Professional Documents
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2022 SBCA CBO Bar Lecture Notes (Combined) Opt
2022 SBCA CBO Bar Lecture Notes (Combined) Opt
ACADS SCRIBES TEAM: HANNAH MORALES |MARIA CHRISTINA ARCE | QUIMBERLYN RANCHEZ | EMMANUELLE GRACE VILLAS
CHECKED BY: ADRIAN MACASAQUIT (Deputy for Academics) | HANNAH KEZIAH MORALES (Chairperson for Academics)
A. Introduction
HOW TO REVIEW FOR THE BAR?
● The first weapon a barrister should have is confidence - be confident.
Do not ever doubt yourself. A bar examinee should be the most confident person.
Because If you don’t believe in yourself, who will? It is only a matter of execution of
what you already knew to become a lawyer.
IMPORTANCE OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN PRACTICAL EXERCISES
● Now the first thing I would like to emphasize here, even if I am talking about
practical tips, it is inevitable that I would have to cover substantive laws.
○ If you notice the latter part of the syllabus where Practical Exercise is located, it is
the latter part because it presupposes that you know the topics.
○ In the syllabus Civil law, it entails substantive laws in civil laws. The same with
criminal law, it means you have somehow familiarized criminal law. In the criminal
law syllabus, it mentions practical exercises.
■ In fact you will be able to perform these different exercises if you know
substantive and procedural law.
● There is no such thing as redundancy in bar review.
○ The more you repeat the topic the more you understand it. You notice the
interrelation of these different laws.
○ At this stage of your studies, all laws are actually interrelated. It should not be
studied anymore section by section, rule by rule.
● I would like to focus more on the fundamentals.
○ I will give you the tips of the different parts of a pleading, motion, conveyance in
document, contract, that need to be mastered. So whatever kind of contract is
asked, you will be able to answer.
HOW TO ANSWER QUESTIONS DURING THE BAR EXAM?
○ First and foremost, do not leave any item unanswered.
■ It is a crime for a bar taker to leave an items unanswered because they won’t
get any point, not even partial points. As long as you master these fundamental
parts, you will get some points. One point is the difference between 74 and 75.
Every number counts in the bar exam.
● IMPORTANT REMINDERS:
○ Do not leave any number unanswered
■ By mastering these different parts, then you’ll be able to answer the bar
exams
○ Master the basics
■ What is substantive law and procedural law? Do not ever forget these
general ideas in substantive and procedural law. Requisites and
elements are important.
○ Time is the enemy in the bar exams.
○ The Bar exam is a matter of strategy
○ Be a boy scout. Be prepared for anything
○ You should not take it piece-meal or sporadic, at least know all; the percentage
of passing the bar exam is the percentage of what you know in the syllabus.
○ Treat all the topics in the bar as important because you do not know the
inclination of the examiner.
[I have had the opportunity to talk with previous bar examiners. If you know the
requisites by writing the keywords, you're good. Of course it is also a matter of style,
in your essay type question. language, logic, law. Then, chances are, you’ll get a
perfect score or higher grade]
B. General Tips
a. For the contents of the conveyancing forms, affidavits, pleadings and motions,
MASTER the following:
1. Definition and elements, or requisites of civil and commercial transactions;
● If the requisites would only fall on 2 or 3, list it down.
○ Time is your enemy. Allocation of time is important.
● If the requisites are too long, it is not necessary to write all of the requisites
especially if only one is targeted.
○ A question is being asked because a certain law or requisite is being
violated
● As to criminal law, you are being asked to draft criminal information, you must
know the requisites of criminal information. At the same time you must know
the elements of the crime (eg. rape, where it was committed, if there are
qualifying circumstansces.)
● As to civil transactions, E.g. pacto de retro sale, elements of lease, sublease,
lease with right of first refusal, partnership, loan, contract of deposit,
compromise agreement, pledge, chattel mortgage, draft a prenuptial
agreement. [These things can be answered if you know the substantive law]
● As to commercial transactions, you must be able to make a simple memo of
agreement, bill of lading, negotiable instruments,etc.
2. For pleadings - Master different causes of actions (ordinary and special civil action,
criminal and special proceedings), provisional remedies and their elements or
requisites;
● Example, elements of sum of money to draft a complaint on it.
● You should not be limited in the practical exercises.
○ For example, in complaint for forcible entry, master all kinds of
complaints for forcible entry.
NOTE: There is no substitute but mastering the substantive law so that you will be
able to draft the document, complaint, or petition.
● Master what is Mala in se vis-a-vis mala prohibita: the elements of the crimes
under these crimes. The same for provisional remedies Under the rules, 57-60,
may file these provisional remedies.
● It may not be just a simple complaint but you must be able to draft with
prayer.
● Do not forget to allege the bond and the affidavit of merit. Almost similar to
the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
● These (above mentioned) are all provisional remedies that are asked to draft in
your complaint. The same with replevin, but remember double the bond. [In
injunction you have to allege irreparable injury.]
● Pending the case, you can already ask for support pendente lite. You can ask
for support while the case is going on, normally from the father.
● Know not only elements in civil law but also in procedural law especially if you
are tasked/asked to draft.
○ Example: injunction, replevin, temporary restraining order, support
pendente lite
3. Different motions and their requisites (grounds, legal bases and reliefs sought).
● Example: motion for bill of particulars, judgment, etc.
Example: A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it alleges
the following:
REQUISITES:
1. Initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff;
● [For example you choose the first one, you should be able to allege
that. You start with a caption, title, complaint for an unlawful detainer,
who is the plaintiff, defendant, then you start alleging.]
2. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant
of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
● [Do not forget, it is very important for an unlawful detainer case, you
should demand.]
4. Within one year from the last demand of the defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. (Cabrera case)
● [Bear in mind that you should allege the facts, dates and the evidentiary
facts.in a complaint, it is not only needed to allege the ultimate facts
but also the evidentiary facts.]
● E.g. katarungang pambarangay :You should know the elements and
requisites, and also caption, title, relief sought, verification,
certification of forum shopping. *be mindful of the prescription of
actions.
b. MASTER the SPECIFIC PARTS of conveyancing, affidavits, pleadings and motions.
c. Draft a brief, concise, coherent and complete document. Remember the FIVE S
(Structure, Substance, Style, Specificity, and Simplicity).
● [90-second rule: If you are going to bore your reader within 20 seconds, it's a problem.
In legal writing, you must be able to write what you say to the audience within 90
secs. Kapag nabore yung reader, you're done.]
j. USE CONNECTIVES
[As mentioned in the Caguioa syllabus, whatever kinds of complaints or contracts, there are
parts that are always there that says etc., There is no substitute in completing the exam. You
don't earn a point in not answering a question.
Nota Bene: Do not enter the bar exam room without knowing these basic parts of affidavits,
conveyancing, pleadings, and motion.
JUAN DELACRUZ,
Plaintiff,
JURAT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, in the City of ____, this __th day of ____, 2022,
affiant personally appearing to me with his competent evidence of identity in the form of
(Government-issued) I.D. No. __ issued at ___ on ____, 2021.
● Don’t forget that all affidavits have jurat. [If the examiner asked you to draft anything
and there is no exclusion, pag yan affidavit, palaging may jurat yan. Unless the
examiner says "exclude jurat", so whatever is not excluded is included]
● Examinees commonly make the mistake of excluding the 4th part. "The complaint is
not filed to harass…" Please include this.
● Also make sure to include the last part. Yung dalawang bago ay yung last 2 sentences.
[Under the 2019 Amendment on Civil Procedure ROC. Memorize this.]
VI. JURAT
I certify that:
a. I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions Thereof, or any tribunal or
agency.
b. No such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency.
c. If I should learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency, I hereby undertake to notify..
● [Take note of this because normally hindi naman tinatanong sa recitation. Unless legal
forms. Because it's not usually asked in recitation, just memorization, no choice.]
EXPLANATION
This certifies that personal service was not resorted to for the reason that due to time,
distance and manpower constraints, the same is practicable
Name of Counsel
VIII. NOTICE OF HEARING (LITIGIOUS MOTIONS)
● This is for litigious motion like motion to dismiss For non-litigious, no need for notice
of hearing.
E. Authorization Letter
You can use the document for identification of (he/she) after arriving at the office to collect
the documents. The notice will remain valid until the next written notice.
Sincerely
(You name)
(Signature)
(Date)
That I, DIVINA S. BARRERA, of legal age, Filipino citizen, and a resident of Blk. 2 Lot 9
& 10 Sagana Homes, Culiat, Quezon City, by these presents do hereby NAME, CONSTITUTE and
APPOINT MIGUEL FONTILLA JR., likewise of legal age, with same residence address, to be my
true and lawful attorney-in-fact for me and in my name, place
and stead, and for my own use and benefit, to do or perform all or any of the following acts
and thing, to wit:
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said attorney-in-fact full powers and authority
to do and perform all and every act and thing requisite or necessary to carry into effect the
foregoing authority, as fully to all intents and purposes I might or could lawfully do of
personally present, with full power of substitution and revocation, and hereby ratifying and
confirming all that my said attorney-in-fact or his substitute shall lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue hereof.
● NOTE: Without a SPA, the contract is void. Example, if you're going to sell property,
the requirement is SPA to the agent. What is the status of the sale of a real estate
without SPA? It is void. So if you want to sell a real property and only as an agent,
make sure you have an SPA. The one who should be looking for that is the buyer to
ensure the sale is valid [Memorize this. No choice. Or atleast remember the
keywords.]
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our signature this 30th day of June 2006 at
Quezon City, Philippines.
DIVINA S. BARRERA
Principal
APPOINTMENT ACCEPTED
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in Quezon City, Philippines, this 30th day of June,
2006 personally appeared the Principal DIVINA S. BARRERA with her Res. Cert. No. ________
issued on _______ at __________, known to me to be the same person who executed the
foregoing Special Power of Attorney and she acknowledged to me that the same is her own
free voluntary act and free will.
WITNESS MY HAND AND NOTARIAL SEAL at the place and date first above written.
F. Conveyances
● Definition of conveyancing
○ Relates to the preparation of documents for the transferring of property
○ Note: if the deed/ contract is unilateral (i.e., when the vendee assumes no
obligation), there is no need for the vendee to sign the contract.
○ Deed not the acknowledgment; however, if vendee is obliged… [draft onerous
transfer/ deed of sale].
● Sample Bar Question 2017 (Conveyancing)
“Believing that an onerous transfer would result in lesser taxes than a gratuitous transfer,
Nenita Villo, a widow, decided to sell her lone asset worth Php 3,000,000.00 to her daughters,
Andrea, Carina and Carissa, all of legal age, gainfully employed and still unmarried. The asset
consisted of the house and the lot registered underTransfer Certificate of Title No. 67890 of
the Register of Deeds of Paranaque Cityand situated at No. 3156 Bayswater Street, Metro Ville
Subdivision, Paranaque Citywhere Nenita and her
daughters presently resided.Nenita required her daughters to make a down payment of Php
1,000,000.00, and the balance to be paid once the title to the property was transferred to her
daughter’s names. All the taxes, fees, and costs related to the sale would be for the account
of Nenita, while those related to the transfer of title would be paid by Andrea, Carinaand
Carissa.Draft the contract to be executed by Nenita and her daughters in connection with the
transfer of the house and lot. Omit details other than those stated in the question.”
● TIP: MASTER the definition and elements or requisites of civil and commercial
transactions such as:
● Parts of Conveyancing
1. Title
2. Parties [allege the personal circumstances]
3. BODY (STIPULATIONS)
4. SIGNATURES
5. ACKNOWLEDGMENT
G. Affidavits
● Affidavit is a sworn statement in writing made especially under oath or on affirmation
before an authorized officer or notary public. [it’s very important to ask for an I.D.]
● Parts of Affidavits
1. Caption
2. Title
3. Body Signature
4. Jurat
I. Answer
1. Caption
2. Title
3. Body
[general and specific denials]
[rule 16 is removed; allege them as affirmative defenses]
[counterclaim; compulsory counterclaim etc]
● otherwise, if you are already alleging a claim that is not compulsory counterclaim,
then you will/have to file permissive counterclaim.
J. Letters Rogatory
LETTERS ROGATORY
SAMPLE REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
NAME OF COURT IN SENDING STATE REQUESTING JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
NAME OF PLAINTIFF
DOCKET NUMBER
V.
NAME OF DEFENDANT
_ _ _ _ _
DRAFTING JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT AND TRIAL MEMORANDUM
[position paper, memoranda, summation - form: like case digest (facts, issue, held)]
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT
(N.B. TSN, Cross, Re-direct, Re-cross Examination)
Requisites
1. Identity of the witness and personal circumstances;
2. Identity of the counsel conducting the examination and office address;
3. Place of testimony;
4.Offer of testimony;
5. Direct testimony; and
6. Attestation by lawyer who conducted the direct examination.
B. Key words
1. Question and Answer
Do you know [insert: Plaintiff/Defendant]
What proof do you have, if any? I have with me the [insert:description of documentary
evidence].
[leading question not allowed. You have to probably use the 5 W’s and How]
● What proof do you have, if any? I have with me the [insert: description of
documentary evidence]
[the usage of question ‘is’ or ‘are’ may probably be considered as a leading question
unless you can lay the foundation]
N.B.
1. As a general rule, it is best to state you questions with the 5Ws and 1H
2. If you are unsure if there is a predicate to your question. Start by stating the predicate
first, then as your question.
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT
● Marking of Exhibits
○ Q. I am showing you the [insert: description of documentary evidence] that you
handed to me, is this the same as the [insert: description of documentary
evidence]? [an evidence that is not identified and authenticated during trial is
inadmissible]
○ Yes, that is the same [insert: description of documentary evidence].
● EXAMPLE:
○ Q: You mentioned that you made demands. What proof do you have if any that
you made a demand against her?
○ A: I have with me the Demand Letter dated June 15, 2021 that I gave her and
she received (Witness hands over a document to counsel)
Q. There is a signature on top of the name [ insert: NAME OF SIGNATORY], whose signature is
this?
A. That is the signature of [ insert: Name of Signatory] since I am familiar with her after
having seen her signing other documents.
[Marking]
Counsel: May we request that -
a. The [insert: description of documentary evidence], referred to and pointed by the
witness be marked as [insert: Exhibit number]; and
[e.g. a-z, aa-zz, 1,2,3…]
b. The [insert: description of the part of the document subject of a sub-marking] on the
document, referred to and pointed by the Witness, is marked as {insert…
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT
Reminders
1. A judicial affidavit takes the place of direct examination. Hence, all the rules
relevant to direct examination should be observed in the question and answer,
particular those which may be the subject of an objection - e.g. leading
question
[when to object leading question, after the presentation of evidence]
[make timely objections]
2. Marking of evidentiary documents should also be included in the judicial
affidavit.
MEMORANDUM
(N.B. Position papers, Appeal Brief, Petitions)
ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK
F acts
I ssue
L aw
A rgument
C onclusion
[submitted after the trial on merits; discretion of the court (written trial memorandum) (U.S.
counterpart is Summation)]
E.g. car
Contents of Formal Memos
1. Statement of Facts - must include all material facts, both favorable and unfavorable,
stated in objective language.
2. Statement of questions or issues- a brief and objective statement of the issue to be
addressed in the memo.
3. Discussion - designated in terms of each separate issue by a descriptive heading, the
discussion should summarize the law, facts, and various arguments related to the issue
THINK OF A CAR!
● FACTS
(THE BODY OF THE CAR)
1. PLOT
2. PLAYERS
3. DISAGREEMENTS
4. DOCUMENTS
5. STATEMENTS
6. PROPERTY
7. RIGHTS DUTIES
● ISSUE
(THE KEY)
SEARCH FOR APPLICABLE LAW, LATEST & LANDMARK CASES, CAUSES OF ACTION,
GENERAL DOCTRINES OF EQUITY AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES.
● [DO NOT LEAVE AN UNANSWERED QUESTION]
● You will not be given a 0 point if you cited or provided the law.
● ARGUMENT
(THE ENGINE)
APPLY THE FACTS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE LAW:
“WHAT FACTS CAN BE USED BY THE PARTIES TO ASSERT THEIR POSITION
BASED ON THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW?”
● CONCLUSION
(THE FINISH LINE)
MAKE A SUMMARY OF THE REASONS WHY FAIRNESS WILL BE REACHED IN THE COURT
RULES IN YOUR FAVOR.
EMPHASIZE WHAT YOU WANT FROM THE COURT. DISCUSS WHY THE COURT MUST RULE
IN YOUR FAVOR.
[position paper, trial memorandum…FILAC]
● MOTIONS
○ A motion is an application to the court made by the counsel, requesting that
the court make a decision on a certain issue before the trial begins.
Given the same facts in No. IX above, assume that summons had been served on
Jamero, but no responsive pleading was filed within the reglementary period. Prepare a
motion to declare Jamero in default (4%)
“Kyle Angelo was served with summons and a copy of the complaint of Ciara Jane for
collection of the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as evidenced by a promissory note signed by Kyle
Angelo. She alleged that the debt was overdue; and that Kyle Angelo refused to pay despite
repeated demands.
Kyle Angelo engaged the services of Atty. Carlos Sa bit, who decided to file a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action and prescription. Atty. Carlos Sabit drafted
the motion and sent the draft to Kyle Angelo for his perusal. Kyle Angelo, being himself a law
graduate, quickly noticed that the draft did not contain a notice of hearing.
Draft the notice of hearing that Atty. Carlos Sabit should include in the motion to dismiss”
Motions that are frequently asked in the Bar
Parts of motions
● Caption
● Title
● Grounds
● Arguments
● Reliefs sought
● Signature of counsel
● Notice of hearing
● Copy Furnished
● Explanation
Sample of Motion
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
-end-
LABOR LAW I
Atty. Paulino Ungos III
September 12, 2022
ACADS SCRIBES NOTES TEAM: MIGUEL JULIO RAFAEL SORIANO | KARLA ISABELLA CERA | ANNIE JECINO | MARIA
CHRISTINA ARCE | GABRIEL PALLASIGUE
CHECKED BY: ADRIAN MACASAQUIT (Deputy for Academics) | HANNAH KEZIAH MORALES (Chairperson for Academics)
LABOR STANDARDS
– END –
LABOR LAW II
Atty. Paulino Ungos Jr.
September 16, 2022
ACADS SCRIBES NOTES TEAM: HANNAH KEZIAH MORALES | ADRIAN MACASAQUIT | ANDREA JOSES TAN | ELOISA BUÑO | BIANCA
MARGARITA PUJALTE | SHERRY PAGAY | JANYN MARIELLA MONTEALEGRE
LABOR RELATIONS
A. Right to Self-organization
a. What is the Right to Self- Organization?
i. It is the right to form, join, and assist in the formation of associations for
purposes not contrary to law.
ii. Constitutional basis: Sec 8, Article III.
b. Some rights in the Right to Self-Organization
i. To abstain from joining a union
ii. To choose which union he would join
iii. To cancel his membership with the union
iv. Absolute rights? No, not absolute.
1. Absolute rights? No, not absolute.
iii. Are USA valid? Yes. authorized by Article 259, LC. valid and legal
iv. Legal Effect of Union Security Agreement
1. The employee must join the union, and maintain his membership in
good standing to keep his employment
a. The union member can resign from the union only during the
freedom period.
2. Effect if an Employee Refuses to Join the Union or Fails to Maintain His
Membership with the Union:
a. The union member will be subject to dismissal even if he may
not be aware of the union security agreement.
b. Note: the authority to dismiss must be expressly stipulated in the
agreement.
c. Can he resign? Yes. only during the freedom period.
d. Limitations
i. Cannot be enforced against employees who are already members of another
union at the time of the signing of the CBA.
1. Limitation 1: All members of Union 2 should join Union 1. However,
Union 2 members don’t want to join because they are already part of
Union 2. Can the closed shop agreement be made applicable to them?
No, because of limitation 1.
ii. Cannot be enforced against employees who were refused admission by the
union itself without any reasonable ground.
1. Limitation 2: similar to estoppel
iii. Cannot be enforced against employees who are members of religious sects
which prohibit their members from joining a labor organization.
1. Limitation 3: INC cannot be forced to join a union. Before catholic and
where members and they were converted to INC. can they be dismissed?
No, limitation 3. Religious beliefs superior to contractual rights.
g. Cancellation of Registration
i. Only through a direction action for cancellation
1. direct petition for cancellation. NOT COLLATERAL ATTACK
2. Some members of the union do not belong to the bargaining unit. Will it
warrant cancellation of registration? No. members who do not belong
will be deleted from the list.
h. Effect of a Petition for Cancellation
i. The mere filing of a petition for cancellation of registration does not divest the
union (whose registration is sought to be canceled) of its legitimacy and legal
personality.
ii. Only a final order of cancellation can strip a legitimate labor organization of its
rights.
i. Remedy from Order or Cancellation
i. Appeal within 10 days from receipt to the following agencies:
1. Bureau of Labor Relations - if the case was decided by the DOLE
Regional Director;
2. Secretary of Labor and Employment - if the case was decided by the
Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of its original (not appellate)
jurisdiction.
a. Orders issued by BLR in its appellate jurisdiction are not
appealable - may be reviewed only by special civil action for
certiorari by the CA
b. Can a Union become a Legitimate Labor Organization without
undergoing the normal process of registration? - Yes, by
affiliating with a duly registered federation or national union, in
which case, it becomes a local chapter or chartered local.
j. When does a local chapter become a legitimate labor organization?
i. When all required documents have been submitted to the BLR, specifically:
1. Charter Certificate;
2. Names and Addresses of the Officers of the Local Chapter
3. Principal Office of the Chapter; and
4. Constitution and by-laws of the local chapter
ii. Can the local chapter file a petition for certification election before the
submission of the required documents? - Yes, if the federation or national union
has already issued a Charter Certificate to it.
1. Legal basis: Article 241, LC
2. Relationship F and LU: principal (local union) -agent (federation)
relationship
3. Even if LU is not registered
4. In case of illegal strike, liabilities is on LU even if federation signed the
cert to strike
k. Disaffiliation
i. Generally, the local union (with the approval of majority of its members) can
disaffiliate from its mother federation only during the freedom period, i.e., the
60-day period prior to the expiry of the collective bargaining agreement.
ii. Exceptionally, disaffiliation may be done before the freedom period, if there is
a substantial shift of allegiance on the part of the majority of the members of
the union.
c. Mode of Certification
i. Through SEBA certification;
ii. Through certification election
d. SEBA Certification
i. Proper only when there is no other legitimate labor organization within the
bargaining unit sought to be represented by the union
ii. If there are two or more legitimate labor organizations with the bargaining
unit, the proper course of action is certification election.
1. The legal effects of SEBA Certification
a. The union becomes the certified collective bargaining agent of
the employees covered by the bargaining unit
b. Filing of a petition for certification election is barred for a
period of one (1) year from date of issuance of the SEBA
Certification.
e. Certification Election
i. The process of determining through secret ballot the sole and exclusive
collective bargaining agent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.
f. Legal Standing of an Employer in a Certification Proceeding
i. A mere by-stander because certification election is the sole concern of
workers.
g. When can a Petition for Certification Election be filed?
i. In unorganized establishments - anytime.
ii. In organized establishments - during the freedom period.
h. Petition for Certification Election Cannot be Filed
i. Within one (1) year from certification as bargaining agent.
ii. Within one (1) from holding a valid certification election.
iii. When the collective bargaining negotiations resulted in a deadlock that has
been submitted to conciliation, arbitration or is the subject of a valid notice of
strike or lockout.
iv. When there is a duly registered collective bargaining agreement.
i. Who can file Petitions for Certification Elections
i. An independent union;
ii. A local chapter;
iii. A federation/national union, on behalf of its local chapter; or
iv. An employer
j. If the Employer files the petition, it reverts itself to a bystander after filing. Can the
order/decision of the med-arbiter in a Certification Proceeding be appealed?
i. IN UNORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENTS
1. If the petition is granted - not appealable. Any issue arising therefrom
may be raised as a protest.
2. If the petition is dismissed - appealable to the sole within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof.
ii. IN ORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENTS
1. Order/decision granting or dismissing the petition - appealable to the
SOLE within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
2. Who are qualified to vote in COE? All members (probationary, on strike,
religious organization, etc.)
3. How about dismissed employees, can they vote? Yes, if they filed a case
for ID but their ballots will be segregated
k. Notice of election
i. A mandatory requirement which cannot be waived
ii. Must be posted at least 10 days before the actual date of the election in two
most conspicuous places in the company premises
iii. Posting is a mandatory requirement which cannot be waived by the parties
l. Re-run Election
i. A voting conducted when the certification election (consent election or run-off
election) results in a tie
m. Condition for Run-off election
i. The certification election should have at least three (3) choices;
ii. None of the choices obtained a majority of the valid votes cast;
iii. The total votes for all contending unions are at least 50% of the number of
votes cast; and
iv. There are no challenged ballots, which can materially alter the results
n. Failure of election
i. When majority of the eligible voters were not able to vote
ii. COURSE OF ACTION IN CASE OF FAILURE OF ELECTION - file a motion for the
immediate holding of another election within six (6) months from the
declaration of failure of election
o. Valid Election
i. When majority of the eligible voters were able to vote.
ii. Valid Election will bar any union from filing a petition for certification election
within one (1) year from the holding of the election (election year bar rule).
p. Certification as Bargaining Agent
i. The winning union will be certified as the collective bargaining agent if:
1. No protest was filed within the 5-day period from the close of the
election proceedings; and
2. No challenge or eligibility issue was raised, or if one was raised, the
resolution of the same will not materially alter the election results.
q. Legal Effects of Certification as Bargaining Agent
i. Certification qualifies the union to act as the collective bargaining agent of the
employees covered by the bargaining unit.
ii. It will bar any union from filing a petition for certification election within one
(1) year from certification.
r. The Certification Year (or Negotiation Year) Bar Rule
i. No petition for certification election can be filed or entertained within one (1)
year from certification as collective bargaining agent.
s. When should the Certified Bargaing Agent Start the CBA Negotiations?
i. Within one (1) year from certification as bargaining.
ii. Legal effect if agent did not start it in 1 year - filing by any union is not barred
t. Courses of Action in case of Deadlock
i. Bring the matter to the NCMB for conciliation and mediation;
ii. Submit the matter for arbitration; or
iii. Declare a strike or lockout
u. The Deadlock-bar Rule
i. No petition for certification election can be filed or entertained when the CBA
negotiations that resulted in a deadlock, has been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or is the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
M. Management Prerogatives
a. General
i. Only managerial employees
ii. NLRC can review to see whether bad faith or grave abuse - may reduce
excessive penalties but cannot absolve
b. Who can exercise Managerial Prerogatives?
i. The exercise belongs solely and exclusively to the employer and no one else.
c. The Managerial Prerogatives
i. To choose whom to hire
ii. To promote employees
iii. To transfer employees
iv. To change work schedule
v. To reorganize and abolish a department
vi. To reduce personnel
vii. To close down its business
viii. To promulgate company policies, rules, and regulations.
d. Limitation on the Prerogative to Choose whom to Hire
i. The prerogative to choose whom to hire is subject to the limitations imposed
by the Anti-Age Discrimination in Employment Act which forbids employers
from, among others:
1. Placing a job advertisement which suggests age preference; or
2. Declining an applicant for employment simply because of age. UNLESS it
is a bona fide occupational qualification
ii. Bona fide occupational qualification- standard
1. E.g airline company can prescribe maximum weight of FA; maximum
retirement age of pilots
iii. No Spouse Employment Policy
1. A company policy prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of
a competitor company is valid
2. Employers have the right to guard their trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies, and other confidential programs from
competitors.
3. What is sought to be avoided: conflict of interest
4. Duncan Association v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. | G.R. No.
162994
a. The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of
that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In
laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
b. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests
cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect
its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion
and growth.
c. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional
policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not
mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the
workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of fair play.
iv. Anti-Nepotism Employment Policy
1. Validity if there is a “reasonable business necessity”
2. It must be shown how the marriage could be detrimental to the business
operations and not on the mere fear that the employees married to
each other will be less efficient.
3. Star Paper Corp. v. Ronaldo Simbol | G.R. No. 164774 | April 12, 2006
a. In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the
United States, complainants utilize two theories of employment
discrimination: the disparate treatment and the disparate
impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff
must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its
face. No-spouse employment policies requiring an employee of a
particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially
discriminatory. On the other hand, to establish disparate impact,
the complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy has a
disproportionate effect on a particular class.
b. To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer
must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved;
and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be
unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
c. The Court did not find a reasonable business necessity in the
case at bar. Petitioners’ sole contention that “the company did
not just want to have 2 or more of its employees related
between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity” is
lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the
first paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the valid
reasonable business necessity required by the law.
d. In the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found
fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a
co-employee. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient. If the
questioned rule is upheld without valid justification, the
employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption
of a perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to
security of tenure.
e. IT IS ONLY IN THIS CASE: Failed to show how the policy of
marriage is prejudicial - no reasonable business necessity in so
far as this case is concerned.
f. Other cases must have reasonable business necessity
d. Commission of a Crime
i. The crime must be committed against the person of the:
1. Employer
2. Authorized representative; or
3. Immediate member of the employer’s family,
e. Analogous Cases
i. Requirements
1. To be considered analogous, the offense must have an element similar
to the specific grounds enumerated under Article 297 of the Labor Code
2. The analogous cause must involve a voluntary or willful act or omission
of the employee
ii. John Hancock Life Insurance v. Joanna Davis | G.R. No. 169549
1. In this case, petitioner dismissed respondent based on the NBIs finding
that the latter stole and used Yuseco’s credit cards. But since the theft
was not committed against petitioner itself but against one of its
employees, respondents misconduct was not work-related and
therefore, she could not be dismissed for serious misconduct.
2. Nonetheless, Article 282(e) of the Labor Code talks of other analogous
causes or those which are susceptible of comparison to another in
general or in specific detail. For an employee to be validly
3. dismissed for a cause analogous to those enumerated in Article 282, the
cause must involve a voluntary and/or willful act or omission of the
employee.
4. The labor arbiter and the NLRC relied not only on the affidavits of the
NBIs witnesses but also on that of respondent. They likewise considered
petitioners own investigative findings. Clearly, they did not merely
adopt the findings of the NBI but independently assessed evidence
presented by the parties. Their conclusion (that there was valid cause
for respondents separation from employment) was therefore supported
by substantial evidence. All things considered, petitioner validly
dismissed respondent for cause analogous to serious misconduct.
iii. Armando G. Yrasuegui vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. G.R. No. 168081, October 17,
2008
1. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e)
of the Labor Code.
2. The standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the
employer; they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must
maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the
company. In other words, they were standards that establish continuing
qualifications for an employee’s position. In this sense, the failure to
maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose
express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground
for dismissal. The failure to meet the employer’s qualifying standards is
in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and
is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) – the "other causes
analogous to the foregoing."
f. Other Valid Causes For Dismissal
i. Other
1. Failure to comply with government regulation
2. Immorality
3. Sexual Harrassment
4. Safe Spaces Act - even if there is no working relationship
5. Drug Abuse
6. Breach of USA
7. Illegal Strike
8. Commission of Illegal Acts during strike
9. Defiance of return to work order
ii. St. Luke’s Medical Center Employee’s Association - AFW ( SLMCEA-AFW ) and
Maribel S. Santos vs. National Labor Relations ( NLRC ) and St. Luke’s Medical
Center, Inc. G.R. No. 162053, March 7, 2007
1. Complainant-appellant cannot insist on her sterling work performance
without any derogatory record to make her qualify as an x-ray
technician in the absence of a proper certificate of Registration from
the Board of Radiologic Technology which can only be obtained by
passing the required examination. The law is clear that the Certificate
of Registration cannot be substituted by any other requirement to allow
a person to practice as a Radiologic Technologist and/or X-ray
Technologist. No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon private
respondent as the separation of petitioner Santos was undertaken by it
conformably to an existing statute. It is undeniable that her continued
employment without the required Board certification exposed the
hospital to possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to
operate. Certainly, private respondent could not be expected to retain
petitioner Santos despite the inimical threat posed by the latter to its
business.
g. Criminal Case is not a Condition Precedent for Dismissal
i. Right to Dismiss- not dependent upon a verdict of guilt or innocence in a
criminal case
ii. Effect of Acquittal- does not invalidate the dismissal
iii. Effect of Conviction- will nullify the final judgment declaring the dismissal
illegal as a supervening event
1. Sampaguita Garments Corp. vs. NLRC | G.R. No. 102406 – June 17, 1994
a. Santos stole from Sampaguita and was dismissed. While she filed
a labor case, Sampaguita filed a criminal case. NLRC ruled for
Santos in the labor case, SC found her guilty in the criminal case.
NLRC still sustained their decision. Sampaguita filed a petition to
reverse this, stating that she cannot be reinstated + paid back
wages if she has just been convicted of theft in another case. SC
ruled in their
b. favor, but held them liable for damages for dismissing Santos
without complying with the procedural requirements.
c. DOCTRINE: Conviction is a valid ground for dismissal, which also
deprives the guilty EE of their right to separation pay if it
involves turpitude. Such would have the effect of rewarding
rather than punishing the erring EE for their offense.
h. Procedural Requirements for Dismissal for Just Cause
i. The Due Process Requirement in Dismissal for Just Cause
1. Written notice to explain
2. Hearing, if necessary
3. Written notice of decision
ii. (Belated Due Process Rule) The Legal Effect of Dismissal Without Due Process
1. Where the dismissal is adjudged to be valid, lack of due process does
not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal, much less ineffectual
2. The employer is only liable for nominal damages, the amount of which is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
iii. Note:
1. With due process - no employer’s liability
2. Without due process - liable for nominal damages
3. If illegally dismissed - liable for employee’s back wages
P. Authorized Causes for Dismissal
a. Authorized Causes
i. Installation of labor-saving device
ii. Redundancy
iii. Retrenchment to prevent losses
iv. Closure of establishment not due to serious losses
b. Redundancy
i. A mode of reducing personnel when the required services are more than what
is demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise.
ii. Can exist even if there is no other person holding the same position as that
held by the employee declared to be redundant.
iii. Requisites of a Valid Redundancy Program
1. The abolition of redundant positions must be done in good faith
2. Fair and reasonable criteria must be used in ascertaining what positions
are to be declared redundant
3. Note:
a. Not destroyed by independent contractor criteria
b. Seniority
c. Employer can declare redundancy even if not bankrupt but due
to necessity of the position
c. Retrenchment
i. A mode of reducing personnel to prevent or minimize business losses and thus
protect and preserve the employer’s viability
ii. Requisites of a Valid Retrenchment Program
1. The retrenchment must be adopted to prevent losses or further losses
2. Fair and reasonable criteria must be used in ascertaining who would be
dismissed and who would be retained
3. The retrenchment must be resorted to as a last resort and after less
drastic means have been tried and found wanting or insufficient
4. Note:
a. Actual or expected losses must be substantiated
b. Criteria:
i. Efficiency
ii. Seniority
iii. Physical Fitness
iv. Age
v. Status - temporary, casual, or regular employee
vi. Last in, first out is applied
c. Examples: rotation of workers: reduction of workers or salary of
executives
d. Distinguish Retrenchment and Redundancy ( Article 298 of the
Labor Code )
iii. Retrenchment vs Redundancy
1. Retrenchment
a. Employees are termed to avoid or minimize losses
b. Result of business recession, seasonal fluctuations, lack of work
c. Payment of separation pay of 1 month or at least ½ month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction of six
(6) months service is considered as one (1) whole year.
2. Redundancy
a. Results when the services of an employee are in excess of what
is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the
enterprise
b. Last in, first out not applied
c. Payment of separation pay of 1 month or at least one (1) month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction of
six (6) months service is considered as one (1) whole year.
d. Procedural Requirements for Terminating Employment for Authorized Cause
i. Serve a written notice at least one (1) month in advance to the:
1. Affected employees, and
2. Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
e. Relief for Employees Terminated for Authorized Causes
1. Separation pay Equivalent to
a. At least 1 month pay or 1 month pay for every year of service,
for:
i. Redundancy, or
ii. Installation of labor-saving device
b. At least 1 month pay or 1/2 month pay for every year of service,
for
i. Retrenchment to prevent losses;
ii. Closure of establishment not due to serious business
losses
c. No suspension pay if closure is due to:
i. Serious business losses; or
ii. Act of the Government without fault on the part of the
employer
f. Termination of Employment due to Illness
i. Continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health or to
the health of his co-employees; and
ii. Medical certificate from a competent public health authority that the disease
cannot be cured within 6 months even after proper medical treatment.
Q. Lay-off/Temporary Closure
a. Whether done in good or bad faith, temporary closure should not exceed six (6)
months
b. May be extended by agreement in case of war, pandemic, and similar national
emergencies
c. Note
i. If more than six (6) months, employer / employee relationship will terminate
ii. If in good faith, separation pay of one (1) month or 1/2 month pay for every
year of service
iii. If in bad faith, wages for 6 months plus separation pay
iv. Employment status remains suspended in case of war, unless the employee
resigned during war
v. If employer decides to extend, employee is entitled for separation pay
R. Constructive Dismissal
a. A situation where the employee gives up his employment ( resigns ) because the
employer does things that are intended to force the employee to quit
i. The resignation is involuntary because the employee stops working, considering
the continued employment is no longer feasible due to harsh, hostile, and
unbearable working conditions set by the employer.
b. Voluntary Resignation
i. INDICATIONS OF VOLUNTARINESS
1. When the employee expresses gratitude in the resignation letter
2. When the employee ( who misappropriated company funds ) resigns
because the employer threatened to file criminal action for estafa
against him
ii. Note: Voluntariness of resignation is not negated by the fact that the employee
was made to sign a ready-made resignation letter
c. Courtesy Resignation - tantamount to forced resignation
i. ENTITLED TO THE RETIREMENT BENEFIT UNDER THE LABOR CODE
1. All employees are generally entitled:
a. Regardless of their position, designation, or status, and
b. Irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid
S. Retirement
a. When can an employee Retire or be Retired?
i. IF THERE IS A RETIREMENT PLAN, CBA OR EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT - upon
reaching the criteria established in the retirement plan, CBA, or employment
contract
ii. NO RETIREMENT PLAN, CBA, OR EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT - upon reaching the
retirement age prescribed by the Labor Code
b. Validity of Early Retirement
i. VALID if there is an express agreement between the employer and the
employee
ii. The mere mention of the retirement plan in the letter of appointment cannot
be construed as consent especially when the letter of appointment does not
specify details of the retirement program
iii. LAYA vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 2018
1. FACTS:Laya was employed by the Philippine Veterans Bank as Chief
Legal Counsel. When he reached the age of 60, Laya was retired by the
Philippine Veterans Bank pursuant to the Retirement Plan which
provides that an employee can be retired at the age of 60. To protest
his unexpected retirement, Laya filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
2. ISSUE: Was Laya validly retired?
3. RULING: No. Laya was not validly retired because he did not consent to
early retirement. Lay’s knowledge of the existence of the retirement
program at the time of his engagement will not suffice. His implied
knowledge did not equate to the voluntary acceptance.
iv. The Retirement Pay under the Labor Code
1. A total of 22.5 days for every year of service because it is composed of
the following:
a. 15 days salary based on the employee’s latest salary rate;
b. Cash equivalent of five (5) days service incentive leave; and
c. 1/12 of the 13th month pay due to the employee
v. Computation of Length of Service in Case of Re-hiring
1. If the employment was validly severed and the employee was re-hired,
the length of service should be reckoned from the date of re-hiring, and
not from the date of initial hiring
vi. Computation of Length of Service in case of Absorption into the Regular
Workforce
1. Not from the date of absorption but from the first day of service
f. Reinstatement Pending Appeal - Proper Only When the Decision of the LA Orders
Reinstatement
i. If the decision of the labor Arbiter did not order reinstatement ( despite his
finding that the employee was illegally dismissed ), the NLRC, in resolving the
appeal, cannot order payment of reinstatement salaries.
g. Appeal Bond
i. Required only for employers who appeal for monetary award
ii. COMPUTATION - exclude damages and attorney’s fees
iii. FORM - cash or surety bond
iv. UNENCUMBERED CASH BOND - A cash bond posted by the employer in another
case which has been dismissed with finality and which has not yet been
released
v. UERM-Memorial Medical Center and Dr. Isidro Carino vs. National Labor
Relations Commission and UERM Employees Association, et al. G.R. No. 110419
March 3, 1997
1. The sole issue before the Court is whether or not petitioner complied
with the appeal bond requirement under the Labor Code and the NLRC
Rules by filing a Consolidated Motion to release the cash bond it posted
in another case, which had been decided with finality in its favor, with a
view to applying the same cash bond to the present case.
2. The Supreme Court allowed the appellant-employer to post a property
bond in lieu of a cash or surety bond. The assailed judgment involved
more than ₱17 million; thus, its execution could adversely affect the
economic survival of the employer, which was a medical center.
3. In the case at bar, the judgment involved is more than P17 million and
its precipitate execution can adversely affect the existence of
petitioner medical center. Likewise, the issues involved are not
insignificant and they deserve a full discourse by our quasi-judicial and
judicial authorities. We are also confident that the real property bond
posted by the petitioners sufficiently protects the interests of private
respondents should they finally prevail. It is not disputed that the real
property offered by petitioners is worth P102,345,650. The judgment in
favor of private respondent is only a little more than P17 million.
vi. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation vs. Belio Icao G.R. No. 196047,
January 15, 2014
1. This is a Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and
set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision. In the assailed Decision
and Resolution, the CA upheld the Order of the National Labor and
Relations Commission (NLRC) First Division dismissing petitioner’s appeal
for allegedly failing to post an appeal bond as required by the Labor
Code. Petitioner had instead filed a motion to release the cash bond it
posted in another NLRC case which had been decided with finality in its
favor with a view to applying the bond to the appealed case before the
NLRC First Division. Hence, the Court is asked to rule whether the
petitioner had complied with the appeal bond requirement. If it had, its
appeal before the NLRC First Division should be reinstated.
2. It is undisputed that the petitioner has an unencumbered amount of
money in the form of cash in the custody of the NLRC. To reiterate,
petitioner had posted a cash bond in the separate case Dangiw Siggaao,
which was earlier decided in its favor. As claimed by petitioner and
confirmed by the Judgment Division of the Judicial Records Office of
this Court, the Decision of the Court in Dangiw Siggaao had become final
and executory, or more than seven months before petitioner had to file
its appeal in the present case. This fact is shown by the Entry of
Judgment on file with the aforementioned office. Hence, the cash bond
in that case ought to have been released to the petitioner then.
3. Under the Rule VI, Section 6 of the 2005 NLRC Rules, "[a] cash or surety
bond shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or posting,
until the case is finally decided, resolved or terminated, or the award
satisfied." Hence, it is clear that a bond is encumbered and bound to a
case only for as long as 1) the case has not been finally decided,
resolved or terminated; or 2) the award has not been satisfied.
Therefore, once the appeal is finally decided and no award needs to be
satisfied, the bond is automatically released. Since the money is now
unencumbered, the employer who posted it should now have
unrestricted access to the cash which he may now use as he pleases – as
appeal bond in another case, for instance. This is what the petitioner
simply did. Third, the cash bond posted in Dangiw Siggaao is more than
enough to cover the appeal bond required in the present case.
4. Fourth, this ruling remains faithful to the spirit behind the appeal bond
requirement which is to ensure that workers will receive the money
awarded in their favor when the employer’s appeal eventually fails.
There was no showing at all of any attempt on the part of petitioner to
evade the posting of the appeal bond. On the contrary, petitioner’s
move showed a willingness to comply with the requirement. Hence, the
welfare of Icao is adequately protected.
5. Having complied with the appeal bond requirement, petitioner’s appeal
before the NLRC must therefore be reinstated.
vii. Appeal Bond Not Required
1. When the employee is the appellant;
2. When the appeal questions only the award of damages or attorney’s fees
3. When there is no monetary award; or
4. When the decision of the Labor Arbiter does not state the amount of the
monetary award
viii. Reduction of Appeal Bond
1. File a Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond within the reglementary period to
appeal, citing a meritorious ground; and
2. Post a provisional bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary award
ix. Judicial Review of NLRC Decisions
1. Special civil action for certiorari, with the Court of Appeals
2. Not a part or continuation of the NLRC proceedings - it is an
independent action
3. Will not stay the execution of the NLRC Decision, unless a temporary
restraining order is issued by the Court of Appeals
– END –
TAXATION LAW
Atty. Deborah Acosta
September 17, 2022
LECTURE NOTES TEAM: BIDO, Alexandre Janus B. | CERA, Karla Isabella O. | MILO, Jose Francisco B. | ROSARIO, Briant Allen |
DOMINGUEZ, Mary Grace B. | MONTEALEGRE Janyn Mariella | PAGAY, Sherry Jane B.
CHECKED BY: HANNAH KEZIAH MORALES (Chairperson for Academics) | ADRIAN MACASAQUIT (Deputy for Academics)
NOTE: Please refer to the presentation shared and provided by Atty. Acosta for Taxation Bar Lecture
● No imprisonment for non-payment of a poll tax (Article III, Section 20, 1987 Philippine
Constitution)
○ Applicable to residence tax only, not for all other kinds of taxes
● Uniformity and equality of taxation and a progressive system of taxation (Article III, Section
28, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
○ Progressive Taxes - the tax rate goes up based on the taxpayer’s ability to pay.
○ Recall that the imposition of regressive taxes is not prohibited. An example of a
regressive tax is VAT.
○ All taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same
rate.
● Prohibited use of tax raised for special purposes (Article VI, Section 29, 1987 Philippine
Constitution)
● Tax bills must originate exclusively in the House of Representatives (Article VI, Section 24,
1987 Philippine Constitution)
○ Senate may introduce amendments and even make an entirely different bill than the
House’s version; Senate may propose or concur with amendments
○ The initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problem
● President’s veto power on appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills (Article VI, Section 27, 1987
Philippine Constitution)
○ Line-item veto only allowed for these bills.
● Grant of power to create own sources of revenue to the LGUs (Article X, Section 5, 1987
Philippine Constitution)
○ Power to tax is inherent in the government and assigned to Congress.
○ This power can be delegated by law to the local government units.
○ The LGU’s exercise of this power can be limited by laws passed by Congress.
■ The main limiting law is the Local Government Code of 1991.
■ Another limiting law is the Renewable Energy Act where LGUs are prohibited
from imposing real property tax on renewable energy developers at a rate more
than the rate provided by the Act.
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL TAXATION
● Local Business Taxes
○ Recall that LGUs cannot tax the instrumentalities of the national government, like
PAGCOR. This is based on the supremacy of the national government over LGUs.
○ Fundamental Principles same as the general principles of taxation
○ All taxes must be uniform in each LGU within their taxing jurisdiction..
○ Tax collection cannot be delegated to private individuals.
○ Taxes collected shall inure to the benefit of the LGU collecting the tax.
○ Each LGU shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
■ Recall that regressive taxes are not prohibited.
○ Taxes imposed shall be based on the ability to pay and for public purposes only.
○ Taxes should not be unjust, oppressive, excessive or confiscatory.
○ not be contrary to law, public policy and national economic policy, nor in restraint of
trade
■ Judicial
● File a civil action for collection
● LGU has to make an assessment first and if that assessment becomes
final and executory for failure of the taxpayer to file a protest against
that assessment or if there is a final judgment of the court on the
validity of the assessment, then that is the time the LGU can file a civil
action for collection.
● Prescriptive period
○ 5-year period from the due date to assess (10 years from
discovery of fraud or intent to evade payment)
○ 5 years from assessment to collect
○ The running of the periods of prescription provided in the
preceding paragraphs shall be suspended for the time during
which:
(1) The treasurer is legally prevented from making the
assessment of collection;
(2) The taxpayer requests for a reinvestigation and executes
a waiver in writing before the expiration of the period
within which to assess or collect; and
(3) The taxpayer is out of the country or otherwise cannot be
located. (Sec. 194(d), LGC)
■ Taxpayer
● Before Assessment
○ Question constitutionality or legality of ordinance (e.g., tax is
unjust, confiscatory or oppressive) by filing an administrative
appeal to Secretary of Justice within 30 days from date of
effectivity
○ Action for declaratory relief
■ In order for the taxpayer to validly rely or claim this
action, the requisites for declaratory relief must be
present.
● After Assessment
○ Filing of protest within 60 days from receipt of the assessment
○ Filing of an action for a refund within 2 years from payment of
the tax.
○ Injunction against the collection of tax
○ The claim must first be filed with the treasurer within the 2 year
period. There is no specific period within which the treasurer has
to act on your refund.
○ If the 2-year period is about to expire without any action by the
treasurer, you go directly to the regular courts and file your
claim there.
○ The court may entertain the appeal as long as the case if filed
within the 2 year period and the written claim had earlier been
submitted to the treasurer.
○ Same case for claims for refund for NIR taxes except for VAT. You
just have to file an admin claim refund first within the two year
period and if the period is about to lapse, you file already a
judicial claim for refund.
■ Flowchart: Date of Payment of Taxes: within 2 years file
an administrative claim.
○ If there is denial of refund or if the two year period is about to
lapse, go to RTC if 2 million or more, then go to the CTA division,
then CTA en banc, then Supreme Court.
○ Less than 2 million: go to MTC first then RTC then en banc. RTC
already has appellate jurisdiction here.
■ HYPO: What if I was forced to pay local business taxes?
Most cases in reality, taxpayers are forced to pay local
taxes even before to filing a protest because payment of
local taxes is a prerequisite to issuance of mayor’s
permit.
● Multiple jurisprudence stating that it is the national government that imposes the real
property tax. This is the previous law.
● Under the local government code, it is the LGUs that have the power to impose the real
property tax. It is the province, city, or municipality within the metro manila area.
○ If it is a municipality in the province, it has no power to impose a real property
tax.
○ It is the province that has the power to impose the real property tax.
● Real property tax is a direct tax on ownership as a general rule.
○ There are certain instances in the LGC wherein the tax liability is imposed based
on the beneficial use of the property.
■ EXAMPLE: even if the owner is the government who is exempt from real
property tax, real property tax will still be imposed based on the beneficial
use if it is being used by private entities for commercial purposes thru a
lease agreement with the national government.
● That property will still be subject to real property tax even if it is
owned by the government.
● Since it is a direct tax on ownership, can the LGU assess real property tax on the lessor for
the real properties of its lessees?
○ NO, since it is based on ownership. The real properties of the lessees are owned by
the lessee and therefore the lessee should be liable to the LGU.
■ EXAMPLE: you own a building and you are leasing units of the building to
lessees, those lessees made improvements on the unit (leasehold
improvements).
● LEASEHOLD IMPROVEMENTS. Under the LGC, improvements on the
property are considered real property and shall be subject to real
property tax.
● Those leasehold improvements, owned by the lessee, shall be
subject to real property tax. Since the lessee is the owner of such
improvements, they shall be liable to the LGU for the RPT.
● The RPT is imposed on real property such as buildings, machinery, and other
improvements.
○ Take note of the definition of “Machinery” in the LGC.
● When imposing real property taxes, you must comply with the rules and/or requirements
under the LGC and not the Civil Code.
○ The concepts of movables and immovables under the Civil Code under property
law.
■ A movable shall be considered as immovable if it is attached to the
property permanently.
■ BUT TAKE NOTE that under the LGC, machinery, even if not attached
permanently to the real property shall be subject to real property tax.
■ Even if it is mobile, self-powered, or self-propelled, and not permanently
attached to the real property, it will be subject to RPT for as long as they
are directly and essentially used for the particular needs of the industry.
● If it is being used for the business of the owner of the property, that
will be subject to real property tax
● EXAMPLE: ATM that is mobile? It is subject to real property tax. This
is so because it is actually, directly and essentially used to meet the
needs of the banking business which owns the ATM.
● Improvements, like leasehold improvements, are defined under the LGC as a valuable
addition made to the property or immolation in its condition amounting to more than to a
repair or replacement.
● Examples of RPT:
○ Tanks that are not embedded in the real property and are considered
improvements on the land so they are subject to RPT
○ Old jurisprudence stating that electrical posts are exempt from RPT, is not
applicable anymore. This is due to the excise provision of the LGC.
■ August 2015 case – Transformers, electric posts, transmission lines,
insulators, and electric meters of Meralco shall qualify as machinery. Even if
they are not permanently attached, they are still actually, directly, and
essentially used to meet the needs of the particular industry which is the
power distribution industry, by their very nature in achieving its business
purpose. This is therefore subject to RPT.
○ Underground Tanks, elevated tanks, water tanks, and air compressors are subject
to real property tax.
■ Note: even if they are not immobilized, if they are essential to the business
of the taxpayer, they should be considered as real property subject to RPT.
■ If immobilized and not essential for the business, it is still real property
subject to RPT.
■ If not immobilized and not being used in the business of the taxpayer, it is
not subject to RPT.
■ If it is mobilized and necessary to the business of the taxpayer, it shall be
considered as machinery and subject to RPT.
○ Power barges, floating and movable are real property since it is specifically
specified as immovable according to Article 415 of the Civil Code.
● 1st step: LGU to determine the fair market value of the property.
■ The fair market value shall be determined by the local assessor of the concerned
LGU and the local assessor shall also make a determination on what kind of
property it is based on use, whether it be agricultural, residential, etc. The value
of the property shall be based on the actual use of the property.
■ After such the local assessor shall produce the notice of assessment or the tax
declaration.
■ The tax declaration to be issued shall bear the name of the owner, the address of
the property, and a table that shall show the use of the property (whether
agricultural, commercial, cultural, etc.), the fair market value, and the
assessment level.
■ The assessed value shall be used in the computation of the real property tax.
○ IF THE ASSESSMENT MADE BY THE ASSESSOR IS WRONG, the remedy is to go to the local
board of assessment – appeals within 60 days from receipt of the notice of assessment.
■ The LBAA has 120 days to decide on the appeal.
■ If the decision of the LBAA is adverse, you have 30 days to file an appeal with the
CBAA.
● A motion for reconsideration may be filed but the fresh period rule shall not
apply. Hence, the 30-day period shall still run.
■ Proceed to the CBAA.
■ Proceed to the CTA en banc, not division.
● Take note: the appeal of the assessment shall not suspend the collection of
the RPT.
○ The LGU will still collect the RPT based on the initial assessment of
the assessor.
○ The RPT shall just be adjusted prospectively after attaining the final
judgment of the courts.
● NAPOCOR v CBAA: discusses the tax exemption in favor of the GOCC at that time.
○ However, the exemption of the RPT was not applied by the Court because at the time the
RPT was assessed, the owner was not NPC but the private corporation, BOT partner, and
actual and direct use of the machinery equipment did not belong to NAPOCOR but
belonged to the BOT partner. Therefore there is no basis for claiming tax exemption.
○ Tax exemption is not transferable.
■ If the tax exemption is in favor of the government, government
instrumentality, or GOCC, it strictly belongs to that entity, and its tax
exemption cannot be transferred using a contractual provision. The
contract cannot be honored by the LGU.
● Under article 234 of the LGC, provides for 5 exceptions from RPT.
■ Take note: this list is exclusive. Should there be additional exemptions,
they must be from Congress.
○ Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person;
■ Even if the property is owned by the Republic of the Philippines, once the
beneficial use of the property has been transferred to a taxable person the
property shall be subject to RPT and the taxpayer shall not be the Republic
of the Philippines, but the one using the property.
○ Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, nonprofit or religious cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes;
■ The constitutional limitation is also applicable to Art 234 of the LGC.
Church and other religious institutions, religious cemeteries, etc shall be
exempt from RPT.
■ Land and buildings actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, and educational purposes shall be exempt.
○ All machinery and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by
local water districts and government-owned or - controlled corporations engaged
in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of
electric power;
■ Cited the NAPOCOR case and why they are exempt.
○ All real property owned by duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R. A.
No. 6938; and
■ Real property owned by cooperatives, even if rented out to taxable
persons, shall be exempt from RPT.
■ Basis of exemption of cooperatives: Ownership.
■ If real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, exempt.
● However, if the use was granted or leased to a taxable person, the
property is now subject to real property tax.
○ Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax
previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including all government-owned or -controlled corporations are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
■ Keywords: “use for pollution control and environmental protection”
TESTS OF EXEMPTION
○ Three Tests:
■ Ownership Exemption for government and cooperatives.
● If use is transferred or leased to a taxable person, subject to RPT.
■ Character Exemption
● If it’s a property owned by a charitable institution, church, non-profit, etc., it is
exempt.
■ Usage Exemption
● If it is land, building, and improvements
○ Use for religious, charitable, non-profit institutions, etc. → EXEMPT
○ Machinery used by local water districts and GOCCs engaged in water and
electric power → EXEMPT
○ Machinery used for pollution control and environmental protection →
EXEMPT
● If a property is owned by a religious and charitable institution but used for purposes not
exempt, the tax exemption shall not attach because it is clear from the LGC and the
Constitution that the land, building, and improvements must be actually, directly, and
exclusively used for charitable, religious, and/ or educational purposes for it to be exempt
from RPT.
● Take note: Exemption granted to property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, not
just the national government. It’s a broader term and synonymous with the government of
the Philippines.
○ Government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers or corporate entities
performing public functions are exempt from RPT.
■ EXAMPLES: MIAA, Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, UP, National Railway, and etc.
● These are examples of government instrumentalities. They are also
performing government or public functions and shall be exempt from
RPT. They are part of the Republic of the Philippines and its political
subdivisions.
● Take note: GOCCs are subject to RPT.
● LRTA is not exempt. While it is a public utility, it is profit-earning. It
is not being operated for public service.
● Appraisal
○ It is the process of determining the value of the property putting it in writing and valued.
○ Usually from the owner. If not, the LGU shall do the appraisal and shall proceed with the
assessment. After they will issue the tax declaration. RPT will accrue. They will issue a
notice of assessment stating the tax due and the demand for payment. After, the
collection of RPT.
○ This cycle shall be guided by the following principles,
■ Real property shall be appraised at its current and fair market value;
■ Real property shall be assessed based on its actual use;
■ Real property shall be based on a uniform classification within each local political
subdivision;
■ Appraisal, assessment, levy of real property, and the collection, just like local
business taxes, cannot be left to any private person.
■ Appraisal and assessment shall be equitable.
● RPT accrues every year. It is due every year, at the beginning of the year. The deadline is
dependent on the local ordinance setting such.
○ Can be paid in quarterly installments.
● Responsibility for collection of the RPT belongs to the treasurer.
1) Tax Return
Could be
● Income Tax Return
● VAT Return
● Documentary Stamp Tax Return
● Withholding Tax Return
● Exception: In case of a fraudulent return, false return or omission to file a tax return, the
BIR has 10 years from the discovery of a fraudulent return, false return or discovery of
failure to file a return to assess the internal revenue tax.
