Wittgenstein, Games, and Art

Author(s): B. R. Tilghman
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Summer, 1973), pp. 517-
524
Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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 B. R. TILGHMAN

Wittgenstein, Games, and Art

I He continues his answer by reminding us

how the word is taught. The meaning of
TO A PHILOSOPHER dissatisfied with tradi- the word is taught, not by providing the
tional attempts to define art, the appeal of learner with a set of strict criteria, but
what Ludwig Wittgenstein says about
by acquainting him with various examples
meaning by way of his discussion of games of games; he then learns to call other
is obvious. Talk about games was intro-
duced into the Philosophical Investiga- things "games"because they resemble in one
tionsl as an analogy intended
way or another the-paradigm-examples.
to illumi-
"How should we explain to someone what a
nate certain important aspects of lan-
game is? I imagine that we should describe
guage, but not as a part of theory of lan- games to him, and we might add: 'This and
guage. Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the similar things are called
"games"'." [?69]
temptation to turn the language-game anal- What similarities will be out to jus-
picked
ogy into a philosophical theory about the tify calling a game cannot and
essence of language. There is no essence of need not be something
specified ahead of time, and if
language in the sense of something common this means that the
to all cases that serves as the defining criter- words will application of our
frequently not have precisely de-
ion for the word "language." [?65] It is in limited
boundaries, it does not follow that
explaining this that Wittgenstein examines their application is forever
the use of the word "game" and points out arbitrary and
subject to no rational discussion.
that there is no one feature common to all
It has been argued that we do not need a
things we call games, but rather that they
are bound together by a complex series of technical definition of "art" just as we do
not need such a definition of "game" as a
overlapping similarities that he describes as
"family resemblances." In response to the prior condition of using the word. The
question of what justifies the application of word "art" can be applied to an object be-
"game" in any particular case, since there is cause it bears some relevant resemblance to
no one thing common to all instances an agreed upon paradigm, just as "game"
where the word applies, Wittgenstein an- can be applied to an activity because it has
swers by warning that it is a mistake to a relevant resemblance to some paradig-
insist that there must be something com- matic game. This is how Morris Weitz puts
mon, else they would not all be called it.
"games" and that we should "look and see" The problem of the nature of art is like that of
whether there is anything common. [?66] the nature of games, at least in these respects:
If we actually look and see what it is that we
B. R. TILGHMAN is head of the department of call "art," we will find no common properties-
philosophy at Kansas State University. He has only strands of similarities. Knowing what art is
published The Expression of Emotion in the is not apprehending some manifest or latent
YVisualArts: A Philosophical Inquiry (1970). essence but being able to recognize, describe, and

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 518 B. R. TILGHMAN

explain those things we call "art" in virtue ofthe ball carrier by throwing him to the
these similarities.2
ground, etc. We can also detail the impor-
tant differences and explain about scrums
II as contrasted to scrimmages. There are
Before examining the cogency of this enough points of contact between the two
move from "games" to "art," it will be nec- games, and we know enough about what is
on the questioner's mind, to give us a
essary first to look more carefully at Witt-
discussion of Two obser- handle on the question and permit us to
genstein's games.
vations need making. have some idea of what similarities and
In the first place, although Wittgenstein what differences are the relevant ones.
is clearly right in warning against thinking But now suppose that we are asked how
that all games must have something in com- parcheesi is like football. The question has
mon to merit the use of the common word, a queer sound. Of course, the question
that is, we must not let a theory of meaning might be the result of being under the mis-
lead us by the nose, nevertheless there is apprehension that parcheesi is a kind of
Hindu football. If this is so, it will not do
something in his advice that we "look and
see" whether there is anything common to answer with anything like, "In football a
that bears questioning. The question, Do team is given four downs to advance the
all games have something in common? is ball ten yeards, but in parcheesi...." The
treated as if its meaning is clear. If it makes proper response would be to explain
sense to ask what all games might have in enough about the game to make clear the
common, then it ought to make just as nature of the mistake. What, however, can
much sense to ask what, if anything, any be made of the question put by someone
two particular games have in common. I not under that kind of misapprehension I
want to challenge this for I do not think am not at all sure. Would it be an answer
such questions are always intelligible. to point out that both involve winning and
What is probably the single most impor- losing? That would depend, I suppose, on
tant thing we have learned from Wittgen- what the point of the question was. It is not
stein is that an expression can be under- easy to imagine what the point of this ques-
stood only when it plays a role in a lan- tion might be and what sense is to be made
guage-game and that our language is intelli- of it.
gible only when seen against the back- Questions, or perhaps it would be better
ground of human activities and forms of to say, forms of words that look like ques-
life. Philosophical problems arise when we tions, such as the one just mentioned, are
try to understand language apart from the the stuff of which riddles are made. How is
requisite context, that is, when "language parcheesi like football? reminds us of the
goes on holiday." Thus, when we ask what children's conundrum, How is an old man
3
two particular games have in common, how like a window? only we have no idea what
they are alike or possibly unlike, we do not the punning answer might be that-after a
fashion-redeems it. If it will not always do
know what this question means apart from
to compare two games in a search for simi-
the specification of a setting for the ques-
larities, then surely to entertain the suppo-
tion. Until that is made clear, we really do
sition that all games might have a common
not know what it is that is in question nor
feature becomes even more suspicious. The
what will do by way of answer. implications for the analogous question
Suppose, for example, someone who about art are immense.
knows one game well, but has only rather When Wittgenstein talks about the var-
sketchy notions about the other, asks in ious features that may or may not be com-
what respects rugby and American football mon to different games, he does not men-
resemble each other. We can reply that they tion such details as whether the ball can be
both involve running with the ball and picked up and run with or how many
trying to carry it across the opponent's goal places a piece can be moved on a throw of
line while the opposition is trying to stop the dice. Rather, he lists a very few charac-

