Digest Pool Cases

NORMA DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOT CHILD RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM, PETITIONER, VS. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM,
RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 193707, 10 December 2014, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of
public international law and to treaty stipulations."
FACTS
Norma A. Del Socorro (petitioner) married Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem in Holland on
September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, They had a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. When
Roderigo was 18 months old, Del Socorro and Van Wilsem divorced. Del Socorro moved back to the
Philippines with her son. She alleged that Van Wilsem promised to provide monthly support of 250
Guildene (Php 17,500.00) to their son, which Van Wilsem never gave. Few years later, Van Wilsem came
to the Philippines and was remarried in Pinangmungahan, Cebu. He and his new wife established a
catering busines (Paree Catering) located in Brgy. Tajao, Pinangminahan, Cebu. It is important to note
that Del Socorro and his son was also residing at Cebu.
Del Socorro sent a demand letter requesting support from Van Wilsem which he refused. Thus, Del
Socorro filed a complaint with the provincial prosecutor of Cebu. RTC- Cebu granted Van Wilsem’s
Motion’s to Dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction and (2) prescription of crime
charged.
Petitioner’s Argument/s
Del Socorro alleged that Van Wilsem violated Sec. 5, Par. E(2), of R.A. 9262 for the angels refusal to
support his minor child with Del Socorro. She also invoked Art. 195, FC which provides the parents’
obligation to support his child. Petitioner also contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce
decree it should in relation of Art. 26 of the FC, Van Wilsem is not excused from complying with the
obligations support his minor children with the petition
Respondent’s Argument/s
Van Wilsem argued that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by Del Socorro that she, as well as
Roderigo, are entitled for support. Van Wilsem also added that by the reason of the divorce decree, he is
not obligated to Del Socorro for any financial support
ISSUES
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law? (YES)
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child. (YES)
RULING
1. YES. While the SC agrees with the RTC that since Van Wilsem is a citizen of Holland and is
subject to the laws of his country and not the Philippine law, it does not mean that Van
Wilsem is not obliged to support his son altogether.
The Court stated that in international law, the party who wants to have the foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has to burden of proving the foreign law. in this case, Van Wilsem hey silly concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of incapacity
support. However, he never proved the same. it is incumbent upon Van Wilsem to plead and prove the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child.
Due to Van Wilsem’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the Doctrine of
Processual Presumption shall apply. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our court will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local/domestic/international law.
2. YES. Respondent may be made liable under Sec. 5(e) and (i) of R.A. 9262 which states that:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or
her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children
Further, since Van Wilsem is currently living in the Philippines, the Court finds strength in petitioner’s
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code,
applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall
be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing
acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as
all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
MARIA TIN @ MARIA TY @ MARIA DY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 126480, 10 August 2010, SECOND DIVISION (Quisumbing, J.)
Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule, where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates,
the party having the burden of proof loses.
FACTS
Dr. Francisca Santiago (complainant) alleged that on February 10, 1980, she and Aurora Jose
went to Mady’s Pawnshop owned by Maria Tin, to pawn some jewelry. Santiago asked for Php
250,000.00 but Tin only offered PhP 220,000.00. Php 2000,000 first and Php 20,000.00 after a week. Th
pieces of jewelry pawned where then listed and both Santiago and Tin signed the list as evidence of her
receipt of the jewelry. From 1980 to 1982, Dr. Santiago made 19 payments amounting to Php 95,600.00.
Santiago said that the loan was under a “white paper system” wherein there is no maturity/expiration date
and that the jewelry can be redeemed anytime provided that the interests were paid.
On February 1, 1984, Dr. Santiago together with Mrs. Dava and Mrs. Zuñiga went to the pawnshop to
redeem her jewelries. She brought Php 450,000.00 to settle her loan. However, Tin told her that the
jewelries were already sold. Dr. Santaigo consulted Atty. German Abaya Sipin, who wrote a letter to Tin
asking her to allow Dr. Santiago to redeem the jewelries. Maria Tin, through her counsel, Atty. Marcelo
T. Dy, replied acknowledging Dr. Santiago’s unsettled obligation of Php 220,000.00 and demanded
payment. The reply also stated that no jewelries were received as collateral for the loan
Maria Tin argued that she was merely a guarantor of the loan and that the real parties to the loan were Dr.
Santiago and her (Tin) daughter-in-law, Mia Chan. Tin merely introduced them to one another and that it
was Mia Chan who signed the receipt and actually received the jewelries.
