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Pelecture2 2022
Pelecture2 2022
LECTURE 2
Theodosios Dimopoulos
HEC Lausanne,
Swiss Finance Institute
Outline
❑ Early stage VC firms focus on areas undergoing structural change (e.g. IT, life sciences)
❑ Buyouts target firms seeking generational transition or major reorganization
❑ Should PE firms specialize in sectors, locations etc?
❑ LPs like specialization. Changing investment focus is a bad sign for them
❑ Some would think that diversification is good for reducing idiosyncratic risk
❑ However this can also be done by individual investors
Specialization vs. Diversification: Information
❑ VCs that finance early stage firms tend to specialize in order to share info with other VCs
❑ That means that VC firms often form networks and pool information in order to better
identify potentially good deals
❑ Specialization occurs both in terms of the sector of the funded firms and their location
❑ After deciding the sector, stage and geography of investing, a PE firms needs to find deals
and evaluate them
❑ Top PE firms get contacted by top entrepreneurs, so those firms have ample choice (e.g.
KPCB, Sprout, NEA)
❑ Smaller firms can hope for deals in niche markets (e.g. Montagu PE specializes in European
family owned businesses)
❑ What if not many entrepreneurs contact a PE firm?
❑ It will have to find deals by itself
Deal Formats
❑ Auctions
✓ Bidders compete to acquire the target firm
✓ Especially relevant for buyout funds
❑ Private Deals
✓ Proprietary Deals: The entrepreneur approaches the PE firm
✓ Proactive Deal Searching: The PE firm approaches the entrepreneur
Private Deals vs Auctions
For entrepreneurs:
❑ Auctions
✓ generate high price competition
✓ make firm info available to competitors. Solution: Tiered auctions
❑ Private deals
✓ Are not often contested
✓ Facilitate reciprocal invitations to deals among GPs
✓ Protect the GP’s due diligence investment
✓ Involve more reputational risk to the GP
Proprietary Deals vs Proactive Searching
❑ Proprietary deals involve easier disclosure of info to the GP, as the entrepreneur tries to
impress the GP
❑ However, GPs need to be vigilant against overconfident entrepreneurs
❑ Friends
❑ Angels
❑ Commercial bankers
❑ Investment bankers
❑ Stock brokers
❑ Accountants, lawyers
❑ Business development officers
5 How does our firm solve the problems? Why is ours a TEN times better solution?
➢ Lots of things go awry for startups. If the ideal scenario is not exciting, the VC is not looking into
our case
6 Who is the team that is going to build this business?
11 Basic financial projections by quarter for three years, including revenues, expenses, cash,
head count
12 How much capital do you need to raise now? What milestones will you hit before you need
to raise more?
3. Cyclicality in PE investing
Cycles of the past: Aggregate funds
Total Invested ($Bln) Number of IPOs
160 250
140
200
120
100 150
80
60 100
40
50
20
0 0
1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019
Cycles of the past: Computer startups
Total Invested ($Bln) Number of IPOs
80 120
70
100
60
80
50
40 60
30
40
20
20
10
0 0
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017
Cycles of the past: Semiconductors
Total Invested ($Bln) Number of IPOs
8 30
7
25
6
20
5
4 15
3
10
2
5
1
0 0
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017
Cycles of the past: Communcation & Media
35 80
30 70
60
25
50
20
40
15
30
10
20
5 10
0 0
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017
Cycles of the past: Biotechnology
Total Invested ($Bln) Number of IPOs
18 60
16
50
14
12 40
10
30
8
6 20
4
10
2
0 0
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017
Cycles of the past: Life Science
12 50
45
10 40
35
8
30
6 25
20
4 15
10
2
5
0 0
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017
Venture financing across sectors
Characteristics of Cycles
❑ Besides market wide cycles there are those isolated to specific sectors or specific regions
❑ It is not predictable though how long a cycle will last, or when is the new cycle coming
Why do Cycles Happen?
Demand of PE funds:
R1 Smaller the lower
entrepreneurs have to
Demand> price their firm to leave
Supply: room for PE returns
Entrepreneurs
sell cheaper, PE
Q1
return increases Quantity of
Funds
Equilibrium in the PE Market: Demand shock
S1 Competition by
Return new funds
SL
drives returns Long term supply of
downwards PE: Increases with
expected return, since
more funds are raised
R2
RL
Positive demand
R1 shock: Funds
D2 demanded increase
for each level of
D1 return required by PE
Q1 QL
Quantity of
Funds
Equilibrium in the PE Market: Overshooting
S3 Too many funds are
Return S1
raised
SL
Investors
overestimate the
future demand for PE
RL D3
Returns are driven
R1 down, leading to exits
D2 of funds from the
D1 industry
Q1 QL Q3
Quantity of
Funds
Implications for Fund Policy
❑ Usually investment made at the peak of a financing cycles yield on average lower returns
❑ Makes sense: When financing is hard, a PE firm only undertakes the best PE projects
available
❑ Implication: PE firms often raise financing with a view to investing later, at more favourable
times (cookie jar approach)