Agrarian Law and Social Legislation Case Digests

2021
STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS

DOCTOR STUDENTS
AGRARIAN LAW & SOCIAL

LEGISLATION
A COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS FROM THE 2ND JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS OF ST. THOMAS MORE
SCHOOL OF LAW & BUSINESS
ST. THOMAS MORE SCHOOL OF LAW & BUSINESS
AGRARIAN LAW & SOCIAL LEGISLATION CASE DIGEST COLLECTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DYCAICO V SSS .............................................................................................................................................. 3
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ASIA PRO .................................................................................................. 6
SIGNEY V SSS ................................................................................................................................................. 7
SSS V CA & COSMO ..................................................................................................................................... 12
SSS V CA & QUALITY TOBACCO ................................................................................................................... 15
SSS V CA & MANILA JOCKEY CLUB .............................................................................................................. 19
BARTOLOME V SSS ...................................................................................................................................... 21
RABOR V CSC ............................................................................................................................................... 23
BERONILLA V GSIS ....................................................................................................................................... 26
PROFETA V DRILON ..................................................................................................................................... 28
SANTIAGO V COA & GSIS ............................................................................................................................ 30
VDA. DE CONSUEGRA V GSIS ...................................................................................................................... 32
GSIS V DE LEON ........................................................................................................................................... 34
MANUEL BELARMINO V ECC ....................................................................................................................... 36
ALANO V ECC ............................................................................................................................................... 38
LAZO V ECC & GSIS ...................................................................................................................................... 39
MENEZ V ECC .............................................................................................................................................. 40
CLEMENTE V GSIS & ECC ............................................................................................................................. 42
NARAZO V ECC & GSIS................................................................................................................................. 44
DABATIAN V GSIS ........................................................................................................................................ 46
CASUMPANG V ECC & GSIS ......................................................................................................................... 47
CARBAJAL V GSIS & ECC .............................................................................................................................. 49
VILLONES V ECC & GSIS ............................................................................................................................... 51
MABUHAY SHIPPING V NLRC & SENTINA.................................................................................................... 54
INTEROIENT V NLRC & PINEDA ................................................................................................................... 55
YENG V ROMA ............................................................................................................................................. 57
LUZON STEVEDORING V WCC ..................................................................................................................... 58
VISAYAN STEVEDORE V WCC & LABIYO ...................................................................................................... 60
MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING, INC./MAERSK SERVICES LTD. V MESINA ..................................................... 62
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. v JOEL D. TAOK ............................................................................ 65
OSCAR GAMBOA V MAUNLARAN TRANSPO, INC. ...................................................................................... 67
VENTURA V CREWTECH SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC. ................................................................ 70
HACIENDA LUISITA V PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL .......................................................... 72
CMU V DARAB ............................................................................................................................................. 76
DAR V SUTTON ............................................................................................................................................ 78
GELOS V CA & ALZONA ............................................................................................................................... 81
GABRIEL V PANGILINAN .............................................................................................................................. 82
ZAMORAS V SU ........................................................................................................................................... 84
CASTILLO v CA ............................................................................................................................................. 86
BERNAS V CA ............................................................................................................................................... 88
HILARIO V IAC & BALTAZAR ........................................................................................................................ 90
ENDAYA & TRINIDAD V CA .......................................................................................................................... 93
CABALLES V DAR ......................................................................................................................................... 95
TANPINGCO V IAC ....................................................................................................................................... 97
NISNISAN V CA ............................................................................................................................................ 99
DYCAICO V SSS
G.R. No. 161357, November 30, 2005
FACTS:
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of SSS on January 24, 1980 and

named Elena P. Dycaico and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time,
Bonifacio and Elena live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and started receiving his
pension. On January 6, 1997 the petitioner and Bonifacio got married but few
months after the latter died.
Upon the death of Bonifacio, petitioner filed with sss an application for survivor’s
pension but her application was denied because she cannot be considered as a
primary beneficiary because they were only married after the retirement of the
deceased.
Petitioner filed a petition alleging the denial of her claim contending that SSS
Form RS-1 and RA 8282 does not require that the primary beneficiaries be
legitimate relatives. Her claim was denied by SSC promulgating that primary
beneficiaries need to be legitimate as of the date of retirement and the same was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the survivor’s pension.
RULING:
Yes, petitioner is entitled to the survivors’ pension.
By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective

marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement, the
proviso "as of the date of his retirement" qualifying the term "primary beneficiaries"
for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension has created the presumption
that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS members were entered
into for the purpose of securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282. This
presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not
afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The
proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it
presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true.
The Social Security System cannot deny the claim of petitioner Elena P.
Dycaico for survivor’s pension on the basis of this invalid proviso.
3 DYCAICO V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

MANILA GOLF V IAC

G.R. NO. 64948, September 27, 1994
FACTS:
This case had been involved, either directly or peripherally, in three separate
proceedings, all initiated by or on behalf of herein private respondent and his fellow
caddies. That which gave rise to the present petition for review was originally filed
with the Social Security Commission (SSC) via petition of seventeen (17) persons
who styled themselves "Caddies of Manila Golf and Country Club-PTCCEA" for
coverage and availment of benefits under the Social Security Act as amended,
"PTCCEA" being the acronym of a labor organization, the "Philippine Technical,
Clerical, Commercial Employees Association," with which the petitioners claimed to
be affiliated.
The petition, docketed as SSC Case No. 5443, alleged in essence that
although the petitioners were employees of the Manila Golf and Country Club, a
domestic corporation, the latter had not registered them as such with the SSS. On
the other hand, Manila Golf and Country Club (MGC), had not registered them as
employees with the SSS based on the absence of 2 elements:
1) Payment of wages (paid by the golf players themselves and not by

respondent club); and
2) Control or supervision over them.(manner in which they performed their
work).
At about the same time, two other proceedings bearing on the same question
were filed or were pending; these were:
(1) a certification election case filed with the Labor Relations Division of the
Ministry of Labor by the PTCCEA on behalf of the same caddies of the Manila
Golf and Country Club, the case being titled "Philippine Technical, Clerical,
Commercial Association vs. Manila Golf and Country Club" and docketed as
Case No. R4-LRDX-M-10-504-78; it appears to have been resolved in favor of
the petitioners therein by Med-Arbiter Orlando S. Rojo who was thereafter
upheld by Director Carmelo S. Noriel, denying the Club's motion for
reconsideration;
(2) a compulsory arbitration case initiated before the Arbitration Branch of
the Ministry of Labor by the same labor organization, titled "Philippine
Technical, Clerical, Commercial Employees Association (PTCCEA), Fermin
Lamar and Raymundo Jomok vs. Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc., Miguel
Celdran, Henry Lim and Geronimo Alejo;" it was dismissed for lack of merit
by Labor Arbiter Cornelio T. Linsangan, a decision later affirmed on appeal by
the National Labor Relations Commission on the ground that there was no
employer-employee relationship between the petitioning caddies and the
respondent Club.
4 MANILA GOLF V IAC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

In the case before the SSC, the respondent Club filed answer praying for the
dismissal of the petition, alleging in substance that the petitioners, caddies by
occupation, were allowed into the Club premises to render services as such to the
individual members and guests playing the Club's golf course and who themselves
paid for such services; that as such caddies, the petitioners were not subject to the
direction and control of the Club as regards the manner in which they performed
their work; and hence, they were not the Club's employees.
Subsequently, all but two of the seventeen petitioners of their own accord
withdrew their claim for social security coverage, avowedly coming to realize that
indeed there was no employment relationship between them and the Club. The case
continued, and was eventually adjudicated by the SSC after protracted proceedings
only as regards the two holdouts, Fermin Llamar and Raymundo Jomok.
ISSUE:
Whether or not persons rendering caddying services for members of golf clubs and
their guests in said clubs' courses or premises are the employees of such clubs and
therefore within the compulsory coverage of the Social Security System (SSS).
RULING:
No. Petitioner's regulations, does not circumscribe the actions or judgment of

the Caddies concerned as to leave them little or no freedom of choice whatsoever in
the manner of carrying out their services. Caddies must submit to some supervision
of their conduct while enjoying the privilege of pursuing their occupation within the
premises. Club has no measure of control over the incidents of the caddies' work
and compensation that an employer would possess. The group rotation system so-
called, is less a measure of employer control than an assurance that the work is
fairly distributed, a caddy who is absent when his turn number is called simply
losing his turn to serve and being assigned instead the last number for the day.
The caddies were not required to render a definite number of hours of work
on a single day. Even the group rotation of caddies is not absolute because a player
is at liberty to choose a caddy of his preference regardless of the caddy's order in
the rotation.
Fermin Llamar is not an employee of the petitioner Manila Golf and Country
Club and that petitioner is under no obligation to report him for compulsory
coverage to the Social Security System.
5 MANILA GOLF V IAC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ASIA PRO

G.R. No. 172101, November 23, 2007
FACTS:
Respondent Asiapro is a cooperative composed of owners-members. Its

primary objectives are to provide savings and credit facilities and to develop other
livelihood services for its members-owners. The respondent cooperative entered
into service contracts with Stanfilco. The owners-members did not receive
compensation or wages from the respondent cooperative. Instead, they receive a
share in the service surplus in the Service Contract with Stafilco.
The owners-members registered with SSS as self-employed members. The

SSS informed the respondent cooperative that based on its contract with Stanfilco,
it is actually an employer and thus need to register as such. This goes unheeded by
the cooperative so SSS petitioned SSC praying that the cooperative be directed as
an employer. The SSC denied the motion of the cooperative to dismiss the petition
arguing that there is no employer-employee relationship between the cooperative
and its owners-members.
The cooperative filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA sustained the
cooperative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cooperative is an employer of its owners-members.
RULING:
Yes, there is employer-employee relationship between the cooperative and

its owners-members based on the elements of employer-employee relationship.
These are, to wit: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) the
payment of wages by whatever means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
power to control the worker’s conduct. The Court said that all these elements are
fulfilled in the case at bar.
6 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ASIA PRO | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
SIGNEY V SSS
G.R. No. 173582; January 28, 2008
FACTS:
2001
Rodolfo Signey, Sr., who is a member of the SSS, died on May 21, 2021. In
his member’s records, he had designated petitioner Yolanda as primary beneficiary
and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. Petitioner filed a claim for
death benefits with herein public respondent SSS. Petitioner revealed that Rodolfo
had a common-law wife, Gina, with whom he had two minor children named,
Ginalyn, born April 13, 1996 and Rodelyn, born April 20, 2000. Said petition was
confirmed by the fact that Gina also filed for claim of death benefits where she
declares that both her and herein petitioner were Rodolfo’s common-law wives and
that one Editha Espinosa was the legal wife, who also later filed for claim of death
benefits.
In their response, the SSS denied petitioner’s claim for death benefits, but
recognized Gina’s children, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, who were still minors upon the
filing of such claim for death benefits. SSS reasoning for denying petitioners claim
is that SSS found that petitioner and the deceased’s marriage was null and void
because of a prior subsisting marriage between the deceased and Editha.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition with the SSC in which she attached a
waiver of rights executed by Editha, where she declares that she waived any claims
and that Editha was legally married to one Aquilino Castillo and not the deceased.
However, the SSC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The SSC gave more weight to
the field investigation conducted by the SSS. The SSC also cited that the petitioner
failed to present any evidence, and that the petitioner allegations are merely
supported by the said waiver of rights by Editha. SSC applied Section 8(e) and (k)
of the SSS Law which was in force at the time of death of the deceased, said
provision held that dependent legitimate and illegitimate minor children of the
deceased member were also considered primary beneficiaries. And that upon
looking the deceased’s records, it showed that he had one legitimate child who
predeceased him and several illegitimate children with Gina, and that petitioner and
their children cannot be included as they are over the age of 21 years of old when
he died.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner which was subsequently

denied by the SSC. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review to the Court
of Appeals which was also denied by the Court of Appeals as it also affirmed the
SSC’s decision. Hence, this present petition.
7 SIGNEY V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits
against the illegitimate minor children of the deceased.
RULING:
The Court held in the negative.
The Court cited Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 where it enumerated
the dependents as 1) legal spouse entitled by law to receive support; 2) legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one
(21) years of age is congenitally or permanently incapacitated of self-support,
physically or mentally; and 3) parent who is receiving regular support from the
member. The same provision also defined the beneficiaries where it reads The
dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated
or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries
of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled
to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted children of the member, his/her dependent
illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the
benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary
beneficiaries of the member. Thus, any other person designated by the member as
his/her secondary beneficiary. Lastly, when a death of a member occurs, his
primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the monthly pension.
In this case, the minor illegitimate children Ginalyn and Rodelyn were born
on 13 April 1996 and 20 April 2000, respectively. Had the legitimate child of the
deceased and Editha survived and qualified as a dependent under the SSS Law,
Ginalyn and Rodelyn would have been entitled to a share equivalent to only 50% of
the share of the said legitimate child. Since the legitimate child of the deceased
predeceased him, Ginalyn and Rodelyn, as the only qualified primary beneficiaries
of the deceased, are entitled to 100% of the benefits.

CO V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 160265, July 13, 2009
FACTS:
This is a case of petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeal’s

resolutions on May 15, 2003, and October 6, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No. 69510. In
this case, the petitioner, Nely T. Co was charged by the complainants Jose and
Mercedes Lim, with violation of Section 22 (d) in relation to Section 28(e) of
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended in Republic Act 8282 (The Social Security Law
of 1997). Spouses Lim claimed to be the employees of Nely T. Co and accused her
of her failure to remit the compulsory contributions to the Social Security System
(SSS).
Co filed a motion to quash the information ascertaining that the alleged

information did not constitute an offense because spouses Lim were not her
employees, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) refused the motion. Co contended
based on the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) when
Ernesto S. Dinopol, the labor arbiter (LA) decided by dismissing the complaint of
the respondent spouses Lim for lack of merit. The labor arbiter stated that spouses
Lim voluntarily left the company as shown by deeds of release and quitclaim they
executed and are not entitled for monetary claims under Article 82 of the Labor
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent spouses can seek coverage of the SSS Law in the
absence of employer-employee relationship?
RULING:
No. The existence of an employer-employee relationship is the premise of the

rule on mandatory coverage as stated in Republic Act No. 1161. The refusal of the
RTC to grant the petitioner’s motion to quash the information was a grave abuse of
discretion. The conviction for violation of the SSS Law based on unmeritorious
premise of the existence of employer-employee relationship constituted a
transgression of the constitutional rights of the petitioner. Thus, affirmed the
finality of the decision of the NLRC which stated that spouses Lim were not
employees of Co, and binding on this criminal case for violation of RA 1161, as
amended pursuant to the principle of res judicata.

