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    Development and Politics in Developing-Country Contexts

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    Dan Cabarrubias

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    1 ‘Development’ and ‘politics’ in developing-country contexts (On the exge of the commercial district of a provincial capital there is a hotel of four levels, eaurant serving cheep food firm behind a wite fence the ground floor of which house rebinble than moet, lily & grvune-hoce pump cide iy busy during the day, ely fivied and worn, ts plumbing igh the waver sues in xpurs, in pasmodic response tthe impulse The motorbikes, we the other half Maat of the peuple se, the line with t rt h a jumble of poorly muintained cary ee out a Kving ‘eling mobile phe it fruit or trinkets nny peuple and the opportunities for work neat to non-eaisten They speak the fig frome with va brought together by the state exe ing the administrative role of the former ecloial power. The screet sometimes sees flashes af wealth when a new car, mmetimes a Enropean they are a polygiot people ode, ede» past. The economic gulf besween the opulence of the car and the life lived by its cnmmer and that of the people sed wernment, only it has almost. monopoly on polis, and being love to a minister sir pasty membe rnhances opportunities for government contracts and, hence, wealth ed that government members receiv ickbacks for the favorable awarding of these lacrative This is all, however, very ted evi «from the daily lives of people an the street What is closer to their tment in that sector, in keeping with nccrliberal prescriptions a reading. Likewise, health exe is lacking, so that preventable in peevalemt among the poor, with elites able 10 wie private clinies of speciale eluewhere, On the sect, average lie expectan women and babies dbirth or soon afterwards and options for a different type of life are existent. The government promises development, a better fotare. Far most, however, that future sermai ant. This could be any provincial town im any developing country anywhere in the world Is politcal processes, though dilering in scope andl syle, are broadly common. Politics Peli ‘manifest most obviously for most people. In lly understood in relation government, which is how politi politics’ refers to 2 Dawlapent, politics inde vcs — or what is political ~ is actually the employ the governance of cities, How achieve particular ends oF to privilege particular interests or Anmably, the dominant form of interest is eoonomic, in the wider sense implying peo ole's material preferences and needs, in turn shaping how they are able to live. Decision how econanie matters, auch as dstibution, opportunity and alleviation (or impesition) of rarcity are among the mast ‘political” and will very afien be contested, It i through this votes, which identifies interests across groups of people, that group identity is formed, csually manifested a8 a politcal parry ‘What distinguishes politics in developing counts nd the problems encountered by one may well manifest in similar for ot an abwohte avother. However, developing courzis do fice a confluence of pr to diaingish them from most developed countries. In particular, developing countries necessarily fure greater ecomomi es are often more scarce oF less able vo he accessed and p in both relative and absolute terms. Moreover, the opportunites for political process 10 develop around ‘rules of the game’, so that there is Jemandk, is usualy lee fully formed and m being a key ty tends to be greater regulated and agreed method for the resolution of competing int This is often complicated b ping countries having that may inelude people who do not share commen identity bon thet. Such common bond that they might have shared may sploitation, the not have lasted much beyond sh 10 prior colonial rule and consequences of which al ial models of political relations ‘One might even go back further and suggest that ies in terms of pee-colonial compestion and cou also reverberate in post-colonial fs wel ax in aeking more culturally ‘authentic? (if somesimes reified) models for social Akyeampang, Bates, Nunn and Robinson 2014 vron of politcal power and is dieribution of material bencits “in such cares, the one ot rivalries rarely seen in developed counties facing fewer reatcr sense of social eohesion. Having lex time thar nigh which 1 nost developed countries in rres is frequently beset by tensions that st more austere and often urgent sets of circum less apparent wuld further be suggested that earlier attempts to resolv 1g countries have been undermined by a ghbs da which, while having overseen economic growth in in developed counesics. I the fandamental challeng towards & neo-liberal een mie inequality both within and often between many areas, has also produced greater All of thie bege the question Jstinet from polities in deve whether the politics of developing countries i in som way fundam ned countries and, hence, needs to be ‘considered employing a clfferent sct of referential tools, ‘This fe countries is diferent in cerms of orietation hey ways in which the politi rphasis fram that of developed counts ‘Comm, from what is intended! io be a pri, fist principle set oP assumptions about the nature of pawer and its application, developing countries are not given a pass to be Deceogmans, puis tn developing eunties 3 derstood in their own ~ usually quite vacied and often inconsistent ~ terms. Such relat ‘so fundamental problems. The fist i that is amumes a mnmonality among developing countries that can be understood in its own terms that is ndamentally diferent to that of developed countries The second assumption is based on rativisation that does not allow analytic closure; thece is no logical point at whi olution of exceptional ends The fist assumpiion fails in its lack of understanding of politics asa fel in which there a continuum of challenges and typologies rather than, at some arbitrary point, a fund tal dsjuncture. That i wo sty, the type of polities may vary, but the subject remains tics. The second asnumption acknowled 8 — indeed privileges — relatvisny but fails to knowledge similarity. Di ences do exist, but not so rmuch so that they manag 2 the overarching subject field. And, at least as importantly, the bounding of implies that ‘difference’ cannot be sed to rationalise the diminution tical markers, Were it the case that ‘iflerence” implied its own (necessarily unlocatable) tical markers, 30 many developing countries would re undergone many of se political changes they have, from the sloughing off of cictarorships or authoritarian pernments, to accountabilities for gross corruption and human rights violations. Development Development, it is ssid, when it is working properly, promotes justice, reduces poverty and dds environments for people to lead productive, creative and fulfilling ives, These ou mes are intended to be achieved, 10 the exent they rough thoughtful and aceful government polices and planning, using available resources Yet in developing n-exitent than because of how they are prioritised an ade unavailable Development has historically been seen in overwhel mic terms. The origin ofthe term in this content was in reference to ‘economical deve pment, firs used in 1860 in relation to the then young ‘Vietoria in what is now ‘Commonwealth of Australia (Cowen and Shenton This fallowed the fcc collapse of the gold boom which had seen the colon sdigenons) population ase from fewer than 100,000 in 1851 (SMH 1851) to more shan a half a millon just seven years later (Searle 1977:382) Similarly the income of unionised alled workers rose from 8 shillings « day in 1851 to 40 shillings within three years (VIG 1851:5; Cowen and Shenton 1996:1 The relevance of this dacursion on a developed country’s colo o demonstrat he origins of the idea at two pointe. The fine is thar “development” was understood prix marily in economic terms, The second was that it was also seen as a farm of ‘progres’ (Cowen and Shenton 1996:12-18). In 1835, colonial Victoria was allowed its own patlia- pent (albeit with a landed and essentially undemocratic upper house) following a rebellion gold miners at the Eureka Stockade, on the Ballarat goldfields, the year before. ‘Th elion had a number of causes, principal among them the imposition of what was for many’ a burdensome mining icen Many of the ‘Eureka’ miners were recent immigrants, and some were refugees from the pean liberal ‘Revolutions of all of which filed,’ with many ethers being either exiles from the failed English Chartit movement or converts to the then radical Chari ideal of « secret vole forall men. From around 1850, rade unions had begun to form ia 4D Victoria, and ia 1856 V orkers fouled the first traces hall council, with stonemaums union inning the work's firs eighthour day that eame year, These pow working.clas heroes coneirued ‘development’ se not just about overall economic growth but incuding pres social and political values. That is to sty, the origin ‘development’ were inherently political Since World War Il, the idea of development has taken on a particulary economic tne Jed by the United States at rebuilding Europe and Japan after that war's dest tion, employing industrialsation along with, eventually, ‘democratic’ polis. However smphasis wat on induutralsason, pariculatly as the idea became applied ta. newly iv pendent former xt, notiors of developracnt, and their critique, have tended to shun the political, even though i pobitical decisions ~ or the lack thereat ~ eh determine development In one sease, then, “development” as it has come to be understood! was simply intened imply economic growth or growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP,, which turn, would find a way of being disributed throughout a society and thus raise most pe plc's standasd of living. The earliest means of achieving this development was intended bring the process of modernisicion to nev or developing countries. In many respects, sncept continues to un lcy in many developing countries, ‘The initial imerto ras that these developing. coun ulte the West (developed counties) to industrial ard then ‘take off (as demonstrated, over fv ny Rostow 1960: Not only did chs procest of indusriaiation and ‘take-of? fallin many, perhaps moat prescriptive and too stil doing so, Where a progra ssf, itis usually a eonsequenee of being applied by ¢ countries themsclves. The most recent of the haere lees ance’, implying that clear and consistent rules around financial probity and orderly pr costes are fundamental to ul development. One could also suggest that such quali stitute ‘evelopanea’ ia its political sense. The failure to understand ‘developine in this more potitical sense has, moreover, been shown to-curb the economic growth tha inally defined i A further, i ell largely material and apolitical, way of measuring “development” ha Jhth ingly broad range of human development indicators (HDIs), whic inchide such yardsticks as infant and maternal mortality, ie expectancy, education, acces to potable water, adequate nutrition and other ‘quality of life’ measures, as well as pe DP and the distribution of a ‘of these paraciga shi lewlopment since the mille of the ls ive. The advan kets ~ patting responsibilty; strong or weak centzal planning; intrinsic economic potential or the lack hereof; participatory and bottom-up versus top-down appreaches; and pro-poor ver rorgrowth, models ~ ha layed advancing, or hindering, development From the 1980: until around 2010, the inherently politcal, perhaps ideclogical, neo-ib paradigm was dominant, and it remains «0 in many markets, under the generic rubric 1 “Washingzon Cons Niliamraon The tka ey principles sneneSted dha GDP. excing government subsidies in favor of key pro-grouth, pr ston Comentus are: avoidance of Tare broadening the tax base anc reducing marginal tax rates; matket-determined, postiv Dredapment, plies in dnelaping cones 5 rest rates; a competitive exchange rate; removal of restrictions on imports; encouraging fig direct investment privatising state enterprises; deregulation of finally, quarante rights (Wis his Washing ion of government deficit relative to GDP, re and other pay sarket activity: a wn 2005:5-4) ing legal security for on Consens implies a te lated reduction of goveruamert subsidi rhet deve h these police ind bealth care), broadening the tax base andl cutting toprend tax ening of markets to glebal trad, the reduction of tariffs and other trade restrictions, relatively open external ive ies, or SOEs (Williamson 1980}. These policies ako aligned with Bank's ‘structural adjustment programs’ (SAPS) he IMP ancl Wor