Trial Court
Found the petitioner GUILTY of Estafa. Tin was sentenced to an imprisonment of 6 years + 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused is also ordered to pay
Dr. Santiago Php 280,000.00 + 12% interest per annum from the filing of the Information and Php
40,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Court of Appeals
Affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUES
1. Whether Maria Tin is guilty of Estafa? (NO)
RULING
1. First, it was erroneous of the CA to consider as evidence the letter of Aurora Jose to Fiscal
Jumino, as Aurora was never presented to testify the veracity of the letter. A private
certification is hearsay where the person who issued the same was never presented as a
witness. The same is true of letters. They are hearsay evidence.
Second, the signature in the receipt was different from the signatures provided by Maria Tin
in open court. It resembles Mia Chan’s signature more. Third, petitioner did not deny that she
received payments and made demands for payment from private complainant. They do not
show, however, that she was the one who extended the loan and accepted the jewelries.
Lastly, Mia Chan's admission, that she was the one who extended the loan and received the
jewelries, deserves weighty consideration and could not be ignored.
Dr. Santiago claims that the loan was for a three-month period only. But Dr. Santiago averred
that it was extended under a so-called "white-paper" system, or a loan with an indefinite term.
Maria Tin presented her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan, to establish that the loan was only for a
three-month period. Dr. Santiago did not present evidence to substantiate her claim, other
than her self-serving testimony. Private complainant relied solely on the acknowledgment
receipt.
Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule,
where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds
application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and
does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to
convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner
must be declared innocent and set free.
MARIA TIN @ MARIA TY @ MARIA DY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule, where the
evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates,
the party having the burden of proof loses.
FACTS
Dr. Francisca Santiago (complainant) alleged that on February 10, 1980, she and Aurora Jose
went to Mady’s Pawnshop owned by Maria Tin, to pawn some jewelry. Santiago asked for Php
250,000.00 but Tin only offered PhP 220,000.00. Php 2000,000 first and Php 20,000.00 after a week. Th
pieces of jewelry pawned where then listed and both Santiago and Tin signed the list as evidence of her
receipt of the jewelry. From 1980 to 1982, Dr. Santiago made 19 payments amounting to Php 95,600.00.
Santiago said that the loan was under a “white paper system” wherein there is no maturity/expiration date
and that the jewelry can be redeemed anytime provided that the interests were paid.
On February 1, 1984, Dr. Santiago together with Mrs. Dava and Mrs. Zuñiga went to the pawnshop to
redeem her jewelries. She brought Php 450,000.00 to settle her loan. However, Tin told her that the
jewelries were already sold. Dr. Santaigo consulted Atty. German Abaya Sipin, who wrote a letter to Tin
asking her to allow Dr. Santiago to redeem the jewelries. Maria Tin, through her counsel, Atty. Marcelo
T. Dy, replied acknowledging Dr. Santiago’s unsettled obligation of Php 220,000.00 and demanded
payment. The reply also stated that no jewelries were received as collateral for the loan
Maria Tin argued that she was merely a guarantor of the loan and that the real parties to the loan were Dr.
Santiago and her (Tin) daughter-in-law, Mia Chan. Tin merely introduced them to one another and that it
was Mia Chan who signed the receipt and actually received the jewelries.
Trial Court
Found the petitioner GUILTY of Estafa. Tin was sentenced to an imprisonment of 6 years + 1 day of
prision mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused is also ordered to pay
Dr. Santiago Php 280,000.00 + 12% interest per annum from the filing of the Information and Php
40,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Court of Appeals
Affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUES
1. Whether Maria Tin is guilty of Estafa? (NO)
RULING
1. First, it was erroneous of the CA to consider as evidence the letter of Aurora Jose to Fiscal
Jumino, as Aurora was never presented to testify the veracity of the letter. A private
certification is hearsay where the person who issued the same was never presented as a
witness. The same is true of letters. They are hearsay evidence.
Second, the signature in the receipt was different from the signatures provided by Maria Tin
in open court. It resembles Mia Chan’s signature more. Third, petitioner did not deny that she
received payments and made demands for payment from private complainant. They do not
show, however, that she was the one who extended the loan and accepted the jewelries.
Lastly, Mia Chan's admission, that she was the one who extended the loan and received the
jewelries, deserves weighty consideration and could not be ignored.
Dr. Santiago claims that the loan was for a three-month period only. But Dr. Santiago averred
that it was extended under a so-called "white-paper" system, or a loan with an indefinite term.
Maria Tin presented her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan, to establish that the loan was only for a
three-month period. Dr. Santiago did not present evidence to substantiate her claim, other
than her self-serving testimony. Private complainant relied solely on the acknowledgment
receipt.
Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule,
where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds
application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and
does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to
convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner
must be declared innocent and set free.
ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006, FIRST DIVISION (Callejo, Sr., J.)
FACTS
Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera were charged of attempted murder of Ruben Rodil.
Ruben Rodil was a taxi driver who stopped driving after a would-be rapist threatened his life. Rodil was
given an citation as a Bayaning Pilipino for saving the would be victim. Rodil’s wife works as a
manicurist and they have 3 children. Rodil and his family resides in Brgy. San Isidro Labrador II,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.
At noon of May 2, 1998, Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food when he encountered Edgardo.
Edgardo mocked him of being jobless and dependent on his wife, soon heated exchange of words ensued.
The next day, at about 7:30 p.m. Rodil together with his daughter went to the store to buy food and look
for his wife. They encountered Esmeraldo and his 2 brothers emerging from their house. Esmeraldo and
his brothers proceeded to beat Rodil and Esmeraldo managed to hit Rodil three times with a hollow block
on the parietal area. The beating continued until the police arrived and the three fled to their house.
Rodil was brought to the hospital and was attended to by Dr. Cagingin Jr. In the medical certificate he
said that Rodil sustained lacerated wounds on the parietal area, cerebral concussion or contusion,
hematoma on the left upper buttocks, multiple abrasions on the left shoulder and hematoma periorbital
left. The doctor declared that the lacerated wound in the parietal area was slight and superficial and would
heal from one to seven days.
Trial Court
RTC found all the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder and are sentenced to
an imprisonment of 6 years one day to 8 years of prision mayor. They are also ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, civil indemnity to the complainant in the amount of Php 30,000.00.
Court of Appeals
CA affirmed the decision with MODIFICATIONS. The appellants are convicted of attempted murder and
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision coreccional as minimum to 6 years and 1
day of prision mayor as maximum.
CA held that the prosecution was able to prove the petitioners’ intent to kill Rodil. As earlier stated by Dr.
Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block directly hit his head, and had the
police not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered away. When a wound is not sufficient to
cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that
the (3) brothers helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the
ground; that one of them even picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the
head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the appellants desist
from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.
Petitioners’ Argument/s
Petitioners argues that the prosecution failed to prove that they had the intent to kill Rodil when they beat
him and hit him with a hollow block as based on Dr. Cagingin’s testimony Rodil sustained only a
superficial wound in the parietal area.
ISSUES
1. Whether there was intent to kill? (YES)
2. Whether the CA is correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder? (YES)
3. Whether the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied? (YES)
RULING
1. Yes, there was intent to kill Rodil. An essential element of murder and homicide is intent of the
offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.
Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial
evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.
In People v. Delim, the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, of the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the
malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.
In this case, while the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not
have produced his death does not negate petitioners’ criminal liability for attempted murder.
2. Yes, the CA is correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a felony,
thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
(a) That there be external acts;
(b) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than
his spontaneous desistance
The Court elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act in People v. Lizada which states:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which
if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling
the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the
middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.
3. Yes, treachery was properly applied.

Petitioners attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was walking with
his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He had no chance to
defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the synchronized assault of the three
siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim. Even if the
attack is frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or
defend himself, there would be treachery.
The sentencing of the appellate court is erroneous, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
Hence, petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years
of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months
of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
SALVADOR YAPYUCO Y ENRIQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES, AND VIRGILIO A. MANGUERRA, PETITIONER, VS.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. AND ERNESTO PUNO, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 120744-46; G.R. 122677; G.R. 122776, 25 June 2012, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton violence is
never justified when their duty could be performed otherwise. A "shoot first, think later"
disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never has homicide or murder been a
function of law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the cost of human life
FACTS
These are petitions for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in three Criminal
Cases. The cases are predicated on a shooting incident in San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the
death of Leodevince Licup and injured Noel Villanueva. Accused were all charged with murder, multiple
attempted murder and frustrated murder. Accused were all members of the Integrated National Police
stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga, barangay captains of Quebiawan and
Del Carmen, members of the Civil Home Defense Force or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays
Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan.
On April 5, 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De
Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations.
The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession. With Licup in
the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva
allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on
the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding
profusely. Both Flores and Villanueva allegedly did not see any one on the road flag them down. After
the shooting, Flores jumped out of the jeepney when he saw petitioner Pamintuan emerging. Pamintuan
reproved them for not stopping when flagged. Villanueva cried out and told Flores to summon
Salangsang for help as he and Licup were wounded. Flores dashed back to Salangsang’s house as
instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and
Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney by two armed men together with Pamintuan, to be taken to
the hospital. As soon as Flores and his companions had been dropped off at the hospital, the driver of the
Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with his two armed companions. Licup later expired at the
hospital. Flores claimed that all the accused had not been known to him prior to the incident, except for
Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wife’s uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift. The
bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were all on the passenger side and that there were no other bullet
holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.