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Wittgenstein, Games, and Art 519
teristics of a much more general nature, ferent uses of the word "game," the differ-
amusement, winning and losing, competi- ent situations in which the word gets used,
tion, skill, and luck. It is not nearly as diffi- and the diverse points that can be served by
cult, I think, to discover a context in which using it.
a comparison of different games in terms of Wittgenstein's account in paragraph 69
these characteristics is quite in order. of how the word "game" is taught, by de-
Imagine a schoolmaster who wishes to in- scribing games to someone and then adding
troduce a number of games into the educa- that these and similar things are called
tion of his pupils. He wants games that will "games," is misleading. We certainly do not
do various jobs, e.g., develop intellectual teach the word "game" to children by de-
skills such as ability in arithmetic, enhance scribing games to them; we teach them by
physical conditioning, that will encourage teaching them to play games. In teaching
competition between rivals or cooperation children to play games we teach them, natu-
among partners, games that are played by rally, the rules of play and how to follow
strict rules that will require an official to them, techniques of play, points of strategy,
supervise, and more informal ones that can how to keep score, and so on. But other
be gotten up by the children themselves in things are taught in addition: I am think-
an idle hour, and so on. The schoolmaster ing of such things as the spirit in which the
will run over all the games that he can game is to be entered, notions of fair play
think of with these categories in mind, like and sportsmanship, and the etiquette, fre-
this, "I want a game to teach counting, quently very elaborate and ritualized, that
Monopoly will do very well, but not foot- can govern the comportment of both play-
ball; on the other hand, football is good ers and spectators, all in all, a richer body
physical training and Monopoly is quite of behavior and attitudes than is necessarily
useless for that ..." and so on. In the light suggested by Wittgenstein's passing refer-
of this, to say that there is no one feature ence to amusement and competition. What
that all games have in common is simply to wants emphasizing is the fact that learning
say that no such classification scheme will the concept "game" involves learning to
have one category that will include all the play games and this in turn involves, in
many things and activities we are willing to addition to learning what might be called
call games. the mechanics of games, e.g., rules, skills,
The second observation begins with an and the like, entering into a very complex
impression that it is possible to get from system of human relationships.
one kind of reading of Wittgenstein and In his Memoir of Wittgenstein,4 Malcolm
that is that the primary use of the word relates an occasion upon which he, Mrs.
"game" is to identify and classify activities. Malcolm and Wittgenstein were taking a
From this point of view it might be thought walk and Wittgenstein suggested that in
that the main contribution that he has their progress they enact the movements of
made to the philosophy of language is his the earth and moon about the sun. Mrs.
pointing out that identifying and classify- Malcolm was the sun and walked straight
ing are not the rigorous exercises that they ahead; Malcolm was the earth and trotted
were hitherto thought to be. But all this in a big circle about her; Wittgenstein was
makes it appear that there is nothing really the moon and sprinted epicyclically around
at stake in calling something a game, or Malcolm. Imagine two observers of these
anything else for that matter, except possi- proceedings. One asks in a suspicious tone
ble alternative schemes of classification, and of voice "What are you doing?" He thinks
that in troublesome borderline cases one perhaps he is in the presence of some weird
can say what one likes as long as one is ritual or something equally untoward. His
clear about what is being said, that is, the suspicions can be disarmed by the reply,
extent to which it is the similarities or the "We are only playing a game." The other
dissimilarities to some selected paradigm observer, in quite a different tone, asks,
that are being appealed to. And this way of "Are you playing a game? " Here the reply
looking at it only tends to obscure the dif- might well be, "It's not really a game,"