- END -
PRACTICAL EXERCISES II
Atty. John R. Jacome
September 19, 2022
ACADS SCRIBES TEAM: HANNAH KEZIAH MORALES | EMMANUELLE GRACE VILLAS |MARIA CHRISTINA ARCE | QUIMBERLYN RANCHEZ | JOSES
TAN
CHECKED BY: ADRIAN MACASAQUIT (Deputy for Academics) | HANNAH KEZIAH MORALES (Chairperson for Academics)
A. INTRODUCTION
● Conduct a specific survey on different legal forms that you will expect to come out in the bar exams.
● Includes frequently asked questions
○ Criminal Complaint, Motion to Quash etc
Labor
● Allege short facts - to let the receiver understand what you are talking about.
● Include what you demand - amount you’re demanding
● Include a time frame when you want your demand to be satisfied.
○ Usually within 3 banking days (if estafa) or 5 days (if BP 22); the usual is about 5-10 days.
■ Notice to explain must be sent at least within 5 days before they’re
required to submit an answer/reply otherwise, it is a violation of due
process.
■ Kings of Kings: The reasonable time for notice to explain, to be given to an
employee who is to be disciplined for just cause must be at least within 5 days.
Otherwise, it is violation of due process.
Demand Letter to Pay and to Vacate
● Before you can file a case of ejectment, especially unlawful detainer, you need to serve the
respondent a demand within 1 year.
○ Within that year, the reckoning period will start; if it lapses, it will be accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. It should be a demand letter to pay AND vacate.
■ OR - it is a demand for simple collection of money and not ejection.
■ AND - use for ejectment; to pay AND vacate.
2. Authorization Letters
● This is the usual format: Mention the principal and attorney-in-fact.
● Do we consider SPA, or even a GPA, as a contract?
○ In essence yes, because it’s a contract of agency
○ In practice, it is not required for the agent to sign.
○ Make sure that the principal is able to sign.
● Format:
○ Parties.
○ Transactions agent is authorized to do.
○ “Hereby giving and granting…”
● Any sale of real property in representation, you should have SPA, otherwise, the sale is VOID
Authority to Sell
● Mention the location, the description of the property, the price.
○ Elements of a contract.
■ Consent: Implied by taking the form.
■ Object: Property.
■ Consideration: Price.
● Capital gains Tax is shouldered by the seller when it comes to ordinary sale.
● Registration expenses, documentation, transportation and so forth, will be borne by the buyer as they
will benefit from the transaction.
Authority to lease
● Consent is implied, consideration should be there, object which is the lease property
● For lease, put the fixed period of time, or indefinite
xxxx
● Instead of Competent Evidence of Identity, it can be an oath or confirmation of one credible witness.
● Or the party signing is not a party of the document, but personally known to the notary public.
● You just have to present 2 credible witnesses:
○ Names and IDs.
○ This might not be asked in the Prac Exercise, but in your legal ethics.
● If the person signed the document in front of the notary public, even without competent evidence of
identity, it is valid as long as the person signed in the presence of the notary public.
CONTRACTS
Parts of Contracts
MASTER the basic parts of contracts: (T.P.B.S.A)
1. Title
2. Parties
3. Body (Stipulations)
4. Signatures
5. Acknowledgment
● A corporation organized under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
● Put duly represented by because it has a different juridical personality.
General Contract (Persons)
● For persons, then this is the format.
● As you will notice, no more representation .l
● In most instances, if the seller is married, marital consent of the spouse must be secured.
○ Because the requirement in most cases, like conveyances, especially if there is no agreement
or absolute community property, it means all property of the spouses are co-owned.
○ Contract void if no consent.
● Don’t forget the witness and acknowledgment
SALE, LEASE, MORTGAGE
A. NON-REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES
● e.g. car, jewelry
● This is another way of writing it.
MEMORIZE FOR MORTGAGE: “That for, and consideration of, this indebtedness, and to assure the
performance of said obligation to pay, the MORTGAGOR, conveys by way of CHATTEL MORTGAGE to the
MORTGAGEE, his heirs and assigns, the following personality now in the possession of said MORTGAGOR”
● There is a special part of a chattel mortgage that needs to be alleged as required by law: the amount
in words, the parties, marital consent (if married),the witnesses, and the acknowledgement, and the
affidavit of good faith. [See format below]
● The Rationale of the law in requiring the affidavit of Good Faith: that personal property is supposed
to secure the performance of the obligation. You cannot take it [personal property] away from the
locality where it is registered to defraud the creditor.
● The security is in the possession of the debtor but at the very least by the execution of the affidavit
of GF, in essence, one declares that “If I defaulted, I make the collateral available to satisfy the
judgment.” [See example of Affidavit of Good Faith below]
[Affidavit of Good Faith pwedeng before or after acknowledgement. But suggested putting it before the
acknowledgement para sabay ng notaryo.]
● When asked to draft a simple deed of sale, indicate the purchase price, the taxes [who will be
responsible for that?], and then the transfer of title.
● There is no hard and fast rule on stipulations. You can put taxes, other expenses etc. What is
important is for you to impress the examiners that you know other matters aside from the
subject matter and the consideration but do not sacrifice your time.
● Do not forget the acknowledgement part. [See example of Acknowledgment with two parties
(Bilateral contract)]
B. Contract to Sell
● Contract of sale is not a contract to sell.
● The ownership retains to seller subject to suspensive condition in order to be transferred to buyer
○ If confused, remember the concept of res perit domino.
■ Res perit domino - the property perishes in account of the owner
● if the thing is already delivered, you are the owner and you will bear the loss
○ Sale is a consensual contract but only for perfection. But ownership transfers after the
delivery, which can be actual or constructive. Actual means taking possession of the property
by traditio brevi manu and so on.
○ NOTE: Constructive delivery of property happens when the deed of sale is executed.
● Contract to sell is one of the exception from res perit domino
○ You should know the difference between a contract of sale and a contract to sell.
○ Remedy is insurance (insure the property)
○ IMPORTANT: Amount usually is in installment (you need to allege this)
■ If one whole payment then it will no longer be a contract of sell but a Deed of
Absolute Sale
D. Assignment
● Know the difference between assignment of credit and subrogation.
● In subrogation, a third party faces the obligation of the debtor to the creditor with the
consent of the creditor. As a consequence, the third party paying, steps into the shoes of the
original creditor and becomes the subrogee of the latter.
● In assignment of credits, the original creditor transfers the right to the assignor. The assignee
would have the right of the assignor to proceed against the debtor; this may be gratuitous or
onerous. The assignment would have the effect of sale.
● See example of assignment of credit
● Example of Assignment and Transfers of Rights.
● NOTE: If gratuitous, no need to put the amount. Just remember, it is like sale, but the word used is
"assignment".
● This is almost the same as sale, the only difference is the use of the term “assignment, assignor, and
assignee.”
E. Contract of Lease
● A lease may be a lease of things, service, etc. but it is temporary in nature.
[If you're being asked to simply draft a contract of lease, make sure you put the property or the subject
matter, the consideration or the rental, the lease payment, and the stipulations on deposit and advance,
sublease.]
● Make sure you know what's the meaning of the right of first refusal.
○ Right of first refusal: if the property is to be sold, the lessee has the first option to be offered
the property.
● Make sure to include in the stipulation the sublease agreement if asked to do so. Why?
○ If sublease is not put in the contract of lease, it is understood to be excluded. If you want
sublease to be applied in the agreement, put it in the contract.Therefore the lessee becomes
the sublessor and third party becomes sublessee.
● See picture below for the usual terms and conditions.
○ Usually, this will not be asked in the bar but if malaki yung points [20 pints] na ibigay sa
question, include the usual terms and conditions.
● See example of sublease below
Contract of Employment
● If asked to be drafted, write the usual labor standards provision on salaries/wages and job
description, duties, and responsibilities.
● Sometimes you need to attach the job description, if you don’t want to put it in the body itself.
● Acknowledgement then notarial details.
Sample of Employee Waiver, Release, and Quitclaim
Employee Waiver, Release, and Quitclaim
● This is to avoid complications after employment .
● After the employee has resigned or terminated, they can no longer claim by way of separation pay,
overtime pay etc from the company.
○ This is also true in labor cases where you need to compromise more often than not your
option in NLRC etc is to compromise or execute waiver.
○ Jurat and notarial details.
● Possible contracts may be asked in Prenuptial Agreement as asked in the previous bar exam
● Under the Family Code, the automatic property regime is Absolute Community Property (ACP)
Prenuptial Agreement
● Parties
● Stipulations - normally separations of properties, liabilities, financial disclosures
● Acknowledgement and Notarial Details
Sample of Prenuptial or Premarital Agreement (Between Parties)
Sample of Acknowledgment for Prenuptial or Premarital Agreement (Between Parties)
Petition For Adoption of Minor, Affidavit of Legitimation of Child, Petition for Legal Separation, Petition
for Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person
● Might not be included as syllabus ask for complaints or contracts and not petitions
● Shown to help for SPECPRO
COMPLAINTS
A. COMPLAINTS
a. Parts of Pleadings
i. Caption
ii. Title
iii. Parties
iv. Body (allegations)
v. Prayer (relief sought)
vi. Signature of Counsel
vii. Copy Furnished
viii. Explanation
ix. Verification and Certification of Forum Shopping (especially for initiatory pleadings)
x. Jurat
● Not acknowledgment for pleadings
Sample of Answer
● Answer
○ Not indicated in the syllabus
○ Answers with counterclaim
■ If you have a counterclaim, need to know the difference between permissive and compulsory.
● For compulsory, arises from the series of transactions and is normally used for damages. No
need to pay for additional docket fees
● For permissive counterclaim, because you just want to include a suit that involves the same
parties pero magkaiba na. You have to file and pay docket fees. If not, the court would not
take cognizance.
○ Admissions and denials
■ If actionable documents, denial must be specific and under oath otherwise it is deemed as
admission
● Eg.Promissory note - must be specifically denied under oath otherwise deemed admission. If
not true, it is tantamount to affirmative defenses
■ Affirmative defenses
● Rule 16: Motion to Dismiss - removed under the new rules
○ MTD Grounds under the new rules: Litis Pendentia, Res Judicata, Prescription, Lack of
Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
○ All the rest that used to be grounds for motion to dismiss are now affirmative defenses
Legal Basis: Title VIII. - NUISANCE (Article 694 to Article 707 NCC)
Sample of Complaint for Accounting and Receivership
● Where the father is single and the woman wants the man to acknowledge the child
Sample of Complaint for Annulment of Marriage
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age
or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents,
guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears
to be incurable
COMPLAINT FOR COLLECTION OF FIRE INSURANCE
(Court)
______________________,
Plaintiff,
C O M P LAI N T
COMES NOW the plaintiff by the undersigned attorney, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. That plaintiff __(name)___ of legal age and a resident of __(address)___ and defendant
___(name)___, a fire insurance company with office address at _____(address)_____.
2. That on __(date)___, plaintiff, who was the sole and exclusive owner of a _(restaurant)__ situated at
_______________, Philippines, insured said restaurant and all Mahogany tables and Mahogany chairs,
with defendant corporation against loss from fire, for the amount of Php __________, plaintiff having
paid to defendant on said date the sum of Php _____________, corresponding to the yearly premium
covering the period of said insurance, namely from ________________, up to, and including
_____________.
3. That defendant corporation agreed and bound itself to insure the aforementioned restaurant and all
Mahogany tables and Mahogany chairs of plaintiff, for the amount, and during the period stated
above, and as evidence of said contract, defendant issued Policy Number __________ copy of which
is attached to the complaint as Annex “A” and made an integral part thereof.
4. That, on ___________, the aforementioned restaurant of plaintiff, plus all Mahogany tables and
Mahogany chairs contained therein, were totally lost due to a fire which completely gutted the
premises.
5. That the value of the restaurant and all Mahogany tables and Mahogany chairs thus lost and
destroyed amounted to, at least Php ______________.
COMES NOW the plaintiff by the undersigned attorney, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. That plaintiff _________ of legal age and a resident of ___________ and defendant __________ is
likewise of legal age and a resident ______________________.
2. That on ___________, plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant whereby the latter, as
building contractor, bound himself to construct for the former a __________ on a lot identified as No.
________, Philippines.
3. That, in paragraph ____ of the Building Contract between plaintiff and defendant, complete copy of
said contract having been attached hereto as Annex “A”, it is provided that the construction of the
aforementioned _________ shall be terminated, in accordance with contract specification, on or
before _____________, and that, in case of failure on the part of the defendant to finish said
construction within the stipulated period, he is bound to pay plaintiff, as damages, the sum of Php
_________ for every day after _______ until the movie house is completed as per contract.
4. That defendant failed to finish the construction above mentioned on _________, but he did succeed
in finishing the same on the evening of _________, or a total of ___ days after the deadline specified
in the contract.
5. That plaintiff had made demands for the payment of damages amounting to Php ________,
corresponding to the above mentioned ___ days laps, at the rate of Php ________ per day, but
defendant failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, without any justifiable cause or reason, to
pay said amount to plaintiff.
1. Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of Php ________, plus interest thereon, at the legal
rate from the date this complaint was filed until the amount is paid:
2. ______Costs ________, ______other reliefs ____.
___________________, _____________________.
1. That plaintiff of _________ of legal age and a resident of ______________ and defendant
____________ is likewise of legal age and a resident of __________________________.
2. That plaintiff was the owner of a sari-sari store, situated at ___________________, Philippines, and
the defendant was the occupant of the office space directly on top of plaintiff’s sari-sari store.
3. That defendant, whose business license was that of a ________________, store several chemicals in
his office, and on _______, as a consequence of defendant’s negligence, said chemicals leaked,
resulting to damages stocks of merchandise and total loss of plaintiff’s sari-sari store.
4. That the stocks of merchandise which plaintiff had in stock at the time, and which was completely
damaged, including the following:
_________________________,
_________________________,
_________________________,
_________________________,
_________________________.
5. That, due to the total loss of the sari-sari store, the business of plaintiff had to stop, thereby causing
losses to plaintiff in the sum of Php _________ a day, which was his average daily net profit from said
business; and it will take plaintiff at least ______ (__) months to locate another store space and to
re-establish his business.
6. That, even should plaintiff be able to put up another sari-sari store after said period of ___ (__)
months, the temporary cessation of his business will cause him damages, due to loss of patronage
and goodwill, amounting to Php _________, more or less.
7. that on ________, plaintiff notified defendant of the amount of plaintiff’s losses, the same amount
averred in this complaint, and, at the same time, plaintiff demanded payment thereof by defendant,
but the latter failed and refuses to pay the same to plaintiff.
2. Ordering the defendant to pay interest thereon at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the
complaint, until the entire amount is fully paid.
3. ___________________ __________________.
___________________ ______________ _________________
Place Date Signature
1. That plaintiff is duly registered owner of a manufacturing plant for ____________ and his products
are generally known by the trademark “_________________” which trademark is duly registered in
his name with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO).
2. That said trademark is designed on a ________ background, with the ___________________________,
and with the words “___________” written in script immediately ________________________.
3. That plaintiff had been using said trademark since the year ___, when it was first registered with the
Bureau of Patents (BOP) of the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), until the present time and he had
spent at least Php ______ in advertising and popularizing said trademark, by means of internet,
billboards, handbills, posters, newspaper advertisement, television and radio programs,
announcements and other such advertising media; and due to said advertising campaign, the
aforementioned trademark is now known all over the Philippines, and identified with the products
put out by plaintiff.
4. That, on or about _____________, defendant _______________ started manufacturing, and putting in
the market, ___________, which come under the same classification as plaintiff’s products, and
used, as trademark for said articles, the name “_____________”, with the following designs,
_________________, ________________________, ______________________.
5. That the aforementioned trademark of defendant _________________ infringes plaintiff’s trademark,
both by idem sonans and similarity in design.
6. That the other defendant, __________________, as Director of Patents, agreed to register, as he did
register, trademark “___________________” in the name of defendant, notwithstanding previous
registration in his office of plaintiff’s trademark, and in spite of plaintiff’s representation against
defendant’s application for registration.
7. That defendant’s products are of inferior quality, and, as a consequence of the public display and
sale of said products, under a trademark which infringes that of plaintiff, the latter has suffered ,
ans is suffering, damages, due to loss of prestige and patronage, which is reasonably evaluated at
Php _______________.
8. The former patronizers and clients of plaintiff’s products decide to buy defendant’s goods, under the
mistaken belief that they are xxx.
=========================
Definition:
Idem sonan - a name or trademark incorrectly written which, when read, has a sound similar to the name or
trademark.
COMPLAINT FOR MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT
(Court)
________________,
Plaintiff,
-versus- CIVIL CASE
No. _______
________________,
Defendant.
x—-----------x
COMES NOW the plaintiff by the undersigned attorney, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. That plaintiff _________________ of legal age and a resident of ___________ and defendant
__________ is likewise of legal age and a resident of _____________________.
2. That plaintiff is the lawfully wedded wife of defendant, their marriage having been celebrated and
consummated on ___________ by and before the _____________ of _________________, _____________
Philippines, copy of the marriage contract between them being attached to this complaint as Annex “A”.
3. That plaintiff and defendant begot on ______________ a child, _______________.
4. That on ____________, defendant abandoned plaintiff and his minor child, for another woman with
whom he at present cohabits, and since said date, defendant has failed and refused and still refuses, to
provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff and his child;
5. That defendant is the owner of __________ situated at ___________, and has an average monthly net
income of Php ____________, more or less, while plaintiff is without any source of income, and has to
depend on the charity of relatives and friends for the sustenance of herself and of her child.
__________, __________,
__________, __________,
__________, __________,
__________, __________,
and _________.
Plaintiff,
CIVIL CASE
No. _____
-versus-
________.
Defendant.
x—------- —------------x
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the plaintiff by the undersigned attorney, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. That plaintiffs ___________ of legal age and resident of _______________, _____________ of legal
age and a resident of
_______________________, _________ of legal age and a resident of
_______________________, _________ of legal age and a resident of
_______________________, _________ of legal age and a resident of
_______________________, _________ of legal age and a resident of
_______________________, _________ of legal age and a resident of
_______________________, _________ of legal age and a resident of
_______________________, _________ of legal age and a resident of
_______________________, and defendant _____________ is likewise of legal age and a resident of
_______________________.
2. That the subject matter of this suit is general interest to nine (9) persons more or less, all of when
are residing at _____________ and herein plaintiffs are sufficiently numerous and xxx
COMES NOW the plaintiff by the undersigned attorney, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. That plaintiff _________ of legal age and a resident of _____________ and defendant ___________ is
likewise of legal age and a resident of ________________.
2. that , on _________, defendant borrowed from plaintiff the sum of ______________ PESOS (Php
______), which indebtedness was to be paid and to earn interest in accordance with the terms of promissory
note which was executed by defendant on the same date, which was executed by defendant on the same
date, which instrument is copied verbatim, hereunder:
“For value received, I promise to pay _________ the sum of _________________________PESOS (Php _____),
with one (1) year from the date of this promissory note, plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
_______________, Philippines.
____(date)______ (Sgd.) _____________.”
3. That the payment of said indebtedness is now overdue, and defendant has failed and refused, and
still fails and refuses, to pay the same, notwithstanding repeated demands from plaintiff.
4. That defendant likewise failed to any interest due on the aforementioned obligation.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment issued in favor of plaintiff and against defendant,
ordering the latter:
1. To pay to plaintiff the sum of Php __________, plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum
from _____________ until complete payment is made;
2. __________________, ___________________
__________________ _________________ ____________________
Place Date Signature
___________,
Defendant.
x—-------------------------x
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the plaintiff by the undersigned attorney, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. That plaintiff is the legal guardian of the minor ________, by virtue of an order issued on
__________, by the Regional Trial Court of _________-, Branch ________, in connection with Special
Proceeding No. ________ of said court. And that defendant __________– is of legal age and a resident of
____________________.
2. (Allegation of cause of action).
___________, ___________,
Plaintiffs,
-versus-
CIVIL CASE
No.______
___________,
Defendant.
x—--------------------x
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW the plaintiff by the undersigned attorney, and unto this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
1. That plaintiff ____________ of legal age and a resident of _______________, plaintiff __________ of
legal age and a resident of ___________ and defendant ____________ is likewise of legal age and a resident
of ______________.
2. That plaintiff ____________is included as party plaintiff for the reason of his being the husband of
the other plaintiff __________.
3. (Allegation of Cause of Action).
COMES NOW the plaintiff by the undersigned attorney, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. That plaintiff _____________ of legal age and a resident ___________ and defendant ___________ is
likewise of legal age and a resident of _________________.
2. That, on _____, defendant, jointly with one ____________, signed a promissory note for Php
__________, which promissory note is copied verbatim hereunder:
COMES NOW the plaintiff by the undersigned attorney, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. That plaintiff _________ of legal age and a resident of _________ and defendant ____________ is
likewise of legal age and a resident _________________.
2. That, on ___________-, defendant hired the services of plaintiff for the construction of defendant’s
poker room, and as consideration of said service, defendant promised to pay plaintiff the sum of Php
________________.
3. That, pursuant to said virtual contract, plaintiff rendered the services aforementioned and
terminated the construction of said poker room on ________________, the date agreed upon completion of
the work.
4. That, even should the defendant fail to prove the existence of the verbal contract mentioned in
Paragraph 2 hereof, still the reasonable value, on quantum meruit, of plaintiff’s services in Php __________.
5. That defendant failed, and still fails in spite of repeated demands, both oral and written, to pay
plaintiff any portion of the aforementioned amounts.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that the defendant be ordered:
To pay plaintiff the sum of Php _____________, in accordance with the verbal contract between them, and
should this court rule that no such contract exist, then to pay plaintiff the same amount as the reasonable
vale, on quantum meruit, of the services rendered by the plaintiff, plus costs, and such other remedies as
may be just and equitable.
2. Lord Coke says averments are two-fold, namely, general and particular. A general averment is that which
is at the conclusion of an offer to make good or prove whole pleas containing new affirmative matter, but
this sort of averment only applies to pleas, replications, or subsequent pleadings for counts and a vowries
which are in the nature of counts, need not be averred, the form of such averment being et hoc paratus. est
verificare.
3. Particular averments are assertions of the truth of particular facts, as the life of tenant or of tenant in
tail is averred: and, in these, says Lord Coke, et hoc, &c., are not used. Co. Litt. 362 b. Again, in a
particular averment the party merely protests and avows the truth of the fact or facts averred, but in
general averments he makes an offer to prove and make good by evidence what he asserts.
4. Averments were formerly divided into immaterial and impertinent; but these terms are now treated as
synonymous. 3 D. & R. 209. A better division may be made of immaterial or impertinent averments, which
are those which need not be stated, and, if stated, need not be proved; and unnecessary averments, which
consist of matters which need not be alleged, but if alleged, must be proved. For example, in an action of
assumpsit, upon a warranty on the sale of goods, allegation of deceit on the part of the seller is
impertinent, and need not be proved. 2 East, 446; 17 John. 92. But if in an action by a lessor against his
tenant, for negligently keeping his fire, a demise for seven years be alleged, and the proof be a lease at will
only, it will be a fatal variance; for though an allegation of tenancy generally would have been sufficient,
yet having unnecessarily qualified it, by stating the precise term, it must be proved as laid. Carth. 202.
5. Averments must contain not only matter, but form. General averments are always in the same form. The
most common form of making particular averments is in express and direct words, for example: And the
party avers or in fact saith, or although, or because, or with this that, or being, &c. But they need not be in
these words, for any words which necessarily imply the matter intended to be averred are sufficient. See, in
general, 3 Vin. Abr. 357 Bac. Abr. Pleas, B 4 Com. Dig. Pleader, C 50, C 67, 68, 69, 70;
1 Saund. 235 a, n. 8 3 Saund. 352, n. 3; 1 Chit. PI. 308; Arch. Civ. PI. 163; Doct. PI. 120; 1 Lilly's Reg. 209
United States Dig. Pleading II (c); 3 Bouv. Inst. n. 2835-40.
QUANTUM MERUIT
[Latin, As much as is deserved.] In the law of contracts, a doctrine by which the law infers a promise to pay
a reasonable amount for labor and materials furnished, even in the absence of a specific legally enforceable
agreement between the parties.
A party who performs a valuable service for another party usually enters into a written contract or
agreement before performing the service, particularly when the party is in the business of performing that
service. For instance, most professional roofers hired to repair a roof insist on having a formal agreement
with the owner of the house before beginning the repairs. In the absence of an agreement or formal
contract, the roofer may be unable to recover losses in court if the transaction goes awry. Quantum meruit
is a judicial doctrine that allows a party to recover losses in the absence of an agreement or binding
contract.
By allowing the recovery of the value of labor and materials, quantum meruit prevents the Unjust
Enrichment of the other party. A person would be unjustly enriched if she received a benefit and did not pay
for it when fairness required that payment be made. Quantum meruit can be used to address situations
where no contract exists or where a contract exists but for some reason is unenforceable. In such cases
courts imply a contract to avoid an unjust result. Such contracts are called quasi contracts.
Quantum meruit also describes a method used to determine the exact amount owed to a person. A court
may measure this amount either by determining how much the defendant has benefited from the
transaction or by determining how much the plaintiff has expended in materials and services.
The doctrine of quantum meruit was developed in the seventeenth century by the royal Court of Chancery in
England. This court worked apart from the common-law courts to grant relief that was due under general
principles of fairness but could not be obtained under the strict legal precedents of the common-law courts.
The system of basing decisions on basic principles of fairness became known as Equity. The Chancery Court
developed quantum meruit along with other equitable doctrines that allowed a person to recover or collect
for other valuable acts performed without a contract, such as the delivery of goods or money. Some of the
first cases of quantum meruit involved recovery by persons in so-called trades of common calling, such as
innkeepers, tailors, blacksmiths, and tanners.
As service industries increased, so did claims for recovery under quantum meruit, and the doctrine was
adopted by colonial courts. U.S. courts now apply quantum meruit principles in a wide variety of cases,
including cases involving attorneys' fees, physicians' fees, construction work, government contracts, and
even domestic relations suits for "palimony." Palimony is a form of financial support that is similar to
Alimony but arises out of a nonmarital relationship.
Courts have crafted four basic elements that the plaintiff must prove before she may recover under the
doctrine of quantum meruit: (1) that valuable services were rendered; (2) that the services were rendered
to the defendant; (3) that the services were accepted, used, and enjoyed by the defendant; and (4) that the
defendant was aware that the plaintiff, in performing the services, expected to be paid by the defendant.
The case of Montes v. Naismith and Trevino Construction Co., 459 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970),
illustrates how quantum meruit works. In August 1968 Abraham Montes began oral negotiations with Abdon
Perez regarding improvements Montes sought for his homestead. Perez testified that Montes brought a
contract to him more than once, but that the contract was never complete, and no contract was ever
signed. Despite the lack of a contract, Perez arranged for the Naismith and Trevino Construction Company to
do the work on Montes's house. Montes paid $1,800 to Perez, and Perez withdrew from the transaction.
Naismith and Trevino made improvements on Montes's homestead for a total value of $3,835.36, but Montes
refused to pay for the improvements. Naismith and Trevino brought suit against Montes, arguing that even
though they did not have a contract with Montes, they should be paid for their labor and the materials they
used in making improvements to his house. The court agreed and entered judgment for Naismith and Trevino
in the amount of $1,760, the amount of the services and materials provided by Naismith and Trevino less the
amount Montes had paid to Perez. The court based its ruling on the theory of quantum meruit.
The doctrine of quantum meruit is contained in court decisions and, to a lesser extent, in statutes. It can be
a confusing doctrine: many courts mix quantum meruit with the similar principles of restitution and unjust
enrichment. Restitution is a broad term that describes measures taken by a civil or criminal defendant to
restore a victim to the status that he enjoyed before the defendant caused a loss or injury.
Unjust enrichment is an equitable approach to civil relationships that covers more than just contractual
situations.
A civil plaintiff may recover under the doctrine of unjust enrichment by showing (1) that the plaintiff
conferred a benefit on the defendant; (2) that the defendant appreciated or knew of the benefit; and (3)
that, under the circumstances, it was unfair for the defendant to accept or retain the benefit without
paying for it. Most courts consider quantum meruit a particular form of legal restitution that follows the
basic restitutionary principle of preventing unjust enrichment.
=============================================================================================
COMES NOW the plaintiff by the undersigned attorney, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. That plaintiff _________ of legal age and a resident of __________________, defendant
____________ is likewise of legal age and a resident of __________________ and co-defendant
________________ is likewise of legal age and a resident of ________________________.
2. That on _________________, the two defendants were jointly occupying the premises immediately
on top of plaintiff’s poker club.
3. That, on said date, either one of said defendants or both of them, willfully or recklessly or
negligently spilled chemicals on the floor of their premises, which chemicals leaked through the wooden
floor into plaintiff’s poker club, causing irreparable damage to two (2) poker tables, to the damage of
plaintiff in the amount Php _________________.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that judgment issue ordering either one of defendants, or both of them to
indemnify plaintiff in the amount of Php ________________, with interest thereon from the date this
complaint was filed, plus costs.
_____________________________ ____________________ _____________________
Place Date Signature
COMES NOW the plaintiff by the undersigned attorney, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. That plaintiff _____________ of legal age and a resident of _____________ and defendant
__________ is likewise of legal and a resident of _______________________.
2. That, on __Date1___, defendant borrowed from plaintiff the sum of Php ____Amount1____, for which
defendant issued a promissory note copied hereunder:
(Copy Promissory Note)
3. That payment of the aforementioned obligations is now overdue, but defendant fails and refuses to
pay the same, notwithstanding plaintiff\s demands.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1. Plaintiff reproduces herein the allegations in Paragraph 2 of the First Cause of Action.
2. That, on __Date2__, defendant rented and used plaintiff’s Mercedes Benz Van for a trip to
__________, promising and obligating himself to pay plaintiff the sum of Php __Amount2___ for the
same.
3. That defendant fails and refuses to make said payment, in spite of plaintiff’s demands.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that defendant be ordered:
A. Essential Parts of an Information [Information: where it basically criminally charges a person for
what is allegedly committed]
a. Caption
b. Heading
c. Opening Sentence
d. Body Alleging Acts or Omissions constituting a crime
e. Contrary to Law
f. Certification of Preliminary Investigation
g. Jurat
h. List of Witnesses
i. Bail Recommended
INFORMATION
Information
● An information is a document being filed to court; not to a fiscal or prosecutor because more often
than not they are the ones who file it to the court
● criminally charges a particular person, now called as the accused, to be held in trial for the crime
allegedly committed.
○ You should know the elements of the alleged crime.]
○ Somebody died, with intent to kill, mode of killing , there is aggravating circumstance.
Remember justifying, exempting, mitigating, and alternative circumstances need to be
alleged in the information
Alleged the 5W and 1H (Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How)
● Facts
● Crime (as well as present elements)
● JEMA Circumstances
○ Allege the basics. remember 5Ws, 1H: Who, What; what was the crime committed?; when;
where, because it will determine the jurisdiction of the court. Under the rules, venue is
jurisdictional. How, how was the crime committed.
● Stages of commission of crime
○ Memorize the definition of each stage as they will matter in drafting of the information
○ Be mindful of crimes where there is no certain stages of commission
ALWAYS MENTION IN INFORMATION: .. did there and then willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously…
(CAPTION)
INFORMATION
PROSECUTOR
Witnesses:
_______________________
_______________________
INFORMATION
The undersigned, ______________, accuses _____________ of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE,
committed as follows, to wit:
That on or about _______________, at about ____________ (a.m./p.m.), in the City/Municipality of
______________, Province of _____________ and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a jungle knife, and with evident intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously assault, attack and wound one ____________ inflicting mortal wounds in different parts of
his body, which would have directly caused the death of said __________, thus performing all acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce the same by reason of caused independent of his will, that is, because of the timely medical
assistance rendered on the said ___________________.
Contrary to law.
_____________, Philippines, _______ Date _______.
PROSECUTOR
Witnesses:
___________________
___________________
(Certification of Preliminary Investigation)
Sample Information - Frustrated Homicide
Information - Frustrated Homicide
● For murder, or homicide, there is intent to kill; theft, with intent to take; physical injury, with intent to
injure.
○ *highlighted did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack and
wound one (person) inflicting mortal wounds in different parts of his body, which would have
directly caused the death of said victim, thus performing all acts of execution which would
have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce the
same by reason of caused independent of his will, that is, because of the timely medical
assistance rendered on the said victim.
● It is different if it is attempted homicide, although you need to allege the intent to kill, there is no
mortal wound.
● At the same time, the allegation in attempted, commences the performance of an action but did not
produce the act.
○ In consummated, the act was finalized. That is why you need to attempted, frustrated, and
consummated. However, there are crimes which do not have frustrated stage, like rape.
○ There is no such thing as a crime of frustrated rape. Simple touching of the labia is
consummated rape. But the element of rape is penetration. Otherwise, that is attempted.
(Information for Damage to Property Through Reckless Imprudence)
(Caption)
INFORMATION
Contrary to law.
(Baguio City), Philippines, __Date___.
_______________________
Provincial/ City Prosecutor
Witnesses:
________________________ _________________________
(Certification of Preliminary Investigation)
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Contrary to law.
Investigating Prosecutor
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am satisfied that he voluntarily
executed and understood the foregoing Complaint.
Sample Complaint - BP 22
Complaint - BP 22
● Classic example of direct filing to MTCC
● May mga kaso required by the rules filed via complaint. Directly without inquest or prelim
investigation.
○ Otherwise if with inquest and prelim investigation, the one that will be filed with court is the
information, which would be the main accusation against the accused. It will be read during
the arraignment.
COMPLAINT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 7th day of July in 2007. Affiant exhibited to me his passport
No. 1234567 issued on June 6, 2006 at Agoo, La Union.
__________________
Metropolitan Judge
WITNESSES:______________________ _____________________
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT
Sample Complaint-Affidavit
Different from complaint
● Complaint-affidavits are filed with prosecutor during Preliminary investigation
● Complaints - filed with the Court
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
MR. X,
Complainant,
-versus- Criminal Case No. 22-0918
For: ATTEMPTED MURDER
MR. Y,
Respondent.
x—-------------------------------------x
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, MR. X, Filipino, of legal age, married, and with residence address at Blk. 29 Lot 7, Camella Subd.,
BFRV, Talon 2, Las Piñas City, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and
say:
1. I am the private complainant in the case entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Mr. Y” for Attempted
Murder pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 255, Las Piñas City, and docketed as Criminal Case
No. 15-0511. Said criminal case, which arose from an incident that transpired on 19 March 2022 along Gov.
Sikat St. Las Piñas City, was remanded to the Office of City Prosecutor for the conduct of required
Preliminary Investigation now under Assistant City Prosecutor, Hon. Z.
2. After a careful evaluation of the facts surrounding the case and with thorough soul searching, I found out
that the filing of the instant case against respondent Mr. Y just arose from pure misunderstanding and
misapprehension of facts.
3. In order to move on after the unfortunate incident and to end an otherwise protracted litigation of my
claims, and since the respondent has already expressed his sincerest apology to me and is willing to settle
the civil aspect of the case, which I hereby acknowledge and accept, I am withdrawing my complaint in the
criminal case I filed in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. Attached herewith as Annex “A” is
a Compromise Agreement that both parties signed and executed and forms an integral part of this Affidavit
of Desistance.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby affix my signature this 15th day of June 2022 at Las Piñas City.
MR. X
Complainant-Affiant
Assisted by:
ATTY. W
Counsel for Complainant Mr. X
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 15th day of June 2022 at Las Piñas City. I hereby certify
that I have personally examined the affiant and I am satisfied that he voluntarily and knowingly executed
the foregoing Affidavit of Desistance.
HON. Z
Assistant City Prosecutor
Copy furnished:
MR. Y
Village 007
Las Piñas City
=============================================================================================
6. I therefore respectfully request that the above-mentioned case filed against said _______________
be dismissed as in fact I now withdraw my complaint against him and I further manifest under oath that I am
now desisting from testifying against him in Court or any other government entity or agency in connection
with the said criminal case.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hands this ____________, at ______________, Philippines.
_______________________
AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a notary public in and for _________________, this ____th day of
_____________ 20___. Affiant personally came and appeared with ________________________ issued by the
________________________ on _________at ______________, bearing his photograph and signature, known
to me as the same person who personally signed the foregoing instrument before me and avowed under
penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of said instrument.
Atty. ______________________________________
Notary Public
Doc. No. _____ Commission Serial No.________________________
Page No. _____ Notary Public for ____________________________
Book No. _____ Until December 31, 20__
Series of 20___ Office:__________________________
Roll No._________________________
IBP Lifetime Roll No. _____;___/__/__,(Province)
MCLE Compliance Cert. No. _______;___/___/___
Sample Affidavit of Desistance
Motion to Quash (possibly referred in ETC)
____________Signature of Lawyer____________
ATTY. _______Name of Lawyer_______________
OFFICE: __________________________________
ROLL NO. ________ ADMITTED AT BAR: ________
IBP NO. ______;___/___/___;________________
PTR NO. ______;___/___/___;_______________
MCLE COMPLIANCE NO. ______________;______
COMPLAINANT/S: RESPONDENT/S
1.______________________________ 1. _________________________________
Address: _______________________ Address: ____________________________
2. _____________________________ 2. __________________________________
_____________________________ __________________________________
3. _____________________________ 3. __________________________________
_____________________________ __________________________________
CHARGE: 4. __________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
Place of Commission 5. ___________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
Date ________________ Time ________________(Use back hereof for add, accused)
Witness:
Name ________________________ Address ____________________________
_____________________________ ____________________________________
_____________________________ ____________________________________
NOTE: 1. Has a similar complaint been filed before any other office? (YES OR NO)
2. Is this complaint in the manner of a counter-affidavit? ________(YES OR NO)
3. Are all the above information true and correct _____________(YES OR NO)
THE ABOVE SHOULD BE FILLED UP BY COMPLAINANT OR COUNSEL
Investigation on ___________________ Postpone to ________________________
On relation of________________________
________________________________
(Signature of complainant or counsel)
NOTE: Not yet accused but merely complainants and respondents
-versus- FOR:
x------------------------------------------x
That on _________., __________ personally appeared to the office of ________________ and reported that
SUBJECT OF S.W, located at __________________________________ is engaged in the illegal operation of
_______________________________; (See Photos and Sketch as Annex “A”).
That relative to the said information, at around ________, the informer and _________ together with the
undersigned conducted investigation and surveillance operation at ___________________, located at
_____________________________, __________. The undersigned together with ____________ and
_____________ inquires to the said office about _______________.
That on the said occasions, SUBJECT OF S.W, disclosed that they are (illegal activities). (See photos &
sketch and See Attached Calling Card, List of Requirements, Studio Romano Job Order Form & MTC Job
Information as Annexes “B” - “C”)
(modus operandi).
That on the said investigation and surveillance operation the undersigned confirmed and believes that
SUBJECT OF SW and/or any of its Officer, Agents, employees of
_____________________________________, __________ is indeed engaged in
________________________despite the fact that the said office is ________________and is not licensed to
__________________.
The properties, articles, objects and items which are used and/or intended to be used in the
commission of the afore-stated offense in the possession of the SUBJECT OF S.W includes the following:
a. Leads
b. ....
The undersigned has personally verified the report thru surveillance and investigation activities
together with _________________ and _______________, to ascertain the veracity thereof and found the
same to be true and correct;
PRAYE R
b. that this Honorable Court cause the immediate issuance of a Search Warrant commanding any Peace
Officer to conduct a search on the above-described premises and to seize the above-described items to be
dealt with as the law directs;
(Date), (Place).
___________________
Applicant
______________________
Presiding Judge
2. I personally caused the preparation of the foregoing application for Search Warrant and have read
its content and the allegations therein, which are true and correct to my own personal knowledge and
belief.
3. I further certify that (a) I have not therefore commenced or filed any application for a Search
Warrant involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and to the best of my
knowledge, no such other application for Search Warrant is pending therein; (b) If there is such other
pending Application for Search Warrant, I will therefore inform this Honorable Court of the present status
thereof; (c) If I should thereafter learn that the same and similar application for Search Warrant has been
filed or its pending , I shall report that fact within five (5) days there from to this Honorable Court, wherein
the aforesaid application for Search Warrant has been filed.
____________________
Applicant
Date: ___________________
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the instant petition be considered by the Honorable
Court and further grant the complaint other relief be granted as shall be deemed just and equitable in the
premises.
____________________, _____________________, ________________.
___________________________________
(Attorney for the Complainant)
___________________________________
(Address)
Copy furnished:
______________________________________
(Counsel for the Accused)
______________________________________
(Prosecutor on Case)
EXPLANATION
(Proof of Service)
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
Atty. Joseph Ferdinand M. Dechavez
September 26, 2022
ACADS SCRIBES TEAM: ADRIAN MACASAQUIT | MICA ARCE | SHERRY PAGAY | JOSEPH MILLADO | KARLA MARIE SANTOS | JOANNA
BULAUITAN | DARLYMPLE TABLIZO |
CHECKED BY: ADRIAN MACASAQUIT (Deputy for Academics) | HANNAH KEZIAH MORALES (Chairperson for Academics)
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS, PROPERTY, WILLS, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, SALES
● Mistake of law cannot be used to justify a legal act because everyone is presumed to know
the law and the consequence of its violation.
○ On marriage for instance, while absence or lack of authority of the solemnizing officer to
solemnize marriage, will render the marriage a nullity.
○ Article 35 par (2) of the Family code is an exception to the effect that the marriage was
entered into in either or both of the parties, believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so, but in fact he had none, then the marriage be
considered as valid.
○ Where prospective spouses, for instance, appear before in a notary public, thinking and
believing that he is or the notary public is authorized to solemnize marriage, such is a
case of mistake of law which will not result in a valid marriage
○ On the other hand, if they have gone instead to the court to be married, and assuming
that the judge was not around, but the clerk presented himself as one. This case may
qualify as a good faith marriage- being a case of mistake of fact.
● Presumption of knowledge of an existing law does not apply to foreign laws and judgment
because the Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws.
○ They must not only be alleged, they must also be proven
○ International Doctrine of Processual Presumption - provides that if foreign law is not
pleaded, or even if it was pleaded is not true, the presumption is that the foreign law is
the same as Philippine laws.
Del Socorro vs. Van Wilsem (Gr. No. 193707 December 10, 2014)
Van Wilsem a national of Holland claimed that even if he is here in the Philippines, the
Anti-violence against women and children act does not apply to him because he is a foreigner.
Here, Van Wilsem refused to provide support to his son with del Socorro; this argument is not
tenable because of the Territoriality Principle. Under Article 14 of the Civil code, our penal
laws apply to all persons who commit a felony in PH territory regardless of nationality, gender,
age, or other personal circumstances, subject to treaty stipulations and general principle of
international law. Van Wilsem also argued that the family code and support does not apply to
him because being a foreigner, the national law of Holland applies to mothers pertaining to
his family rights and duties. Yes, this is true. Under the nationality principle, Ph law continues
to apply to Filipino citizens when it comes to their family rights and duties, conditions, and
legal capacity, even if they do not reside in the PH.
Van Wilsem is a citizen of Holland he is subject to the laws of his country and not the
laws of the Philippines as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child as well as the
consequences therein. BUT under the Doctrine of Processual presumption, foreign laws must
be alleged and must be proved, otherwise, they will be considered as the same as ours (PH
Law).
In this case, where a filipino married to another filipino went to the US, obtained a
divorce there, such divorce will not be recognized in the Philippines because divorce is not
one of the grounds by which marriages in the PH between filipino citizens may be terminated.
Van Dorn vs Romillo (G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985)
The SC ruled, however, while it is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in the Article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. Aliens obtained divorces abroad may be recognized in the Philippines
provided they are valid according to their national law.
The SC clarified that par 2 of Article 26 applies even where both spouses were Filipino
citizens at the time of their marriage, what is important is that, at the time of their divorce,
one of them is already a foreigner. In mixed marriages, If the divorce is validly obtained
abroad and that divorce gives the alien spouse the capacity to remarry, the Filipino spouse
should then have the capacity to remarry.
The SC ruled that the probate of a will only involves extrinsic validity and does not
delve into its intrinsic validity unless there are exceptional circumstances which would
require the probate court to catch upon the intrinsic validity of the wills. Thus, when it comes
to the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments which are part
of extrinsic validity the civil code provides that, it shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed. Article 17 of the 1st par, is principle of lex loci
celebrationis which relates to the place of the ceremony or law of the place where the
contract is made.
For instance, Philippine law following the lex loci celebrationis adheres to the rule that a
marriage that is valid where it was celebrated, is valid everywhere. Under Article 26 par 1 of
the Family code, provides that All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
E. Conflict of Laws
● Conflict of laws refers to that part of municipal law of a state which directs its court when
confronted with a legal problem involving a foreign element (foreign laws or judgments).
● Doctrine of Forum Non- Conveniens
○ literally means that the forum is not convenient.
○ This doctrine applies in conflict of law cases where there is controversy involving a foreign
element.
○ It gives the courts the choice of not assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not
the most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another forum.
○ It is a device designed to frustrate elicit means of securing advantages and vexing litigants
that would otherwise be possible if the venue of the litigation were left entirely to the
will of either party.
○ Our courts may assume jurisdiction on the following requisites:
■ That the Philippines is one convenient to take jurisdiction
■ The Philippines is intelligent to make decision
■ The Philippines has power to enforce its decision
○ A mere invocation of the Doctrine of forum non-conveniens cannot operate to
automatically divest the court of jurisdiction.
● Choice of Law
○ Choice of law provisions are fundamental Principle of Autonomy of contracts.
○ Under 1306, The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.
○ Contractual choice of law is not determinative of jurisdiction. Stipulating on the laws of a
given jurisdiction as the governing law of the contract does not preclude the exercise of
jurisdiction by tribunals elsewhere.
● Doctrine of Renvoi
● Means “referring back”.
● It is a procedure whereby a dural matter is presented which the conflict of laws rule of
the forum refers to foreign law.
● The conflict of laws rule of which in turn refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum.
Aznar vs Garcia (G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963)
The SC elucidated that the theory of the Doctrine of renvoi, the court of the
forum determinate the question before it, must consider the entirety the law of the
other jurisdiction, including the rules as to conflict of laws, and apply the law to the
actual question, which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribed. This may be the
law of the forum.
Saudi Arabian Airlines vs Rebencio (Gr. No. 198587, January 14, 2015)
(Choice of law vs Forum non-conveniens)
The Saudi Airlines asserts that PH court tribunals are not in the position to
make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts because the respondents
cabin attendants, their contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia,
rather than those of the Ph. It claims that the difficulty in ascertaining the foreign law
calls into operation the Doctrine of forum non-conveniens , thereby, rendering and
proper the exercise of jurisdiction by PH tribunals. In that case, the SC denied the
Saudi Arabia Airlines. It averred that the choice of law governing the validity of
contracts or interpretation of its provisions does not necessarily imply forum
non-conveniens. Choice of law and forum non-conveniens are entirely different
matters. Here, the contracts signed by the cabin attendants, it was stated that in case
of conflict or in case of dispute between the contracting parties the same must be
resolved applying the law of Saudi Arabia and that is the choice of law.
The City of Bacolod vs Phuture Visions (G.R. No. 190289. January 17, 2018)| )
The SC held that the City of Bacolod in ordering the closure of respondent's
bingo operations, were exercising their duty to implement laws and ordinances which
include the local government's authority to issue licenses and permits for business
operations in the city. This authority is granted as delegated exercise of the police
power of the state. If no business permit, the LGU has the right to padlock or close the
operation of such business entity.
Damnum Absque Injuria does not apply when there is an abuse of the person’s
right or when the exercise of his right is suspended or extinguished pursuant to a court
order. Indeed, in the availment of one’s rights such must act with justice. When a
right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held answerable. The principle of an abuse of a right is
an exception to the principle of Damnum Absque Injuria.
● In the case of Punag vs CA, the SC held that the acts of the petitioner forcibly abducting
the private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her, against her will.
Thereafter, promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability only. In this light,
it is contrary to morals and good customs.
● In the case of Pe vs Pe, the SC awarded damages to the family of an unmarried woman
already 24 years old when a married man used trickery and scheme to seduce the former
to the extent of making her fall in love with him.
● In Baksh vs. CA, the Sc awarded damages pursuant to Article 21 , not because of the
promise to marry, but because of FRAUD and DECEIT and the willful injury to the woman's
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. However, in the case of Constantino vs
Mendez, the SC denied the claim of a woman, as regards Amelita’s claim for damages
which is based on Article 19 & 21 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan’s
promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of
Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could
only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire.
At the time she met Ivan, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she
was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her
womanhood. Had she induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could
have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first
sexual contact, that he was a married man. Her declaration they repeated their sexual
intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the
moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
● Accion in rem verso - it is an auxiliary action available only when there is no other
remedy on contract, quasi contract, crime or delict. If there is other obtainable action
that action must be resorted to and accion in rem verso will not lie.
○ In order the action in rem verso may prosper the essential elements must be present:
a. The defendant has been enriched;
b. The plaintiff has suffered a loss;
c. That the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground; and
d. That the plaintiff has no other action or remedy anymore based on contract,
quasi contract, crime or delict
G. Legal Personality
● Refers to a person's legal standing before the courts of law.
● In civil law, legal personality consist of 2 aspects:
○ Juridical capacity
■ Fitness of the subject of legal relations.
■ Juridical capacity is inherent in every natural person. Therefore, not acquired
■ Acquired from his birth and loss only through death. BUT even prior to his birth, a
child who is still in the mother’s womb, the law grants him provisional personality.
Under PD 603, the civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of
his conception for all purposes favorable to him provided, it be born later with the
condition specified in Article 41of the new civil code.
■ Article 41 - for civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time
it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the foetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within
twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
■ Under jurisprudence, a conceived child has a right to support from its progenitors;
an unborn child can be considered as dependent under the collective bargaining
agreement entered into by the labor union and the employer. It may also receive
donations and if ignored by his parents, may result in the preterition of the forced
heir that will annul the institution of testamentary heir, even if such child should
be born after the death of the testator. .
○ Capacity to act
■ It is not inherent in a person.
■ It is attained, conferred, and may be loss through valid causes.
■ A person who possesses the capacity to act, may waive any matter which affects
his property, provided that it does not infringe the right of others, and his waiver is
not forbidden by law and does not contravene public policy.
■ Otamias v. Republic, the SC held that the decision of Colonel Otamias to waive a
portion of his retirement benefit does not infringe the right of third persons even
the right of his family to receive support. The deed of assignment executed by him
was not contrary to law. It was in accordance with the provisions on support in the
family code.
■ Civil interdiction
● Limits a person's capacity to act.
● Person suffering from civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the
time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship,
either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the
right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by
any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
● It is required that the marriage settlement executed by a person, suffering
a sentence of civil interdiction or any subject of any disability, the guardian
appointed by the competent court, must be a party thereto.
● Adopted child
■ The adopted child shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights of obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopter.
■ In the matter of the adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia - The SC held that
being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
● Illegitimate children
■ The family code states that the illegitimate children shall use the surname of
their mother unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case, they
may bear their father’s surname.
■ When an illegitimate child is acknowledged and recognized by his/her father,
said child will have the choice for which surname to use.
■ Under jurisprudence, the acknowledgment or recognition by the father of an
illegitimate child makes him mandatorily obliged to support that child, but he
cannot use that as a condition to require the child to use his surname.
● Married woman
■ Married woman has an option, but not a duty to use the surname of the
husband in any of the ways provided in Article 370 of the Civil Code
■ Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
“A married woman may use:
○ Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or
○ Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
○ Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as "Mrs."
■ When a woman marries a man, she need not apply or seek judicial authority to
use her husband’s name by prefixing the word “Mrs” before her husband’s full
name or by adding his husband’s surname to her maiden firstname.
■ When the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exist, as in the case in the death
of the husband, or divorced as authorized by the muslim code, the widow need
not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to
revert to her maiden name. The use of her former husband’s name is optional
and not obligatory.
■ When a married woman married her husband she did not change her name, only
her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the
surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it.
Family Code
Tan-Andal v. Andal
The Supreme Court explained why marriage is a special contract, stating that when the legal
existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled
by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society, as well as the
parties.
When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some ways should be
obtainable.
On Marriage settlements:
● While the nature, consequences and incidents of marriage are governed by law, and not subject
to stipulation, the property relations of these spouses may be fixed in marriage settlements,
provided that it cannot contravene mandatory provisions of the Family Code.
For instance, it cannot be amended or terminated except by court decision, and it becomes
effective upon the celebration of marriage.
Keppel v. Keppel
The matrimonial property agreement entered into by the parties in 1991 or a few years after the
celebration of their marriage on August 30 of 1988, could not be enforced for being in contravention
of a mandatory law.
The Court found that petitioner Francisco and Victoria expressly agreed in the Ante-nuptial
agreement that the properties of Victoria would be hers exclusively, that any gift that Francisco will
bestow upon Victoria would remain her exclusive property, and that Francisco waived all direct and
indirect interest in Victoria’s properties.
When Francisco therefor purchased a condominium, and gave the same as a gift to his wife Victoria,
such gift falls within the coverage of the Ante-nuptial agreement; therefore, when Francisco
executed the Ante-nuptial agreement and waived any and all rights, interest over the properties of
Victoria, the condo unit that he gave as a gift was deemed included therein.
On Property Relations:
● A marriage celebrated under the Civil Code and those whose property relations are governed by
the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains shall continue under such property regime to enjoy
rights of ownership over their separate properties.
● Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got married
under the Civil Code into Absolute Community of Property in 1988 when the Family Code took
effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such properties.
● Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal
assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate,
and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of
the liquidation and settlement.
● Thus, the right of the husband or wife to ½ of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership or after dissolution of the marriage, when
it is finally determined after settlement of conjugal obligations, if there are still assets left which
can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs in the latter case if the death of one
of the spouses was the one that terminated the marriage.
● This is the reason why the provisions of the Family Code which requires the consent of one spouse
before the other can sell or mortgage property belonging to the absolute or conjugal partnership
will retroact and apply to marriages celebrated prior to the Family Code. Because prior to the
termination of marriage, neither spouse may claim to have any vested right on the common
properties.
● In order to be valid, marriage settlements must comply with the following requirements:
1. That marriage settlements and any modifications thereof shall be in writing;
2. That they shall be executed before the celebration of the marriage;
● If the marriage does not take place, the marriage settlement including donations by reason of
marriage contained in the marriage settlement shall be considered as void; but those stipulations
in the marriage settlements that are not related at all to the marriage will remain to be valid.
I.e. For instance, if there is an acknowledgement of filiation by one of the parties over a
child, then that acknowledgement will take effect validly.
● The formal requirement that the marriage settlement and its modifications shall be in writing is
provided not only for the purpose of enforceability, but for validity.
● The marriage settlement and its modifications should be registered in the local civil registry and
in the proper registries of property in order to have an effect on third persons.
● Consequently, if a third person purchased a property registered in the name of only one of the
spouses, without the knowledge of the existence of the marriage settlement, he may claim the
benefit of being a buyer in good faith.
● RA 6809, which amended Art. 234 and 236 of the Family Code and lowered the age of majority to
18, also provides that emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and
property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for acts of civil life.
The only exception provided in the law is that when he or she enters into a contract of marriage,
parental consent shall still be required until the age of 21.
This means that a contracting party to a marriage who is at least 18 years of age may execute a
marriage settlement without the need to include the persons referred to in Art. 14 of the Family
Code as parties thereto.
● The 21 year old minor referred to under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code on vicarious liability was
expressly excepted from the application of this new law, which means that under Art. 2180, on
vicarious liability, the parents, the guardian, will still be responsible for the acts of the minor
below 21 years of age living in their company.
However, where the person is suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or any other disability, it
shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party
thereto.
Matteo v. Lagua
The Supreme Court explained that donations propter nuptias, or donations by reason of marriage are
without onerous consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion or the motive for the
donation, and not the causa.
The causa for donations propter nuptias would still be the pure liberality of the benefactor. Being
liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor’s death if they
should infringe the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
In order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof, however, that
the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share
as legitime in the properties of the donor.
Republic v. Albios
The SC held that the avowed purpose of marriage under Art. 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage may have no real
intention really to establish a life together, is however, according to the SC, insufficient to nullify
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law.
The same article 1 provides that the nature, consequences and incidents of marriage are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may thus only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign
citizenship, therefore, so long as the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present,
and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared as valid.
Morimoto v. Morimoto
The Supreme Court held that it is still vital to distinguish the authentic underlying consent of the
parties from the external manifestation of such consent during a marriage ceremony. Jurisprudence
therefore recognizes that where there is no bona fide intention of becoming a spouse to another, a
marriage is void for want of consent even when the marriage ceremonies have been conducted, and
there the parties declared their intent to enter into married life.
On parental consent:
● In case either or both of the contracting parties not having been emancipated by a previous
marriage, kapag kinasal na ng una, pangalawang asawa na, you don’t need consent even if
you are between the ages of 18 and 21.
However, if you have not yet been emancipated by a previous marriage, and you are between
the ages of 18 and 21, you have to exhibit to the local civil registrar the consent to your
marriage by your father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge
of you in the order mentioned, otherwise the marriage is voidable.
● Parental consent is a requirement that must be submitted when applying for a marriage
license. A Marriage license is a formal requisite of marriage.
● In Atty. Dechavez’ view, where parental consent is sought and submitted but the order of
persons from whom parental consent must be sought is not observed, the same will only
constitute an irregularity in procuring a marriage license, the latter, being only a formal
requisite of marriage. This irregularity will not affect the validity of remarriage, but the party
or parties responsible for the said irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
● However, where parental consent is totally absent, the same will constitute a defect in the
legal capacity of the contracting party, an essential requisite of marriage. The latter defect
will render the marriage voidable or annullable under Art. 45 paragraph 1 of the Family Code.
On marriage ceremony:
● An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the
witnesses who stated that a wedding has indeed taken place. Since the very purpose of having
a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment, it would indeed be unusual to have
the wedding without an exchange of vows, and quite unnatural for people not to notice its
absence.
● However, the mere private act of signing a marriage contract without a duly authorized
solemnizing officer bears no semblance to a valid marriage, and thus needs no judicial
declaration of nullity.
On marriage in articulo mortis:
● Where either or both of the contracting parties are on the verge of dying, they are no longer
required to secure a marriage license, and the wedding ceremony can push through
wherever they are. Here it is the condition of the ailing party at the time when the marriage
was solemnized which is material.
Thus, even if the parties subsequently survive, this fact will not affect the validity of the
marriage that was solemnized in articulo mortis.
Hilario v. Miranda
The Supreme Court declared the marriage there as invalid for the simple reason that one of
the essential elements in valid marriage which is consent to be freely given was totally
wanting or not present because one of the contracting parties was not only ailing, but was
already unconscious and under comatose condition, and was hovering between life and death,
hecne he could not be said to have given his consent freely.
● The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned.
The absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal
requirement for procuring a marriage license. This is similar to the case of a parental consent
where parental consent is required to be exhibited to the civil registrar in order to obtain or
apply for a marriage license. Similarly, a certificate of legal capacity must be exhibited or
presented by a foreigner applying for a marriage license here in the Philippines.