Salangsang testified that he caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an owner-type jeepney idling
in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same jeepney which he remembered to be that frequently
used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. Only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified
himself as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga. He narrated that
he and his men received a summon for police assistance concerning a reported presence of armed NPA
members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and
bring their M-16 rifles with them. Yapyuco and his group met with Pamintuan who told him that he had
earlier spotted four men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan
intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes had also brought in a number of armed men and
CAFGU members. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying
the victims would make an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that
it was the target vehicle, so they allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that
instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This inspired them to fire warning
shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and
instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of a nearby house directly at the
subject jeepney. Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at
Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men
then immediately searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom
they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men
returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who fired directly at the jeepney.
They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone.
Petitioners’ Argument/s:
On the other hand, the accused stated that they allegedly received information concerning a reported
presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Believing that the victims were the armed NPA
members, the accused opened fire to the passengers of the said Tamaraw. Such shooting incident caused
the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). The accused were all
charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder.
Upon conviction, Yapyuco disputed that he cannot be exonerated since he responded to the scene in
fulfillment of his duty as a member of the police force and he invoked mistake of fact as caused by his co-
accused in the belief that the victims are members of the NPA.
SANDIGANBAYAN
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty only of HOMICIDE for the eventual death of Licup, and of
attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva. The Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was not shown how the aggression
commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and Licup began and developed, and second,
this circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious adoption of the mode of
attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from circumstances immediately preceding the
aggression. The same finding holds true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco
received the summons for assistance and the time he and his men responded at the scene, there was no
sufficient time to allow for the materialization of all the elements of that circumstance.
ISSUES
1. Whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them?
2. Whether or not Yapyuco and his men and the offense committed is the necessary consequence of
the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right?
RULING
1. The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co- principals in the crimes of
homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the non-fatal
injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with the other
accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims.
Judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms employed, the
likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact even the driver himself of being hit and
injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise. This demonstrates the clear
intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was seated on the passenger side and to
Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all the consequences arising from their
deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was
deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill.
2. At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure.
In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true,
would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a
reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component
of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent.
The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or
state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires: a) that the mistake
be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability
required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with
respect to an element of the offense.
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah
Chong, but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the
physical circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it
was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of
his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after having
demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder
but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving
that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his
roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact.
Finding that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained.
AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT
Article 4(1) of the RPC states that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The essential requisites
for the application of this provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise
a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.
In the case of US vs. Brobst
where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the
diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve
the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.
FACTS
Petitioner was charged with murder and upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Garcia,
Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando Foz had a drinking spree at the apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which was
adjacent to the house of Manuel k. Chy. At around 7:00 p.m. Chy pleaded to the group to quiet down the
noise from the videoke machine and it was not until the second time that Chy pleaded that the group
acceded. Such encounter left Garcia irate with Chy and was heard saying "Talaga a napangas ni Manny
saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy," (This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long.)
On Septemner 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador Tacuboy not far from
Chy’s apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest they be told off againt. This further
angered Garcia and was heard saying "Talaga a napangas ni Manny saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy," (This
Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long.)
On September 29, 1999, at around 12:00 p.m. the group had another drinking session in the house of Foz
and Garcia where they mused their confrontation with Chy. Garcia was again heard saying "Talaga a
napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This Manny is really arrogant, I will finish him off
today). Later that afternoon, they went to the store of Aurelia Esquibel, Chy’s sister, and decided to have
some drinks. Garcia ordered Esquibel to call Chy. When Chy approached, Garcia punched him in the
face. Petitioner kept assaulting Chy even when Foz attempted to pacify him. Garcia then grabbed a bottle
of beer and struck the lower back portion of Chy’s head, then shoving Foz to Chy causing them to fall.
Chy managed to escape and ran towards his house. Chy called his wife, Josefina, and instructed her to call
the police. Chy also complained to his wife that he has trouble breathing. When the policemen came to
Chy’s house nobody answered, after a few minutes Josefina arrived and they found Chy lying
unconscious in the kitchen floor. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital, the cause of death
was myocardial infaction.
Trial Court
RTC found Amado Garcia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.
