Throughout history, great military minds attempted to convert the art of warfare into a

science-based repeatable process. Many military institutions study Jomini, Clausewitz, and Sun

Tzu as the foundation of military theory. Arguments for analyzing classical theorists posit those

military theories are timeless and applicable across various forms of warfare. Modern warfare

terrain has changed dramatically with the addition of air, cyber, and space domains. Jomini

defined strategy as “the art of making war on a map.”1 Jomini’s map is inherently two-

dimensional and tangible, while air, space, and cyber domains are increasingly not. Clausewitz’s

general theory revolves around war as an instrument of policy and the trinity of people, military,

and government.2 This theory relies on an antiquated definition of war incompatible with the

modern environment. Sun Tzu’s five factors and nine variables can be applied to various wars,

much like Clausewitz and Jomini’s theories, because they are broad.3 Broad theories can be used

as a framework for many situations but lack specificity to apply practically. Modern military

theorists can arguably conceive these general theories without extensive study of classical

theorists but through research on contemporary warfare. Classical military theorists contribute

little to future warfare studies because air, space, and cyber terrain are more abstract, the

definition of war has changed, and modern theorists can provide evolved theories through

experience and studies of contemporary war.

War on an “air map” is less focused on mass and maneuver due to three-dimensional

movement and technology. Napoleonic wars heavily influenced Jomini and Clausewitz’s

experience, culminating in theories focused on land maneuvers and their associated logistics. Sun

Tzu draws his conclusions from eastern wars, but his principles are predominantly similar. Land

force maneuver is markedly different from air force maneuver. In aerial combat, the ability to

mass forces for a decisive point is less critical than a technological advantage in aircraft and
weaponry. If a singular aircraft can carry multiple effective long-range missiles and remain

undetectable to enemy aircraft, then massing enemy aircraft becomes a lousy strategy. Aircraft

fuel is the only resource in aerial combat requiring logistics. Aerial combat range and duration

are determined by fuel, weapons remaining, and human factors. Logistical concepts of classical

theorists cannot solve aircraft limitations of fuel, weapons, and human factors. Aircraft need to

land to rearm, and pilots need to be replaced to be effective. Interior and exterior lines of

communication do not exist within the same context as land maneuvers in aerial combat because

the lines become contorted.

Maneuver theories developed by Jomini, Clausewitz, or Sun Tzu are incompatible with

space. Space “terrain” is a vacuum with a low particle density drastically different from air.

Space maneuver becomes more complex using Newton’s third law of motion in a three-

dimensional environment with no definitive sense of direction. Space operations have no

massing of force upon a decisive point.4 Maneuvers in space are heavily dictated by gravity, and

spacecraft orbits keep them in a state of being. Resources are severely limited, as resupply

logistics are expensive and complex, so moving spacecraft out of its orbit is calculated and

limited. As in air, lines of communication, in the sense of logistics, do not exist the same way

they do on land. “Knowing when to fight and when not to fight” provides little practicality in

space since encounters between spacecraft will be defined by physics, and engagement windows

are short due to velocity.5 A leg of Clausewitz’s trinity is removed with a separation of

equipment and people. Distance between people and combat inherently builds a disconnect and

lowers emotional response, thus decreasing “primordial violence” and collapsing the paradoxical

trinity.6 Human factors in space warfare will be less violent than those Jomini, Clausewitz, and

Sun Tzu experienced.

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 Unlike air and space, the cyber domain has become more abstract. There are no defined

boundaries or laws of physics within networks, only assets, data, and access. The cyber

maneuver is conducted within the physical and mental plane. In contrast, cyber terrain is a

network of information requiring access and decision-making to acquire or deny information and

control. There are no traditional logistical lines within cyber to apply classical military theories.

Cyber operations rely heavily on technology procurement and less on maneuvers and tactics.

Offensive and defensive actions within operations have blurred since their intent is the sole

distinguishing element. Like space, cyber operators do not exist in the same physical plane as

their operations. Cyber operators use their technical skills to determine cyber intent versus

executing violence defined traditionally. Technological advancements have progressively

connected everything to the cyber domain creating vulnerabilities. Control of these

vulnerabilities grants the victor access to cripple and control a nation. New theories to define

space and cyber maneuver requires careful studies of recent events to redefine warfare and

develop new military approaches.

Globalization and expansion of technology in space and cyber domains have changed the

classical definition of war. Clausewitz defines war as “the act of force to compel our enemy to do

our will.”7 Force, in this context, means a military action taken upon the enemy. Economic

globalization has changed the definition of force and, thus, war. Nations find themselves in

constant economic conflict to achieve political ends. Hobbes says there are three natures of man:

competition, diffidence, and glory.8 Competition transformed economic levers into a modern-day

“force,” and constant conflict means nations are already at war. Classical theorists focus on

military actions with a defined beginning and end to war, while modern war has no definitive

beginning and end, only magnitude and category of force. The lines between offense and defense

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are indistinguishable since every action creates a counteraction and the nature of these actions

depends on each side's point of view. Economy has evolved beyond the classical theorists' idea

of funding conflict to becoming a force of its own and changed our definition of war.