SAP& are lending regimes aimed at persuading borrowing economies to align their gu ccnments’ revenues with its expenditure and at producing long-term economie growth. The IMF is generally responsible for financing the stabilisation of a given economy, with the World Bank responsible for transforming is structure, Key characterstics of SAPs accord With the precepts of neo-lberalian enumerated above. Cuts 1 education and health spending hard-wired into SAPs have led to criticism of the programs, prompting the Wor Bonk to ahi p SAPs as a means of cus with targeted countries now urged 10 de poverty teductian (Bird 2001 This, in turn, runs counter to an carer conception of development that, while ret social strvctares and did not shy away from the introduction of new ones (Dowal Although not formally part of the Washington Consens ‘often suggested that ch paradigm necessarily ran in tandem with ‘democratisation’. The pairing of the two s scen, in some quarters, 10 represent a ‘postideological’ world, teleologically identiod a ‘the end of history! (Fukuyama 199%) This argument was, however, more blind for veo-iberalism, with Bile emphasis on political substance or its translatabily into previously anudemocratic political content The Washington Consens faced hurls, In some case isd but did not produce the desired outcomes: indeed, it made many people poorer. Secadly, many gor sd the model as being financially onerous and ideologically driven. Ev where economic development proceeded, this was very often due to longer-term goverr cloprncntales’ or ate-directed capitalism ~ Halper 2010¢103-194;, rather than neo-liberal economie pre. ptians as such. Again, thie did not imply any particular political modelling to achic ich outcomes. The third obstacle, however, consttited the ie of all 0 the Washington Consensus ~ and that care from a competing hat has beeen Inown as the Bei Tee importance of the Beijing Consensus, which is more or les the eamomic and pol- tical model adopted by port-Mao China, lies in the challenge itx economic auccess has Posed to the hegemony of the Washington Consensus and its assumed dominance of the industrial West (Halper 2010), Rathe being speciically prescriptive, the Chinese model, at it was also known, was perceived ae offering « ‘pragmatic’ route to stable eco- nomic growth, iavolving sate-led oF -run enterprises, 2 port ortentaion ane the redirection of state resources at required (Hasmath 2014 Insofar as the Being Comensus mode! adcressed non-economic factors, it relied 00 the idea of political continuity (usually in the form of authoritarianism) rather than repr scatative pluralism, This, in tum, largely meant keeping active political power out of the 6 wt, itis on dcaping conti Drelp instances, allowing the veindow-dressing of elect hands of the people while this category Singapore remaine a prime example The mest common intended meaning of the terra ‘development’, then, has concemed ‘economic and material ives Political fsues have played second file or been dior garded lopment describes both the economic method and the rationale of altogether. ‘De developing counties, To the extent that pelitcal processes are addvessed at all in develo rental tens, normatie om the debate (for ela boracions, se Huntingson 1968; alo Kingsbury 2007a), The key exception to this has bee Sen's reli artcipatory elections to help ens and thereby promote ‘conceptions of “rcedom' Sen 1999633 and social consol over circumstances rather than vice versa (Sen 1989), ‘That i, “economic liteal development” has been excluded fo re good yovernanc 38) or ‘capabilities’. This implies reasoned individual prowerity iso moze dis one of the means to curching lives of people’ Sen 198942) Tn lange part, the politics of developing countries has, almost from the idemtfied with mism ed the priar colonial power's negative jaigment of i aes fen rele als prospects fa independence or, during the Cold War, which side of the overriding ideological bat particular countries aligned themselves with, But such perceptions have lived experience of developing countries, Some countries have battled unequal. mark forces, white others have all too often squandered opportunities ~ due to poor management capacity oF cormuption — snd exhibited low tolerance for disent ane opposition Perceptions of postcolonial performance have ranged from a sates daing ‘quite well w ‘not very’. Almost no developing countries are ideal in all categories and, indeed, if they w “ideal” they woul not be i veloping country” category, In part this identification polis in developing counties results from a global media industry that readily report: bac! ‘hows bat, given the These media channels apply pa audiences, Reyardlest ofthe detailed lnowledge of specialists and government values shape not just understandings but responses 10 event in developing conneres. Thus the identification of de uncries with adverse processes or cutcomes ha Ses of ‘new’ Valles to stories they present to general oping vamon realities of political failure, repression and a lack stemmed from the to cs viewed developing countries is openly cbgpated by s ce of ‘democracy’ are 1 Mirroring critiques of how audiences in developed count the off-claimed usualy on ‘cukural’ grounds, Even s0, the content and applic veldely varied thatthe term all but ceases to hawe-mesuingy adem defined at the Outset ;ersalty of the normative valve of democrs aasuming a more or ess commen undentanding of what ‘democracy’ means ~ entailing uni versal suffrage in che regular, competitive selection of government ~ its use as a rhe en strays far from any meaning consonant with that uadersanding Universalism or competing values? world view and When considering politics in developing coursries, a parties reed set of ww i generally implied as universal, that there aze social or individual goods commonly understood as such and that there are correlating negatives. There is gencral hactrical agreement, for instance, that corruption is a neg br thete it much lex commitment to actually instituting effective anti-corruption measy much kes an agreed undersanding of wbat constitutes éotmuption as apposed to traditional i Deeloprant, in dadoping counties 7 Ik is a question, then, whether itis posible to employ’ a set of universal values, such as ‘democracy’ Gil an political rights, and rule