He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of 10 YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as
minimum, to 14 YEARS 8 MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum;
He was also ordered to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of ₱50,000.00, as death indemnity;
₱200,000.00, representing expenses for the wake and burial; ₱300,000.00 as moral damages; and
₱332,000.00, as loss of earning, plus the cost of this suit.
Court of Appeals
CA affirmed the conviction.
Petitioner insists on a review of the factual findings of the trial court because the judge who penned the
decision was not the same judge who heard the prosecution evidence. Petitioner denies laying a hand on
Manuel Chy. Instead, he implicates Armando Foz as the author of the victim’s injuries. Corollarily, he
challenges the credibility of Armando’s brother, Fidel, who testified concerning his sole culpability. In
support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio that Chy’s medical condition could have
resulted in his death anytime.
ISSUES
1. Whether Garcia is liable for the death of Manuel Chy? (YES)
RULING
The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only took over from a
colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. It does not follow that the judge who was not present
during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot render a valid and just decision.
From the statements of Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan, it can be reasonably inferred that the emotional strain
from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable conclusion
then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the RPC states that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The essential requisites
for the application of this provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a
felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts. In
this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a bottle. Hence,
the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter petitioner’s liability for his
death.
In the case of US vs. Brobst

where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the
diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve
the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.
A person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical consequences resulting from it
although the unlawful act performed is different from the one he intended. "El que es causa de la causa es
causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). Thus, the
circumstance that petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him
from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply
mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court properly imposed upon the petitioner the indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision
mayor, as minimum to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum. However, the Court
modified the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy for his loss of earning capacity in the amount
of ₱332,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of
moral damages is reduced to ₱50,000. Petitioner is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Manuel K.
Chy ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; ₱200,000, representing expenses for the wake and burial; and
₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.
FILOMENO URBANO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 72964, 07 January 1998, THIRD DIVISION (Gutierrez, Jr., J.)
FACTS
At around 8 a.m. on October 23, 1980, Filomeno Urbano went to went to his ricefield in Brgy. Anonang,
San Fabian, Pangasinan, which was located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo
Javier. There he found that the place where he stored his palay was flooded and upon further
investigation, found out that the water came from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion
of the canal where he saw Javier and Erfe cutting grass, he asked them who opened the irrigation canal
and Javier admitted that he was the one who opened it.
Enraged, Urbano demanded that Javier pay for the soaked palay and an argument ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (2 feet long, including the handle and 2 inches wide). He hacked Javier hitting him
on his right palm. Javier ran away and Urbano chased him, Urbano also hit the left leg of Javier. When
Urbano tried to further injury, Urbano’s daughter prevented him from causing another injury to Javier.
Thereafter, Antoni, Emilio and Felipe Erfe brough Javier to their house. Emilio then went to Brgy.
Captain Solwen’s house but was unable to find him, he found councilman Solis instead. Solis advised
them to go to the police to report the incident, which they did. The group also went to Dr. Padilla, the
rural health official of San Fabian, he was unable to treat Javier because he had no medicine available,
instead he instructed the group to go to Dr. Mario Meneses. After being treated by Dr. Meneses, the group
went back to Dr. Padilla who conducted the medico-legal examination. Upon the intercession of
Councilman Solis, Javier and Urbano entered into an agreement to settle their differences, Urbano agreed
to pay Javier ₱700.00 for Javier’s medical expenses.
On November 14, 1980, at around 1:30 a.m. Javier was rushed to the hospital as he was experiencing lock
jaw and convulsions, Dr. Exconde who was attending to Javier found that Javier’s serious condition was
tetanus toxin, he noticed the already healing wound in the right palm of Javier. Unfortunately, Javier died
at around 4 p.m. the next day.
In April 10, 1981, Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide, which he plead “not guilty.”
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to
his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected
with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare
hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
Trial Court
Trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of
from 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier,
in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in
view of the nature of his penalty.
Court of Appeals/ Intermediate Appellate Court
CA affirmed RTC’s ruling but raised the award of indemnity to ₱30,000.00.
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the
deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not
deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but
the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound
which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw
because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could
be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm. Consequently, the proximate
cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in
this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act.
ISSUES
1. Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death. (NO)
RULING
1. Urbano was acquitted. The evidence does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano
was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. It merely confirms that the
wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment,
somehow got infected with tetanus. However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear
from the record.
In Vda. De Bataclan vs. Medina, the Court defined proximate cause as:
"That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
In this case, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo
which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days,
or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms.
The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If the wound of Javier inflicted by Urbano was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is
more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more
than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not
yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been
infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. Since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
In addition, Urbano’s criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act.