● Under Art. 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage
celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate of legal capacity.
On legal ratification of marital cohabitation:
● The 5-year common law cohabitation period which is counted from the date of celebration of
marriage shall be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of marriage.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage, and
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity and without legal
impediment, meaning there is no third party involved at any time within the 5 years, and
continuity that the 5-year period must be unbroken.
Void marriage under Art. 35 paragraph 6 of the Family Code: Subsequent marriage or subsequent
marriages that are void under Art. 53.
● This rule presupposes that a previous marriage has been declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Art. 40 and 45 of the Family Code.
Art. 53 of the Family Code provides that either of the former spouses may marry again, after
their previous marriage has been declared a nullity.
However, the following must be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property:
1. Judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of their marriage,
2. The partition or distribution of the spouses’ properties, and
3. The delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes (must be of the common children)
● Failure to comply with these requirements will render the subsequent
marriage void. But their children, of course, will be considered as
legitimate.
On psychological incapacity:
Tan-Andal v. Andal
The Supreme Court categorically declares that psychological incapacity is neither a mental
incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion.
There must be proof, however, of the durable, or enduring aspects of a person’s personality called
personality structure which manifest itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines
the family. The spouses’ personality structure
It must make it impossible for him or her to understand and more important to comply with his or her
essential marital obligations.
Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have
been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on
behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse.
With respect to the essential marital obligations, the Molina guidelines provide that the essential
marital obligations are those embraced by Art. 68-71, on the rights and obligations of the husband
and wife, as regards the husband and wife, as well as Art. 220, 221, 225 of the same Code, in regard
to parents and children.
According to the SC, it is true that marriage is a contract primarily between the spouses, but its
cause remains to be the establishment of not just conjugal, but also family life. The spouses’
obligation to their children, once children are conceived, is as much a part of the spouses’ obligation
to each other, failure to perform these obligations to their children may be a ground to nullify a
spouses’ marriage.
● Art. 147 of the Family Code governs the property relations of marriages declared a nullity
under Art. 36 where there is no showing that:
1. The marriage was incestuous, or void due to public policy,
2. That they lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife, being
capacitated to marry each other; and
3. Having lived exclusively with each other, although under a void marriage,
Under Art. 147, wages and salaries earned by the parties during their cohabitation shall be
equally divided between them. This is regardless of who worked to earn the wage or salary.
However, if a piece of property was obtained through only one party’s effort, work or
industry, and there is proof that the other did not contribute through the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household, the property acquired during the
cohabitation shall be solely owned by the party who actually worked to acquire the property.
● Where the marriage was declared void under Art. 36 of the Family Code and not under Art. 40
or 45, what governs the liquidation of property owned in common by the parties are the rules
on co-ownership, more particularly under Art. 496 of the Civil Code.
Thus, a judicial declaration of nullity is required for prior marriages contracted before the
effectivity of the Family Code, but only for purposes of remarriage.
● If a person wants to contract a subsequent marriage and for that marriage to be recognized
under the law as valid, he must first secure a judicial decree declaring the previous marriage
void ab initio.
The Supreme Court held that the purpose of a prior judicial decree of nullity under Art. 40 was only
to establish the validity of the subsequent marriage, and not to hold one criminally liable for
bigamy for failure to secure the same.
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity.
For other purposes such as but not limited to the termination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same as long as it is essential to the determination of the case. (COLLATERAL ATTACK)
Likewise, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first or second marriage, presented by the
accused for instance in the prosecution for bigamy, is a valid defense irrespective of the time
wherein which they are secured.
The court clarified that a collateral attack against a void marriage may be permitted for purposes
other than remarriage.
Same ruling, a collateral attack by a spouse to a void marriage in an action for support was allowed.
A collateral attack is defined as an attack made as an incident in another action whose purpose is to
obtain a different relief, not to ask the court to declare a marriage a nullity.
Accordingly, there is a collateral attack on the validity of marriage when as an incident in a pending
action, not precisely brought to nullify the marriage, an attack is made impugning the validity of
marriage to obtain a different affirmative relief, or by way of defense, even though there is no final
judgment yet in a direct proceeding declaring the marriage annulled, or nullified.
A direct attack is an attempt for sufficient cause to have the marriage annulled or declared void in a
proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated
before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born while
the civil code was in force.
● The term well-founded belief of death of the absentee spouse must result from diligent
efforts to locate the absent spouse. Such diligence entails an active effort on the part of the
present spouse to locate the missing one.
● The mere absence of a spouse devoid of any attempt by the present spouse to locate the
former will not suffice.
● The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the
persons assailing the validity of the second marriage.
● A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even when it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the
spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated.
Therefore, the party you contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune
from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous.
Santos v. Santos
The Supreme Court held that while a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage may be filed
solely by the husband and wife, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but
also nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage,
mere filing of an affidavit of appearance will not suffice. Here, the petitioner’s choice to file an
action for annulment of judgment will therefore lie.
It was held that Art. 41 of the Family Code applies only when a person seeks to remarry and not
when the present spouse intends to get the absentee spouse’s SSS benefits.
A marriage that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court, whereas
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place and
cannot be the source of rights.
A void marriage can be questioned even after the death of either party, but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the
death, in which case, the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid.
● The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it, but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.
Lastly, void marriages have no legal effect except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouse regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution and its effect on the children born to such void marriages, as provided in Art. 50.
On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership or absolute community, and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.
The Supreme Court held that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of either Art.
147 or 148 of the Family Code.
Under the property regime described in Art. 147, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership, and a property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party’s effort consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’s separate properties are not
included in the co-ownership, meanwhile under the property regime described in Art. 148, when the
common law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry, or when they do not live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife, only the property acquired by both of them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions.
Such contributions and corresponding shares however are prima facie presumed to be equal.
The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage, and the party who has acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
prescribed under Art. 147.
The SC also declared that in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by the
parties falling under their relationship described under Art. 147 and 148, the provisions on
co-ownership under the Civil Code will apply, which means that the rules set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, their property
regime recognized for valid and voidable marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the
co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.
Republic v. Villacorta
The SC held that the concealed pregnancy which will vitiate consent must have existed at the time
of the marriage. It is the concealment of the fact of pregnancy of another man at the time of the
marriage that constitutes fraud as a ground for annulment; not pregnancy before the marriage.
Thus, if the wife had previous relations with other men and as a consequence of which, she became
pregnant or bore a child previously, the concealment thereof will not be a ground for annulling the
marriage if at the time the marriage was celebrated, the wife was not pregnant at all.
The incapacity of a party to consummate marriage must exist at the time of the marriage and not
thereafter.
This ground may not be ratified by cohabitation, which means that the injured spouse will not be
estopped from filing the action for annulment even after learning of the defendant’s incapacity. He
or she has cohabited with the other, it is expected that the spouses will try to do everything to
consummate their marriage.
● The fact that the injured spouse was informed of it at the time of the celebration of marriage
is immaterial.
● This ground may not be ratified by subsequent cohabitation, because it is not based on
vitiated consent, but on the fact that the STD is serious and incurable.
However, if the defendant contracted the STD after the marriage, even if it was serious and
incurable, it may not be used as basis to file an action for the annulment of marriage,
although it may constitute as a ground for legal separation.
If the STD was concealed, the same may constitute fraud and serve as a separate ground for
the annulment of marriage even if the STD was not serious and incurable.
● In all cases of annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage, and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of
preventing any collusion between the parties, and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
If the defendant spouse therefore fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him
or her in default, but instead the court should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if
collusion exists between the parties.
The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence if in his opinion, the proof adduced
is dubious and fabricated.
On confession of judgment:
De Ocampo v. Florenciano
The SC made a qualification to the effect that even supposing that the statement of the defendant
constituted practically a confession of judgment, in as much as there is evidence of adultery,
independent of such statement, the decree may and should be granted since it would not be based
on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff.
What the law prohibits here is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on the defendant’s confession.
● Voluntary separation of property agreed upon by the parties via a compromise agreement,
duly approved by the court prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
On legal separation:
● An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than a bed and board separation of
the spouses is purely personal.
Only the innocent spouse may file the action to claim legal separation, and the spouses can by
their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered.
● Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the
death of the action itself.
On donations:
● Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect between the spouses
during their marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each
other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.
The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
Agapay v Palang
The woman, a concubine, 22 years old, bought a property with the money provided by the man, who
directed the property be placed in her name alone as the vendee. The transaction was properly a
donation, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it
was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under
Art. 739 of the Civil Code.
In addition Art. 87 of the FC expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between
spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage.
For otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.
● The spouse may donate a property belonging to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership provided it is moderate and intended for charity, family rejoicing, or family
distress.
On expenses for support:
● The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such
support and other obligations shall be paid from the community property and in the absence
thereof, from the income of each of the separate property.
● In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied
from the separate properties, and their liability is solidary.
● The support of the spouse, their common children and legitimate children of either spouse,
shall be charged against the absolute community or conjugal partnership.
However, the support of illegitimate children, shall be paid from the separate property of the
spouse responsible for giving that support.
● In case the obligor had no property, the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted
from the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership.
It is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired by the funds of the
partnership. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not
appear, that presumption will still apply.
The presumption shall subsist in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome the same.
The Benefit to the family must be direct and not just a byproduct or spinoff of the loan
itself.
● Where a husband therefore contracts obligations on behalf of the family, or of the family
business, the law presumes and rightly so that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.
‘
● Note that all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator spouse for the benefit of the community of property or by both spouses or by
one spouse with the consent of the other may be charged against the absolute community or
conjugal partnership.
● Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other may also
be charged against the absolute community or conjugal partnership, only to the extent that
the family may have been benefited.
PROPERTY
● Property is not limited to that which is already possessed or owned by man. If you read Art.
414, a property refers to things which are or may be the object of appropriation. Accordingly,
there are many things which are not yet possessed or owned by man but they qualify as
property.
● Appropriability is one of the characteristics of property. The others are utility and
substantivity. It means that when you say appropriability, it means for a thing to be classified
as property, it is enough that it is susceptible of being owned or possessed by man.
So that the sunlight may qualify as a thing but it may become property once it is harnessed
and brought under the control of science like when it is converted into solar power or solar
electricity.
● Appropriability must however be distinguished from the phrase “outside the commerce of
men.” While things outside the commerce of men may not be the object of a contract, they
may not necessarily be disqualified from becoming a property under Article 414.
For instance, the properties of the public dominion like roads are outside the commerce of
men. However there are properties because they are either owned or possessed by the state
or its instrumentalities.
● Now let's go to Article 414. In Article 414, let us stress that a building is an immovable
property regardless of whether or not the steady structure and the land on which it is adhered
to belong to the same owner or whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a
usufructuary or a lessee.
While a machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the
owner of the tenement the property or plant but not so when placed by tenant, usufructuary,
or any other person having only a temporary right unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner.
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority
G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
Foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belong to the public domain and are inalienable unless
reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed
for public service. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
For a land of public domain to be converted into patrimonial property, there must be an express
decoration in the form of a law enacted by congress or Presidential Proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law and that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial.
The Supreme Court held that a mere endorsement of the Executive Secretary is not the law or
Presidential Proclamation required for converting land of the public domain into patrimonial property
and rendering susceptible to prescription.
● On ownership, we know that ownership is a real right. It is the power belonging to a person
over a specific thing without a definite passive subject against whom such right may be
enforced. Thus, it is said to be enforceable against the whole world.
Being a real right, it gives the holder or owner the right to exclude others from the enjoyment
of the thing. We have the doctrine of self help, which authorizes the owner or possessor of a
property to exclude and to use reasonable force or to use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to prevent or repel an actual or threatened, unlawful, physical invasion of his
property.
● Take note of the distinction between jus possidendi and jus possessionis. The lessee has
jus possessionis but it is the owner that has always had the right to possess or jus possidendi.
Remember, one of the characteristics of ownership is elasticity so that an owner may give up
his possession over his property to another person. For instance, if the owner of a property
will pledge his property to another person, in such case, the right of possession is held by the
pledgee but upon the payment of the loans, subject of the pledge, the pledge is terminated
and the ownership of the property by the owner becomes full ownership; thus, will have the
right possess and the right of possession.
● There are several remedies available to recover possession. Remember in Article 433 and
434. Under ArtIcle 433 of the Civil Code, it states that actual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership and the true owner will have to go to
court in order to recover ownership. There are therefore several remedies available to
recover possession.
● Accion Interdictal. Accion Interdictal may either be forcible entry or unlawful detainer;
while ownership carries the right of possession but the possession however contemplated by
the concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry
case. I will repeat, the nature of possession in ownership contemplated in the concept of
ownership, is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in forcible entry case.
● Possession in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than a prior physical possession or
possession de facto. Prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure.
Title is not the issue and the absence of title is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief
from the parties in an ejectment case. Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who can prove
prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.
For instance, “yung informal settlers sa likod ng bahay ninyo, pag sinipa mo siya, hindi ka
pumunta sa korte bago siya paalisin, he can file an action for forcible entry against you even
if he is not the owner of the property.”
● Refusal to vacate despite demand will give rise to an action for summary ejectment of
unlawful detainer.
So the other remedy under Accion Interdictal apart from forcible entry is unlawful detainer. In
forcible entry, the entry into the property is from the beginning, unlawful. On the other hand,
an unlawful detainer, the entry into the property initially was lawful. So unlawful detainer
is the action that must be brought when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other
person of any land or building is being unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract.
● So that the lessee, if after their expiration of the contract of lease, refuses to leave the
property and turn over the property to the owner, then the proper remedy, the action that
must be filed is unlawful detainer. Possession is lawful here from the beginning. It must be
brought within one year from the time the possession becomes unlawful. If the period, again,
is one year from the expiration of the lease or if the reason is non-payment of rent, one year
from the demand to vacate.
● The issue here, similar to forcible entry, is mere physical possession and not juridical
possession, nor ownership. Let me stress, that in unlawful detainer, a demand is a
prerequisite to an action for unlawful detainer when the action is based on failure to pay
rent due, or to comply with the conditions of his lease but not where the action is to
terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term.
The cause of action which would give rise to an ejectment case would be the expiration of
the lease. Thus, the requirement under the rules of a prior demand to pay or to comply with
the conditions of the lease and to vacate would be unnecessary.
Apart from Accion Interdictal we have Accion Publiciana or a plenary action. This is the
action for the recovery of the better right to possess. It must be brought within ten years. In
other words, if you fail to file an action for forcible entry within the period of one year or an
action for unlawful detainer within a period of one year, then you may still have 10-year
period to file an action for action publiciana. This is the action for recovery of the better
right to possess. The issue involved here is who has the better right to possess or de jure and
not de facto possession.
● The other case or remedy that may be filed is Accion Reivindicatoria. This is an action to
recover ownership over real property. I will repeat, this is an action to recover ownership.
Possession is only an incident to ownership. This is an action to recover ownership over real
property. This must be brought within ten years or thirty years depending on whether the
other party seeks to obtain ownership through ordinary or extraordinary prescription.
The issue involved here is one of ownership. So an accion reivindicatoria is a suit which has
for its object the recovery of possession over real property as owner. It is different from
accion publiciana or the plaintiff merely alleged proof of better right to possess without claim
of title. Note that the doctrine of self help is available not only to the owners of the property
but also to any of his lawful possessors.
● Ownership may be acquired by prescription. If in good faith, you have ten years. But it must
be with just title and adverse possession. If in bad faith, you have 30 years by adverse
possession. It is [a] well settled rule, however, that a title, when registered or falls under a
Torrens system, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open, and notorious possession.
● Take note that right of accession or jus accessionis is another attribute of ownership. Jus
possidendi is another attribute of ownership. Our laws on property provide that the ownership
of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby or which is
incorporated or attached thereto either naturally or artificially.
● So meron tayong accession discreta, yung accession, the right of the owner to everything
which is produced by the property which includes natural, industrial, and civil fruits.
● And accession continua, which may either be accession industrial, accession natural and
accession with respect to movable properties.
● So under Art. 445, whatever is built, planted, or sown on the land of another and
improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Thus, even if the
land was being leased when the roads were constructed, the ownership of the improvement
belongs to the owner of the land, not to the lessee.
● Under Art. 433, I will repeat, the Civil Code provides that actual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Mere possession of the land was
not adverse against the owner and was sufficient therefore to vest title unless such possession
was accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner which means that the possession must
be in the concept of an owner, not in the concept of a holder.
● Art. 448 of the Civil Code therefore cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants, or sows on
the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant, or sow upon the land that
exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third
person under the circumstances and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.
However, when the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house
of the defendant overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to
the plaintiff which the defendants obviously built in good faith, the provisions of Art. 448 of
the New Civil Code apply.
I will repeat, generally speaking, a co-owner who builds, plants, or sows on the land owned in
common is not a builder in good faith because as a co-owner, he builds on a property that
does not belong to another but on the property of which he is a co-owner. A co-owner is not a
third person under the circumstances and the situation is governed by the rules of
co-ownership. However, when the co-ownership is terminated by partition and it appears
that the house of a co-owner overlaps or occupies a portion of five square meters of the land
belonging to his co-owners and which he built in good faith, the provision of Art. 448 of the
Civil Code should apply.
● Take note that if the possessor is a builder in good faith which means that he erected in good
faith on the land, a building, owned by another is entitled to the possession of the land or he's
entitled to the right of retention until has paid the value of the building.
The owner of the land on the other hand has the option either to pay for the building or to
sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot refuse both to pay for the building
and sell the land and compel the owner of the building to simply remove it from the land
where it is erected. The owner is only entitled to the remedy of removal after he has chosen
to sell the land and the other party fails to pay for the same.
Take note, I will repeat, to be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person
asserts title to the land on which he builds, that he is a possessor in the concept of an
owner, and that he is unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition a flaw
which invalidates it. Therefore, Art. 448 on builders in good faith are inapplicable in cases
covered by the Condominium Act, where the owner of the land and the builder are already
bound by a specific legislation on the property and by contract.
The Supreme Court declared that a lessee is not a builder in good faith. Being mere lessees,
the private respondents knew that their occupation of the premises would continue only for
the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good
faith.
So that the provision which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention
of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor in good faith. One
who builds on the land with the belief that he is the owner thereof does not apply where
one’s only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract. Otherwise, it would always be
in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of his property.
● The applicable law on lease which provides that if the lessee makes in good faith, useful
improvements which are suitable for the use for which the lease is intended, without altering
the form or substance of the property lease, the lessor, upon the termination of the lease,
shall pay the lessee one half of the value of the improvements at the time. Should the
lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements even
though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby.
He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than it is
necessary. The right of reimbursement arises only if the lessor opts to appropriate
improvements. In this case, there was no indication that the respondents chose appropriate
improvements. Thus, they cannot be compelled to pay one half of its value.
● In another case, the Supreme Court held that under Art. 448, in case the trial court
determines that the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the buildings
and improvements, the possessor- the builder may not be compelled to pay the value of
the land. Instead, he shall pay reasonable rent upon the agreement of the parties on the
terms of the lease. In the event of disagreement between the parties, the court shall fix the
terms of the lease.
The Supreme Court has declared that upon deposit by the appropriator of the amount fixed for just
compensation, the owner whose property is sought to be expropriated becomes the owner of the
deposited amount.
On co-ownership:
● There is co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already
completely determined and separately identifiable even if not yet technically described.
Take note, that co-ownership only exists for the owners while the property is not yet
physically divided. Although the ideal or fractional or aliquot share is already determined so
where the property is not yet physically divided, a co-owner cannot point to a specific portion
of the property owned in common as his own because his share remains intangible. The
co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house or agree to lease it,
meaning, the co-owners may either agree, they can live together, or anyone of them in the
house owned in common, or they can agree to lease it to a third person. If however, they fail
to exercise any of these options, it would be unjust to require a co-owner who chose to live in
the house to pay rent, after the co-owners, by their silence, have allowed that co-owner to
use the property.
● This one is very important. Where a co-owner may bring an action in ejectment, it includes
all the remedies in order to recover property. It includes forcible entry, unlawful detainer,
action publiciana, action reivindicatoria. So the rule here is where a co-owner may bring an
action in ejectment, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any adverse judgment
cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.
● However, any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the co-owners. A
co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided share in the common property. This is to
be distinguished from the provision on Art. 147, paragraph 3, of the Family Code.
● Under the Civil Code, generally speaking, a co-owner has absolute ownership of his
undivided share of the common property and therefore he has the right to alienate or
mortgage his undivided share. The effect of such alienation, however, or mortgage with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him in the
division upon determination of the co-ownership.
● If a co-owner sells the whole property as is, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Take note under Art. 147 of
the Family Code, paragraph 3, a party who cohabited with the other cannot sell or mortgage
his or her share in the property that they acquired during their cohabitation without the
consent of the other until the termination of the co-ownership.
● Although their property relation is governed by co-ownership but while under the Civil Code,
a co-owner may alienate or share his undivided share with respect to parties living together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, they
cannot sell or mortgage their respective, undivided share in the property owned or
acquired by them during their cohabitation, without the consent of the other, and until
the termination of their cohabitation.
● An individual co-owner in one case decided by the Supreme Court, an individual co-owner
cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned
in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. What a co-owner may
dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share which shall be limited to the portion that may be
allotted to him. Before partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional rights; however, the
sale prior to partition will not invalidate the sale. However, the interest thereby acquired by
buyers are limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned to a co-owners that sold
the portion of the property upon the partition of the estate.
A sale by a co-owner of a definite portion of undivided property is void. At the time of the
alleged sale, the entire property was still held in common. The rules allow respondent to sell
his undivided interest in the co-ownership; however, a co-owner has no right to sell or
alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing owned in common because his
right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without physical adjudication.
On possession:
● Even if the possessor is aware that there is a flaw in his title resulting in its invalidation, so long
as he claims ownership of the property and does not acknowledge in another, is superior right, he
is nonetheless considered a possessor in the concept of an owner.
● One whose interest is merely that of a holder such as a mere tenant, an agent, or usufructuary, is
not qualified to become a builder in good faith.
● Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of an owner can serve as a title for
acquiring dominion.
● If a possession of another lasts for more than one year, only possession de facto is lost but not
the real right of possession. Possession de jure is not lost until after the lapse of ten years.
On usufruct:
● Usufruct is a real right of a temporary character which authorizes the holder to enjoy all the
utilities which result from the normal exploitation of the property of another in accordance with
its destination and which imposes the obligation of restoring at the time specified, either the
thing itself or in special cases is equivalent.
● So the main obligation of the usufructuary is to preserve the form and substance of the
property subject of the usufruct. The exception is in the case of an abnormal usufruct where
the property subject of this usufruct is a property that deteriorates through wear and tear.
Quasi-usufruct:
● Where the property subject of the usufruct is a consumable thing. In quasi-usufruct, the
ownership of the property is transferred to the borrower, whereas, thru usufruct, the naked
owner retains the ownership of the property subject of the usufruct.
● The right of enjoyment of the usufructuary extends to all the accessions which the property held
and usufruct may acquire to the servitudes or easements established in favor of such property as
well as to the benefits inherent in the property.
On easement:
The rule is that easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
estate and where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. So
the convenience of the dominant estate’s owner is not the basis for granting an easement of right of
way, especially if the owner’s needs may be satisfied without imposing the easement.
● Easement of light and view consists of two easements; namely, the easement of light, which is to
allow sunlight to get inside the property; and easement of view, so that one can have a view of
his surroundings.
● Easement of light and view is a continuous and apparent easement; therefore, it may be acquired
by prescription. However, the rules to acquire this by prescription differs, depending on whether
the easement is a positive easement or a negative easement.
● An easement of light and view is a positive easement if the opening is made through a party wall.
Here, the party wall being owned by the owners of both sides, making an opening through the
party wall would mean that the owner of the other side is allowing it. So that if he does not
close it for ten ( 10 ) years, then the easement of light and view is deemed to have been acquired
by prescription. On the other hand, if the opening or the window is open not thru a party wall but
thru the wall of the dominant estate, then what may be acquired would be a negative easement
of light and view, meaning, you’re trying to prevent your neighbor from blocking your view.
However, to acquire this kind of easement, it is necessary that the dominant estate observes a
distance of at least two ( 2 ) meters between the wall and the boundary of your neighbor’s
property.
Otherwise, no easement may be acquired and the kind of window that may be opened is only a
restricted window, in order to allow light and some air.
In addition, in order to acquire a negative easement of light and view, the dominant estate must
serve upon the owner of the servient estate a notarized prohibition, prohibiting him from
blocking your view which he could do without the easement.
SUCCESSION
Treyes v. Larlar
The Supreme Court dealt with the right of the heir to inheritance. In that case, Rosie Treyes died and
was survived by her husband, Dr. Treyes and seven siblings. In this case, the surviving spouse
adjudicated to himself all of the properties left by Rosie Treyes, and when the siblings filed an action
for the annulment for the affidavit of adjudication and the transfer of the properties of the wife to
the husband alone. Dr Treyes argued that they do not have personality until they are declared as
heirs.
According to the Supreme Court, no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an
heir may assert his/her right to the property of the deceased. The right to assert a cause of action as
an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to be so, if duly proven is well-settled in this
jurisdiction.
The property of the deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by
the mere fact of death of his predecessor-in-interest, and as such can deal with it precisely in the
same way in which the deceased could have dealt subject only to the limitations or contract may be
imposed upon the deceased himself.
Accordingly, from the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners
of his properties, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent. The right of the heirs to the
properties of the deceased vest in them even before judicial declaration of them being heirs in the
testate or intestate proceedings.
Uson v. Del Rosario
The Supreme Court held that although the lawful wife has expressly renounced her right to inherit
any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death. Such renunciation
cannot be entertained for the reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract
nor can it be renounced.
Note that Art. 1080 of the Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an
act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected in so far as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the
partition by the parent as provided under Art. 1080 is a case expressly authorized by law.
Under Art 1080 of the Civil Code, clearly gives a person two options in making partition of his estate,
either by an inter vivos or by will when a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such
partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills. However, when the
person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may be oral or written,
and need not be in the form of a will provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs.
Will
● Take note that the making of a will is strictly a personal act. The duration or efficacy of the
designation of heirs, devisees, or legatees, or the determination of the portions which they
are to take, when referred to by name, cannot be left to the discretion of a third person.
● The testator may not also make a testamentary disposition where another person has to
determine whether or not the will is to be operative. However, the testator may entrust to a
third person the distribution of specific property or sums of money that the testator may
leave in general to specified classes or causes.
● Note that when an uncertainty arises on the face of the will as to the application of its
provisions or when there is an imperfect description of the identity of the heirs, the testator’s
intention may be ascertained from the word of the will itself, taking into consideration of the
circumstances of which it was made but not, but excluding, however, oral declarations of the
testator.
The Qualification of a Testator
● The qualification of a testator must be 18 years of age, at least and he must be of sound
mind.
● To be of sound mind, however, it is sufficient that the testator was, at the time of making the
will, able to know the nature of estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty
and the character of the testamentary act.
● When you say ‘the nature of the estate to be disposed of’, meaning he knows what are his
properties, when he knows the ‘proper objects of his bounty’ it means that the testator
knows to whom he is giving his properties. The person he instituted is known to him.and the
character of testamentary act means that there is animus testandi and the testator must be
of sound mind.
○ The sound mind does not require that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties or that his mind is wholly broken, unimpaired or shattered by
injury or other cause. However, insanity is presumed, one month or less, before
making his will, publicly known to be insane or testator, makes a will after being
judicially declared insane or before the order is set aside.
● Note that a notarial will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses, in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other.
○ The term ‘in the presence’ does not require actual seeing but that the testator and
the witnesses be so placed that they can see, if they wish, without changing their
relative positions, by merely casting their eyes in that proper direction.
● Note that the attestation clause may be incorporated in the will itself or may be written in a
separate page that need not be signed by the testator.
● Very important, under Art. 823, a devise or legacy to the attesting witness or to his spouse,
parent or child, or anyone claiming under the same is void unless there are three other
competent or disinterested witnesses to the will. However, the person so attesting shall be
admitted as a witness as if the devise or legacy had not been made.
● Note that a forced heir is a competent witness and does not lose his legitime that he owes
exclusively to the law but he will lose all his devises or legacies in his favor chargeable to the
free portion.
Revocation of Wills
● Waiver or restriction of the right to revoke a will is void. If the recovcation is made to
depend upon a condition, the non-fulfillment of the condition bars the revocation.
● Thus, if the testator who desires to make a new will cancels the old will by physical
destruction preparing to make a new one and thereafter fails to execute the same or has
invalid disposition, it is presumed that he preferred testacy over intestacy therefore the old
will is not revoked. → This is the Doctrine of Relative Revocation.
● If the will is burned, torn, canceled or obliterated without express direction of the testator,
the will may still be established, proved, and probated, and the estate distributed accordingly
upon proof of its contents and due execution and authorized destruction.
● This is true because even if a will is revoked, that revocation will not be effective if it is not
coupled with animus revocandi or the intention of the testator to revoke the will.
Take note that in animus revocandi, the testator must be of sound mind. Mere intention to
revoke without actual mutilation or destruction does not revoke even if the destruction is
prevented by another person but the latter is incapacitated to inherit. The destruction need
not be of the whole paper.
● If a will executed and kept under the control of the testator cannot be found after his death,
the presumption is that the testator revoked the will, this is the Doctrine of Presumed
Revocation.
● Preterition is the omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious.
So long, however, as the heir gratuitously receives any property at any time, his omission or
preterition does not annul the institution of the heir, but entitles that compulsory heir to
demand merely that his legitime be completed.
Disinheritance
● Disinheritance that is without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which,
if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in the Civil Code, shall
annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the
devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will
not impair the legitime.
Substitution
● The Sabinian Doctrine on Art. 873 on institution of heirs, states that impossible, illegal, and
immoral conditions are considered not imposed. Therefore, the effect is that of a pure
institution.
● An absolute condition, in relation to this, an absolute condition not to contract marriage shall
be considered as not written. It is contrary to morals and public policy because it would
deprive a person of one of his inherent or inalienable rights, which is to choose one’s status in
life.
○ However, if the condition is imposed by the deceased spouse, or his ascendant or
descendant, upon his widow or widower, such is valid but if it will only apply to
legitime and the condition is resolutory.
○ A condition not to contract a first marriage, may also be valid, if it is relative. For
instance, if it is a condition not to contract marriage with a determinate person.
● Grandchildren inherit by right of representation except in case that all of those nearer
degree repudiate inheritance when those of the next degree succeed in their own right.
Representation takes place when in case the nearer decedent predeceases, incapacitated or
disinherited but not if he repudiates. Those succeeding in representation shall not inherit
more than what the person they represent would inherit. If living or able to succeed unless all
the nearer degree have repudiated.
● The testator cannot deprive his compulsory heirs of their legitime except in cases of
disinheritance. Neither can the testator impose upon the same any burden, condition or
substitution of any kind whatsoever
Take note that disinheritance applies only to forced heirs. Disinheritance implies revocation of
legacies to the disinherited heir unless the testator otherwise provides.
A subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the
latter the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been
made.
In intestate succession, nephews and nieces can represent if they concur with their uncles
and aunts. If they are alone, they inherit equally, not by right of representation.
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
● In breach of contract, negligence is presumed, so long as it can be proved that there is breach of
contract.
Who has the burden to prove? The defendant to prove that there was no negligence in
carrying out terms of contract.
● Additionally, in Breach of Contract, the principle of respondeat superior is followed. This means
when there is a breach of Contract, it is irrelevant for the employer to prove that it had
exercised due care in the instruction or selection of his employees. This is because negligence is
presumed.
● Art. 2180 of NCC provides that the obligation arising from quasi-delict is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions but also for those persons for whom one is responsible
(vicarious liability)
Valenzuela vs. CA
An employer is liable for the negligence of his employees in the discharge of his respective duties,
the basis of which is not respondeat superior, but based on the relationship of pater familias.
● Pater Familias - the theory which bases the liability of the master, ultimately on his own
negligence, and not that of his servant. Before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage must have occurred
when the employee in the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties. This includes,
any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of the employer or on the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage. An employer is
expected to impose on its employees the necessary discipline called for the performance of
any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.
● Bonus pater familias - the responsibility treated under Art. 2180 on vicarious liability shall
cease when the persons mentioned therein proved that they observed DOAGFOAF to prevent
damage.
● Doctrine of assumption of risk - One who voluntarily exposes himself to an obvious known
and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom. It rests on the
fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the defendant of obligation of conduct
toward him. Whether he exercised caution or not, is immaterial. (Acceptance of a known and
appreciated risk; VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA)
● Example: Contract for a piece of work - If he states that the contractor bound himself
to furnish the material, he shall suffer the loss if the work should be destroyed before
its delivery save when there has been delay in receiving it.
● Subsidiary liability of employer - Is an offshoot of the civil action for compensation from civil
liability arising from acts or omissions punished by law. An employer’’s liability in the finding
of guilt against the accused employee is subsidiary. It automatically arises upon the
employee’s conviction and subsequent proof of inability to pay or insolvency.
The employer cannot dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case, otherwise, it would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. The decision convicting an
employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the liability and amount. It cannot
be separated.
There must be adequate evidence establishing that they are indeed the employers, that the
former are engaged in some kind of industry, that the crime was committed in the discharge
of their duties, that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.
Obligations may be pure or conditional, or subject to a period.
● Conditional - The acquisition of rights and extinguishment, or loss of those already acquired shall
depend on the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.
● Suspensive - The demandability of its performance including the acquisition and effectivity of
rights arising therefrom are suspended pending the fulfillment of the condition.
In a contract to sell, payment of the full purchase price is a positive suspensive condition the
failure of which is not considered a breach, but an occurrence which prevents the obligation of the
seller from transferring the title from being effective.
Romero v CA
SC interpreted the legal effect of a condition in a deed of sale, that the balance of the purchase
price would be paid by the vendee when the vendor has successfully ejected the informal settlers as
not effecting the perfection of the contract but only imposes as a condition the fulfillment of the
condition to pay the balance of the purchase price.
Payment: failure to encash a check delivered to a creditor within a reasonable time produces effect
of payment.
The payees’ act of keeping the checks in a safe and forgetting to demand the payment of the loan,
either by encashing a check or demanding from terh payor, constitutes an impairment of the check’s
function as security or conditional payment of the loan amount. Hence the payor debtor is
discharged from his obligation to pay and cannot be announced civilly liable for the amounts
indicated thereon.
Rescission of reciprocal obligations
● Where there is no just cause for the fixing of the period, the court may order rescission under
Art. 1197 where it allows the court to fix the duration or period when, from the nature and
circumstances of the obligation, a period was intended and when the fulfillment of the
obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance
therewith, the court may order for rescission.
● The failure of the parties to comply with reciprocal obligation allows the wronged party to
seek the remedy of art 1191. The wronged party is entitled to rescission under 1191 and even
the payment of damages.
● Rescission under 1191 is a principal action because it is a remedy for the violation of a
principal pre-station however it will not be permitted for slight or casual breach of contract,
but only for substantial breach as to defeat the object of the parties in making the
agreement.
● Art. 1381 and Art. 1383 on rescission of contracts, pertains to rescission where creditors and
even third persons, not privy to the contract can file an action for rescission due to lesion or
damage as a result of the contract. It is a subsidiary remedy.
● Rescission or resolution under Art. 1191 therefore, is a principal action because of the breach
of a contract and it is immediately available to the party at the time the principal pre station
was breached.
Rescission will be ordered only where the breach complained of is substantial as to defeat the
object of the parties in entering into an agreement, it will not be granted where the breach is
slight or casual.
Velarde v CA
Rescission abrogates the contract from its inception and requires mutual rescission of benefits
received. Therefore rescission creates the obligation to return the object of the contract. It
can only be carried out when the one who demands rescission can return whatever he may be
obliged to restore.
Solidary obligations
● When one creditor makes a remission or condonation, it extinguishes the obligation to the
amount and extent to which it is made, but the creditor who made the remission becomes
liable to his co-creditors for his shares.
When several, but not all of the creditors, makes the remission there can be no action against
the one who made it; but all of them will be liable for the shares of the creditos who did not
remit. When one is insolvent, his share shall be paid by the others who concurred in the
remission.
● When the remission is in favor of a debtor and is partial, not covering his full share, his
character as a solidary debtor continues with respect to the creditors and his co-debtors, but
when the remission is for his full share in the obligation, he ceases to have any relations with
the creditors where he is released, unless the continuance of the solidary relation has been
expressly reserved in which case he shall be a surety of the other debtors.
Contracts of adhesion
● Are not invalid per se, they are binding as ordinary contracts.
● It is where one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other.
● It is a contract where almost all of provisions are drafted by one party with the participation
of the other party being limited to affixing his signature or adhesion to the contract.
While the court has occasionally struck down contracts of adhesion as void, it did so when the
weaker party has been imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and
reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it completely deprived of the opportunity to
bargain on equal footing, thus on the terms in a COA is ambiguous the ambiguity shall be
resolved against the party who prepared it.
Mutuality of contracts
● One of the fundamental characteristics of contracts. The contracts must bind both parties
based on the principles that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between
the contracting parties and that there must be mutuality between the parties based on the
essential quality to which it is repugnant to have only one party bound by the contract,
leaving the other free therefrom.
Its ultimate purpose is to render void a contract containing a provision which makes its
fulfillment dependent exclusively on the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.
● The meeting of minds need not always be put in writing, and the fact that the document has
not been signed or notarized does not mean that the contract has not been perfected.
● A binding contract may exist even when the signatures have not been affixed because
acceptance may be express or implied. Thus, the parties have been bound to consummate
the contract such as when one party fails to comply with its obligations, it entitles the other
to damages.
There is a perfected contract; MRT has already awarded the contract to Gammon, and
Gammon’s acceptance of the award was already communicated to MRT before MRT could
rescind the contract. The first letter shows that Gammon’s acceptance was shown in
Gammon’s mobilization of resources to prepare the performance in advanced payment bonds
and procure the materials necessary for the performance of the project, and all that
remained was the formality of returning the contract documents which was eventually
complied by Gammon, thus there was already mutuality and absolute acceptance of the offer.
Art. 1934: a loan contract is perfected only upon delivery of the object of the contract.
When the bank approved and released the 3M out of the original 5M credit facility the
contract was perfected. Such approval and release of the amounts, although delayed,
perfected the contract between the parties. Hence bound by the said contract.
● Consent must be intelligent; The one who signs the contract is presumed they know the
contents; This is true even in situations where the party is an illiterate person, if he cannot
read, they are negligent if they fail to have the contract read to them. If a person cannot
read the instrument it is his duty to procure a reliable person who can read and explain it to
him before he signs it;
● In Pari Delicto It is well-settled that the law will not relieve parties from the effects of an
unwise agreement they entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness
of what they were doing.
● According to Jurisprudence, mere forgetfulness without evidence that the same has removed
from the person the ability to intelligently protect property rights will not by itself incapacite
a person from entering into contracts.
● On credit cards: When issuing pre-approved credit card,The CC provider must prove that
person has read and consented to the T&C of the credit card; Failure to prove consent
means that the client cannot be bound by the provision and terms and conditions of the CC
despite the fact that eh already used the credit card.
● This is true even when the client did not deny availing of the credit card by availing purchases
on it, thus the client can only be charged of legal interest, the client should not be
condemned to pay the interest and charges provided in the terms and conditions on the mere
claim of the CC provider without the client's conformity.
● Take note of the distinction between 2 kinds of fraud: The dolo incidente (incidental fraud,
only damages, cannot invalidate contract) v. dolo causante (Serious enough to make the
contract voidable)
● Art. 1344 in order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and not be
employed by BOTH contracting parties.
● Incidental fraud on the other hand only obliges the person employing it to pay damages. So
that if it did not compel the imputing party to give his or her consent, it shall not serve as
basis to annul the contract in the absence of dolo causante.
A bank that wrongly advertises the area of property acquired through foreclosure because it
failed to dutifully ascertain the properties specification is grossly negligent as to practically
be in bad faith in offering the property to a prospective buyer. Any sale made in this account
is voidable due to causal fraud.
In an action to void such sales, banks cannot hide under the defense that the sale was made
on an as is where is basis; As is where is, is a stipulation where it can encompass physical
features which are readily perceptible by an ordinary person possessing no specific skills.
Here, the bank advertised a condo unit with an area of 95 sqm. before the sale, and after the
buyer occupied the unit, the buyer found out that it was only 70 sqm.
Art. 1354 - even if the cause is not stated in contract, it is presumed that it exists and is
lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary.
Sales
In the case of province of cebu vs heir of morales, the SC held that a formal document is not
necessary for the sale transaction to acquire a binding effect, for as long as the essential
elements of a contract of sales are proved to exist in a given transaction the contract is
deemed perfected regardless of the absence of a formal deed evidence in the same.
The SC added, the failure to pay the balance of the purchase price did not render the sale
inexistence or invalid but merely gave rise to a right in favor of the vendor to either demand
specific performance or rescission of the contract of sale. It did not abolish the contract of
sale or result in its automatic invalidation.
In Bank of Commerce v. Manalo, the SC held that it is not enough for the parties to agree on
the price of the property, the parties must also agree on the manner of the payment of the
price of the property to give rise to a binding and enforceable contract of sale or contract to
sell. This is because the agreement as to the manner of the payment of the price goes into
the price such that a disagreement on the manner of the payment is tantamount to a failure
to agree on the price.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
● A deed of sale is considered absolute in nature, where there is neither a stipulation in the
deed that title to the property sold is reserved to the seller until full payment of the price.
No one gives the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer
fails to pay within a fixed period. Ownership will then be transferred to the buyer upon
actual or constructive delivery of the property sold.
● When the sale is not absolute but conditional, such as to the contract to sell. Where
invariably the ownership of the thing sold is retained until the fulfillment of a positive
suspensive condition, the breach of the condition will prevent the obligation to convey title
from acquiring an obligatory force.
Recto Law
● On Recto law, the rule is in installment sales, if the action instituted is for specific
performance and the mortgaged property is subsequently attached and sold, the sale thereof
does not amount to foreclosure of the mortgage,hence, seller-creditor is entitled to
deficiency judgment
● A stipulation that installment or rent paid shall not be returned to the vendee or buyer shall
be valid in so far as same may not be unconscionable under the circumstances, thus where
the vendor elects to canceled the sale, he may not return to the vendee the installment
already made if there is an agreement to that effect provided that such agreement is not
unconscionable.
● It is worth noting that it is the fact of foreclosure and actual sale of mortgage chattel that bar
recovery of any balance of the purchaser’s outstanding obligation not satisfied by the sale,
thus if the vendor desisted on his own initiative from consummating the auction sale such
desistance was a timely disavowal of the remedy of foreclosure and the vendor can still sue
for a specific performance.
● When the property is sold at an execution sale, the judgment debtor is not required to deliver
the property sold right away because he has a period of 1 year within which to redeem the
property. In the meantime, the buyer should not take actual or physical possession of the
property, if he does so an action for unenforceable entry may be brought against him.
The period of redemption commences to run not from the date of the coction or tax sale, but
from the day the sale is registered.
● Under Art. 1592, in the sale of immovable property even though it may have been stipulated
that upon failure to pay price at time agreed upon, the rescission shall take place, the vendee
may still pay even after expiration of the period as long as no demand for rescission of the
contract has been made upon him either judicially or by notarial act after the demand, the
court may not grant him a new term.
Ramos v Herhuela
● In Ramos v Herhuela, the SC held that article 1191 and 1592 of the civil code, are applicable
to contract of sales while the maceda law applies to contract to sell. The full payment of the
purchase price in a contract to sell is a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which
prevents the prospective sellers’ obligation to convey title from the coming effective.
Still in Maceda Law, the right of the buyer to refund arose only when he had only paid at least
2 installments.
Orbe v. Filinvest
In Orbe v Filinvest, the court emphasized that at least 2 years of installments means
equivalent to the totality of payments diligently or consistently made throughout a period of
2 years. The cancellation of the contract by the seller must be in accordance with section 3 of
the Maceda law which requires a notarial act of rescission and the refund to the buyer of the
full payment of the cash surrender value of the payments on the property.
Actual cancellation of the contract takes place after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the
notice of cancellation or demand for rescission of the contract by notarial act and upon full
payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.
In one case, there was a contract of lease of 1 yr with an option to purchase, the contract of
lease expired without the lessee purchasing the property but he remain in possession thereof,
hence there was a explicit renewal of the contract of lease on a monthly basis, however, the
other terms of the contract which are revived in the implied new lease are only those
germane to the lessee’s right of continued enjoyment of the property lease, therefore an
implied new lease does not ipso facto carried with it any implied revival of the option to
purchase the lease premises.
The provision entitling the lessee the option to purchase the lease premises is not deemed
incorporated in the impliedly renewed contract because it is alien to the possession of the
lessee. the right to exercise the option to purchase expired already with the termination of
the original contract of lease for one year. Simply put the SC ruled that the implied renewals
do not include the option to buy as it is not germane to the continued lessee’s use of the
property.
REMEDIAL LAW
Vice Dean Francesca Señga
October 1, 2022
LECTURE NOTES TEAM: MARIA CHRISTINA ARCE | PIA BARROSO | JOANNA MANUELA BULAUITAN | SAMUEL JOSHUA CRUZ | ANDREA
DE GUZMAN | MARAE DOMINGUEZ | ROSCH EMILLE MANUEL | MIKHAELA MAEIA MAYUGA | SHERRY JANE PAGAY | DAVID GABRIEL
PALLASIGUE | ANDREA JOSES TAN | MARIELLE TELEBRICO
CHECKED BY: HANNAH KEZIAH MORALES (Chairperson for Academics) | ADRIAN MACASAQUIT (Deputy for Academics)
NOTE: Please refer to the presentation shared and provided by Vice Dean Señga for Remedial Law
Bar Lecture
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Saya ba? Saya ba umupo ng 8 hours a day? Kamusta na yung mga pwet niyo guys,
may kalyo na ba? Sana wala.” *Upon her request that her jokes be included.
JURISDICTION
A. Jurisdiction
a. conferred either by law or by the allegations in the complaint
b. R.A. No. 11576
i. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 increasing the jurisdictional amount cognizable by the
Regional Trial Courts:
1. In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value exceeds Four Hundred thousand
pesos (Php400,00), except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands and buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts, and
2. Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
3. In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or
claims exceeds Two million pesos (Php2,000,000);
4. In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of
the estate exceeds Two million pesos (Php2,000,000); and
5. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds Two million pesos (Php2,000,000).
ii. Section 33 of B.P. Blg. 129 increasing the jurisdictional amount cognizable by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts:
1. In civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the
grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal
property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two million pesos
(Php2,000,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically
alleged;
2. In all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or any interest
therein does not exceed Four hundred thousand pesos (Php400,000) exclusive
on interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
costs, and
3. In admiralty and maritime actions where the demand or claim does not exceed
Two million pesos (Php2,000,000).
So let’s talk about jurisdiction first. As you know, jurisdiction is conferred by law. What law will you
use insofar as determining the jurisdictional amount? Ayan, ang daming mga debate niyan. Ang dami
niyong time magdebate. Okay. Ganito po kasi yan. The law that determines jurisdiction is that
enforced at the time of the commencement of the action. So although the syllabus has a cut-off prior
to the amendment of B.P. 129 of R.A. 11576, it may be more prudent for you to nevertheless take
note of that amendment. Anyway, dalawang numero lang naman yang tatandaan nyo: Php2,000,000
and Php400,000, di ba?
In the amended law, if the real action is in first level courts, the assessed value does not exceed
Php400,000. If it is in the RTC, the assessed value exceeds Php400,000. For all other claims,
demands, gross estate, Php2,000,000 yung threshold amount natin. So, if it is in first level courts,
does not exceed Php2,000,000 and then for RTC, it exceeds Php2,000,000. Then you just need to
remember when that amendment took effect. So it took effect on August 21, 2021. So my advice to
you is that if on the facts of the exam, it shows that the commencement of the action is from
August 21, 2021 onwards, then the applicable law for jurisdiction would be as amended. It should
be the Php400,000 or Php2,000,000 threshold. But if the facts did not mention a date of when the
action is commenced or the date mentioned is before the effectivity of the amendment, then you
use the old rule. You get it? So I hope that clarifies a lot of questions. Di ba mas matagal mag debate.
Yung debate buong maghapon. Eto dalawa lang tatandaan mo: Php2,000,000 at Php400,000, at
August 21, 2021. O Pak! Tapos! Sige move on na tayo. Sana nakuha nyo na yan mga kosa.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Sandali kamuntikan na ako maglaway. Teka. Sipsip laway muna tayo. Sana
kasama sa transcript yung sipsip laway.”
A Complaint for Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order, Temporary Restraining
Orders, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Damages was filed, docketed as a civil case, and
raffled to Branch 276 of Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, which branch was not designated
as a Special Commercial Court.
There is a Complaint for Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order and TRO, ang dami
naman hinihingi nito, with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages. Okay. So that is the title of
the complaint filed, yan yung denomination Complaint for Injunction. And then, it was docketed as a
civil case kaya it was raffled to a regular court Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa so it is not
designated as a special commercial court.
The allegations of the Complaint actually make out an intra-corporate dispute, which was not
denominated in the title of the complaint. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa, Branch 276
granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the commercial case, specifically, the
intra-corporate dispute. Was the dismissal correct?
Now, although the denomination is just simply a complaint for injunction based on the allegations of
that complaint, it is actually an intra-corporate dispute. Okay. So that is why there was an error
made, instead of raffling the case to a special commercial court in Muntinlupa City it was raffled to a
regular court, specifically to Branch 276. So because it is an intra-corporate dispute but it was
raffled to a regular court, there was a motion to dismiss filed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over that commercial case and the RTC granted that motion to dismiss. So the question is, is it valid
to grant that motion to dismiss? Was the dismissal correct? Ano tingin niyo?
No. Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes. The erroneous raffling
to a regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure. It
should not negate the jurisdiction which the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City already
acquired. Branch 276 should have first referred the case for re-docketing as a commercial case and
thereafter, the said case will be assigned to the designated Special Commercial Court. (Gonzales v.
GJH Land, Inc., G.R. No. 202664, 10 November 2015)
Answer is no, it is not correct. Why? The Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over intra-corporate
disputes. So the error here is not as to the filing to the correct court, it was filed in the correct
court, the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes. The erroneous
raffling to a regular branch instead of raffling to a special commercial court, according to the
Supreme Court, is only a matter of procedure. Okay?
So that designation of a branch in a court, as a special commercial court, does not affect jurisdiction
as long as it was filed in the correct court, in this case, it is the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa.
So according to the Supreme Court, when they filed it in the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa, the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa already validly acquired jurisdiction over the intra-corporate
dispute. So sabi ng Supreme Court, it was incorrect to dismiss it because the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa had jurisdiction over the intra-corporate dispute. What should have happened instead is
that Branch 276 should have just referred the case to the Executive Judge so that it can be
re-docketed as a commercial case. After that, it will be assigned to the Special Commercial Court
designated in Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa. Alright? Okay. Hope that is clear.
On 2 February 1998, A filed a complaint against B in Makati City. In that complaint, A alleges that:
(1) B owes A the sum of Php100,000.00 pursuant to a contract of loan they entered into and B
failed to pay the same when it became due, despite demand;
For this example, I suggest that you get your pen and paper so that you can note down the values for
determining jurisdiction.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Kung ayaw mo, okay lang din, di wag. Maaga pa kasi para magmath guys. Pwede
rin kuha kayo tissue. Lagay kayo ng tissue sa ilong para saluhin niyo, in case ma-nosebleed kayo sa
math. Kung CPA ka magaling ka sa math, edi ikaw na ang anak ka ng Diyos.”
So on February 2, 1998, so that is the date of commencement, clearly it is prior to the amendment.
Okay. So A files a complaint against B in Makati City. Alright? Okay.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Teka lang, nakikita niyo ba yung font size. Maraming beses na akong nabashing
through the snow na masyadong maliit yung font size ng akin powerpoint. Paano ko malalaman.
Pareact naman diyan guys, kita niyo ba? Eh paano kung ano, paano kung Nokia yung telepono?
Nakazoom ba yung Nokia na telepono? Hindi natin alam.”
So there is a complaint, A against B, it is the same party, A vs. B. Alright? Okay. According to A, A has
three (3) causes of action against B contained in a single complaint. The first cause of action is one
for sum of money, on the ground of breach of contract of loan. So A made a demand, despite
demand, sabi ni B kahit patayin mo ako hindi kita babayaran. Gusto niyang patayin pero hindi niya
magawa because it is a crime.
(2) B is liable to A for damages when B negligently struck A’s car, which caused A to incur
Php150,000.00 for the repair of his car; and Php80,000.00 for moral damages because B caused A
sleepless nights and hurt feelings for his negligent acts and his refusal to timely compensate A;
The next cause of action is that the defendant, B, is liable for damages. Bakit? Because the
defendant, B, struck plaintiff’s car negligently causing A to incur Php150,000.00 for the repair of the
car. So that is compensatory damages. And Php80,000.00 for moral damages. Hindi siya makatulog,
sleepless nights, hurt feelings because of the negligent acts and refusal to timely compensate A. So
the second cause of action, on the other hand, is, ayun na nga, one for damages arising from a
quasi-delict.
(3) pursuant to a contract for services entered between A and B, A build B’s fence, and for his
services, B bound himself to pay A Php100,000.00 but despite having completed the fence and
despite demand, B refused to pay A. Which court has Jurisdiction?
And then the third cause of action is for again recovery of money. The basis here is for breach of
contract of services. So A, the plaintiff, was contracted by the defendant to build the defendant’s
fence. After building, tigas ng mukha ni defendant, ayaw niyang magbayad despite demand. Which
court has jurisdiction.
b. Computation for jurisdiction
i. Totality Rule - the test of jurisdiction is the aggregate amount claimed.
● E.g. (all are for recovery of sums of money) First, contract of loan amounting
to Php100,000; second, damages for the quasi-delict amounting to
Php230,000.00 [Php150,000.00 for compensatory damages, Php80,000.00 for
moral damages]; and third, recovery of money for services performed
amounting to Php100,000. Total of Php430,000.00.
● The given example does not involve title to or possession over real property
and it is capable of pecuniary estimation. It is the Regional Trial Court of
Makati because the total claim is Php430,000.00 and it is within Metro Manila or
in Makati City. There is a single complaint with several causes of action, but all
of them are claims for money or recovery of money and so the test of
jurisdiction is the aggregate amount claimed.
So note here that we have three (3) causes of action in the same complaint, so this is a case involving
joinder of causes of action. Question: do we need to comply with the rule of joinder of parties?
Answer: No. The rule on joinder of parties where it is based on the same or series of transactions and
there is a common question of law and fact, it will only apply if you have several parties. But if the
cause of action is between the same parties, you don’t need to comply with the first requirement for
joinder of causes of action.
So you need to be careful with joinder of causes of action because you don’t strictly apply all of
those requirements for joinder, it depends on the circumstances. So that first enumeration on
complying on joinder of parties, is not applicable in this case because the action is between the same
parties. If it is the same parties, they can have as many causes of action against each other, provided
that it does not include special civil actions or those covered by special rules. Even if they do not
arise from the same transaction or series of transactions, if it is the same parties pwede yan mag
join.
Now the question is, how do we compute the jurisdiction? The rule here that you will apply is the
totality rule. Why? Because all of these actions involve one for recovery of money. Why is it all for
recovery of money? Let’s go back.
The first one, obviously, is for a contract of loan that is for a recovery of money. The totality rule
says that the test of jurisdiction is the aggregate amount claimed. So the principal loan here, there is
no interest sought, is Php100,000.00. So you include that. So the first amount is Php100,000.00.
Okay?
Then the second one is for quasi-delict. Now do not be confused, although BP 129 says that we do
not include damages or interest, that rule only applies if the damages or interest is incidental to
your main action. Here, in this case, the action is primarily for quasi-delict. And in quasi-delict what
are you asking for? Damages. So the principal action in your second cause of action is one for
damages. And what are you asking for when you are for damages, sorry ba? Hindi, hindi mo kailangan
ng sorry. Kailangan mo ng pera para macomfort ka ng mga bagay-bagay na mabibili mo sa Lazada at
Shopee lalo na kapag sale. Although it is one for damages, ultimately, it is actually for recovery of
money. These damages should be included. Sabi ng jurisprudence, if your main cause of action is one
for damages, such as in this case, all of the damages sought would be included. So here, the
Php150,000.00 for the repair of the car is actually what you call compensatory damages, a kind of
damages. And Php80,000.00 for moral damages you include it also. So clearly the main cause of
action here is for damages. Kung may attorney’s fees you include it din. So that is plus Php150,000.00
plus Php80,000.00.
And then the last one is again for recovery of money for services performed, so again that is for
money, Php100,00.00.
Note that the action here is in Makati City, so it is within Metro Manila. So dapat laglagpas yan ng
Php400,000.00 because this does not involve title to or possession over real property and it is capable
of pecuniary estimation.
So which court has jurisdiction? It is the Regional Trial Court of Makati because the total claim is
Php430,000.00 and it is within Metro Manila or in Makati City. There is a single complaint with several
causes of action, but all of them are claims for money or recovery of money and so the test of
jurisdiction is the aggregate amount claimed. Alright? Hope you got that.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein (Multinational Village Homeowners’ Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 98023, 17 October 1991)
We said earlier that jurisdiction is conferred by law, but at the same time jurisdiction is also
determined by the allegations in the complaint. It doesn’t matter whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recover some or all of the claims. To determine jurisdiction, we look at the allegations of the
complaint.
B. Actions
i. Real action - actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein.
(Sec. 1, Rule 4 Rules of Court)
● By nature, real actions are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
● Test of jurisdiction for real action is the assessed value of the real property.
● Since the basis of jurisdiction for real actions is the assessed value, it should be
alleged in your complaint. There is what we call the 2-tier rule.
● If not in the complaint, then in the documents attached to the complaint
(Foronda-Crystal v. Son, G.R. No. 221815, 29 November 2017)
● If there is no assessed value for the subject property, the assessed value of the
adjacent lot of the subject property shall be the basis for assessed value to
determine the jurisdiction.
ii. Distinctions among accion interdictal, accion publiciana, and accion reivindicatoria.
● Accion interdictal - An ejectment proceeding which may be either that for
forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio); a summary
action for recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior
court.
○ Forcible (detentacion) - deprivation of physical possession of land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; for
the first level court to have jurisdiction over the remedy the forcible
entry, must be filed within one (1) from the dispossession. Unless the
dispossession is by means of stealth, then it is one (1) year from the
discovery.
○ Unlawful detainer (desahucio) - one unlawfully withholds possession
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied; for the first level
court to have jurisdiction over the remedy, the unlawful detainer must
be filed within one (1) year from the last demand, unless there is a
contract that provides that there is no need to make a demand.
● Accion publiciana - An ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year
from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.