INVESTMENT PLANNING V SSS

G.R. NO. L-19124, November 18, 1967
FACTS:
Investment Planning Corporation of the Philippines, the petitioner, is a

domestic corporation engaged in business management and the sale of securities.
It has two classes of agents who sell its investment plans: (1) salaried employees
who keep definite hours and work under the control and supervision of the
company; and (2) registered representatives who work on commission basis.
On August 27, 1960, the petitioner applied to Social Security Commission,

the respondent, for exemption of its so-called registered representatives from the
compulsory coverage of the Social Security Act. The application was denied in a
letter signed by the Secretary to the Commission on January 16, 1961. A motion to
reconsider was filed and also denied, after hearing, by the Commission itself in its
resolution dated September 8, 1961.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the registered representatives are employees within the meaning of
the Social Security Act.
RULING:
No. Section 8 (d) of the Social Security Act defines the term "employee" —
for purposes of the said Act — as "any person who performs services for an
'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who
receives compensation for such services, where there is an employer-employee
relationship."
These representatives are in reality commission agents, and of the three

requirements under Section 8 (d) of the Social Security Act it is admitted that the
first is present in respect of the agents whose status is in question. They exert both
mental and physical efforts in the performance of their services. The compensation
they receive, however, is not necessarily for those efforts but rather for the results
thereof, that is, for actual sales that they make. This point is relevant in the
determination of whether or not the third requisite is also present, namely, the
existence of employer-employee relationship.
Considering the similarity between the definition of "employee" in the Federal

Social Security Act (U.S.) as amended and its definitions in our own Social Security
Act and considering further that the local statute is admittedly patterned after that
10 INVESTMENT PLANNING V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
of the United States, the decisions of American courts on the matter before us may
well be accorded persuasive force. The logic of the situation indeed dictates that
where the element of control is absent; where a person who works for another does
so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or
conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts
and not the amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer
and employee exists.
Finally, the Court have examined the contract form between petitioner and
its registered representatives and found nothing therein which would indicate that
the latter are under the control of the former in respect of the means and methods
they employ in the performance of their work. The fact that for certain specified
causes the relationship may be terminated (e.g. failure to meet the annual quota of
sales, inability to make any sales production during a six-month period, conduct
detrimental to petitioner, etc.) does not mean, that such control exists, for the
causes of termination thus specified have no relation to the means and methods of
work that are ordinarily required of or imposed upon employees.
11 INVESTMENT PLANNING V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

SSS V CA & COSMO

G.R. No. L-55764 February 16, 1982
FACTS:
In a petition filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC), the Social
Security System (SSS) together with Jose Concepcion, Manuel Chan, Manuel Ong,
Roberto Lai, Arturo Gonzales, William Co, Federico Marcial, Santiago Mancuba,
Jesus Crelencia, Alfredo So and Pedro Aquino, the individual petitioners were
sought to be declared employees of Manila Cosmos Aerated Water Factory, Inc.
(Cosmos) and not independent contractors under the following Agreement to
Peddle Soft Drinks:
"1. The MANUFACTURER shall provide the PEDDLER with a delivery truck to
be used by the latter, under his own responsibility, exclusively in the sales of
the products of the former purchased by the PEDDLER from the
MANUFACTURER;
"2. The PEDDLER himself shall carefully and in strict observance to traffic
regulations, drive the truck furnished him by the MANUFACTURER or should
he employ a driver or helpers, such driver or helpers shall be his employees
under his direction and responsibility, and not that of the MANUFACTURER,
and their compensation including salaries, wages, overtime pay, separation
pay, bonus or other remunerations and privileges shall be for the PEDDLERS
own account;
"3. The PEDDLER shall be responsible for any damage to property, death or
injuries to persons or damage to the truck used by him caused by his own
acts or that of his driver and helpers;
"4. The PEDDLER shall secure at his own expense all necessary license and
permits required by law or ordinance, and shall bear any and all expenses
which may be incurred by him in the sales of the MANUFACTURER'S
products, covered by this contract;
"5. All goods (soft drinks) purchased by the PEDDLER shall be charged to him
at a factory price of P0.86 per case of the 6.6. oz. size, ex-warehouse;
PROVIDED, However, that, if the PEDDLER purchases a total of not less than
200 cases of the 6.5 oz. size a day, he shall be entitled to a dealer's discount
of P7.30;
"6. Upon the execution of this agreement, the PEDDLER shall give a cash
bond in the amount of P500.00 against which the MANUFACTURER shall
charge the PEDDLER with any unpaid account at the end of the day or with
any damage to the truck or other account which is properly chargeable to the
PEDDLER; within 30 days after termination of this agreement, the cash bond,
after deducting proper charges, shall be returned to the PEDDLER;
12 SSS V CA & COSMO | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
"7. The PEDDLER shall liquidate and pay his account at the end of each day,
and his failure to do so shall subject his cash bond or so much thereof as
may be necessary to such set offs and payments as shall be proper against
the accounts in question;
"8. This contract shall be effective only up to December 31, 1962 and
supersedes any or all other previous contracts that may have been entered
into between the parties; However, either of the parties may terminate the
same upon seven (7) days prior notice to the other;
"9. Upon the termination of this agreement, unless the same is renewed, the
delivery truck and such other equipment furnished by the MANUFACTURER to
the PEDDLER shall be returned by the latter in good order and workable
condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted, and shall promptly settle his
outstanding account if any, with the manufacturer." (Rollo, pp. 24-25.)
The status of the individual petitioners was important because if they were
employees of Cosmos and not independent contractors, then Cosmos would have
"to pay the employer's share of premium contributions (employer's and employees'
share) for and in behalf of the delivery helpers, as employees of respondent
corporation, plus the penalties thereon for late remittance of premium
contributions, covering the period of delinquency from the respective dates of their
coverage up to the present" as prayed for in the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship.
RULING:
No, we hold that under their peddling contracts of Repomanta and Moralde
were not employees of Mafinco but were independent contractors as found by the
NLRC and its fact-finder and by the committee appointed by the Secretary of labor
to look into the status of Cosmos and Mafinco peddlers. They were distributors of
Cosmos soft drinks with their own capital and employees. Ordinarily, an employee
or a mere peddler does not execute a formal contract of employment. He is simply
hired and he works under the direction and control of the employer.
Repomanta and Moralde voluntarily executed with Mafinco formal peddling

contracts which indicate the manner in which they would sell Cosmos soft drinks.
That circumstance signifies that they were acting as independent businessmen.
They were free to sign or not to sign that contract. If they did not want to sell
Cosmos products under the conditions defined in that contract; they were free to
reject it.

In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the
following elements are generally considered, namely: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages: (3) the power of
dismissal: and (4) the power to control the employees' conduct.
On the other hand, an independent contractor is "one who exercise

independent employment and contracts to do a piece of work according to his own
methods and without being subject to control of his employer except as to the
result of the work".
Among the factors to be considered are whether the contractor is carrying on

an independent business; whether the work is part of the employer's general
business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and
duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of the work to
another; the power to terminate the relationship; the existence of a contract for the
performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of the work;
the employer's powers and duties with respect to the hiring, firing, and payment of
the contractor's servants; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the
premises, tools, appliances, material and labor; and the mode, manner, and terms
of payment.

SSS V CA & QUALITY TOBACCO

GR NO. L-46058, December 14, 1987
FACTS:
QTC, formerly U.S. Tobacco Corporation, is a firm engaged in the

manufacture and sale of cigarettes. On August 12, 1972, QTC, as VENDOR, entered
into an agreement with CARREON, as VENDEE.
The contract with CARREON was terminated by QTC on December 18,1972.
On April 29, 1974, CARREON filed a petition with the Social Security
Commission alleging that he was an employee of QTC, and asking that QTC be
ordered to report him for coverage under the Social Security Law QTC answered
claiming that CARREON has not been an employee but was an 'Independent
businessman.' The Social Security System intervened and, taking the side of
CARREON, also asked that QTC be ordered to pay Social Security contributions in
respect of CARREON. On January 21, 1976, the Social Security Commission
resolved CARREON's petition, finding him to be an employee of QTC. The rulings in
U.S. Tobacco Corporation vs. Benjamin Serna, et al., CA-G.R. No. 32041,
September 5, 1967, and The Shell Co. Phil. Ltd. vs. Fireman's Insurance Co. of
Newark, et al., 100 Phil. 757, were inter alia, relied upon.
Cognizant of the striking similarities obtaining in the case before it and

the Mafinco vs. Ople case decided by this Court on March 25, 1976, and relying
solely on the doctrine laid down in said case, the Court of Appeals issued the herein
assailed decision dated March 16, 1977, the dispositive part of which reads:
In a Motion for Reconsideration dated March 25, 1977, the Social Security
System sought the reconsideration of the aforequoted decision (Rollo, pp.
43-49). However, finding no merit in said motion, the Court of Appeals
denied the same in its resolution dated April 14, 1977 (Rollo, pp. 50-51).
ISSUE:
Whether or not an Romeo Carreon is an employee or an independent contractor
and thus obliged to pay SSS benefits.
RULING:
The First Division of this Court without giving due course to said petition
resolved to require the respondents to comment (Rollo, p. 64). Private respondent
filed its Comment on August 9, 1977 (Rollo, p. 69).
15 SSS V CA & QUALITY TOBACCO | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
Thereafter, this Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda (Rollo, p. 74). On
September 23, 1977, private respondent and petitioner filed their respective
memoranda (Rollo, pp. 80-118).
The issue raised by the petitioner before this Court is the very same issue
resolved by the Court of Appeals-that is, whether or not Romeo Carreon is an
employee or an independent contractor under the contract aforequoted. Corollary
thereto the question as to whether or not the Mafinco case is applicable to this case
was raised by the parties.
The Court took cognizance of the fact that the question of whether or not an
employer-employee relationship exists in a certain situation continues to bedevil
the courts. Some businessmen with the aid of lawyers have tried to avoid the
bringing about of an employer-employee relationship in some of their enterprises
because that juridical relation spawns obligations connected with workmen's
compensation, social security, medicare, minimum wage, termination pay and
unionism.
For this reason, in order to put the issue at rest, this Court has laid down in a
formidable line of decisions the elements to be generally considered in determining
the existence of an employer-employee relationship, as follows: a) selection and
engagement of the employee; b) the payment of wages; c) the power of dismissal;
and d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means
and method by-which the work is to be accomplished. The last which is the so-
called "control test" is the most important element.
Applying the control test, that is, whether the employer controls or has reserved
the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work to be done
but also as to the means and method by which the same is to be accomplished, the
question of whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship for purposes
of the Social Security Act has been settled in this jurisdiction in the case of
Investment Planning Corp. vs. SSS, 21 SCRA 924 (1967). In other words, where
the element of control is absent; where a person who works for another does so
more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of
work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his effort, the
relationship of employer-employee does not exist.
It is the contention of petitioner that the Mafinco case which has been the
sole basis of the Court of Appeals' finding that Romeo Carreon is an independent
contractor is not applicable in the instant petition, there being no substantial
parallelism between said contract and the contract of purchase and sale in this
case.
It further contends that the Court of Appeals in an effort to justify its holding
picked out only paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 6 and 9 of the Mafinco contract and thereafter
concluded that the two contracts are similar.
Private respondent on the other hand, avers that the Mafinco contract is
applicable to the case at bar. The two contracts need not embody almost the same
provisions in order that they may be considered similar. It is enough that the
aspect of similarity arising from the terms and condition be considered because of
their relevance to the issue, is relatively much stronger than the dissimilarity.
Private respondent likewise maintains that the decision was correctly

concluded not only on the similarity of the two contracts but also on factual
evidence adduced at the trial and since respondent Court has already examined the
facts and passed judgment on the basis thereof, its decision is no longer subject to
review. Stated otherwise, the Court of Appeals "looked behind the contract" but
found the evidence insufficient to justify a finding that the terms of the contract
were not followed. That the evidence for Carreon and SSS failed to pierce" the
contract (Rollo, p. 83).
Private respondent's contention is untenable.
In the case at bar, it is evident that the basic contention is what the law is in
the given state of facts. More than that, the well-settled rule that the finding of
facts of the Court of Appeals is conclusive on the parties, admits of exceptions
among which are: (1) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court and (2) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by
evidence on record (Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 609 [1986]; Manlapaz vs.
Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 239 [1987]).
In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is not enough evidence to
show that the contract between Carreon and QTC was not reflective of their
agreement to warrant reformation. As earlier pointed out, the Court of Appeals did
not consider the entirety of the contract but only portions thereof which led to the
conclusion that Carreon was an independent contractor.
Thus, after a study of the records and applying the "control tests," there
appears to be no question that the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between Romeo Carreon and QTC has been established, based on the following
"undisputed" facts as pointed out by the Solicitor General, to wit: (a) QTC assigned
a definite sales territory for Romeo Carreon; (b) QTC provided Romeo Carreon with
a delivery truck for the exclusive use of the latter in his sales activities; (c) QTC
dictated the price of the cigarettes sold by Romeo Carreon; (d) QTC prescribed
what brand of cigarettes Romeo Carreon could sell; (e) QTC determined the
persons to whom Romeo Carreon could sell, (f) QTC issued circulars and
memoranda relative to Romeo Carreon's sales activities; (g) QTC required Romeo
Carreon to submit to it daily, weekly and monthly reports; (h) QTC grounded
Romeo Carreon for six months in 1966; (i) Romeo Carreon was supervised by sales
coordinators of QTC; (j) Romeo Carreon was subject to payment of damages and
loss even of accrued rights for any violation of instructions made by QTC in relation
to his sales activities; and (k) Romeo Carreon was paid an allowance by QTC. All
these indicate control and supervision over Carreon's work.
SSS V CA & MANILA JOCKEY CLUB

G.R. NO. L-26146, October 31, 1969
FACTS:
This case involves the issue if the jockeys connected with respondents Manila
Jockey Club and Philippine Racing Club may be considered their employees and
therefore will fall within the coverage of the SSS Law.
The facts and circumstances provide that the selection and employment of
the jockey is made by the race horse owner whose horse the jockey will ride, not by
the race club. Upon the other hand, the jockey decides for himself the horse he is
to mount. There are declaration forms which race horse owners file with the race
club before the scheduled race meet, stating the name of the race horse being
entered in the race and the name of the jockey chosen to ride the mount, which
declaration must bear the signature of the jockey concerned as evidence of his
conformity thereto.
The matter as to which jockey shall ride which horse, is mutually agreed
upon by and between the race horse owner and the jockey. Once such agreement is
reached, the race club cannot compel the race horse owner to accept another
jockey or the jockey to ride another horse. Nor can the race club prevent the jockey
from riding the horse, which the jockey had previously agreed with the race horse
owner to ride.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the jockeys are considered employees of the race clubs.
RULING:
No, the Court ruled applying the control test. From the aforementioned facts,
that there was no employer-employee relationship, especially so in view of the
undeniable fact that no control was exercised by respondents over the jockeys.
Such control is exercised by racing stewards who, as noted, are entrusted with the
duty to supervise the conduct of the races and enforce the Games and Amusements
Board rules. As noted in the decision: "The stewards admittedly received per diems
from the race clubs. However, the acts and decisions of race stewards, when
exercising their office as such, are not under the control of the race clubs.
The powers and authority of the stewards proceed from the law aforecited,
not from the club sponsoring the race meet. Such powers and authority of the race
stewards are in turn defined and delimited by the same law and by the [Games and
Amusements Board] rules. Consequently, the acts and decision of the stewards
when acting as such, are independent of and not subject to the will of anybody,
save the [Games and Amusements Board]. And the jockeys, the race horse owners
19 SSS V CA & MANILA JOCKEY CLUB | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
as well as the racing clubs must abide by the decision of the stewards relative to
the conduct of the race and the enforcement of [such] rules.
The absence of control that may be exercised on the part of respondents

over the jockeys negates the existence of an employer-employee relationship. That
is the principle adopted by the Court in the leading Investment Planning
Corporation decision. Thus: "The specific question of when there is 'employer-
employee relationship' for purposes of the Social Security Act has not yet been
settled in this jurisdiction by any decision of this Court. But in other connections
wherein the term is used the test that has been generally applied is the so-called
control test, that is, whether the 'employer' controls or has reserved the right to
control the 'employee' not only as to the result of the work to be done but also as
to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished.
20 SSS V CA & MANILA JOCKEY CLUB | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
BARTOLOME V SSS
G.R. NO. 192531, November 12, 2014
FACTS:
John Colcol, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.,

on board the vessel Maersk Danville. As such, he was enrolled under the
government's Employees' Compensation Program. Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008,
an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which
led to his untimely death the following day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Petitioner
Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining
beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security
System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in
a letter dated June 10, 2009 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim.
The SSS contended that Bernardina was no longer the parent of John for the
latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. The denial was appealed to the
Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS
La Union Branch through the assailed Decision. This Commission believes that the
appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the
latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested
her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise

denied by the ECC. Hence, the instant petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee
considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to
receive the benefits under the ECP?
RULING:
The court ruled in the affirmative. The ECC’s factual findings are not
consistent with the evidence on record. The ECC contended that the records do not
show that Mr Cornelio was already dead which will entitle petitioner herein to the
benefits of John. However, the Court disagreed. The ECC had overlooked a crucial
piece of evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate. Based on
Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October
26, 1987, or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on
February 4, 1985, which attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have
ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already
passed away. The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is
contrary to law.
21 BARTOLOME V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

On the other hand, the court resolved an issue on whether or not the
petitioner is entitled to the death benefits. The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption
of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the
benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s
untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died,
then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue
solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
22 BARTOLOME V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

RABOR V CSC
G.R. No. 111812, May 31, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor,

Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978
at the age of 55 years. Sometime in May 1991, he was advised to apply for
retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68)
years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of
government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of
Membership" issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and
dated 12 May 1988.
Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to

the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City
("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice as to what
action should be taken on this matter. In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director
Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte that
the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the
President. Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26
July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for
work effective August 16, 1991."
Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated
14 August 1991, asking for extension of his services in the City Government until
he "shall have completed the fifteen (15) year service requirement in the
Government so that he could also avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given
to employees of the Government." Asserting that he was "still in good health and
very able to perform the duties and functions of [his] position as Utility Worker,"
Rabor sought "extension of his. service as an exception to Memorandum Circular
No. 65 of the Office of the President." This request was denied by Director Cawad
on 15 August 1991.
Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January 1992
seeking reconsideration of the decision of Director Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of
the President referred Mr. Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission on 5 March 1992 which, in its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April
1992, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the action of Director Cawad.
On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-

594 of the Civil Service Commission this time invoking the Decision of this Court in
Cena v. Civil Service Commission. Petitioner also asked for reinstatement with back
salaries and benefits, having been separated from the government service effective
16 August 1991. Rabor's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Commission.
Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the Office of the
Mayor, Davao City, again requesting that he be allowed to continue rendering
23 RABOR V CSC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
service to the Davao City Government as Utility Worker in order to complete the
fifteen (15) year service requirement under P.D. No. 1146. This request was once
more denied by Mayor Duterte
Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a Letter/Petition dated 6

July 1993 appealing from Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 and from Mayor
Duterte's letter of 10 May 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s request for extension should be granted in view of the
Cena case.
RULING:
No. In Cena v. CSC, the Court reached its conclusion primarily on the basis of
the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Section 11
may be quoted in its entirety:
Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. — (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid
to a member who
(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;

(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and
(3) is separated from the service.
(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall

be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with at least
fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15)
years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed
the fifteen (15) years. (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of

detail in the statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems
clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin
with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for implementing administrative
regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to anticipate
all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex
subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative
agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably; demanded is a
showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are
germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute.
This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.
Like what Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said in the ruling of People v. Exconde
case:

It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a
non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect.All
that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to standards that the law prescribes.
Plus, not only P.D. No. 1146 is the statute that should appropriately be
examined is the present CivilService lawthere is Administrative Code of 1987 which
provides the Commission was acting as "thecentral personnel agency of the
government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for
efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the government."
Another thing, the SC find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of
permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65)
years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing
provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological
processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the
efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons.
The Policy considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting the
maximum extension of service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized
by Griño-Aquino,J. in her dissenting opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission
that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year
would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect
discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2)delay the
promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3)prejudice the
chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have
already passed the various government examination but must wait for jobs to be
vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but
are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they
may qualify for old-age pension.
SC’s conclusion is that the doctrine ofCenashould be and is hereby modified

to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990,
more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective.
Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with
Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding inCenathat the
head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to
allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has
reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of
government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably
with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.