After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical
expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of
Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3).
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly
examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so
minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROLUSAPE SABALONES

ALISA “ROLING”, ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, TEODURO ALEGARBES, AND
EUFEMIO CABANERO, ACCUSED, ROLUSAPE SABALONES ALISA “ROLING” AND
ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, ACCUSED-APPELANTS
G.R. No. 123485, 31 August 1998, FIRST DIVISION (Panganiban, J.)
The case is better characterized as error personae or mistake in the identity of the victims,
rather than aberratio ictus which means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but
hitting the other due to imprecision in the blow.
FACTS
Edwin Snatos (witness), stated that he was at the resident of Rogelio and Inday Presores at Rizal Ave.,
Cebu City at 6:00 p.m. to attend a wedding. He then went to the house of Ma. Tiempo where is small
gathering was also taking place. There he saw Nelon Tiempo, Glenn Tiempo, Rogelio Presores, Rogelio
Oliveros, Junior Villoria, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo. Stephen Lim, who was also at the party, called
the group and asked them to drive his car to his house in Mansueto Compounnd, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu.
Nelson Tiempo drove Lim’s car while Nardo drove an owner-type jeep in order to bring them back as a
group.
The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the jeep 3 to 4 meters ahead of the car. when they arrived at the
gate of the house of Lim, they were met with a sudden burst of gunfire. Santos looked at the direction
where the gunfire came and identified 2 persons who fired at the jeep. The shooting incident led to the
death of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and fatal injuries to Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo, and Rogelio
Presores.
Rolusape Sabalones was recognized as the one who fired at the jeep. Teodulo Alegarbes, Teodoro
Beronga and another person, whom he only recognized by face.
Sabalones and Beronga denied their presence during the commission of the crime. Sabalones presented
numerous witnesses who stated that he was sound asleep when the incident took place [since he got tired
watching over his brother’s wake]. While Beronga testified that he attended a cock-derby in Cebu, and
was fetched by his wife at 7 pm, arrived home by 10:30 pm to sleep. Sabalones even escaped from place
to place to flee from the wrath of Maj. Juan Tiempo, the father of the two victims. The defense even
pointed out errors from the testimonies of the witnesses arguing that the place where the incident
happened is dim and not lighted.
Trial Court
Trial Court found the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The dispositive
portion is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above-set forth, the Court finds accused ROLUSAPE SABALONES and
(ARTEMIO) TIMOTEO BERONGA, [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals:
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years,
[e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months
and [o]ne (1) day, of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased,
Glenn Tiempo, the sum of P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years,
[e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months
and [o]ne (1) day, of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased,
Alfredo Nardo, the sum of P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248
in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the
penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8)
months of [re]clusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rey Bolo, the sum of
P20,000.00;
penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight
months of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rogelio Presores, the
sum of P20,000.00;
penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8)
months of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Nelson Tiempo, the sum
of P20,000.00; and
To pay the costs in all instances. The period of their preventive imprisonment shall be credited to
each accused in full.
SO ORDERED.
Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision convicting appellants of two counts of murder
and three counts of frustrated murder. Like the trial court, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and rejected appellants' defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the penalties imposed by the trial court were erroneous. Hence,
for each count of murder, it sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua. For each count of frustrated
murder, it imposed the following penalty: ten years (10) of prision mayor (medium), as minimum, to
seventeen years (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal (medium), as maximum. Sustaining
the trial court, the Court of Appeals awarded indemnity of P20,000 to each of the victims of frustrated
murder. However, it was silent on the indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the trial court to the heirs of each
of the two deceased.
ISSUES
1. Whether the witnesses are credible and the sufficiency of evidence? (YES)
2. Whether the alibis are acceptable? (NO)
3. Whether the correct penalty is imposed? (NO)
RULING
1. Yes. RTC findings were binding to court with appreciated testimonies of two witnesses.
There was positive identification by survivors who saw them when they peered during lulls in
gunfire. The place was well-lit, whether from post of car’s headlights. The extrajudicial
confession has no bearing because the conviction was based on positive identification. It is
binding though to the co-accused because it is used as cirmustancial evidence corroborated by
one witness. The inconcistencies are minor and inconsequential which strengthen credibility of
testimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus [mistake in blow], mistake does not diminish
culpability; same gravity applies, more proper to use error in personae. Alibi cannot prevail over
positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.
It must be stressed that the trial court relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why the
appellants staged the ambush, not to prove that appellants did in fact commit the crimes. Even
assuming that the trial court did err in explaining the motive of the appellants, this does not
detract from its findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and sustained by this Court in the
discussion above, that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. No. It was still quite near the crime scene.