● Accion reivindicatoria - An action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a
parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is a suit to recover
possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership.
iii. 4 Grounds which motion to dismiss is prohibited
1. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
2. Litis pendentia;
3. Res judicata; and
4. Statute of limitations.
● Even if you raise in a motion to dismiss those four (4) grounds to dismiss and it
is denied, you can still assert it as an affirmative defense.
iv. Exception to the prohibition of the motion to dismiss
● Estoppel Jurisdiction (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450. April 15, 1968.)
○ The Supreme Court ruled in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is that it is an undisputed
fact that the action commenced by appellees against the Sibonghanoy spouses
was for the recovery of sum of Php1,908.00 only - an amount within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. True also is the rule that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as
the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the
case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However,
considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Surety is now
barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of
annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
They failed to raise the lack of jurisdiction for 15 years.
○ This cannot be used as a general rule.
○ Estoppel jurisdiction will only apply if the facts are exactly the same as Tijam
vs. Sibonghanoy.
○ If the facts are not the same as Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, then this exception will
not apply, the general rule will still apply that lack of jurisdiction may be
raised at any time even for the first time on appeal.
v. Principle of Judicial Stability or non-interference
● Principle of Judicial Stability or non-interference - where decisions of certain
administrative bodies are appealable to the Court of Appeals, these adjudicative
bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts and their actions are beyond the
control of the Regional Trial Court.
Real Action – involves title to, possession over real property or any interest therein (Rule 4, Sec. 1)
● 2-tiered rule
● Assessed value needs to be alleged in the Complaint
● If not in the complaint, then in the documents attached to the complaint (Foronda-Crystal
v. Son, G.R. No. 221815, 29 November 2017)
What are real actions? Those are the actions that involve title to, possession over real property or
any interest therein. Make sure kompleto yan, pasok niyo yung lahat ng terms na yan. Actually by
nature, real actions are actually incapable of pecuniary estimation. Why? Because by definition,
actions that are incapable of pecuniary estimation are actions that are other than recovery of money.
So in a real action, you’re actually not recovering money. Nevertheless, jurisprudence says that
although real action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the jurisdiction is conferred by law and BP
129 says that if it involves title to, or possession over real property or any interest therein, we look
at the assessed value of the real property and that will be the test of jurisdiction. So under BP 129,
prior to the amendment, yan yung Php20,000.00, etc. threshold depending if within or outside Metro
Manila.
Since the basis of jurisdiction for real actions is the assessed value, it should be alleged in your
complaint. There is what we call the 2-tier rule. It must be alleged in the complaint, but if it is not
alleged in the complaint it can still be alleged in the documents attached to the complaint. So as
long as the assessed value can be determined, whether in the complaint or in its attachments, then
we can determine the jurisdiction of the court.
If the land was not declared for taxation purposes and thus has no assessed value, then the
assessed value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots (BP
129, Sec. 33(3) )
What do you do if there is no tax declaration for that property and, therefore, there is no assessed
value? Can you use the market value? Can you use the purchase price? No, because jurisdiction is
conferred by law and the law requires that we only look at the assessed value for real actions. So if
there is no declared assessed value for the land for taxation purposes, BP 129 says that we look at
the assessed value of adjacent lots. So it is still the assessed value.
I have noticed that there are some who think that it is market value. Hindi. Zonal valuation? Hindi pa
rin. Ano lang? Assessed value. But if there is none for that property, then of the adjacent lot that is
in BP 129, Section 33 (3).
● If assessed value is not alleged anywhere in the complaint or its attachments, the case will
be dismissed
● It cannot be determined whether it is the Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court which
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the action (Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Cruz, G.R.
No. 172217, 18 September 2009)
If the assessed value exists, there is a declared assessed value for the land but you did not allege
that assessed value anywhere in the complaint or even in the attachments, the case will have to be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Why? Because we cannot determine whether it is the RTC or the
first level courts that have jurisdiction because the determination of jurisdiction would be the
assessed value. So if you don’t know the assessed value or it is not alleged in your complaint, you
won’t know which court has jurisdiction and the case will have to be dismissed.
Accion interdictal or a summary ejectment proceeding, which may be either for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), for the recovery of physical or material possession
(possession de facto) where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be
brought in the proper inferior court;
Now, this is in your syllabus, the distinctions among interdictal, accion publiciana, and accion
reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal is your summary ejectment proceeding. There are two kinds, it can be
detentacion/forcible entry or desahucio/unlawful detainer, in either case, the main action is to
recover the physical or material possession that is possession de facto. Ownership is not an issue, but
if the issue of ownership is raised, the court has the power to resolve the issue of ownership only
provisionally for determining the issue of possession. What is important in accion interdictal is that
the dispossession has not lasted for more than one (1) year and the court that has exclusive, original
jurisdiction would be our first level courts. So your accion interdictal is a real action because it
involves possession over real property. But we do not look at the assessed value to determine
jurisdiction of the court because BP 129 categorically provides that first level courts have exclusive,
original jurisdiction, regardless of the assessed value, regardless of the amount of damages that you
seek to recover. The damages you seek to recover are the unpaid rentals, those are only incidental to
your main action which is to recover possession.
Accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the better right of possession (possession de
jure), which should be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court (depending upon
the value of the property) when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and
Accion publiciana, again, this is a plenary action but also involving possession which is possession de
jure, the better right of possession. But this time the dispossession has been more than one (1) year.
Remember from forcible entry, for the first level court to have jurisdiction over the remedy the
forcible entry must be filed within one (1) from the dispossession. Unless the dispossession is by
means of stealth, then it is one (1) year from the discovery. No need to make a prior demand in
forcible entry. If it is unlawful detainer, it is one (1) year from the last demand, unless there is a
contract that provides that there is no need to make a demand. If the contract states that the lessee
must vacate the premises upon termination of the lease without need for demand, then you can file
it one (1) year from the termination of the lease.
Kapag lumagpas yung one (1) year period na yan jurisdiction over the remedy wala na yan in the
first level court. Remember that jurisdiction over the remedy is jurisdiction over the process. It is
one that is provided under the Rules of Court and it cannot be subject of waiver.
If that one (1) year period lapses, does that mean that you don’t have anymore remedy? You do, but
this time it is for accion publiciana where the dispossession has lasted for one (1) year. Which court
has jurisdiction for accion publiciana? It depends on the assessed value because it is an action
involving possession over real property. It can be the first level courts and it can be RTC depending
on the assessed value.
Then you have accion reivindicatoria or a reivindicatory action which is an action to recover the
ownership and the court that has jurisdiction is not only the RTC, but either the first level court or
inferior court/RTC depending on the assessed value because this is about title to or interest over real
property. In this case, it is ownership.
An ordinary civil proceeding to determine the Cause of action of the plaintiff is to recover
better right of possession of real property possession by virtue of his ownership of the land
independently of title. It also refers to an subject of the dispute – jus vindicandi
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one
year from the accrual of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of
the real property
A registered owner or one with a Torrens title Plaintiff's claim of ownership (and necessarily,
can likewise file an accion publiciana to recover possession or jus possidendi) is based on Torrens
possession if the one-year prescriptive period title. If defendant disputes the validity of this
for forcible entry and unlawful detainer has Torrens title, the issue of whether there is a
already passed. direct or collateral attack on the plaintiff's title
is irrelevant.
Court can pass upon issue of ownership for the
purpose of resolving possession The court has the jurisdiction to rule
definitively or with finality on the issue of
ownership and pass upon the validity of the
plaintiff's certificate of title
Accion publiciana determines the right of possession over the real property and in accion publiciana
the issue of title is not resolved. Just like in ejectment, we only look at the issue of possession. In
reivindicatory action, what you want to recover here is ownership; if it is possession, it is possession
by virtue of ownership of the land or jus vindicandi.
Here in accion publiciana, the one who can file can also be the registered owner or the one in whose
favor the torrens title was issued. Pwede rin yan. Basta here the issue is who has the right to
possession de jure. In accion reivindicatoria, there is a claim of ownership and there can be a dispute
as to the validity of the torrens title. So it may be a direct attack on the Torrens title.
● Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal.
● The question of jurisdiction may be tackled motu proprio or on appeal even if none of the
parties raised the same (Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. v. Redmont
Consolidated Mines Corp., G.R. No. 202877, 9 December 2015)
● Ground for motion to dismiss/assert as affirmative defense
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
for the first time on appeal. The court can even rule on lack of jurisdiction motu proprio, on its own
motion. Even if none of the parties raised the same, whether in the trial court or in the appeal level.
Remember, if you have your Rules of Court with you, please look at Rule 14, Section 1. If you look at
Rule 14, Section 1, ordinary rules provide that upon the filing of the complaint prior to the issuance
of the summons, the court can motu proprio dismiss the complaint if on its face there are grounds to
dismiss, as provided under Section 1, Rule 9. What are these grounds? Lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, res judicata, litis pendentia, and statute of limitations. So the court can motu
proprio dismiss if, on the face of the complaint, it can be seen that the court has no jurisdiction. And
rightfully so, the court should be able to motu proprio dismiss because a court bereft of jurisdiction
does not have the power to proceed with the case and to rule on it, otherwise, the judgment would
be void. Right?
In the same way, the defendant could move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Remember under Rule
15, Section 12 (a). If you have your codals, I hope you look at it so you’re also familiar with the
provisions. Motion to dismiss, under ordinary rules, is prohibited except for the four (4) non-waivable
grounds. Again, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and statute
of limitations. If the defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied, can the defendant raise those grounds
again as an affirmative defense? Yes, that is found under Rule 6, Section 5. Even if you raise in a
motion to dismiss those four (4) grounds to dismiss and denied, you can still assert it as an
affirmative defense.
Now that rule is subject to an exception, estoppel jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court clarified that
estoppel jurisdiction is only the exception, it is not to be used as a general rule. And estoppel
jurisdiction will only apply if the facts are exactly the same as Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. So if the facts
are not the same as Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, then this exception will not apply, the general rule will
still apply that lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal.
Alright? Even for the first time on appeal pwede yan. That is our rule.
What are the factual circumstances in Tijam? I summarized it for you so that you know whether we
will apply estoppel jurisdiction, meaning you will be barred from raising lack of jurisdiction. In the
case of Tijam, the case was pending for 15 years before the defendant raised lack of jurisdiction for
the first time in the Court of Appeals. And it was not just after appeal in the Court of Appeals, it was
after the Court of Appeals already rendered an adverse ruling against the defendant. So the
defendant, after receiving the decision of the Court of Appeals, wanted to file a motion for
reconsideration and manifested to the court that the defendant will be filing a Motion for
Reconsideration. Instead of filing a Motion for Reconsideration, the defendant files instead a Motion
to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. So after the defendant received an
adverse ruling in the Court of Appeals, did the defendant assail the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals for the first time and this was after the defendant actively participated in the proceedings in
the Regional Trial Court. It sought a lot of affirmative reliefs from the Regional Trial Court and in so
doing, the defendant invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. So you cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and thereafter assail it only after you receive an adverse
ruling. And after 15 years sabi ng Supreme Court, if we were to grant this lack of jurisdiction, it
would render nugatory all of those 15 years of proceedings, which could not be allowed. So the
defendant is now estopped from assailing jurisdiction, but again we only use this Tijam ruling for
exception when it is exactly the same factual milieu. If the facts are not the same, such as in one
case, after appeal pagka perfect ng appeal inassail niya agad yung jurisdiction, it was allowed by the
court because you can assail lack of jurisdiction even for the first time on appeal.
A filed a complaint against B before the Ombudsman for violation of the GSIS Act. The Ombudsman
issued an order of preventive suspension against B to last until the administrative adjudication is
completed but not to exceed 6 months.
There is a complaint filed before the respondent in the Ombudsman, this is an administrative
disciplinary case in the Ombudsman. Remember in the Ombudsman, you can have preliminary
investigation for criminal cases but you can also have administrative disciplinary cases before the
Ombudsman. So before the ombudsman, there was a complaint for violation of the GSIS Act. So the
Ombudsman issued an order of preventive suspension against the respondent and this would last until
the administrative proceeding is adjudicated or completed, but for a period not exceeding six (6)
months.
The propriety of the order of suspension was assailed by B before the Court of Appeals but the
Court of Appeals affirmed the preventive suspension. B filed with the Regional Trial Court a
petition for declaratory relief with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order.
So the respondent assailed that order of preventive suspension by certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. But the Court of Appeals affirmed the preventive suspension. So this time, the respondent
again assailed that order of preventive suspension issued by the Ombudsman, but this time with the
Regional Trial Court under the guise of filing a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order. So the respondent was asking the Regional Trial Court to declare the
rights of the parties under that order of preventive suspension. Ano pa bang idedeclare mong rights?
Edi preventively suspended ka pero yan na nga ang style niya para makakuwa siya ng Temporary
Restraining Order, so that the RTC will issue a Temporary Restraining Order before determination of
the declaratory relief para hindi muna siya masuspend.
B prayed that the Regional Trial Court make a definite judicial declaration on the rights and
obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of
the suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, and to restrain the implementation of the
Ombudsman order.
So the RTC issued that Temporary Restraining Order. The issue here is, can the Regional Trial Court
issue that Temporary Restraining Order? Sinasabi nila na okay lang kasi from the Ombudsman
administrative, it is the court that issued that Temporary Restraining Order, Regional Trial Court. But
sabi ng Supreme Court cannot be. Why?
No. This will violate the principle of judicial stability or non-interference. Pursuant to this
principle, where decisions of certain administrative bodies are appealable to the CA, these
adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the RTCs and their actions are beyond the control of the
RTC.
Because this violates the principle of judicial stability or non-interference. Ano naman yung judicial
stability or non-interference na naviolate here? Although the Ombudsman here is administrative and
the Regional Trial Court is a court, in this instance, when you have an Ombudsman administrative
ruling, the Ombudsman is in the same level as the Regional Trial Court. Why? In Ombudsman
administrative disciplinary cases, after the Ombudsman renders a ruling in that administrative
disciplinary case, the appeal is to the Court of Appeals or you assail it before the Court of Appeals.
So it is therefore in the same level as the Regional Trial Court because Regional Trial Court is
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
You get it? So although the Ombudsman is administrative and Regional Trial Court is judicial, a court,
but in this instance specifically, it is an administrative disciplinary proceeding before the
Ombudsman, it is co-equal with the Regional Trial Court. Because their actions or decisions are both
appealable to the Court of Appeals. Being co-equal, the Regional Trial Court cannot interfere with
the co-equal rulings of the Ombudsman so the Regional Trial Court cannot and should not have issued
that Temporary Restraining Order against the Ombudsman to stop the enforcement of the preventive
suspension order of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA under Rule 43. The RTC
has no jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman’s decision in
disciplinary cases, more so when the CA already affirmed the Ombudsman’s order of suspension.
(Erice v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407, November 22, 2017, J. Caguioa)
The Ombudsman decisions in disciplinary cases, if the penalty is not light or exculpatory, is
appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. Pareho sila ng level ng Regional Trial Court kung
co-equal sila, alright?
Okay, let’s review the rulings of the Ombudsman. If it is the ruling of the Ombudsman in a criminal
case for preliminary investigation, this one is non-administrative, so it is the determination of
probable cause of whether to charge the respondent in court. In that case, the Ombudsman Act of
1987 does not provide for a remedy of appeal after the ruling of the Ombudsman. So after the ruling
of the ombudsman in a criminal preliminary investigation, they can file a motion for reconsideration
within 5 days. If your MR is denied, there is no appeal provided.
Aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari with the SC when the finding of probable cause is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Tirol, Jr., v.
Del Rosario, G.R. No. 135913, 4 November 1999; Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 156160, 9 December
2004)
Assuming that the ruling of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, since after the
MR there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, adequate remedy, then your remedy will now be
certiorari. And where do you file it? It is with the Supreme Court. But this requires that the ruling of
the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Remember, courts will not interfere with
findings in preliminary investigations of the Ombudsman or the prosecutor because they are granted
a leeway for determination of probable cause; that is within their discretion. Exception only if there
is grave abuse of discretion. So, if it is Ombudsman criminal preliminary investigation, if there is
grave abuse of discretion, after the denial of the MR, there is no more appeal or plain, speedy,
adequate remedy, certiorari to the Supreme Court.
For Ombudsman determination in Administrative Disciplinary cases
● The remedy against decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative charges, where the
penalty is not light or does not absolve the respondent of the charge, is by appeal to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
If it is an Ombudsman Administrative disciplinary case, you must distinguish the penalty. If the
penalty is not light and it does not absolve the respondent of the charge, then the remedy is appeal,
Court of Appeals, under Rule 43. The decision here in this case is immediately executory but it is
appealable under Rule 43, Court of Appeals.
Sec. 27, Ombudsman Act providing that decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of
Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC under Rule 45 was declared unconstitutional
● violated the proscription in Section 30, Article VI, Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and
concurrence. (Namuhe v. The Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 124965, 124932 & 124913, 29 October
1998; Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, 16 September 1998)
There was a case in Fabian v. Desierto where they said that if it is an Ombudsman administrative
disciplinary, penalty is not light, Rule 45 to the Supreme Court. This was struck down by the Supreme
Court for being unconstitutional because it increased the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
without its advice or concurrence. So now the rule is in Ombudsman administrative disciplinary
cases, if the penalty is not light and not exculpatory, it is appealable to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43.
If the decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative charge imposes light penalties (public
censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month or fine equivalent to one month
salary) or absolves the respondent of the charge
● final and unappealable
● Rule 65, Court of Appeals (Administrative Order No. 07, Series of 1990, Rule III, Sec. 7;
Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083, 19 November 2013)
But if the Ombudsman Administrative disciplinary case imposes a light penalty (ano ba yung mga light
penalties? suspension of not more than 1 month, fine equivalent to 1 month salary, public censure,
reprimand, suspension), or it absolves the respondent of the charge (as in wala na daw siyang
kasalanan daw), the nature of the decision in these cases is final and unappealable. Walang appeal.
This is also an instance that you cannot appeal because it categorically provides that it's not
appealable. So assuming that there was grave abuse of discretion, Rule 65 ang remedy natin. But this
time, it is with the Court of Appeals.
So if it's the Ombudsman criminal Preliminary Investigation, Supreme Court yan, yung certiorari mo.
Pero kung Ombudsman administrative disciplinary, Court of Appeals yan lagi. If it is not light, Rule 43.
If it is light or absolved, it is Rule 65. Bakit Rule 65? Because it is unappealable and final.
Should you file a Motion for Reconsideration before availing of Rule 65? If it is not a speedy, adequate
remedy such as if your suspension is for one day, Oh eh di na yan ang adequate remedy. Finifile mo
pa lang yung Motion for Reconsideration mo, tapos na yung suspension mo. So you avail of certiorari,
then you ask for Temporary Restraining Order so that you can suspend the execution of that ruling
against you.
X filed a complaint for sum of money against Y. X filed a motion for leave to file amended
complaint to implead the estate of the late Z, Y’s deceased husband, as additional defendant,
represented by Y, the wife. Y sought the dismissal of the complaint as representative of Z, for
failing to state a cause of action, raising this ground as an affirmative defense.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Whew! Ok lang ba kayo diyan? Ako, nangawit yung panga ko dun. Alright, sige.
So I want to cover as much as I can so sana kaya ng braincells niyo. Kaya natin to kasi wala kayong
choice. Wala kayong choice, gustuhin niyo to, pinili niyo to sa buhay niyo.”
There is a complaint for sum of money. There is a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. So
kinasuhan ni plaintiff yung wife. Hindi niya asawa ah. Kinasuhan ni plaintiff si babae. After niya
kasuhan yung babae, in-amend niya yung complaint para kasuhan yung lalaki except patay na yung
lalaki.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Gusto niya sigurong kunan yung bulsa ng bangkay. Check niya kung may barya
doon. Ewan ko kung anong trip niya sa buhay.”
Pero in-amend niya yung complaint para i-implead niya yung deceased defendant, which is the
husband of the other defendant. Mag-asawa yung kinasuhan niya, except yung babae buhay, yung
defendant deads na.
What the plaintiff did is the plaintiff mentioned there that the wife, being the wife, is the
representative of that dead person. So syempre, itong si wife, she filed an answer raising as an
affirmative defense that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against the deceased husband.
The trial court did not dismiss the claim as against the estate of Z, ruling that the inclusion of Z’s
estate was necessary for a complete relief on the determination or settlement of the controversy
raised in the case.
Should the case against the estate of Z be dismissed against the estate of Z?
Yes. Neither a deceased person nor his estate has capacity to be sued. A deceased person does not
have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case. A deceased person or his
estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil action as they lack legal personality. (Gaffney
v. Butler, G.R. No. 219408, November 8, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Question: Dapat bang ma dismiss yung kaso against the dead person? Syempre. Kasi di na siya
pwedeng makasuhan. A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued. He cannot be made
a defendant in a case. Patay na nga yung tao, iniistorbo mo pa. So cannot be a party in a civil action
because they have no legal personality. Also, in this case, the plaintiff sought to have the wife serve
as the representative of the deceased but there was no settlement of estate proceedings instituted
in relation to the estate of the deceased.
So, on the strength of the allegation in the complaint, that the wife is the representative of the
deceased, is there valid service of summons?
No. The Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person or estate of Z, who was
dead at the time the complaint was filed and no special proceeding to settle his estate had been
filed in court. Summons served upon Y purportedly as the representative of her late husband was
invalid. (Gaffney v. Butler, G.R. No. 219408, November 8, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Answer no. Why? Because there was no settlement of estate proceedings, the wife was never
appointed whether as an executor or as an administrator. So there is improper service of summons
assuming na pwede maging party yung patay. Pero sabi nga ng Supreme Court, he can’t even be a
party. Assuming he can, there is no proper service of summons because the plaintiff just designated
the wife as representative kahit naman there is no settlement of the estate. Note that after the
death of a person, kailangan natin ipa-appoint ang representative executor or administrator.
But what about under the Rules of Court na sinaasabi natin na if there is a deceased under Rule 3,
the heirs can represent. Note that that applies if during the pendency of a case, the party dies. So
when you file the case, buhay siya and during the pendency namatay, substitute siya ng heirs. The
heirs that can substitute do not have to be those that are appointed by the settlement court as an
executor or as an administrator. This is a totally different factual scenario. Why? Because here, the
defendant was dead in the first place before the action was filed.
So what is the proper remedy? The remedy is that the plaintiff should just participate in the
settlement of estate proceedings of the deceased by filing his money claim in that settlement of
estate proceedings pursuant to Rule 86.
What if there is no pending settlement of estate proceedings? Then the creditor can institute it.
Remember, the one who can institute the settlement of estate proceedings is one who has a legal
interest in the estate.
Who has a legal interest in the estate? The person who stands to benefit or to receive something
from the estate. Ano bang pwede mo matanggap dun? Natural, pera diba. So if you are an heir,
compulsory heir, you stand to receive from the estate. Devisees, legatees, sino pa? Creditors
syempre. Kasi ang creditor makakatanggap ng yan from the estate. Bayad muna diba? Bayad muna
bago distribute sa heirs. So the creditors can institute that settlement of estate proceedings.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Gets ba? Ok lang ba kayo diyan? Di ko alam kung ok lang kayo pero sana ok lang
kayo mga cosa (??). Sana ok lang mga pwet, mata niyo, at mga ulo niyo because mga ngayong
month, October bago ng bar, aba lahat ng mga sakit lumalabas. Di mo na maintindihan bakit
andami mong nararamdaman. Sakit ng ulo mo, sakit ng likod mo, batok mo. Yan, stress yan. Tawag
diyan stress. Pwede rin old age. Consider mo rin na matanda ka na. Pero sa totoo, marami
talagang nararamdaman because of the stress. Di mo na ma-figure out. Ano gagawin mo? Aba
malay ko di naman ako doctor. Check mo sa doctor. Juris Doctor lang ako. Di ako medical
practitioner. But what you can do is you make sure that you get a good night’s sleep and you drink
your vitamins. Yun yung maipapayo ko kasi di naman po ako doctor. Di ko alam yan. ”
After the Regional Trial Court denied the affirmative defense of Y for the dismissal of the claim
against Z’s estate, Y assailed such ruling before the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals
reverse the Regional Trial Court. Will the dismissal of the action against Z’s estate result in the
dismissal of the claim against Y?
So in this case, the wife who is alive filed an affirmative defense stating that there is failure to state
a cause of action against the dead one. It was granted. Na-dismiss yung action against the dead
husband. So now the wife is saying na kung na dismiss yung case against sa husband, dapat
ma-dismiss din yung against the wife.
No. Y only assailed the claim against Z’s estate, as representative of said estate. Courts cannot
grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party.
(Gaffney v. Butler, G.R. No. 219408, November 8, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Is that correct? No. Because the wife only asked for the dismissal of the complaint against the
husband. If she wanted a dismissal of the claim against her, she should have raised it but she did not.
Because the court cannot grant a relief beyond the relief sought for. So she never sought for the
dismissal of the claim against her; only the dismissal of the claim against the husband. So the court
cannot grant a relief that is not prayed for.
So your indispensable party is a real party in interest or party in interest but also one without whom
no final determination can be had of an action. When you are studying, you don’t have to memorize
it verbatim kasi baka maloka kayo. But try to remember these keywords. Kunyari, an indispensable
party, no final determination can be had in an action. So sobrang important ng indispensable party
kasi kung wala siya, di tayo magkakaroon ng final determination. That indispensable party obviously
would have a material and direct interest in the controversy. Without that indispensable party, we
cannot have a final decree. The court cannot proceed with the action without the presence of the
indispensable party.
So does that mean that if there is a non-joinder of an indispensable party, the action shall be
dismissed? Answer is no. Why? Because non-joinder or misjoinder of a party is not a ground to
dismiss. What is the remedy? You drop. Ibagsak mo sila. Drop those parties or you join them by
impleading them.
Who has the burden of pleading the indispensable parties? It is the plaintiff who has the burden to
implead the indispensable parties. Exception? If the court orders the plaintiff to implead the
indispensable party, despite order of the court. Sabi ng plaintiff, “Di kita susundin”. O ano sagot ng
court? “Pakyu. Idi-dismiss ko. On what ground? Section 3, Rule 17.” Joke lang di sasabihin ng court na
pakyu. Sinabi ko lang yun para magising kayo. The basis is Rule 17, Section 3.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Di mo alam. Tangu-tango ka diyan. Syempre gamitin mo kamay mo. Lipat mo sa
codal. Ano ka. Para naman alam mo. Di ka mangmang sa buhay.”
Section 3, Rule 17. Yan ay dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff such as when there is failure to
comply with the order of the court or the Rules of Court.
CAUSE OF ACTION
C. Cause of Action
i. Cause of action - it is an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.
(Rule 2, Sec. 1)
ii. Elements of a cause of action:
1. A legal right in favor of the plaintiff;
2. A correlative duty of the defendant to respect the plaintiff’s right; and
3. An act or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right. (Multi-Realty
Development Corp. v. Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp., G.R. No. 146726, June 16,
2006)
iii. Failure to state a cause of action
● Test for failure a state a cause of action - Whether the complaint alleges facts
which if true would justify the relief demanded.
● Inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.
● If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
presented by the defendant (Heirs of Dolleton v. Fil-Estate Management, Inc.,
G.R. No. 170750, April 7, 2009)
● Failure to state a cause of action is an affirmative defense pleaded in the
answer, when the complaint or pleading asserting the claim states no cause of
action
● Waived if not raised at the earliest time
● Inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations in
the complaint or pleading asserting the claim
● Any action of the court on such affirmative defense, whether the court grants
or denies the dismissal based on failure to state a cause of action, among
others, cannot be the subject of a motion for reconsideration, it being a
prohibited motion (Rule 8, Sec. 12; Rule 15, Sec. 12)
● If the court rules to dismiss the case on the ground that complaint fails to state
a cause of action, the dismissal is without prejudice to refiling an amended
complaint
● dismissal without prejudice is not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a
petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, pursuant to the categorical
prohibition under Section 12(e), Rule 8.
● such ground may be among the matters to be raised on appeal after judgment
on the merits (Rule 8, Sec. 12).
D. Lack of Cause of Action
● Lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the
action.
● Dismissal due to lack of cause of action is a demurrer to evidence on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, and is made only after the plaintiff rested
his case
● Lack of cause of action is determined only on the basis of stipulations, judicial
admissions, matters of judicial notice and the evidence adduced by plaintiff
● The court must determine the truth or falsity of the allegations, based on the
evidence presented
● Before that, it cannot be raised as a ground for dismissal
● Dismissal due to lack of cause of action constitutes res judicata on the issue
and will bar future suits based on the same cause of action,
● Remedy against is to file (1) motion for reconsideration, as it is not among the
prohibited motions under the rules and/or (2) an ordinary appeal, by notice of
appeal. Casent Realty Development Corp. v. Philbanking Corp., G.R. No.
150731, 14 September 2007
● E.g. Complaint for breach of contract of carriage. The action is filed against
the operator and owner of the jeepney and the driver as well. The driver files
an answer raising as an affirmative defense the failure to state a cause of
action. The affirmative defense of failure to state a cause of action raised by
the driver is proper because the latter cannot be made liable as he is not a
party to the contract of carriage. (Sanico v. Colipano, G.R. No. 209969,
September 27, 2017, J. Caguioa)
What is a cause of action? Oh gusto niyo deadmahin tong part na to. For your information, sa bar,
julit-julit, every year, naririnig ko reklamo ng mga bar candidates na yung saan yung mga tanong na
sobrang simple yung di nila nasagot. Why? Kasi di nila pinansin kasi feeling nila ah. Alam ko na yan.
Pero pag dating sa exam, “Ay shet. Di ko maalala yung exact wording.” Kailangan alam niyo yung
mga definition basis na yan. Kasi kasi syempre sasabihin “Uy di magaling. Di alam. Engot to.” Ganun.
So kailangan alam niyo yang mga basic-basic na yan. And also, if you have a question that would
appear to be confusing, himayin niyo lang. Malay niyo cause of action lang topic diyan. You just need
to test it against the definition or elements. Pag wala kayong maghugot sa bar, definition lang or
requirements ang basehan niyo to preface it para may pag hugutan kayo.
It is an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another (Rule 2, Sec. 1)
So the rules provide that it is an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.
Now, please note that these elements and this definition to a cause of action only applies to our
ordinary rules. Iba ang special rules. If it is special rules, then those provided under the specific
special rules shall apply. Some special rules would not have a cause of action within the meaning of
ordinary rules. Nevertheless, there is a cause of action but it is within the meaning of special rules.
An example of that, the most common one, is your declaratory relief. Because you know that the
requirements sine qua non in our declaratory relief is that when you file a petition to declare the
rights of the parties, it should be filed before any breach.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Hindi po beach. Yung beach po yung pinupuntahan niyo na may buhangin. Breach
po, breach. Sabi naman nung isa, you’re such a bitch. Di rin yun. Okay?”
Yung breach na sinasabi ko ay violation. So bago ka mag file ng violation ang pag-file ng declaratory
relief. So within the meaning of a cause of action, di yan papasok kasi wala pang breach. Ibig sabihin,
wala pang act or omission in violation of the plaintiff’s right. Nevertheless, pasok yan as a cause of
action but under the special rules for declaratory relief because declaratory relief, Rule 63, requires
that there should be no breach.
● whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded.
● inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.
● If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it
should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant
(Heirs of Dolleton v. Fil-Estate Management, Inc., G.R. No. 170750, April 7, 2009)
Ano ba ibig sabihin ng failure to state a cause of action? Just remember that when you get confused
by failure to state and lack of cause of action, makikita niyo lang yan sa wording ng dine-define niyo.
Failure; to state by its name, hindi mo na-state. Duh? There is a failure to allege the facts in the
complaint. Which assuming it were true, would justify the relief demanded.
So when you’re looking at whether there is a failure to state a cause of action, the inquiry is not as
to the veracity but on the sufficiency of the material allegations. Without regard kung totoo or not.
Assuming na totoo, will the plaintiff be entitled to the relief demanded? Example. The plaintiff in the
complaint alleges that the defendant owes plaintiff P100,000 and that the loan is due and
demandable on December 31, 2022. Today, that complaint is filed. Oh yun yung allegations in the
complaint. Assuming na totoo na may utang si defendant kay plaintiff and due and demandable yun
on December 31, 2022, will the plaintiff be entitled to the relief prayed for? Answer no because the
loan is due kailan? December 31, 2022. Ano pa lang ngayon mga cosa? October 1, 2022. So, wala ka
pang cause of action. Based on the allegations in the complaint, it does not sufficiently state a
cause of action. The plaintiff would not be entitled to the relief demanded, assuming those
allegations are true.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Oh na-gets niyo yun? Kasi di niyo pinansin yung December 31, 2022. Ako, guys,
everyday of my life dinadasal ko lang na sana December na. Specifically, December 24, 2022.
January pa lang dinadasal ko na sana December na. Pagod na pagod na ako pero I am sure na mas
pagod na pagod kayo. So I am sure na gusto niyo na rin umabot ng kahit December 1. Siguro
December 1 yung gusto niyo mangyari. Oh diba? Sana talaga makaraos na din kayo pero tiisin niyo
na po yan para you only have to do it once.”
● Failure to state a cause of action is an affirmative defense pleaded in the answer, when the
complaint or pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action
● Waived if not raised at the earliest time
● inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations in the complaint
or pleading asserting the claim
Failure to state a cause of action, how do you raise it? It is an affirmative defense pleaded in the
answer. It cannot be under a motion to dismiss whether under summary procedure or under ordinary
rules, you cannot have a motion to dismiss based on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
That is a prohibited motion. Pati sa summary procedure prohibited yan.
Under summary procedure, dalawa lang ang grounds mo under a motion to dismiss. It is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter and failure to comply with prior barangay conciliation
proceedings. If your ground is failure to state a cause of action, that should be raised as an
affirmative defense whether under your summary or ordinary rules. Therefore, note that under Rule
8, it provides that you must already raise those defenses in your answer as an affirmative defense. If
you fail to do so, that will be a waiver. The only grounds for an affirmative defense that will not be
waived if you do not raise it agad in your answer would be the 4 non-waivable grounds: Lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, res judicata, litis pendentia, or statute of limitation. But all
other grounds, if you do not raise it at the earliest time in the answer with affirmative defense, it
would be waived.
Again, the inquiry in the failure to state is the sufficiency in the allegations in the complaint. Since
the basis is only the allegations in the complaint, in failure to state a cause of action, you raise this
ground before trial. So it is only a preliminary objection bago ka pa mag present ng evidence kasi nga
in the answer mo siya ir-raise.
If there is an affirmative defense raised in the answer such as failure to state a cause of action, what
will the court do? The court shall motu proprio resolve that affirmative defense within 30 calendar
days within the filing of the answer.
Any action of the court on such affirmative defense, whether the court grants or denies the
dismissal based on failure to state a cause of action, among others, cannot be the subject of a
motion for reconsideration, it being a prohibited motion (Rule 8, Sec. 12; Rule 15, Sec. 12)
What is the remedy against the court’s ruling on the affirmative defense? Note that under Rule 8,
Section 12, sabi, you cannot file an Motion for Reconsideration against the denial of the affirmative
defense but you need to read Rule 8, Section 12 with Rule 15, Section 12 on prohibited motions and
the prohibited motions provide that you cannot file a motion for reconsideration against any action
of the court on the affirmative defense. When you say any action of the court, it means whether the
affirmative defense is granted or the affirmative defense is denied. Kasi ang grant for denial ng
affirmative defense ay action ng court on the affirmative defense. So whether your affirmative
defense is granted or denied, you cannot file a motion for reconsideration. Can you appeal it?
Obviously you cannot appeal an order denying an affirmative defense.
An order that denies an affirmative defense is interlocutory. Why? Pag dineny ang affirmative
defense, what happens? Tutuloy ang kaso. So you cannot appeal that interlocutory order. An
interlocutory order is not appealable. On the other hand, if your affirmative defense is granted, what
is the effect? Obviously if your affirmative defense is granted, edi iyan ay dismissal na ng kaso.
Oh baka maguluhan ka. Ulit. Pag yung affirmative defense denied, syempre tuloy kaso. If affirmative
defense is granted, ma-didismiss yan.
● If the court rules to dismiss the case on the ground that complaint fails to state a cause of
action, the dismissal is without prejudice to refiling an amended complaint
● dismissal without prejudice is not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, pursuant to the categorical prohibition under Section
12(e), Rule 8.
Let's start first with the denial. Whether granted or denied, you cannot file a Motion for
Reconsideration. Prohibited yun. If your affirmative defense is denied, you cannot appeal that denial.
Why? Because it is interlocutory. So can you assail it by certiorari if there is grave abuse of
discretion? No you cannot because it is prohibited under Section 12(e), Rule 8. That is categorical
prohibition. Please do not make the mistake of thinking that all interlocutory orders cannot be the
subject of certiorari. No. The remedy against interlocutory action if there is grave abuse of
discretion is certiorari. But there are certain provisions under ordinary rules that prohibit certiorari
against specific interlocutory orders. In summary procedure, certiorari against all interlocutory
orders is not allowed. Under ordinary rules, if it is a denial of affirmative defense, that specific
interlocutory order cannot be the subject of certiorari.
If the affirmative defense is granted, it is a dismissal but that dismissal is it with or without
prejudice? It is without prejudice to re-filing your amended complaint. Ayusin mo yung complaint mo
so that it will sufficiently state a cause of action. The dismissal on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action, is it appealable? Answer no. Based on Rule 41, Section 1, a dismissal without
prejudice is not appealable.
● such ground may be among the matters to be raised on appeal after judgment on the merits
(Rule 8, Sec. 12)
If your affirmative defense is denied, we cannot appeal it. We cannot assail it by certiorari. So what
is the remedy? Aba. Tumuloy ka sa kaso. Then, once there is judgment rendered in that case, the
denial of the affirmative defense can be one of the errors raised on appeal after judgment on the
merits.
Is lack of cause of action the same as failure to state [a cause of action]? Oh spelling pa lang
magkaiba na. Lack of cause of action, this one is connected with your demurrer to evidence.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Ano ba ang tamang pronounce? Demyurer, Demoorer? Di na yan nag mamatter
basta tamang spelling sa bar. Yun lang importante guys. Di niyo kailangangan magaling mag
pronounce. Kailangan niyo lang maging tama mag spell. You pronounce it whatever way you need
to pronounce it para tama spelling niyo. Kasi kung mali spelling niyo, baka sabibhin ng examiner
‘Ang obob naman nito. Hindi marunong mag spelling.’ Oh, so dapat tamang spelling tayo. Keber na
sa pangit na pronunciation. Okay? Pero ginoogle ko dati, sabi demoorer. Pero ang point, tamang
spelling po. Yun ang point dito.”
Yung lack of cause of action, sa demurrer to evidence yan. So what is that? The ground is the
insufficiency of evidence and this is only arrived at after the plaintiff has rested his case. When does
the plaintiff rest his case? After the plaintiff has rested his evidence and has already formally offered
and after the court makes a ruling on that formal offer of evidence. So the lack of cause of action
ground is the insufficiency of the factual basis ng kanyang action.
● determined only on the basis of stipulations, judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice
and the evidence adduced by plaintiff
● the court must determine the truth or falsity of the allegations, based on the evidence
presented
● Before that, it cannot be raised as a ground for dismissal
How do you determine this? The lack of cause of action is not only based on the evidence presented.
It can also be on the basis of stipulation. Remember, stipulations are your judicial admissions and
they do not require proof anymore. So stipulations are judicial admissions, even matters of judicial
notice and the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. So not limited only to the evidence of the plaintiff
but even judicial admissions and matters of judicial notice. So based on all of those, the court must
determine the truth or the falsity of the allegations. Based on the evidence presented. But before
that presentation of evidence, you cannot raise as a ground lack of cause of action for dismissal
because you can only raise that after trial, after plaintiff has rested his case.
● dismissal due to lack of cause of action constitutes res judicata on the issue and will bar
future suits based on the same cause of action,
● remedy against is to file (1) motion for reconsideration, as it is not among the prohibited
motions under the rules and/or (2) an ordinary appeal, by notice of appeal. (Casent Realty
Development Corp. v. Philbanking Corp., G.R. No. 150731, 14 September 2007)
If the lack of cause of action ground is raised, that is usually in a motion to dismiss in a demurrer to
evidence, then the dismissal, if it is granted, this time it is res judicata on the issue and you cannot
re-file it anymore. That is a dismissal with prejudice. So you cannot re-file the case. The remedy is
either you file for a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. Please do not think that all motions for
reconsiderations under ordinary rules are prohibited. Isa lang ang prohibited. If you have your codal
with you, go and look at that list of enumeration under Rule 15, Section 12. I-isa lang ang prohibited
motion for reconsideration diyan. At ang nag-iisang yun ay on the court’s action on the affirmative
defense. Whether an affirmative defense is granted or denied, an MR on that ruling is prohibited. All
other MRs, not prohibited.
So if there is a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, meaning if your demurrer to
evidence is denied, then you can file a motion for reconsideration. If your demurrer to evidence is
granted, you can file a motion for reconsideration. If your demurrer to evidence is denied, you
cannot appeal that order denying your demurrer to evidence. Why? It does not terminate the case.
Something is left to be done. What is it? You proceed to trial for the defendant's evidence. Something
is left to be done so that interlocutory order is not appealable. If your demurrer to evidence is
granted, it is dismissal with prejudice. The remedy is appeal.
X filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage against the Operator and Owner of the
Jeepney and its driver, because X was injured while X was a passenger in the said jeepney. May the
driver raise the affirmative defense of failure to state a cause of action?
There is a complaint for breach of contract of carriage. Take note of the cause of action here. It is
breach of contract of carriage. The action is filed against the operator and owner of the jeepney and
the driver as well. The driver files an answer raising as an affirmative defense the failure to state a
cause of action. Is the driver correct? That the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the
driver in this complaint for contract of carriage?
Yes. Since the cause of action is based on a breach of a contract of carriage, the liability of the
owner/operator of the jeepney is direct as the contract is between him and X. The driver of the
jeepney cannot be made liable as he is not a party to the contract of carriage. (Sanico v. Colipano,
G.R. No. 209969, September 27, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Answer yes. Why? Because in a contract of carriage, there are only 2 parties. Who are the parties?
You passenger and you common carrier operator or owner. The driver is just the employee of that
common carrier. So there is no cause of action against the driver.
Do not confuse this with quasi-delict. Ito ay breach of contract of carriage. So obviously, since the
driver is not a party to the contract of carriage, only the employee of the common carrier, the
complaint fails to state a cause of action against the driver. But what if the complaint is for
quasi-delict for that car accident due to negligence? The action is only filed against the common
carrier. Common carrier says that they need to implead the driver as an indispensable party. Is the
common carrier correct? Answer no. Why? Because in quasi-delict, the liability of those liable, the
nature of which is solidary. When you say solidary, you can claim the entire amount against any one
of them. So by just impleading the common carrier, you can recover that entire amount against that
common carrier. The driver is not even indispensable, not even necessary because the obligation here
is solidary. You can have a final determination even just against the common carrier.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “I’m back ebak. Sana nasa transcript din yung ebak. Inisip ko pa yan during
breaktime ko. Ano kayang magandang malagay sa transcript na yan. Sana nandun yan sa
transcribed lecture ha. I’m back ebak.
Yung pala sa bar, ingat ingat tayo pag na-jjebs tayo during the bar. Anong gagawin niyo pag
na-jjebs na kayo? Aba, release it! Release it baka hindi kayo makapag-isip diba. Ngayon pa ba
niyong iisipin na nakakahiyang jumebs. Jumebs ka. Ilabas mo yan. Baka hindi ka makapag-isip.
Nung bar namin, nakwento ko na ‘to dati pero ewan ko kung yung iba, baka hindi nila alam. Yung
bar namin, ewan ko kung ngayon ganun, sinusundan ka hanggang bathroom. Medyo bukas yung
pinto. Yung friend ko, jebs na jebs na siya kasi kapag kinakabahan siya, na-jjebs daw siya. So
ayun, nung jume-jebs daw siya, ayun, naka-eye-contact lang sila nung watcher. Nagtititigan sila
habang tumatae siya. Eh medyo intense daw kasi kinakabahan daw talaga siya. Ayun, medyo
mabaho talaga. Dahan-dahang sinasara ni watcher yung pinto. Si watcher hindi kinaya yung baho.
Ang point, ilabas niyo yan para makapag-sagot kayo ng exam. Diba tatandaan pa ba nila “ehh
tumae yon.” Ang importante ay mailabas mo yan.”
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM
E. Compulsory Counterclaim
i. A compulsory counterclaim arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. (G.
Holdings, Inc. v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., G.R. No. 226213, September 27, 2017, J.
Caguioa)
● Docket fees should not be collected for compulsory counterclaims as provided by the
Supreme Court in OCA Circular No. 96-2009, which suspended the payment of filing
fees provided in A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated 21 September 2004 (G. Holdings, Inc. v.
Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., G.R. No. 226213, September 27, 2017, J.
Caguioa; A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated 21 September 2004; OCA Circular No. 96-2009
dated 13 August 2009)
Yan po may tanong nako. Gumaganti na yung mga estudyante ko dati. Pinapag-recite nila ako. Akala
niyo. Kaya kong sagutin yan. Ang tanong nila is if it is based on quasi-delict based on vicarious
liability. If the basis is your vicarious liability, again, here, the basis of vicarious liability is that you
want the employer to be liable for the negligence of the employee. Correct? So you want the
employer to be liable and you need to establish whether there is diligence or proper exercise of
diligence of the employer in its selection, training, etc., management of their employees. So here,
you can implead your employee [and] you can also implead your employer. But the Supreme Court
said that if there is a ruling, exactly, that is the case actually Mr. Questioner. That is exactly the case
with the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court said that in that instance, the nature of their liability
would be solidary liability. So in that case, the employer, the operator, and the common carrier, and
the employee were impleaded. However, summons could not be served on the defendant driver. So,
the case proceeded, judgment was thereafter rendered and it was found that the operator should be
liable. So nag-reklamo yung operator on appeal, sabi ng operator: judgment is not valid because the
driver is an indispensable party. So that is why the Supreme Court ruled: you don’t even need to
implead the driver because in that vicarious liability, the liability is solidary. It means you can claim
the amount against any one of them. So even without the driver, we can have a final determination
of the case because the claim- a full amount, can be made only against- even against just the
common carrier. The full amount, dapat babayaran yan ng common carrier. Ok hope that answers
your question.
Yung compulsory counterclaim niyo, it must arise or it must be connected with the transaction or
occurrence that constitutes the subject matter ng kalaban mo or the opposing party’s claim. Your
compulsory counterclaim is the claim of the opposing party against the other party. Now, as a rule, it
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties to whom the party cannot acquire
jurisdiction.
No. There is no liability to pay filing fees on compulsory counterclaims, as provided by the
Supreme Court in OCA Circular No. 96-2009, which suspended the payment of filing fees provided
in A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated 21 September 2004 (G. Holdings, Inc. v. Cagayan Electric Power and
Light Co., Inc., G.R. No. 226213, September 27, 2017, J. Caguioa; A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated 21
September 2004; OCA Circular No. 96-2009 dated 13 August 2009)
I notice that there are some reviewers mentioning cases of Justice Caguioa that mentioned that
there is payment for filing fees for compulsory counterclaims. That is incorrect. That is not accurate.
Why? The basis of that ruling that was cited in some reviewers that mentions that there is
compulsory counterclaim is based on a case during the time when there was a Supreme Court
Administrative Matter No. 04-2-04-SC in September 2004 that said that there will be docket fees for
compulsory counterclaims. But that Administrative Matter was already subsequently suspended by
OCA Circular No. 96-2009. In that subsequent circular of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court said
it is suspended, the rule in A.M. No. 04-2-04 that requires payment of filing fees. Ang point na gusto
kong sabihin: yung rule na nagsasabi na yung payment ng docket fees sa compulsory counterclaims
sinuspend. So at present, walang payment of docket fees on compulsory counterclaims. I just wanted
to clarify that.
SUMMONS
F. Summons
i. What is summons?
● The summons shall be directed to the defendant, signed by the clerk of court under
seal, and contain:
(a) the name of the court and the names of the parties to the action;
(b) a direction that the defendant answer within the time fixed by these Rules;
(c) a notice that unless the defendant so answers, plaintiff will take judgment
by default and may be granted the relief applied for.
A copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem, if any,
shall be attached to the original and each copy of the summons. (Rules of
Court, sec. 2, rule 14)
● A writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of
such writ is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person.
Trial and judgment without such service is null and void. (Spouses Olar v. Cuna, G.R.
No. L-47935, May 5, 1979, citing Sy v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-44909, January 31, 1978)
X filed an action for sum of money against Y. In the return of service of summons, it was
alleged that Y refused to receive summons, constraining the process server to tender it on Y.
No Answer was filed and upon motion, Y was declared in default. X was allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
Alright there is an action for sum of money against the defendant. In the return of the service of
summons, nakalagay sa report or return ng sheriff that the defendant refused to receive summons.
And so, the sheriff or the process server was constrained to tender it on the defendant. Remember,
service of summons is personal. But if the defendant refuses to receive it, then isasampal mo ba yung
summons sa kanya? Hindi. Pero gusto mo pero hindi mo pwedeng gawin. So how do you tender it? You
leave it within the view and in the presence of the defendant. So yun yung ginawa ng sheriff and that
is what’s indicated in the return. Then no answer was filed by the defendant. So, there was a motion
to declare defendant in default, the Court ordered to declare defendant in default, and the plaintiff
was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
The trial court later ruled in favor of X. After the decision became final and executory, X
moved for execution, which was granted. Later on, Y’s property, after being attached, was
scheduled to be sold at an execution sale.
Subsequently after presentation of evidence, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The
decision became final and executory and the plaintiff moved for execution which was granted. Later
on, the property of the defendant was attached. And remember, how do you attach real property? So
you need to have that annotated or registered with the Registry of Deeds. That’s how you attach or
levy real property. And so, it was scheduled to be sold at an execution sale.
Y allegedly learned of this through another, more than 6 months from the finality of judgment,
and thus filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals, claiming that
the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over his person.
So, more than 6 months from the finality of judgment, the defendant allegedly learned through
another about the finality of that judgment. And so, the defendant filed a petition for annulment of
judgment. It cannot be petition for relief because lampas na yung 6 months from finality kaya
annulment of judgment ang basis ni defendant. Defendant claims that the Regional Trial Court never
had jurisdiction over his person.
Y claimed that summons was not validly served on Y, because at the time of the service of
summons, Y allegedly was not residing in the address provided by X in the complaint. Y alleged
in the petition that his lease in the former address was expired already, showing he was no
longer residing in said address, but no lease contract was submitted.
According to the defendant, he was not validly served summons because at the time that the
summons was served on the defendant, he was no longer residing in that address indicated in the
complaint. According to the defendant, his lease in that premise has already expired. And so, he was
no longer residing in that address. But note that as proof of that, the defendant did not submit any
lease contract to show that he was living there pursuant to a lease that terminated.
The lease is established by affidavits of neighbors but there was no affidavit from the alleged
lessor. Will the petition prosper?
Instead, the defendant submitted affidavits of neighbors saying that the defendant was no longer
living there. But the Court noted that there was no affidavit of the alleged lessor. Kung natapos na
yung lease, best evidence lease contract or the affidavit of the lessor. Instead, affidavit ng mga
marites ang binigay niya. Yung mga tsismosang kapitbahay. Will the petition for annulment of
judgment prosper on the ground that there was no proper service of summons and therefore there
was lack of jurisdiction over the defendant.
No. The process server being a public official, enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge
of his official duties and functions. The Return of Service of the process server of the RTC
constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein. Y did not show any clear and
convincing evidence to overturn such presumption. (Yap v. Lagtapon, G.R. No. 196347, January 23,
2017, J. Caguioa)
Okay, ground for annulment lack of jurisdiction kasama yan, yung over the person of the defendant
ha, not just subject matter. Alright. According to the Supreme Court, NO, that petition for
annulment will not prosper. Why? Number one, the process server is a public official. And so, it
enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of its official duties and functions. So the
return of service of summons of the process server is prima facie proof of the facts stated therein.
That prima facie proof, it can be overturned by what evidence? It must be clear and convincing
evidence. In this case, according to the Supreme Court, the affidavits of the neighbors are not
sufficient to overcome the clear and convincing evidence. So sabi ng Supreme Court, the defendant
should have been able to present the lease contract to show that the lease terminated in the
premises and that he was no longer residing there at the time of the service of summons. He should
have been able to present the affidavit of the lessor himself but it is curious why it is the neighbors’
affidavits. So sabi ng Supreme Court, how can you even say that those neighbors would have personal
knowledge of the lease contract between the lessor and the lessee? So the evidence presented,
according to the Supreme Court, was not able to overcome the clear and convincing evidence. And
so, the presumption of regularity in the performance of functions stays. And so the Court gave
credence to the report of the public official in the absence of proof to the contrary that there was
service of summons on the defendant who refused to acknowledge receipt.
PRE-TRIAL
G. Pre-trial
i. What is Pre-trial?
● A device to clarify and narrow down the basic issues between the parties, to ascertain
the facts relative to those issues and to enable the parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent trials
from being carried on in the dark. (Heirs of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
157959, March 28, 2007)
ii. Pre-trial Order
● It controls the subsequent proceedings
● It may be modified provided it is done before trial, to prevent manifest injustice.
(Rules of Court, Rule 18, Sec. 7)
● An issue not raised in the pre-trial order may be ruled upon by the trial court, by
exception, when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings, and no amendment of such pleadings deemed amended is
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence. (Rules of Court, Rule 10, Sec. 5)
● As a rule, no theories, issues, and arguments can be brought to the attention of the
trial court because if not raised in the trial court, it cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.
○ Exceptions:
a. Subject of judicial notice; or
b. Had already been judicially admitted. (Borromeo v. Mina, G.R. No.
193747, June 5, 2013)
A complaint was filed against A. In A’s answer, A alleged the affirmative defenses of
prescription and laches. However, the issues of prescription and laches were not raised in A’s
pre-trial brief, nor were they included in the pre-trial order.
Trial ensued and A participated in the trial, without also raising the issues of prescription and
laches. Judgment was rendered without ruling on the issues of prescription and laches. May
these issues be raised and considered on appeal?
So there is a complaint against the defendant. In the answer of the defendant, the defendant alleged
an affirmative defense of prescription and laches. Now, the prescription and laches, although raised
as an affirmative defense, if the answer was not raised in the pre-trial brief. It was also not included
in the pre-trial order. Take note of that. So it is in the answer that it is not in the pre-trial brief and
not in the pre-trial order. After that, there was trial. The defendant participated actively in the trial
but during the trial, defendant never raised the issue of prescription and laches. Judgment was
rendered without any ruling on the issue of prescription and laches. On appeal, defendant wants to
raise the issue of prescription and laches. Can these issues be raised and considered on appeal?
No. These issues can no longer be raised for the first time on appeal as A is deemed to have waived
them when he failed to have them included in the pre-trial order, his pre-trial brief and to raise it
during trial, where A actively participated in. (Republic v. Capital Resources Corp., G.R. No.
217210, November 7, 2016, J. Caguioa)
Answer: NO. They can no longer be raised for the first time on appeal. Why? Defendant is deemed to
have waived those grounds because he failed to include them in the pre-trial order. And how will it
be included in the pre-trial order? By raising it in the pre-trial brief, or raising it in the trial even if it
is not in the pre-trial order. Note that the pre-trial order is the order that governs the proceedings of
the case. So only the witnesses mentioned in the pre-trial will be presented, only the evidence in the
pre-trial order will be presented, and only the issues raised in the pre-trial order will be resolved by
the court. Exception is although it is not in the pre-trial order, if you presented evidence on that
issue and there is waiver on the part of the other party, whether express or implied consent, meaning
he did not object to that issue not raised in the pre-trial order, then the pleadings are deemed
amended. In this case, defendant actively participated but never raised during the trial and during
the pre-trial the issue of prescription and laches. And so he is deemed to have waived that. And he
cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. Matters that are not threshed out in the trial court
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Pre-Trial Order
● It controls the subsequent proceedings
● may be modified provided it is done before trial, to prevent manifest injustice. (Rules of
Court, Rule 18, Sec. 7)
Can we modify the pre-trial order? Answer: YES. As long as it is done before trial and with the
approval of the court to prevent manifest injustice.
When may an issue not raised in the pre-trial order be ruled upon by the trial court?
By exception, there are issues that are not raised in the pre-trial but they can be ruled upon by the
trial court.
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings, and no
amendment of such pleadings deemed amended is necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence. (Rules of Court, Rule 10, Sec. 5)
So what are these again? These are those that are issues not raised but because of the express or
implied consent of the adverse party who did not object when evidence was presented on this issue
that was not raised in the pre-trial order, then the pleadings are deemed amended. There is no need
to amend, to conform to evidence. The pleading is deemed amended.
By exception, may there be theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the
trial court but may be considered by a reviewing court?
Can there be theories, issues, and arguments that are not brought to the attention of the trial court
but may be considered by a reviewing court? As a rule, NO. As a rule, if not raised in the trial court,
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Yes, when factual bases would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse
party in order to enable him to properly meet the issue raised such as:
(a) subject of judicial notice; or
(b) had already been judicially admitted. (Borromeo v. Mina, G.R. No. 193747, June 5, 2013)
Exceptions: when these factual bases do not require presentation of further evidence to enable the
reviewing court to resolve it and for the adverse-- it does not require the presentation of further
evidence by the adverse party to properly meet the issue raised. What are these? Matters of judicial
notice and matters that are judicially admitted. Remember under the Rules of Court, if it is a matter
of judicial notice or judicially admitted, there's no need to present evidence on this matter.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
H. Demurrer to evidence
i. What is a demurrer to evidence?
● It is a remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence
produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain an issue. (Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448,
January 9, 2017, J. Caguioa)
● It is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
● All motions shall be served by personal service, accredited private courier or
registered mail, or electronic means so as to ensure their receipt by the other
party. (Sec. 5, par. B, Rule 15 Rules of Court)
● The opposing party shall file his or her opposition to a litigious motion within
five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. No other submissions shall be
considered by the court in the resolution of the motion. (Sec. 5, par. C, Rule 15
Rules of Court)
● The movant cannot file a reply if an opposition is filed because under Rule 15
of the Rules of Court, it says that after the opposition, no other subsequent
pleadings shall be considered by the court in resolving the litigious motion.
ii. When to file demurrer to evidence?
● After the court rules on the formal offer and objections to the formal offer of
evidence because it is the only time after the court rules on the offer that one will
know what evidence was admitted by the court and what evidence constitutes that of
the plaintiff’s evidence.
○ When to make a formal offer of evidence?
■ Testimonial evidence - at the time the witness is called to testify.
■ Documentary or object evidence - after the witness testifies (Sec. 35,
Rule 132 Rules of Court)
○ How formal offer of evidence is made?
■ All evidence must be offered orally. (Sec. 35, Rule 132 Rules of Court)
iii. Effect of a grant of demurrer to evidence
● It is a dismissal similar to a judgment, which is a ruling on the merits of a case.
(Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017, J. Caguioa)
● A ruling granting demurrer to evidence may not be the subject of a Rule 45 petition
with the Supreme Court because the propriety of the trial court’s granting of a
demurrer to evidence entails a calibration of the evidence on record. Factual
questions are not the proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45, the same
being limited only to questions of law. (Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January
9, 2017, J. Caguioa)
iv. What is crucial in the determination in demurrer to evidence?
● It is whether the thing in evidence entitles it to the relief sought based on its own
evidence presented, but we cannot use the basis of preponderance of evidence.
Demurrer to evidence
● motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
● remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence produced by the
plaintiff is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an
issue. (Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017, J. Caguioa)
As I mentioned earlier, your demurrer to evidence is filed after the plaintiff has rested his case. But
by definition based on jurisprudence, you do not file it after--
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Slower presentation. Sige sorry sorry babagalan ko. Yun yung problema ko
talaga. Minsan masyadong mabilis ako pag na-excite ako. Pag-na-excite ako sa topic? What a nerd.
So I really request you if I’m going too fast please tell me in the chat because in my delusional
head, I might be going slow but actually it’s too fast. So please yes please let me know if I’m
going to fast or too slow as the case may. So I apologize. Okay. so I’ll try to pace myself slower.
Alright. Thank you for that. That you for raising that.”
Now, when you say demurrer to evidence, it is actually a motion to dismiss. And this motion is a
litigious motion. That is under Rule 15. So the requirement is that when you file this motion, you
must serve a copy of the motion on adverse party. If you fail to serve a copy of your motion, that is
litigious on the adverse party, the Court will not act on your motion to dismiss by demurrer to
evidence on or on your litigious motion. So you need to serve on the adverse party. So that the
adverse party will have the opportunity to oppose your litigious motion within a period of 5 days.
After the lapse of that period, and you do not file an opposition, then you waive the right to file that
opposition.
Can the movant file a reply if an opposition is filed? Answer: NO. Because under Rule 15, it says that
after the opposition, no other subsequent pleadings shall be considered by the court in resolving your
litigious motion. So if demurrer to evidence, what is the timing? So we said it is after the plaintiff
rested its case. But the resting of the case doesn’t happen exactly after the last witness is
presented. No. For you- because remember the phases of your demurrer to evidence is the evidence
of the plaintiff.
And how do you know what constitutes the evidence of the plaintiff? First, the plaintiff needs to
formally offer the evidence because no evidence will be considered by the court unless it is formally
offered.
So, in conclusion, the time to make your demurrer to evidence is after the court rules on the formal
offer and objections to the formal offer. Because it is only when the court rules on your offer that is
the only time that you will know what evidence was admitted by the court, what evidence
constitutes that of the plaintiff’s evidence. After there is a ruling on the formal offer of evidence,
then you can file your demurrer to evidence. In the civil case, there is no need for leave court. Sa
criminal case lang yan. File mo na lang basta yan dito sa civil cases.
This remedy for demurrer to evidence is only available to the defendant. So, the defendant is saying
that, “Hey, court, the evidence of the plaintiff is insufficient to make out a case to sustain the issue
raised.” Kulang, insufficient ang evidence. So, it follows that the defendant has not yet presented
evidence in your demurrer to evidence.
If your demurrer to evidence is granted, what is the effect? This is a dismissal that is on the merits.
As similar to a judgment. It is a dismissal with prejudice, because the court makes a ruling on the
merits of the plaintiff’s evidence. And so, if it is a dismissal with prejudice, the remedy is appeal.
May a ruling granting demurrer to evidence be the subject of a Rule 45 petition with the
Supreme Court?
● No. The propriety of the trial court’s granting of a demurrer to evidence entails a
calibration of the evidence on record
● Factual questions are not the proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45, the
same being limited only to questions of law. (Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448,
January 9, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Now, question. You know that, or if you don’t know, you will know now that from the RTC judgment
rendered in the RTC’s jurisdiction original, from the RTC, the mode of appeal is by Rule 41. Correct?
Okay. It can be by ordinary appeal, notice of appeal, record on appeal. Right? Rule 41. So that is from
the RTC to the CA.
If the RTC ruling, you want to assail it, but your only issue is only a pure question of law, note that
I’m talking about the RTC ruling rendered in its original jurisdiction lang. From the RTC ruling
rendered in its original jurisdiction, from there, if it is only a pure question of law that is raised, the
remedy is to go to Rule 45 to the Supreme Court. Again, only if it is the ruling of the RTC in its
original jurisdiction and there is a pure question of law.
If it is a pure question of law from the RTC ruling rendered in its original jurisdiction, can you do it
by Rule 41 notice of appeal? Answer: NO. The Rules provide that if you do it by notice of appeal and
it is a pure question of law assailing the original judgment in the exercise of original jurisdiction of
the RTC, CA will dismiss it. Jurisdiction is with the Supreme Court. What’s my basis? Aba, madami.
Jurisprudence. And also, you can find that in Section 1 of Rule 45. It makes mention that you can go
up to the Supreme Court from the RTC on a Rule 45 based on a pure question of law.
Now, since you can raise a judgment from the RTC in its original jurisdiction judgment to the
Supreme Court by Rule 45 on pure question of law, the question now is if there is a judgment of the
court granting a demurrer to evidence, can you assail it to the SC by Rule 45? Sabi ng Supreme Court,
kasi daw original jurisdiction naman ng RTC, can you go to Rule 45 if it is on a demurrer to evidence?
Answer: NO, because Rule 45 must only be on pure question of law. If you’re going to assail the
demurrer to evidence, it entails calibration of evidence on record. And the Supreme Court, on Rule
45, is not a trier of facts. Factual questions are not proper under Rule 45. Kasi nga, di ba ang
demurrer to evidence natin ay basis is insufficiency of evidence. So, if you’re going to assail that,
hindi yan pwede by Rule 45, because if the issue is whether the evidence is sufficient or not, it
requires the court to calibrate the evidence on record and that is a factual issue that is not within
the province of a Rule 45 petition with the Supreme Court.
X assails the grant of demurrer to evidence by appeal, alleging that X was sufficiently able to
establish the burden of proof by preponderance of evidence. Is this ground proper in assailing
the grant of demurrer to evidence?
There is a grant of a demurrer to evidence. Ibig sabihin ay na-dismiss yung kaso with prejudice. So, it
is assailed by appeal. According to the appellant, the plaintiff was sufficiently able to establish the
burden of proof required of the plaintiff by preponderance of evidence. Is this ground proper in
assailing the grant of demurrer to evidence. Answer: NO. Remember here in the question, the basis is
that the plaintiff was able to discharge the burden of proof by preponderance of evidence.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Kung sino mas mataba, kung sino mahilig umorder ng Grab Food. ‘Yan, evidence
of greater weight.”
So, it presupposes that it’s not just one party who presented evidence. It’s both parties. Because you
are determining which among the two presented weightier evidence.
So, kung isa lang nagpresent ng evidence in this case, plaintiff lang, sabi ng Supreme Court, it is
premature to speak of preponderance of evidence. Because your demurrer of evidence is filed after
the plaintiff presents evidence but before the defendant presents evidence. So, there is nothing here
to measure the preponderance of evidence. Because the basis of your demurrer is the insufficiency
of the plaintiff’s evidence but not the failure to discharge the preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence means evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than
that which is offered in opposition to it. What is crucial is the determination as to whether the
plaintiff's evidence entitles it to the relief sought. (Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January
9, 2017, J. Caguioa)
So, what is crucial in the determination in demurrer to evidence is whether the thing in evidence
entitles it to the relief sought based on its own evidence presented, but we cannot use the basis of
preponderance of evidence.
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
I. Annulment of Judgment
i. Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47
1. Extrinsic fraud
2. Lack of jurisdiction (over the subject matter and over the person)
3. Denial of due process
ii. Annulment of Judgment - Extrinsic fraud
● Not a valid ground for annulment of judgment if this ground could have been raised in
a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
● If it could have been raised it in a motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial
or in a petition for relief but choose not to and then the decision becomes final and
executory, extrinsic fraud can no longer be raised as a ground in annulment of
judgment because it is deemed waived nor annulment of judgment itself as the
extraordinary remedy.
● File the action within four (4) years from the discovery of extrinsic fraud. This
presupposes that the judgment is already final and executory. Annulment of judgment
cannot be availed of if another remedy is available or if the decision is not yet final
and executory.
iii. Annulment of Judgment - Lack of jurisdiction (over the subject matter & over the person)
● It is before is is barred by laches or estoppel
iv. Annulment of Judgment - Denial of due process
● The violation of one's due process rights is a defect in jurisdiction. When there is
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction, such
as when there is defective service of summons. (De Pedro v. Romasan Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 158002, 28 February 2005, Arrieta v. Arrieta, G.R. No. 234808,
November 19, 2018; Yap v. Lagtapon, G.R. No. 196347, January 23, 2017, J. Caguioa)
The Rules of Court make mention of two grounds for annulment of judgment: extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction. As I mentioned earlier, lack of jurisdiction can refer to lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; it can also refer to lack of jurisdiction over the person. ‘Wag kayo magulat, di naman
kasi nilimit ng Rules ang lack of jurisdiction. Di naman sinabing over the subject matter lang, kaya
pwede rin ‘yan over the person. And there is another ground for annulment of judgment. This is not
under the Rules of Court, but recognized under jurisprudence, that is denial of due process.
Extrinsic fraud cannot be a valid ground if it had been availed of, or could have been availed of, in
a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Now, extrinsic fraud is not a valid ground for annulment of judgment if this ground could have been
raised in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. If you could have raised it as in an MR or motion
for new trial or in a petition for relief, but you chose not to. Tapos, the decision becomes final and
executory. Can you raise it as a ground in annulment of judgment? NO. You are deemed to have
waived your right to do so. Nor your annulment of judgment is your extraordinary remedy. Only if
there are no other remedies available, but you must not have any fault.
Example, you received a copy of the decision today. But you are claiming that you were not able to
participate in the proceedings because of extrinsic fraud. Instead of filing a motion for new trial,
dinedma mo yung decision. Remember from the notice of decision, you have 15 days to file that
motion for new trial. You did not do so. That 15-day period lapsed, and it became final and
executory. Can you still raise that as a petition for relief? Again, NO. In the same way, petition for
relief is also an extraordinary remedy and you can only avail of it if you cannot have availed of that
ground in your motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration. Petition for relief presupposes that
the decision, when you discovered it, was already final and executory. In this case, when you learned
of the decision, you still had time to file your motion for new trial. So, the remedy is to file a motion
for new trial. That you did not do so is a waiver on your part. Remember, the law does not protect
those who sleep on their rights.
Lack of jurisdiction means either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
As I mentioned, lack of jurisdiction either means lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or
pwede rin on the person of the defendant.
When there is violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction,
such as when there is defective service of summons. (De Pedro v. Romasan Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 158002, 28 February 2005, Arrieta v. Arrieta, G.R. No. 234808, November
19, 2018; Yap v. Lagtapon, G.R. No. 196347, January 23, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Now, when you say violation of due process, sabi ng Supreme Court, violation of due process is
actually a defect in jurisdiction. So, medyo kabarkada niya yung lack of jurisdiction. Why? Sabi ng
Supreme Court, courts are bereft to exercise jurisdiction in violation of due process, which is a basic
constitutional right. A court is ousted from jurisdiction when there is violation of due process, such
as when there is defective service of summons. Kaya medyo barkada niya talaga yung lack of
jurisdiction.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Honestly, di mo na kailangan sabihin yung violation of due process kung ganyan
rin lang defective service of summons. Pwede yan mag-fall sa lack of jurisdiction over the person.
Pero anyway, naisip ko lang yan, ‘di naman ako Supreme Court. Basta ang point, tatlo yung
grounds kasama yung violation of due process. Dami kong hanash, di naman ako— tao lang ako, di
naman tayo Supreme Court. Comment comment lang tayo. ‘Wag niyo ilagay sa bar yung comment
‘kong ‘yan, ha?”
Ang sagot niyo dapat due process is a ground for annulment of judgment because where there is a
violation of the constitutional right of due process, courts are ousted of jurisdiction.
So, what is the period within which to file your annulment of judgment? The period to file your
annulment of judgment depends on your grounds.
If your ground is extrinsic fraud, you need to file the action within 4 years from the discovery of the
extrinsic fraud. Again, this presupposes that the judgment is already final and executory. Because
you cannot avail of annulment of judgment if another remedy is available. So if the decision is not
yet final and executory, you cannot avail of annulment of judgment, because the remedy of MR,
motion for new trial, or appeal can still be availed of.
Paano naman ang violation of due process? Yung period ‘pag violation of due process, pareho yan ng
lack of jurisdiction. Kasi nga, kakasabi ko lang na if there is violation of due process, a court is bereft
of jurisdiction to proceed with the case. That is in violation of one’s right to due process.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
J. Preliminary Injunction
i. What is a writ of preliminary injunction?
● A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy in support of the main relief to
preserve the status quo during the pendency of the main case.
● It can be an original action. As an original action, Regional Trial Court solely has
jurisdiction over an action for injunction because it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. It cannot be filed as an original action in the Court of Appeals.
● Matters resolved in injunction proceedings do not, as a general rule, conclusively
determine the merits of the main case or decide controverted facts therein.
(Philippine Ports Authority v. Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services,
Inc., G.R. No. 214864, March 22, 2017, J. Caguioa)
ii. Grounds for granting writ of preliminary injunction
1. That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
2. That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained
of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
3. That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or
is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights
of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual. (Rules of Court, Rule 58, Sec. 3; AMA Land, Inc. v.
Wack Wack Residents' Association, Inc., G.R. No. 202342 , July 19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
iii. Requirements to be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction:
1. there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
2. this right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined;
3. the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and
4. there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and
irreparable damage (AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents' Association, Inc., G.R.
No. 202342, July 19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
iv. Grant or denial of the injunctive relief
● The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests on the sound discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case; the exercise of judicial discretion will not be interfered
with, except upon a finding of grave abuse of discretion. (AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack
Wack Residents' Association, Inc., G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
The writ of preliminary injunction, that is your provisional remedy. So, it is your ancillary remedy. It
is sought not for itself, but in support of your main relief. To preserve the status quo, during the
pendency of the main case. However, please note that your injunction can also be a main action. It
can be an original action, it can be a provisional remedy.
As an original action, the court that has jurisdiction over an action for injunction is solely with the
Regional Trial Court because it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Can you file an original action for injunction in the CA? HINDI. Kakasabi ko lang, ano ka ba. Cannot be
because that is original action and the basis of jurisdiction is what is in the law. And action for
injunction is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
If you filed your original injunction in the Regional Trial Court, note that BP 129 provides that writ of
injunction will be enforceable within its judicial region. Ano ibig-sabihin niyan? If the Regional Trial
Court of Makati issues your injunction, you can enforce it in Pasig, in Quezon City, in the City of
Manila, not only in the territory but within the judicial region. What is this judicial region? That is
called the National Capital judicial region. If it’s issued in Baguio, can you enforce it in other parts of
Ilocos (Dahil bobo tayo sa geography, ‘di ko maisip)? YES, because they are under the first judicial
region. ‘Pag RTC ‘yan. ‘Pag CA, SC, enforceable in the Philippines.
Although CA and SC does not have original jurisdiction over injunction, it has jurisdiction over a writ
of preliminary injunction as a provisional remedy that is ancillary to the main action pending with
the CA or the SC.
Matters resolved in injunction proceedings do not, as a general rule, conclusively determine the
merits of the main case or decide controverted facts therein. (Philippine Ports Authority v.
Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc., G.R. No. 214864, March 22, 2017, J.
Caguioa)
Now, the matters that are resolved in your injunction proceedings will not or should not determine
the merits of the main case. If your issue in the writ of injunction or the provisional remedy would
amount to a pre-judgment in the main case, the court will not rule on your preliminary injunction
because it will serve as pre-judgment.
What are the grounds for granting of a preliminary injunction? Syempre the first ground, applicant
should be entitled to that relief, whether in whole or in part, and that relief is that you are stopping
or restraining the commission or continuance of acts that you are complaining or that is prohibitory
or if it is mandatory, you are requiring the performance of an act either for a limited period or
perpetually.
Now, the second ground is that the commission, continuance, or the non-performance of the act that
you are complaining of during the pendency of the litigation would probable work injustice to the
applicant.
And that the party, court, agency, or person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do, or procuring,
or suffering to be done acts that are probably in violation of the right of that applicant with respect
to the subject matter of the action and it would or can render the judgment ineffectual.
Now, apart from these grounds, you need to comply with the requirements to establish entitlement
to a writ of preliminary injunction. Ano ito? Apat ‘yan, dapat memorize-in mo:
There exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected or your right in esse. ‘Yan, clear legal
right. When is it clear legal right? When it is founded on law. A legal clear right. If your right is
conditional, hindi ‘yan pwede. Kunwari my common example is expired na yung franchise mo.
Siyempre isasara ka na. Pwede ka bang mag-TRO, writ of injunction, to stop that closure? NO,
because you have no clear legal right because your franchise is already expired.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Parang yung ulam sa refrigerator ko na panis na. Pero di ko pa rin tinatapon kasi
tinatamad akong maghugas ng tupperware. O, sana nasa transcript din ‘yan ah.”
This right is the second requirement: the right is directly threatened by the act sought to be
enjoined. And yung invasion na ‘yan (third requirement), dapat material ‘yan and substantial. And
the most important but always neglected requirement: there has to be urgent and paramount
necessity to prevent serious and irreparable damage and also dapat wala ka ng other remedy
available. ‘Pag meron ka pang ibang remedy available, pwede ‘yang i-deny ng court.
The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case; the exercise of judicial discretion will not be interfered with, except upon
a finding of grave abuse of discretion. (AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents' Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
What do you mean by irreparable injury? When it is irreparable, it cannot be quantified. So lost
business profit, that can be quantified, that is not irreparable. Ano ba yung common example ng
irreparable? Reputation, good will.
Now, the Supreme Court ruled that whether the court grants or denies your writ of injunction or
provisional remedy, that is within the sound discretion of the court and it will not be interfered with.
Exception, when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
If it is a provisional remedy as a writ of preliminary injunction, your remedies against it are that you
can seek its dissolution or discharge.
How? Well, you can show the court that there is no basis for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction during the summary hearing for the writ for preliminary injunction.
Or you can tell the court that, “Your Honor, yung damage ko as defendant is far greater if that writ is
issued than if not issued, and my damage is greater than the plaintiff and my damage is irreparable,
pero yung kay plaintiff can be compensated.” ‘Yan, that is another ground. But if you will invoke that
second ground, it is an indispensable requirement that the person against whom the writ is issued
must file a bond in an amount approved by the court. Without the bond, that writ of preliminary
injunction will not be dissolved.
Another remedy is to assail it by certiorari to a higher court. If you assail it by certiorari, there is no
need to give a bond. And if the court finds that it’s certiorari because it is a provisional remedy, it is
interlocutory, not a judgment. So, you cannot appeal it, you assail it by certiorari. If the court finds
that the issuance of the writ is with grave abuse of discretion, then it will be reversed by the higher
court on a certiorari even without the giving of a bond.
But, if your injunction is a permanent injunction, meaning that it is already part of the judgment of
the case, the remedy this time is appeal.
Lagi niyong tinatanong, “What is the instance when there will be a pre-judgment in your provisional
remedy of injunction?” Ito na, bigyan ko kayo ng example since Caguioa case ito.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Okay, sabi ko pala hanggang 11 lang ako, pero 11:10 na pala. Mag-lunch break
muna tayo. O, suspense na lang ‘to. Sabi ng iba, ‘Wala naman kaming pake, di kami na-excite.
Excited kaming matulog, ganon.’ ‘Wag kayo mag-alala, makakatulog na rin kayo. Okay? So let’s
take a one-hour break. So let’s resume at 12:15.”
A filed a complaint praying that A be granted easement of right of way over B’s property, so that A
may pass through it to be able to construct the building on A’s property, with prayer for issuance of
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction so A may be granted temporary easement.
Prior to the break, we said that it is possible that your provisional remedy for a writ of injunction
would be denied if it would amount to a prejudgment of the merits of the main case. So this is
exactly an example of that: a case penned by Justice Caguioa. So there is a complaint filed asking
that the plaintiff would be granted an easement of right of way over the property of the defendant.
Why does the plaintiff want to get an easement of right of way over the property of the defendant?
So that the plaintiff can pass through it, to be able to construct a building on the plaintiff’s property.
So the plaintiff needs to pass through the defendant’s property in order for the plaintiff to construct
the building on plaintiff’s property. So the provisional remedy here is one for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction so that the defendant would mandatorily or be compelled to grant the plaintiff
a temporary easement. So if you’ll notice here, the prayer for a writ of injunction is similar to the
merits of the main case because the main case is to ask for an easement of right of way. The
provisional remedy is to compel the defendant to grant the temporary easement para makadaan si
plaintiff so that he can start building during the pendency of the case.
So ito namang si B, on the other hand, sabi niya “labanan ng injunction to.” Sabi ni B, “pwes, ako
rin, mag-apply for writ of injunction to stop naman the construction.” Kasi sabi niya, “that there is
still pending determination of the case so i-restrain natin yung construction until we can determine
whether A can have that right of way.”
With the denial of B’s application for writ of preliminary injunction, without presentation of
evidence, the trial court granted A’s application for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and
granted temporary easement in favor of A. Was this proper?
But that injunction of B to stop the construction was denied. Since B’s injunction was denied (it was
denied without presentation of evidence), the Court, on the other hand, granted the plaintiff’s
prayer naman for preliminary mandatory injunction so that the plaintiff will be granted by the
defendant temporary easement para mapadaan ni defendant si A sa property ni defendant so A can
build on the property. So is it proper for the trial court to grant this temporary easement pursuant to
a writ of preliminary injunction?
No. In granting A’s application for preliminary mandatory injunction, the RTC prematurely decided
disputed facts and disposed of the merits of the case without the benefit of a full-blown trial
wherein testimonial and documentary evidence could be fully and exhaustively presented, heard
and refuted by the parties.
Sabi ng SC no, because by granting that preliminary mandatory injunction, the RTC already
prematurely decided the disputed facts and disposed the merits of the case without the benefit of a
full-blown trial. Remember, the hearing on a writ of preliminary injunction is just a summary hearing.
It is different from the hearing of the main case which requires the full-blown trial before the
determination of the merits of the case. So sabi ng SC before the evidence can be exhaustively
presented by granting that writ of preliminary injunction and allowing plaintiff to have that
easement of right of way on defendant’s property pursuant to that writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, it is as if that the Court already judged on the merits of the main case because the main
case is precisely to ask for that easement of right of way. You get it?
The temporary easement of right of way under Article 656 of the Civil Code, similar to the
permanent easement of right of way pursuant to Articles 649 and 650, can only be granted after
proof of compliance with the prerequisites set forth in the articles duly adduced during a
full-blown trial. (AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents' Association, Inc., G.R. No. 202342, July
19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
So sabi ng SC, a temporary easement under Article 656 of the CC is similar to a permanent easement.
And both of these temporary and permanent easements can only be granted after there is proof of
compliance with the requisites set forth under those articles but only after a full-blown trial. So this
is an example where it was improper to grant the provisional remedy because it amounted to a
prejudgment of the main case. Ayos?
X filed a complaint for sum of money. The RTC issued an order directing X to pay additional
docket fees within 15 days. X complied but before X could file its compliance, the RTC
dismissed the case for failure to file docket fees. X filed a motion for reconsideration against
the dismissal, which was denied.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Dami namang complaint ng mga taong ‘to. Alam niyo ba nung nagaaral ako sa
bar, everytime nagbabasa ko ng complaint complaint na yan, isip ko, bakit ba kasi mareklamo
‘tong mga taong ‘to?! Kung ‘di sila mareklamo, hindi maraming kaso, ‘di maraming aaralin. So pag
nahihirapan na kayo at marami kayong inaaral, sinong sisisihin niyo? Ah, tignan niyo yung pangalan
nung mga petitioner dyan sa mga SC cases. Sila yung isumpa mo. Wooh, masyado ka mareklamo!
Ganyan.”
There is another complaint for sum of money (inaudible) you can still be allowed to pay the full
docket fees within a reasonable time as long as it is beyond the lapse of the reglementary period or
beyond the prescriptive period. So kunwari appeal yan, after your perfection of appeal hindi
kumpleto yung docket fees mo, hindi outrightly madedeny yung appeal mo. You will have an
opportunity to complete the payment of docket fees but within a reasonable period not before the
lapse of the 15-day period to appeal. Kasi kung nag-lapse na yung 15-day period, ibig sabihin you’re
not able to pay docket fees, hindi mo naperfect yung appeal mo. Pag di mo naperfect yung appeal,
the decision assailed becomes final and executory.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Nakita ko bigla yung mukha ko sa gilid ng zoom. Ang laki po. Parang napuno ng
siopao. Yun talaga guys, Grab food is life. Oh, lagay niyo rin yan sa transcript. Gulong gulo na
yung mga tao kasi ang dami kong side kwento.”
Ulit, take 2. May complaint for sum of money. Hindi kumpleto yung payment of docket fees. So the
Court directed the plaintiff to pay additional docket fees within 15 days. The plaintiff complied.
Nabayaran niya within 15 days but the court directed the plaintiff to file the compliance within that
period. Pero hindi na-file yung compliance. So nabayaran pero hindi na-file yung compliance. So
before the plaintiff could file its compliance, the RTC already dismissed the case for failure to file
the docket fees. (Fees yan, hindi fess. Wrong spelling sorry.) So because the Court dismissed it, the
plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration against that dismissal. That MR was denied.
X timely filed a notice of appeal. The RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal on the
ground that said appeal is not the proper remedy. X then filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the CA, which was denied, for failure to file first a motion for reconsideration
against the RTC order denying to give due course to the notice of appeal. X filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied.
So plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Sabi ng RTC, “Ay mali. Hindi ka pwede mag-notice of appeal.”
The RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal. On what ground? Sabi ng RTC that is an improper
remedy. Sabi ng RTC, “Dapat nag-file ka ng petition for certiorari with the CA.” Yan. Improper
remedy yan. Sabi ng plaintiff, “Pakshet. Sige na nga!” So the plaintiff filed a certiorari and
mandamus in the CA to compel the court to accept that there is payment of docket fees so that it
will not be dismissed. But the CA denied that certiorari. Napakamalas naman nitong si plaintiff.
Lahat nalang na-deny. Why? Because there was failure to first file an MR. Remember: in a Certiorari,
as a rule, kailangan mo muna ng MR. Tas sabi ni plaintiff, “Nag-file naman ako ng MR.” No, your MR is
against the judgment. But you did not file an MR daw against the ruling denying the notice of appeal.
Diba? Oh, na-lost na yung mga tao. Ulitin ko.
Yung case dinismiss. Pagkadismiss, nag-MR. Nag-notice of appeal siya, dineny. Pagkadeny ng notice of
appeal, hindi na siya nag-MR. Kaya nag-Certiorari na siya. So kaya the Certiorari was denied kasi
there was another plain, speedy, adequate remedy daw which is to file an MR of the denial of the
giving of due course of the notice of appeal.
X filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the SC, to assail the CA decision.
Was the petition for certiorari and mandamus with the SC the proper remedy against the CA
decision?
So bwisit na bwisit na tong si plaintiff pumunta na siya sa SC. But instead of appealing the judgment
of the CA, nag-Certiorari nanaman itong si plaintiff. So what you are assailing in the SC is the
judgment of the CA in a Certiorari case. So there is a Certiorari filed with the CA. It was denied
because they did not file an MR first. And so from the CA, umakyat siya ng SC but by Certiorari under
Rule 65. Is that a proper remedy against the CA Decision?
No. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for
review under Rule 45, to the SC
When a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright (Philippine Bank
of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Answer: NO, because the proper remedy is to appeal. Remember, Certiorari is an original action and
it is not a remedy when an appeal is available. Remember, Certiorari being an original action, the
remedy against it is appeal. So here, appeal was an available remedy. From the CA ruling that denied
the Certiorari, from there dapat umakyat ka sa Rule 45 to the SC. So there is an improper remedy
here. And what is the effect when there is an improper remedy? The petition may be dismissed
outright. Kasi dapat appeal instead of Certiorari.
May the SC give due course to the petition for certiorari and mandamus although it is a wrong
mode of appeal?
● Yes. The SC, by exception, may set aside technicalities and proceed with the appeal when
there is a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. (Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Nevertheless, may the SC give due course to that wrong mode of remedy? Yung Certiorari papansinin
ng SC. By exception, YES. The SC, by exception, may uphold technicalities and proceed with it as if it
is an appeal. The Court can consider your Rule 65 as a Rule 45 provided it is filed within that 15-day
period to file your appeal. So otherwise, pag lumagpas na yung 15-day period, hindi na yan pwedeng
i-consider ng appeal. So by exception, the SC can relax the application of the technical rules of
procedure if there is justifiable reason and to prevent the commission of a grave injustice.
Was the petition for certiorari filed with the CA the proper remedy to assail the order of the
RTC denying the notice of appeal?
● Yes. A trial court’s order disallowing a notice of appeal, which is tantamount to a
disallowance or dismissal of the appeal itself, is not a decision or final order from which an
appeal may be taken. (Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
218901, February 15, 2017, J. Caguioa)
So, let’s go back. Kanina, nag-file siya sa RTC ng action. Ulitin ko ah kasi baka naconfuse na kayo sa
dami ng nasabi ko. So nag-file siya ng action sa RTC. Although nagbayad siya ng docket fees na
kumpleto, the compliance hindi agad natanggap ng court, dinismiss na ng court. From the dismissal,
nag-MR siya, dineny. Nag-notice of appeal siya, the RTC denied it on the ground that it is not the
proper remedy. From the RTC denial of giving due course to the notice of appeal, nag-Certiorari siya
to the CA. Is that Certiorari a proper remedy to assail the Order of the RTC denying the notice of
appeal? So, what is the subject of the Certiorari in the CA? It is an Order denying the notice of
appeal. It is an Order that is not giving due course to the notice of appeal. And according to the SC,
YES. A trial court’s order disallowing the notice of appeal is tantamount to a disallowance or the
dismissal of the appeal itself. It is not a dismissal or final order from which appeal can be taken.
What is the basis of this? Go to Rule 41, Section 1 kung naconfuse na kayo sa buhay niyo.
Section 1, Rule 41
No appeal may be taken from:
● An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
● An interlocutory order;
● An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
● An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
● An order of execution;
● An judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is
pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;
● An order dismissing an action without prejudice
Look at Rule 41, Section 1. Here, you will find the enumeration of instances where no appeal can be
taken from. So among those in the list, you will find the 3rd bullet point: an order disallowing or
dismissing an appeal. So here, there was a notice of appeal filed. But the notice of appeal was
disallowed. That disallowance of an appeal by notice of appeal is not appealable based on Section 1
Rule 41. So, tignan niyo yung pinakadulo na paragraph ng Section 1 Rule 41. What is the remedy in
these instances where appeal is not a remedy?
Sabi ng rule, in any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action as provided in Rule 65. Kaya, the Order of the RTC denying the notice of appeal
can be assailed by a Certiorari.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Kung kayo nanonosebleed sa Remedial Law, ako inuuhog bleed. Naglalabasan na
‘tong uhog ko. Buti nalang di tayo magkasama. Baka mamaya bawat bahing ko lahat kayo, ‘Oh,
may covid siya.’ Pero sabi nila guys, sa panahon ngayon na may pandemya, mas acceptable pa na
umutot sa public kesa bumahing. Kasi pag umutot daw, wala namang talsik laway dun diba. Oh, di
ka mahahawa. And matetest mo kung may pang-amoy ka pa. Maaamoy mo. Magt-thank you ka pa!
‘Hay salamat, wala akong COVID. Naaamoy ko na nakakasuka yung utot mo.’ Okay? Consistent yan
sa theme ng aking lalagyan ng tsaa. Yan, isabit natin.”
In those instances where appeal is not a remedy (I hope you’re looking at your codal Section 1 Rule
41 para hindi tayo mangmang sa buhay). In all of those instances where appeal is not a remedy, take
note that the Rules mention that Rule 65 may be a remedy. It says may. So it’s not always Rule 65.
For it to be an available remedy (Rule 65), you still need to read it in connection with the provisions
of Rule 65. And what are the requirements in order for you to avail of a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65? There must be grave abuse of discretion and there must be no appeal or any, plain, speedy,
adequate remedy under the ordinary course of law. So example, if your dismissal is without
prejudice. Let’s say the ground is failure to state a cause of action. That is not appealable. Should
you assail it with Certiorari? Answer: NO, because there is another plain, speedy, adequate remedy
which is to re-file it with an amended complaint. In the same way, if your dismissal is due to lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Let us say that you filed in the RTC an action for forcible entry.
RTC should dismiss that for lack of jurisdiction. That dismissal is without prejudice. That is not
appealable. Can you assail it by Certiorari? Answer: NO. Why? Because the RTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing. Kasi wala naman talagang jurisdiction ang RTC sa forcible entry.
And the proper remedy in that instance is to re-file it in the Court that has jurisdiction which is in
the first level courts. In this case, what happened was there is a dismissal of an order disallowing
your appeal.
Was the CA correct that before availing of the certiorari under Rule 65 in this case, X should
have first filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the RTC order denying the notice of
appeal?
● No.
So sabi ng SC in that instance, Certiorari was an available remedy. Why? Because there was grave
abuse of discretion. Now, sabi naman ng CA, well, hindi ko dapat yan i-grant yang Certiorari na yan
because there was failure to file an MR first. Because the rule is dapat walang appeal, or any plain,
speedy, adequate remedy. From the RTC Order denying the notice of appeal, hindi na nag-MR si
plaintiff. So sabi ni CA dapat nag-MR muna siya.
As a rule, you file an MR before you avail of a Certiorari because MR is a plain, speedy, adequate
remedy. But that rule is not absolute. It is subject to exceptions, such as when the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court has no jurisdiction.
General Rule: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration
is filed before the respondent court
Exceptions:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter
of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “So marami pang exceptions yan. Hindi ko na iisa-isahing basahin yan on the
ground na pag binasa ko siya na parang robot eh sayang yung laway ko tapos di rin naman kayo
nakinig. Alam niyo na dapat yang exceptions na yan. Yung powerpoint ba ibibigay ko sa inyo? Of
course. Gusto niyo ba ipadala ko na dito? Mamaya. Dito sa chat. Pwede ba mag-attach dito sa chat
dito sa Zoom? Teka lang, lemme figure it out. Oo, pwede. Eto nalang. Eto na ia-attach ko na.
Ia-alay ko na sainyo. Wait lang. Ohmygod, hindi ako marunong mag-to everyone. Pano mag-to
everyone? Oof. Teka lang. Attach ko muna bago magkalimutan. Sinend ko dito sa SBCA Centralized
Bar Operations as direct message. Pwede bang i-send to everyone niyo nalang bilang hindi ko
makita yung option dito to send to everyone. Ayan na, may kopya na kayo.”
The first exception applies in this case, where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction. (Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 218901,
February 15, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Here, the exception applies that the Order of the RTC denying that notice of appeal is a patent
nullity. Oy, kaso to ni Justice Caguioa ha.
Why is the RTC order denying to give due course to the notice of appeal on the ground that it
is not the proper remedy a patent nullity?
➢ Section 13, Rule 41 provides that the power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to
instances when: (1) the appeal was filed out of time; and (2) non-payment of the docket
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
Bakit patent nullity? Remember, the notice of appeal in this case was filed on time. The notice of
appeal was filed on time but the RTC refused to give due course on the ground that it is not the
proper remedy daw. Please go to Section 13, Rule 41. Tignan niyo para hindi kayo mangmang sa
buhay. Yung Section 13, Rule 41 provides only the instances when the RTC can dismiss an appeal and
those instances are limited only to 2 grounds. So when you file your notice of appeal to the court of
origin, the RTC, in this case, under Rule 41, the RTC can only deny the appeal if the appeal was filed
out of time or if there is nonpayment of docket fees and other lawful fees for the perfection of
appeal within the reglementary period. In this case, what is the ground of the RTC to deny to give
due course to the notice of appeal? The ground is it is not a proper remedy. Ang not a proper remedy,
nagfafall ba yan sa dalawang ito? Hindi. Kasi dalawa lang ang grounds ng RTC to deny giving due
course to the appeal. It is (1) that it is out of time and (2) that it is non-payment of docket fees.
The RTC order denying due course to X’s notice of appeal on the ground that it was a wrong
remedy is a patent nullity, and the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction (Philippine Bank
of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Because the RTC denied due course to a notice of appeal on the ground that it is a wrong remedy, it
is patent nullity. The RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, reason being the RTC’s power to
deny the notice of appeal is only grounded on these two things: the appeal was filed out of time and
non-payment of docket fees for the perfection of appeal.
Do not confuse the grounds of the Court of Origin for dismissal of an appeal with the grounds of the
CA to deny the appeal. Yung Rule 41, Section 13, yan kapag ang magdedeny ng appeal niyo ay yung
RTC in a Rule 41 appeal. Meaning the RTC judgment, you are appealing it to the CA but you filed first
your notice of appeal with the RTC. Before i-elevate sa CA, the RTC can deny the appeal if filed out
of time or no payment of docket fees. Do not confuse it with the grounds of dismissal of appeal
under Rule 50, Section 1. Ano yung nasa Rule 50, Section 1? Yan yung discretionary grounds for the CA
yan to deny the appeal. Ano yung nasa Section 1 Rule 50? Aba gamitin ang mga kamay. Ilipat ang
codal para mapunta sa Rule 50 Section 1. Eh wala kang codal? Ay Jesus take the wheel. Paano ka
mag-bar kung wala kang codal? Kailangan mo ng codal. Pero sana yung updated ha. Mahirap mag-aral
ng procedure kung luma ang inaaral mo.
What is the period for filing a notice of appeal? Notice of appeal, that is 15 days. Is it from the date
of judgment? NO. It is from the notice of the judgment that you are appealing from. Within that
15-day period from the notice of the decision or pwede rin from the notice of the denial of your MR.
Because meron tayong tinatawag na fresh period rule.
Ano ba yung fresh period rule? The fresh period rule applies to our appeals. It provides that from the
notice of the court’s decision, you have 15 days. You can file your appeal, or if you choose to, you
can file an MR or motion for new trial within that 15-day period. If your MR or motion for new trial is
denied, from notice of that MR or motion for new trial, you have a fresh period of 15 days within
which to perfect your appeal. And this rule also applies to our criminal cases as we learned in
Criminal Procedure. But does it apply to administrative proceedings? Does the fresh period rule apply
to administrative proceedings?
ANSWER: No. As a rule, the fresh period rule only applies to judicial appeals. Now, baka maguluhan
kayo kasi may iba-ibang cases na sinasabing applicable. May iba nagsasabi hindi applicable. Kaya para
hindi na kayo maconfuse, ayan sinummarize ko na para sainyo. General rule, applies lang yan sa
judicial proceedings. Exception: if the administrative rule makes mention of the fresh period rule.
‘Di natural, maga-apply yung fresh period rule. But if the administrative rule does not provide for the
fresh period rule, or says that the fresh period rule will not apply, then obviously it will not apply. If
the administrative rule mentions that we apply the ROC suppletorily, then we can apply the fresh
period rule. But in the absence of that provision in the administrative rule that the ROC will apply
suppletorily, or in the absence of a provision in the administrative rule that makes mention of the
fresh period rule, the fresh period rule will not apply. Ayos?
A filed a Custody case over minor M, against B, with the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of B,
granting B custody over M, in a Decision dated 5 August 2010. A timely filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated 31 August 2010.
Eto, there is a custody case over a minor. The mother files a custody case against the father over
their minor in the RTC. Plaintiff files a custody case against the defendant. The Court ruled in favor
of the defendant granting custody over the minor to the defendant. The decision is dated August 5,
2010. Alam niyo medyo masalimuot tong part na to. Medyo baka kailangan niyong isulat yung mga
petsa na sinasabi ko. Pero kung ayaw niyong isulat tapos gusto niyo maconfuse, pwede rin naman.
Choice mo naman yan. So the Decision is dated August 5, 2010. Remember, the time for you to
appeal is counted from the time of notice. So pwedeng magkaiba yung period to appeal ni plaintiff
and defendant kasi depende kung kailan natanggap ni plaintiff and defendant yung decision. Hindi
yan sabay. From the time that plaintiff received notice of the decision, plaintiff timely filed a MR but
the court denied this in its Order dated August 31, 2010.
A filed a notice of appeal (which satisfies the requirements under Rule 41) and paid the appeal
and other docket fees on 8 September 2010, within 15 days from notice of the order denying
A’s motion for reconsideration.
So from the denial of the MR, plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal and paid for docket fees on
September 8, 2010. That date is within 15 days from notice of the order denying the MR. So si
plaintiff yan.
On the same day of 8 September 2010, B timely filed a motion for partial reconsideration of
the Decision. The RTC denied to give due course to A’s appeal due to the pendency of B’s
motion for partial reconsideration. It was reasoned that there was no final ruling that disposes
of the case to appeal yet since there is a pending motion for partial reconsideration filed by B.
The RTC instead ordered A to file a comment on B’s motion for partial reconsideration.
On the same day that the plaintiff filed his notice of appeal, defendant naman filed a motion for
partial reconsideration. So it means mas late natanggap ni defendant yung decision kasi nasa MR
palang siya. So from notice of the decision, defendant can either appeal or file an MR. Defendant
chose to file first an MR. So on the same date that the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, defendant
filed a MR. Because there is a MR filed by the defendant, the court denied to give due course to the
plaintiff’s appeal. Kasi daw may pending MR pa for defendant. So according to the court, the case is
still pending, there is still no final ruling of the case and so you cannot appeal yet daw kasi may
pending MR pa si defendant. And the court instead ordered the plaintiff to file a comment on
defendant’s MR.
Was it proper for the court to deny to give due course to the notice of appeal?
● No. When there is a notice of appeal that satisfies the requirements under Rule 41, the
approval of the notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the court. A’s notice of
appeal was timely filed, within 15 days from notice of the order denying A’s motion for
reconsideration. (Bernardo v. Soriano, G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019, J. Caguioa)
QUESTION: Was it proper for the court to deny to give due course to the plaintiff’s notice of appeal?
Remember, the reason why the trial court denied to give due course to the plaintiff’s notice of
appeal is because defendant filed an MR and the defendant’s MR is pending. So hindi pa daw
pwedeng i-appeal ang decision. Is the court correct? The SC ruled NO. Ano ka ba, sabi ng SC. Why? In
this case, the plaintiff’s notice of appeal is filed within 15 days from notice of the denial of the MR.
It was filed on time. It satisfied the requirements under Rule 41. Nagbayad siya ng docket fees.
According to the SC, if the notice of appeal satisfies the requirements under Rule 41, meaning you
filed it on time, there is the material date rule there, etc. and you paid for the docket fees on time,
then the court’s approval of that notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the court. So here,
the notice of appeal was timely filed within 15 days from the order denying the MR and there is
timely payment of docket fees. It was error of the court to deny to give due course to the appeal.
Did the pendency of B’s motion for partial reconsideration preclude A from filing her own
notice of appeal?
● No. A party’s right to appeal is not dependent or on contingent on the opposing party’s
motion for reconsideration. (Bernardo v. Soriano, G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019, J.
Caguioa)
But what about the argument of the court that the pending motion for reconsideration of the
defendant precludes the plaintiff from filing an appeal? INCORRECT. Because the party’s right to
appeal is not dependent or contingent on the opposing party’s motion for reconsideration.
Yung time ng party to file depends on when they received their decision. When plaintiff received the
decision earlier, the time to file the MR started to run. So, nag-MR na siya. Noong na-deny yung MR
niya, the time to file the appeal starts to run. So, kailangan na niyang mag-appea.
Defendant received the decision later on. So from notice ni defendant, siya naman, may karapatan to
file his own MR or appeal.
Will A’s Notice of Appeal prevent B from filing a motion for reconsideration against the
decision?
● No. Each party has a different period within which to appeal, which is counted from the
party’s respective notice of the assailed judgment or final order. The timely filing of a
motion for reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other party’s period of
appeal. (Bernardo v. Soriano, G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019, J. Caguioa)
But what about the argument of the court that since there is a motion for reconsideration is pending,
hindi mo pa pwedeng i-appeal ang decision? NO. Sabi ng Supreme Court, each party has a different
period within which to appeal. Your period is counted from your notice of the decision or order that
you are assailing. So the timely filing of an MR or appeal by the plaintiff will not interrupt the period
of the other. It will run from your notice.
So, when defendant filed his MR, it will not affect the period of the plaintiff to appeal. Tumatakbo
pa rin yun since yung counting ng period of plaintiff to appeal is from notice of denial of the motion
for reconsideration. It doesn’t matter that the defendant filed an MR. Tatakbo yung 15-day period ni
plaintiff from the time plaintiff learned of the denial of the MR, plaintiff must file timely an appeal
within that period.
Will giving due course to A’s notice of appeal divest the RTC of jurisdiction to decide on B’s
motion for reconsideration?
● No. Section 9, Rule 41 provides that the court loses jurisdiction in appeals by notice of
appeal, upon perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time
to appeal of the other parties. There is no expiration of time to appeal yet as B still has
the time to do so. (Bernardo v. Soriano, G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019, J. Caguioa)
If the court gave due course to the plaintiff’s notice of appeal, does that mean that the RTC will be
divested of jurisdiction to decide the defendant’s motion for reconsideration? NO. Section 9, Rule 41
provides that the court or the trial court or the court of origin will only lose jurisdiction in appeals by
notice of appeal upon perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties.
Ibig pong sabihin, when the plaintiff perfected the appeal, that court is not yet deprived of
jurisdiction because there are two requirements in the perfection of appeal for the court of origin to
lose jurisdiction. First, is the perfection of appeal and, second, dapat nag-expire na ang time to
appeal ng lahat.
In this case, the plaintiff first perfected his appeal but the time for the defendant to appeal has not
yet expired. So the court has not yet lost jurisdiction. There is no expiration of time yet on the part
of the defendant to appeal.
QUESTION: Does the fresh period rule apply to Rule 45? Yes.
QUESTION: Does the fresh period rule apply to Summary Procedure? No. Why Not? Kasi po sa Summary
Procedure, a motion for reconsideration against a judgment or a motion for new trial against a
judgment is a prohibited motion. Note that in Summary Procedure, not all MRs are prohibited. Only
the motions for reconsideration against the judgment or the motion for new trial against the
judgment is prohibited. So, in Summary Procedure, if there is an interlocutory order, you can assail it
by MR. Judgment lang ang bawal i-MR sa Summary Procedure. So, if there is a ruling in Summary
Procedure, you cannot file an MR against that judgment, wala tayong fresh period rule na
pag-uusapan dahil MR is prohibited. Remedy in Summary Procedure is to appeal that decision,
ordinary appeal from MTC to RTC under Rule 40. But if it is from the MTC to the RTC and it is
ordinary procedure, yes, there is fresh period under Rule 40. But if it is a judgment from the MTC in
Small Claims, walang fresh period ‘yan. Number one, the judgment in Small Claims is immediately
final, executory, and unappealable. You cannot file an MR against the judgment in Small Claims
because MR against judgment in Small Claims is also prohibited. You cannot appeal in Small Claims
because it is unappealable. Remedy in Small Claims is certiorari, if there is grave abuse of discretion
from the MTC to the RTC.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Wait lang, tumutulo ang aking uhog. Pakisama ‘yan sa transcript na tumutulo
yung uhog ko.”
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision, and the appellant received a copy of the decision on
September 30, 2013. The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on December 6, 2013. The CA
denied outright the motion for reconsideration. Was the denial proper? Yes, because it was filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Dapat ang MR mo, i-file mo within 15 days. Ito hindi lang
lagpas 15 days, lagpas isang buwan na ‘yan. So dapat within the 15-day reglementary period lang
from the date of the decision. If you do not do so, then the decision attains finality. ‘Pag final na
‘yan, immutability of final judgment na ‘yan, kahit na maling judgment pa ‘yan because of the
principle of immutability of final judgment. At the risk of errors, litigation must come to an end.
If that 15-day period lapses without filing an MR or an appeal, the decision becomes final and
executory, there is nothing left for you to assail by MR or appeal. If MR is filed out of time, it will also
be denied.
The RTC rendered a decision dismissing a complaint for replevin. A petition under Rule 45 was
filed with the Supreme Court, on pure question of law, with prayer for issuance of preliminary
mandatory injunction to allow petitioner to inspect and conduct an appraisal of the chattels
mortgaged by respondents to determine their current conditions and value.
The SC granted the petition but remanded the determination of the prayer for issuance of
preliminary mandatory injunction to the RTC. Is this procedurally correct?
● Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to remand cases to lower courts for the reception
of evidence and determination of facts, such as the prayer for issuance of preliminary
mandatory injunction, which requires a determination of the facts and circumstances on
which the prayer is premised. (Land Bank of the Phils. v. Spouses Amagan, G.R. No. 209794,
June 27, 2016, J. Caguioa)
In this case, pwede bang maging original action ang replevin? Yes. It can be an original action, it can
also be a provisional remedy.
From the RTC original jurisdiction decision that denied to dismiss the complaint, a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 was raised to the Supreme Court. We said earlier from RTC pwede yan to
the Supreme Court basta you are assailing the original judgment or judgment rendered in the
exercise of original jurisdiction of the RTC and it is on a pure question of law.
In that petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, there is also a prayer for a
provisional remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction asking the Supreme Court to allow the
inspection and appraisal of chattels mortgaged to determine their current condition and value. The
Supreme Court granted the petition under Rule 45 but remanded the determination for the prayer of
issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction to the RTC. Is this procedurally correct? Can the
Supreme Court remand a case to the lower court for the reception of evidence? Yes. The Supreme
Court has the authority to remand cases to lower courts for the reception of evidence and
determination of facts, such as the prayer for issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction, which
requires a determination of the facts and circumstances on which the prayer is premised.
Is it absolute that only pure questions of law may be raised before the SC in a petition under
Rule 45?
● No. The rule is subject to the following exceptions, among others:
(1) when the findings, are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Prudential
Bank v. Rapanot, G.R. No. 191636, January 16, 2017, J. Caguioa)
In addition to the exceptions mentioned above, Kalikasan cases. Sa kalikasan cases, Rule 45 ang
remedy mo. And the Rules categorically provide there that the Supreme court can review questions
of fact in Kalikasan, Rule 45.
QUESTION: If the judgment is not appealable under Rule 41, can it be a subject for a motion for new
trial or reconsideration? You can file a motion for reconsideration for sure.
Motion for new trial, baka hindi. Why? Let’s go back to Rule 41. We need to go through all of the
grounds. You can definitely file an MR against that order, those rulings under Rule 41. But not all can
be a subject of motion for new trial. Like interlocutory order, walang motion for new trial diyan. By
the nature of an interlocutory order, it’s not even a judgment. Ganyan din ‘yan sa order disallowing
or dismissing an appeal. And also an order to set aside a judgment by consent, confession, or
compromise, hindi rin pwede ‘yan. Order of execution, hindi mo rin ‘yan pwede i-motion for new
trial.
Now, if you have a judgment against several judgments or separate judgments, as a rule, you cannot
appeal it unless the court allows it. But you can definitely file a motion for new trial there if the
grounds of FAME are present. If it is a dismissal without prejudice, kunwari it is a failure to state a
cause of action, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, wala kang i-n-new trial diyan kasi wala
pa ngang trial in the first place. So it cannot be motion for new trial. You cannot give an all
encompassing answer, it will depend on the ground. So I hope that answered the question on whether
you can file a motion for new trial against these under Rule 41.
QUESTION: Can you assail it by a petition for relief or annulment of judgment? No. Kasi ang petition
for relief, ang annulment of judgment, it presupposes na judgment siya. Dapat judgment siya, and
this petition for relief and annulment of judgment, these are extraordinary remedies. These are only
available when there are no other remedy is available and it presupposes that the judgment is final
and executory. So, here under Rule 41, hindi naman mga judgment ‘yan.
Kapag dismissal of an action without prejudice, hindi ka rin dapat mag-annulment of judgment or
petition for relief kasi you have another remedy, which is you refile it. But if it is filed in the proper
court, let us say it is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, you filed it in the RTC. Despite
filing it in the correct court, it was dismissed. So, there is no remedy to refile it because you filed it
in the correct court. So, here, the remedy cannot be petition for relief or annulment. It is certiorari
because there is grave abuse of discretion. Note that kapag certiorari naman, the period, lalagpas
‘yan sa finality kasi it is 60 days if it is certiorari. I hope I answered your question.
X lost before the NLRC in a labor case. After his motion for reconsideration was denied, X filed
a petition for certiorari with the CA, which was denied. X then elevated the CA decision to the
SC under Rule 45. X claims the SC, in this case, may review questions of facts. Is X correct?
● No. Only questions of law may be raised. The CA decision will be examined only using the
prism of whether it correctly determined the existence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC, and not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on
the merits of the case was correct. (San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union v.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 200499, October 4, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Dito sa NLRC pala, from the NLRC in a labor case, you cannot go by Rule 43. The remedy in an NLRC
ruling is after the MR is denied, you file a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65.
So, in the NLRC, you assail it from the NLRC, you go by certiorari to the CA pursuant to St. Martin’s
Funeral Homes because no appeal is available. That is not falling under Rule 43, it is expressly
excluded under Rule 43.
So, from the CA, in a certiorari case, what is your next remedy. How do you assail the ruling of the
CA? From the CA, you go up to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. Now, the petitioner claims that
since it is a labor case, the Supreme Court may review questions of fact. Is the petitioner correct?
Note that what you are assailing here in a petition under Rule 45 is the judgment of Court of Appeals
in a petition for certiorari. So, is it correct? No. Again, Supreme Court, only questions of law can be
raised. So if the certiorari, CA decision will be brought to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court will
only determine whether the CA correctly determined the existence of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC, and not the decision of the NLRC on the merits. Remember, what you are only
assailing in certiorari in the CA is whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion. It is not an
appeal, it is an original action. Then, if you appeal that certiorari, the Supreme Court will only
determine whether the CA correctly or incorrectly found grave abuse of discretion. Doon lang limited
ang Rule 45 mo ng certiorari.
Ultin ko, sa NLRC administrative case ‘yan, kunwari may labor case ka, walang appeal sa NLRC. Since
there is no appeal, the remedy is certiorari. But note that in a certiorari with the CA, the CA will not
review the factual merits of the labor case. The CA will only determine facts insofar as it determines
whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari is only about the
determination of whether there is grave abuse of discretion. Once the CA rules on the determination
of grave abuse of discretion, if you appeal that to the Supreme Court by Rule 45, the Supreme Court
will not review the merits of the labor case, the Supreme Court will not determine whether the
decision of the NLRC is correct on the factual merits, but, rather, the Supreme Court will review the
CA certiorari decision. Supreme Court will only look at was it correct or incorrect that he CA found
grave abuse? Doon lang limited ang Rule 45.
QUESTION: Synonymous po ba ang lack of cause of action sa demurrer to evidence? No, pero
magkabarkada sila.
Demurrer to evidence is a kind of a motion to dismiss, and the demurrer to evidence is a motion to
dismiss that is filed after the plaintiff has rested its case, after the plaintiff has presented evidence.
The basis of your demurrer to evidence is lack of cause of action. They’re not synonymous but,
rather, magkatambalan. So the lack of cause of action is the basis why the demurrer to evidence
would be granted.
There is lack of cause of action when there is insufficiency of the evidence to prove the claim of the
plaintiff.
So, yung formal offer of evidence, diba no evidence will be considered unless formally offered. Pero
pagka-formal offer mo, it does not automatically form part of your evidence. Kunwari, nag-offer ka
ng Exhibits A, B, C, but the defendant objects to your Exhibit A for being in violation of the original
document rule. So, if the court grants that objection, Exhibit A will not be admitted, B and C na lang
ang matitira. Once the court makes a ruling on the formal offer of evidence, that is the only time
that you will know what evidence is forming part of the plaintiff’s case. If it is offered, kailangan the
court rules on that. Once the court rules on what is the evidence admitted, then you will know what
constitutes the evidence of the plaintiff. From there, you will see whether it is insufficient to
establish the claim of the plaintiff. If insufficient, you can file your demurrer to evidence and the
ground is that there is lack of cause of action. Then, if granted, madi-dismiss.
What is the law of the case?
● It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. (Philippine Ports
Authority v. Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc., G.R. No. 214864,
March 22, 2017, J. Caguioa)
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Alam niyo ba yung law of the case? Ayan yung hindi niyo alam. Law of the case,
yung topic na minemorize niyo pero di niyo naunawaan. Ano ba yang law of the case na yan? Eh
alam mo pala, edi ikaw na, eh di mabuti alam mo, okay? Pero i-kwento ko lang, case din ito ni
Justice Caguioa.”
When you say law of the case, once it is irrevocably established as the rule of a decision or a decision
between the parties, it will continue to be the law of the case between those parties so long as the
facts on which the decision is based continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “O, dami kong sinabi, wala kayong naintindihan. Kwento ko na lang sa inyo para
magets niyo.”
X, in a bidding, was awarded by Y to provide cargo handling for Y for 10 years. X accepted the
notice of award. Instead of executing a contract, X asked Y to issue several times a hold over
authority in its favor. These authorities, upon X’s request were extended several times. Before
the contract could be executed, Y revoked the award, upon expiration of the last hold over
authority.
X filed a petition for mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against Y, praying that Y formally execute the contract with X in accordance with the notice of
award. The RTC granted the writ. Y filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC granted,
causing the dissolution of the writ. X filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
The CA granted the petition, reversing the RTC’s dissolution of the writ. In resolving the
petition, the CA determined whether X had the legal right to continue its operations for cargo
handling. The CA found there was a perfected contract between X and Y for cargo-handling,
although unwritten and that the hold over authorities and its subsequent extensions
constituted partial fulfillment thereof.
The CA decision was sustained by the SC. Thereafter, the RTC dismissed the petition for being
moot and academic, and it had nothing left to do. X filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was granted, and in the order granting the motion, the RTC directed Y to execute a 10-year
formal contract in favor of X. Y appealed the RTC ruling to the CA, and the CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
Did the CA err in affirming the RTC decision directing the execution of a 10-year contract?
● The present appeal and the previous issue in the injunction case both stem from the same
petition, the same relief, i.e., the execution of a written contract in accordance with the
notice of award. They involve the same facts, parties and arguments. The doctrine of the
law of the case is applicable.
● The factual findings of the CA in respect of the perfected cargo-handling contract in the
injunction proceedings became conclusive upon finality of the Supreme Court’s decision
affirming the same. The 10-year term of the perfected contract had already expired, it was
error for the CA to order the execution of a 10-year contract. (Philippine Ports Authority v.
Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc., G.R. No. 214864, March 22,
2017, J. Caguioa)
So merong government agency, nagpa-bidding sila. Itong si plaintiff, nag-bid siya, so na-award siya ng
bid. So, there is a notice of award of the bid and the plaintiff accepted it. Because of that bid,
magrender siya ng service for 10 years doon sa notice of award. After that notice of award is
accepted, magexecute sila ng contract nila. But instead of executing the contract, the plaintiff,
which is the bidder, asked first for hold authority muna, ‘wag muna yung actual contract daw. Why?
Kasi may mga epal na nagrereklamo bakit napunta kay plaintiff yung award. Sabi ni plaintiff para
walang issue, ‘wag muna natin gawing, “ito na yung kontrata,” temporary muna. Everytime there is a
temporary authority, nage-expire kasi certain period lang yung temporary authority.
The temporary authority was extended several times. Hindi pa rin nae-execute yung contract ni
plaintiff. So, nabwisit itong government agency sabi, “Ayaw mong i-execute yung contract, pwes,
wala ka ng temporary authority. We are also canceling your right pursuant to the award of the bid.”
Sabi naman ng plaintiff, “Teka lang, in-award niyo na sa akin yan, dapat we should execute that
contract.”
Plaintiff filed a petition for mandamus to compel the government agency to execute that contract
with them to respect it and with a provisional remedy of a preliminary mandatory injunction, praying
that they formally execute that contract in accordance with the notice of award. The writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was granted. Note that this is the provisional remedy. Siyempre,
nagreklamo yung ating government agency. So they assailed that writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. Remember earlier we said what is your remedy against a provisional remedy if that writ
of injunction is granted? You assail it by certiorari because that is interlocutory if there is grave
abuse of discretion.
So the case before the CA is a petition for certiorari that assails the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. The CA, in resolving it, determined that the plaintif had a legal right to continue the
operations. Kasi nga, there is a perfected contract already between the government agency and the
plaintiff. Although it is not yet executed in a written contract, nevertheless, they have a perfected
contract. There was an offer, notice of bid, and the acceptance of the bid. So, there is a contract
although unwritten. So sabi ng CA, from the time that the contract was entered into although
unwritten, nagstart na yung 10-year period. So, remember what was assailed in the CA is only the
provisional remedy.
So bumalik yung case to the RTC. Noong nasa RTC na, sabi ng RTC, “Ano pa ang gagawin ko, eh
nag-rule na yung CA. Sabi ng CA, may right itong si plaintiff to the contract.” So, the RTC rendered a
judgment, and in the judgment of the RTC, it said that the 10-year contract applies. But, this time,
the RTC, in its ruling, said that the 10-year contract is counted from the finality of the decision of
the RTC.
Is that correct? NO, it is contrary to the law of the case. Why? What is the law of the case? The CA
ruling, although it is on a provisional remedy, it is the CA ruling on the right to the contract from the
time it is entered into although unwritten. It means yung 10-year period nagstart noong nag-agree
sila. So, the RTC violated the law of the case when the RTC ruled that the 10-year period is to count
from the finality of the RTC decision. Hindi. It should have counted the 10-year period from the time
that they entered into that agreement. So, by the time na nagka-decision na yung RTC, tapos na yung
10-year period. So that is the law of the case. They should have followed the CA findings.
SPECIAL PROCEEDING
QUESTION (from student): What if there is an acquittal in a criminal case and there is GAD?
● You cannot file a motion for reconsideration against that acquittal.
● General Rule: Before a certiorari, you file a Motion for Reconsideration.
● Exception: GMA case: Acquittal in criminal cases, with GAD = cannot file a Motion for
Reconsideration/appeal against that acquittal. Remedy is Certiorari Rule 65 provided there is
GADALEJ.
○ RATIONALE: Since it violates the rule against double jeopardy. It will place the accused
twice in jeopardy.
Is lack of jurisdiction over a subject matter a question of law?
● Yes. SC ruled that tack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is question of law. Rule 45 can
be applied. However, there are varying SC decisions.
○ Another SC decision: Dismissed for Lack of jurisdiction = the remedy is to refile it (If
we apply Rule 41).
○ Some SC decision: Dismissed for Lack of jurisdiction = dumiretso ng Rule 45 to the SC
instead of refiling and it was allowed. Kasi on a pure question of law.
Dismissal without prejudice, lack of jurisdiction, remedy generally is to REFILE or if not, Certiorari
under Rule 65 if there is abuse of discretion.
So honestly, like you naguluhan din ako dun, pero tinandaan ko na lang na iyan yung eksaktong case
where the SC allowed from a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to go up to the SC by
Rule 45 on a question of law.
So kapag ganun na lang exactong facts, pwede mong gamitin yun. You can mention that “as a rule if
it is a dismissal without prejudice, remedy is to refile it or certiorari, if there is GAD. However, in
this case, in a case decided by the SC on exactly the same factual milieu, the SC took cognizance of
Rule 45 petition to determine a pure question of law on WON the RTC had jurisdiction”. Usually if
there are conflicting views, it is always best for you to know both views. Sabi ng iba, you choose the
view that you can argue the most or the best, but I would recommend that you know both views and
then you just mention it. “In this case ito yung sinabi, however there is another ruling na ganito”,
bahala na sila mamili basta alam mo pareho diba. But normally in the bar they will not ask you yung
mga controversial na ganyan.
DPWH expropriated land. A portion thereof is claimed by several parties A, B, C, and D. All of
them claimed for just compensation. The Republic of the Philippines filed an interpleader
against them to settle the payment of just compensation.
A presented to the court a compromise agreement for the allocation of just compensation
among the defendants, but it was only A and B who agreed on this allocation. RTC rendered
partial judgment on compromise and ordered partial execution of judgment. CA affirmed the
RTC’s orders.
● NO. The allocation of the remaining balance was determined without the participation of
all other claimants who likewise stand as parties to the Interpleader. This defeats the very
purpose for which the Republic's Interpleader had been filed, as it opens the portals to
protracted litigation not only among the opposing claimants, but also between said
claimants and the Republic. (Republic v. Heirs of Cruz, G.R. No. 208956, October 17, 2018,
J. Caguioa)
Action for interpleader may be invoked when there are several parties claiming against one who has
no interest over the same subject matter. The government has no interest with the payment. Hence,
interpleader is proper here.
During the pendency of the interpleader, parties entered into a compromise agreement, only A and B
out of four. Approved by the court, and there was judgment on a compromise. Can there be a
judgment on a compromise in interpleader?
● Yes. However, it has to be with the participation of all the conflicting claimants.
● In this case, only 2 agreed on the compromise agreement.
○ SC said, compromise agreement should not have been approved for a judgment on a
compromise, when not all of the conflicting claimants are parties to that compromise
agreement. Why?
○ Since, the purpose of interpleader is to prevent duplicity of suits, so that there will be
no double vexation. If the court approves a compromise agreement, only of the 2
conflicting claimants, there will remain 2 other claimants, that will defeat the very
purpose of the interpleader, which is to prevent protracted litigation.
○ In this case, by approving the judgment on a compromise agreement, only of some but
not all of the conflicting claimants, conflicting claims will still continue, there will be
protracted litigation. So, it was incorrect to approve a judgment on a compromise
agreement in interpleader when not all the conflicting claimants are parties to the
compromise agreement.
A filed a complaint against B before the Ombudsman for violation of the GSIS Act. The
Ombudsman issued an order of preventive suspension against B to last until the administrative
adjudication is completed but not to exceed 6 months. The propriety of the order of
suspension was assailed by B before the Court of Appeals but the CA affirmed the preventive
suspension.
B filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for TRO, praying that the RTC
make a definite judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties asserting
adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of the suspension order issued by
the Ombudsman. Should the petition prosper?
● No. Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for declaratory
relief. They are not included within the purview of the words “other written instrument” In
Rule 63. The same principle applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial
bodies, and this is anchored on the principle of res judicata. (Erice v. Sison, A.M. No.
RTJ-15-2407, November 22, 2017, J. Caguioa)
There was a complaint before the Ombudsman for an administrative disciplinary case. There was an
order of preventive suspension which was assailed in the CA. After the CA affirmed the order of
preventive suspension, they filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for TRO praying the
RTC make a declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties on the suspension order of the
Ombudsman. Should the declaratory relief prosper?
● No. Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for declaratory
relief. The list of what can be the subject of declaratory relief in Rule 63 is exclusive. That
decision of the Ombudsman that may be of an administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is also
not in that list. That decision is not just limited to judicial but also to even quasi-judicial
bodies. So, it is not the proper subject of a declaratory relief.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1005 on the rules and regulations on the ban of carrying
firearms during the election period. The Resolution was assailed before the Supreme Court
under Rule 65, and the petition was filed within the 60-day period provided under Rule 65.
The OSG counters that the 30-day period under Rule 64 for filing the petition should have been
followed. Is this correct?
● No. The 30-day reglementary period under Rule 64 does not apply. The review under Rule 64
pertains to final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
● The petition herein assails the validity of a COMELEC Resolution which was issued under its
rule-making power, to implement the provisions of The BP 881 an RA 7166. (Philippine
Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 223505, October 3, 2017)
The Commission on Election issued Resolution No. 1005 or its rules regarding the gun ban during the
election period. This resolution was assailed before the Supreme Court on a Rule 65 petition. It is
filed 60 days from the issuance of the resolution. It is being assailed that it was filed out of time,
because rule 64 covers the reviews of decisions of the COMELEC and COA.
Rule 64 is the review of decisions and the COA. Rule 64 makes reference to rule 65. But period to file
your petition under Rule 64 is 30 days. But in this case, what they applied is the 60-day period under
rule 65. Is the petition filed on time?
● The petition is filed on time. Why?
○ That 30-day reglementary period under rule 64 does not apply. The petition for review
under rule 64 only pertains to rulings and orders of the COMELEC and the COA that are
rendered in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
● What is the ruling subject of review here?
○ It is a resolution on the rules of gun ban during the election period.
● Is that a ruling of the COMELEC in exercise of its quasi-judicial powers?
○ No. It is pursuant to the rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.
So, if you are going to assail the COMELEC or the COA ruling pursuant to rule-making power, you do
not abuse Rule 64, you use Rule 65. So that 60-day period will apply, provided there is grave abuse.
But if it is pursuant to their adjudicatory or quasi- judicial power, then it is rule 64 that is when the
30-day period will apply.
A filed a Custody case over minor M, against B, with the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of B,
granting B custody over M, in a Decision dated 5 August 2010. A timely filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated 31 August 2010.
A filed a notice of appeal (which satisfies the requirements under Rule 41) and paid the appeal
and other docket fees on 8 September 2010, within 15 days from notice of the order denying
A’s motion for reconsideration.
On the same day of 8 September 2010, B timely filed a motion for partial reconsideration of
the Decision. The RTC denied to give due course to A’s appeal due to the pendency of B’s
motion for partial reconsideration. It was reasoned that there was no final ruling that disposes
of the case to appeal yet since there is a pending motion for partial reconsideration filed by B.
The RTC instead ordered A to file a comment on B’s motion for partial reconsideration.
A filed a comment on B’s motion. The RTC granted B’s motion in an Order dated 22 October
2010. A timely filed a motion for reconsideration to assail said order granting B’s motion,
which was denied in an Order dated 31 January 2011. A then filed a petition for Certiorari.
Will it prosper?
● No. The writ of certiorari is an extraordinary writ that will not be issued to cure mere
errors in proceedings or errors in conclusions of law or fact. The RTC’s denial to give due
course is a procedural error.
● A could have also filed an appeal from notice of the Order dated 31 January 2011, the order
that denied A’s motion for reconsideration against the Order dated 22 October 2010, which
granted B’s motion for partial reconsideration. (Bernardo v. Soriano, G.R. No. 200104, June
19, 2019, J. Caguioa)
● The Court of Appeals rendered a decision, and appellant received a copy thereof on 30
September 2013. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on 6 December 2013. The CA
denied outright the motion for reconsideration.
● No. There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in denying the motion for
reconsideration because it was filed out of time, beyond the 15-day period. It was proper
for the judgment to be entered by the clerk of court in the book of entries of judgments.
(Heirs of Francisco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 215599, November 28, 2018, J. Caguioa)
There is a case for custody over the minor. There is a decision and there is a timely filing of a motion
for reconsideration by the plaintiff which was denied. The plaintiff files a notice of appeals and then
payment of docket fees on time from the denial of a Motion for Reconsideration. But on the same
day, the defendant filed his Motion for Reconsideration. So, the court denied due course to the order
to the appeal.
As discussed earlier, the order denying appeal is not appealable but reviewable by certiorari because
here, there is grave abuse of discretion. Because the RTC can only rule on two (2) grounds to deny:
1. if it is filed out of time
2. if there is no payment of docket fees.
May the court treat a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which assails a decision of a lower
court, as an appeal?
● Yes. By exception, the petition for certiorari may be treated as an appeal, in the interest of
justice, provided that the:
(1) petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file an
appeal;
(2) when errors of judgment are averred; and
(3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. Thus, a Rule 65
petition may be treated as one for Rule 45. (Privatization and Management Office v.
Quesada, G.R. No. 224507, September 20, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Can the Court treat a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as an appeal?
● If you are meant to file an appeal, but you treated it as Rule 65, you filed it as Rule 65.
Example kanina, it should have been rule 45 pero ginawa mong rule 65. The court can in
exercise of its power to relax the rules treat your 65 as a 45, but note that yung 65 petition
mo is to be filed in 60 days; 45 - 15 days.
● If your 65 will be treated as a 45, dapat nafile mo yung 65 within 15 days, for it to be treated
as an appeal that certiorari should have been filed within the period to appeal.
● Pag lumagpas na ng 15 days within 60 days, it cannot be treated as an appeal anymore,
because the period to appeal has lapsed, the decision becomes final and executory. There is
nothing left for the court to review on appeal.
May you assail the decision of the CSC by petition under Rule 65 with the CA?
● No. Rule 65 petition may only be availed of when there is no appeal, or any other plain
speedy adequate remedy. An available against the CSC decision, is appeal by Rule 43,
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. (Cerilles v. Civil Service Commission, G.R.
No. 180845, November 22, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Can you assail the decision of the Civil Service Commission by Rule 65 petition with the CA?
● No. Rule 65 can only be availed of when there is no appeal or any plain speedy adequate
remedy.
● A duty is considered ministerial where an officer is required to perform an act not requiring
the exercise of official discretion or judgment in a given state of facts. (Valmores v.
Achacoso, G.R. No. 217453, [July 19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
● No. The authority of the mayor to issue licenses and permits is not ministerial, it is
discretionary.
● The power to issue license and permits is a manifestation of the delegated police power of
a municipal corporation. (Lacap v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 198162, June 21, 2017, J.
Caguioa)
The authority of the mayor to issue licenses and permits, is this ministerial?
● No. The authority of the mayor to issue those licenses and permits is actually discretionary
because it is a manifestation of a delegated police power of a municipal corporation. “Kaya
discretionary iyan, cannot be compelled by mandamus.”
Exams and classes were rescheduled on Saturdays, causing X to miss the same and to fail. X
thus brought the matter before CHED, who directed the College to comply with 2010 CHED
Memorandum
May X file a petition for mandamus to compel the College to comply with said Memorandum?
● Yes. The CHED memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty imposed upon HEIs.
The CHED imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as well as faculty
members, from academic activities in case such activities interfere with their religious
obligations. (Valmores v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 217453, July 19, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Merong isang estudyente, nag enroll sya sa isang eskwelahan but that student is a member of the
7th-day Adventist Church. So based on their fundamental beliefs, they have to observe Sabbath as a
sacred day. So bawal siya magklase on that day. So maaga pa lang, he’s been informing the school of
his religion and asking kung pwedeng wag siyang ilagay ng schedule ng Saturday. Pero shempre dedma
yung school, nilagay pa rin sya sa Saturday classes na hindi nya napasukan because of his religious
beliefs. He brought the matter to the CHED.
Notably, the CHED issued a memorandum and the CHED in that memorandum says that the student’s
rights to religion must be respected and if they are exercising that religious right it must not be
taken against them. Dedma pa rin yung school. So, what is the remedy of that student? The remedy
of that student, can he file a petition for mandamus to compel the school to comply with that CHED
memorandum?
● Yes. Because that CHED memorandum is a duty imposed on the higher educational institution.
The CHED imposed that positive duty on all colleges to exempt students and faculty members
from academic activities that interfere with their religious obligations that is compellable by
mandamus to comply with the CHED memorandum.
The expropriating authority, a public utility corporation endowed with the power of eminent
domain, took the property of the landowner for public use without any negotiated sale and
without instituting an expropriation case for such taking.
This constrained the landowner to file an ejectment suit against the expropriating authority,
although the works on the property were already done. Should the ejectment suit prosper?
● NO. The ejectment case would not prosper because of: (1) equitable estoppel; (2) public
policy and public necessity. (National Transmission Corporation v. Bermuda Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 214782, 3 April 2019, J. Caguioa)
So, there is a public utility corporation and it has the power of eminent domain. They took the
property of the landowner for public use but they did not offer any negotiated sale. And they also did
not institute any expropriation case for such taking. So, the landowner was constrained to file an
action for ejectment, sabi nya lumayas kayo dito sa lupa ko mga hayop. At this point in time,
kumpleto na yung government project, kumpleto na yung works. Should the ejectment suit prosper?
● The SC said no. The ejectment case cannot prosper for two (2) reasons:
1. equitable estoppel (bakit naman kasi parang syang t*ng* inintay nya matapos,bago nya
in-eject, so estopped na sya); and
2. public policy and public necessity – it requires that we should not interfere with public
service. So dahil complete nayung project, it is being used for public service, we
should not interfere with that.
In inverse condemnation, the government takes your property and already builds structures
thereon, but they do not institute the action for expropriation. So, because of the public
policy we cannot interfere with public service, especially pag nagawa na yung structures, the
landowner cannot eject the government but the landowner has a remedy to claim for just
compensation. So the landowner will file an action to claim just compensation and damages if
ever.
2. the RTC or the first level court can dismiss the case and direct the expropriating authority to
file an expropriation action
3. If the first level court has jurisdiction over the case, then the first level court can continue
and treat it as if it is one for inverse condemnation to determine just compensation.
So, it means, the court will not treat it as an ejectment case but one as inverse condemnation. But
the first level court can only do this if the first level court has jurisdiction over your action. This
brings us now to the topic of which court has jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings.
● SC held that it is incapable of pecuniary estimation, so it is the RTC that has jurisdiction.
However, please note that we have two (2) phases in expropriation proceedings.
● The 1st phase is to determine whether expropriation is proper, in that instance, that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and so, it is the RTC that has exclusive original jurisdiction.
● However, if the action will start in the 2nd phase, the 2nd phase of expropriation is for the
determination of just compensation. Like in inverse condemnation.
○ Again in inverse condemnation, you will not anymore question the propriety of the
government to take your property. Because of estoppel and because of public public
policy that we do not interfere anymore with public service when the structure has
been built. So in inverse condemnation tapos na yung structure, hindi nagfile ng
expropriation case yung govt, but you are still entitled to just compensation. So you
file your action for inverse condemnation. In that instance you start on the 2nd phase.
So if it is on the 2nd phase, then it is on the title, possession, or interest over real
property if real property ang ineexpropriate natin, the basis of jurisdiction if it starts
in the 2nd phase or in inverse condemnation for determination of just compensation, is
the assessed value of the real property.
A complaint for expropriation was filed. After proceedings, the RTC issued an order of
expropriation. Should the order be assailed by petition for certiorari?
● No. Remedy is appeal, and not to file a certiorari. (PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v.
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019, J.
Caguioa)
● Yes, the remedy is still appeal, and not to file a certiorari. (PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v.
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019, J.
Caguioa)
In the first phase, it either ends with an order of expropriation, if the court says that expropriation is
proper or the court denies the complaint for expropriation.
The RTC issues an order of expropriation. Can it be assailed by a petition for certiorari?
● NO. The remedy is appeal.
● Note that in the 1st and 2nd phase in expropriation, these orders are appealable, they are final
orders record on appeal, because multiple appeals are allowed. So, whether expropriation is
found to be proper or not proper in the first phase, remedy is appeal. And as to the
determination of just compensation, again appeal, mode of appeal? Record on appeal.
Will the appeal of the order of expropriation suspend the expropriation proceedings?
● No. Such appeal shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be
paid (PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 224936, September 4, 2019, J. Caguioa)
● If no appeal is taken, the order becomes final, the authority to expropriate and the public
use of the property can no longer be questioned.(PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. National
Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019, J. Caguioa)
If there is an order of expropriation in the first phase or if there is an order of expropriation in the 1st
phase or if the expropriation is denied in the first phase, and you appealed it, will it suspend the
expropriation proceedings?
● Hindi. Matutuloy iyan. It will not prevent the court from determining just compensation.
1st phase = whether foreclosure is proper, meron bang mortgagor, mortgagee, may mortgage ba, may
utang ba talaga and is due and demandable?
● If sagot yes, then that is your order in the 1st phase.
● If sagot no, order pa rin iyan in the first phase. Remedy? Appeal na naman. Multiple appeals.
During the pendency of the order of the first phase in your judicial foreclosure, pwede na ba
magproceed sa foreclosure sale?
● No. Because there is equity of redemption in judicial foreclosure of REM. And the counting of
equity of redemption period is from the entry of judgment in the first phase. Only when there
is no payment during the equity of redemption period, saka ka lang pwede magforeclosure
sale by motion. So, if the first phase is not yet final, if there is no finding yet whether
foreclosure is proper because it is pending appeal the equity of redemption period will not
run. If it will not run, then you cannot say that foreclosure sale will be proper later on.
What is the effect if the order of expropriation is not appealed?
● If no appeal is taken, the order becomes final, the authority to expropriate and the public
use of the property can no longer be questioned.(PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. National
Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019, J. Caguioa)
28:10 - 51:27
The RTC issued an order of expropriation. The landowner wants to question the order on the
ground that the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines had no authority to exercise the
power of eminent domain and therefore the expropriation is invalid. What is the proper
remedy?
● Appeal the Ruling by Rule 45 to the SC,
● Legal in nature
● SC to decide by looking at the applicable law and jurisprudence on eminent domain, law
granting respondent NGCP the right of eminent domain, ie. RA 9511. (PNOC Alternative
Fuels Corp., v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, GR No. 224936, September 4,
2019, J. Caguioa).
So ang tanong, from the RTC Order of Expropriation, pede ba mag-Rule 45 tayo to the Supreme
Court on a pure question of law?
● Sabi ng SC, YES. Why? It is purely legal in nature. The SC will not look at the facts, it will only
look at the law. And whether the law grants the National Grid Corporation the power of
eminent domain. So it is a pure question of law reviewable by Rule 45 to the Supreme Court
in that instance.
Capital Gains Tax cannot be awarded to the landowner in expropriation proceedings, in the
form of consequential damages
● CGT paid by seller, tax on passive income
● May be considered in determining just compensation (Republic v. Spouses Bunsay, GR No.
2015473, December 10, 2019, J. Caguioa)
What about Capital Gains Tax? Can Capital Gains Tax be part of the consequential damages?
● NO. Kasi ang Capital Gains Tax, that is your passive income from the sale or transfer or
exchange of your real property. And the one who pays the Capital Gains Tax is the seller. So
even if there is a forced sale, that is to be paid by the landowner Capital Gains Tax.
● It is a tax on passive income. It is not in the nature of consequential damages. Kasi nga, by
definition, the consequential damage is the damage that is suffered by the remaining portion
of your property when only part of your property is taken by the government. So it cannot be
part of the computation of consequential damages.
● However, the SC ruled that although capital gains tax is not part of consequential damages, it
is among the factors that the Court may consider in determining just compensation.
Now, in your syllabus it makes mention of RA 8974, but that is already amended by RA 10752. So
huwag nyong ipilit na 8974 yan, hindi talaga kasi 10752 categorically states na repealed na yang
8974. But we can just apply the corresponding provision in 8974 to 10752. Dami kong numero na
sinabi, ano ba yan kase. Yan yung National Infrastructure Projects na Expropriation.
RA 8974 (now RA 10752) provides for a standard of assessment of value of land. Does it mean
that just compensation in expropriation for national infrastructure projects ceased to be a
judicial determination?
● No. Determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The Standard for Assessment
of Value of Land under RA 8974 is merely a standard which the court may consider to
facilitate the determination of just compensation. (Republic v. Decena, G.R. No. 212786,
July 30, 2018, J. Caguioa)
Under RA 10752, it provides for the standard assessment of the value of land. So does it mean that
just compensation for expropriation if it is a national infrastructure project, it is no longer a
judicial determination?
● Sabi ng Case penned by Justice Caguioa, no. That just compensation remains to be a judicial
function.
● The standards of assessment of the value of land in the law are only those factors or
guidelines that the Court may consider. But at the end of the day, it is still the Court that
determines just compensation. It is a judicial function.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Alam nyo ba yung asawa ko, noong nag-Bar sya dati. So nakikinig din sya sa
lectures ko dun sa review center na inattendan nya and kinekwneto nya saken na sa ibang
lectures, fina-fast forward nya. Sa lectures ko, naghahanap sya ng slow motion button. Hahahah.
Pano ba daw i-slow motion, hindi daw makahabol ang utak nya. Sana nakakahabol po kayo, pero
bagalan ko. Kaya natin to guys.”
“Sabi nga ng the great Ruffa Mae Quinto, ‘ENERGY GO GO GO!' Kaya natin yan. Sandale, hinga
ako.”
X obtained a loan from Y, and to secure the loan, X executed a real estate mortgage. When the
loan fell due, X was unable to pay despite demand. May Y file against X an complaint for sum of
money and an action for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage?
● No. A creditor-mortgagee cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for
payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage.
The filing of one, bars the other. (Pineda v. De Vega, G.R. No. 233774, 10 April 2019, J.
Caguioa)
Merong loan. The loan is secured by a real estate mortgage, ok. Obviously, para may issue dito,
noong kailangan nang mag-bayad, and despite demand, the debtor was unable to pay. Syempre, para
panalo, galit pa. Sya na may utang, sya pa yung galit. “Bat mo ko sinisingil, alam mo namang wala
akong budget ngayon.” Yan ang style, pag ikaw may kasalanan ikaw pa yung galit. Para ung biktima,
maguguluhan. Hindi yun makaka-file ng Redress ng remedy kasi na-confuse sya. “Bakit sya pa yung
galit?” Style yan ng mga taong may kasalanan. Anyway. As a consequence, because of the breach of
contract of loan, the plaintiff files an action against the defendant for sum of money.
Ang tanong: pwede bang dalawang actions ang i-file ni plaintiff? One for sum of money and one
for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage? Kasi magkaiba naman daw pati spelling. Complaint
for Sum of Money, ordinary action. Judicial Foreclosure of Real estate Mortgage, real action quasi in
rem. Ang Complaint for Sum of Money, in personam personal action. Magkaiba.
● Sabi ng SC, no. That would result in splitting of cause of action. Ultimately, there is only one
breach here. The breach is the non-payment of the loan. You cannot split your causes of
action. You can only choose one remedy. And the option is deemed chosen upon the filing. In
the judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, the ultimate goal there is for you to be paid
based on the security. So it is the same as the cause of action for collection of sum of money.
Hindi pedeng dalawa, isa lang. Otherwise, splitting ka.
● Pede ring litis pendentia yan, yung ground mo to dismiss.
May a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction be issued against the extrajudicial or judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage?
● Yes, provided that there is compliance with the requirements under Rule 57 and
additionally, with the following rules in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended:
1. No TRO or WPI against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued
on the allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not delinquent
unless the application is verified and supported by evidence of payment.
2. No TRO or WPI against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued
on the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless debtor pays
mortgagee at least the legal rate of interest percent per annum interest on the principal
obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly
while the case is pending.
3. Where a WPI has been issued against a foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case
shall be speedily resolved. To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the Supreme
Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of
the cases involving ten million pesos and above.
4. All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a TRO or WPI, such as the
posting of a bond, which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the
time limitation for its effectivity, shall apply as well to a status quo order. (Spouses Tumon
v. Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 243999, March 18, 2021, J. Caguioa)
X obtained a loan from Y, subject to interest of 50% per month, and to secure the loan, X
executed a real estate mortgage. When the loan fell due, X was unable to pay despite demand.
In an action filed by X, the RTC found that the interest rate of the loan obligation was
iniquitous and unconscionable, and therefore void. What is the effect of this ruling on the
foreclosure?
● Since the obligation of making interest payments in the instant case is illegal and thus
non-demandable, the payment of the principal loan obligation was likewise not yet
demandable.
● Foreclosure should not proceed, or if already done, should be invalidated (Bulatao v.
Estonactoc, G.R. No. 235020, December 10, 2019, J. Caguioa)
A donated to B and C a parcel of land, which they accepted. There was no provision in the
donation, preventing B and C to partition. May B, upon acceptance of the donation, bring an
action for partition?
● Yes. The law does not make a distinction as to how the co-owner derived his/her title, may
it be through gratuity or through onerous consideration. A person who derived his title and
was granted co-ownership rights through gratuity may compel partition (Logrosa v. Spouses
Azares, G.R. No. 217611, March 27, 2019, J. Caguioa)
There is a donation of a parcel of land. Now, two persons were donated a parcel of land, they
became co-owners and there is a provision that prevents them from partitioning. There was no,
sorry, there was no provision that prevents them from partitioning. Can they bring an action for
partition?
● It is argued that they cannot. Because they only acquired the property by means of donation.
Sabi ng SC, ano ba? Basta co-owned yung property, pede mong i-partition yan.
● The law does not distinguish how you acquired co-ownership over the property. As long as
there is a property owned in common, and anyone of them wants to leave that co-ownership,
partition is a proper remedy.
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in
turn represent Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good
public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable.
They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writ of kalikasan due to
the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by environmental
laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos.
Respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite standing to
file the petition, being representatives of a rather amorphous sector of society and without a
concrete interest or injury. Are respondents correct?
Writ of Kalikasan
● The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberalized the requirements on standing,
allowing the filing of citizen’s suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under
environmental laws. In a petition for writ of kalikasan, it is sufficient that the person filing
represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ.
(Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines. Nag-file sila ng Writ of Kalikasan. Remember in Writ
of Kalikasan, this is in the nature of a Citizen’s Suit. When you say that it is a Citizen’s Suit, it is an
action that is filed in representation of others for the enforcement of those person’s rights and
obligations under environmental laws. So by its nature, ang writ of kalikasan, being that it is a
Citizen’s Suit, is filed in a representative capacity and that is why we have a more relaxed rule on
legal standing in kalikasan cases. Kasi by its nature nga, citizen’s suit sya in representation of others
sya.
● So pede yan. The sine qua non requirement is that it affects the magnitude of inhabitants of
two or more cities or provinces. So it can just be five of those residents who will file the
petition on behalf of the other residents.
Is there also a liberalized rule on legal standing in petitions for writs of continuing mandamus?
● No. A petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus is only available to one
who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission. (Segovia v. Climate Change
Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Is there also a liberalized rule on legal standing in petitions for writs of continuing mandamus?
● No. Writ of continuing mandamus is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the
unlawful act or omission. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March
7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
A petition for writ of kalikasan was filed with the SC. Respondents opposed this on the ground
that the direct filing of the petition with the SC violated the hierarchy of courts. Is the
opposition correct?
● No. Magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the rules satisfies at least
one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed
where it is dictated by public welfare.
● Given that the rules allow direct resort to the Supreme Court, it is ultimately within the
Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly before it. (Segovia v.
Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Can you file directly your Writ of Kalikasan with the Supreme Court?
● Yes, you can file your Writ of Kalikasan directly with the Supreme Court because the
Jurisdiction for Kalikasan is the SC and the CA. And pano kung direct resort ka to the SC, sabi
ng SC, well it falls under exceptional circumstances where it is exempted from the hierarchy
of courts because of the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the rule.
● What is that sine qua non requirement? The magnitude is that it affects the life, the property,
of those that are inhabitants of two or more cities or provinces.
● Sabi ng SC, since the rules allow direct resort to the SC in kalikasan, in the end, ultimately, it
is up to the Supreme Court whether it will accept the petition brought directly to it.
What are the Requisites that must be established for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan?
1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology;
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities
or provinces. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, J.
Caguioa)
X filed a petition for writ of kalikasan against respondents government officials, invoking the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology, without stating any rule or regulation violated or
that would be violated. Will the petition prosper?
● No. A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a
law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. (Segovia v. Climate Change
Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
There is a petition for kalikasan against government officials. And they are claiming that there is a
violation of their right to a balanced and healthful ecology but they did not state any rule that is
violated or that would be violated. Will the petition prosper?
● No, because as I told you there has to be an act or omission that violates. Without that
violation, your kalikasan will not prosper.
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippine, representing their children, who in turn
represent Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good
public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable.
They filed a petition for writ of continuing mandamus against respondents public officials,
claiming that they failed to implement the road sharing principle that would divide roads,
allowing the use thereof by carless people or bikers, to reduce air pollution.
The basis of the petition is the failure to implement rules and issuances that would prevent or
reduce air quality degradation. Respondents showed they implemented projects but not in
accordance with that provided in the petition, there being no law requiring the same. Will the
petition prosper?
● No. Petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the
respondents to be entitled to the writ.
● Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated — a principle. There is no rule or law
that requires the respondents to implement the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road
Sharing Principle in the manner provided in the petition. (Segovia v. Climate Change
Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Itong Carless People of the Philippines iniinsist nila na gumawa ng road sharing principle. So sabi nila
dapat gumawa ng bike lane so that it will lessen air pollution and dapat dun sa bike lane mas
magkakabikers tayo so that mabawasan ang gumagamit ng cars and reduce air pollution. This was
also penned by Justice Caguioa.
● The SC ruled that petition for kalikasan will not prosper, because sabi ng SC, that road-sharing
principle is precisely as it is denominated. It is only a principle. There is no law nor rule that
requires respondents to divide the road to create that bike lane. In fact, what the law
provides is that it is subject to the discretion of the government agency on what projects they
will implement to protect the environment. So the Writ of Kalikasan will not prosper, there
being no showing of any law or rule violated.
QUESTIONS:
Is the expanded certiorari jurisdiction under the constitution exercised only by the SC?
● NO, the Expanded Certiorari Jurisdiction is not only exercised by the SC. It is also exercised
by lower courts.
● Example: With respect to a criminal case for a preliminary investigation, from the ruling in a
preliminary investigation in a criminal case of a prosecutor, what is your remedy? From the
City of Prosecutor, you can file an MR or you can file a Petition for Review with the Secretary
of Justice. You can go straight to the Secretary of Justice or you file an MR then from denial
you file it to the Secretary of Justice, PetRev (Petition for Review).
○ The difference of availing MR and PetRev (Petition for Review) is that the MR will not
suspend arraignment, the PetRev with the Secretary of Justice will suspend
arraignment for a period of 60 days counted from the time of filing of the petition for
review. From the Ruling of the Secretary of Justice of that PetRev, you can file a
Motion for Reconsideration. From Denial of the MR of the Secretary of Justice, the NPS
Rule on Appeals no longer provides any appeal from that ruling so if the ruling of the
Secretary of Justice is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, there is no more appeal
or plain, speedy, adequate remedy, then the remedy is Certiorari. In that case, where
do you file it? Court of Appeals.
○ And note, what is the exercise of power of the Secretary of Justice and the
Prosecutors in determination of probable cause? It is merely executive, it is not
judicial, it is not quasi-judicial. Why is it only executive? Because it is only
inquisitorial, only to determine probable cause of whether a crime was probably
committed and whether respondent probably committed it is enough for us to know
whether an information should be charged in court. So that does not fall under Rule 65
on those bodies or tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial.
○ Nevertheless, you can assail it by Certiorari if there is grave abuse of discretion
pursuant to the expanded certiorari jurisdiction provided in the Constitution when
there is grave abuse of discretion on any instrumentality of the government, here it is
the executive exercise of powers of the Secretary of Justice under the Executive
branch.
○ Where do you file it? Is it only with the SC? No, you file it in the CA.
The one who asked the question is asking bakit dun sa isang case for the payment of just
compensation, interpleader ang nangyari?
● Kasi dun, hindi nag-file ng expropriation case. It was for a negotiated sale. Pero nagtatalo
sila, who is entitled to the proceeds of that sale. Kaya hindi sya napasok sa second phase ng
expropriation.
● But the rule is, that if there are conflicting claimants to the ownership of the property or the
one entitled to just compensation, it should be determined by the Court in that expropriation
case specifically in the second phase when there is determination of the Court of just
compensation.
● For purposes of the Court determining to whom just compensation will be paid, the Court will
determine provisionally ownership.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Allegedly there was a previous final decree of nullity declaring void the marriage between And
Y, before Y married X. The trial court granted the motion to quash. X appealed and the CA
sustained the dismissal. The private complainant filed a petition for review on certiorari with
the Supreme Court. Should the petition be given due course?
Okay, alright. Baka tanungin niyo ako bakit puwede mag-appeal dito. Kasi naman hindi lahat ng
dismissal sa criminal case ay bawal mag-appeal. Okay. Kasi. One that you cannot have an appeal is an
acquittal and for that to apply, you need to test it against the requirements of double jeopardy.
You have a court of competent jurisdiction. There is a valid plea. Yan. Kung nag-motion to quash, ibig
sabihin, wala pang valid plea ‘yan. Kaya the first jeopardy did not yet attach. Puwede pang
ma-appeal yung dismissal niyan, you get it?
So, the prohibition on appeal will only apply if the first jeopardy attach, meaning, requisites are
there is a court that has jurisdiction, there is a valid plea, and then, there is that judgement, ‘di ba.
Okay, alright.
➢ No. X has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case. Section 5, Rule
110, provides that all criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.
Does the private complainant have the legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal
case?
No. As a rule, it is the State who should assail the criminal aspect of a case.
Well, if your appeal is with the RTC, then it is the prosecutor. But if it is in the CA or in the SC, it is
OSG who will assail that. Basta it pertains to the criminal aspect, denial of evidence, yung mga ‘yan,
the one who will assail it should be the State. The private complainants’ interest is only as to the
damages, so they should not be the one to assail the criminal aspect of the case. Okay. But this rule
is not absolute, it is subject to exceptions.
A, B, and C were charged with rape with homicide. During the trial, the prosecutor filed a motion
to discharge accused A to be utilized as a state witness. The prosecutor argued that there was no
need to present evidence to discharge A as a state witness, since A was already admitted into the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
Eto yung exception. Alright. The accused were charged with rape wiith homicide So yung biktima,
dead na, okay. Alright. During the trial, the prosecutor filed a motion to discharge one of the accused
as a state witness. Now, you know that if you want to move to discharge an accused as a state
witness, there needs to be presentation of evidence, to show that the testimony is necessary, right,
and that it can be corroborated in its material points and that the accused is not the most guilty,
right, among others. So there needs to be a trial or a hearing on the discharge of an accused to be a
state witness. When the court told the prosecutor to present evidence for the discharge of the state
witness, ayaw ng prosecutor. Sabi niya, ayoko nga. Basta, pwede na ‘yan, ganun. So, syempre, hindi
siya nag-present ng evidence on the prayer for the discharge of a state witness, it was denied, okay.
Alright.
The RTC denied the motion for failure of the prosecution to present evidence in support of the
prayer to discharge A as state witness, who was the only eye witness to the crime. The prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of the motion, but without any prayer for
injunctive relief to restrain further proceedings in the trial court.
And then, during the trial, the prosecutor asked for postponements and then, the fact there was a
witness present there, and the court act as the prosecutor: “Oh, magpi-present ka pa ba ng witness?
Sabi ng prosecutor: “Hindi na, okay na ‘yan.” O, so wala siyang prinesent na witness, nakakaloka. So
obviously, because of this, the accused was acquitted pursuant to a demurrer to evidence.
M, the mother of the victim, assailed before the CA the order granting demurrer to evidence,
which the CA denied. A motion for reconsideration was filed but later denied. M appealed to the
SC. The case was set for oral arguments where the OSG appeared, and manifested it was joining
M’s cause to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Does M, the private complainant, have the legal
standing to assail the acquittal?
Alright, now, that acquittal is assailed by the mother of the victim before the CA, on certiorari. Okay.
This one certiorari na ’yan, acquittal na ‘yan kasi jeopardy attached na. There is valid plea, may
presentation of evidence, etcetera. Okay, now, the issue here is whether the mother has the standin,
kasi ‘di ba, we said earlier, the rule is, the one who can only assail the criminal aspect, the acquittal,
mga orders in relation to the criminal case not relating to the right to damages, or the civil aspect, it
should be the State through the prosecutor, up to the RTC or SolGen in the CA or SC. But in this
case, notably, when the mother filed her certiorari, the OSG entered its appearance and manifested
that it was joining the petition. That won’t cure any problem because, by the OSG joining the
mother, the private complainant, it is as if the Solicitor General is the one who is also assailing the
criminal aspect but nevertheless, sabi ng Supreme Court, even without the OSG joining the mother,
the mother by exception had legal standing to assail that acquittal, okay.
The right of offended parties to appeal on order of the trial court which deprives them of due
process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse
ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy
Why?
● Because of violation of due process. When there is violation of due process, by exception, the
private complainant has legal standing to assail the criminal aspect.
● Obviously, the prosecutor bungled the case, ‘di ba. Bungled not bundled. Bungled the case.
The prosecutor did not present evidence even if the witness was there and on the discharge
of the state witness. The prosecutor chose not to present evidence, there were repeated
postponements, right. Sabi ng Supreme Court, even the court is guilty of violation of due
process because the court just watched the prosecutor do all of those things, without
intervening, okay. So, here, the acquittal is void because of violation of due process, and so,
the first jeopardy did not attach.
W2 executed a complaint-affidavit against H for bigamy, claiming that when they married, H was
still married to W1. An information for bigamy was filed against H, who, before arraignment,
moved toquash the same on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
There is a complaint affidavit against the husband. The second wife files complaint-affidavit against
the husband for bigamy, okay. The second wife is claiming that when they married, the husband was
still married to the first wife. An information for bigamy against the husband was filed. In that
complaint information, it alleges that during the existence of the marriage with wife 1, husband
contracted a marriage with wife 2, without nullifying the first marriage. The accused husband moves
to quash the information, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
According to him, in a separate case recently, mga few days before filing the information, the RTC
declared the marriage with wife 2, null and void. And as support of his motion to quash for, on the
ground of failing to allege an offense, he presented a decree of nullity of marriage as proved.
Alright. But according to the prosecutor, nevertheless, at the time when the husband married wife 2,
the marriage with wife 1 was still subsisting and so, the information sufficiently alleges an offense.
Alright. So according to the prosecutor, all elements of bigamy are alleged in the information.
So the question now is, was it correct for the trial court to quash the information? Because
here, the trial court quashed the information.
● NO, that was not correct. It was grave abuse on the part of the RTC, the trial court, to quash
the information. Because the basis of the quashal is, what is the basis? Eto. That the facts
charged do not constitute an offense.
○ If your ground is that the facts charged do not constitute the offense, you are limited,
or the court is only limited to looking at the allegations in the information. The court
should not go beyond that.
○ But what did the court do here? The court considered the decree of nullity of marriage
that the husband submitted. The court went beyond the allegations in the information
and considered evidence, in quashing the information, and so, the Supreme Court said,
that evidence was not yet even proven, right. And so, it was an error for the court to
grant a quashal on that ground by going beyond the information.
○ Also, in the information, it sufficiently alleges an offense because all the elements of
bigamy are present, so,it was incorrect for the trial court to quash that information.
What are the exceptions to the rule that facts not stated in the information will not be
appreciated in a motion to quash?
Okay. So, we said that the rule is that the court should only be limited to the facts and allegations in
the information in a motion to quash, on the ground that the facts stated there do not constitute an
offense. But this rule is subject to exceptions. There are some instances that although not stated in
the information, the court can appreciate it in ruling the motion to quash.
➢ No. There was no valid arraignment or plea to the charge and the accused was not
convicted or acquitted or the case otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent, since H moved for the dismissal (Antone vs. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, December
8, 2010)
The motion to quash was granted but the motion to quash that was granted was reversed. Is there
violation of the right against double jeopardy?
● No. Because there is no valid arraignment or plea yet. Remember, the motion to quash is filed
before arraignment. So, the first jeopardy did not yet attach.
➢ General Rule: An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense.
➢ Exception: (1) criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (2) accused previously
acquitted or convicted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent ( Rules of Court, Rule 117, Sec. 6 )
As a general rule, if there is a motion to quash granted, it will not bar another prosecution for the
same offense. If your motion to quash information is granted, aba, i-refile mo ‘yan.
● No.There are two grounds. If the ground is the extinction of criminal liability or action, and
the second one is, double jeopardy. In those instances, if there is quashal, you cannot
anymore refile the case. But for all other grounds, you can still refile the case.
An information was filed against X for acts of lasciviousness. During trial, it was proven that he
raped the victim. The information was never amended. May X be convicted of rape?
➢ No. X can only be convicted of the crime charged,a cts of lasciviousness, and not the crime
proven, rape. ( Variance Doctrine )
➢ The offense charged, acts of lasciviousness, is included in the offense proved, rape. X may
only be convicted of the offense charged, acts of lasciviousness ( Rules of Court, Rule 120,
Sec. 4; People vs. Bongbonga y Nalos, G.R. No. 214771, August 9, 2017, J. Caguioa )
Can the accused be convicted of rape?
● No. Okay. He can only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness.
● This is the variance doctrine. If there is a variance between the crime charged and the crime
proven, then, the accused can only be convicted of what is necessarily included. If the charge
is included in what is proven, then, dun ka lang sa charge mako-convict. If the crime proven is
included in the crime charged, dun ka sa crime proven, in other words, the lesser one.
EVIDENCE
May a court take judicial notice of the publication of the notice of initial hearing for Case No. 123
in the issue of the Official Gazette on October 23, 2021, Volume 62, Number 42, page 8044?
● Yes. Given that the Official Gazette is the official publication of the government, the court
can take judicial notice thereof pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129, ( Padayhag vs. Director
of Lands, G.R. Nos. 202872 & 206062, November 22, 2017, J. Caguioa )
Judicial notice. There is a publication in the Official Gazette. Okay. Can the court take judicial
notice of that publication of notice of an initial hearing of a case of the court in the Official Gazette?
● Yes. Because the Official Gazette is an official publication of the government and so the court
can take judicial notice of that official publication in the Official Gazette. Okay. Alright.
Sandali lang, inom lang ako.
➢ It provides that the original document be produced whenever its contents are the subject of
inquiry ( Spouses Tapayan vs. Martinez, G.R. Nos. 207786, January 30, 2017, J. Caguioa )
● Eto yung dating best evidence rule pero wala nang ganun ngayon.
● The rule provides that basta there is documentary evidence and its contents are the subject
of inquiry, it should be the original document that should be produced, otherwise, it would be
inadmissible but subject to exceptions under the rule, okay, a copy of the deed of undertaking
was presented during trial. So it’s only, not the original.
A copy of the Deed of Undertaking was presented during trial. When it is the time to object to the
admissibility thereof for violating the original document rule?
➢ Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered. In case of
documentary evidence, the offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the
offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is
only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be
made (Spouses Tapayan vs. Martinez, G.R. Nos. 207786, January 30, 2017, J. Caguioa)
Okay, now, if during trial, a witness is confronted with that deed of undertaking, and it is only a
photocopy, should you already object to the admissibility of that document during the testimony
of the witness, for violating the original document rule?
● No. Because the objection is made at the time it is formally offered. Remember, I told you
kanina, you have to distinguish, whether it is testimonial, object, or documentary evidence.
Testimonial, the time to make an offer is while the witness is called to testify. Object and
documentary is offered after the last witness testifies. So, in this case, the witness was still
testifying but the witness was just confronted with a photocopied Deed of Sale. It is not the
time for you to object to the admissibility of that Deed of Undertaking because at that point
of time, that deed is not being offered as evidence. So, it is premature to make an objection.
Right, okay.
Offer of evidence - court shall consider evidence which has not been formally offered
➢ Purpose for which evidence is offered must be specified
➢ All evidence must be offered orally (Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 34-35)
So, we already discussed offer of evidence. Now, if you made an offer of evidence, and it is objected
by the other party, and after the other party objects to your offer of evidence, ay gusto mo namang
ipasok pa rin yung ebidensya na ‘yan.
● The remedy is tender of excluded evidence. Okay, so what is the remedy? You have that
document attached or made part of the record if it is object or documentary evidence. But if
it is oral evidence, you need to state for the record, the name and personal circumstances of
the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.
What's the reason why you want to make it part of the record?
● Even if the RTC or trial court will not consider that excluded evidence in ruling on the case,
you still want it to be part of the records, so that it will be the on-appeal. It is among those
that you can raise or point out during appeal. Okay, alright.
A copy of the Deed of Undertaking was presented during trial. During its formal offer, the opposing
party did not raise its inadmissibility for violating the original document rule. May the opposing
party raise such ground on appeal?
A copy of the Deed of Undertaking, so a photocopy was presented during trial and then, when it was
formally offered, the opposing party did not raise its inadmissibility for violating the original
document rule.
No. When a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered
in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived, even if by its nature the evidence is
inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.
(Spouses Tapayan vs. Martinez, G.R. Nos. 207786, January 30, 2017, J. Caguioa)
On appeal, can the opposing party raise the inadmissibility of the Deed of Undertaking?
● No. If you failed to timely object on the admissibility of evidence, that is considered as a
waiver. Remember, even if an evidence is inadmissible by nature but there is failure to object
to the same, the evidence becomes admissible. It is a waiver on your part to object to that
evidence.
● But note, that although inadmissible evidence but the objection is waived, it becomes
admissible, it doesn’t follow that it is credible evidence.
Accused X was in a detention cell when he voluntarily confessed to the commission of the crime
before members of the media. Is this an inadmissible extrajudicial confession?
● No. X was in a custodial investigation when he made a confession. An extrajudicial
confession made before news reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from police
authorities, as in this case, is admissible (People vs. Dacanay y Tumalabcab, G.R. Nos.
216064 , 2016, J. Caguioa )
The accused is in a detention cell. While he is in a detention cell, nabuang na siya doon, nabaliw na
siya kasi mag-isa lang siya doon, kausap niya lang ang mga lamok at ipis doon. So, bored na bored na
siya, naghanap siya ng kausap. Tinawag niya ang media. Sabi niya, “media, come here, may sasabihin
ako.” And the accused voluntarily confessed to the commission of the crime, before the members of
the media, while he was in a detention cell. Question, is that confession inadmissible extrajudicial
confession? Is it inadmissible?
● Of course not, that is admissible: 1) There was no custodial investigation made there.
Remember, the requirement that extrajudicial confession must be in writing and in the
presence of counsels is only required if it is an extrajudicial confession during a custodial
investigation.
● Dumating yung mga pulis sa’yo, sabi ahh, may nabalitaan ka bang mga crimes na nangyayari
sa paligid mo. That is not a custodial investigation. But if you, under detention, or asks
specifically for your participation in a specific offense “Binebenta mo ba ‘tong mga drugs na
to”? That is now a custodial investigation. Right. In that instance, you can make an
extra-judicial confession that is valid. Don’t think that you can never make a valid
extrajudicial confession. You can. But while you are in custodial investigation, extrajudicial
confession must be in writing, with the assistance of counsel. If you wanna waive the
assistance of counsel, you need a counsel to assist you in waiving the right to counsel but
still, you must make that extrajudicial confession in the presence of your family members,
etcetera.
● That confession made before the news reporters is not a custodial investigation because the
news reporters are not part of the law enforcement officials. Okay. The custodial
investigation is done before law enforcement officials such as the PNP, yan. Okay, alright. So,
before the media, this is just a spontaneous statement and that statement is admissible
against you. Kaya ‘pag may kliyente kayo in the future, ‘wag kayong pa-interview nang
pa-interview ha, kasi that can be used against you. Alright.
● It is the prosecution who has the burden to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
● Again, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness
of the defense of the accused.
● Even if you did not directly see it, you may still establish the guilt by indirect evidence or
circumstantial evidence.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Ikaw pumatay kay X!” “Wala ah, dun ako sa bahay nun/Jumejebs kaya ako nun”
● To establish an alibi, it must be proven that at the time of the commission of the crime, he
was at a place other than the crime and there was physical impossibility of the accused to
have been at the scene of the crime.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Kung nasa Pasig yung crime, nasa Quezon city daw siya” – not an impossibility
kasi pwede mag Angkas.
● Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when
the crime transpired and the place where the crime was committed, as well as to the
facility of access between the two places. (People v Pentecostes y Cronico, G.R. No.
226158, November 8, 2017, J. Caguioa; People v. Mayingque, G.R. NO. 179709, July 6,
2010)
● This is always required in our appeals and petitions. The purpose of such is to show the
timeliness of the filing of the petition/appeal.
○ The date of when the judgment was received must be shown. Receipt of the
judgment, not the date of the judgment.
■ Why? From the time of receiving the judgment, the 15-day period will start to
run, whether it is to appeal or file an MR.
○ If you file an MR, you must state the date when the MR was filed as to show if you
timely filed it.
○ If your MR is denied, from the time you received notice of the denial of the motion.
■ From such receipt of denial of MR, the fresh period rule will start to run.
● If you are a person who wants to bring an action against a government agency, to enforce
environmental rights.
○ In turn, this government agency files a case against you. It can be civil, criminal, or
administrative. This case brought against you is only for the purpose of harassing or
vexing or so they can assert undue pressure to stifle you from availing of a legal
recourse to enforce environmental laws.
○ This harassment case was filed to stop you from availing the remedy or enforcement of
environmental laws.
● You’re saying that the action filed against you is a SLAPP suit since it was only filed to harass
or vex, to stop you from taking action to enforce environmental laws.
● The allegation of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to have been filed
merely as a harassment suit against environmental actions. (Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No.
230170, June 6, 2018, J. Caguioa)
X was charged with murder. X filed a petition for bail and after hearing thereon, the court
denied bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt was strong. Trial on the merits ensued and
the prosecution rested its case. X filed a demurrer to evidence, which was denied.
X filed a motion to fix bail, alleging that the prosecution was able to show that the crime
charged should be homicide only and not murder, relying on People v. Rivera, a case with
substantially the same facts, where the victim was killed during a heated argument, the crime
was only homicide due to the absence of treachery because there was no preparation made in
a manner to ensure the killing of the victim.
The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the evidence of guilt for the death of the victim
was strong and it was incumbent on the accused to take the witness stand, to show otherwise.
X moved for reconsideration which was denied. X filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
Was the denial of the motion to fix bail proper?
The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the evidence of guilt for the death of the victim
was strong and it was incumbent on the accused to take the witness stand, to show otherwise.
X moved for reconsideration which was denied. X filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
Was the denial of the motion to fix bail proper?
● No. The RTC committed grave of abuse of discretion in denying the motion to fix bail
because the prosecution could at best, only convict X of homicide and not murder.
Treachery is not present when the killing was preceded by a heated argument.
● The RTC stated that the evidence of death is strong but the basis for bail is the evidence of
guilt for the crime charged is strong or not strong.
● The charge here is murder. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
● Bail is not a matter of right until it is shown that the evidence of guilt is not strong.
○ The determination of evidence of guilt, whether strong or not strong, is on the crime
charged.
● The Supreme Court stated, here, the evidence of guilt for murder is not strong. It is shown,
by evidence, that homicide was committed, not murder because the killing was made during a
heated argument.
● It is an error for the RTC to state that the evidence of killing is strong since homicide is
different from murder. Treachery was not present as well as it preceded a heated argument.
● The RTC should only have determined whether the evidence of guilt is strong for Murder
(the crime charged), as opposed to simply determining if the evidence that he was
responsible for the victim’s death was strong.
● The evidence of X’s guilt for murder was not strong. (Recto v People, G.R. No. 236461,
December 5, 2018, J. Caguioa)
● Since the evidence only showed Homicide, the evidence of guilt for Murder is not strong so
bail should be allowed.
● Yes.
● The TRO ex parte can be issued if there is extreme urgency, and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury.
○ If it is issued by the trial court, the TRO is for 72-hours first.
■ That 72-hours, a hearing is to be conducted in determining if the 72-hours
should be extended to 20 days.
■ The court should rule if ever the extension of the 72-hour TRO shall be up to 20
days.
○ If the 72-hours has lapsed without a ruling on its extension, it is deemed functus
oficio.
■ Either conduct a hearing on writ of preliminary injunction.
○ If the court has decided to extend the 72-hours to 20 days, the 72-hours are deemed
inclusive of the 20 days.
● 20 day -TRO, if it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application
that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be
heard on notice.
● Trial court has 20 days from its issuance to resolve the application for preliminary
injunction. (Philippine Investment Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Mendoza, AM RTJ-18-2538,
November 21, 2018, J. Caguioa)
● If there is a 20 day -TRO, during the 20 days there will be a hearing on a writ of preliminary
injunction.
o Note: You cannot have a writ of preliminary injunction without a hearing.
o But you can have a denial of preliminary injunction without hearing.
● If that 20 day – TRO lapses without a ruling on the writ of preliminary injunction, the 20-day
TRO becomes functus oficio and you cannot extend it anymore.
The issue in an accion publiciana is the “better right of possession” of real property independently
of title. This “better right of possession” may or may not proceed from a Torrens title. (Miranda v.
Spouses Mallari, G.R. 218343, November 28, 2018, J. Caguioa)
⮚ Yes. Where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property.
⮚ It will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff’s certificate of title. (Miranda v.
Spouses Mallari, G.R. 218343, November 28, 2018, J. Caguioa)
Note: what can only be the subject of levy in an execution sale is the property of the judgment
obligor. It cannot be the property of a 3rd person.
● If it turns out the property belongs to a 3rd person, that cannot be a subject of a levy.
o EXAMPLE: if the judgment debtor, prior to the pending case against him, already sold
the land to Mr. X. Mr. X already acquired ownership when he possessed the land.
▪ Note: Delivery or traditio is a way of which you transfer ownership).
o However, Mr. X did not transfer the title from the debtor to himself, Mr. X. The title
remained in the name of the debtor but Mr. X is the new owner because of the transfer
of ownership.
▪ Note: Title will not affect ownership. Title is only proof of ownership. The
transfer or the delivery already transferred ownership to Mr. X.
o Because the title remained in the name of the debtor, the same was attached to the
civil case filed against the debtor. The highest bidder in the case was the creditor.
o ISSUE: Whether the creditor has a better right to the property because Mr. X was not
able to transfer title in his name.
o NO. The SC stated that the rules mentioned on what is subject to levy is the property
of the judgment obligor. Here the judgment obligor previously transferred ownership
of the property to a different person before the execution sale. So the highest bidder
cannot have a higher interest over the judgment obligor.
Plaintiff files a civil action against defendant, who moved to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Plaintiff filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA, alleging that the order dismissing the case on the ground of red judicata
was interlocutory and not appealable. Is the plaintiff correct?
● No. The dismissal on the ground of res judicata is a final order and not an interlocutory
order because it terminated the proceedings and left nothing to be done.
● Under Sec. 1, Rule 41, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, as in the case. Certiorari cannot be availing when appeal is
available.