BERONILLA V GSIS
G.R. No. L-21723, November 26, 1970
FACTS:
The petitioner was an auditor of the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had
occupied many other positions in the government and had been a member of the
GSIS. In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement
insurance as well as his application to be allowed to take civil service examinations,
ten times, petitioner uniformly indicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898.
He also indicated the same date of birth in his Member's Service Record which he
submitted to the GSIS. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No.
660. He requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor General, that
his date of birth indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900. According
to the petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise of his mother that petitioner
discovered that his true date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him
that in 1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla, purchased a cedula for him showing in the
same that he was already 18 years old for the reason that his uncle wanted to take
advantage of his being able to vote for him. The petitioner’s letter was denied by
the legal counsel even after submitting additional evidences. But it was later on
approved upon appeal to the General Manager. Three years after the approval of
the change, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to the Philippine National
Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of petitioner and
stated that " it was found that Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid
since January 15, 1963, his salary allowances and other fringe benefits as Auditor
of said Bank notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth
(65th) birthday last January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and compulsory
retirement from the government service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096
approved June 16, 1961." The Board, after referring the same to the Assistant
General Manager, adopted a resolution stating that Mr. Beronilla be considered as
compulsorily retired from service effective January 14, 1963 without notifying and
giving the petitioner any opportunity to be heard.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its powers when it
reversed the approval by General Manager of petitioner's request for the
change of his date of birth?
2. Whether or not the Board's resolution in question constitutes an impairment
of the obligations of his contract of insurance?
RULING:
The petition was dismissed. The court upheld the authority of the Board of
Trustees. By express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages
the System and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the
Board. It results, therefore, that any authority conferred upon the General Manager
by the Board of Trustees notwithstanding, the said Board may in appropriate cases
and in the exercise of its own sound discretion review the actions and decisions of
26 BERONILLA V GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
the General Manager. The compulsory retirement of government officials and
employees upon their reaching the age of 65 years is founded on public policy.
Needless to say, therefore, the officials charged with the duty of implementing this
policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the correctness and
integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all that the Board has
done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision of the General
Manager in approving the change of date of petitioner's birth, because from the
evidence before it, the Board was convinced that the originally recorded date of
birth should not be disturbed. We cannot see where the charged inequity of such
action of the Board could lie. For decades back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner
made it appear in all material government and public records and in all his
representations to respondent System that his date of birth is January 14, 1898.
His rather belated request for a change of said date to January 14, 1900 which
would unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise, and
correspondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its members.
it is obvious that the constitutional injunction that is evidently the basis of such
argument refers to the legislature and not to resolutions even of government
corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance policy, apart from not having any
real relevance in this case, what is involved being his retirement, contains specific
provisions contemplating the correction of any error or mistake in the date of birth
of the insured. On the other hand, the retirement of government employees is
imposed by law and is not the result of any contractual stipulation.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against

petitioner, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby dissolved.

PROFETA V DRILON
G.R. NO. 104139, December 22, 1992
FACTS:
November 4, 1988 | petitioner was appointed Acting President of Eulogio

"Amang" Rodriguez Institute of Science and Technology (hereinafter referred to as
EARIST)
March 29, 1989 | Appointed as President.
After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989 | petitioner
inquired from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as to whether she
may be allowed to extend her services with the government as President of EARIST
beyond the age of sixty-five (65) years, to enable her to avail of the old-age
pension retirement benefits under PD 1146.
In answer to her query, petitioner was advised by the GSIS to return to the
service until she shall have fulfilled the fifteen (15) years’ service requirement, to
qualify for the old-age pension retirement plan.
The GSIS declared that petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under PD 1146, as
she had not rendered the sufficient number of years of service on the date of her
supposed retirement on 16 June 1989 and that her creditable service was only
twelve (12) years and two (2) months.
6 October 1989 | as recommended by DECS secretary, extended the term of
petitioner as President of EARIST until she shall have completed the required fifteen
(15) years of service after reaching the age of sixty five (65) years on the date of
her normal retirement on 16 June 1989 or for an additional period of two (2) years,
seven (7) months and twelve (12) days. Due to administrative charges, for
irregular appointment and corruption practices against the petitioner. And then Sec.
Carino recommended the compulsory retirement of the petitioner.
After evaluating the evidence, the Ad-hoc committee dismissed the administrative
complaint against petitioner for lack of substantial evidence, and the office of
President declared petitioner as compulsory retired from government service as of
15 October 1991
However, the GSIS advised that the exact date of her retirement falls on 14
August 1992.
The petitioner would be deprived by the reduction of 3 ½ months (composing

sick leave and service as lecturer) extension to avail old-age pension plan, based on
the computation of the GSIS.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is considered retired compulsorily on 15 October 1991 as
declared by the office of the President.

RULING:
The court does not agree.
We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension
benefit under P.D. 1146, based on its computation of a member's years of service
with the government. 16 The computation of a member's service includes not only
full time but also part time and other services with compensation as may be
included under the rules and regulations prescribed by the System.
The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20 March to 17
June 1986 and her part-time service as a lecturer of approximately two (2) weeks,
or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months is not reflected in her service record.
Said period should be considered as part of her service with the government and it
is only but proper that her service record be amended to reflect said period of
service.
We have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of petitioner's

date of retirement failed to take into account the three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months
service of petitioner which was not reflected in her service record. If we deduct this
unrecorded three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner from 14 August
1992, petitioner is to be considered retired on 30 April 1992. (14 August
1992.minus 3 ½ months)
The order of the Office of the President declaring petitioner as compulsorily

retired as of 15 October 1991 defeats the purpose for allowing petitioner to remain
in the service until she has completed the fifteen (15) years’ service requirements.
Therefore, the decision of the office of the President was set aside and the
Petitioner Is hereby declared to have been in the service until April 30, 1992. She is
entitled to old age pension benefits subject to her compliance with all applicable
regulations and requirements of the GSIS.

SANTIAGO V COA & GSIS

G.R. NO. 92284, July 12, 1991
FACTS:
The petitioner was employed in the Commission on Audit as State Auditor IV

with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. In 1988, he was assigned to the COA Auditing
Unit at the Department of Transportation and Communications and detailed to the
Manila International Airport Authority. On July 1, 1988, the board of directors of the
MIAA passed the following resolution to designate him as Assistant General
Manager for Finance and Administration, effective 15 August 1988.
The petitioner served in this capacity and collected the differential salary of
P5,849.00 plus his salary of P7,219.00 for a total compensation of P13,068.00. He
received this compensation until December 5, 1988, when he was transferred to the
Presidential Management Staff under COA Office Order No. 8811448 dated
December 6, 1988.
On March 1, 1989, the petitioner retired after working in the government for
44 years.
In computing his retirement benefits, the Government Service Insurance

System used as basis the amount of P13,068.00, considering this the highest basic
salary rate received by the petitioner in the course of his employment.4 The COA
disagreed, however, and paid his retirement benefits on the basis of only his
monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State Auditor IV.
The Solicitor General argues, albeit not too strongly, that the additional
compensation received by the petitioner was merely an honorarium and not a
salary. As a mere honorarium, it would not fall under the provision of Section 9 and
so should not be added to his salary in computing his retirement benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the difference in the salary as State Auditor IV and Assistant
General Manager of the petitioner is just an honorarium which excludes from the
computation of his retirement benefits.
RULING:
No. An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of

obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in
consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money.8 The
additional compensation given to the petitioner was in the nature of a salary
because it was receive by him as a matter of right in recompense for services
rendered by him as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration. In fact, even Chairman Domingo referred to it in his letter dated
July 14, 1988, as the petitioner's "salary differential."
30 SANTIAGO V COA & GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
It is noteworthy that the petitioner occupied the second office not only for a
few days or weeks but for more than three months. His designation as Acting
Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration was not a mere
accommodation by the MIAA. On the contrary, in his letter to Chairman Domingo
requesting the petitioner's services. MIAA General Manager Evergisto C. Macatulad
said, "Considering his qualifications and work experience, we believe that a finance
man of his stature and caliber can be of great help in the efficient and effective
performance of the Airport's functions."
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because

their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when
he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the
best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful
government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity
commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the
least he should expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he
feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening
shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and
was rewarded for it.
31 SANTIAGO V COA & GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
VDA. DE CONSUEGRA V GSIS

G.R. NO. L-28093, January 30, 1971
FACTS:
Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman of the office of the District
Engineer in the province of Surigao del Norte. Consuegra contracted two marriages,
the first with respondent Rosario Diaz, out of which marriage were born two
children but both predeceased their father; and the second, which was contracted
in good faith while the first marriage was subsisting, with petitioner Basilia Berdin
who bore with him seven children.
When Consuegra died in 1965, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid
by the GSIS to petitioner Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named
in the policy. As to his retirement insurance benefits, Consuegra did not designate
any beneficiary who would receive the retirement insurance benefits due to him.
Respondent Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed a claim with the GSIS
asking that the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir of
Consuegra, considering that the deceased did not designate any beneficiary with
respect to his retirement insurance benefits. Petitioner Berdin and her children,
likewise, filed a similar claim with the GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries
named in the life insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to
receive the retirement insurance benefits due the deceased Consuegra.
The GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were Diaz,
who is entitled to one-half of the retirement insurance benefits and Berdin and their
seven children, who are entitled to the remaining one-half.
Berdin and her children claimed, however, that since Consuegra failed to
designate the beneficiaries in his retirement insurance, the beneficiaries named in
the life insurance should automatically be considered the beneficiaries of the
retirement insurance benefits, to the exclusion of respondent Diaz, Hence, this
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Berdin and her children are the lone beneficiaries of the
subject retirement insurance benefits?
RULING:
No, petitioner Berdin and her children are not the lone beneficiaries of the
subject retirement insurance benefits.
The Court held that both Berdin and her children together with respondent
Diaz are entitled to the retirement benefits; that the beneficiary named in the life
insurance does not automatically become the beneficiary in the retirement
insurance. When Consuegra, during the early part of 1943, or before 1943,
32 VDA. DE CONSUEGRA V GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
designated his beneficiaries in his life insurance, he could NOT have intended those
beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the beneficiaries of his retirement
insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance under the GSIS came
about only when CA 186 was amended by RA 660 on June 18, 1951.
The Court further held that Sec. 11(b) of said Act clearly indicates that there
is need for the employee to file an application for retirement insurance benefits
when he becomes a GSIS member and to state his beneficiary. The life insurance
and the retirement insurance are two separate and distinct systems of benefits paid
out from 2 separate and distinct funds; that in case of failure to name a beneficiary
in an insurance policy, the proceeds will accrue to the estate of the insured. And
when there exist two marriages, each family will be entitled to one-half of the
estate.
33 VDA. DE CONSUEGRA V GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

GSIS V DE LEON
G.R. NO. 186560, November 17, 2010
FACTS:
After 44 years of service to the government, Respondent Fernando P. de

Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. He applied for
retirement under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended
by R.A. No. 4140, which provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank
as judges. The application was approved by GSIS. Thereafter, and for more than
nine years, respondent continuously received his retirement benefits, until 2001,
when he failed to receive his monthly pension.
Respondent found out that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension
because the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) informed GSIS that
respondent was not qualified to retire under R.A. No. 910. The said law was meant
to apply only to justices and judges. Having the same rank and qualification as a
judge did not entitle respondent to the retirement benefits provided. Thus, GSIS
stopped the payment of respondent’s monthly pension.
Respondent wrote GSIS several letters until he received a response on

November 9, 2007. Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA,
praying that petitioner be compelled to continue paying his monthly pension and to
pay his unpaid monthly benefits from 2001. He also asked that GSIS and the DBM
be ordered to pay him damages.
The CA granted the petition. Hence, petitioner GSIS is now before this Court,
assailing the Decision of the CA and the Resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to monthly pension and monthly benefits
from GSIS.
RULING:
Yes, respondent is entitled to monthly pension and monthly benefits from

GSIS.
In this case, as adverted to above, respondent was able to establish that he

has a clear legal right to the reinstatement of his retirement benefits. Respondent’s
disqualification from receiving retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910 does not
mean that he is disqualified from receiving any retirement benefit under any other
existing retirement law. Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, retiring
government employees who were not entitled to the benefits under R.A. No. 910
had the option to retire under either of two laws: Commonwealth Act No. 186, as
amended by R.A. No. 660, or P.D. No. 1146.
34 GSIS V DE LEON | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

Respondent had complied with the requirements for retirement benefits
under P.D. No. 1146 at the time of his retirement. GSIS does not dispute this.
Accordingly, respondent is entitled to receive the benefits provided under Section
12 of the same law.
To grant respondent these benefits does not equate to double retirement, as

GSIS mistakenly claims. Since respondent has been declared ineligible to retire
under R.A. No. 910, GSIS should simply apply the proper retirement law to
respondent’s claim, in substitution of R.A. No. 910. In this way, GSIS would be
faithful to its mandate to administer retirement laws in the spirit in which they have
been enacted, i.e., to provide retirees the wherewithal to live a life of relative
comfort and security after years of service to the government. Respondent will not
receive --- and GSIS is under no obligation to give him --- more than what is due
him under the proper retirement law.
35 GSIS V DE LEON | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

MANUEL BELARMINO V ECC

G.R. NO. 90204 May 11, 1990
FACTS:
Mrs. Belarmino, a classroom teacher and was 8 months pregnant,

accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she complained
of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she still continued to
suffer from recurrent abdominal pains and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach.
Her co-teachers told her to take a leave of absence but she continued to report to
school.
On January 25, 1982, she went into labor and delivered a premature baby
girl at home.
Her abdominal pains persisted even after delivery, accompanied by high

fever and headache. She was brought to the hospital and found that she was
suffering from septicemia postpartum due to infected laceration of the vagina.
She was discharged after 5 days but died 3 days later with the Cause of Death of
septicemia postpartum.
Her husband claimed for death benefits but was denied by GSIS claiming that
the cause of death if petitioner's wife is not an occupational disease.
On appeal, ECC affirmed the decision of GSIS.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of Mrs. Belarmino is a compensable disease.
RULING:
Yes, the death of Mrs. Belarmino is a compensable disease.
The illness, which resulted in the death of Mrs. Belarmino, is admittedly not
listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a classroom
teacher (See Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation).
However, her death from that ailment is compensable because an

employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its
development.
The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall
and suffer injury as a result.
The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated
in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her
fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the
development of postpartum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore
36 MANUEL BELARMINO V ECC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
was the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of
events, leading to her demise. ECC and GSIS were ordered to pay death benefits to
the petitioner.
37 MANUEL BELARMINO V ECC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

ALANO V ECC
G.R. NO. L-48594, March 16, 1988
FACTS:
This case involves the claim of the petitioner herein for income benefits with
the GSIS as the surviving heir of the deceased Dedicacion de Vera. The said
deceased was a government employee during her lifetime and worked as a principal
of a Community School in Pangasinan. It was 7 am while she was waiting for a ride
at the Plaza on her way to the school when she was bumped and ran over by a
speeding mini-bus which resulted to her instant death.
Petitioner Generoso Alano, brother of the deceased, filed an instant claim for
income benefits with the GSIS in behalf of the decedent’s children. However, such
claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that the injury upon which
compensation is being claimed is not one of the accidents satisfying all the
conditions as prescribed by law.
Such decision of the GSIS was affirmed by the respondent Commission

stating that the Rules on Employee’s Compensation specifically provides that for the
injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be
the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The
employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The
employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions.
According to the respondent Commission, the deceased’s accident did not meet any
of the aforementioned conditions. Hence, the present petition for certiorari. The
petitioner alleges that the accident has arisen out of or in the course of her
employment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accident happened in the course of the deceased’s employment
thereby entitling petitioner herein to the income benefits.
RULING:
YES. The Court ruled in this case that it is not disputed that the deceased
died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where her job
necessarily required her to be to enable her to reach her place of work on time.
Hence, such accident has deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of her
employment.
The petitioner herein is entitled to the income benefits and GSIS is ordered
to pay the heirs of the deceased.
38 ALANO V ECC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