Classical definition of force and war has changed, reinforced by space and cyber

conflicts. Satellite posturing has evolved into a continuous competition for space dominance.

Daily battles of offensive and defensive actions in cyber networks for information dominance

and access continue the trend of perpetual competition. Nations regularly use space and cyber

force to compel others to their will, and war is changed by its ease of use. Endless competition

forces nations to exhaust resources to conduct steady alterations of defensive and offensive

operations. By applying the modern definition of force to Clausewitz’s definition of war,

governments are perpetually at war in the modern era.

General military theories can be conceived through studying warfare without studying

past theorists. Clausewitz states, “no general can accustom an army to war.”9 Preparation for

future wars relies on extensive war experience for success. US Air Force developed Red Flag to

simulate combat experiences for pilots to increase survival rates in war. Studying modern

warfare becomes more essential and provides military theorists with context for current theories

applicable to air, space, and cyber domains. Experiences in air, space, and cyber domains

become critical to developing a usable framework to conduct war in those domains. David

Kilcullen, a modern military theorist, described a landscape favoring stealth, dispersion,

modularity, and small bands.10 He argues smaller bands become smaller targets for attack.11 Mass

of forces presents an easy target and counters classical theorist writings. Mao quotes Clausewitz

by saying, “Wars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and,

therefore, every period must have its independent theory of war.”12

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 Theories developed from Napoleonic wars or China’s late spring and autumn period

provide little usable theory applicable to modern warfare. Military theory can be defined as the

study and analysis of warfare to provide a framework for war. It can be argued classical military

theorists provide context for the evolution of warfare and thus warrant investigation from

military leaders. Jomini, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu derived their military theories through analysis

of warfare in their era. Their experience and, thus, theories are primarily irrelevant when applied

to air, space, and cyber conflicts since those domains are nonexistent in their warfare.

Technology has shaped air operations and created space and cyber domains requiring different

experiences to develop theories based on their abstract nature. Without emerging technology,

classical theorists’ understanding favored maneuvers of land forces, logistics to provide supplies,

and political and economic influences on war. In contrast, modern warfare relies on logistics

differently in each domain, and economic power has become a force of its own.

A separate argument can be made for classical theorists' contributions in providing a

relevant framework for land and maritime forces. Sun Tzu says, “nothing is more difficult than

the art of maneuver,” so prudence suggests studying classical theorists when developing

strategy.13 This thought discounts contemporary warfare’s inherently joint nature. Modern land

and maritime maneuvers in conventional war require joint support to achieve success from air,

space, and cyberspace. Additions of present-day domains alter maneuver theories provided by

classical theorists. Defined concepts of interior and exterior lines become less relevant as

military fronts become more fluid due to strategic strike capabilities within air, space, and

cyberspace. A perceptive military theorist studying contemporary joint warfare is more well-

equipped to derive suitable maneuver theories.

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 Although classical military theorists like Jomini, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu provide

general theories on war applicable in certain parts of war, they fall short in providing a

framework for modern war. Classical theories lack a fundamental understanding of air, space,

and cyber domains required to create relevant ideas, the definition of war has changed and

studying modern warfare can produce military theories for modern warfare. Air, space, and cyber

terrain are increasingly different from land and maritime terrain. Jomini focused on how to

conduct war based on Napoleonic wars. His primary principle can be boiled down to an

application of “mass of the force upon the decisive point.”14 Mass of force in land and maritime

domains are drastically different compared to air, space, and cyberspace. Technology becomes a

significant factor in reducing mass to provide an advantage. Forces used in war have evolved

since classical theorists’ time. Economic actions, space operations, and cyber operations have

become a constant force used to compel others. Classical definition of war is transformed into

perpetual war with no clear beginning and end. Clausewitz posits there is only one lubricant to

reduce the friction of war, combat experience.15 He argues combat experience is critical in

preparing military leaders and forces for war. Without experience, military leaders can make

costly mistakes. Modern theorists can study modern warfare and draw upon experiences of

conflict in air, space, and cyber domains to develop military theories. These theories can provide

a specialized framework for air, space, and cyber domains to be helpful in modern warfare.

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Notes

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 1
Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini The Art of War: Restored Edition, trans. Capt. G.H. Mendell and
Lt. W.P. Craighill (Ontario, Canada: Legacy Books Press, 2008), 46.
2
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 88-89.
3
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, 1963), 63-65, 111-
115.
4
Jomini, The Art of War, 47-48.
5
Sun, The Art of War, 85-89.
6
Clausewitz, On War, 89.
7
Ibid., 75.
8
William Ebenstein and Alan Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers: Plato to the Present, (Boston,
MA: Cengage Learning, 1999), 365.
9
Ibid., 122.
10
David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020),
71.
11
Ibid., 71.
12
Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-18, Mao Tse-tung on Guerilla Warfare, 5 April
1989, 49.
13
Sun, The Art of War, 102.
14
Jomini, The Art of War, 48.
15
Clausewitz, On War, 122.