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 520
where the intention is to point out that it is
not as formal an undertaking as it was
thought to be. Calling it a game in one
breath and denying it in the next need not
seem either odd or inconsistent if the point
of using that word is kept in mind. The
word "game" in such instances is not ap-
plied or withheld on the basis of similari-
ties or the lack of them with some paradigm
in order to achieve a classification, but is
used, rather, to put the activity in a certain
light, e.g., to show it as harmless rather
than sinister or as improvised and idle
amusement rather than contest of skill con-
ducted according to rules.
It is only against the background of a
complex set of human activities and rela-
tions that we can understand the following
sorts of remarks that might be made at the
stadium of a Saturday afternoon. This is no
game; it's a slaughter! This is no game;
they're playing for blood. This is no game;
it's a business! To say such things is to com-
ment upon the one-sidedness of the contest,
the viciousness of the play, or the motives
of some of those involved; it is not to make
an identification or classification of the ac-
tivity, but is to characterize that activity in
a certain way by putting it in a certain
light. There is no objecting here, "But I
was taught to call football a game."
III
Now to art. It will not do to answer the
question, Do all works of art have some-
thing in common? in the negative for that
presupposes the intelligibility of the claim
being denied. What would it be like if all
works of art did have something in com-
mon? If all works of art have something in
common, then any two works of art must
have something in common and thus the
question, How is work A like work B? is
always in order. This was just the kind of
question that seemed so peculiar when
asked of games and I am inclined to think
its sense is even more difficult to get hold of
when it is asked about works of art.
Suppose the question is, How is Braque's
The Portugese like Picasso's Accordianist?
This question is typical of those often
raised in art appreciation and art history
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B. R. TILGHMAN
classrooms. The answer follows easily be-
cause of the remarkable resemblance of the
two paintings. Both employ the cubist de-
vice of breaking up the figure into lines and
planes, both use the same muted colors, and
so on. Now compare Manet's Olympia with
Titian's Venus of Urbino. Here about all we
can find in common is the pose of the nude
on the couch. All the rest, the texture, space
composition, use of color, etc., is altogether
different. As a third example, try asking
how the Titian is like Mondrian's Broad-
way Boogie Woogie. It is not at all clear
what will do as an answer in this instance.
What is the basis of comparison and what is
to be looked for? The question might have
been introduced as a rhetorical way of call-
ing attention to the vast changes that have
taken place in four hundred years of paint-
ing, but that aside, it is not easy to imagine
what sense the question might have.
The muddle gets even thicker when we
try to compare the Titian with the Par-
thenon, East Coker, Finlandia, or Tiny
Alice, to list only a few possibilities. This is
not intended to deny the obvious fact that
paintings, pieces of sculpture, and works of
architecture can frequently manifest affini-
ties of style and design nor that it some-
times makes sense and may even be enlight-
ening to compare quite diverse art forms in
specific cases. Wylie Sypher's Four Stages of
Renaissance Style is an example of a sus-
tained effort to draw a series of parallels
between visual art and literature despite
the suspicion that the similarities are more
metaphorical than literal. When "unre-
solved tensions and contradictions" are said
to be features of both mannerist painting
and poetry, one suspects that "tensions"
and "contradictions" are being used in
somewhat different, although related, ways.
This notwithstanding, Sypher sometimes
has something to tell us.
Traditional aesthetic theories, however,
have never attempted to compare works of
art in the ways that I have been doing.
They have never sorted out items in terms
of the particulars of any art form, that is to
say, in looking for common elements they
have never singled out as candidates line,