LAZO V ECC & GSIS

G.R. NO. 78617, June 18, 1990
FACTS:
The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, a security guard of the Central Bank of the
Philippines rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the
evening and since the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, he
rendered overtime up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning the next day. When he went
home at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning, the passenger jeepney he was riding
met an accident and as a result, he sustained injuries and was confined in the
hospital.
When he filed a claim for disability benefits, GSIS denied for the reason that
he was not at his work place performing duties when the incident occurred.
Moreover, ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS since the accident which involved
the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a
personal matter. Thus, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner Salvador Lazo can claim for disability benefits?
RULING:
Yes, petitioner Salvador Lazo can claim for disability benefits because the
Court held that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from
the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing,
with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way
over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and
relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is
one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had
happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its
performance.
In this case, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank
several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so
petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he
went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual,
regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.
Since, there is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be

protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a
reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises,
therefore, the petitioner here can claim for disability benefits.
39 LAZO V ECC & GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
MENEZ V ECC
G.R. NO. L-48488, April 25, 1980
FACTS:
Menez was employed by the Department (now Ministry) of Education &

Culture as a school teacher at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila
and she retired at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching. Petitioner filed a
claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with
respondent Government Service Insurance System.
Petitioner claims she contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with

hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling
during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and
work-connected. Respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's
ailments are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of her
particular work.
Menez filed a letter-request for reconsideration but the same was denied by
the GSIS reiterating that petitioner has not established that her employment had
any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailments.
On March 7, 1977, petitioner again requested for reconsideration of the second
denial of said claim and respondent GSIS reaffirmed its stand on the case and
elevated the entire records thereof to the Employees' Compensation Commission
for review.
Respondent Commission issued a decision agreeing with the respondent

system that appellant's employment has nothing to do with the development of her
disabling illnesses.
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari from the decision.
Respondents Commission and System contend that petitioner's ailments of

rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not among the occupational diseases
listed as compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, or under
Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; and, that respondent
Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the form of accepted
medical findings thus making said decision final and conclusive on the matter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Menez is entitled to disability benefits under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance
System.
40 MENEZ V ECC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

RULING:
Yes, Menez is entitled to disability benefits since petitioner have substantially

shown that the risk of contracting her ailments had been increased by unfavorable
working conditions.
All public high school teachers, like herein petitioner, admittedly the most
underpaid but overworked employees of the government, are subject to emotional
strains and stresses. In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is
heightened by the fact that the high school in which she teaches is situated in a
tough area - Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal
elements and further aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as
well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like herein
petitioner, are most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of
all public school teachers is further accentuated by poor diet for they can ill-afford
nutritious food.
In her work, petitioner also has to contend with the natural elements, like
the inclement weather — heavy rains, typhoons — as well as dust — and disease-
ridden surroundings peculiar to an insanitary slum area.
Indisputably, petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with

hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after being drenched and
the consequent "chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and
recurring in nature and work-connected." Undoubtedly, petitioner's ailments thus
become compensable under the New Labor Code since under Rule 111, Section 1
(c) of its Implementing Rules, "only sickness or injury which occurred on or after
January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under
these Rules."
Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public
School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and
activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional
stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions
that "Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in
accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the
teachers' health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in
accordance with laws".
Therefore, there is ample proof that petitioner contracted such ailments by

reason of her occupation as a public high school teacher due to her exposure to the
adverse working conditions and hence she is entitled to disability benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service
Insurance System.
41 MENEZ V ECC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

CLEMENTE V GSIS & ECC

G.R. NO. L-47521, July 31, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner's husband, the late Pedro Clemente, was for ten (10) years a
janitor in the Department of Health (Dagupan City), assigned at the Ilocos Norte
Skin Clinic, Laoag City. He was hospitalized from November 3 to 14, 1976 due to
his ailment of "nephritis‖. He was also found to be suffering from such ailments as
portal cirrhosis and leprosy, otherwise known as Hansen's Disease.
On November 14, 1976, Pedro Clemente died of uremia due to nephritis.

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the GSIS a claim for employees' compensation
under the Labor Code but was denied the claim of the petitioner because the
ailments of her husband are not occupational diseases.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration of the GSIS' denial of her claim,

stating that the ailments of her husband were contracted in the course of
employment and were aggravated by the nature of his work. Petitioner stated that
her husband's ailment recurred in the course of employment presumably due to his
direct contact with persons suffering from this ailment.
Acting upon petitioner's request for reconsideration, the GSIS reiterated its
previous denial of her claim.
Treating the request for reconsideration as an appeal, the GSIS forwarded

the records of the petitioner' claim for review by the ECC.
Respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS' action of denial and rendered its own
decision dismissing petitioner's claim.
Respondent ECC's decision was anchored upon the findings that the ailments
are not listed as occupational diseases; that there was no substantial evidence of
causal connection; and that, in fact, the evidence was that the deceased had
already contracted the Hansen's disease before his employment. Thus, the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s claim is compensable.
RULING:
Yes, according to the court the major ailments of the deceased, i.e. nephritis,
leprosy, etc., could be traced from bacterial and viral infections. In the case of
leprosy, it is known that the source of infection is the discharge from lesions of
persons with active cases. It is believed that the bacillus enters the body through
the skin or through the mucous membrane of the nose and throat.
42 CLEMENTE V GSIS & ECC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
The husband of the petitioner worked in a skin clinic. As janitor of the Ilocos
Norte Skin Clinic, Mr. Clemente was exposed to different carriers of viral and
bacterial diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself where patients with different
illnesses come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipment that had been
used. He had to dispose of garbage and wastes that accumulated in each working
day. He was the employee most exposed to the dangerous concentration of infected
materials, and not being a medical practitioner, least likely to know how to avoid
infection. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Clemente's working
conditions increased the risk of his contracting the ailments. This Court has held in
appropriate cases that the conservative posture of the respondents is not consistent
with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee
embodied in the Constitution in favor of the workers. As a rule, doubts should be
resolved in favor of the claimant-employee.
43 CLEMENTE V GSIS & ECC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
NARAZO V ECC & GSIS

G.R. NO. 80157, February 6, 1990
FACTS:
Geronimo Narazo was employed for thirty eight (38) years as Budget
Examiner in the Office of the Governor, Province of Negros Occidental. On 14 May
1984, Narazo died at the age of fifty seven (57). His medical records show that he
was confined three (3) times at the Doña Corazon L. Montelibano Hospital in
Bacolod City, for urinary retention, abdominal pain and anemia. He was thereafter
diagnosed to be suffering from "obstructive nepropathy due to benign prostatic
hypertrophy", commonly known as "Uremia.
Petitioner, as the widow of the deceased, filed a claim with GSIS for death
benefits for the death of her husband, under the Employees’ Compensation Law (PD
626, as amended). However, said claim was denied on the ground that the cause of
death of Narazo is not listed as an occupational disease, and that there is no
showing that the position and duties of the deceased as Budget Examiner had
increased the risk of contracting "Uremia."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said decision, claiming that although

the cause of her husband’s death is not considered as an occupational disease,
nevertheless, his job as Budget Examiner which required long hours of sedentary
work, coupled with stress and pressure, caused him many times to delay urination,
which eventually led to the development of his ailments. The GSIS denied said
motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the Employees’ Compensation Commission
affirmed the decision of the GSIS. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be granted a claim for compensation benefits
under PD 626, as amended, for the death of her husband, Geronimo Narazo
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the cause of death of petitioner’s husband
is work-connected, i.e. the risk of contracting the illness was aggravated by the
nature of the work, so much so that petitioner is entitled to receive compensation
benefits for the death of her husband.
Sickness or death caused by said sickness is compensable if the same is

listed as an occupational disease. If it is not so listed, compensation may still be
recovered if the illness was aggravated by employment. However, it is incumbent
upon the claimant to show proof that the risk of contracting the illness was
increased by his working conditions.
To establish compensability under the increased risk theory, the claimant

must show proof of reasonable work-connection, not necessarily direct causal
44 NARAZO V ECC & GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
relation. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means
such relevant evidence as will support a decision, or clear and convincing evidence.
The nature of the work of the deceased as Budget Examiner in the Office of the
Governor dealt with full concentration and thorough study of the entries of accounts
in the budget and/or financial reports were necessary, such that the deceased had
to sit for hours, and more often than not, delay and even forego urination in order
not to interrupt the flow of concentration. In addition, tension and pressure must
have aggravated the situation.
45 NARAZO V ECC & GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
DABATIAN V GSIS
G.R. NO. L-47294; April 8, 1987
FACTS:
At the time of his death, Sigfredo A. Dabatian was employed as Garbage

Truck Driver in the General Services Department of the City Government of
Cagayan de Oro City. As Garbage Truck Driver, he was assigned mostly in the night
shift. In fact, at the time of his death his time of duty started from 10:00 o’clock at
night to 6:00 o’clock in the morning the next day. It was gathered from the
evidence on record that the deceased was a heavy coffee drinker which was his way
of warding off sleepiness.
A claim for income benefits under the Employee’s Compensation Program

was filed by the widow, the herein appellant. The Government Service Insurance
System decided against the compensability of the claim on the ground that
decedent’s ailment, Peptic Ulcer, is not definitely accepted as an occupational
disease, as listed under the present law on compensation. Neither was there a
showing that the same was directly caused by his employment and that the risk of
contracting the same was increased by the working conditions attendant to the
deceased’s employment. The case was then elevated to the ECC which ruled that
upon evaluation based on generally accepted medical authorities, the deceased’s
ailment was found not to be in the least causally related to his duties and conditions
of work. Thus, ECC found no sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the GSIS
denying petitioner’s claim. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not under the premises the death of Sigfredo A. Dabatian is
compensable.
RULING:
No, the death of Sigfredo Dabatian is not compensable. The Court held that
in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness
or death resulting therefrom must be, or must have resulted from either a) any
illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or
b) any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting
the same is increased by working conditions.
In this case, since peptic ulcer is not included in the list of occupational
diseases as drawn up by the Commission, then petitioner has the burden of proving
that the nature of her husband’s work increased the risk of contracting the disease.
Being a heavy coffee drinker may have aggravated his peptic ulcer, but,
aggravation of an illness is no longer a ground for compensation under the present
law. Therefore, Sigfredo’s death is not compensable.
46 DABATIAN V GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

CASUMPANG V ECC & GSIS

G.R. NO. 48664 May 20, 1987
FACTS:
Jose Casumpang, then working as Prison Guard of the Bureau of Prisons at

the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm, Zamboanga City, dies of stomach cancer.
When her petitioner widow claimed for death benefits, the same was denied by the
GSIS on the ground that the cause of death is not an occupational disease nor the
result of the deceased's nature of occupation as Prison Guard.
On appeal with the ECC, the petitioner claimed that compensability is

presumed once the ailment is shown to have supervened in the course of
employment. This was negated however by the ECC arguing that the doctrine of
presumptive compensability which was then expressly provided under the old
Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) is not recognized under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended, which provides that proof of causation by the
claimant is imperative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not cancer of the stomach is an occupational disease and thus
compensable under PD 626.
RULING:
No, cancer of the stomach is not an occupational disease and therefore not
compensable.
The Court held that under Art. 167 (b) of the New Labor Code and Section I
(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, for the sickness
and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupation disease listed under Annex ―A‖ of the Rules with the
condition set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
Under the Labor Code, cancer of the stomach is not an occupation disease. In
ECC Resolution No. 247-A, cancer of the stomach and other lymphatic and blood
forming, vessels was considered occupational only among woodworkers; wood
products industry carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and
plywood mills. The complained illness is therefore not compensable under the first
group provided in the Labor Code.
Under the second group for compensability, it should be shown that an illness
is caused by employment and that the risk of contracting the same is increased by
working conditions. Petitioner failed to show that the conditions, i.e. missed meals,
overtaken by rain, work at night, brought about cancer of the stomach.
47 CASUMPANG V ECC & GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
The Court further held that under the former Workmen’s Compensation Act
or Act. No. 3428, the claimant was relieved of the duty to prove causation as it was
then legally presumed that the illness arose out of employment under the
presumption of compensability. However, under the new law, the principles of
aggravation and presumption of compensability have been stricken off by
lawmakers as grounds for compensation. In order to be compensable, the injury or
illness must be listed under Annex ―A‖ with the conditions set therein or it must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
48 CASUMPANG V ECC & GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
CARBAJAL V GSIS & ECC

G.R. NO. L-46654 August 9, 1988
FACTS:
The late Nenita P. Carbajal was employed as Campaign Clerk in the Municipal
Treasurer's Office of San Julian, Eastern Samar. Her duties include typing tax
declarations, making entries in their books, and campaigning for tax collections. On
February 2, 1976, she suffered from bleeding per vaginum due to incomplete
abortion while performing her duties. She was brought to the Bagacay Mines
Hospital for treatment due to profuse hermorrhage of one month duration
secondary to complete abortion and shock. However, this proved to be futile
because she still died on March 8,1976.
Subsequently, petitioner Lupo Carbajal, husband of the deceased, then filed

his claim for benefits with the respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) under P.D. No. 626, as amended. Respondent GSIS denied the petitioner's
claim stating that the ailments of his wife were not occupational. Petitioner then
requested reconsideration of respondent's adverse ruling, which was also denied.
Aggrieved, a petition for review was filed by petitioner before the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC). However, the ECC affirmed the GSIS decision
denying the claim.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner's wife's ailments resulting in her death is
compensable.
RULING:
Yes, it is compensable. In granting the petition, the Court states that Section
1, P.D. No. 626, amending Article 165 of the Labor Code, defines a compensable
sickness as "any illness definitely accepted as occupational disease listed by the
Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions."
In this case, petitioner's wife while working suffered "two attacks of vaginal
bleeding and hypogastric pain" attributing said ailment to the lifting of heavy tax
declaration books, due to incomplete abortion.
Based on the findings/analysis of medical authorities, pregnant women

become tired more readily, therefore, the prevention of fatigue must be stressed
very emphatically. It is not considered desirable for pregnant women to be
employed in occupation that involve heavy lifting or other heavy work; and
occupation involving continuous standing and moving about. They should, if
possible, be transferred to lighter and more sedentary works.
49 CARBAJAL V GSIS & ECC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
Thus, the opinion of the ECC Medical Officer that there was no causal relation
between the ailment of petitioner's spouse and the nature and/or conditions of his
wife's employment cannot overcome the substantial evidence submitted by
petitioner.
50 CARBAJAL V GSIS & ECC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
VILLONES V ECC & GSIS

G.R. NO. L-46200, July 30, 1979
FACTS:
The late Rolando M. Villones was employed as a secondary school teacher in

the Department of Education and Culture assigned at Dayhagan Barrio High School
in Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro, from July 3,1972 up to the time of his death on
September 2, 1975. He died of pulmonary tuberculosis. On December 23, 1975, the
deceased's father and herein petitioner, filed with the Government Service
Insurance System, in the prescribed form, a claim for income benefits for the death
of his son under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 626.
On February 4, 1976, additional documents were submitted to the GSIS

consisting of:
(a) a medical certificate showing that deceased Rolando M. Villones was on

sick leave of absence from December 4 to 20, 1972 due to influenza;
(b) a medical certificate issued by Dr. Fernando B. Viloria, Municipal Health
Officer of Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro certifying that he examined Rolando M.
Villones on July 19, 1972 and found him to be physically and mentally fit for
employment; and
(c) a certification from the principal of Bongabon (South District), Oriental
Mindoro to the effect that the actual duties of the deceased as secondary
school teacher "were teaching secondary school subjects specifically the
following: chemistry, science, history, and English. He also led students in
some curricular work like green revolution projects, youth civic programs,
and the like. Aside from these, he also did community work like helping in
the organization of puroks and barangay youth clubs.‖
On March 9, 1976, the GSIS Medicare-Employees' Compensation denied the

claim on the ground that the cause of death, Pulmonary Tuberculosis, although
listed as an occupational disease, has failed to satisfy other conditions in order to
be compensable.
After petitioner's request for reconsideration of the denial of his claim was
denied on June 10, 1976 by the GSIS Medicare Employees' Compensation, the
entire record of the case was elevated on September 2, 1976 to the Employees'
Compensation Commission for review. On February 17, 1977, the Employees'
Compensation Commission (En Banc) rendered its decision affirming the earlier
denial made by the GSIS Medicare-Employees' Compensation of herein petitioner's
claim for income benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can claim for income benefits for the death of his son,
Rolando M. Villones, under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 626.
51 VILLONES V ECC & GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
RULING:
Yes. In the case before US, it is undisputed that petitioner's son, the late
Rolando M. Villones, who was employed on July 3, 1972 as a secondary public
school teacher in Dayhagan Barrio High School in Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro, died
on September 2, 1975. The cause of his death, according to the municipal health
officer of Bongabon, Dr. Fernando B. Viloria, was PTB, hemoptysis.
By the very nature of tuberculosis, the deceased could not have instantly
acquired such illness on September 2, 1975 and died as a result of that on the
same day. And the observation of petitioner's counsel that "pulmonary tuberculosis
does not belong to that category of sickness which is instantaneously fatal to its
victim upon contracting thereof, but takes months, if not years, before the person
afflicted dies" is realistic as it is confirmed by several compensation cases that
reached this Court.
Considering, therefore, the undisputed nature of the deceased's employment

