Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.

Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.

Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover
moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00
exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a

defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of
action.

After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair
with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that
defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to
prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried
to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët

Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the
issues involved are purely of law.

The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and
sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24
years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla
Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in
connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same
town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative
of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime
in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to
teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita
used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with each other the contents
of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they
had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of
Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going
to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant
and Lolita continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their
residence at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared
from said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thin g and found
that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of
paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately
4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it
reads:

Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month
and we will have a date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.

Reply

Love

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but
up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.

The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.

There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that
defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby cau sing
plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. But in
spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on
between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of
plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their
complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that defendant
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the
absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who
deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and
sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the
defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on
their part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will
bring to both of them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried
woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."

We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win
Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an
ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love
with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray th e rosary. Because of the frequency
of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral
relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with
each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac
where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs
reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against
defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs
with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can
be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through
a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an
injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby

sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to

review and set aside the Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is
the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry
on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed

with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she
is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married
after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then
visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their
approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live
with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a
week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change;
he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a
day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and
asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petition er is already married to someone
living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner
to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other
relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal

circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the
allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative
Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents
nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop
coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his
money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the
barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and
unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and
compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and
P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,

Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic)
of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to
the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceu m Northwestern,

Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,

Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a
(sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the
plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on
16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus
ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered

in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a)
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of
loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petition er,
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent,
d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered
by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture
and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court
and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the
evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent
Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that
she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few
days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times
and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August
20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them
of their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs
Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of
plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion,
defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended
to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because
plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his
 proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were
in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City,
they continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However, in the
early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet
while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the
morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day.
As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but
defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued
to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to
a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home
to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to
the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother,
and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to
defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that
he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City,
although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that
defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors
for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and
chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals
which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the
trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in
ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged

decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the
trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who
was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose
morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate
experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described
by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive
promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the
lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so
the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for
otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
 defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in
the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's
pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the
restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to
plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at
(sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic)
a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when
he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter
(pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in
Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship
between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to
defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not
only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of
the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first
proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why
plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted
defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for
Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod
City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common -law wife in Bacolod City.
In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then,
that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and
promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order
to satisfy his lust on her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-

appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise
to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep
said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-
in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of
appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and
public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to
our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the
hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in
one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
 made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for
the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court
ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March
1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code
applies to the case at bar. 13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not
committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has
not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never
maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions
and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with
such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, h e is not familiar with
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry,
the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem
upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take
four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that
he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life"
is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the
Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner
claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the
private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed
his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would
not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the
petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they
subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in

support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the
credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the ru le in this jurisdiction that appellate courts
will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court
having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of
substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the
case.
 Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court
to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower
court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina
vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica
v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v.
Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) Wh en the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10)
The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar
v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above
quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the
Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry

is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse
by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has
 led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in
many of the American states.19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to

another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces
the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age.
Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and
though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she
and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or

intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil
law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is
 much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious
acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has
become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and
so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof
that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however,
that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent
and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered
her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but
because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example
earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished
under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a
breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus,
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the
woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of

seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger
than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and
as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then
 a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found
that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible
recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We
were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition
and conclusion were made in the said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth
in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who
had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more
than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse
of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded
(U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some

sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by
the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which
are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which
result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to th e
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,

persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a
mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly, it is not seduction where the willingness arises

out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the
commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of
the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which
a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur.
662)
 xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded
to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment
of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant
did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made
under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing
the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who
recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there
had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due
to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise
to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that
there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages
will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for
the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,

notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction,
not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But
when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of
age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
 But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the
action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit
as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the
act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect
that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent,
the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto;
hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The
latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury
or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a
mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25,
1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can
give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance.
(TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to
accept a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear
that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on
account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as
perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he
was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love
and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile
and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her
to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina
who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their
women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant
disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty an d good faith in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually
submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after
all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means
"in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where
his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue
influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally
rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be
no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40
Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not
be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and
the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse
upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant

petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

# Footnotes

1 Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, 53-62. Per Associate Justice Alicia V.

Sempio-Diy, concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and
Jaime M. Lantin.

2 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 20-22.

3 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 23-24.

4 Annex "C", Id.; Id., 25.

5 Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 26-33. Per Judge Antonio M. Belen.

