to explain the eases of great wars and long periods of peace, and the creation and waning of Intemational orders. ill nother avenue is provided by the application of the new scientific discoveries to socal sciences. The evidence fr this i, for example, the recent work of Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and Social Science. Anew realist spprosch to intewational polities could be based on the organic ad liste world view emerging from quantum ‘theory the idea of human evolution, andthe growing awareness ofthe ole of human beings in the evolutionary process (Korab-Karpowiez 2017), Realism is thus more than a stati, amoral theory, and cannot be sccommodated solely within & positivist interpretation of international relations It is practical and evolving theory that depends on the actual historical and politcal conditions, and is limatly judged by its ethical standards and by is relevance in making pruden political dessins (Morgenthau 1962), Realism aso performs 2 useful cautionary roe. Tt wars us against progressivism, morals, lealsm, and other orientations that lose touch with the reality of sel-merest and power. Considered fom this perspective the neorelst revival of the 1970s ca alo Be interpreted asa necessary coretve to an overoptinisic literal belie in interationsl cooperation and change resulting from interdependence 2 Staxvono ENevevorea:s oF Pinosoviey W, JUAN KonateKanvowien [Neverheless, when it becomes a dogmatic enterprise, realism fil to perform its proper function. By remaining stuck in a sateen and ‘excessively simplified “paredigm” suchas neoralism and by denying the possibilty of any progress in intestate relations, it tums into an ideology Tis emphasis on power politics and national interest can be misused to justty aggression, I has therefore 1 be supplanted by theories that tke ily changing picture of global politics. To fas merely negative, cautionary function, postive norms must be added ‘These norms exend fom the rationality and pradence sessed by classical tealsts; though the vision of multralin, international ly, and an ‘ternational society emphasized by liberals and members ofthe English ‘School; to the cosmopoitanism and glohal solidarity advocated by many of today’s writers. biter account of tbe drt Bibliography ‘Aron, Raymond, 1966, Peace and War: A Theory of International ‘Relations, tras. Richaé Howard and Annette Baker Fox, Garden City, New York: Doubleday. ‘Ashley, Richt K., 1986, “The Poverty of Neoealism,” in Neoreliom and Its Cites, Rober O. Keohane (ed), New York: Columbia Univesity Prese, 255-200 1988. "Untying te Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anurchy robiematigue” Milensum, 17: 27-282, ‘Ashworth, Lusian M. 2002, "Did the ReaistLdealst Debate Relly ‘Happen’ A Revisionst History of International Re Inzrational Relations, 161: 33-81, ‘Brown, Chis, 2001. Understanding International Relations, 2nd edition, "New York: Palgrave Bed, Hartmut, 2010. A History of International Polical Theory (Ontologies of he Insertional ound: Palgrave Maer, ‘Scan 2017 Epiriox a