as certified by the principal of Bongabon (South District); and in addition, the fact
that he had plenty of homework to do after his regular working hours; that with a
meager monthly pay of P397.60, with his parents, a sister, and two (2) brothers
depending on him for support, he could barely afford to buy and eat good food; and
that as such teacher, it becomes inevitable for him to be in constant contact with
students and other types of people who may be afflicted with PTB, which is a highly
communicable disease, it is not surprising that he should contract tuberculosis, so
that from December 4 to 20, 1972, only five (5) months after he was employed as
a teacher, he was forced to go on sick leave by reason of the aforestated illness.
When he was able to resume work, he was again exposed to same working
conditions thus aggravating his illness until he suddenly died on September 2, 1975
of sever hemoptysis due to PTB as certified by Dr. Fernando B. Viloria.
It must be pointed out that as early as December 4 to 20, 1972, the

deceased Villones was already entitled to disability benefits under Section 14 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, because his illness prevented him from
reporting to his work for more than three (3) days; and under such a situation, his
employer (Department of Education and Culture) was obligated under Section 37 of
the same Act to file a notice of illness with the Workmen's Compensation
Commission and to manifest its intention of whether or not to controvert his right to
compensation. There is no showing that respondent employer has complied with its
duty under Sections 37 and 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended,
of filing with the Workmen's Compensation Commission a notice of the initial illness
of its employee, Rolando Villones, as well as his subsequent death on September 2,
1975, and of controverting the right to compensation within the prescribed period
of fourteen (14) days from the occurrence of the disability or death, or within ten
(10) days from knowledge thereof.
Moreover, this Court, in consistently holding that the disease of tuberculosis

is an occupational disease or work connected in such occupations as that of a
teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and such other occupations, hence
compensable, aptly stated and WE quote: "Medical science has it that tuberculosis
as an ailment is latent in man regardless of his age, sex and occupation. When
given favorable conditions, this disease becomes active and prominent. Some of
these favorable conditions are: too much physical exertion without the
corresponding rest; exposure to excessive heat and cold; lack of good food as to
weaken the body constituents and contact with people suffering from tuberculosis
..." (Corales vs. ECC, supra).
Even unexplained deaths, the occasion and circumstances of which are

unknown or undertermined, are usually deemed compensable, as long as there is
some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection, a casual relation between
the death and the employment (Mulingtapang vs. WCC, 80 SCRA 610 [1977];
Castro vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 179 [1977]; ITEMCOP vs. Florzo, 16 SCRA 2104 [1966]).
And, in case of doubt in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
the Labor Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, the same shall be
resolved in favor of the laborer (Art. 4, PD No. 442, as amended; Art. 1702, New
Civil Code).
Wherefore, the decision of respondent employees' compensation commission

is hereby set aside and the government service insurance system is hereby
ordered:
1. To pay herein petitioner the sum of six thousand (P 6,000.00) pesos as

death benefits;
2. To refund petitioner's medical and hospital expenses duly supported by
proper
3. To pay petitioner burial expenses in the amount of two hundred (P
200.00) pesos;
4. To pay six hundred (P 600.00) pesos as attorney' fees; and
5. To pay administrative cost.
MABUHAY SHIPPING V NLRC & SENTINA

G.R. NO. 94167, January 21, 1991
FACTS:
Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th Engineer by petitioner Mabuhay Shipping

Services, Inc. (MSSI) for and in behalf of co-petitioner, Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd.
to work aboard the M/V Harmony I for a period of one year.
On January 16, 1988, Sentina caused a fight with Emmanuel Ero. The fight
resulted to the death of Sentina. Private respondents filed a complaint against
petitioners with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for
payment of death benefits, burial expenses, unpaid salaries on board and overtime
pay with damages. POEA ordered the petitioner to pay the private respondent. The
same was affirmed by the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer exempted from liability in a case of one who ran
amuck or who was in the state of intoxication when he provoked a fight which
resulted to his death.
RULING:
Yes, the employer is exempted from liability.
The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not
automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which led to the death
as well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the
employer and seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. There are limitations
to the liability to pay death benefits.
When the death of the seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his
own life, and it is directly attributable to the seaman, such death is not
compensable. No doubt a case of suicide is covered by this provision.
54 MABUHAY SHIPPING V NLRC & SENTINA | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
INTEROIENT V NLRC & PINEDA

G.R. NO. 115497 September 16, 1996
FACTS:
The proceedings originated as a claim for death compensation benefits filed

by Constancia Pineda as heir of her deceased son, seaman Jeremias Pineda, against
Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. and its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping
Corporation and the Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.
On September 28, 1989, Jeremias Pineda finished his contract and was
discharged from the port of Dubai for repatriation to Manila; that his flight schedule
from Dubai to the Philippines necessitated a stopover at Bangkok, Thailand, and
during said stopover he disembarked on his own free will and failed to join the
connecting flight to Hongkong with final destination to Manila; that on October 5,
1990, it received a fax transmission from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the
effect that Jeremias Pineda was shot by a Thai Officer on duty on October 2, 1989
at around 4:00 P.M. The police report submitted to the Philippine Embassy in
Bangkok confirmed that it was Pineda who "approached and tried to stab the police
sergeant with a knife and that therefore he was forced to pull out his gun and shot
Pineda".
Constancia Pineda filed a claim for death compensation benefits as heir of her
deceased son, seaman Jeremias Pineda, against Interorient Maritime Enterprises,
Inc. and its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation and the Times Surety
and Insurance Co., Inc.
Petitioner contends that they are not liable to pay any death/burial benefits
pursuant to the provisions of Par. 6, Section C. Part II, POEA Standard Format of
Employment which state(s) that "no compensation shall be payable in respect of
any injury, (in)capacity, disability or death resulting from a willful (sic) act on his
own life by the seaman"; that the deceased seaman died due to his own willful (sic)
act in attacking a policeman in Bangkok who shot him in self-defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of seaman Jeremias Pineda was a work related?
RULING:
Yes. Court held that for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex 'A' of the Rules (the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation)
with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
The POEA Administrator ruled, and this Court agrees, that since Pineda
attacked the Thai policeman when he was no longer in complete control of his
mental faculties, the provision of the Standard Format Contract of Employment
55 INTEROIENT V NLRC & PINEDA | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
exemption the employer from liability should not apply in the instant case. Firstly,
the fact that the deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time of his
repatriation means that he must have been deprived of the full use of his reason,
and that thereby, his will must have been impaired, at the very least. Thus, his
attack on the policeman can in no wise be characterized as a deliberate, willful or
voluntary act on his part. Secondly, and apart from that, we also agree that in light
of the deceased's mental condition, petitioners knowing fully well that its employee
had been suffering from some mental disorder should have observed some
precautionary measures and should not have allowed said seaman to travel home
alone and their failure to do so rendered them liable for the death of Pineda. The
foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a
companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly
tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and

the Decision assailed in this petition is AFFIRMED.
56 INTEROIENT V NLRC & PINEDA | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
YENG V ROMA
G.R. NO. L-14827, October 31, 1960
FACTS:
Santos Romeo was working for petitioner as cargador in loading and

unloading copra at the former’s warehouse at Cebu City. One morning, after asking
permission from his employer, Santos Romeo went to petitioner’s house just across
the street from the warehouse to get a drink of water, the water pump in the
warehouse being out of order and no supply being available. Reaching the kitchen
of said house and while he was drinking, he saw a puppy eating some fried fish
inside an open cabinet. He tried to drive away the puppy by saying "tse," but as the
puppy continued to eat the fish, Santos made a motion with his hand to drive it
away, in the course of which his right hand was bitten by said puppy. Santos
Romeo died of hydrophobia from the dog bite. It appears that the puppy was not
owned by petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether the death of the laborer can be considered to arise "out of and in the
course" of his employment.
RULING:
Yes, The rule is well established that — "Such acts as are reasonably
necessary to the health and comfort of an employee while at work, such as
satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other physical demands, or protecting himself
from excessive cold, are nevertheless incidental to the employment, and injuries
sustained in the performance of such act are generally held to be compensable as
arising out of and in the course of the employment."
That Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellant’s house and not at his
usual place of work does not bring the case out of the operation of the rule
previously quoted, for the reason that the laborer was practically driven to that
place through the appellant’s fault in not providing an adequate supply of drinking
water at the warehouse.
Appellant urges that the dog bite was provoked by Santos’ trying to take the
fish away from the puppy and hence, while he was engaged in an independent
activity. We do not regard such act as a voluntary deviation from his duties,
considering that the act of the deceased was practically an instinctive one, that
would naturally be expected from any person in his position. Moreover, it was
motivated by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a desire to protect the latter’s
property, that cannot be deemed wholly foreign to the duties of the laborer as such.
In fact, it has been held that the act of saving the employee’s own property from an
apparent danger, is compensable.
57 YENG V ROMA | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

LUZON STEVEDORING V WCC

G.R. NO. L-19742, January 31, 1964
FACTS:
Antonio Cordero was employed as a sailor on a barge of the Luzon

Stevedoring Co., Inc His duty was to look after the safety of the barge and its cargo
especially in the absence of the patron. On September 11, 1956, Cordero, having
been requested by the patron to take over, was left alone in charge of the barge.
Two days later his lifeless body was found floating in the Pasig river by Det. Labao
of the Manila Police Department. A post-mortem examination revealed that he died
of asphyxia as a result of submersion in water.
In 1957, the deceased's widow filed a formal claim for compensation which
was referred to a hearing officer who, after hearing, rendered decision ordering the
company to pay to claimant death benefits in the amount of P2,912.00.
The company filed a petition for reconsideration based on three grounds: (a)
there was no causal connection between Cordero's death and his employment as a
sailor; (b) Cordero's death was due to his own negligence; and (c) claimant's right,
if will, is already barred by Section 24 of Act 3428, as amended.1äwpThe WCC
affirmed the decision in toto; hence the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the widow should be granted the compensation?
RULING:
Yes. Under Section 24 of Act 3428, in order the a claim for compensation
may prosper it is necessary that it be made not later than three months after the
death of the deceased and that if that is not done the claim may considered of no
legal effects.
The request for financial aid can be considered as advance filing of claim in
contemplation of law for then the company cannot plead surprise the preparation of
its defense, this being the only tenable reason for requiring an early filing of the
claim on the part of the employee or heirs of the deceased. This is especially so
taking into account that under Section 44 of the same Act it is presumed that "the
claim comes within the provision of the Act and that sufficient notice thereof was
given." This provision should be liberally construed.
As to the nature of death of the accused:
His duty required him to be nailed to his post 24 hours of a day followed by
other days. He had to move and perform the ordinary, functions of a human
being. When he took a bath in the water, he performed a daily routine
needed by the human body, incidental to, and habitual and usual in the life
of a sailor, and any accident occurring to him and due to ordinary and
necessary incidents of his employment is well within the sphere of such
58 LUZON STEVEDORING V WCC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
unusual employment and the employer is liable to pay compensation to the
family.
Neither can it be contended that in going out with some companions to swim
the deceased is guilty of notorious negligence for the reason that if his purpose was
to take a bath he could have done it with the aid of a water tank on board the
barge. At any rate there is no clear evidence that his death was due to his notorious
negligence and not to a cause which he could not have reasonably avoided.
59 LUZON STEVEDORING V WCC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

VISAYAN STEVEDORE V WCC & LABIYO

G.R. NO. L-26657, September 12, 1974
FACTS:
February 17, 1964, Engr. Labiyo who was tasked to start the engine and see
to it that it functioned properly during the voyage, died. Medicolegal findings said
that the cause of death was ―Bangungot‖. The widow, Julieta, filed a claim for
compensation with the Department of Labor, but after appropriate proceedings of
the Workmen’s Compensation Unit, dismissed the case upon a finding that "the
cause of death of Eduardo Labiyo did not arise out of and was aggravated by the
nature of his employment." However, upon review, the decision was set aside and
petitioner was ordered to pay compensation benefits, burial expenses and costs.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Petitioner assails the Commission's finding that Eduardo Labiyo "must have
died due to over fatigue or over exertion," arguing that said conclusion is not at all
supported by the result of the autopsy which traced the cause of the deceased's
death to "bangungot."
ISSUE:
Whether the cause of death of the deceased is compensable under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act?
RULING:
Yes, it is compensable.
It is to be presumed, under section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,

as amended, that the employee's death, supervening at the time of his
employment, either arose out of, or was at least aggravated by said employment.
With this legal presumption the burden of proof shifts to the employer, and the
employee is relieved of the burden to show causation. The mere opinion of doctors
presented by petitioner as evidence cannot prevail over the presumption
established by law."
The liberal attitude displayed by this Court in considering as compensable the

death by heart attack of an off-duty employee helping in the loading operation of a
vessel, or the disappearance of an off-duty crew member of a vessel who has no
choice but to be in the vessel during the voyage, or the death by drowning of an
employee whose duty was to watch over and take charge of a barge in the absence
of the patron, proceeds from an awareness of the fact that when an employee
undertakes to satisfy, in the course of employment, certain human wants, i.e.
eating, freshening up, sleeping and the like, "and something takes place that may
cause injury, harm or death to the employee or laborer, it is fair and logical that the
happening be considered as one occurring in the course of employment for under
the circumstances it cannot be undertaken in any other way", unless it can be
clearly shown that the mishap occurred because the employee acted beyond his
60 VISAYAN STEVEDORE V WCC & LABIYO | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
duty or outside the course of employment, which is not so in the case at bar. For
aside from the conclusion arrived at by the medicolegal officer who conducted the
autopsy that "bangungot" was the cause of Eduardo Labiyo's death, * there was
hardly anything else that would disconnect the deceased's death from his
employment, In other words, petitioner had not proved that death was not and
could not be caused or aggravated by the deceased's work as engineer who, at the
time of his death, was practically on 24-hour continuous duty.
MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING, INC./MAERSK SERVICES

LTD. V MESINA
G.R. NO. 200831, June 5, 2013
FACTS:
The respondent was employed by Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc., with Mr.
Jerome delos Angeles as its Manager, for and in behalf of its principal, Maersk
Services, Ltd., (petitioners) as a steward on board the vessel "Sealand Innovator"
for a period of nine (9) months with a monthly basic salary of US$425.00.
As a steward, the respondent’s functions involved kitchen-related services,

cleaning accommodation spaces and performing laundry services, as may be
required. He was further ordered by the vessel’s captain to wash-paint the decks
from second to fourth deck using special soap and chemicals.
The respondent started to feel unusual itchiness all over his body followed by
the appearance of small spots on his skin. He initially deferred seeking medical
attention but when the itching became unbearable, he requested for a thorough
medical check-up.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, the respondent was referred to the

petitioners’ company-designated physician, Dr. Alegre, before whom he reported
for treatment twice a week for eight (8) months. The respondent also underwent
phototherapy for not less than twenty (20) sessions. During all these times, the
petitioners shouldered the medical expenses of the respondent and paid him sick
wage benefits.
In a letter to the petitioners, Dr. Alegre declared the respondent to be

afflicted with psoriasis, an auto-immune ailment that is not work-related.
Based on Dr. Alegre’s finding that psoriasis is not work-related, the

petitioners discontinued paying the respondent’s benefits. Aggrieved, the
respondent sought the assistance of his union, the Associated Maritime Officers’
and Seamen’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), which submitted him for
diagnosis to Dr. Glenda Anastacio-Fugoso (Dr. Fugoso), a dermatologist at the
Seaman’s Hospital.
Dr. Fugoso confirmed that the respondent is suffering from Psoriasis Vulgaris,
a disease aggravated by work but is not contagious.
The respondent claimed that his illness is compensable because it manifested

during his employment aboard the petitioners’ vessel. He further averred that it
was triggered by his exposure to strong detergent soap and chemicals which he
used in washing the dishes, laundry and ship decks. Upon the other hand, the
petitioners denied liability on the basis of Dr. Alegre’s declaration that it is not a
work-related ailment and psoriasis is not an occupational disease under the 2000
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract for
Seafarers (POEA-SEC).
Ruling of the LA, in favor of Respondents. The LA further reasoned that in

disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated but rather the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity.
Ruling of the NLRC, The NLRC differed with the conclusions of the LA and held that
there is actually no substantial evidence to prove that the nature of and the stress
concomitant to the respondent’s work aggravated his psoriasis. Thus, the NLRC
reversed the LA’s ruling.
Ruling of the CA, The CA sustained the LA’s judgment elaborating that
inasmuch as the actual cause of psoriasis is unknown and given the probability that
its onset was caused by factors found within the respondent’s work environment,
the doubt as to whether his illness is work-related should be resolved in. Hence,
this Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
RULING:
Yes. At the onset, it is well to note that in resolving disputes on disability

benefits, the fundamental consideration has been that the POEA-SEC was designed
primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their
employment on board ocean-going vessels. As such, its provisions must be
construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor because only
then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.
The 2000 POEA-SEC25 defines "work-related illness" as "any sickness

resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."
In interpreting the said definition, the Court has held that for disability to be
compensable under Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC,27 it is not sufficient to
establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or
partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between
the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted.
It is undisputed that from the time the respondent was medically repatriated
on October 7, 2005 he was unable to work for more than 120 days. In fact, Dr.
Alegre’s certification was issued only after 259 days with the respondent needing
further medical treatments thus rendering him unable to pursue his customary
work. Despite the declaration in the medical reports that psoriasis is not
contagious, no profit-minded employer will hire him considering the repulsive
physical manifestation of the disease, it’s chronic nature, lack of long-term cure and
the vulnerability of the patient to cardiovascular diseases and some cancers. Its
inevitable impact to the respondent’s chances of being hired and capacity to
continue working as a seaman cannot be ignored. His permanent disability thus
effectively became total in nature entitling him to permanent total disability benefits
as correctly awarded by the LA and the CA.
Definitions:
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more
than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of
his body.
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to

earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained
for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his
mentality and attainments could do.
A total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled,
or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that
the employee cannot pursue his or her usual work and earn from it. A total
disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120
days.
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. V JOEL D. TAOK