of law, when eying to understand polities in ng a ov understanding politics across developing countries ‘The further question is whether different world views, manifest wltura cfference, imply a conditionalty the perpective ie of contrac Tn ying tn answer sich questions there are three sets of isucs. The frst concces the quality of being human; the second concerns the logic of power; the third concems the ireunstances of sonetimes con wiih decisions are made. IF human all people have similar fundamental physical = of adlequate nutrition and sheker, and the equal value of beings share a common phys reeds. This includes the bas health care, But, at F rot enough, since ‘many pris do as mach’ dl shelter alone are pino juries Jowe Diokno noted (198154), fo Beyoru! basic physiological needs, people have consistent psychological responses to negative sirmul (allowing for individual tolerance}. There may be minor variation beween individuals, but alieneticn, fear and trauma apply commonly in ike circumstances. Not least, the intended effec: of such conedtions derives from ts hatred, ignorance, greed and prychors. These factors are che hardmaidens of unestraned power, which can arse when other, more benign political sractures collapse or are removed, al or major na i These ses assume tha canbe played out sract, not subject to reaword consideration or constrains, Where aterstory later defined as a severeign state has pre-colonial br cclonial legacy of ipa plsitation, where scarcity is a present factor in determining the allocaion of economic rescurves and/or where there isa limited hitory of socal cohesion, politcal decsions ate rarely abstractions andl overwhelmingly acess immediate and conere Tn auch circumstances, and especially where the ‘rules ofthe game” are poorly established 1. understood, notions of limited political competition and sed to limit the posit of inter-cas participation have been party states, such as South Africa, in which such competition that exits is usually within the opie The mechanisms for poli party rather than between parties, or in East Asi hich ec 1d modernisation has been priate! ove al control in each ciceumstances may be relatively benign but, where there are real tem sons, may quickly turn authoritarian and even brutal. This may then, in turn, establish new grounds for dissent, implying further represion and so on, varians of which have become instiwoinalised in many developing stats. The next qu tion then arises as to whether the circumstances in which these qualities manifest themsches become secuiturated and accepted as “aorta I-ncculturation isan effec f resolving, 1, for example by accepting a situation because of incapacity change it, that doesnot then leitsmise the situation but ra 1 explains ip continued existence Ii that inespacity is caused by unequal power relations, the siuation is not one of eulure ach but of politics. This sn ay the capacity for les, but i isto clarify that its explanatory method is primarily politcal, not cultural. This ceuturaton to political methods and farther helps to understare! that what night be called “cure” is polities in d Post-colonial experiences In the immediate post-colonial period, many decolonised states had opted for a phural femocratic or other ‘Lberating” system 28 m ment in hich cil and 8 Daslaiment fie clialalaceniees tnultipie similar problems ‘The fis ofthese was that removing the colonial yok did st supposed to guarantee. In this, expectations very often grassy exceeded capacity, which Wa by the act of independenc hood revolved around the promise that ‘often reduced rather than enbane Th the colonial power had gone, the resoutees exploited by that power would benefit ch ited pe le, That is to say, once independence was achieved, the people who had themselves 1o the liberation movement would be wealthier. The prospect of liberation afien created heightened, sometimes quite unrealistic, expectations around its benefits. bn prac tice, this has rarely been the case, and especialy-not in the short or even meckum term (ee e.g, on sub-Saharan Alica, Killick 199 "The common pies-colonial experience al falure, expecially in cas where plural dewocratic sructures that had often taken decades to formulate and refine in ‘western counirics were expected to take immediate holdin postcolonial countries, In ca where states have heen coninacted on top of multiethnic identities, aor competitive or sometimes even hostile ethnic groups, competition for scarce n maintenance of poltical power have frequently led to the establishment of ethno-specifi patron-client relations to the exchuion of other ethaic groups, uaually but n0t Added to the dest usually deserted the former colony, and incoming adminis ve impacts of wars for independence, colonial investment and ski ons ofien hid Ke if aay practice at running a sate. Rather than independence delivering economic benefits, i immediate comequcnce was more usually economic decline (see Hirschmann 1987; Corm 9995 Englebert 2000; Lass 2000), This has, is carn, ni tise to compromised form: of admiaisiration bearing labels such as ‘patrimonialisn, neo-pa ly politics” (M 1 provide services and he edard 1996:78), Where states bendlaliam, rent-aeking, preckaory struggled to build basie isi re consistent development path, the poltical distractions of competitive, pluralist politics in which power was not aks Set agains often arbitrary and fractured polities fighting increasingly tlesperare intern battles, in many cases it has been a convenience and arguably & necessity for political elites comtriling the levers af powrr to abandon or violently repress plarait democratic or other ‘emancipatory processes in exchange for the “eabiliy’ of one-party or one-person author- iearian rule. The functional claims of plural democracy or other forms of actual liberatior were thus frequenth spedient political pructice, e.g. authoritaria Ai Asia but for f regis at one time or another have presided over mo and Latin Americas the Middle East but for Ierae Malaysia and posibly S ermal rules ane ly Singapore (ihe later (wo restricting political competition th The political economy of development paradigm is whether such resources that might be available are accumulated homie elite and shared through that accumulation being used w grow (supply) the econ= omy, This model proposes the