color, space composition, meter, rhyme
scheme, harmonic intervals, or any such
Wittgenstein, Games, and Art 521
things. The stuff of aesthetic theories is, to this training, or lack of it, is often
rather, imitation, expression, significant thereby impaired. This may lead to prob-
form, and objectified pleasure. The diffi- lems, but not necessarily philosophical
culty with these theories is not that they are ones. What I do want to insist upon is the
too wide or too narrow, that they admit too centrality of looking, listening, and reading,
much that is not art or leave out too much that is, I want to call attention to the im-
that is art; it is either that they are so intol- portance, the conceptual importance, of the
erably vague that they can be stretched to enjoyment, appreciation, and understand-
fit anything, and hence nothing, or that ing of the many different things that get
they are part and parcel of some more gen- called works of art and that come only with
eral philosophical theory whose intelligibil- some training and experience.
ity is itself very much in question. It should not be supposed that the things
This much can now be concluded: indi- we teach people about works of art and
vidual works of art can be compared and how to understand and appreciate them are
similarities picked out, but there are limita- in any way the result of some theory about
tions-grammatical limitations-on doing what is and what is not art. This is just the
this. It does not always make sense to ask supposition that Maurice lMandelbaum
what two works of art have in common. seems to make in commenting on Paul
Ziff's description of Poussin's Rape of the
IV Sabine Women. Ziff talks about the paint-
ing by referring to its sensuous features, its
If the possibility of all works of art hav- design, and the fact that it is a representa-
ing something in common is ruled out, tion of a mythological scene.6 Mandelbaum
what justifies the application of the word then makes the curious remark that in fo-
"art" in any particular instance? Pursuing cusing attention on the features that he
the parallel with Wittgenstein's account of does, Ziff "is making an implicit appeal to
"game," we could answer with a reminder what is at least a minimal aesthetic theory,
about how the word is taught. Only it will that is, he is supposing that neither weight
not do to say that we teach someone the nor insurable value need be mentioned
word by describing works of art to him and when we list the characteristics which lead
adding that these and similar things are us to say ... it is a work of art." 6 But Ziff
called "art." This was an inadequate ac- isn't supposing anything; he is simply doing
count for games and it is even more inade- what one does when one looks at and talks
quate for art. Children are not taught the about a painting in the way that one ought
word "art" in this way. Instead we teach to do these things. There is no theory here,
them by teaching them art appreciation. only what we do. One might as well say
MWeteach them how to look at paintings, that by his opening with a bid of two
how to read literature, how to listen to hearts, having the honor count to do so,
music, and we encourage them to paint pic- rather than calling for the fullback to carry
tures, write poems, and play music for them- the ball off tackle, Culbertson made an im-
selves. We teach them, eventually, about plicit appeal to what is at least a minimal
different periods and styles, that the quat- theory of bridge. No; that is just how the
trocento must be approached differently game is played and that is just how we look
from the impressionists, that Wordsworth at paintings.
must be read differently from Donne and There is an impression one gets from
Eliot, and that we should not look for the reading a great deal of traditional aesthetic
same things in the French classical theater theory which is reinforced by philosophers
that we expect to find on the Elizabethan such as Weitz and Kennick who have dis-
stage. puted with the tradition over the matter of
Unfortunately, the education of children definition. It is that we are frequently being
in art and its appreciation is not as system- called upon to identify objects as works of
atic and widespread as we might wish and art and to distinguish them from those
the understanding of the notion consequent things that are not art. In the light of this,