G.R. NO. 193679, July 18, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioners C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc., Norwegian Cruise Line and
Norwegian Sun entered into a ten (10)-month employment contract with
respondent Joel D. Taok (Taok) where the latter was engaged as cook on board M/V
Norwegian Sun Taok boarded the vessel on January 8, 2006. On July 25, 2006,
Taok complained of pain, prompted the ship physician to bring him to Prince Rupert
Regional Hospital in Canada for consultation. He was until July 29, 2006 As he was
diagnosed with atrial fibrillation, he was advised not to report for work until such
time he has undergone DC cardioversion, echocardiography and exercise stress
test. And, on August 5, 2006, Taok was repatriated to the Philippines for further
treatment.
On August 7, 2006, upon his arrival, Taok went to Sachly International

Health Partners, Inc. (Sachly), he was recommended for the conduct of several
tests. On September 18, 2006, Taok was once again examined in the said hospital
diagnosed him with "cardiomyopathy, ischemic vs. dilated (idiopathic); S/P
coronary angiography.". He was asked to return on October 18, 2006 for re-
evaluation. However, Taok did not subject himself to further examination, instead,
filed on September 19, 2006 a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits
in NLRC NCR OFW and raffled to Labor Arbiter Elias H. Salinas (LA Salinas).The
latter dismissed the claim. He appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) affirmed the dismissal. Taok moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Thus, filed with the CA in which the latter reversed the findings of the NLRC.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA. Thus, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Taok can claim for total and permanent disability?
RULING:
No, Taok cannot claim for total and permanent disability the Court held that
a seafarer may pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits if:
(a) the company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his

fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day
period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would
address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the
period to 240 days;
(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the
company-designated physician;
(c) the company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty
within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician
65 C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. v JOEL D. TAOK | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR
STUDENTS
of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are
of a contrary opinion;
(d) the company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially
permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and
jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent
but total as well;
(e) the company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and
permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading;
(f) the company-designated physician determined that his medical condition
is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-
choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC
found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;
(g) the company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently
disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits;
and
(h) the company-designated physician declared him partially and
permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains
incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of the said
periods.
In this case, Taok filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits
while he was still considered to be temporarily and totally disabled; while the
petitioners were still attempting to address his medical condition which the law
considers as temporary; and while the company-designated doctors were still in the
process of determining whether he is permanently disabled or still capable of
performing his usual sea duties.
None of the enumerated instances when an action for total and permanent
disability benefits may be instituted is present. As previously stated, the 120-day
period had not yet lapsed and the company-designated physician has not yet made
any declaration as to his fitness or disability. Thus, in legal contemplation, Taok was
still considered to be totally yet temporarily disabled at the time he filed the
complaint. Being in a state of temporary total disability, Therefore, Taok cannot
claim total and permanent disability benefits.
66 C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC. v JOEL D. TAOK | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR
STUDENTS
OSCAR GAMBOA V MAUNLARAN TRANSPO, INC.

GR. NO. 232905, August 20, 2018
FACTS:
On January 17, 2014, petitioner entered into a nine (9)-month contract of

employment as Bosun with respondent Maunlad Trans, Inc. (MTI), for its
principal, Rainbow Maritime Co., Ltd. (RMCL), on board the vessel, MV Oriente
Shine, a cargo vessel transporting logs from Westminster, Canada to several Asian
countries. Prior thereto, or in 2013, petitioner was likewise hired by MTI on board
MN Global Mermaid, also a cargo vessel.
After undergoing the required pre-employment medical examination (PEME)

where he was declared fit for duty, petitioner disembarked and joined the vessel on
January 24, 2014 that was then docked at Tokushima, Japan. The following day, or
on January 25, 2014, petitioner assisted in the unloading of raw logs from the
vessel, as well as in the clean-up thereafter of the debris and log residue that were
meter-deep. As petitioner could not withstand the strong odor of the logs and was
gasping for breath, the latter asked for leave which was granted, and as such, was
excused from the activity. However, the incident already triggered an asthma
attack on petitioner which initially started as a cough that was later accompanied by
wheezing breath.
On February 12, 2014, during the rigging operation, petitioner experienced

back pain and difficulty in breathing that prompted Captain Cloa to disembark him
for medical consultation at the Mariner's Clinic, Ltd., in Canada. While the foreign
port doctor, Dr. Stanley F. Karon, took note of petitioner's back pain, it was his
diagnosed asthma that prompted the said doctor to declare him unfit for duty.
Thus, on February 15, 2014, petitioner was medically repatriated and

brought to Marine Medical Services where he was seen by a company-designated
physician, Dr. Mylene Cruz-Balbon, who confirmed his bronchial asthma.
Subsequent check-ups further disclosed that petitioner was suffering from
"Degenerative Changes, Thoracolumbar Spine" and was found to have a "metallic
foreign body on the anterior cervical area noted on x-ray," which, as pointed out by
the company-designated physician, was not related to the cause of petitioner's
repatriation. Petitioner was thereafter referred to orthopedic doctors, Dr. Pollyana
Gumba Escano (Dr. Escano), for rehabilitation and therapy, and Dr. William
Chuasuan, Jr. (Dr. Chuasuan), for expert evaluation and management.
Likewise, the orthopedic specialist, Dr. Escano, consistently reported that

petitioner has not been relieved of his back pain despite rehabilitation, and further
recommended that the latter undergo MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) of the
spine, which she pointed out could be done only after the removal of the foreign
bodies embedded in petitioner's neck area. She added that there was a need to
control petitioner's blood pressure and asthma which prevented them from doing
spiral stabilization exercises on him.
67 OSCAR GAMBOA V MAUNLARAN TRANSPO, INC. | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
Thus, on June 4, 2014, petitioner filed a complaint for non-payment of his
sickness allowance, medical expenses, and rehabilitation fees, against MTI, before
the NLRC, docketed as NLRC Case No. SUB-RAB I (OFW) 7-06-0106-14
Meanwhile, petitioner claimed that he still suffered from severe back pain
and asthma attacks, which prompted him to consult on June 27, 2014, an
independent physician, Dr. Sonny Edward Urbano of the Eastern Pangasinan District
Hospital, who declared him unfit for work or maritime voyage given that he was
found to be suffering from "Hypertension stage II, Hypertensive cardiovascular
disease, Bronchial asthma, Community acquired pneumonia."
In their defense, respondents denied liability contending, among others, that

the complaint was prematurely filed given that the 120-day period had not yet
expired at the time petitioner filed his complaint on June 4, 2014, and that the
latter even returned for a follow-up check-up with his attending specialist on June
20, 2014. They further contended that petitioner was not entitled to disability
benefits under the CBA as his condition was not due to an accident, and that his
illnesses were not compensable, considering that his degenerative changes (back
condition) was declared by the specialist to be a pre-existing condition, while his
bronchial asthma was not work-related since he already manifested its symptoms
at the time he joined the vessel on January 24, 2014. They likewise averred that
petitioner failed to follow the procedure in contesting the findings of the company-
designated physician. Lastly, they asserted that the claims for sickness allowance
and reimbursement for medical and transportation expenses had already been paid,
while the damages and attorney's fees sought were without factual and legal bases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
RULING:
Yes, the petitioner is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised and resolved by
this Court on petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, because the
Court, not being a trier of facts, is not duty bound to reexamine and calibrate the
evidence on record.70 Findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are generally accorded finality and respect. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this general rule, such as the instant case, where the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts and the findings of facts are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.
It is settled that the entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to

disability benefits is governed by law, by the parties' contracts, and by the medical
findings. By law, the relevant statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 (formerly
Articles 191 to 193) of the Labor Code in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X of the
Amended Rules on Employee Compensation. By contract, the material contracts are
the POEA-SEC, which is deemed incorporated in every seafarer's employment
contract and considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the
government, the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement, if any, and the
employment agreement between the seafarer and the employer.
Under the 2010 POEA-SEC, a "work-related" illness is defined as "any

sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this
Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."
In the case at bar, petitioner was diagnosed with "Bronchial Asthma;

Degenerative Changes, Thoracolumbar Spine, Left Parathoracic Muscle Strain." In a
medical report dated May 14, 2014, the company-designated physician gave
petitioner an "interim" assessment of Grades 8 and 12 for his orthopedic and
pulmonary conditions, respectively. While the orthopedic specialist, in his medical
report dated July 10, 2014, opined that petitioner's Degenerative Changes,
Thoracolumbar Spine, Left Parathoracic Muscle Strain "may be [a] pre-existing"
condition, and therefore not work-related, the pulmonary specialist, on the other
hand, merely reiterated the previous disability rating of Grade 12, i.e., slight
residual or disorder. From the foregoing medical report, it can be reasonably
inferred that petitioner's bronchial asthma was deemed a work-related illness unlike
his degenerative changes of the spine (back condition), which was declared by the
specialist to be not work-related in view of the specialist's observation that it was a
pre-existing condition that "could not have developed during his [22-day] period on
board."
VENTURA V CREWTECH SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES,

INC.
G.R. NO. 225995, November 20, 2017
FACTS:
Assailed in this case is the petition for review on certiorari the Decision dated
March 1, 2016, and the resolution on July 4, 2016, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 142802 which reversed and set aside the Decision and resolution of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated June 30, 2015, and August
27, 2015, NLRC LAC (OFW-M)-06-000514-15, and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s
(LA) Decision on April 30, 2015 which dismissed the complaint for total and
permanent disability benefits, but ordered respondent Elburg Shipmanagement
Philippines, Inc. to pay Teodoro V. Ventura, Jr. (petitioner) the unpaid sickness
allowance and 10% attorney’s fees.
In this case, Ventura was employed by Crewtech Shipmanagement

Philippines, Inc. (Crewtech), for its principal, Rizzo-Bottiglieri-De Carlini Armatori
S.P.A. (Rizzo), as Chief Cook on board the vessel MV Maria Cristina Rizzo with a
nine (9)-month contract signed on October 18, 2013, and a basic monthly salary of
US$710.00 exclusive of overtime pay and other benefits. Ventura had undergone
pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duty, by
the company-designated physician. He boarded the vessel and claimed to have
been employed for the past three (3) years and was assigned to different vessels.
There was a transfer of management on April 4, 2014, MV Maria Cristina Rizzo to
Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. (Elburg) which assumed full responsibility
to all contractual obligations of its seafarers originally under Crewtech.
Sometime in April 2014, Ventura complained to the Chief Mate of his

difficulty in urinating with lower abdominal pain. He was given pain relievers and
advised to drink plenty of water. When their vessel reached Singapore on April 30,
Ventura was brought to the Maritime Medical Centre and was diagnosed by the
specialist to have ―prostatitis‖. He was declared ―unfit for duty‖. He disclosed to the
foreign doctor his medical history of prostatitis three (3) years ago, that he was
treated for kidney stone in August 2013, and that he was not under any regular
medication. He was repatriated. Ventura filed for total permanent disability
benefits, sickness allowance, transportation and medical expenses, damages, and
attorney's fees against Crewtech, Rizzo, and its President/Manager, respondent
Angelita Ancheta (Ancheta) before the NLRC asserting his illness as work-related.
The Crewtech denied petitioner’s claim contending that Ventura was guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentation for failing to disclose his medical history of illness,
which disqualified him for any compensation and benefits under Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled of the POEA-SEC permanent disability
benefits?
70 VENTURA V CREWTECH SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC. | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS
DOCTOR STUDENTS
RULING:
No. The petitioner failed to observe the conflict-resolution procedure provided

under Section 20 of 2010 POEA-SEC, and the Court is inclined to uphold the opinion
of the company-designated physician that petitioner's illnesses were not work-
related, hence, not compensable. Probability of work-connection must at least be
anchored on credible information and bare allegations do not suffice to discharge
the required quantum of proof.
The CA did not err in granting respondents' certiorari petition as the findings
and conclusions reached by the NLRC are tainted with grave abuse of discretion
since the claim for disability benefits remains unsupported by substantial evidence.
Subsequently, the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the
seafarer, it cannot allow claims for compensation based on whims and caprices.
When the evidence presented negates compensability, the claim must fail, lest
injustice be caused to the employer.
Thus, the petition for permanent disability benefits was denied and the CAs
decision on March 1, 2016, and resolution on July 4, 2016, were affirmed.
71 VENTURA V CREWTECH SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC. | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS

DOCTOR STUDENTS
HACIENDA LUISITA V PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM

COUNCIL
G.R. NO. 171101, July 5, 2011
FACTS:
At the core of the case is Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac (Hacienda Luisita), once
a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several
municipalities of Tarlac and owned by Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas
(Tabacalera). The Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned and/or
controlled by the Jose Cojuangco, Sr. Group, was willing to buy. As agreed upon,
Tadeco undertook to pay the purchase price for Hacienda Luisita in pesos, while
that for the controlling interest in CAT, in US dollars.19
To facilitate the adverted sale-and-purchase package, the Philippine

government, through the then Central Bank of the Philippines, assisted Tadeco in
obtaining a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million
loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price component of the sale, with the
condition that ―the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the
applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and
whenever conditions should exist warranting such action under the provisions of the
Land Tenure Act.‖ Tadeco however did not comply with this condition.
On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila
RTC against Tadeco, et al., for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmers at
cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants,
besides which sugar lands – of which the hacienda consisted – are not covered by
existing agrarian reform legislations. The Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering
Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to
the CA.
On March 17, 1988, during the administration of President Corazon

Cojuangco Aquino, the Office of the Solicitor General moved to withdraw the
government’s case against Tadeco, et al. The CA dismissed the case, subject to the
PARC’s approval of Tadeco’s proposed stock distribution plan (SDP) in favor of its
farmworkers. [Under EO 229 and later RA 6657, Tadeco had the option of availing
stock distribution as an alternative modality to actual land transfer to the
farmworkers.] On August 23, 1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, herein
petitioner HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this
purpose, Tadeco conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares)
and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of
stock.
On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs)

complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the
proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP). On May 11, 1989, the SDOA
72 HACIENDA LUISITA V PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS
DOCTOR STUDENTS
was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This
attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis and
mechanics of HLI’s SDP, which was eventually approved by the PARC after a follow-
up referendum conducted by the DAR on October 14, 1989, in which 5,117 FWBs,
out of 5,315 who participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.
On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land
of the hacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657.
The DAR approved the application on August 14, 1996, subject to payment of three
percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s continued
compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.
On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000

shares of stocks of Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of
the converted area to the latter. Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300
hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which
used it in developing an industrial complex. From this area was carved out 2
parcels, for which 2 separate titles were issued in the name of LIPCO. Later, LIPCO
transferred these 2 parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in
payment of LIPCO’s PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to RCBC. LIPCO’s titles
were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart from the 500 hectares,
another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by
the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex.
Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to
HLI.
Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions reached the DAR
in the latter part of 2003. The first was filed by the Supervisory Group of HLI
(Supervisory Group), praying for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative,
its revocation. The second petition, praying for the revocation and nullification of
the SDOA and the distribution of the lands in the hacienda, was filed by Alyansa ng
mga Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA). The DAR then
constituted a Special Task Force (STF) to attend to issues relating to the SDP of
HLI. After investigation and evaluation, the STF found that HLI has not complied
with its obligations under RA 6657 despite the implementation of the SDP. On
December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01,
recalling/revoking the SDO plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject
lands be forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land
acquisition scheme of the CARP.
From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its motion