The established doctrine requires the accused to prove not only that he was at some other place at
the time of the commission of the crime, but that it was physically impossible for him at the time
to have been present at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The appellants failed to do so.
3. No. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period, to death.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder. The CA erred in
computing the penalty for each of the three counts of frustrated murder. Under Article 50 of the
RPC, the penalty for frustrated felony is next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony. Because there are no mitigating or aggravating conspiracy between the two
accused. It does not matter that the prosecution has failed to show who was between the two who
actually pulled the trigger that killed the child. They are liable as co-conspirators since the act of a
conspirator becomes the act of another regardless of the precise degree of participation in the act.
However, the Court agrees with the appellate court that accused-appellants are guilty of murder
for the deaths of Glenn Tiempo end Alfredo Nardo. The allegation of treachery as charged in the
Information was duly proven by the prosecution. "Treachery is committed when two conditions
concur, namely, that the means, methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and that such means, methods and forms
of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
person." These requisites were evidently present when the accused, swiftly and unexpectedly,
fired at the victims who were inside their vehicles and were in no position and without any means
to defend themselves.
GEMMA T. JACINTO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 162540, 17 July 2009, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property;
2) that the act was done with evil intent; and
3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as
an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
FACTS
Jacinto, together with two other women, Anita Busog de Valencia and Jaqueline Capitle was charged with
the crime of qualified theft.
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Petitioner, Gemma Jacinto,
along Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, conspiring together and mutually helping
one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., and as such had free
access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them
with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check
No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00, representing payment made by customer
Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated
amount of P10,000.00.
Prosecution's evidence
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner
Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's
purchases from Mega Foam and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. The check was
deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is
the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land
Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform
Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the
latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask
Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash and
divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca,
upon the advice of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph
Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed handed
petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00. Verification from company records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega
Foam P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his bank
account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown woman arrived at his
house to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even
bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank
that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didn’t know where to find the woman who
rediscounted the check.
Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked
and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was
tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.
On August 21, 2007, Ricablanca went to petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and Jacqueline
Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle
decided not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping.
Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was
getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was the
P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the money and upon
returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia
were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent
powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that petitioner and Valencia
handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two and one Jane
Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
Version of the defense
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997, but
claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her
resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her
mother’s house, where she was staying at that time, and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to
Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General
Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby
Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their
jeep, which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca
placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997.
According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if
she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she
agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did not know where Baby
Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of petitioner's mother,
rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at
said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes,
Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, "What is
this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
The RTC finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft.
Three appealed to the CA, but the latter only modified the ruling of the RTC. CA modified that the
sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced
to 4 months arresto mayor medium; and the accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft (NO)
RULING
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the crime
of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code:
1) the taking of personal property;
2) said property belonged to another;
3) the taking was done with intent to gain;
4) it was done without the owner’s consent;
5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force
upon things; and
6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the personal
property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the
thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the
crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
Intod vs. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the accused,
intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was
not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted
murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined
and penalized by Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of
producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provision read as follows:
Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were
it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property;
2) that the act was done with evil intent; and
3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as
an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime
against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the
check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. The thing
unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the marked money, which she thought was the cash
replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The crime of theft is committed or produced
when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Unlawful
taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession of
the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it
not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.
Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only
after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing
offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of
the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely
corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its
issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or
covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused;
otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme
could have been another possible source of criminal liability.
Thus, the petition is granted. The decision of the CA was modified. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found
guilty of an impossible crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. REGIE LABIAGA, APPELLANT

G.R. No. 202867, 15 July 2013, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio, J.)
FACTS
At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and Glenelyn
Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Gregorio stepped outside. Glenelyn was
in their store, which was part of their house. Labiaga, who was approximately five meters away from
Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorio’s
aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The two other accused, Alias Balatong Barcenas and Cristy
Demapanag, were standing behind the appellant, when Labiaga said, "she is already dead," and the three
fled the crime scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on arrival while
Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.
Labiaga that it was self-defense and Gregorio Conde armed with a shotgun challenged him into a fight.
That Labiaga tried to take away the firearm from Conde and during the struggle the firearm discharged.
Labiaga also stated that he did not know if anyone was hit by the gunshot.
Trial Court
RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence. Appellant, however, was convicted of
murder and frustrated murder. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @
"Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-
1555 and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with accessory penalty
provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said accused
to a prison term ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, together with the necessary
penalty provided by law and without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.