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 522 B. R. TILGHMAN

the issue would seem to turn around the vant to the decision. The government
stringency of the principle upon which argued that Brancusi was not known as an
identification is practised, that is, whether artist and that the Bird did not look like a
we must go about armed with a set of neces- piece of sculpture. Brancusi's side coun-
sary and sufficient conditions or whether we tered that he was well known as an artist in
may be permitted to do our labeling with a Europe, that the Bird was crafted by hand
looser "family resemblance" model. with an artistic purpose in mind, and that
That the issue presents itself in this way the past decades had seen important
suggests that something has gone wrong. It changes in the artistic tradition. It might be
is simply not the case that we are very often worth adding that in addition to the imme-
called upon to identify something as a work diate legal and economic issues at stake, the
of art and then it is only in rather special decision probably had the further effect, in
circumstances. Indeed, I am tempted to re- the United States at least, of encouraging
mark that the expression "work of art" has certain artistic trends and hastening their
something artifical about it; I mean it gets public acceptance.
bandied about far more in aesthetics books A short while ago an exhibit was held in
and philosophical discussions than it does a student union building made up largely
in the stream of life, even in that stream of of assemblages of found objects. One of
artistic life inhabited by painters and poets these was a stack of railroad ties roped to-
and the people who run galleries and fre- gether into a bundle. Imagine that just be-
quent them and all the rest. It is only in fore the exhibit was to open this stack of
this stream of life that the diverse uses of ties was delivered to the building and left
"art" and all its friends and relations, on the loading dock. Some employee might
"painting," "sculpture," "poem," "novel," well have been in doubt about what it was
and so on, can be understood. It is here that he had on his hands, thinking perhaps
that the earlier remarks about the concep- that it was something left over from the
tual relation between the word "art" and recent construction work that the builder's
its kindred and art education take on par- men had forgotten to carry off. He would
ticular importance. The stream of artistic have to be told that it was a work of art so
life involves not only those who paint, he would know that it was to be carried
write, and compose, but also those who ap- into the gallery instead of being carted off.
preciate, dislike, discuss, criticize, and buy We can also without difficulty imagine
and sell, and this stream of life would not our employee making sport of the claim
exist without a process of education and that it is art as he dutifully trucks the bag-
training both for performers and audience. gage into the gallery. This plain man's
It is only by ignoring this context of artistic mockery is no doubt altogether philistine,
life and practice that definition, identifica- but it nevertheless allows us to approach
tions, and labels can be made to appear so another kind of use of "work of art." He
important. rejects the thing as "art" because he likely
If the word "art" is to be applied to a thinks of art in rather simple representa-
thing intelligibly, it must be done with tional terms with sensitivity to design,
something in mind; there must be a job to color, and all that, scarcely entering in. He
be done, a point to be made; in a word, probably takes the same stance before all
something must depend upon its being that he indiscriminately labels "modern"
called "art" or not. Consider the celebrated art. On the other hand, imagine a more
Brancusi case. Is the Brancusi Bird a work knowledgeable and sophisticated visitor to
of art or merely a piece of raw metal on that exhibit; a professor of aesthetics per-
which import duties are to be levied? The haps. He is very much at home in the his-
judge decided that the Bird, indeed, was a tory of art; he dearly loves the post-impres-
work of art. Here something was at issue sionists, the cubists, Mondrian, and Calder's
and something depended upon the judge's mobiles. Yet he is puzzled by the railroad
application of "work of art" and we have a ties. Is this art? What is behind this ques-
pretty clear idea of the considerations rele- tion? He is too much aware of the history of