notwithstanding, HLI also filed a petition before the Supreme Court in light of what
it considers as the DAR’s hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita under CARP even before
PARC could rule or even read the motion for reconsideration. PARC would
eventually deny HLI’s motion for reconsideration via Resolution No. 2006-34-01
dated May 3, 2006.
DOCTOR STUDENTS
ISSUE:
Whether or not the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO
acquired be excluded from the coverage of the PARC resolution.
RULING:
Yes. There are two (2) requirements before one may be considered a
purchaser in good faith, namely: (1) that the purchaser buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and fair price for the property at
the time of such purchase or before he or she has notice of the claim of another.
It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC are––based on the above
requirements and with respect to the adverted transactions of the converted land in
question––purchasers in good faith for value entitled to the benefits arising from
such status.
First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares
of industrial land, there was no notice of any supposed defect in the title of its
transferor, Centennary, or that any other person has a right to or interest in such
property. In fact, at the time LIPCO acquired said parcels of land, only the following
annotations appeared on the TCT in the name of Centennary: the Secretary’s
Certificate in favor of Teresita Lopa, the Secretary’s Certificate in favor of Shintaro
Murai, and the conversion of the property from agricultural to industrial and
residential use.
The same is true with respect to RCBC. At the time it acquired portions of
Hacienda Luisita, only the following general annotations appeared on the TCTs of
LIPCO: the Deed of Restrictions, limiting its use solely as an industrial estate; the
Secretary’s Certificate in favor of Koji Komai and Kyosuke Hori; and the Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of RCBC to guarantee the payment of PhP 300 million.
It cannot be claimed that RCBC and LIPCO acted in bad faith in acquiring the
lots that were previously covered by the SDP. Good faith "consists in the
possessor’s belief that the person from whom he received it was the owner of the
same and could convey his title. Good faith requires a well-founded belief that the
person from whom title was received was himself the owner of the land, with the
right to convey it. There is good faith where there is an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage from another."150 It is the opposite of
fraud.
To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were
subjected to CARP coverage by means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR
conversion order was annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they acquired.
However, they are of the honest belief that the subject lots were validly converted
to commercial or industrial purposes and for which said lots were taken out of the
CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 and, hence, can be legally
DOCTOR STUDENTS
and validly acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows
conversion and disposition of agricultural lands previously covered by CARP land
acquisition "after the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the land ceases to
be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes." Moreover, DAR notified all the affected parties,
more particularly the FWBs, and gave them the opportunity to comment or oppose
the proposed conversion. DAR, after going through the necessary processes,
granted the conversion of 500 hectares of Hacienda Luisita pursuant to its primary
jurisdiction under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and its original exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform. The DAR conversion order became final and
executory after none of the FWBs interposed an appeal to the CA. In this factual
setting, RCBC and LIPCO purchased the lots in question on their honest and well-
founded belief that the previous registered owners could legally sell and convey the
lots though these were previously subject of CARP coverage. Ergo, RCBC and LIPCO
acted in good faith in acquiring the subject lots.
And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of Hacienda Luisita for
value. Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300 hectares of land from Centennary for the
amount of PhP 750 million pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998.151 On
the other hand, in a Deed of Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO
conveyed portions of Hacienda Luisita in favor of RCBC by way of dacion en pago to
pay for a loan of PhP 431,695,732.10.
As bona fide purchasers for value, both LIPCO and RCBC have acquired rights
which cannot just be disregarded by DAR, PARC or even by this Court.
DOCTOR STUDENTS
CMU V DARAB
G.R. NO. 100091, October 22, 1992
FACTS:
This case involves the complaint filed by the complainants against CMU. The
complainants are hereby calling themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and
Agricultural Laborers Organization. The complaint was filed before the Department
of Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants under the CARP.
Central Mindanao University (CMU), the petitioner herein, is an agricultural

educational institution owned and run by the State located in Musuan, Bukidnon
province.
From the beginning, the said school was the answer to the crying need for
training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of
Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school had a vision as to the
future development of that part of the country. By virtue of President Carlos P.
Garcia, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture, through the
issuance of Proclamation No. 476, it withdrawn the sale or settlement and reserved
the Mindanao Agricultural College as a site which would be the future campus of
what is now the CMU.
Under the terms and conditions of the contract, former employees would be
grouped with an existing selda of his choice and provided one hectare (ha.) for a
lowland rice project for one calendar year. The former employee would pay the land
rental participant’s fee of Php 1,000.00 per ha. but on a charge-to-crop basis. The
former employee would also be subject to the same prohibitions as those imposed
on the CMU employees. It was also expressly provided that no tenant-landlord exist
as a result of the agreement.
Because of the non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice,

corn and sugar cane project, it resulted to the loss of jobs due to the termination or
separation from the service and the alleged harassment by the school authorities,
all precipitated to the filing of the complaint.
On the basis of the aforementioned facts, the DARAB found that the private
respondens were not tenants and cannot be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the
same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 ha. of suitable, compact and
contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution
to qualified beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Department of Agrarian Reform was correct in segregating the
400 ha. of CMU.
76 CMU V DARAB | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

RULING:
No. The DARAB found that the complaints are not share tenants of lease
holders of CMU, yet it ordered the segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous
area of Four Hundred ha. more or less, from the CMU land reservation, and directed
the DAR Regional Director to implement such order of segregation. Having found
that the complainants in this agrarian dispute are not entitled to claim as
beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not share tenants or leaseholders of the
said property, its order for the segregation of 400 ha of the CMU land was without
legal authority.
Furthermore, the 400 ha. ordered segregated by the DARAB is not covered
by the CARP because, first, it is not alienable and disposable land of public domain;
second, the CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined
by Congress; third, it is a private land registered and titled in the name of its owner
which is CMU; and lastly, it is exempt from the coverage under Section 10 of RA
6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for
educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot
production centers.
77 CMU V DARAB | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

DAR V SUTTON
G.R. NO. 162070, October 19, 2005
FACTS:
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by the

respondents Delia T. Sutton, Ella T. Sutton-Soliman and Harry T. Sutton, which has
been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant
to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made
a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of
certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It
included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v.

Secretary of DAR, where the Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and
poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we
declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included
livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a
formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively
to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy,

Masbate, inspected respondents' land and found that it was devoted solely to
cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of

their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in
connection therewith. Petitioner ignored their request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which
provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the
coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O.
fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land
per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815
hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be
excluded from the operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him
to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz
Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.
78 DAR V SUTTON | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an
Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the
coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9,
petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents' land for grazing purposes, and
a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of
respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory
Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire

landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their
motion was denied. They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President
assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which
provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area
qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No.
9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands
excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order
of petitioner DAR. It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to
the Luz Farms case as the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a
certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the issue on the
constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the courts as
the sole arbiters of such issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared

DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987
Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program
of the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not livestock farms not actually utilized for livestock activities are
included from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
RULING:
No. In the case at bar, the court find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by
including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum
retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in
the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities
and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The
raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an
industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this
enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing
structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders,
mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for

feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deep wells, elevated water tanks,
pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have
been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has
exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

GELOS V CA & ALZONA

G.R. NO. 86186, May 8, 1992
FACTS:
On July 5, 1970, the petitioner entered into a contract with respondent as

the laborer of the latter at a stipulated daily wage of PHP 5.00. On September 4,
1973, respondent terminated the services of the petitioner and demanded that he
vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working on the land. Gelos went
to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform which granted his petition as a tenant. The
respondent filed for illegal detainer against Gelos.
The RTC (which has taken over the Court of Agrarian Relations) declared
Gelos as tenant. The CA reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gelos is a tenant.
HELD:
No. Gelos is not a tenant but a farm laborer. The contract has clearly
stipulated that they did not enter into a tenancy agreement but only a contract of
employment. The agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in dispute. This
intention is quite consistent with the undisputed fact that three days before the
agreement was conducted the former tenant of the land had executed an
instrument in which he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights to the private
respondent. It also clearly demonstrates that, contrary to the petitioner’s
contention, Alzona intended to cultivate the land himself instead of placing it again
under tenancy.
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GABRIEL V PANGILINAN
G.R. NO. L-27797, August 26, 1974
FACTS:
Herein petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga

against herein defendant alleging that she is the owner of a fishpond situated in
barrio Sta. Ursula, Betis, Pampanga. The said fish pond measured about 169,507
square mebers. Petitioner notified the defendant in a letter that she was to
terminate the contract and that upon the request of the defendant that he should
surrender possession of the fishpond, a demand which the defendant had ignored.
The defendant, moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case which properly pertains to the Court of
Agrarian Relations, as there exist an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship
between both parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is existing leasehold between the parties.
RULING:
The court held in the negative.
In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may
exist, the following requisites must concur:
1) That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

2) That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
members of his immediate farm household;
3) That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with
the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household;
4) That the land belongs to another; and
5) That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed
amount in money or in produce or in both.
In the immediate case, their tenancy agreement was cut in 1956 when he
ceased to work the fishpond personally as he became ill and incapacitated. R.A. No.
1199 provides that leasehold tenancy exists when a person, who either personally
or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household,
undertakes to cultivated a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a
single person together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging
to, or legally possessed by another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or
in produce or in both. A person, in order to be considered tenant, must himself and
with the aid available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. A
Person, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants;
and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation the land, ceases to
hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning
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of Section 5 and 8 of R.A. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the rights, privileges and
status of one.
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ZAMORAS V SU
G.R. NO. 85611, April 6, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner Zamoras was hired by the respondent Roque Su, Jr., in 1957 as
overseer of his coconut land in Dapitan City. Zamoras was charged with the task of
having the land titled in Su's name, and of assigning portions to be worked by
tenants, supervising the cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the land, the
harvesting of coconuts and selling of the copra. Su paid Zamoras a monthly salary
plus one-third of the proceeds of the sales of copra which normally occurred every
two months. Another one-third of the proceeds went to the tenants and the other
third to Su. This system of sharing was regularly observed up to September, 1981.
In May, 1981, Su informed Zamoras that he obtained a loan from the other
respondent, Anita Su Hortellano, and that he authorized her to harvest the
coconuts from his property "while the loan was outstanding". Su sent Zamoras a
letter informing him that he was being laid-off temporarily until Su could obtain a
loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines with which to pay Anita.
However, Zamoras was not allowed anymore to work as overseer of the plantation.
Without his knowledge and consent, Hortellano harvested the coconuts without
giving him his one-third share of the copra sales.
Consequently, Zamoras filed before the Ministry of Labor and Employment a

complaint against the respondents for illegal termination and breach of contract
with damages.
When the case reached the NLRC, it rendered a decision reversing the Labor
Arbiter. It held that "the right to control test used in determining the existence of
an employer-employee relationship is unavailing in the instant case and that what
exists between the parties is a landlord-tenant relationship.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was a tenant of the private respondents?
RULING:
No, the petitioner was not a tenant but an employee of the private
respondents.
The Court held that the NLRC's conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship
existed between Su and Zamoras is not supported by the evidence which shows
that Zamoras was hired by Su not as a tenant but as overseer of his coconut
plantation. As overseer, Zamoras hired the tenants and assigned their respective
portions which they cultivated under Zamoras' supervision. The tenants dealt
directly with Zamoras and received their one-third share of the copra produce from
84 ZAMORAS V SU | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
him. The evidence also shows that Zamoras, aside from doing administrative work
for Su, regularly managed the sale of copra processed by the tenants. There is no
evidence that Zamoras cultivated any portion of Su's land personally or with the aid
of his immediate farm household. In fact, the respondents never raised the issue of
tenancy in their answer.
The Court laid down the following essential requisites of a tenancy

relationship; namely: (1) the parties are the landholder and the tenant; (2) the
subject is the agricultural holding; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant;
and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between landlord and tenant.
In this case, the element of personal cultivation of the land, or with the aid of
his farm household, essential in establishing a landlord-tenant or a lessor-lessee
relationship, is absent in the relationship between Su and Zamoras, for Zamoras did
not cultivate any part of Su's plantation either by himself or with the help of his
household. On the other hand, the following circumstances are indicative of an
employer-employee relationship between them:
1. Zamoras was selected and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut

plantation;
2. His duties were specified by Su;
3. Su controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. He determined

to whom Zamoras should sell the copra produced from the plantation; and
4. Su paid Zamoras a salary per month plus one-third of the copra sales
every two months as compensation for managing the plantation.
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CASTILLO V CA
G.R. NO. 98028 January 27, 1992
FACTS:
Allegedly, respondent is the agricultural tenant of the petitioner in the latter's

parcel of land consisting of 9,920 square meters with fruit-bearing trees. Sometime
in April 1985, the petitioner requested the respondent to allow him to construct a
resthouse in said land, and as a token of goodwill, the respondent agreed, which
agreement is embodied in a "Kasunduan" between them; that in violation of said
agreement, the petitioner started to cut fruit-bearing trees on the land in question
and filled with adobe stones the area devoted by the private respondent to the
planting of vegetables.
The complaint asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to

enjoin the petitioner from further cutting fruit-bearing trees and from committing
further acts of dispossession against the private respondent, which was granted.
Petitioner contends that respondent is not his agricultural tenant, who is

merely a ―magisisiga‖ of the landholding in question; that he did not ask permission
from the private respondent to construct a rest house on subject land; that he was
merely exercising his right of ownership when he cut certain trees in the subject
premises; that when the barangay captain failed to settle the conflict and the
matter was referred to the MAR-BALA (Ministry of Agrarian Reform-Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance) Office, Atty. Benjamin Yambao of the MAR (Ministry of
Agrarian Reform) prepared the "Kasunduan" attached to the respondent's
complaint, but when he (petitioner) said that he had some misgivings about some
words therein, Atty. Yambao assured him that he need not worry because the
respondent could not be a "kasamang magsasaka" of his mango land because there
is nothing to cultivate or till in said land, but he still corrected the last part of par. 4
of said "Kasunduan" by making it read "sa kanilang matiwasay na kaugnayan"
before signing the same.
Trial court rendered judgment declaring that no tenancy relationship exists

between the petitioner and the private respondent.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties?
RULING:
No, there is no tenancy relationship between the parties.
Under the law, the essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3)
86 CASTILLO v CA | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
the purpose is agricultural production; (4) there is consideration which consist of
sharing the harvest; (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on the land and (6)
there is personal cultivation by him.
The element of personal cultivation is absent. In agrarian cases, all that is

required is mere substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact
which went beyond the minimum evidentiary support demanded by law, that is
supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot be reversed
by the appellate tribunal.
The Court ruled that there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to

establish that the element of consent is present. But even assuming arguendo that
the element of consent is present, absent the element of personal cultivation, one
cannot be a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement of the
parties.
Well-settled is the rule that all the requisites must concur in order to create a
tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites
do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de
jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
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BERNAS V CA
G.R. NO. 85041, August 5, 1993
FACTS:
Natividad Bito-on Deita is the owner of lot with a total area of 5,831 square
meters. Natividad entrusted the lots by way of "dugo" to her brother, Benigno Bito-
on. Prior to April 1978, these agricultural lots had been leased by one Anselmo
Billones but following the latter's death and consequent termination of the lease,
petitioner Graciano Bernas took over and worked on the land. Benigno and Bernas
worked out a production-sharing arrangement whereby the first provided for all the
expenses and the second worked the land, and after harvest, the two (2) deducted
said expenses and divided the balance of the harvest between the two of them. The
owner, Natividad, played no part in this arrangement as she was not privy to the
same.
In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister Natividad. When
Natividad, and her husband sought to take over possession of the lots, Bernas
refused to relinquish, claiming that he was an agricultural leasehold lessee
instituted on the land, by Benigno and, as such, he is entitled to security of tenure
under the law.
Natividad filed an action with the Regional Trial Court for Recovery of
Possession, Ownership and Injunction with Damages and the trial court held in
favor of the Bernas and dismissed the complaint, ruling that Bernas was indeed a
leasehold tenant under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1199 and an agricultural
leasehold lessee under Republic Act No. 3844, having been so instituted by the
usufructuary of the land (Benigno). As such, according to the trial court, his tenurial
rights cannot be disturbed save for causes provided by law.
Aggrieved, Natividad appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the

"dugo" arrangement between her and her brother Benigno was not in the nature of
a usufruct, but actually a contract of commodatum. This being the case, Benigno,
the bailee in the commodatum, could neither lend nor lease the properties loaned,
to a third person, as such relationship (of bailor-bailee) is one of personal
character. This time, her contentions were sustained, with the respondent appellate
court, reversing the trial court's decision, ruling that having only derived his rights
from the usufructuary/bailee, Bernas had no better right to the property than the
latter who admittedly was entrusted with the property only for a limited period.
Further, according to the appellate court, there being no privity of contract between
Natividad and Bernas, the former cannot be expected to be bound by or to honor
the relationship or tie between Benigno and the latter (Bernas).
Hence, this petition by Bernas.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the agricultural leasehold established by Benigno Bito-on in favor of
Graciano Bernas is binding upon the owner of the land, Natividad Bito-on, who
disclaims any knowledge of, or participation in the same.
RULING:
Yes, the agricultural leasehold established by Benigno Bito-on in favor of

Graciano Bernas is binding upon the owner of the land.
There is no dispute, as it is admitted by the parties in this case, that Benigno