use of labor as a key element of the proces eating iencral eranomic wellbeing and econemnic distribatioe through employment creat, The ing couries 9 ‘main competing parsdigm is whether such resourc ight be available should be amore widely distributed from the outset, with resaltant ex arsvity (demand) lesding economic development by gencrating supply to mect thet cemand, In both cases, polities ood through the prism of haw st preferences or orders the allocation 0 resources and of who benefits from such allocation, sentially the basic Right/Left politica of those who control the levers of political ard econ degree to which they are represenvative and accountable, play a central role in the balance between these competing economic paradigms, That is, an econ reflects the economic preferences of a political party or bloc: how that party or blo hosen or maintained is central to understanding the relationship berween economics and A fundamencal distinction exits between understandings of policcal economy. They can be broadly described, in che first instance, by whether the politcal system necessari reflects the economic tystem (a comentional Marxian analysis) and might be said to ha spied rent times, 19 Central American states euch as Hondunss, El Salvador and Nicaragy to mention other Latia American stat ive to tiene) as well as Thailand and Myanmar. In the second instance i whether the economic system reflects the palccal system (public choive analysis) understood 10 apply i Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Singapore and Malaysia The forme: proposition implies economic ordering of political alfairs, or a structural relationship between economic models and political systems the latter implies that pal teal stractures are shaped by popular decision-making proceses (e.g, elections or direc- tives) which in turn shape the economy. Both approaches possess varying degrees of usc explanations of diflering political and economic circumstances, in particula politico-eeonomic jurisdictions his approach to understanding the relationship between politics and economies does pot, though, inchude the all 0 common accurmulation of state resources by political cites in what has been termed "booty capitalism’ (Hutcheraf ancl consequent ‘elite state ‘capture’ or predatory police, Further, political and economic elites may work on beha interests external to the sate but from which they also benefit if to the exclusion of many f most oxhers or elites), within an exploitative eyele of economic dependency of ternal markets and investment (sce Baran 195: Frank 1967; Cardoso sand Faletto 1979, among many others ofthe “dependency” sehool). Such a view, which held that the strucural relationship between capital and negative exploitation is inevitable, was widely eriqued following the export-based economs fa number of developing ountries, particularly in Asia. The ‘dependency’ approwch was later modified to explain some instances of economic success, including more generalised economic growth, whi continuing to highlight the exploitative character of global capitalism (e.g. James 1997) Regardless of the various reasons for specific economic successes, it has been relatively easy for governments presiding over economic prosperity to ascribe it w their political method. This they frequently relate to on a specific ‘cultural’ heritage (even as they attr te economic weakness of fallure w extemal infliences and henee factors beyond theit ontrol. When economic success is ascribed 40 a political style that owes nothing to the western capitalist paradigm, with its attendant ideas of plural democracy as wel as evil and political rights, the succesful state ie liable to cxedit is cult 4 and its national pride, for countering the cultural ignominy to which as a product of colonia postion, China is one of the more pranounced examples ofthis retura fom “ignorniny 10. Declarant, politics i denlping soni Thus success, has come to alsa be adopted by governments that oul 1 exceptionalist claim that snvally reflected tnity, in this ease arou aim neither a cuktural affinity nor, in many cages, ecamomic success. What they do often claim is authoritarian politcal mo d, for many post-colonial one-party states, rejecting plural democracy and civil and political rights has become a further method of assert on-colonial ther forms of material development take precedence over democratic processes and civil and political rights. Where the ‘luxury’ of democracy or civil and political rights ix be granted, or returned, itis ofien claimed that this will only follow the estal of prerequisite econcm It has been argued that people will not care about political representation if the do not have enough to eat. Yet making political represemtatives accountable is noi only the best mechanism for ensuring basic needs are catered to but such a system of accountability is more likely to create an environment in which economic activity flourishes (sce Howard 18 > Sen 1909), The assumption that democratisation contingent upon economic development ~ the ‘rice before ri ment or “ful ica thesis! — has been undermined by many port-colonial states having ne rminism between economic de The farther assumption of structural jocratisation has sina: been contradicted by eeonomically sucessfl Sing veratise while Indos despite bi the “tbocks’ that can lead to regime change, in this case away from eg: Bolivia (1980), Peru (1980) ODonnell and Se studies), Post Soviet states in eastern Europe also democratized, in part at a default posit ane the Phikppin a the deptts of cconumie crisis, Indeed, economic crisis may const sgentina (1983), Uruguay (1985) and Brazil wing heavily an Latin American secupying its own place in the larger historical process that precipitated the ce political colapee of the Soviet Union, Myanman’s move towards a cvlianed government in 2015 resulted in part from longer-term economic collapse compounded by the devastating effects of Gyclane Nargis 2008), Haggard and Keufinan (1997) note that transitions may but do not always away from authoritarian rue, citing the examples of Thailand (1983, not sustained), Tucker hile Taiwan voluntarily if tenet 983), South Korea (1906) and Chile emocratised between 1979 and 1996, The democratisation of many sub-Sahat states has been attributed to a range ef reasons, demonstrating