6 Id., 33.

7 Rollo, 31-33.

8 Rollo, 54-55.

9 Exhibit "E" of Petition; Rollo, 34-50.

10 Annex "G", Id.; Id.; 53-62.

11 Rollo, 58-59.

12 Rollo, 61.

13 Id., 11.

14 In support thereof, he cites Despi vs. Aliosco, [CA] 64 O.G.; Wassmer

vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 [1964]; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109
Phil. 629 [1960]; and Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].

15 People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA
465 [1979]; People vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503 [1979]; People vs.
Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984];
People vs. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985]; People vs. Sanchez, 199 SCRA
414 [1991]; and People vs. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 [1991].

16 191 SCRA 218 [1990], footnote omitted; see also, Remalante vs. Tibe,
158 SCRA 138 [1988].

17 Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; Estopa vs.
Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].

18 58 Phil. 866 [1933].

19 Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, 14 May 1949, 2352.

20 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978].

21 Report of the Code Commission, 39-40. This passage is quoted,
except for the last paragraph, in Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 18 SCRA
994, 996-997 [1966]; the Article 23 referred to is now Article 21.

22 Report of the Code Commission, 161-162.

23 TOLENTINO, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil

Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 72.

24. Rollo, 61.

25. Supra.

26. Supra.

27 At pages 997-999.

28 Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, vol. I, Eleventh ed., (1984), 91-
92.

29 Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,

vol. 1, 1985 ed., 76-77, omitting footnotes.

30 7 Phil. 156 [1906].

31 Article 21.

32 Supra.

33 Rollo, 16.

34 Id., 16-17.

35 Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004.

36 37 Am Jur 2d, 401, omitting citations.

37 11 SCRA 158 [1964]; see also, Liguez vs. Court of Appeals 102 Phil.
577 [1975].
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,

vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel
Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November
2001 reversing the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
104, as well as the Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the
human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein)
Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that
at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at
the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart,
who then approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s
penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu
Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of
course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits
which was the latter’s present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their
picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr.
Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at
the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by
petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary
thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who
were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka
nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he
was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however,
completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while
he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached
and asked him to step out of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of
the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos
actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17

Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not
under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was
the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions
included organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated
an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly. 20 The guest list was limited
to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel employees
and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr.
Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the
party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to
the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes
with the group of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest
and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart,
Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. 25 Ms. Lim then
requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. 26 Mr. Reyes,
however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said th at Mr. Reyes
did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with
a Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that Captain Batung and Mr.
Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e.,
for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.29 Still, Mr.
Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to
speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30 However,
as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait. 31 When Mr.
Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo,
hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang
ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then turned around
trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he
began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on
her.33 1awphi1.nét

Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also
gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the
party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits
intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the
penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr.
Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. 36 All the while,
she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking
to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38 She
ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that
she invited him.40
 After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more
credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave
the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being
thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:

Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr.
Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for
attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some
right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim
because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew
that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and
took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko
Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found
more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave
in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:

In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not
finish his food and to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act
which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate
the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21,
New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not
prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a
formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner
contrary to morals or good customs.43

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching
several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and
was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should
have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:

Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by
appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told
appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as the celebrant only
wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach
appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs.
Filart’s invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee
Filart is equally liable.
 ...

The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere
rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human
dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who
violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were attended by
malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence.
It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong,
a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature
of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44

Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr.
Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount
of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s fees in the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply
discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered." 46

Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the
Court of Appeals seriously erred in –

I.

… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING

THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER

II.

… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD
NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S
INVITATION"

III.

… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS

REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION
OF AMAY BISAYA

IV.

… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF

HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
 V.

… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT’S

BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed
the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process)
as he was a "gate-crasher."

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed
in law as injury" 47 ) refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntari ly exposed
himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by petitioners,
however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in
order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.

Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking
Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the
celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil C ode.
Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her
employer, is solidarily liable with her.

As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable
conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without
choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule
is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising
errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. 52 The lower court
ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she
talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms.
Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to
finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both
courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr.
Reyes to the party.

The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?

From an in-depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s
findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.

We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-only,

thrown for the hotel’s former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who
was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear into the crowd
as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the
organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not
yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the
celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the
"gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an
otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her
former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly
reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only
his close friends and some of the hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden
rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer
any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and
intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed
his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough
for him to kiss:

Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at
the buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?

A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.

Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she
shouted?

A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."

Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?

...

A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes
and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him
from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years
wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes
that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the
lower court was correct in observing that –

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the
latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request
was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to
cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have
made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .

Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to
take him out.56

Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is
unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes,
however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses – Danny
Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who
invited him to the party.57

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which
he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21
of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its
liability springs from that of its employee.58

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse
of rights,59 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible." 60 The
object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. 61 These
standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure.
Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is
violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article
20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law 64 which does not obtain herein as
Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other
hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1)
There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.66
 A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained
of must be intentional.68

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that
Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other
personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer
for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms.
Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr.
Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign
businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say
that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it
has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was
likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put
our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally
approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr.
Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect
of such dignity." 70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing
Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from
Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all,
Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount
to bad faith.

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim
and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages 72 especially for the reason
stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held –

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s
lowly station in life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such
a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under
consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34).
And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert further commission of
such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with
the very facts of the case and the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at
the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host
of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer
(MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen
Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an
awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines." 74 During his direct
examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income 75 and nowhere did he
say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the
social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion
reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which
Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within
the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko
Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26
November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26
April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO, ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Now Dusit Hotel Nikko.

2 Penned by Associate
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Justices Teodoro P.
Regino and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador concurring (Rollo, pp. 48-57).

3 Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.

4 Penned by Associate
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Justices Teodoro P.
Regino and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador concurring (Rollo, pp. 59-60).

5 TSN, 08 March 1995, p. 8.

6 Id. at 10.

7 Ibid.

8 Id. 11.

9 Id. at 13.

10 Id. at 13 & 16.

11 COMPLAINT, RTC Record, p. 2.

12 Supra, note 5 at 17.

13 Supra, note 11.

14 Ibid.

15 Id. at 2-3.

16 Id. at 3.

17 Ibid.

18 TSN, 27 July 1996, p. 9.

19 Id. at 10.

20 Id. at 12-13, 15.

21 Id. at 15-17, 25.

22 Id. at 25.

23 Id. at 27.

24 Ibid.

25 Id. at 31-32.

26 Id. at 33.

27 Id. at 37.

28 Id. at 38-39.

29 Ibid.

30 Petition, Rollo, p. 18.

31 Supra, note 29 at 41-42.

32 Id. at 42-43.

33 Answer, pp. 32-33, RTC Records; RTC Decision, Rollo p. 62; TSN, 27 July
1995, pp. 43-46.

34 TSN, 05 November 1997, p. 15.

35 Violeta Filart’s "ANSWER WITH COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM," RTC
Records, p. 21.

36 Supra, note 34 at 17.

37 Or "Captain Batung" from the testimony of Ruby Lim; Id. at 18.

38 Id. at 19.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Dismissed aswell were the counterclaims filed by then defendants Nikko Hotel
Manila Garden, Ruby Lim and Violeta Filart, RTC Records, p. 347.
42 RTC Records, p. 342.

43 CA Rollo, p. 205.

44 Id. at 208-209.

45 Id. at 238.

46 CA Rollo, pp. 239-240.

47 E.L. Pineda, Torts and Damages Annotated, p. 52 (2004 ed).

48 Garciano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96126, 10 August 1992, 212 SCRA
436, 440.

49 cf.
Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
74553, 08 June 1989, 174 SCRA 80, 88.

50 Sangco, Torts and Damages Vol.1 , pp. 83-84.

51 Floro v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, 02 June 1995, 244 SCRA 713, 720.

52 Ibid.

53 TSN, 22 May 1999, p. 11.

54 Admitted by Mr. Reyes, see TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 10.

55 TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 20.

56 RTC Records, pp. 340-341.

57 Danny Rodinas and Pepito Guerrero (TSN, 18 May 1995), Alexander Silva
(TSN, 21 June 1995).

58 Article 2180, Civil Code.

59 Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, 25
August 1989, 176 SCRA 779, 783.

60 AlbensonEnterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, 11 January

1993, 217 SCRA 16, 25.

61 Supra, note 61 at 783-784.

62 Ibid.

63 Supra, note 62.

64 Art.
20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. See Globe
Mackay, supra, note 61 at 784.

65 Civil Code.

66 Supra, note 62 at 25.

67 Civil Code.

68 Ibid.

69 "COMMENT," Rollo, p. 302; "MEMORANDUM," Rollo, p. 417.

70 CA Rollo, p. 209.

71 Infact, Mrs. Filart herself, in her testimony and in her pleadings, consistently
disclaimed having invited Mr. Reyes to the party such that when Mr. Reyes was
being escorted out of the penthouse, she lifted nary a finger to his rescue.

72 Art. 2234, Civil Code.

73 CA Rollo, pp. 209-210.

74 Appellant’s Brief, CA Rollo, p. 27; see also TSN, 08 March 1995, pp. 7-8.

75 TSN, 29 October 1998, p. 11.