● Dismissal on res judicata is not interlocutory but a final order that is a dismissal with
prejudice.
● The remedy is appeal, not certiorari.
Which grounds for dismissal whether in a motion to dismiss or answer as an affirmative defense
would have the effect of dismissal with prejudice?
● The cause of action is barred by prior judgment (res judicata);
● The cause of action is barred by statute of limitations;
● The claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned
or otherwise extinguished; or
● The claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the
statute of frauds. (Rules of Court, Rule 15, Sec 13)
● These are the instances. If it is dismissed it is with prejudice.
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Napaaga na yan. Nasa book ko kanina. It is Section 13, Rule 15”
X, in seeking for the issuance of injunctive relief, claims that unless restrained, the
pre-termination of the lease would cause them to lose such business with the opposing party. Is
this an irreparable injury?
● No. The act sought to be enjoined will only lead to the reduction of its revenues, a loss that
may be measured with reasonable accuracy, and therefore quantifiable or susceptible to
mathematical computation. (SM Investments Corp. v. Mac Graphics Carranz International
Corp., GR 224131-32 & 224337-38, June 25, 2018, J. Caguioa)
Reparable Injury
● The plaintiff is claiming that unless restrained, he will lose his business with his client, the
defendant. Is it an irreparable injury?
o NO. The SC stated that losing a client is compensable since you are only losing profits.
It wasn’t stated that you will lose your entire livelihood but only profits.
What are the rules on venue in relation to a criminal charge for libel under the RPC?
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or private person, the criminal action may
be filed in the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the RTC
of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the RTC of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be
filed in the RTC of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense or at the time first published. (People v. Macasaet, GR 196094,196720,
197324, March 5, 2018, J. Caguioa)
VD SEÑGA JOKE: “Under the RPC, kakaibae yung rules on venue.”
What should be alleged in the information as to venue if the basis of venue of the libel criminal
action is the place where the libel was printed and first published:
The information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first
published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business
offices in the case of newspapers, magazines, or serial publications. (People v. Macasaet, GR
196094,196720, 197324, March 5, 2018, J. Caguioa)
Example Information:
“That on April 21, 1999, In Manila City, and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, as publisher/writer, executive editor, and editor, respectively of Malaya
with address at Port area, Manila City defamed private complainant Narciso Y. Santiago, Jr., did
then and there, knowingly, willfully. Unlawfully, and feloniously by writing and publishing an article
in the Malaya xxx”
The accused did not file a motion to quash information for lack of territorial jurisdiction. Are the
allegations in the information as to libel venue sufficient?
● YES. That the information did not expressly state “first published” is of no moment because
the word “published” does not exclude the first publication.
● The accused does not deny that Port area, Manila is the editorial and business offices of
Malaya. He did not raise the ground of lack of jurisdiction to dismiss the case.
● The information alleges with particularity Port area, Manila as the place where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published.
● Information need not parrot the provisions of Art. 360 of the RPC and expressly use the
phrase “Printed and first published.” (People v. Macasaet, GR 196094,196720, 197324,
March 5, 2018, J. Caguioa)
● Although it did not say the word “first published”, it did mention where it was published. It
was in the Port area in Manila, so it is a sufficient allegation of territorial jurisdiction of the
court.
MERCANTILE LAW I
Atty. Timoteo B. Aquino
October 8, 2022
ACADS SCRIBES TEAM: SAMANTHA ALVAREZ | ANDREA DE GUZMAN | PAMELA DELA CRUZ | SHERRY PAGAY |
LANCE PUNZALAN | QUIMBERLYN RANCHEZ
CHECKED BY: HANNAH KEZIAH MORALES (Chairperson for Academics) | ADRIAN MACASAQUIT (Deputy for
Academics)| ANDREA JOSES TAN (Deputy for Academics)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LAW ON INSURANCE 3
RULE 1: Principal object and purpose test 3
RULE 2: An insurance contract is CONSENSUAL 4
RULE 3: Generally REVOCABLE 7
RULE 4: Insurable interest 7
RULE 5: Cancellation of the Policy (Sec. 64) 10
Concealment, Representation, and Warranties 12
TRANSPORTATION LAW 15
Common carriage (art. 1732) 15
Defenses 17
CORPORATION LAW 18
Revised Corporation Code 18
Limited Liability Rule 19
Doctrine of Piercing The Veil of Corporate Fiction 22
Nationality of The Corporation 23
Control Test 24
Incorporation Stage 25
Articles of Incorporation 26
Term 27
Revival of Corporation 28
Substantial Compliance 29
Contracts before Incorporation 30
Board of Directors 31
Corporate Officers 34
Powers of the Corporation 37
Shares 40
Special Type of Corporation - One Person Corporation (OPC) 43
Recommended Book: Reviewer on Commercial Law by Atty. Aquino and Dean Sundiang. Latest was
released last month (September 2022)
LAW ON INSURANCE
BAR TIP: Remember all the basic definitions. You can trace the attributes, elements and
characteristics from definitions. Memorize the basics of foundational concepts that are important
for Bar Examination purposes. For Jurisprudence, one important rule that we should remember is
the text to determine the contract is an insurance contract.
RULE 1: Principal object and purpose test (on whether or not it is an insurance contract)
Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. CIR (2009). Whether the assumption of risk and
indemnification of loss (which are elements of an insurance business) are the principal object and
purpose of the organization or whether they are merely incidental to its business.
If these are the principal objectives, the business is that of insurance. But if they are merely
incidental and service is the principal purpose, then the business is not insurance.
Health Card agreements
It is not insurance with assumption of risks but extension of medical services at affordable
costs. This is a contract for services. You pay in advance to avail of medical services
Exceptional Cases: That a health card agreement is an insurance. Like health insurance or life
insurance. It would depend on the circumstances that there should be additional facts that indicate
assumption of risks. But if it is just an ordinary health card, then your answer should not be an
insurance contract under the principal object and purpose test.
Compared to contracts that are real and solemn. Since it is consensual, you don't need a policy
to perfect the contract.
If the question is whether or not the policy should be issued, or whether or not the insured
policy holder is entitled as a matter of right in the policy, the answer is yes. The insurance company is
required to issue an insurance policy.
The requirement of policy does not mean it is necessary for the perfection of the contract
because the rule is an insurance contract is consensual.
● EXAMPLE: Steamship mutual underwriting association of Bermuda v. Sulpicio Lines also
decided in 2017.
There is an offer and acceptance. In civil law, it is perfected right there and then.
If there was perfection by correspondence — Meaning, you are not in the same place and
therefore, it is good to know when there is a meeting of the minds between the parties. At what point
is there a perfection of the contract and this is where a cognition theory comes in.
By signing the application and submitting it to the insurance company, the insured is making an
offer. It is the insurer that accepts the offer by approving the application.
BAR TIP: Determine the applicable doctrine and apply it to the given problem and apply your
solution. If you can answer in 4 sentences, then better. But make the strongest and direct statement
that you can make.
Next rule is about the parties in the insurance contract, there are times especially in life
insurance where the insured is also the applicant — he is insuring himself.
There are times too, when there is an insured and somebody else is applying — he is insuring
the life of another person. This other person who is insuring the life of another must have an
insurable interest in the life of the person. (Refer to Section 10, Republic Act No. 10607)
Q: Can you insure your own life and designate your friend as a beneficiary? There was a
question in the past involving live-in partners.
● A: One argument is that no you cannot because hindi naman married pero it’s really
immaterial because if you insure your own life, you can designate any beneficiary even
if they do not have any insurable interest. Insure mo sarili mo kahit sino pwedeng
beneficiary basta hindi disqualified. On the other hand, if a person will insure the life
of another, and he will designate himself as a beneficiary, he must have insurable
interest.
Heirs of Maramag v. Maramag (2009). A legally married man had a common law spouse that
bore 3 children. He took insurance policy on his life and designated his common law spouse and the 3
illegitimate children. When he died, their rights were questioned for lack of insurable interest and
disqualified.
Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be named
beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot make any donation to him. If a
concubine is made the beneficiary, it is believed that the insurance contract will still remain valid,
but the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not to the concubine, for evidently, what is
prohibited under Art. 2012 is the naming of the improper beneficiary.
The ruling is that the common law spouse is disqualified but there is no prohibition on the
designation of illegitimate children as beneficiaries. Lack of insurable interest does not matter
because the man himself insured his own life.
Q: If you have four beneficiaries, one is disqualified, what happens to the share of the
disqualified beneficiary? Will the estate get it?
● A: No, it will go to the co-beneficiaries. So ang mangyayari ay instead of ¼, magiging
⅓ na ang share ng children — this is the new rule under RA no. 10607. ‘Pag may
co-beneficiaries, sa kanila mapupunta ang share ng disqualified.
When else will the estate get the proceeds?
● No designated beneficiaries
● Beneficiary is disqualified no co-beneficiaries and no provision in the contract
● If the policy itself designates the estate as the beneficiary
● Other cases: the beneficiary’s designation is subject to a contingency and the event did not
materialize, then the proceeds will go to the estate.
Creditor as a beneficiary
There are two types:
(1) Designated as a person who is not a creditor. You will designate him whether he is a creditor
or not)
(2) Designated in his capacity as creditor. Then the creditors’ right to recover will depend on the
amount of credit
EXAMPLE: A owes 1M to the creditor, hence can recover 1M. But if the 1M or 50% has been claimed,
then the rest will go to the estate. Pero be careful with the wording of the problem. If he was
designated not as a creditor, then the extent of recovery will not depend on his credit)
Endowment Policy
● Dependent on the death of the insured.
● EXAMPLE: Within 15 years, the insured dies, the beneficiary can get the proceeds. If he does
not die, he can get the proceeds on its face value.
BAR TIP: If it is an insurable interest in life insurance, then there is no alternative to Section 10 but
to memorize all those persons. For example, the question is how to determine if there is insurable
interest in the life of a particular person? Look if it is mentioned in Section 10.
Test by Exclusion
● Memorize section 10. It is excluded if it is not under Section 10.
● Blood relatives by themselves will not by blood itself establish insurable interest.
BAR TIP: Just because one person is not covered by one paragraph in section 10, does not mean there
is no applicable provision. Memorize section 10. Take note of the question being presented.
Test to Determine Insurable Interest
● Will the insured be “damnified” for the loss or damage of the property?
○ If the answer is yes, then there will be insurable interest.
● What kind of right or interest? When will it be damnified?
(1) Interest by ownership
(2) Interest by virtue of contract (i.e. possessor, borrower in commodatum,
usufructuary, lease if for a fee)
● Why do they have the interest? APPLY THE TEST.
One property involved, but two insurance policies that are both valid and binding.
● Is there double insurance? No, because the two insurable interests are different.
○ EXAMPLE: The mortgagor and the mortgagee have separate insurable interests and the
extent of recovery.
● If the mortgagee is the creditor, his recovery is dependent on the amount of the credit. If
already paid, he can no longer recover.
● Can the mortgagor recover if the credit is already paid? No. Unless he is designated as the
beneficiary. If the mortgagee insured the property and designated himself as beneficiary, the
mortgagor cannot recover because it's a separate contract.
● Paramount v. Castro (2016) - can mortgagee be enjoined as a party because the
mortgagor/ee have interest over the property? Yes, because both of them have insurable
interests.
Sec. 77. CASH and CARRY RULE: Insurance policy is not valid and binding until there is no
payment of premium.
Here, the contract is already perfected but the liability of the insurer is subject to payment of
premium. Not necessary for the perfection of the contract but to make the insurance liable
EXAMPLE: Kung hindi pa bayad ang premium kasi ayaw tanggapin ng insurer tapos nagkaroon ng loss,
liable na ang insurer.
Q:If the insurer approved the policy, there is a perfected contract but the insured did not pay
premium and the insurer filed an action for the recovery of the premium. Will it prosper?
A: No, because the payment of premium is not actionable. The effect of non-payment will only
bar the insured to recover should there be loss.
Liability of the insurer to be subject to the whole payment for the premium
If the premium is already paid, liability of the insurer already attaches. However, the parties
can agree that the liability of the insurer can be attached even if there is no payment of premium
yet.
● Attached by agreement of the parties - can file a case. The credit terms have already passed
whether or not loss occurred. Insured will be liable subject to the condition of the insurer
(EXAMPLE: may credit pero naghihirap)
● Not paid within credit term - insurer can file an action
Exceptions to the rule when premium payment must be made for policy to be valid and binding
A rule which is no longer controlling is if payment is made through installments, at least one
must be paid. Now, the Supreme Court recognizes that the pure credit term is valid and binding.
Concealment v. Misrepresentation
Discussed in the case of Insurance Life Assurance Co., Ltd v. Heirs of Alvarez (2018) where
the age of insured disclosed was allegedly fraudulent. The Court held that it is more of a
representation. It is an inducement to enter into a contract
Since it is a case of representation, the rule is that the representation must be fraudulent or in
bad faith. In this case, wala namang proof of fraud. Nagkamali lang ng date na linagay pero kita
naman sa documents yung totoong date.
Good faith is a defense in representation. Pero pareho lang na test of materiality ang gamit.
Concealment Misrepresentation
Dispenses with proof of fraudulent intent Rescission under Section 45 remains subject to the
in cases of rescission due to concealment. basic precept of fraud having to be proven by clear and
Good faith is no defense in concealment. convincing evidence.
WARRANTY
Incontestability Clause
Still problematic until now because of the case of Sun Life v. Sibya (2016) case where the
insured died within the 2 year period but the court held that it is already incontestable (BAR TIP: If
asked, just say that there are two views on the matter).
Two Requirements:
1. It must be a life insurance policy; and
2. It must be reinforced 2 years from insurance or from last reinstatement
● Parang fresh period, hindi icoconsider yung original period. Should investigate
within the 2 year period, otherwise can no longer question.
● Died within 2 years - contestable bc there is no time to investigate.
● It can be shortened by agreement - the view is that it cannot be extended by
stipulation. Pwedeng 1 year pero hindi pwedeng 3 years
Right Of Subrogation
Insurer is subrogated to all the rights of the insured. The effect is automatic in property
insurance upon payment. In property insurance, it is still a practice to sign assignment of right
contracts. But the law does not require it so long as there is already payment.
Henson Jr. v UPCB (2019) with respect to prescriptive period not for insurance claim but for
the filing of a case against a third party. Following the principles of subrogation, the insurer only steps
into the shoes of the insured and therefore, for purposes of prescription, inherits only the remaining
period within which the insured may file an action against the wrongdoer.
To be sure, the prescriptive period of the action that the insured may file against the
wrongdoer begins at the time that the tort was committed and the loss/injury occurred against the
insured. The indemnification of the insured by the insurer only allows it to be subrogated to the
former's rights, and does not create a new reckoning point for the cause of action that the insured
originally has against the wrongdoer.
EXAMPLE: In quasi delict, the injured party is insured and has 4 years to file, and it took the insurer 1
year to pay. When the victim files a case, it will take 4 years. If insurance will pay, then the remaining
period lang.
Alpha Plus v Philippine Chapter Insurance (2021) provides for the prescriptive period for
filing an insurance claim.
Case law teaches that the prescriptive period for the insured's action for indemnity should be
reckoned from the "final rejection" of the claim. The rejection referred to should be construed as the
rejection in the first instance.
The prescriptive period should be reckoned from petitioner's receipt of the notice of rejection.
One (1) year or 365 days from January 24, 2009 would show that petitioner's prescriptive period to
file its insurance claim ends on January 24, 2010.
● Memorize the definition. It provides the test to determine if it is one of common carrier
● Does the entity hold itself out to the public as transporting goods or passengers? For a fee?
Intent is continuity of dealings
EXAMPLE: school bus, sidelines (ancillary to main business), hotels that provide transport from them
to the islands is a common carrier kahit walang franchise from LTFRB
De Guzman v. CA (1988) - yung may junk dealer. The court held that there was no distinction
between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity or as a mere “sideline”. It makes no distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and
one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither it distinguishes
between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,
Extraordinary diligence
● Negligence is presumed
● Take note of void provisions in common carriage that are valid in private carriage (Eg: in an
agreement, “we are not responsible for these goods. The shipper is invalid for all the goods.)
● Service provider outsourced by a drug company, pero yung tracking company walang ibang
buyer and is dedicated to the manufacturer. SC held its private carriage.
Liabilities
Q: What if there’s an agreement that the carrier will be liable for the goods?
A: No
Q: When talking about a shipowner’s responsibility where it is not a common carrier, is it also
possible to use it as a common carrier? Paano yun?
A: Charter who is using the vessel can be a common carrier
● Torres Madrid v. Feb Mitsui (2016)- Paano kung nisubcontract yung carriage? Pwede ka bang
common carrier pero wala kang vehicle, vessel or airplane? In this case it’s a tracking service.
Kaso na-hijack. There is no privity of contract between subcontractor and shipper. The fact
that A, original contractor, is not the one operating will not change the conclusion.
Subcontractor will be liable for quasi delict.
● Orient assurance v. Ong (2017) - Arrastre operator - not common carriers but public utilities.
It is questionable.
○ Diligence is higher than that of diligence of a good father of a family. It is akin to a
warehouseman (sa
○ Eg: an alien filed against the arrastre operator under COGSA. 1 year period is not
applicable with orient assurance.
● Stevedores - diligence of a good father of a family
● Registered owner - person who appears on the certificate of registration
○ Seller is liable under the registered owner rule. If the victim knows na binenta na sa
buyer na hindi registered owner. Solidary liabiilty for seller and buyer
Defenses
Pay particular attention to new provisions which were not part of the old Corporation Code.
Number one for Corporation Law, although it seems basic, they always ask questions where the
answer will be based on doctrine of separate personality. Okay, now, of course, as I remind you again
and again before, memorize yung definition, so, memorize the definition of corporation. And it’s also
important here because the definition of a corporation under Section 2 of the RCCP, provides us to the
different attributes of corporation:
It’s an artificial being, created by operation of law, that’s the right of succession, it has the
powers, attributes and properties that are expressly provided by law or incident to its
existence.
Now, for the first one, that embodies what is known as the doctrine of separate personality.
It’s an artificial being. It’s a being, it’s a person. As a person, it has a personality separate and
distinct from its stockholders, members. Now, as I said, every now and then, they ask questions, na
yun lang naman ang sagot
Q: For example, merong property yung corporation, somebody took it, who can file the case?
Can the stockholders file the case?
A: No. They are not real parties in interest. It is the corporation itself.
But one interesting case that can be involved in Bar question is Alvarado vs. Ayala Land ( 2017 ). It
was decided in 2017 but the case is really about an action to annul a sale, tax sale, for non-payment
of taxes, binenta yung part of the golf course. Okay, so ang question pwede ba sumali yung mga
members magfa-file an action to annul the sale? The court said yes. So now, of course, ordinarily,
kung property ng corporation ‘yan, yung corporation lang dapat. But what makes this different is that
their allegation is that they have interest over the land, yung golf course. And, in fact, as members,
they will be deprived of use and enjoyment of the golf club. Kasi yung binenta, parang nahati yung
golf course, hindi na talaga, they will not be able to completely make use of the golf club. And that’s
their interest. They also therefore, have the interest to protect, their use and enjoyment of the golf
club. So,they are also real parties in interest, in a sense. So, what I’m saying is that there seems not
of an exception. Kasi nga, meron rin silang cause of action. Their rights are also violated.
So, in other words, even if the property of the corporation is involved, pwede pa ring mag-file
ng case if they also have rights that were violated, independent of the interest of the corporation
Okay, related to separate personality, is the limited liability rule. Okay, so under the doctrine
of separate personality, obligations of the corporation are not obligations of stockholders. Okay. Hindi
pwedeng pagbayarin ang stockholders. Now, however, under the limited liability rule, the corporation
creditors can actually make the stockholders liable but their liability is limited, it’s limited to their
investment.
What is their investment?
It’s referring to unpaid subscription, okay, yung price to pay for acquiring shares under the
subscription agreement. So they are liable. The stockholders are liable, only up to that unpaid
subscription, which means that, if they are already fully paid, hindi na sila liable. Kung kalahati ang
binayaran nila, yung balance. They can be made to pay corporate creditors. Okay, so that’s reiterated
on Donina Hailey vs. Printwell. It's in 2011.
But I think the limited liability rule, and the trust fund doctrine are important for Bar exam
purposes because there are two recent cases where these doctrines were reiterated. So, isa ung 2020
case, well, the other one is March, 2021, while the other is November, 2020. Both involving trust fund
doctrine and the limited liability rule.
Q: Okay, so the question is this. So let’s just say, we’re talking about, ano ba ‘yung mga big
companies. So, let’s just say, San Miguel Corporation. Maraming stockholders ‘yan. Let’s say,
Mr. A is one of the stockholders ng San Miguel. Pero ‘di pa sya fully paid ng subscription price.
Let’s say, he has shares worth Php100,000.00, Php50,000.00 lang ‘yung nababayad niya for his
subscription. So, there is this, the creditor, may utang ‘yung San Miguel Corporation,
question, etong creditor, pwede nya bang kasuhan na kaagad ‘yung si Mr. A, who is the
unpaid subscriber, unpaid stockholder?
A: The answer is actually No. Okay. What I’m saying is this, under the doctrine, kahit na dun sa
Donina Hailey vs. Printwell, kaya lang na-file ng case, kaya lang na-implead ‘yung ano, unpaid
subscriber, is because the corporation whose already closed. I mean, ceased operating, so,
hindi na sila nag-ooperate, sarado na ‘yung company. That is why the limited liability rule was
applied. They were made to pay, up to their unpaid subscription. Okay. But, what is clear is
that these shareholders cannot be made liable immediately. Ang general rule pa rin is ‘yung
separate personality, yung doctrine of separate personality. In other words, kung may utang is
corporation, again in our example, San Miguel, San Miguel ang pagbayarin mo.
You will invoke the limited liability rule and make the stockholders liable in exceptional cases only. So
number 1, sa Donina Hailey, hindi na nag-ooperate, closed na ‘yung operations, they ceased
operating.
The other case is, if the debtor corporation is insolvent, okay, or dissolved, kung insolvent or
dissolved, pwede mo nang habulin ‘yung unpaid subscribers. Kung wala, walang proof, corporation pa
rin ang habulin mo. In other words, dapat ‘yung corporation is incapable of paying its obligation,
either because it’s already closed, is insolvent, or it is already dissolved. ‘Yung insolvency naman,
does not mean to be formal insolvency proceeding, but in these two recent cases, there’s another
one, sabi ng Supreme Court, ‘pag ni-release mo ‘yung mga subscriber from paying, you can still run
after them. Because release of the subscriber from the obligation to pay the unpaid subscription, it’s
actually a violation of the Trust Fund doctrine. Okay, so therefore, pwede mo pa rin silang habulin.
Okay. So, release in whole or in part, will actually prejudice corporate creditors and it will then be
considered as a violation of the Trust Fund doctrine. You can still recover from them under the limited
liability rule. What is limited is up to the unpaid subscription.
Q: Okay. So, in this March 18, 2021 case of Salido Jr., ang tanong diyan, pwede ba yung
Directors will issue a resolution na either i-rereduce ‘yung kanilang subscription or i-rerelease
‘yung subscription, babawasan or totally i-rerelease. Okay.
Is that allowed?
A: Sabi ng Court, No. Kasi violation nga ’yan ng Trust Fund doctrine. ‘Yung subscription
agreement, it binds everybody. You cannot even rescind them. You cannot release the
stockholders from their liability. Release will be in contravention of the trust fund doctrine.
A: Yes, but in the reduction of the capital stock, dapat di mapi-prejudice ‘yung creditors. That
is actually one of the requirements. Because, necessarily, it will reduce the capital stock,
pwedeng merong ma-release na subscription. Okay, but by express provision of law, there
should be no prejudice for creditors.
Doctrine of Piercing The Veil of Corporate Fiction
Now, of course, one situation where stockholders, directors, and officers, can be made liable
is if the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies. You pierce the veil, you’re a
creditor, you pierce the veil so that you will make the stockholders, directors, and officers liable. It
should have been the corporation who will pay, but kung hindi makabayad, you pierce the veil. And
you can do this if there is fraud, a public convenience may be defeated. But of course, the test that is
applied in many cases, recent cases is what the Supreme Court calls in one case, as the 3-pronged
control test, so control, but this is really an alter-ego case. Control, but it’s not ordinary control
because in another recent case, the question is:
What if one shareholder owns almost all the shares? Can you already pierce the veil of
corporate fiction?
A: No. You cannot. There should be other circumstances. In fact, by express provision of law,
kahit one-person corporation, who, obviously, is in control of that one-person corporation, you
still need to prove the presence of circumstances to justify piercing. So the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction serve limited liability rule, they all apply to OPCs -
one-person corporations. Okay.
So, control is not just ownership of the majority of shares, it should be complete domination.
Okay. The way I put it is that you actually do not consider the corporation as a separate entity. You do
not respect the sacredness of the personality.
For example, you mix things up, so ‘yung sa bahay mo, corporation, mix mo ‘yung mga employees,
mix mo rin ‘yung finances, halo-halo na sila doon, same office, same employees, you do not treat the
funds of the corporation as separate, you use one for the funds for your personal use, for your other
corporation. So all those circumstances should be considered.
One circumstance that will make an OPC liable, for instance, the director, shareholder liable is in the
sufficiently capitalized. So, manufacturing corporation OPC, pero ang funds mo naman
Php100,000.00, and so that’s the reason why ‘di makabayad. In that particular case, you can make the
shareholder liable. Okay. But in all other cases, you need to prove what is known as “probative
factors,” which are basically circumstances that will indicate complete domination. On top of that,
you need to prove the commission of a fraud for a wrong, including violation of statute or dishonesty.
So, it is a wrong, in other words. In this, wrong is the proximate cause of the loss or injury to the
director. Okay.
Take note that when you pierce the veil of corporate fiction, you are actually not destroying
the personality, you are not abrogating personality of the corporation. What happens only, is that you
will be allowed to go beyond the veil so that you can make persons with separate personality liable
for the obligations of the corporation. So, ‘pag reverse piercing naman, it’s the liability of
stockholders directors, you will try to make the corporation liable. So, that’s reverse.
Okay, for the nationality of the corporation, the important case is:
Roy III vs Herbosa. Okay. Just take note of that. So take note that the test that the case
merely affirms the circular of the SEC. So, if you are a foreigner, you want to know how many shares
can you acquire in partly nationalized corporation, so let’s say, limited sa 40%, public utility:
A: So, dalawa ‘yung computation. You determine the 40% on the basis of the total outstanding
capital stock, entitled to vote. So, of course, there will be no problem kung lahat common and
voting. Kasi kung lahat common and voting, isa lang computation nyan, just get the 40% of all
outstanding shares. Eto naman, nagkakaroon lang ng problema, kung merong voting shares at
merong non-voting shares. But to put it simply, kung i-compute mo ‘yung 40% foreign
ownership, i-compute mo ‘yan 40% ng voting, and 40% ng total voting plus non-voting. So, two
separate computations.
So for example, one million ‘yung shares, okay, ilan ba ang 40% nyan?
A: 400k.
If you are a foreigner, let’s say, it’s a public utility, can you acquire shares?
A: Yes
But, there is a requirement too. There should be separate computations for the total outstanding
shares too.
So, for instance, you were able to acquire, let’s say, 300k shares, okay, non-voting, can
you still acquire voting shares?
A: Yes, you can. Pupunuin mo lang sa 40%, okay. Because it’s a twin requirement. Anyways, so
just check the circular of the SEC. Just know, that is the prevailing test.
Control Test
Now, you also have the control test. In the control test, actually, you can find this in your
Foreign Investment Act. So, this one, actually determines the nationality of the stockholder.
EXAMPLE: So, like in the same public utility, X Corporation, owns 50k shares, so ang tanong diyan:
‘Yun bang 50k shares na ‘yan, owned by X, is Filipino owned or foreign owned? Or is it
partly Filipino or foreign? Si X ung shareholder, ang problema usually is ‘yung stockholder
na corporation, partly owned din ng foreigners. Let us 30% of the outstanding capital stock
in X Corporation are owned by foreigners, will you consider that 30% in determining if the
shares owned by X is foreign owned or Filipino owned?
A: Not anymore. Kasi the moment na umabot sa 60% ‘yung Filipino ownership dun sa
stockholders who own the shares in that corporation, owned by that corporation, are Filipino
owned. So that is what the control test means.
Incorporation Stage
Moving on, let’s talk about, well, not exactly changes. For the incorporation stage. You know,
of course, that before, ‘di pwede ung juridical persons. Now, it is allowed. Okay.
Corporations now can be incorporators. Unlike before, only natural persons can be incorporators. Pero
pagdating sa directors, ganun pa rin, natural persons pa rin. Okay. Hindi pwedeng corporation as
director.
● There’s no more minimum. Before, five and minimum, now, pwede na isa, but SEC
clarified na when you say one, sa OPC lang yan.
● Pero kung hindi OPC, kelangan, at least, two. Okay. Now, this rule, actually, in
practice, ina-apply din ng SEC ‘yan, dun sa directors. There’s no circular on this pero
now, for corporations that are not OPC, ina-allow nila ‘yung two incorporators and two
directors. So, dalawa rin ‘yung nagiging directors for corporations other than OPC.
● Pero kung isa lang, dapat OPC, specially, if it is, when it comes to incorporators.
● Now, if it is not an OPC, pwede rin ang juridical persons
● Okay, so, these are the special rules. Unlike before, wala na ring residency
requirement, which basically means, pwedeng non-residents ‘yung mga incorporators.
Pati directors ganun din.
BAR TIP: Just take note of these new rules because there’s a tendency na magtanong dun sa mga
changes brought about by the Revised Corporation Code of the Philippines, which is fairly recent
development
Articles of Incorporation
Okay now, for Articles of Incorporation itself, some of the changes include the rule on corporate
name.
What applies now is what is known as the distinguishability test.
EXAMPLE: Once recent case on Corporate Name is Change Corporate name. Okay, well, when you
change the corporate name, it’s like changing your name, our names. Hindi naman nagbabago ‘yung
tao, it’s the same person.
So, in a 2018 case, for example, nanalo ng bidding ‘yung corporation, tapos nagpalit ng pangalan,
sabi niya, ay hindi na ‘yan ang nanalo kasi iba na ‘yung corporation. That’s not the case. When the
corporation changes its name, it is in no sense a new corporation. It is not a successor of the original
corporation. It is the same entity. Okay, same right, same liability. Kung nanalo siya ng bidding before,
siya pa rin ‘yung tao na nanalo, same person, so there is no change.
Term
Now, another change of course, is the term. It used to be limited to 50. Remember that one of
the attributes of a corporation, is that it is, well, the right of succession, which basically means,
continuity of the life of the corporation. Continuity of existence.
But before, there’s a right of succession but it’s actually limited - 50 years. In theory, pwede namang
tuluy-tuloy. Indefinite, but indefinite only in the sense that you can renew. Okay. You can re-extend
the corporate term.
Now, the problem of course, is that, nakakalimutan. So, syempre, 50 years ‘yan, baka ‘yung original
stockholders, wala nag lahat ‘yan, original officers. So, sometimes, they forget.
The problem is if there’s a fixed term, automatic na madi-dissolve. Okay, so the solution of Congress
is to make all the terms perpetual. Okay, perpetual na ‘yung term of all existing corporation, at the
time of effectivity of the Revised Corporation Code of the Philippines.
Pwede bang sabi nila: ayaw ko ng perpetual term. Gusto ko fixed term. So, ang term ko,
let's say, is 50 years, gusto ko 50 years. Pwede ba ‘yun?
A: Pwede but not anymore. Lagpas na ‘yung period, 2019 pa ‘yun. Merong period to notify the
SEC. So, kung gusto mong i-retain ‘yung period, dapat i-notify mo ‘yung SEC.
But note that, the perpetual term is effective for all corporations, without doing anything. So,
meaning, self-executory ‘yung rule. You don’t need to amend the articles, you don’t need to give
notice to the SEC when all you want is a perpetual term. Because by operation of law, all corporations
have perpetual terms. As I said, ang pwede lang, is to retain the fixed term by notifying the SEC.
Okay.
So, now, this actually is an issue, in relation to another rule. So, under the Corporation Code, as I
said, ‘pag may fixed term, well, even now, ‘yan naman ‘yung rule.
‘Pag may term, like 50 years, nag-expire ‘yung term, ano ang effect niyan?
A: Dissolved na ‘yung corporation. Automatic. Okay. Wala nang applications sa SEC. Pag
nag-expire the following day, wala na ‘yung corporation - dissolved. Of course, subject to
liquidation. Okay. So that is the rule. That’s the rule before, that’s the rule now.
Revival of Corporation
Eto lang ang kaibahan: Before, sa Corporation Code, wala ka nang magagawa, you can’t do
anything about it. Ang pwede mo lang gawin, mag-file ng panibagong application for incorporation.
Same name, kaya lang, ‘di na ‘yan same corporation. It will be a new corporation. Okay. Kasi patay na
‘yung dati. ‘Di mo na mabubuhay ‘yun. So, ‘pag may bago, i-aasign mo pa ‘yung mga properties,
transfer mo ‘yung mga properties kasi it’s a new corporation.
Now, what is good about the present provision is that there’s already a remedy, which is an
application for revival of the corporate term. Okay. But, take note, under SEC rules, hindi lang
‘yung expiration ng term ang covered niyan, pati ‘yung mga na-revoke for non-filing of minor
violations, like filing for GIS, filing of financial statements.
Substantial Compliance
Now, but for being a corporation, you can either strictly comply with the requirements but its’
not even the only compliance. Ang sabi, substantially complied, pwede na ‘yun.
Eh, pano kung kulang-kulang ‘yung Articles mo? Mga important requisite?
A: That will be colorable compliance.
Okay, but let me emphasize this, whether De Jure or De Facto, kelangan merong certificate of
incorporation. You need to apply it to the SEC.
Okay, so the 2018 case of the Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima vs. Alzona, so yan
‘yung leading case diyan, more recent one. So, I’m sure, you studied this in your law school. So,
merong Sisters, they have this association, wala pa silang corporation. They took care of an old lady
who donated a parcel of land in favor of the Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima. Ang problema,
at the time of the donation, wala pa ‘yung corporation, nag-aapply pa lang sila sa SEC. It was only
later that the certificate was issued. Now, it is important because it is from the time of the issuance
of the certificate of incorporation that the life of the corporation starts. So, pag wala pang certificate
of incorporation, there will even be no De Facto corporation. Walang De Jure, walang De Facto.
Because, remember, a De Facto corporation is like any De Jure corporation, pareho lang ‘yan halos,
with all attributes of the corporation - separate personality, separate obligations, separate
properties, rights, etcetera.
Ang kaibahan lang, the only difference is that the personality of the De Facto corporation is subject
to attack by the State. Pwedeng mag-file ng quo-warranto proceeding, which means that, nasa State
iyan, kung ayaw mag-file, it will continue. Okay, so that is the only difference.
Pero ‘dun sa mga features, attributes, pareho lang ung De Facto and De Jure corporation, but for you
to be able to apply, dapat may certificate of incorporation.
But in the Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima, hindi naman na-cancel ‘yung donation. Ang
ginamit, the rule on corporation by estoppel. So that is an important rule. But let me connect this to
contracts before incorporation.
Subscription Contract
Pero ‘pag subscription contract, walang issue, kasi even before incorporation, pwedeng
mag-enter into subscription agreements, which are even binding for a period of six months.
Board of Directors
Now, Board of Directors. Maraming cases paulit-ulit. A recent case involves the business
judgment rule.
Business Judgment Rule — Ano ba ‘yung business judgment rule? So, judgements of
resolutions, judgements of the Board on any business matter binds the corporation. And, this
business judgments cannot be questioned. You cannot appeal it. The stockholders cannot
reverse the business judgment. Not even the courts can question it. Okay.
What if the argument of a shareholder is ‘di dapat i-implement and Board Resolution na
‘yan kasi merong loss ang corporation. Is that tenable?
A: Still No. Not even a possibility of loss will result in the validity of the judgment of the
directors. Subject to the director’s liability under Section 30.
Okay. But the business judgment is binding. Even particular actions that are part of the special powers
of the corporation, like declaration of dividends.
In a recent case, although the recent case, hindi na covered ng coverage ng Bar exam this year, pero
important pa rin. ‘Yung increase or decrease of capital stock, ang sabi ng Supreme Court, basta lahat
ng requirements complied with, aaprubahan ‘yan ng SEC. Business judgment na ‘yun. So kailangan
lang, andyan ‘yung mga requirements pero ‘yung merit, ‘yung business merit nung decision to reduce,
to declare dividends, that cannot be questioned, that is part of the business judgment rule. Okay.
Now, that is the rule because it is the Board who acts for corporation, who does all the business of the
corporation. So, ‘yung Board ang masusunod sa corporation - hindi ‘yung officer, hindi ‘yung
President, hindi ‘yung Chairman, the Board. Okay.
Can it be 2 years?
A: No. Hindi pwede. Kahit ilagay mo sa by-laws ‘yun, invalid ‘yan kasi 1 year lang.
Now, because the term is 1 year, once the 1 year period expires, meron nang vacancy. Okay. This
problem came up because of one case and previous Bar examination too. So, for the replacement of
directors to fill vacancies.
FOR EXAMPLE: While the rule is, if it is thru removal or expiration of term, dapat stockholders ‘yung
mag-elect ng replacement. Pero kung resignation or death, the remaining directors constituting a
quorum can elect the replacement.
Ang question before is, paano kung namatay siya after the expiration of the term?
● A: So after the expiration of the term, ang tawag diyan - hold-over nung mga
directors, they are serving the hold-over capacity. So, while doing so in a hold-over
capacity, the director died, can the directors replace the deceased director? No. Not
anymore kasi nag-expire na ‘yung term. Basta lumampas na ‘yung 1 year term,
stockholders na kasi there’s already a vacancy and the reason is the expiration of the
term. So, technically, hindi ‘yung death ang nag-cause ng vacancy, ‘yung expiration ng
term.
Okay. Now, but actually, if you will look at the RCCP, ayaw nila ‘yang hold-over. Okay. Ayaw nila. You
can see that from the provisions kasi for one, ‘pag walang election, kelangan i-reset mo ‘yung annual
stockholders pitch, ‘yung resetting. And then, i-report mo pa sa SEC kaagad. Dapat mag-meeting pa
within 60 days.
Now, if the problem before is paano kung ‘di naman sinasadya? Wala lang umattend, so
walang quorum, ayaw ring magbigay ng proxy, walang pakialam ‘yung mga stockholders. It
happens in corporations. So, laging walang quorum kaya hindi nagkakaroon ng election. So,
reset nang reset. So, what’s the remedy?
● A: Well, in those cases, specially kung talagang ayaw tumawag ng meeting, a
shareholder can file an application with SEC. So, SEC ‘yung tatawag ng meeting and use
the important rule there. Iba na ‘yung quorum ‘pag SEC ang tumawag.
Ang usual quorum is 50% plus 1 of the outstanding capital stock pero kung the directors refuse to call
a meeting, laging walang annual meeting, tapos nag-apply sa SEC, and the SEC called for a meeting,
whoever attends is the quorum.
So, halimbawa, 40% ang andun, hindi 50% plus 1, pwede ba mag-elect na sila?
● A: Yes. Kasi the moment na tumawag ‘yung SEC, those who will attend will be the
quorum. That is an important change under the Revised Corporation Code of the
Philippines.
Let us suppose, nagkakaroon naman ng election, except that the director before the
election was removed, tinanggal siya. Let’s say tinanggal siya pero ang tumawag ng
meeting is one of the directors. Isang director lang, nagkaroon ng meeting, inaya niya
‘yung iba pero ng ni-remove nila ‘yung isang director, would that be valid?
● A: No. Kasi specific ‘yung sa removal. Kailangan the meeting will be called by
Corporate Secretary upon the request of the President or the stockholders.
So, in one case, Cinco vs. Bernas, ang tumawag ng meeting is a committee, so, invalid ‘yung
removal. The problem, of course is, pag magkakaso ka diyan, tatanda ka hindi matatapos ‘yung case.
So, certainly, ‘di matatapos ‘yung case, normally, for one year, lalo na kung aabot ka hanggang
Supreme Court. The problem is, ‘pag nag-expire ‘yung one year, tapos na ‘yung term mo. Let’s say,
okay, kaso ka, tinanggal ka illegally,nag-file ka ng case sa RTC, commercial court, nanalo ka dun,
appeal sa CA, panalo ka na naman. Pumunta ka sa Supreme Court, panalo na naman, hanggang
Supreme Court panalo ka. Oh di bumalik ka na ngayon sa corporation. Okay, balik na ako as director
kasi panalo ako, final and executory.
Note: If there is an issue regarding election of directors, ang remedy mo is to file an election contest,
pero may period, 15 days from the election
● For one, kapag hindi corporate officer, and may dismissal, he was dismissed, ang punta
mo Labor, as an employee, kahit ang tawag pa sa iyo officer
● Kapag hindi ka nireelect, you can complain that there is illegal dismissal.
● But you are a corporate officer and you are not re-elected, technically, that is not
dismissal, non-reelection lang ‘yun. But if you have reason to complain, sa commercial
court ka pupunta. Sa RTC, hindi sa Labor.
● So, it’s important then to determine who is a corporate officer
The rule now is check the by-laws. Tingnan mo sa by-laws kung ‘yung office mo andun. Like,
for instance, general manager. Kung general manager ka ba, officer ka na rin automatically, not
necessarily. Kung sa by-laws, walang position na general manager, hindi ka corporate officer. Okay, so
the Supreme Court said that the office must be created in the charter, by-laws and he must be
elected either by the Board or the stockholders. So, ‘yun ‘yung rule for one to be considered a
corporate officer.
In one case, for instance, the claim is that the position is a corporate office because sabi nila, eh,
elected by the Board. That alone is not enough. Kung ‘yung position mismo is not in the charter or in
the by-laws.
Okay, another rule that is always being cited in recent cases, is the doctrine of apparent
authority. It starts from the premise na, for actions to be binding, dapat approved ng Board.
So ‘pag walang resolution, that’s not an authorized act. It can even be unenforceable for lack of
authority of the agent but subject to the Doctrine of Apparent Authority. So, ang contents naman
niyan, just apply the rules on agency, ganun din. Same.
Liability of Directors
Next is the liability of directors. So, marami ring cases diyan, paulit-ulit. There are many cases
where the Supreme Court ruled that, well, cited Section 30 on the liability of corporate officers, and
directors, and trustees, and officers.
So, voting on patently unlawful acts, acting in bad faith, gross negligence, conflict of interest
situation, etcetera. So, just take note of the cases when directors are liable. Pwede ring itanong
‘yan.
But one recent question is this, so kung meron ka bang violation nung Section 30 cases
when directors are liable, does it mean that they are criminally liable? Before, under the
Corporation Code, ‘yung penalty clause ng Corporation Code before, Section 144. Okay.
‘Yung criminal liability for violation of the provisions of the Corporation Code. So kung
meron kang violation that cites Section 30 ( 31 before sa Corporation Code ), criminally
liable ka na ba under the penal clause ng the Revised Corporation Code
A: No. It does not follow. Because the rule is, the penal clause, under the Corporation Code,
can also, of course, same principle, under the Revised Corporation Code, applicable lang ;yan
kung may specific provision that makes it criminal.
For example, ‘yung Corporate Secretary, kailangang mag-submit ng GIS ( General Information Sheet )
sa SEC, mag-report sa SEC. Hindi niya ginawa.
Pwede ba siyang file-an ng case for violation of the Revised Corporation Code?
A: No. Hindi. Kasi hindi naman sinabi dun na ‘pag hindi ka nag-file, eh criminally liable ka.
For powers of the corporation, let’s go back to the definition of corporation. Mahalaga talaga
‘yan kasi nakalagay dun sa definition
● It has the powers, properties, and attributes that are created, that are conferred by law, or
incident to its existence. Okay, which basically means that a corporation has - the powers of
the corporation are those that are expressly provided by law. So, express powers or incident to
its existence. Pero kung meron kang express power, and incidental powers, it follows na meron
kang implied powers. You imply it from the express powers. So, express powers provided by
law. When you say law, kasama na ‘yung Articles of Incorporation.
There are also express powers provided by law. Like, to sue and be sued. You can sue, implied na
‘yung pag-hahire mo ng lawyers, preparations in entering into transactions, in preparation for filing of
cases. So, ‘yun namang incidental, incidental to its existence. Don’t confuse implied from incidental.
Incidental, the way we put it is this: the power that is incidental exist, because it is a person, it is a
juridical entity.
‘Yun namang implied, normally, implied from an express power. Okay, but to my mind, you can imply
it to from an incidental power. Okay. So that’s the first important rule. Now,
If the power you will exercise is not included in the express power, not included in the implied
power, not included in the incidental power, but you’re still doing it.
Ultra vires act. And there are, well, a couple of cases on ultra vires acts, one, it’s just to reiterate na
‘pag ultra vires ‘yung contract, voidable. But this is a different kind of voidable contract. Ang ibig
sabihin lang ng voidable dito, it can be ratified, ‘yung ultra vires. So, let’s leave it at that, yan na
‘yung rule.
I have opinions on the contrary but don’t follow my opinion, with respect to that kasi eto ‘yung
Supreme Court ruling. It’s voidable, it can be ratified, if it is an ultra vires act. Okay.
In fact, dahil sa recent case, hindi kasama dun sa coverage, pero ang problema, ‘yung principle
kasama. ‘Yun naman ang sinasabi nila, so ang ibig sabihin, I’m talking about doctrine of corporate
opportunity. Okay.
Paano mo malalaman na dapat sa corporation iyan? Okay. How do you know that it really
belongs to the corporation, that it’s an opportunity belonging to the corporation?
A: Now, if it is not within the power of the corporation kasi ultra vires is not part of the
express power, or implied power, or incidental power, ‘di covered iyan, ‘di iyan kasama doon
sa corporate opportunity. Okay.
What if the corporation is no longer operating? Bankrupt na, insolvent
A: O hindi pa rin covered iyan kasi dapat opportunity that belongs to the corporation, that can
be undertaken by the corporation
O pero paano kung may funds naman talaga ‘yung corporation? Paano mo malalaman na
‘yung business you pursued should have been the business of the corporation?
A: So, you will know that by checking if the business competes with the business of the
corporation. So, kung competing ‘yung business, applicable ‘yung doctrine of corporate
opportunity. Okay.
BAR TIP: So, that is worth remembering. Unfortunately, as I said, other rules regarding this are
memory work, kailangang i-memorize natin ‘yung rules sa interlocking directorship, kailan voidable,
kailan mara-ratify, anong requirements. All these are material, so, I cannot help you there, but I’m
telling you lahat ‘yang provisions na ‘yan sa Board of Directors, lahat ng provisions, powers of the
corporation, eh tinatanong paulit-ulit, recurring. Iba-iba nga lang pero hindi. History of the Bar
examinations napagtanungan na ‘yan. Okay. ‘Yung bandang ruling, hindi gaano. Specially, mga special
types of corporations, specific rules lang dun, pero etong hanggang at least sa powers, lahat ‘yan
mahalaga. Okay.
So, let’s just make the most out of this. We cannot really discuss all of it.
Shares
Shares, marami ring questions dun, I mean, problems and cases involving shares. Now, the
shares, of course, is intangible. It is represented if this is evidenced by the stock certificate.
But once the application is already filed, wala nang bawian ‘yan. Okay. What I call this, a Locked-in
Rule. Naka-locked in na ‘yung investment mo.
● Kung hindi ka pa nagbabayad, magbabayad ka - limited liability rule. Hindi pwedeng i-release.
Hindi na pwedeng “ayawan na,” “ayawan na,” “ayoko na.” Mababawi mo lang iyan,
investment mo, ‘pag mag-liquidate.
● Or, in some exceptional cases, like reducing the capital stock, or where the corporation is
allowed to acquire its own shares. Pero, other than that, your investment will stay with the
corporation.
● You cannot take it back. You cannot even say “ay, nagva-violate ‘tong corporation na ‘to, hindi
na kumikita rito, iab ‘yung promise nila, niloko ako.” But even then, you cannot rescind it.
That will be in violation of the trust fund doctrine.
Now, moreso, hindi mo na maka-cancel ‘yan, kung meron nang corporation. So, violation na nga ‘yung
trust fund doctrine.
Pagka naman, after incorporation, the moment ma-perfect ‘yung subscription agreement, the
subscriber becomes a shareholder, whether fully paid or not. Okay.
Ano ba iyon?
A: ‘Yung the right to get your Stock Certificate. Dapat diyan, fully paid ka. Pero ‘yung
attending meetings, votings, dividend, lahat iyan, you’re entitled to it, unless, you are
delinquent. Pero ‘yung delinquency, kailangan merong call
But now, if you transfer your share, can you still unpay?
A: Hindi ‘yan binding sa corporation. Hindi pwedeng i-register. Okay. Because remember,
for the transfer of shares, you have basically three requirements:
➔ Indorsement of the stock certificate,
➔ Delivery of the stock certificate, and then,
➔ Recording of the transfer
RELEVANT CASES:
Even if you already delivered or indorsed your certificate, if it is not registered, it’s not binding on
the corporation. It is also not binding on third persons. Eto rin ang mahalaga, I mean, kung ako ang
magtatanong, tatanungin ko to, ‘yung sa Kiat vs. Ayala Corporation, 2018 yan. Halimbawa, may
creditor ‘yung shareholder, inatttach niya ngayon ‘yung share, sabi niya, hindi na ako may-ari niyan
kasi binenta ko na ‘yan. Okay. Hindi lang na-report sa stock and transfer book.
But one clarification, the Supreme Court in Andaya vs. Rural Bank, sabi ng Supreme Court, pwedeng
mag-file ng mandamus, kung ayaw namang i-register. So iba namang situation ito. Ini-reregister, ayaw
i-register ng corporate secretary. Sabi ng Supreme Court, pwede kang mag-file ng mandamus to
compel the registration. Okay. But a side issue in Andaya vs. Rural Bank, a case is cited, sabi nga eh,
“dapat may SPA kasi wala pa namang stock certificate, so walang indorsement, so hindi pwedeng
ma-transfer, kung mata-transfer, dapat ‘yung registered stockholder ang mag-request, dapat may
SPA.” Sabi ng Court: “hindi na kailangan ‘yan, basta ma-prove mo na may transfer right.” Meron, in
this case, may deed of assignment, may clearance from BIR, so, there’s really no doubt that there’s a
transfer. In those cases, mandamus is available Okay.
Note: Regarding stockholders too, know the different rights. Tinatanong din ‘yung appraisal right,
requisites, pre-emptive right, right to inspect, we’re running out of time so I’m just mentioning these
rules, kasi tinatanong din ‘yung right to inspect. Just check that, kasi maraming cases din on the right
to inspect. And they may ask questions regarding that.
For example, sabi ng Supreme Court, kahit na meron nang resolution, meron pang right to inspect
during the liquidation period. So, available pa ‘yun. Pending liquidation, eh, may right to inspect.
Meron pang criminal liability. You will prevent it. So it is also clear under the present law, pwede kang
mag-appoint ng auditor, lawyer - to inspect. Pwede kang kumuha ng copies.
So, for the special types of corporation, just look into OPCs. So, na-mention nama natin ‘yung
importance.
● So, laging stock corporation ‘yung OPC.
● Kailangan natural person, trust and estate
● Single shareholder can be a Director, President, and Treasurer
● But you cannot be a Corporate Secretary
RELEVANT CASES: There are two leading cases na it’s important for me to mention.
1) Kolin Electronics Co. Inc. v. Kolin Philippines International Inc. (2015) - Siguro naman ‘yung
nagle-lecture sa Intellectual Property is also emphasizing this. Wala na ‘yung holistic test. Ang
meron na lang is dominant feature, because that is what is contemplated under the Intellectual
Property Law. So the dominancy test is the only test, according to the Court. Kay ano yata to, kay
Justice Caguioa na decision.
2) Zuneca Pharmaceuticals vs. Natrapharm (2020) - I think, this was also Justice Caguioa’s
decision.
● So, remember, ‘yung sa trademark, first to file rule. ‘Yung registration right; which is, of
course, from the filing of the application, meron ka nang right. Okay. Hindi naman kailangang
makakuha ka ng certificate.
So the problem is, what if meron nang gumagamit niyan sa Philippines?
A: Remember, prior use is not necessary for the registration of the trademark.
Pero, what if, hindi ikaw ang unang gumamit, ikaw lang ang unang nag-register?
A: So, ‘yun ‘yung issue diyan. Okay. Here's the rule under Zuneca vs. Natrapharm: If
you will file the application, knowing that somebody else is using it, meaning,
registration is in bad faith, ‘yung registration mo is void. It can be questioned. Okay.
Pero kung hindi ikaw ang unang gumamit, somebody else used it, pero good faith ka,
nag-apply ka ng trademark, valid ‘yung registration. And you have the right over the
mark. But here’s the other qualification: ‘yung unang gumamit, good faith din naman
‘yun, hindi mo pwedeng pigilan sa paggamit. Okay. You cannot even make him liable for
damages. He is protected too. So, that is Zuneca vs. Natrapharm.
So, those are the two leading cases that have important doctrines, new doctrines under the
Intellectual Property Law. Okay. And since, may involvement si Justice Caguioa diyan, so, its’ worth
remembering. I think that’s about it but you have to - for Intellectual Property, kailangang alam niyo
kung ano ba ‘yung trademark, ano ‘yung copyright, ano ‘yung patent.
So, ‘yung author naman, paano kung joint creation ang work? Sa copyright, paano kung
commissioned work? Paano kung employee mo? So all these questions are important. Duration din.
SPECIAL BAR TIPS: And so, as I said, hindi ko na possibly discussed everything. But I think, we gave you
substantial notes on the more important one. So, ‘yun namang Intellectual Property, although
kailangan nating aralin din, the reality is konti lang ang tinatanong dun
● Okay. So, ‘yung concentration natin ngayon: RCCP and Insurance - yan marami. Tinatanong
iyan, specially sa RCCP. But of course, it’s really better to cover all subjects. So, let the
coverage provided by the Supreme Court be your guide.
● There’s still time to go over them. Don’t neglect some doctrines or rules that you find na hindi
na importante kasi sayang din if you miss one question, sayang. That might determine if you
will pass or fail. So, we will end on that note.
— — — END — — —
POLITICAL LAW
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento
October 10, 2022
SCRIBES: Hannah Morales | Eros Cabauatan | Sherry Jane Pagay | Chanelle Mae Ann Abagat | Jose Francisco Milo | Abby Aquino
CHECKED BY: HANNAH KEZIAH MORALES (Chairperson for Academics) | ADRIAN MACASAQUIT (Deputy for Academics)
FOREWORDS
NOTE: Please refer to the presentation shared and provided by Comm. Sarmiento for Political Law
Bar Lecture
● To our future lawyers, you claim that you will be a lawyer and you will be. It’s a matter
of time. Magandang hapon sa kanilang lahat and we hope that we will have a fruitful
review this afternoon.
● First, I’d like to thank Dean Ulan for this bar review for being so fatherly to our student
and to our students. You have a very supportive dean. Thank you to Atty. Jun who has
been very helpful for facilitating this bar review. Maraming maraming salamat Atty. Jun.
I. INTRODUCTION
● Nature of 2022 Bar Examinations
○ What is the nature? I’m sure by this time, handang handa na kayo. You are
well-prepared. After all, this months of preparation and years of study in the college
of law. So what will be the nature of the bar examinations? Ito po ay balik sa dati. The
pre-bar, the pre-2022 meaning February 2022.
○ It was a limited bar examinations. Now we are back to normal.
○ So the law on state which is in relation to the citizens which is the captions for the
political law had a 30% that covered taxation and labor law. Today, labor law is
separated from political law. At balik po sa dati, 15% po ang bibigay sa political law.
○ And the same digital examinations.
● Prognosis
○ Now, what will be my prognosis for this 2022 bar examinations.
■ Before the Feb. 2022 bar examinations my prognosis was and I was proven correct,
that the bar examiner at the time, Dean Marvic Leonen who became a justice of
the Supreme Court. I was saying that he would be very liberal in the bar exams
and that many, many would pass the bar exams considering the nature at the time
which was at the height of the pandemic and then knowing also the examiner
himself, I was telling myself maraming papasa and true enough maraming pumasa
po sa nakaraan examinations.
■ More than 8,000 pass the bar examinations.
■ No regrets, no regrets (for not taking the bar earlier). So I think this is the best
time, every time is always the best time for all of you. And you are given the
chance to review for this forthcoming bar examination
○ It will not be a return to the Feb. 2022 liberality. I’m sure, I’m certain, the chairman
will be more strict this time.
● Preparation, A Must
○ Preparation is a must. But more important than attending bar lectures, is your stock
knowledge and the preparations you have made during our political review class year
ago. And your preparations as a freshmen, as a sophomore, as a junior in the San Beda
College of Law.
● What to Expect from the Lecture
○ Survey and Analysis of Judicial Doctrines in Political Law and International Law
■ A survey and analysis of judicial doctrines in political and international law. I did
not include taxation. Though I saw taxation in the syllabus because number one it
is not normally part of our political review, it separates from political law and
international law. And honestly, I have to be very honest, taxation is not my line of
expertise. If you are a professor who taught constitutional law, you will read and
read the lectures and the lessons and the knowledge from attending classes and
from this lectures.
○ Flashback: Bar Examination Questions Through the Years
■ I will not mention specifically all the questions or discuss them but give you what
were these questions that was asked through the years. And many of this questions
could be found in the book of Nachura.
■ I hope class all of you use the book of Nachura as your textbook. Through the years,
I have discovered teaching political law review, teaching students including bar
reviewees.
■ This book of Nachura is very very useful.
■ I’m sure our bar examiners will use one of the sources or references, this book of
Nachura and finally we go to the bar pointers.
○ Bar Pointers
■ I’ll give you five pointers that will be very useful to you, as bar examinees and as
future lawyer
POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
II. DUE PROCESS, BILL OF RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, PARTY LIST SYSTEM
2. MARK JALANDONI VS. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, GR. NUMBER 211751, MAY
10, 2021
● A factual and evidentiary matter that must be threshed out in a full-blown trial. The
probative value of the verbal and documentary evidence of Jalandoni's authority and
his claim of good faith can be best passed upon in a trial on the merits and there is no
violation of Jalandoni's right to due process.
● When petitioners were given a copy of the Complaint and its annexes during
preliminary investigation, his right to examine the documents was respected. While
his motion for the production and inspection of the documents had initially been
denied, he was later allowed to do so on two occasions. Thus, there was no violation
of his right to due process.
○ Mark Jalandoni was the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. At that time the
Ombudsman was Gutierrez. Now, the ombudsman delegated an authority to
Mark Jalandoni to review cases pending before the ombudsman but soon
thereafter they resigned. Both of them resigned.
○ If I recall, there was an impeachment complaint that was filed against
Gutierrez. But before it pushed through, she resigned and together with Mark
Jalandoni. So the active ombudsman noticed that there were patches of paper
superimposed on Ombudsman resolutions and the decisions.