that, while ‘push facto such as the eullapse of the Soviet client-state system may have assisted, it was fir fom lieing the only infloence in this ‘second lberasion’ (Salih 05:10) ‘On the conditions for democratic transition, Di Palurt noted that econownic instability monic nationalist culture and the abse pendent middle clas sl avian political medel towards a more demecratic one (Di Palma 19913) But, as Sen (1999) noted, there ie no necessary link between poli and economie development Prucworski 1995; Burro 1996; Pracworski ct Tn shor, while aspirational claims to Ube values struggle to gain common ‘often due to vested political or economic interests, mi are alto beset by contradictions. This i, perhaps, best understood us the dynamics political processes, particularly in developing countries, which rarely follow linear, or iced permanet, pa. Deel 1 ites in doping entries Nation and citizenship A fact the extent to which it i at peace with tell, This is very offen not the case in developing countries comprising muliple, distinct and hostile ethnicities or where the value members of a nation and that they live in a ‘nation-state’. However, this aswumpton is flea incorrect, in as much as it forges the origins of most developing countries anc misunderstand the meaning of the term ‘nation-state’. To clarify, a ‘nation’ is a pol ally bonded group of peaple who shate a sense of unity, usually around a common lar guage, culture, sometimes religion and who possess usually more or kes contiguous territory (sce Armstrong 1982; Smith 986; Geliner 1983), This definiion is sometime med ‘ethno-national distinguish it fron nasionalisa', or & political bonding around agreed civic values such as legal equality, acceptance of electoral cut comes and 40 on. Ethoo-nationalien is distinct fron ibe, which may have social stitutions but which will be informal and, while t may have an association with a given territory is usually not formally delineated, with the territory shifting depending on pre wailing conditions (Fried 1975; Singh 1982; James 200 aceties become more complex, nations alo cobcre around cultural and religious asitutions, political authorities such as 2 local chief or Jord and, eventually, a great regional ruler. In any survey of the evolution fruxa local nd more formal orga ation there are, broadly, three theoretical approaches to understanding nation formation The fart theory of nation formation can be categorised as ‘primordials’, reflecting an nphasis on language, culzure ane s0 on (see Gellner 1985; Horowits 1985; Smith 19365, ee P tersen 2002). This theory posits that a pople will cohere around a common lang rough which chey communicate on mutually relevant issues. According to this appr the bond will be especially powerful if it occurs within « la spatially cmmnity. For commanities with language in common, ith dared workl sample, Nuys and within the group, There is lt geographic ron on 2000). This, in turn, helps create « ‘natural’ oF ‘orgeni be that sharing a xe within a common oalexces three prwwesil infhiences on sion and that, at cine level, they could suffice tn constitute oF at leas contribute to the idea of ‘nation’. This would be especially 0 ifthe tcrm were understand in its or reek sense of thn der) usually translated as ‘nation’ and, in the commonly cited passage from Herodotus 144.2), meaning ‘af the same blood’, ‘speaking the same language’ and possessing ‘the ne habits of sity coinage mended to disinguish groups of su by which time it was begi on the connotat collectivity ruled by a law farniar to cach of then, thas im 2001; Taras and Ganguly 2010), National institution Dnelgpnent,poitcs in dedoping countries be informal, with tacit social agreement oF conventions about form and proceriure, parti ccxlarly in political processes but aso in resp: faction, including manners or other unenforced social codes hen, also include eivie values and institutions, the rule of nore generalised notions of vocal int ‘conduct. Aut instrumentals understanding of nation sigh des both legal and social. Also commonly present within this paradigms ar cof equity and civic cquality, and civil soeiery institutions such ax interest groups, political partis, guilds or unions The idea of territorial contiguity nay also be included under the idea of instrumentals nsttuional cobesion to maintain its conventional io that a nation requires an element of aim to severcignty, But the association with teritory also Hinks back to primordilit . iP on. It may alto include nationalist aims that arse out of a specific na onalist political program. This then leas to the idea of the nation as construs lerable degree, manufactured 19976 ns of nation, such as ancestor worship, spirit of place, the con-building exe an idea that presupposes national identity that is, © a cans son, 1983, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Taras in Bremer and T Hobsbaven 1990}. Claims « als’, particularly where the ‘organic’ bond was toricully weak or damaged ly the imposit ty at their weak foundations. Sech strident clams to“ be used as a tool for state assert dicated on an organic assumption (or cl can quickly devolve to asertions of a type of mob identity wh den of colonialism, are often more st manipulation for state or other political purpos Elements of a constructed national identity may include st ily either did not share the ‘national’ argue language, particularly on groupe that pre or spor distnct dialect of i formalising history and embellishing caplaining a common and usualy glorious past; along with other markers or syn ding a flag (and swearing allegiance toi) « national soog or anthem ive identity other rymbok and rituals designed to bond a people around a common idea of loyal All three of allegiance ~ are empha social elements in the face threst or enemy draws on and enha se cleanents ~ common language, & shared historical meta-narrative an and activated t0 prom adversity and, in xt, in the event of war. A common ces primordial sensibilities, requires a high degree of social a gree of uniformiry with strong emphasis on myth and symbols andl aarrowly delineated loyalty (May 2002; Kingsbury 20074:51-5%; see also Erikson 1969}. Elements of each explanatory factor id institutional organisation and compels a relatively high found in the formation of mast contemporary nations ‘Where these factors are not in relative balance, oF where one or more ate relatively orresponcingly high likelihood of dysfunction within 3g that group oF national identity isnot and need, reflecting both under-developed or missing, there isa the nation rather than cobesion, Its also worth not static but moulded and re-mouled by changing circumstance derations ~ soch as what works well or what a society might zurce upoi a challenge oF thteat, oF shifting material ar econatnie circumstances ‘Moreover, new groups cohering around a new ng, expecially where fiundational elements of group identity pre agenda carn come into ccxst Examples of this phenomenon indude « cohesive Tamil identty, and the Mlamisation Mindanao, although theve is considerable evidence that Acehnese national identity ex ther for several hundred year before the emergence of Acch ted in feparation within the Indonesian sate. West Papua dip 11 Daeeopment India in 1947, for example, did not Girmnediately) lead to open war but did lspace 1 1 cost the lives of at least several handred thousand (Palbot and The state The ‘sate in iis moder is a relatively recent political phenomenon for sary the state and its citizens, in which the state a wll, "This implies a wocial contract smmanding a dary to comply; while citizens can expect xpect, and compel, compl a. In reality, many developing count icing ie territory, or their institutions have not always functioned, much les functioned well throughout their entirety ‘Such secal comtracts as exist between developing states and their citizens are frequently mor arbitrary changed t suit th relation t© both the division betwee andermined, compre ivilegre elite on the one hand and 1 nanifescd as studentbuced rebellions in 1971, 19671989) and the division berw a ial ell Draelopmen, pics deloping countres 15 Sinhalese ethnic elite and its Tamil minority (1983-2009). Indonesia's political and eco histcrcally channelled the poltical and economic resources ofthe sta ‘small section of the population of Jalearta, with local elites linked into this In Indonesia's case, this has ed to regional disaffection, not least in Acch and West saffection over the method of the lat Papua, compounding incorporation, as was the the political and economic cite of the Philippines has plun dered the state 10 is own benefit, pechape most arbi in che Lande occupied by the Muslin population of Mindanzo, with the deliberate purpose of easing population and cconomic pressures ehewhere (notably in the Visayas Where states have low levels of institutional expat delivery of services 10 thei tizens tends to be inadequate, often aly so, and thewe sates typically resort to basic forms of compulsion to retain control even in the face of consequent diseat, Notwith standing this fact, many’ states represent multiple ethnic or national groups and, asauming they do not establish other exiteria around which to bond, such as civic values they may experience tensions bewween groups vying for representation within the sate As noted, almost all developing countries have their origina as colonies, where they were rox directly coloned as ‘protectorater 1 bad heir internal proceses and borders shaped by colonial influences. What are now developing counties largely came into being after World War I, primarily between the late 1940s and late 1960s (with some stragglers in subsequent decades). The hey exceptions to this phenomenon are d America, which achieved independ (Cuba, which achi erween IBF and 1825 (with the exception of an War in 1898 pnies retained thelr independence as « rewuk of the Spanish~Ameri Most countries that shape, under the principle of wi possdts (1s you possess). What this wicant was that the territnry of the colony ~ in possession’ of the colonial power — cransferred ‘possession’ of that territory to the saccesor sate, regardless ofthe colony's ethnic or geographical integrity The difficulty with this was that, while much ofthe indigenous administrative structure could be retained, or redeveloped, the cw state had its colonial boundaries defined by colonial enience — a rier, mountain range or simple sraight Ime — rather than ethaic or mal’ cohesiveness. This hed the effect of bringing wogether separate, sometimes rmutaly hostile ethnic groups, with explosive potential wien one of them had been used by a colonial power to contol or repress another. The conflcs in Rwanda and Sri Lanka are but two examples of the consequences of such a policy. The creators of other states did net necessarily intend to sustain a minority in power, but that abo cventuated in countries such as Syria and pendence was the result of struggles for Hberation fram colonial incuding armed strogole. Where armed strigele was instrumental in developing countries hicving independence, independence forces were usually selfflunded and. politically ded in the postindependence eccnomy and politcal processes. Many post-colonial sates, particularly in Africa and paris of Asia, continue reflect this paradigm, where jtaries remain only ps werable to ch ian gover ments and from time to time can and do operate independently of ther Where militaries have regarded themselves ar ‘guardians ofthe state’, eyen if primarily to retain an active poltical role or assume a right to intervene in political processes, Examples ally potent mubitares can be found Iran's Revolutionary Guards, Myanma Taumadav, Indonesia's Tentara Nasional Inco= ‘esia, in Thailand and in numerous Aftican sates including Algeria, Keypt, Gaubia, both 15 Devons, pelts in deep eum gos, Zimbabwe, formerly in ‘Turkey and from time to time in several Latin Ax states. Tndecd, almost every country that has widergone a coup at one time or another ha suffered from the complex of the mlltary assuming itself to be the state's ‘guardian’ or final institutional arbiter rather than the government i has chosen to oust. Between 2010 a 2016 alone there were thirty-two. ccups of attempted coups, overebelmingly mniliary-led, 2016 in Algeria the first of thers on Ii February 2010 in Niger and the lat at the end Though often militarily led, the advantage of liberation strugules was that they peovide 2 common, goal of liberation and a methodology for achieving it around which enwise disparate groups of people could rally. Once that goal was achieved, though, tbe formerly colonised people tended