Bito-on was granted possession of the property in question by reason of the
liberality of his sister, Natividad. In short, Benigno was the LEGAL POSSESSOR of
the property and, as such, he had the authority and capacity to enter into an
agricultural leasehold relation with Bernas. Consequently, there is no need to dwell
on the contentions of the private respondent that, her brother Benigno was not a
usufructuary of the property but actually a bailee in commodatum. Whatever was
the true nature of his designation, he (Benigno) was the LEGAL POSSESSOR of the
property and the law expressly grants him, as legal possessor, authority and
capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he legally
possessed.
Even if there was a lack of authorization (from Natividad) for Benigno to

install a tenant, it still follows that Benigno as legal possessor of the landholding,
could install an agricultural lessee on the landholding. For, as defined in Section
166 (3) of the Code, an agricultural lessor is a natural or juridical person who,
either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor lets or grants to
another the cultivation and use of his land for a price certain. Nothing in said
section requires that the civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor should
have the prior authorization of the landowner in order to let or grant to another the
cultivation or use of the landholding.
In turn, having been instituted by Benigno as an agricultural leasehold

lessee, Bernas is vested by law with the rights accruing thereto, including the right
to continue working the landholding until such lease is legally extinguished, and the
right to be protected in his tenure i. e., not to be ejected from the land, save for
the causes provided by law, and as appropriately determined by the courts. In this
connection, there is no clear indication in the record that the circumstances or
conditions envisioned in Section 36 of Republic Act. No. 3844, as amended, for
termination of the agricultural lease relation, have supervened, and therefore
Bernas' right to the possession of the property remains indisputable.
89 BERNAS V CA | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

HILARIO V IAC & BALTAZAR

G.R. NO. 70736, March 16, 1987
FACTS:
Respondent Salvador Baltazar was working on the land pursuant to a

contract executed between him and Socorro Balagtas in 1979, covering a two-
hectare parcel of land. As a result, he erected his house and planted ―halaman‖ in
the portion of the land he cultivates.
After the death of Socorro, the landownership was transferred to her

daughter Corazon Pengzon. It was only in 1980 that he came to know that the
portion of the land (4,000 sqm) is already owned by the petitioner Spouses Hilario.
Subsequently, petitioner spouses Hilario started cultivating a 4,000-sq m portion of
the property and enjoined Baltazar from entering the same.
Hence, Baltazar filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR),
alleging that he had been in continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of
land.
On the other hand, petitioner Spouses claimed that they acquired the
landholding from PNB after it had been foreclosed by virtue of a deed of sale
executed between Bonifacio Hilario and the PNB.
The former owner, Corazon Pengzon, testified that she owned only a total of
1,740 sqm. The other lots were owned by Ocampo and Mendoza.
She further testified that in 1964 at the time of the partition of the property,
she declared the property for classification purposes as "bakuran", a residential lot,
and had no knowledge that there were other things planted in it except bananas
and pomelos.
When Soccoro died, no new contract was executed, but Baltazar insisted that
the old contract was continued between Corazon Pengzon and himself. On the other
hand, Corazon Pengzon testified that she only owned 2 parcels of land which does
not include the portion being cultivated by Baltazar
Corazon Pengzon further explained that she did not get any share from the produce
of the land and she would not have accepted it knowing that she did not own the
property anymore.
The Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in determining whether or not

respondent Baltazar is the tenant of the petitioners ruled that the land in question
is not an agricultural landholding but plain "bakuran," hence, Baltazar is not a
tenant on the land, ordering his ejectment therefrom.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Baltazar is a tenant in the landholding in question.
90 HILARIO V IAC & BALTAZAR | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
RULING:
As found by the court, Corazon Pengson further explained that she did not
receive any share from the produce of the land from 1964 up to the filing of the
case and she would not have accepted any share from the produce of the land
because she knew pretty well that she was no longer the owner of the lot since
1974 when it was foreclosed by the bank and later on purchased by the spouses
Hilarios.
Noting the findings of the CAR, The Court noted that tenancy relationship is
indivisible. The 2 hec. Land subject of Baltazar’s alleged contract with Socorro
ended when it was partitioned into 7 lots. As such, he cannot claim tenancy of the
4,000 sqm under the old contract.
With this, it is clear that Corazon Pengson did not give her consent to Baltazar to
work on her land consisting of only 1,740 sqm.
Citing Sps. Tiongson vs CA
The Court said that ―tenancy relationship can only be created with the
consent of the true and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by
imposition or usurpation. So the mere cultivation of the land by usurper
cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy
the protection of security of tenure of the law.‖
Also citing Tuazon vs. CA
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged

tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship.
The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed,
and, as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with
and are not contrary to law, are even more important.
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit:
(1) The parties are the landholder and tenant;
(2) The subject is agricultural land;
(3) The purpose is agricultural production; and
(4) There is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.
In this case, since the land is a residential land pursuant to: (1) deed of sale;
(2) declaration of real property; (3) tax declaration. No tenancy relationship can
exist. The mere fact that some corn was planted does not convert the residential
land into agricultural land.
All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship

between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites do not make the
alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contra-distinguished from a de jure tenant. This
is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is
not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws.
Since there is no tenancy relationship established, plaintiff Baltazar is

declared not to be a tenant on the landholding described in the complaint and he is
ordered ejected therefrom.
ENDAYA & TRINIDAD V CA

G.R. NO. 88113, October 23, 1992
FACTS:
The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a piece of
agricultural land consisting of 20,200 square meters situated at San Pioquinto,
Malvar,Batangas, devoted to rice and corn. As far back as 1934, private
respondent Fideli has been cultivating this land as a tenant of the
spouses San Diego under a fifty-fifty (50- 50) sharing agreement. This fact,
petitioners do not dispute.
A lease contract was executed between the Spouses San Diego and one
Regino Cassanova for a period of four years from May 1974 up to May 1978. The
lease contract obliged Cassanova to pay P400.00 per hectare per annum and gave
him the authority to oversee the planting of crops on the land. Private respondent
signed this lease contract as one of two witnesses.
The lease contract was subsequently renewed to last until May

1980 but the rental was raised to P600.00. Again, private respondent signed the
contract as witness.
On January 6, 1980, the Spouses San Diego sold the land to

petitioners for the sum of P26,000.00. The sale was registered with
the Register of Deeds of Batangas and a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was
duly issued on January 7, 1981. Private respondent continued to farm
the land although petitioners claim that private respondent was told
immediately after the sale to vacate the land. Due to petitioners’ persistent demand
for private respondent to vacate the land, private respondent filed in April
1985 a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas
praying that he be declared the agricultural tenant of petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the agricultural leasehold relationship between original owner and
lessee (Pedro Fideli) was already extinguished by virtue of change of ownership
transaction, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession.
RULING:
No, These contentions are without merit. R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended
by R.A. No. 6839 (1971), which is the relevant law governing the
events at hand, abolished share tenancy throughout the Philippines from 1971
and established the agricultural leasehold system by operation of law. Section 7
of the said law gave agricultural lessees security of tenure by providing the
following: "The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the
agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the land holding until
such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom
93 ENDAYA & TRINIDAD V CA | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided." The fact that the land
owner entered into a civil lease contract over the subject landholding and gave the
lessee the authority to oversee the farming of the land, as was done in this case, is
not among the causes provided by law for the extinguishment of the agricultural
leasehold relation.
[Sec. 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. — The

agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural
lessor; (2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written
notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or (3) Absence of the
persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee in the event of death or
permanent incapacity of the lessee." ] Hence, transactions involving the agricultural
land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership,
e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession, such as lease, will not terminate the
rights of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by the law by making such
rights enforceable against the transferee or the landowner’s successor in interest.
The Court, however, notes from the records of the case that private
respondent has unilaterally decided to pay only 25% of the net harvests to
petitioners. Since the agreement of private respondent with the Spouses San Diego,
the original owners, was for a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing of the net produce of the
land, the same sharing agreement should be maintained between petitioners and
private respondent, without prejudice to a renegotiation of the terms of the
leasehold agreement.
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CABALLES V DAR
G.R. NO. 78214, December 5, 1988
FACTS:
The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60)
square meters was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the latter
being the petitioner herein, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Andrea Alicaba Millenes. This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a
total area of about 500 square meters. he remainder of Lot No. 3109-C was
subseconsequently sold to the said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other
members of the Millenes family, thus consolidating ownership over the entire
property in favor of the petitioner. In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes
spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion
of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental to the owner, Andrea Millenes.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and
Yolanda Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close
to his house and pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern
portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land
occupied by his house, but his offer was not accepted. Later, the new owners asked
Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they needed the property. But Abajon
refused to leave. All the efforts exerted by the landowners to oust Abajon from the
landholding were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge. he landowner,
Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately after she
reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without
her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants
on the property. A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed against Abajon.
The trial court ordered the referral of the case to the Regional Office No. VII of the
then MAR for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties.
MAR held that the criminal case was not proper for hearing on the bases that the
accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining witness, which
is devoted to bananas.
The petitioner appealed to the then MAR, now the respondent DAR. The
respondent DAR reversed the previous certification declaring the criminal case as
proper for trial as the land involved is a residential lot consisting of only 60 square
meters whereon the house of the accused is constructed and within the industrial
zone of the town.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant.
RULING:
No, private respondent is not an agricultural tenant. The Court held

mentioned the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship 1. The parties are the
landowner and the tenant; 2. The subject is agricultural land; 3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production; 5. There is personal cultivation; and 6.
95 CABALLES V DAR | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
There is sharing of harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to create a
tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an
occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure
tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure
tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
In this case, private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was

allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and
to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the
said portion. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the
arrangement, it is clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the
former owner, Andrea Millenes.
96 CABALLES V DAR | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

TANPINGCO V IAC
G.R. NO. 76225, March 31, 1992
FACTS:
A complaint for payment of disturbance compensation with damages was

filed by petitioner Espiridion Tanpingco against respondent Benedicto Horca, Sr.
with the RTC of Palo, Leyte.
The respondent informed the petitioner to desist from working on the land,
having donated the same last February 3, 1985.
Petitioner is willing to accept payment of disturbance compensation in an

amount computed in accordance with law and in the alternative to remain as
tenant-lessee of the subject Riceland.
During pre-trial, respondent filed instead a Motion to Dismiss alleging

principally that the complaint states no cause of action because the respondent is
not the real party-in-interest having already donated the subject land to the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, Region VIII, as a school site of the
Buenavista Barangay High School; and that the donation not having in any way
benefited the respondent, no disturbance compensation is due the petitioner since
under Section 36 (1) of the Agrarian Reform Code as amended, disturbance
compensation holds true only in cases wherein the lessor-owner derives financial
benefits from the conversion of the agricultural land into non-agricultural purposes.
The trial court granted the respondent's Motion to Dismiss and denied the
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The Intermediate Appellate Court finding no
merit in the instant appeal, the same is hereby DISMISSED with costs taxed against
the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of
disturbance compensation because the private respondent is not the real party-in-
interest.
RULING:
Yes, we agree with the contentions of the private respondent. The petitioner
should have impleaded the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the party-
defendant for as stated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals,
a donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title
over the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the
donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
Under New Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership
therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to
the land. However, the new owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Section 7
97 TANPINGCO V IAC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
of R.A. No. 3844, gives the agricultural lessee the right to work on the land holding
once the leasehold relationship is established. It also entitles him to security of
tenure on his landholding. As elucidated in the case of Bernardo v. Court of
Appeals, security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they
value as life itself and deprivation of their land holdings is tantamount to
deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same
Act, the law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not extinguished by the
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the land holding. The donation of
the land did not terminate the tenancy relationship. However, the donation itself is
valid.
Considering that the tenant in the case at bar is willing to accept payment of
disturbance compensation in exchange for his right to cultivate the land holding in
question, the real issue is who should pay the compensation. We rule that the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner cannot oust the
petitioner from the subject Riceland and build a public high school thereon until
after there is payment of the disturbance compensation.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the trial court
correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation
because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. And having arrived
at this conclusion, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon the other errors
assigned by the petitioner for as stated in Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of
Appeals (190 SCRA 485 [1990]), a person who was not impleaded in the complaint
could not be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected
by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy then of the petitioner is to
claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local
or national, is in a position to pay for it.
98 TANPINGCO V IAC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

NISNISAN V CA
G.R. NO. 126425, August 12, 1998
FACTS:
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a parcel of land.
Petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan, son of Gavino Nisnisan, has been cultivating one
hectare of the aforesaid land since 1961. Gavino Nisnisan and petitioner Policarpio
Nisnisan entered into a leasehold tenancy contract 3 which stipulates a sharing
arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest.
In 1978, Gavino Nisnisan sold two hectares of their land to private

respondents-spouses Wenceslao Mancera and Pacita H. Mancera. As a result of the
sale, petitioners-spouses were ousted from their landholding. Hence, petitioners-
spouses instituted an action for reinstatement of tenancy holding against private
respondent spouses Wenceslao and Pacita Mancera before the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) in Davao City.
Gavino Nisnisan demanded from the Mancera spouses to repurchase the said
land but the latter refused. Hence, on November 3, 1986, spouses Gavino and
Florencia Nisnisan, together with the petitioners-spouses Policarpio and Erlinda
Nisnisan, filed a complaint. The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint ruling that the petitioners-spouses' allegation of tenancy is repudiated by
the affidavit executed by Gavino Nisnisan to the effect that the subject land is not
tenanted. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners Spouses Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan voluntarily
surrendered their tenancy holding
RULING:
No. While there are annotations in Gavino Nisnisan's certificate of title. In the
case of Cuaño vs. Court of Appeals, the court held that that the findings of or
certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy
relationship between the contending parties are merely preliminary or provisional
and not binding upon the courts. Moreover, petitioners-spouses have sufficiently
shown that they are the tenants of the spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan as
evidenced by a document entitled "Panagsabutan Sa Abang Sa Yuta" executed by
Gavino Nisnisan and Policarpio Nisnisan in 1976.
The document evidences the leasehold tenancy relationship between Gavino

Nisnisan and petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan. It clearly shows that the subject land is
agricultural; that petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan is obligated to cultivate the same by
planting rice thereon; and, that there is sharing of the harvests between the said
parties. It is clear that essential elements of tenancy relationship 10 are present in
this case, namely:
99 NISNISAN V CA | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS
1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant

2. the subject matter is agricultural land
3. there is consent
4. the purpose is agricultural production
5. there is personal cultivation by the tenants
6. there is sharing of harvests between parties
Furthermore, this leasehold tenancy contract cannot be defeated by the

aforementioned affidavit of non-tenancy executed by Gavino Nisnisan, which is
obviously self-serving. Private respondents likewise impliedly admitted in their
answer to the complaint that petitioners-spouses are tenants when they alleged
that petitioners-spouses have voluntarily surrendered the subject landholding.
On the issue of voluntary surrender of the tenancy holding, the SC held that private
respondents failed to present any evidence to show that petitioners-spouses
surrendered their landholding voluntarily after the private respondents purchased
the subject property. Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-
spouses are agricultural lessees and are therefore entitled to security of tenure as
mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act 3844:
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of

Period, etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract
nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholdin
100 NISNISAN V CA | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

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2021

STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS

AGRARIAN LAW & SOCIAL

Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of SSS on January 24, 1980 and

Yes, petitioner is entitled to the survivors’ pension.

By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective

3 DYCAICO V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

MANILA GOLF V IAC

1) Payment of wages (paid by the golf players themselves and not by

4 MANILA GOLF V IAC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

No. Petitioner's regulations, does not circumscribe the actions or judgment of

5 MANILA GOLF V IAC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ASIA PRO

Respondent Asiapro is a cooperative composed of owners-members. Its

The owners-members registered with SSS as self-employed members. The

Yes, there is employer-employee relationship between the cooperative and

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner which was subsequently

7 SIGNEY V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

The Court held in the negative.

8 SIGNEY V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

This is a case of petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeal’s

Co filed a motion to quash the information ascertaining that the alleged

No. The existence of an employer-employee relationship is the premise of the

9 SIGNEY V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

INVESTMENT PLANNING V SSS

Investment Planning Corporation of the Philippines, the petitioner, is a

On August 27, 1960, the petitioner applied to Social Security Commission,

These representatives are in reality commission agents, and of the three

Considering the similarity between the definition of "employee" in the Federal

11 INVESTMENT PLANNING V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

SSS V CA & COSMO

Repomanta and Moralde voluntarily executed with Mafinco formal peddling

13 SSS V CA & COSMO | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

On the other hand, an independent contractor is "one who exercise

Among the factors to be considered are whether the contractor is carrying on

14 SSS V CA & COSMO | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

SSS V CA & QUALITY TOBACCO

QTC, formerly U.S. Tobacco Corporation, is a firm engaged in the

The contract with CARREON was terminated by QTC on December 18,1972.

Cognizant of the striking similarities obtaining in the case before it and

Private respondent likewise maintains that the decision was correctly

Private respondent's contention is untenable.

SSS V CA & MANILA JOCKEY CLUB

The absence of control that may be exercised on the part of respondents

John Colcol, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.,

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise

21 BARTOLOME V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

22 BARTOLOME V SSS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor,

Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to

On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-

Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a Letter/Petition dated 6

(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;

(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall

Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of

24 RABOR V CSC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

SC’s conclusion is that the doctrine ofCenashould be and is hereby modified

25 RABOR V CSC | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against

27 BERONILLA V GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

November 4, 1988 | petitioner was appointed Acting President of Eulogio

The petitioner would be deprived by the reduction of 3 ½ months (composing

28 BERONILLA V GSIS | STMS 2ND YEAR JURIS DOCTOR STUDENTS

The court does not agree.