Accused’s entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when the
accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crimes charged in
both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed
to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some other valid or
lawful cause.
Court of Appeals
CA upheld the conviction for murder and frustrated murder. However it modified the decision by
imposing moral and exemplary damages in both criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated March 10, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
The dispositive portion of the said Joint Decision should now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga @
"Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-1555
and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalty
provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay Gregorio Conde ₱25,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs Accused(’s) entire period of detention shall be deducted from the
penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crime(s) charged in
both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby directed
to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some other valid or
lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUES
Whether or not the CA was correct in upholding the conviction of frustrated murder (NO)
RULING
Labiaga is guilty of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.— Consummated felonies as well as those which
are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment
are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano vs. People, we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this manner:
1) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution.
2) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason
for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own
spontaneous desistance.
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it not
for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would
have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal. This was
admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura who examined Gregorio after the shooting incident. Since Gregorio’s
gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted of attempted murder and not
frustrated murder.
Justifying Circumstances of Self-defense

Appellant’s attempt to invoke self-defense was correctly rejected by the RTC and the CA-Cebu. This
Court, in People v. Damitan, explained that:
When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to
him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of his defense. However, appellant’s
version of the incident was uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of the prosecution.
Appellant’s failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate his testimony and his unconvincing
demonstration of the struggle between him and Gregorio before the RTC lead us to reject his claim of
self-defense. Also, as correctly pointed out by the CA-Cebu, appellant’s theory of self-defense is belied
by the fact that:
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police Gregorio’s alleged unlawful
aggression and that it was Gregorio who owned the gun, as appellant claimed. And, when
appellant was arrested the following morning, he did not also inform the police that what
happened to Gregorio was merely accidental.
In contrast, we find that the Condes’ account of the incident is persuasive. Both the CA-Cebu and the
RTC found that the testimonies of the Condes were credible and presented in a clear and convincing
manner. This Court has consistently put much weight on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO

G.R. No. 149433, 20 March 2000, EN BANC (Bellosillo, J.)
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female
organ," but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia
of the pudendum," or "the bombardment of the drawbridge." But, to our mild, the case at bar merely
constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of
passion.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely
for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ
or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
FACTS
In April 25, 1996, around 4 p.m. Ma. Corazon Pamintuan, mother of 4 year old Crysthel Pamintuan went
downstairs to prepare Milo chocolate drink for her 2 children. She met Primo Campuhan, helper of
Conrado Plata Jr. (Corazon’s brother). As Corazon was preparing the drinks she heard one of her
daughters cry “Ay’oko ay’oko” she rushed upstairs and found Campuhan inside the children’s room
kneeling before Crysthel whose and underwear were already removed, while his short pants were down to
his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the
accused, and punched him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants and ran. Corazon
then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living
within their compound, to chase the accused. Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who
answered Corazon's call for help.
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court
a quo to the extreme penalty of death, hence this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.
Campuhan argues that the assailed the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly
harbored ill will against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. He asserted that in truth Crysthel was
in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of
them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became
hysterical.
Campuhan assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her narration should not be
given any weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible statements and improbabilities. He
claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthel's younger
sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her
daughters. Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact that the episode happened within
the family compound where a call for assistance could easily be heard and responded to, would have been
enough to deter him from committing the crime.
Trial Court
The trial court found him guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death, and
ordered him to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the
costs.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw
Primo with his short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were
supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina." The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided
in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually
molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion perpetua to death, to the single indivisible penalty of
death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven (7) years old.
Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to the
extreme penalty of death, hence this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.
ISSUES
1. Whether the accused is guilty of consummated rape? (NO)
RULING
The accused is only guilty of attempted rape.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female
organ," but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia
of the pudendum," or "the bombardment of the drawbridge." But, to our mild, the case at bar merely
constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of
passion.
In People v. De la Peña, the Court clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attacker's
penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the
presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an
erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim's vagina, the
Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused
repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of
her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva, or that the penis of the accused touched
the middle part of her vagina. Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere
epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external
layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing
proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely
for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ
or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
In this case, the prosecutor failed to show that Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina
however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting
her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between
Primo and Crysthel. In addition, based on Crysthel’s testimonies, she made a categorical statement
denying penetration. The Court has to to conclude that even on the basis of the testimony of Crysthel
alone the accused cannot be held liable for consummated rape; worse, be sentenced to death.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no external
signs of physical injuries on complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical perspective that
penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the absence of complete
penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no medical
basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y
BELLO guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is
instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8)
years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten
(10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.

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