to retzeat from the common struggle and refocus an their ethnic or tribal group. This has beea especially 0 in time of economic harctip, Citizens of new states often hal the obligations and duties that such 2 status conferred on them, #8 weil as full legal rights within « given (often varying) political order. But in many cases they did not, and often sil do not, enjay the active rights and privileges usua associated with the zen’. Typically, where develop omprise mixed and fining preferential acces to education or goveremen: employment Where citizens do enjoy jor wish to enjoy) rights, they can exercise them through being Politically or socially ac atoms such as trade unions, relisious and student bodies or = state inst tolerate public ions such as the polic variable level of readiness protest and dissent, As « rule, the more open and accountable 4 country’s pulitical system, he more talerance it More secretive and unaccountable systems may permit a modicum of protest from quarters aligoed with the government or the sate in Key areas (each as ethnicity or rego ‘while critics from an unafliated or opposition group ar body receive les tolerance 1 repressed, An csample of this phenomenon was in postliberation Zimbabwe, when the Ndebele-dominated Zimbabwe African Peapl's Union (ZAPU) saged 2 localised peo test against the domination of postindependence politics by the ethnic-majority Shon dominated Zimbabse African National Uni petween 198 1987 in the Ne a military crackdown by dhe arzay’s North Korean-traned Fifth Brigade, «hich was loa ZAPU Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. The crackdown, known as Gaduvraluni, included mass shootings and resuked in the torture and deaths of thousands of Nacbele men su » (ZANU). That proves lebele territory ofthe three western provinces of Matabeleland, wax met with The bosilties ended with a peace settlement between ZAPU leader Jo Maybe aad the joint creation of the Zimbabsee Afri National Unio (ZANU-PP) (see Dorman 2006 for further examples of poat-Lberation conflicts in Airic This type of situation ilustrates how, in pos nial or post-iberation sates, consttuens members of the state are formally cizens but in terms of relative equality af access to ta institutions, including political representation and protection under it laws, ‘citizenship ha fen tice rather than treated as a unifying agen This then raises questions around the ‘rights’ of citizens %0 participate in political lif been unequally cstributed in pr who determines tho and the responsiveness and accountabiliry of “represent to the reeds and desires of citizens. It may be a norm of all sociztcs that politician Delep cs i dean counties 17 responsiveness in these spheres is deficient. What often marks developing countries, espe aly in the political seas, is the depth of that deficien Pos-coionial statee may develop common national identity ia muli-ethn scctics, and « number of developing countries have done so by standardsing a comm ghia valorsing the liberation strug Gon’ creation myths and forms of ening or rewriting history to create a supposed unity whece there might not have been me (Hobsbavem and Ranger 1983; Abizadeh 2001). This phenomenon has been particu fy successful in European states, such ax France and Italy, and has been emplayed with increasing success in developing countries weh as Indo jor Leste, Madagascar and an exent India and Bangladesh, « cite some exam andem with active and ie values such as the rue of law, pobiteal participation, representative government and methnorspecific unity (Tamir 1993; Kyrlicka 1995; Miller 1995). Among. developing mntries this could, in prineiple, inelade South Affica, India an! Brazil Yet, where a national or dominant language an its atendan: caine ave speciic to 01 thnic group (eg. Kenya and the Bantu group of languages) but not another fe. Kenya's Nilotic group of languages) and/or where common cominisment to cive values is weak (aS n varying degrees throughout sib-Saharan Aca), ethnic groups can tend to fore> round ctluicty as their key marker of entity. I'the ethnic group has specific grievances, has impesition of a dominant language, economic exclusion or cultural repression, ths an then result in dissent, which in turn may lea to varying degrees af further reaction or eg. the Tamil minority of Sri Lanka, Kurds in Tuskey and Iraq). Where tat nt (anal repression) has a geographic focus, such asa "homeland? or other ethnically densified territory, consolidation of that dissent can spark nd degrees of tion fiom, the state. While many developing countries do not have armed separat other non-state organiaations, many others do, Such armed non-state groups ean in turn ring the military back into domestic affairs and hence into comeste politics (Desch 1989) nd, overtime, damage the efficacy and reach of sta inatitutions, ever triggering incipien failure Conclusion The process of developrnent in developing countries isn tral to their ability oon behalf of ther citizens. Yet hov this should happen, docs happen and why, ane nv this is understood, remains contested. Regardless of the rationales powerholders ploy, the strc imstances in which developed countries function do define the amnework for opportunities and capacities, even as they establish material lanitaion Within a given framework, what appears fimdamental is how development is driven Political processes. ‘They. in turn, refleet both the structural circumstances that nich ntries have inherited and iswes of volition involv ayles and preferences of pwerholders or other elites These styles and preferences then raise questions about what is and what soul b Asiuming seme commitment to normative aspiration ues, the ine arises whether they ar be based on universalist assumptions ~ that all people work fran the sare asic precepts on what constitutes ‘good? and its opposite ther the cultural char- acteristics of particular groups necessarily imply diferent or even competing ennceptions of ne ‘good! and it opposte, How this question is decided informe what is and is not 18 Dextipmet, pits in dedping contri rod’, appropriate or allowable, or in some cases Hluninatcs what is founded upon fart y allowable can reflect values derived from international norms and conventions, often articulated duting anti-

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