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Wittgenstein, Games, and Art
the avant garde to dismiss the unfamiliar
out of hand. What bothers him is this: the
ties are not interesting as a formal design,
thley have no color or texture that is worth
a second glance, and they are not symbolic
-surely there are more effective ways to
suggest the sad demise of the age of steam
or America the junk pile-in short, he does
not know how to look at them or what to
look for. There does not seem to be any-
thing in his previous experience of familiar
art forms and traditions that helps him to
appreciate and understand this unfamiliar
form. The question, Is this art? in the pres-
ent instance comes, virtually, to the ques-
tion, How am I to take this?
I think this is what is at the center of so
many of the controversies that have sur-
rounded new movements in art, whether it
be the outcry that accompanied the first im-
pressionist showings or that the most recent
capers have occasioned. The claim that
earthworks, graves dug and filled again, and
plastic hamburgers are works of art produce
either puzzlement or outrage because we do
not know how to take them since we cannot
connect them in any significant ways to our
familiar traditions. The claim that such
things are in fact art is one that will have to
be made good by teaching people how to
look at them and appreciate them. There is,
of course, no guarantee that such education
will have to proceed by demonstrating links
with otherwise familiar styles and tradi-
tions.
The following are some uses of "art" that
can be understood only by recalling that
the word is learned in connection with the
development of aesthetic sensitivity and ap-
preciation. A finely wrought ship model can
be called a work of art by way of comment
upon the craftmanship shown in it, al-
though it would never occur to an art histo-
rian to speak of it in his scholarly studies. A
painter may dismiss another painter as no
artist at all, but only a mere illustrator,
while finding nothing amiss in his listing
his occupation as that of artist. Bruno Wal-
ter tells us that early in his life, "I consi-
dered dance music perfectly proper for pur-
poses of entertainment, but my boyishly se-
rious mind was absolutely opposed to mix-
ing art with amusement." 7 In these exam-
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523
ples, applying or withholding the word
"art" is not done as a way of identifying or
even classifying things, but rather as a way
of directing attention to certain features of
them so they may be made to appear in a
certain light. It is worth noting that "art" is
used in each of these examples to mark a
specific contrast, e.g., skillfully as opposed
to clumsily done, having something to say,
some vision of things to get across, as op-
posed to executing designs no matter how
skillful, pleasing, or decorative, as serious as
opposed to diverting.
Here is an example where it is in order to
talk about classifying things as works of art.
Acting for a commercial agent, I am given
the job of doing an inventory of the estate
of a recently deceased and wealthy parvenu
for purposes of an action sale. I am given
the categories into which it all must go,
"furniture," "kitchen ware," "silverware,"
and so forth. One of the categories is
"works of art." I have no trouble in picking
out quite a number of things to be tagged
"art"-paintings, tapestries, sculpture-no
matter how execrable the taste. Is it signifi-
cant that books would likely have their own
category although I might well have to sort
them into "literature," "reference," and so
on? But what about the life-size statue of
the Nubian slave girl in the front hall by
the staircase, the one with the lamp on her
head and the clock in her belly? Is it a work
of art, a piece of furniture, or a miscella-
neous? I have to make a decision here and
my decision will not be guided by any ab-
stract considerations of aesthetic theory, but
rather by what I know of the tastes and
wishes of the dealers I represent and of
those of their prospective customers. If the
sale is to be held in Miami Beach, we might
represent her as "work of art"; in San Fran-
cisco, she might go as "conversation piece";
and in Philadelphia, she might well remain
discretely unmentioned.
In the light of all this we can better un-
derstand what can go wrong with the kind
of philosophical generalization in the con-
temporary vein that a philosopher such as
Kennick makes when he says "we are able
to separate those objects which are works of
art from those which are not, because we
know English." 8 This is not to be objected
 524
to so long as we keep in mind how complex
a thing knowing English is and, especially,
that there is a form of life that lies behind
the words. But this tends to be forgotten,
for in the next paragraph Kennick asks us
to imagine a warehouse full of a great num-
ber of things from which someone is to pick
out all the works of art. This he thinks
could be done with reasonable success de-
spite the lack of a philosophical definition
of art; such a definition, he believes, would
in fact only confuse and get in the way of
the picking out. It would be difficult, I sug-
gest, to find a more glaring example of lan-
guage gone on holiday. To tell someone to
go into the world, for Kennick's warehouse
is the world, without further ado and pick
out all the works of art is not to tell him
anything. The thrust of all my examples
has been directed at bringing home the ne-
cessity for a context in which alone "art"
can have a use, make a point, mark a con-
trast, do a job. Kennick has given us no
context in which to understand the request
to pick out, and hence has specified no use
at all for the word "art."
In the last two or three years the campus
of Kansas State University has had placed
about it several of the results of a series of
"Art in Situation" workshops.9 These pieces
have been the subject of a good deal of
controversy. One piece is an abstract con-
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B. R. TILGHMAN
crete affair (no contradiction) that I pass
regularly on my way about the campus.
There are a number of things about it that
I could discuss with another. We might talk
about its being or not being an interesting
design, whether it does or does not harmo-
nize properly with its surroundings,
whether or not it presents a pleasant inter-
lude in a campus stroll, and so on. Suppose,
however, that after all this discussion has
gone on, someone insists upon raising the
additional question, "But is it really a work
of art?" I want to say that this question
does not always make sense.
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investega-
tions (Oxford, 1958).
2 Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aes-
thetics," JAAC (Sept. 1956), p. 31.
3 He has pains.
4Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A
Memoir (London, 1958).
6 Paul Ziff, "The Task of Defining a Work of
Art," Philosophical Review (Jan. 1953).
Maurice Mandelbaum, "Family Resemblances
and Generalizations Concerning the Arts," Ameri-
can Philosophical Quarterly (July 1965), p. 224.
7 Bruno Walter, Theme and Variation (New York,
1947), p. 32.
8 W. E. Kennick, "Does Traditional Aesthetics
Rest on a Mistake?" Mind (July 1958), p. 321.
8"Travel and Study," Craft Horizons (May/June
1970), p. 42.