○ The Ombudsman noticed that this was done by Mark Jalandoni superimposed on
the original copies of the resolutions and decisions. He complained and filed a
complaint for falsification.
○ Now, Mark Jalandoni is saying that though there were patches of paper, the
content of the decision was never affected and he acted based on the authority
of then Ombudsman Gutierrez.
○ Now, his complaining that there was a violation of his due process of law.
○ When petitioners were given a copy of the Complaint and its annexes to
preliminary investigation, though initially he was not allowed to do so, but
subsequently he was allowed to examine the documents. The Supreme Court
has ruled that there was no violation of his right to due process of law.
○ And this allegation that he was authorized by then Ombudsman Gutierrez is a
matter for the Court to press out in a full blown trial.
■ If that is his defense is to prove it during the trial of the case.
○ Here again, the Supreme Court has shown that the probative value of the
verbal and documentary evidence of Jalandon’s authority and claim of good
faith can be passed upon on the trial of the merits. And there was no violation
of Jalandoni’s right to due process of law.
3. VIRGILIO A. BOTE, VS. SAN PEDRO CINEPLEX PROPERTIES, INC., G.R. NO. 203471,
SEPTEMBER 14, 2020
● This Petition stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by San Pedro Cineplex
Properties, Inc. (SPCPI) against Bote, then incumbent mayor of General Tinio, Nueva
Ecija, for Violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160, abuse of authority, and culpable
violation of the Constitution (Sec. 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution)
● The Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against private
individuals, or in cases where there is no participation by the State either through its
instrumentalities or persons acting on its behalf. There is no dispute that Bote, at the
time of the incident, was a municipal mayor. However, the records are bereft of any
indication that, during the incident, he was acting as such, or on behalf of or upon
authority of the State. Bote was acting as a private individual or in his personal
capacity, making the Bill of Rights inapplicable.
● SPCPI cannot invoke Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution to sustain an
administrative case against Bote under R.A. 7160. It may find redress through a civil
or criminal suit.
○ There was a property located in San Pedro, Laguna. I’m sure many of you are
from San Pedro, Laguna. So, there was a petition for the quieting of title.
While the case was pending, Mr. Bote who was then there municipal mayor
General Tinio, Nueva Ecija went to the place because he was entrusted by the
owners of the place to overseek.
○ So, he went to the place together with armed body guards. This was according
to the San Pedro Cineplex properties. Because of what he has done, there was
an administrative complaint against then mayor Bote.
○ Now, question is can he be the subject of an administrative complaint on the
basis of the Bill of Rights Sec. 1, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. When we say
administrative complaint, it is in connection with your authority or position in
government.
○ So, the Supreme Court has showed that the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked
against Mr. Bote because at the time he was not acting on behalf or authority
of the State. Bote was acting as a private individual or in his personal capacity,
making the Bill of Rights inapplicable.
○ But the SC has stated also if you want to file a criminal case against him for the
violation of constitutional rights.
■ A civil or criminal suit, a civil suit for damages, then you can do so.
■ But never, never an administrative complaining which has something to
do with an authority of an individual connected with the State or upon
authority of the State.
III. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERRY SAPLA, G.R. NO. 244045, JUNE 16, 2020
● A warrantless search conducted by the police inside a passenger jeepney is not a valid
search of a moving vehicle where the vehicle is not the target but a specific person
who matched the description given by an anonymous caller.
○ Now, this is a dangerous drugs act case.
○ A complaint was filed against Jerry Sapla for violation of that law. For bringing
with him 6 bricks of marijuana leaves.
○ Now, a warrantless search was conducted by the police inside a passenger
jeepney where at that time, Sapla was board. Now, the search was conducted
because of a tip from an anonymous caller.
○ The Supreme Court has held that if there was a warrantless search meaning
without a search warrant conducted by the police inside a passenger jeepney.
It is not a valid search of a moving vehicle where the vehicle is not the target
but a specific person who matched the description given by an anonymous
caller.
○ Now, one of the exceptions to a search with warrant meaning a warrantless
arrest is a search of a moving vehicle among several others.
○ So, if it is a warrantless search of a moving vehicle, the target should be the
moving vehicle and not the specific person on board that moving vehicle.
2. DELFIN R. PILAPIL, JR. VS. LYDIA Y. CU, G.R. NO. 228608 (AUGUST 27, 2020) AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LYDIA Y. CU, G.R. NO. 228589, AUGUST 27, 2020
● The Court said that the warrantless ocular inspection of the mining site that preceded
the seizure and which allowed Mayor Delfin Pilapil, Jr. and his team of police officers
and barangay officials to catch a view of the subject explosives finds no authority
under any provision of law and the established circumstances suggest that the
incriminating nature of the subject explosives could not have been immediately
apparent to Mayor Delfin Pilapil, Jr. and his inspection teams.
○ Now, this is in connection with a warrantless ocular inspection of the mining
site by a municipal mayor in Camarines Norte and the mayor was Mayor Delfin
Pilapil.
○ Now they conducted a warrantless ocular inspection of the mining site with
Mayor Pilapil as the head of the ocular inspection team assisted by a team of
police officers and barangay officials to catch a view of the subject explosives.
○ So, they found the explosives. Now, they are saying that it was a plain view,
the applicability of the plain view doctrine.
○ They saw it so it can be seized legally but the Supreme Court has said that the
view of the explosives at the time was not apparent. It was hidden inside bags
and placed in a storage room though the storage was open but the explosives
were placed in several bags.
○ The Supreme Court said that it was not a plain view seizure of the evidence
and therefore, it not being a plain view, there must be a warrant that should
be secured by Mayor Delfin and his team of officers.
○ Since, there is no applicability of the plainview doctrine, the warrantless
search conducted or ocular inspection conducted by Mayor Delfin and his team
is invalid and unconstitutional.
3. VIRGILIO L. EVARDO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 234317, MAY 10, 2021
● A warrantless search of a moving vehicle (a tricycle in this case) cannot be premised
solely on an initial tip. It must be founded on probable cause where there must be a
confluence of several suspicions occurrences. Each such circumstance must occur
before the search is commenced. Further, they must each be independently
suspicious.
○ Again here the police acted on a tip given by an anonymous caller. It was also a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle and also involving drugs.
○ The moving vehicle is a tricycle in this case and the Supreme Court showed
that the police must not solely rely on a tip.
○ There must be other suspicious circumstances that must be considered by the
police officers and not simply on a tip. For instance, the actuation of the
subject person inside the vehicle and not rely solely on a tip given by a caller.
○ There should be a confluence of several suspicious occurrences and each must
be indendeptly be suspicious according to the Supreme Court if it involves a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle
IV. BAIL
1. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY AND ITS BUREAU OF PRODUCT STANDARDS VS.
STEELASIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 238263, NOVEMBER 16, 2020
● The Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) regulation allowing the conditional
release of imported steel merchandise from the Bureau of Customs’ premises prior to
compliance with the required testing, inspection and clearance, but not of the local
steel, is not a violation of the equal protection clause.
● The Supreme Court ruled that the DTI Regulations do not violate the equal protection
clause because there exists a valid classification between local producers and
importers even though they produce the same goods and commodities.
○ DTI’s regulations, in this case, allowed the conditional release of imported
steel products from the Bureau of Customs’ premises prior to compliance with
the required testing, inspection, and clearance but did not afford this privilege
to local steel products.
○ Steel Asia assailed these regulations as violating the equal protection clause.
○ The Supreme Court held that the regulations did not violate the equal
protection clause since there is a valid classification between local producers
and importers, even when they produce the same products.
■ In this case, at the time of the case’s pendency, the warehouses at the
Bureau of Custom’s premises were already congested and there was no
more room to store the imported steel products.
○ The imported steel products would still have to be examine and are not
exempted from the examination before they can be released from the Bureau’s
premises.
■ The transfer or conditional release of the imported steel was for a
purpose because of the absence of warehouse or place to store these
imported steel merchandise
○ Hence, there is no violation of the Equal Protection Clause
VI. DOUBLE JEOPARDY, RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
1. PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THADEO Z. ONANO, G.R. NO. 185503, ETC., MAY 3,
2021
● An exception to the rule against double jeopardy is that the State may challenge an
acquittal where there has been grave abuse of discretion. Here, the cases were
dismissed with grave abuse of discretion because the Sandiganbayan abdicated its
duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the cases against the
petitioners.
● There is no violation of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial where there is no
showing that any delay attended the proceedings and how they delays were
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive.
○ We know that we have a basic rule in Criminal Procedure and Constitutional
Law, the right against double jeopardy — there should be no double injury to a
person
■ General Rule: State may not assail an acquittal of the accused, for this
would place the latter in danger of double jeopardy.
■ Exception: State may challenge an acquittal if it was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
○ The Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of the cases against the accused was done with
grave abuse of discretion since the Sandiganbayan abdicated its duty to make
an independent assessment of the merits of the cases against the accused.
○ Two grounds exist for the non-application of the rule on double jeopardy in this
instance.
■ First, when there is grave abuse of discretion.
■ Second, when there is mistrial or violation of the prosecution’s right to
due process of law where the latter was not given the chance to present
its side.
○ An example of mistrial is the Galman case, where the Supreme Court, on the
basis of mistrial and on the basis of violation of due process of law, re-opened
Galman’s criminal case.
■ There, the Supreme Court, on the basis of mis-trial and violation of right
to due process of law, reopened the case of Mr. Galman, the supposed
assassin of Ninoy Aquino.
○ There is no violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial where there is
no showing of any delay that attended the proceedings and no showing that any
delays that were attendant were vexatious, capricious, or oppressive.
○ The rule on double jeopardy is not iron-clad and admits exceptions.
VII. RIGHT TO TRAVEL
1. PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, ETC., G.R. NOS. 241742 AND
241753-59, MAY 12, 2021
● The right to travel is a fundamental right guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a signatory.
However, the exigencies of one's right to travel is not absolute. There are
constitutional, statutory, and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel.
○ The right to travel is a fundamental right and is guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the
Philippines is a signatory.
○ Pichay was charged with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
with the complaint filed before the Sandiganbayan. While the case was
pending, Pichay wanted to travel but the Sandiganbayan did not allow him to
travel. Pichay filed a petition before the Supreme Court and invoked his right
to travel.
○ BUT The exigencies of one’s right to travel is not absolute.
■ There are constitutional limitations, like national security, public health,
and public safety.
■ There are statutory limitations, like the Human Security Act, the Passport
Act, and other statutes that place a limit to one’s right to travel.
● If you are a terrorist, as defined by the Human Security Act, your
right to travel will be restricted.
■ There is also an inherent limitation, where the court has the right to
preserve its jurisdiction and to maintain its dignity and decorum and the
courts may restrict a person’s right to travel if the exercise of that right
would result in the eroding of the court’s dignity and in the eroding of
respect to court processes.
VIII. JUST COMPENSATION
1. ANG PARTIDO NG MGA PILIPINONG MARINO, INC., (ANGKLA) AND SERBISYO SA BAYAN
PARTY (SBP) VS. COMELEC, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 246816, SEPTEMBER 15, 2020
● Recalibrating the formula for the party-list system (allocation of additional seats -
[BANAT Formula]) could not be the subject of judicial review because it is a question
of wisdom which the legislature alone may determine for itself. The Supreme Court
does not write policies.
○ The recalibration of the formula for the allocation of additional seats cannot
be the subject of judicial review since it is a question of wisdom which only
Congress can resolve for itself. The Supreme Court does not write policies.
■ Political Law beyond the domain of judicial review.
○ When the question involves the wisdom of a law, the courts leave it to the
executive and legislative branches.
○ However, this is not absolute. The 2nd paragraph of Section 1, Art VIII of the
1987 Constitution, which defines judicial power, greatly restricted the
application of the political question doctrine.
X. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
1. HERRERA VS. MOGO, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 23110, JANUARY 15, 2020
● The condonation doctrine was good law since then until November 10, 2015 when the
Supreme Court promulgated Carpio Morales vs. Court of Appeals et. al., G.R. Nos.
217126-27, November 10, 2015. In this jurisdiction, there is no legal basis to conclude
that an election automatically implies condonation. If condonation of an elective
official’s administrative liability would be allowed in this jurisdiction, the same should
have been provided by law under our governing mechanisms.
○ Before 2015, the case of Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals. Let’s say 2016,
we were charged with an administrative offense. Administrative offense kasi
public officer and then was found liable for committing that offense.
■ Come 2019, you were elected for the same position of mayor. Now,
under the Aguinaldo doctrine, that finding of a liability for committing
that offense is condoned. Wala na, mabubura na po. Okay, that has been
continued for a long long time.
○ Now, here comes the Supreme Court in the Case of Carpio Morales vs. Court of
Appeals.
■ This is a case involving Jejomar Binay Junior. Who at the time was the
City Mayor of Makati.
○ Now, the Supreme Court in this case, through Justice Perlas-Bernabe ruled that
in this jurisdiction, there is no more legal basis to conclude that an election
automatically implies condonation.
○ If condonation of elective official’s administrative liability would be allowed in
this jurisdiction, the same should have been provided by law under our
governing mechanisms.
○ Now, there is no law that should provide for condonation.
■ At the case of Carpio Morales vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
thus ruled that, conceding the provisions of the constitution regarding
public office is a public trust. Giving emphasis, importance to public
office as a public trust, Code of Ethical Conduct of Public Officials that
this old doctrine, Aguinaldo doctrine, has no more place in our
jurisprudence.
○ Is this retroactive?
■ No, it will only be after the effectivity of that doctrine in Carpio-Morales
vs Court of Appeals. Meaning, after 2015, after the decision was
rendered will this doctrine be operative, be applicable.
II. GUN BAN DURING ELECTION PERIOD
1. ARTURO SULLANO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 232147, JUNE 8, 2020
● Petitioner is charged with violation of the gun ban during the 2010 election period
pursuant to B.P. Blg. 881 in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 8714. He also said
that the checkpoint was improperly done since no signage was up.
● The checkpoints, ruled the Supreme Court, are warranted by the exigencies of public
order, and were conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists, were allowed since
the COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents are
limited to visual search of pedestrians.
○ During election period, the authority to regulate the issuance of licenses is
given to the COMELEC to ensure a peaceful and orderly and honest election.
○ So herein petitioners charged with violation of the Gun ban during the 2020
election period pursuant to B.P. Blg. 881 which is the Omnibus Election Code, in
relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 8714. He was saying that the checkpoint
was improperly done. There was no signage. And in this checkpoint that the
gun was taken from him, the officers saying, he violated this Gun Ban under
these two laws.
○ The Supreme Court thus ruled that checkpoints are warranted by the
exigencies of public order, and were conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists, and were allowed since the COMELEC would be hard put to
implement the ban if its deputized agents are limited to visual search of
pedestrians.
III. FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ARE CONTROLLING TO THE RECEIVING COURT
1. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. HILARIO J. DAMPILOG, G.R. NO. 238774, JUNE 10,
2020
● The Civil Service Commission Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR), after
conducting a preliminary investigation, issued a Resolution charging Hilario J.
Dampilog with Serious Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Grave
Misconduct for allowing somebody to apply and take in his behalf the Career Service
Professional Examination (CSPE) and reflected a rating of 81.89% in his Personal Data
Sheet, thereby misleading the appointing authority to appoint him as Special
Investigator I of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-CAR).
● The CSC-CAR found him guilty of the offenses charged. The CSC affirmed the findings
of the CSC-CAR.
● The Supreme Court ruled that findings of facts of administrative agencies, such as the
CSC, if based on subsisting evidence, are controlling on the receiving court. The CSC
are better equipped in handling cases involving the employment status of employees
in the Civil Service since it is within their field of expertise.
○ The Civil Service Commission Cordillera Administrative Region, this is in Luzon
North, after conducting a preliminary investigation, issued a resolution
charging Hilario Dampilag with Serious Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Grave Misconduct for allowing somebody to apply and take in
his behalf the Career Service Professional Examination.
■ Just imagine class, you will allow somebody to take in your behalf the
bar examination, and then passing it?
○ Of course, the person who acted on behalf of Dampilag passed it, obtaining a
rating of 81.89%, and Mr. Dampilag reflected this rating in his personal Data
Sheet, misleading the appointing authority to appoint him as Special
Investigator I of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
○ Now, the Civil Service Commission-CAR found him guilty of the offenses
charged. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the findings of the Civil Service
Commission-CAR, the CSC Main Office in Quezon City.
○ The Supreme Court has ruled that findings of facts of administrative agencies,
such as the Civil Service Commission, if based on substantial. It should be
substantial. Based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the receiving
court.
○ The Civil Service Commission are better equipped in handling cases involving
the employment status of employees in the Civil Service since it is within their
field of expertise.
IV. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Now we go to the bar question flashbacks. What will be the bar questions in the past.
● Companeros and Companeras I realized that before 2022, last bar examination, almost every
bar exam, almost, has a question of 2, relating to election law. For this, last bar examinations
were not, because 18 questions were allotted for Political Law, Labor Law and Taxation. But
with the restoration of 15 % of Political Law separate from Labor Law.
● So I’m sure an examiner would delve on Election law.
● Considering that there are talks about postponing the election of congress is inclined to pass a
law to postpone the barangay election, where election of presidency is still fresh to all of us.
● TERM LIMITS
○ Di ho ba nag term limits natin for the position of Mayor, tatlong taon. Okay, and run
successively for three times, okay, yun ang term limits.
■ So for Governor and other official, except for the President, yung one term,
consisting of six years.
■ Now, let’s present a situation. Mr. A won for the position of Mayor of a
Municipality, let’s say in 1992, okay, three years after, he ran again for Mayor, so
meaning, 1995, now, he lost, he filed a protest but won in the protest. Okay, now,
1998, he ran for third time, he won, panalo siya. Fourth time, he ran again and
won, but there was a petition before the holding of the election, naka-three terms
na ‘yan, hindi na pwedeng tumakbo for the fourth term?
● But no, said the Supreme Court. In the second election, 1995, he lost but won
in the protest, he was not able to fully serve his term. There was an
interruption of his term.
● Okay. So, pwede siya tumakbo for the fourth time. This is Abundo vs. Comelec.
○ Now, here is another situation. 1992, won; 1995, won, but a protest was filed against
him, he lost in the protest, and was not able to serve his term; 1998, ran, he won;
and decided to run for the fourth term. Okay, now, a petition was filed against him for
the cancellation of his COC, for misrepresentation, “hindi na pwede yan, naka-three
terms na ‘yan, bakit tatakbo pa ‘yan?”
■ The Supreme Court on the case of Lonzanida vs. Comelec has ruled, yes, in the
second elections, he won, but lost in the protest, and therefore, he was not able
to fully serve his term, there was an interruption in his service, and therefore, he
could run for the fourth term. The case is Lonzanida vs. Commission on Elections
○ What if the Provincial Board Member is simply preventively suspended by
Sandiganbayan or by the Ombudsman?
■ These are two bodies which can suspend, okay, for, let’s say, three months. Now,
after serving for three terms, he now runs for the fourth term, saying “I was not
able to fully serve my term, during my third term, because of my preventive
suspension, okay, there was an interruption, so therefore, I can run.
■ Supreme Court said hindi pwede ‘yan, because preventive suspension is temporary,
you continue to act, you continue your position as Board Member, and thereafter
the suspension, bumalik ka rin sa position mo, so preventive suspension is not
considered an interruption of your service.
○ Ms. Almira Mariño, is serving for the third term as a Governor of Quezon City.
Pang-third term na ni Ms. Mariño. But before completing her term, sabi niya “pagod
na pagod na ako, ayoko nang mag-serve, pupunta na ako sa Ukraine, to be with my
relatives in Ukraine, and my friends,” so she was not able to complete her term
because she resigned. Now, upon the prodding of her friends, “takbo ka ulit Almira,
we need people like you, we need Bedans in government, so she decided for the
fourth term, arguing “ eh, nag-resign naman ako eh, I did not fully serve my term.”
Can she be allowed for the fourth term?
■ No more. So, that is not an interruption, it was your decision, your volition to
resign. So therefore, you cannot run for the fourth term. So, if you are in the
public service, don’t resign ha, completely fulfill your mandate up to the very end
of your term of office.
● R.A. 9225
○ Again, that has been asked repeatedly in the Bar exam.
○ This is the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act, which allows dual citizen.
○ Now, if you apply for dual citizenship, you are an American, and at the same time, a
Filipino, and you decide to run for the position of a Mayor of Municipality. So, if you
intend to run, you need to renounce your foreign citizenship. So, dapat isang
citizenship lang.
○ How do you renounce?
■ You should be a sworn renunciation and should be attached to your Certificate of
Candidacy
○ Now, what if you fail to renounce after availing of the benefits of RA 9225? What is
the implication?
■ If you failed to renounce your citizenship, that could mean cancellation of your
COC, denial of your COC, so sayang naman.
■ Here is a good, here’s a classic example of a candidate who was a naturalized
American. He ran for the position of the Vice-Mayor in one municipality in Nueva
Ecija, the case is De Guzman vs. Comelec. Now, in the election, he lost. Now, in
the protest, he won, so meaning, he spent a lot of money for campaign purposes
during the election. Natalo siya, he has to spend again, to support, to finance his
election protest.
● He won in the protest, but his COC was cancelled, declared void ab initio,
because he failed to renounce his foreign citizenship.
○ Now, the latest Bar question was in 2019 about renunciations, on renunciation. How
do we distinguish this from the case of Mercado vs. Manzano? Si Edu Manzano.
■ Now, Edu Manzano, his parents were Filipinos, or are Filipinos, still alive pa naman
si Edu. But he was born in the US. Mr. Manzano has dual citizenship, not because of
RA 9225 but because of the confluence of two laws: jus sanguinis and jus soli.
Okay, it was involuntary on his part to have this two citizenship, so he ran for the
position of, at the time, Vice-Mayor of Makati. A petition was filed against him by
Mr. Mercado, the case is Mercado vs. Manzano.
■ Now, what will happen to his petition? Will it be cancelled for failure to
renounce his foreign citizenship?
● The Supreme Court, No. No need to resign, it was not his fault, it was
involuntary on his part. It is simply the confluence of two conflicting laws, jus
sanguinis and jus soli. It is enough that he filed his Certificate of Candidacy
which contains an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic. That will suffice.
○ Tandaan niyo ha, the distinction between one who has two citizenship due to
confluence of two laws, jus sanguinis and jus soli; and the other situation, where one
availed voluntarily with full volition to become a citizen of a foreign country
● QUESTION: In the case of Secretary Remulla who became the DOJ Secretary. He was
part of the Congress before his appointment. Will there be a need for re-election for
his congressional position?
○ Commissioner Sarmiento: If he won during the last Presidential election as a
Congressman. Kung nanalo nga siya at tinanggap nya yung position as Secretary of
Justice, he has to renounce. He has to abdicate the congressional position because he
accepted a conflicting decision which is appointive
○ Example: Mark Villar, he was appointed as DPWH Secretary but was elected before his
appointment as congressman of Las Pinas. Another one was the Budget Secretary from
Camarines Sur appointed as the Budget Secretary by GMA, he has to renounce his
congressional position because he has chosen the position of a Cabinet Secretary. So
di pwedeng pagsabayin. Dapat isa lang
○ Now, who will fill up the post?
■ There should be a special election. There can be no appointment for that position
BUT pending the election of a new congressman, usually the district congressman
nearest to that district will be responsible to oversee the other district.
■ So that is the arrangement but that is on temporary basis because there should be
a special elections that should be conducted.
● QUESTION: Are Local Government Units allowed to declare certain person as persona
non grata?
○ Commissioner Sarmiento: As persona non grata? Bakit did he commit a crime? Ano
bang ginawa ng taong ito?
○ QUESTION: This is in relation to the Davao City case where certain people where
declared persona non grata due to comments online?
○ Commissioner Sarmiento: So that is the prerogative of the local government. A
resolution will be passed declared that person persona non grata.
■ But of course to me, that will be a subject of a petition. If you make comments
online in the exercise of freedom of expression and freedom of speech, why be
declared persona non grata?
■ You file with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari saying that it is a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of that local government.
○ But the local government can do so kung gusto nila but to me that will be a violation
of your freedoms under the Constitution like freedom of expression, freedom of
speech, and freedom of press.
■ Speaking of freedom of press, speech, and expression, what if you placed
tarpaulins inside your backyard endorsing a candidate and the COMELEC forbids
the posting of those tarpaulins and campaign materials in your backyards and
outside of your homes? Can the COMELEC do so?
● If you recall, this is a controversial issue in the last presidential elections.
● Invoking the decisions of the Supreme Court in Diocese of Bacolod v COMELEC,
the placing of posters inside your backyards is an exercise of your freedom of
expression, freedom of speech, right to property, and even due process of law.
● Hindi pwedeng baklasin without your consent.
● AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT
○ This is also a bar question. Ad Interim Appointment is any appointment before
Congress convenes, we call the appointment Ad Interim Appointment, not regular
appointment.
○ When Congress convened after giving an ad interim appointment by the President, and
you were bypassed. Let’s say because the calendar of the Commission of
Appointments was so full, you were not included in the agenda that would was
bypassed. That’s why we have several cabinet members accept two or three who were
confirmed, but the rest was bypassed.
○ If we recall, Mr Calida was bypassed and he resigned
○ So would that be the end of your service for the Government? Or can you still be
given an ad interim appointment if the President so wishes dahil si Mr. Villamor ay
mahusay at magaling na public servant
■ Yes. How many times ad interim appointment? Ad infinitum. Without limit so long
as the President gives you ad interim appointment which is a permanent
appointment
○ What if the ad interim appointment is rejected? There was an opposition so it was
rejected?
■ If there is a rejection, that will be the end of your ad interim appointment. You
can no longer be issued another ad interim appointment
● And this has happened in the COMELEC a number of times. I have colleagues
class who was given ad interim appointment but were not confirmed and that is
the end of their service in the government for that position
● PARTY-LIST SYSTEM (PARAMETERS)
○ There was a bar examination year where this was asked, the following year it was not
asked, the succeeding year, it was asked!
○ So the parameters were found in the case of Atong Paglaum v COMELEC.
■ Where one parameter is that national organizations, regional organizations,or
parties secular organizations, or national, regional secular organizations can fill
candidates for the partylist system
■ Now they did not bid, form, or organized along sectoral lines, this national or
regional organizations.
■ Let say an organization of Bedan lawyers was formed and it sought accreditation
and it was granted
■ Can you question the organization and that it has complied with all the
requirements for accreditation?
● No that will be recognized
○ This is different from the decision of the Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani v
COMELEC.
■ Because in Ang Bagong Bayani which was decided years before Atong Paglaum the
Supreme Court has ruled that you should represent the marginalized and the
vulnerables
■ In that decision, the Supreme Court has ruled that the party list system is a social
justice vehicle, as according to the words of Justice Panganiban.
● Using the Parameter of Atong Paglaum that national party or regional organization will be
accredited though not representing the marginalized and vulnerables.
○ And the nominees did not belong to the marginalized and vulnerables.
● Whereas using the Parameter of Ang Bagong Bayani, the organizers or the members of
that organization must represent marginalized and the nominees must belong to the
marginalized and vulnerables.
● FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE BAR: We use the parameters of Atong Paglaum v COMELEC
as the prevailing doctrine and not Ang Bagong Bayani
○ But if you ask me ano ang mas tama sa dalawa, consistent with the 1987 Constitution
to me is Ang Bagong Bayani because the party list system is a social justice vehicle in
order to give the marginalized a chance to veritable lawmakers themselves and to
represent those who have less in life for them to have more in law
● QUESTION: Can the appointee rejected by the Commission on Appointments be
appointed to another position?
○ Commissioner Sarmiento: Ay pwede! Halimbawa sya ay nominee an appointee for
COMELEC or CIvil Service Commission pero narejected sya. And then sabi ng
Presidente, sigi appoint ko to sa ganitong position - undersecretary or another position
in a Constitutional Commission, pwede yun.
○ But not in the particular position where he was rejected by the Commission on
Appointments.
● QUESTION: Is the President required to all cabinet positions like the DOH Secretary?
○ Commissioner Sarmiento: Ay Ok! Walang timeframe or time limit but wisdom dictates
and demands our country dictates that the President should now appoint a regular
Secretary of Health
○ Walang limit kung kailan, nasa kanya yun but if you ask me, wisdom and the demands
our country dictates especially that we are in the middle of the pandemic though it
has declined, the appointment should be made by the President.
○ The one acting as the one acting as the Secretary of Health is very competent to act
as the Secretary of Health so why not appoint this person?
● IPSO FACTO RESIGNATION
○ Basahin nyo na lang po what are these six parameters
○ Before the advent of the Fair Elections Act and the advent of several decisions of the
Supreme Court like the case of Quinto v COMELEC, the latest ruling of the Ipso Facto
Resignation.
■ If a mayor runs for governor, he is ipso facto resigned
■ If the governor runs for congressman, automatically resigned when you file your
COC
■ EXCEPT those who were running for president.
● If you recall Lacson ran for presidency but he did not resign
● Rocco ran for presidency but he did not resign
○ In Quinto v COMELEC the Supreme Court has ruled that if an elective official, let’s say
a mayor runs for another position, he is not deemed resigned because he has a
mandate to fulfill. A commitment which he has to fulfill and honor. No more ipso
facto resignation
■ BUT if an appointive official, let’s secretary or undersecretary, director, military
official etc files a COC for an elective position, his filing of his COC is deemed ipso
facto resignation
■ Rationale of Quinto v COMELEC: For the appointee to not avail the resources of his
office to support or boost his or her candidacy and avoid disparity of resource and
to be fair
○ If partylist nominee, when does he cease to be an appointive official, when is he
considered ipso facto resigned?
■ When his or her name is include in the nominees and submitted to the COMELEC
● PROTEST VS. QUO WARRANTO
○ Any difference from the two? Yes!
■ Protest - is for election irregularities or fraud in the elections, you file a
protection within 10 days from the proclamation of the winning candidate.
● Who can file? Any of the losing candidates can file a protest
■ Quo Warranto - the candidate is ineligible or was shown to be disloyal to the
Republic. Also within 10 days from the proclamation
● Who can file? Any of registered voter can file a petition for quo warranto
● RECALL
○ When do you recall a sitting public officer?
■ Only on one ground - loss of confidence
○ Now there is limitations:
■ You cannot file a recall within one year from the assumption of duty by the public
officer or
■ You cannot file a recall within 1 year before the next succeeding election
○ Anyone who was being recalled, if he is incumbent, he cannot resign because he has
to face that recall petition and participate in that recall election
● DETAINEE VOTING (SYLLABUS TOPIC)
○ What is detainee voting?
■ Any detainee whose registration record has not been canceled or has not been
removed from the registration record will qualify for the detainee voting
○ Who are detainee qualified to vote? Tatlo po sila
1. One who was facing a criminal charge before a court of law, and is awaiting or
facing trial, so wala pang finding of guilt
2. If he was convicted and is suffering a sentence of less than a year
imprisonment
3. If he was convicted for committing an offense against national security,
disloyalty to the Republic, or any other crime BUT the case is on appeal
● So there is no finding of guilt, so you can vote
○ During our time, you can vote either in premises of the detention center or you can
request for escorted voting where you go to a precinct where you resided and through
escorted voting, the court will grant or deny, you can vote in that polling station.
● QUESTION: Is there a legal basis for President Marcos’ self appointment as Secretary
of Department of Agriculture?
○ Commissioner Sarmiento: DA? He can do so because there is no Constitutional
prohibition to be acting in a concurrent capacity as President and as a Cabinet
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture BUT wisdom dictates that the President
cannot discharge two sensitive positions.
○ The position of the President is a very exacting position. You are the dynamo of the
government, you shape your government based on your personality and your decisions
and you give it full time of your very best
○ To serve concurrently to me is a big question mark if he is qualified or has background
to run that department
1.02. PUBLIC OFFICERS
1.08. CITIZENSHIP
● Who Are Filipino Citizens
● Natural-Born Citizens and Public Office
1.09. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
C. BAR POINTERS
1. Answering Bar Examination Questions
2. Spelling and Grammar
3. Composure Inside the Room
4. After completion of the First Bar Subject
5. Prayer, Physical and Mental Wellness
TRANSPORTATION LAW
Vice Dean Carlo Busmente
October 15, 2022
ACADS SCRIBES TEAM: SAMANTHA ALVAREZ | ANDREA DE GUZMAN | PAMELA DELA CRUZ | SHERRY PAGAY | LANCE
PUNZALAN | QUIMBERLYN RANCHEZ
CHECKED BY: HANNAH KEZIAH MORALES (Chairperson for Academics) | ANDREA JOSES TAN (Deputy for Academics)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE 6
WHEN A COMMON CARRIER IS NOT RESPONSIBLE 7
DURATION OF EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE 11
STIPULATIONS REGARDING EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE 12
VALID STIPULATIONS UNDER THE CIVIL CODE 14
WHEN STIPULATIONS CANNOT LIMIT LIABILITY 15
WHEN STIPULATION LIMITING LIABILITY CANNOT BE AVAILED 16
RULES ON BAGGAGES 17
CARRIAGE OF PERSONS 19
NEGLIGENCE UPON TRANSPORT OF PASSENGERS 23
RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE 26
RESPONSIBILITY OF PASSENGERS 29
DAMAGES 32
RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE 33
KABIT SYSTEM 36
BOUNDARY SYSTEM 37
BILL OF LADING 38
CHARTER PARTY 40
BOTTOMRY 41
FINAL MESSAGE 51
OPEN FORUM 52
DEFINITION OF A COMMON CARRIER
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business
of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering
their services to the public.
Q: What if yung corporation hindi siya registered with SEC then engaged with transporting passengers for
compensation? Is it considered a common carrier?
A: NO, if it is not SEC registered, then there is no juridical entity. However the persons behind it will be
liable for damages.
Corporation estoppel — persons who represent themselves as a corporation even without any authority to
do so are liable as general partners (up to their personal property).
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as
"a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. (De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47822
(December 22, 1988))
Q: If the person or entity was Issued a business permit, mayor's permit, etc. before, are they considered a
common carrier?
A: No
Illustration:
Q: A Bedan student living in Manila was provided by his parents with a vehicle (Toyota Innova) to go to SBCA.
There are times when he lacked budget, so on the way back to Manila, he puts a sign on his car stating
“Manila”, inviting passengers for a ride to Manila for compensation. He doesn’t do it regularly, but only
when he is on a tight budget. What if something happens?
A: The Bedan student is liable as a common carrier. The Supreme Court held that even if the service is not
done on a regular basis but only as a sideline, then it is still considered as a common carrier.
The Civil Code makes no distinction as to the means of transporting, as long as it is by land, water or air. It
does not provide that the transportation of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle. In fact, in
the United States, oil pipeline operators are considered common carriers. (First Philippine Industrial
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125948 (December 29, 1998))
Notice how all are motorized vehicles. So does it mean all should be motorized? May sagot ang
Supreme Court diyan. In this case, the fuel or oil was being transported through a pipeline.
In the case at bar, the petitioner admitted that it is engaged in the business of shipping and lighterage,
offering its barges to the public, despite its limited clientele for carrying or transporting goods by water
for compensation. (Asia Lighterage and Shipping Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147246 (August 19,
2003))
In this case. while the petitioner bought tickets from the respondent company. This does not mean
that the latter is ipso facto a common carrier.
SCHOOL BUS OPERATOR IS A COMMON CARRIER — school bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting
passengers generally as a business, not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry passengers
over established roads by the method by which the business was conducted; and (c) transporting students
for a fee. (Spouses Pereno v. Spouses Zarate, G.R. No. 157917, (August 23, 2012))
In earlier precedents, authors do not consider it as a common carrier because you cannot just ride it.
You need to enter into a contract with the bus operator. But now, they find that there is more reason that
the operator should be extra careful because they are transporting children.
BAR TIP: This was asked previously and may be asked again
CUSTOMS BROKER MAY BE A COMMON CARRIER — petitioner is a common carrier because the
transportation of goods is an integral part of her business. (Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Co. Inc, G.R.
No. 148496 (March 19, 2002))
BAR TIP: If it’s asked in the bar, answer with “IT DEPENDS” consider that aside from the release of cargo
from customs, when the transport of goods is integral part of its business
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e.,
the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population. (De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47822 (December 22,
1988))
EXAMPLE: The phrase “not the entire Manila” is still within the term general public. Pasok pa din sa term na
common carrier.
EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE
Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
In some books, Extraordinary Diligence is not defined. There was an opportunity to define
Extraordinary Diligence in the Nedlloyd case.
Extraordinary diligence is that extreme care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
circumspection use for securing or preserving their own property or rights. (Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V.
Rotterdam v. Glow Laks Enterprises, Ltd., G.R. No. 156330 (November 19, 2014))
The mindset is that it is as if you're transporting your own goods and safekeeping your own rights.
Kung paano mo alagaan at ingatan ang sarili mong cargo or goods, ganun din ang pangangalaga at pag-iingat
mo sa cargo or goods ng client mo.
Article 1735. PRESUMPTION OF FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE — In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos.
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733.
Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by
evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence. (Victory Liner, Inc. v. Rosalito Gammad, Et Al
(G.R. No. 159636 (November 25, 2004))
The burden is now shifted to the common carrier to prove that they exercised Extraordinary
Diligence.
Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods,
unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: F A A C O
1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Please take note that the Supreme Court held that this is a close list (exclusive). Otherwise, the
carrier is definitely liable.
First Circumstance: “Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity”
A common carrier is not liable for loss only when (1) the fortuitous event was the only and proximate
cause of the loss and (2) it exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss. The second element is
absence here. As a common carrier, petitioner should have been more vigilant in monitoring the weather
disturbances within the country and their (possible) effect in its routes and destination (Fortune Se
Carrier, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 209118 (Notice), (November 24, 2014))
The word “only” means that there is no human or other fault that contributed to the loss or
accident. It is not enough to prove a fortuitous event but also to prove that Extraordinary Diligence was
exercised.
The Supreme Court held that dapat minonitor yung weather disturbances. Kung alam niyong may
bagyo, dapat hindi na kayo tumuloy. The second element is absent here. Hence, the defense of fortuitous
event was not successful.
Third Requisite
Article 1740. If the common carrier negligently incurs in delay in transporting the goods, a natural
disaster shall not free such carrier from responsibility.
Fire
● GR: Fire is not a fortuitous event because it is always traceable to human negligence
● Exception would be if it was caused by lightning or there is a stipulation voluntarily entered into by
the parties
Second Circumstance: “Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil”
Fourth Circumstance: “The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers”
Even if the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods should be caused by the character of the goods,
or the faulty nature of the packing or of the containers, the common carrier must exercise due diligence
to forestall or lessen the loss. (Art. 1742)
The carrier which, knowing the fact of improper packing upon ordinary observation, but still accepts the
goods notwithstanding such condition, it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom
(Southern Lines, Inc. v. CA, 4 SCRA 258
It must be shown that Acting Mayor Basilio Rub had the power to issue the disputed order, or that it was
lawful, or that it was issued under legal process of authority. The appellee failed to establish this. Indeed,
no authority or power of the acting mayor to issue such an order was given in evidence (Ganzon v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48757 (May 30, 1988))
They do not fall among the five categories. Therefore, if goods are lost by reason thereof, the
presumption still applies but the common carrier can still prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence
● Despite the cause of the loss is attributable to grave or irresistible threat, violence or force
● Common carriers are not made absolute insurers
In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite
beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to
recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of
transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are
inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary
diligence. (De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47822 (December 22, 1988))
Article 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the
same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who
has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1738.
In this case, there is no dispute that the custody of the goods was never turned over to the consignee or
his agents but was lost into the hands of unauthorized persons who secured possession thereof on the
strength of falsified documents. The loss or the misdelivery of the goods in the instant case gave rise to
the presumption that the common carrier is at fault or negligent.
To the mind of this Court, the contract of carriage remains in full force and effect even after the delivery
of the goods to the port authorities; the only delivery that releases it from their obligation to observe
extraordinary care is the delivery to the consignee or his agents. Even more telling of petitioners’
continuing liability for the goods transported to the fact that the original bills of lading up to this time,
remains in the possession of the notify party or consignee. (Nedlloyd Lijnen B.V. Rotterdam v. Glow Laks
Enterprises, Ltd., G.R. No. 156330 (November 19, 2014))
Take note that if there is a bill of lading (hawak ng consignee) and once it’s delivered, the bill of
lading should be delivered. In this case, nasa consignee pa proving na hindi pa nadedeliver.
If there is notice of the arrival of the goods, and the consignee fails to claim the goods, after the lapse of
a reasonable period, there will be constructive delivery (Article 1738)
If the consignee still fails to take delivery, from that point on, the contract between the carrier and the
consignee will no longer be a contract of carriage but a contract of deposit. Therefore, the carrier is no
longer required to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only the due diligence required of a good father
of a family.
Therefore, it will end the Extraordinary Responsibility of the common carrier. Ordinary diligence
nalang
Article 1737. The common carrier’s duty to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods remains in full
force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless the shipper or
owner has made use of the right of stoppage in transitu.
Now, this is another important provision. A common carrier’s duty is in effect even if they are
temporarily unloaded. If you temporarily unload the goods or store it in transit, extraordinary responsibility
is there.
BAR TIP: baka lumabas sa civil law. No recall that this was previously asked in the bar.
Article 1744. A stipulation between the common carrier and the shipper or owner limiting the liability of
the former for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods to a degree less than extraordinary
diligence shall be valid, provided it be:
Article 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and
contrary to public policy:
1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or shipper;
2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods;
3) That the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the custody of the goods;
4) That the common carrier shall exercise a degree of diligence less than that of a good father of a
family, or of a man of ordinary prudence in the vigilance over the movables transported;
5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omission of his or its employees;
“Respondeat superior” (Latin for “Let the superior answer”), an employer is legally responsible
for the actions of its employees. However, this rule applies only if the employee is acting within
the course and scope of employment.
6) That the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act
with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished;
7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods on
account of the defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment used in
the contract of carriage.
Valid Stipulations
1) An agreement limiting the common carrier’s liability for delay on account of strikes or riots is
valid. (Art. 1748)
2) A stipulation that the common carrier’s liability is limited to the value of the goods appearing in
the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding. (Art. 1749)
3) A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered. by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction,
or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has
been fairly and freely agreed upon. (Art. 1750)
A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the common carrier's liability for loss or destruction of a cargo to
a certain sum, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is sanctioned by law, particularly
Articles 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code. Such a limited-liability clause has also been consistently upheld
by this Court in a number of cases. (Everett Steamship Corp. v, Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122494
(October 8, 1998))
EXAMPLE: This clause in a bill of lading limiting the liability of the carrier to only P300.00 for “any single
package of silk or other valuable cargo” is not fair and reasonable under the circumstances (Juan Ysmael
& Co., Inc. v. Limgengco, G.R. No. L-28028 (November 25, 1927))
WHEN CANNOT LIMIT ITS LIABILITY – By the weight of modern authority, the carrier cannot limit its
liability for injury to or loss of goods shipped, where such injury or loss is caused by its own negligence.
(Juan Ysmael & Co., Inc. v. Limgengco, G.R. No. L-28028 (November 25, 1927))
This is an old case but it still very much applicable. Once negligence is established, not merely
relying on presumption. The stipulation is considered nugatory, and hence cannot invoke the stipulations
limiting its liability
The fact that the conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are
hard to read would not warrant the presumption that the appellee was aware of those conditions such
that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions. Appellee. Therefore, is not and cannot be
bound, by the conditions of carriage found at the back of a ticket sub issued to him when he made the
flight on appellant’s plane on November 23, 1959." (Shewaram v. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. L-20099
(July 7, 1966))
Remember the requirement that the stipulation limiting liability should be fairly and freely agreed
upon. Dito sa ticket na inissue ng PAL, maliit and very hard to read yung stipulation. Hence, the Supreme
Court held that it is not fairly and freely agreed upon, and cannot bind passenger
While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket (Exh. "12"), he is nevertheless bound
by the provisions thereof. "Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and
valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the
regulation". It is what is known as a contract of "adhesion", in regards which it has been said that contracts
of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other, as the plane ticket in
the case at bar, are contracts not entirely prohibited. (Ong YIu v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. L-40597
(June 29, 1979))
When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common carrier’s liability for
negligence is valid, but not for willful acts or gross negligence.
The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the common carrier’s liability. (Art. 1758)
Requisites:
1) Passenger is carried gratuitously
2) Stipulation limiting liability
3) Injury was not due to willful acts or gross negligence of the carrier
Article 1747. If the common carrier, without just cause, delays the transportation of the goods or
changes the stipulated or usual route, the contract limiting the common carrier’s liability cannot be
availed of in case of the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods.
Take note that the delay here should be without cause. Hence, if the delay is due to the fault of the
government of 3rd persons, or beyond the control of the carrier, the provision shall not apply.
Article 1752. Even when there is an agreement limiting the liability of the common carrier in the
vigilance over the goods, the common carrier is disputably presumed to have been negligent in case of
their loss, destruction or deterioration.
Hindi nawawala ang presumption of negligence. As long as the passenger or victim can prove
contract of carriage or injury or loss, he already established his cause of action against the common carrier
Article 1753. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of
the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration.
Article 1752. Even when there is an agreement limiting the liability of the common carrier in the
vigilance over the goods, the common carrier is disputably presumed to have been negligent in case of
their loss, destruction or deterioration.
Since the passenger's destination in this case was the Philippines, Philippine law governs the liability of the
carrier for the loss of the passenger's luggage.
In this case, the petitioner failed to overcome, not only the presumption, but more importantly, the
private respondent's evidence, proving that the carrier's negligence was the proximate cause of the loss of
his baggage. Furthermore, the petitioner acted in bad faith in faking a retrieval receipt to bail itself out
of having to pay Co's claim. (Philippine Air Lines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92501 (March 6, 1992))
RULES ON BAGGAGES
Article 1754. The provisions of articles 1733 to 1753 shall apply to the passenger’s baggage which is not
in his personal custody or in that of his employee. As to other baggage, the rules in articles 1998 and
2000 to 2003 concerning the responsibility of hotel-keepers shall be applicable.
Hand carried baggage of a passenger, the common carrier is required only to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family (Necessary Deposit), BUT for check-in luggage, the carrier will have to exercise
extraordinary diligence.
Where the common carrier accepted its passenger's baggage for transportation and even had it placed in
the vehicle by its own employee, its failure to collect the freight charge is the common carrier's own
lookout, and cannot be used to exempt the common carrier from liability for the consequent loss of the
baggage. (Sarkies Tours Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108897 (October 2, 1997))
Article 1998. The deposit of effects made by travellers in hotels or inns shall also be regarded as
necessary. The keepers of hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries, provided that
notice was given to them, or to their employees, of the effects brought by the guests and that, on the
part of the latter, they take the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their substitutes advised relative
to the care and vigilance of their effects.
EXTENT OF LIABILITY
The liability is not limited to effects lost or damaged in the hotel rooms which come under the term
“baggage” or articles such as clothing as are ordinarily used by travelers but include those lost or
damaged in hotel annexes such as vehicles in the hotel’s garage.
1) The loss or injury is caused by his servants or employees as well as by strangers provided that
notice has been given and proper precautions taken
2) The loss is caused by the act of the thief or robber done without the use of arms and irresistible
force for in this case, the hotel-keeper (common carrier) is apparently negligent.
1) The loss or injury is caused by force majeure, theft or robbery by a stranger with the use of arms
or irresistible force, unless he is guilty of fault or negligence;
2) The loss is due to the acts of the guests, his family, servants or visitors;
3) The loss arises from the character of the things brought into the hotel (carrier).
Article 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect
that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and
the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or
diminished shall be void.
CARRIAGE OF PERSONS
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
We believe that the behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instance — playing mahjong
"before and up to the time of collision — constitutes behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the
part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty
(750) passengers had been entrusted. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban was "off-duty" or "on-duty" at or
around the time of actual collision is quite immaterial; there is, both realistically speaking and in
contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty" hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a
common carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence (Mecenas v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 88052 (December 14, 1989))
This is an illustration of the requirement to exercise utmost diligence. There is no such thing as
off-duty. As the master of the vessel, he must exercise extraordinary diligence at all times. In this case, the
ship captain was playing mahjong kasi off duty daw siya up to the time of the collision. The Supreme Court
held that it is not an acceptable behavior.
The bus stopped when an old man signaled that he wanted to ride. AS soon as the old man stepped on the
platform of the bus, the bus driver recklessly started to accelerate the bus. The old man slipped and was
ran over, causing his death.
Held: There was a perfected contract of carriage; as soon as the old man placed his foot on the platform,
he was already a passenger.
The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger
and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to a contract of carriage.
A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders.
Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course
of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage (Light Rail Transit Authoirty v. Natividad, G.R. No. 145804
(February 6, 2003))
Passenger: Buy the token > enter the premises of LRT > go the place where the train is supposed to arrive.
Held: Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the
course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage.
Ang nangyari kay Navidad ay he entered drunk, and altercation before Navidad and the security
guard ensued, Navidad fell, and the train was coming in which struck Navidad. The Supreme Court held that
not only during the course of the trip that the carrier is responsible.
A carrier can be held liable for damages for failure to comply with the contract to carry that is consensual
in nature.
Like sa MRT or LRT, the mere fact you bought a ticket is not enough. There should be an intention to
make use of services of common carrier
Held: The child was still a passenger at the time of the accident, hence, the carrier was still liable. The
contract of carriage ends only after a reasonable time within which to get out of the bus terminal.
Doctrine: Contract of Carriage ends only after a reasonable time within which to get out of the bus
terminal. The passenger should be given sufficient time to get out of the terminal for the contract to end.
Once created, relation of carrier and passenger continues and will not terminate until passenger has
been landed at the port of destination safely alighted from carrier’s conveyance and had a reasonable
opportunity to leave carrier’s premises — he remains a passenger within the reasonable time he remains
in the premises. What is a reasonable time is determined from all the circumstances, and includes a
reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for departure.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
The best evidence of a contract of carriage of passenger is the ticket; nonetheless, there may still be a
contract of carriage even without a ticket, since the Statute of Fraud does not cover contracts of
carriage, which means that a contract of carriage may be oral.
The Statute of frauds do not cover contracts of carriage. Which means it may be oral, parang sasakay
ka sa bus bibili ka lang ng ticket. It can be proven by testimonial or circumstantial evidence
The carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers. If the death or injury was due to a cause
beyond the control of the carrier, it will not be liable to the passenger. However, it must do everything in
its power to prevent any passengers from getting hurt. It must take precautionary measures.
The Supreme Court held that when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects
of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses, the
stranded passengers incurred, it cannot be charged to JAL (Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
1185564 (August 7, 1998))
This is a good example when Common Carrier is exculpated from liability due to a fortuitous event.
Article 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers as required in articles
1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by
statements on tickets, or otherwise.
Article 1758. When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common carrier’s liability
for negligence is valid, but not for willful acts or gross negligence.
The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the common carrier’s liability.
For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good
customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under
circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard
unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy. (Gatchalian v. Delim,
G.R. NO. 54687 (Octover 21, 1991))
Commonly, kapag ang bus nahulog sa ravine, they will pay for hospital expenses and the victims will
sign the waiver or quitclaim. Yung mga waiver na pinapapirma sa mga victims, sabi ng Supreme Court ay it
is offensive to public policy, therefore, void. Because that would render the law nugatory.
For it to be valid, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy, or good customs.
● If offensive to public policy then void
● Otherwise, it would weaken the standard of diligence required by law
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Significance: Liability is quite absolute. Common carrier cannot interpose the defense that the employee
acted beyond the scope of his authority or acted in violation of the orders of the common carrier or that it
exercised all the diligence of a good father of family in the selection and supervision of the employees
GR: Common carriers are liable to the death or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts
of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or
in violation of the orders of the common careers
XPN: Off-duty ang employee
RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE
Maranan v. Perez
20 SCRA 413 (1967)
A taxi driver held-up his passenger, who resisted and was killed. His heirs sued based on culpa contractual
against the taxi company, which denied liability on the ground that the driver acted beyond the scope of
his authority.
Held: It may be true that the taxi driver was acting beyond the scope of his authority but Art. 1759 of the
Civil Code expressly provides that the owner is liable for negligence of the employees even if such acts are
beyond the scope of his authority. The taxi company was held liable on culpa contractual.
A bus hit a tree and a house due to the fast and reckless driving of the bus driver. Passenger sustained
physical injuries as a result of the vehicular accident. Bus company denied liability since they exercised
required diligence in the selection of the employees.
Held: Common carriers cannot avail of the defense that exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees. Liability is based on contract, and diligence
in the selection is a defense for quasi-delict, not for breach of contract.
ILLUSTRATION
Pwede sya magfile ng case based on culpa contractual. You do not include the driver because he is
not party to the contract, he is merely an employee, you only implead the bus operator, in this case
company A. If you want to include the driver, contributory negligence is partial, ikaso mo is quasi-delict and
not breach of contract, because if its quasi-delict, you are filing for damages, Mr. C vs. A Incorporated and
Driver C, pwede na dalawa kasuhan and once found guilty, defendants will be considered solidary liable as
tortfeasors
b. CULPA AQUILIANA (Quasi-delict) — Damage caused to another due to negligence. The case will be
entitled “Passenger C v. A, Inc. and Driver C”, and the defendants will be solidarily liable as joint
tortfeasors.
If you want to file a case against the driver, cause of action is based on quasi-delict
Under quasi-delict the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle for damages arising from
the tortious act of driver is primary, direct and solidary with the driver, pursuant to Art. 2194 of the Civil
Code. The only recourse of such owner if the judgment is satisfied by him is to recover what it has paid
from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on
quasi-delict pursuant to Art. 2181.
Unde quasi-delict, the registered owner is liable primary, direct and solidary with driver
C. CULPA CRIMINAL — Driver B’s negligence may amount to a crimeL reckless imprudence, resulting in
physical injuries. The case will be entitled “People v. Driver B,” and if the latter is convicted but is
insolvent, an action can be pursued by Passenger C against A, Inc. to enforce the latter’s subsidiary
liability.
Pajarito v. Seneris
87 SCRA 275 (1978)
Conviction of employee is conclusive upon employer as to his subsidiary liability, although the latter may
not in the strict sense be a party to the criminal case brought against the employee. Enforcement of
employer’s subsidiary liability may be conveniently litigated within the same criminal proceedings because
the execution of the judgment is a logical and integral part thereof. Employer will have the right to
present evidence of the employee’s solvency to avoid liability.
EXAMPLE: Sir experienced a case where he was with the accused. The case is reckless imprudence which
resulted in the death of a person and the client was convicted. Since the case was for reckless imprudence,
sir applied for probation which was granted. Plaintiff filed for motion for execution to recover civil liability
from the driver for the death of the victim but it appeared that driver has no money. Buti nalang, hindi alam
ng kalaban namin na pwedeng ienforce ang civil liability sa company based on the doctrine in Pajarito v
Seneris (1978). They did not pursue an action to invoke subsidiary liability against the employer.
This is a good lesson for you future lawyers. If you are counsel for the victim and the driver was convicted
but he was held as insolvent, then you can pursue the subsidiary liability of the common carrier or employer
based on Pajarito v Seneris (1978)
In this case, even if the common carrier is not impleaded, the common carrier can still be held liable. If you
are the lawyer for the victim, once you have secured conviction and there is civil liability and accused is
insolvent, you can file a motion for execution holding Common Carrier liable under subsidiary liability and
Court will hear it
RESPONSIBILITY OF PASSENGERS
Article 1761. The passenger must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid injury to
himself.
He had first hand knowledge that the ticket in question would expire on March 27, 1990 and that to secure
an extension, he would have to file a written request for extension at the PAL’s office in the Philippines.
Despite this knowledge, appellant persisted to use the ticket in question (Cervantes v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 125138 (March 2, 1999))
In this case, his ticket expired for the trip on the way back and he did not file for a letter of
extension. It was not granted. He should have exercised diligence.
Article 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his
death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount
of damages shall be equitably reduced.
The road on which the bus was passing was wide enough for two buses only. A passenger placed his elbow
outside the window railing of the bus. An incoming bus hit the passenger’s elbow, injuring it in such a
manner that it had to be amputated.
Held: Carrier is not liable. The proximate cause of the injury was the passenger’s own contributory
negligence a complete defense to the carrier and absolves it from liability. When the injured passenger is
guilty of the contributory negligence, his contributory negligence will only serve to diminish the liability of
the carrier and not extinguish it, except if it is the proximate cause of the injury, in which case it serves
to absolve the carrier from any liability.
BAR TIP: There is a problem on contributory negligence on part of passenger, determine if it is the
proximate cause of the loss or accident
Q: What if the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the loss?
A: In the case of Isaac vs. Ammen Transportation, which involved a road which was big enough for two buses
and a passenger who stuck his elbow out of the bus railing causing him to get hit by another bus, in a
manner that he needed to get amputated.
According to the Supreme Court, the carrier is not liable, because the proximate cause of the injury
was the passenger’s own contributory negligence which is a complete defense of the carrier to be absolved
from liability. In the bar, when there is a question in which you notice that there is contributory negligence
on the part of the passenger, then you need to determine and check what is the proximate cause of the
accident or loss.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.
The driver stopped the bus to answer a call of nature. While the driver was thus outside the bus, one of
the passengers went into the driver’s seat and drove off the bus, which met an accident, causing injury to
another passenger. Is Manila Railroad liable for the acts of the passenger?
Held: Yes, because Manila Railroad driver was guilty of negligence in leaving the key on the ignition. Had
drivert taken the key with himself, the passenger could not have driven off with the bus. The carrier is
therefore liable for injuries when the carrier’s employees could have prevented the injuries through
exercise of due diligence.
First impression, dapat hindi liable ang CC ano? However, the Supreme Court ruled that Manila
Railroad is liable for negligence for leaving the key. Kung kinuha niya yung susi nung umihi siya, hindi sana
nangyari ang aksidente.
The act of a passenger stabbing another passenger in the bus is considered as force majeure. However, to
be absolved from liability in the case of force majeure, the common carrier must still prove that it was
not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident; otherwise, it would still be held liable.
Even if the situation involves force majeure, the same cannot apply because there was negligence on
the part of the driver.
Sa first impression, parang walang liability ang Contract of Carriage.What happened here is may nag
amok sa loob ng bus so pinagsasaksak niya. So sa takot ng mga ibang passenger, may mga tumalon at got
injured. Later on, those who jumped filed a case. Bachelor Express in defense claimed force majeure.
Hence, the Supreme Court held that there was negligence when the driver did not immediately stop the bus
instead of continuing then those who jumped wouldn’t have been seriously injured.
DAMAGES
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE
In an action based on culpa contractual the damages recoverable against a common carrier are as follows:
Q: What are the damages that could be recovered when it comes to loss, destruction, injury on the
passenger.
A: If the cause of action is culpa contractual or breach of contract
Take note of the underlined portion: Unrealized profits computed by determining the net, yearly
income of the injured or the deceased employee multiplied on the life expectancy or years indicated on
mortality life table of insurance companies
Moral damages could be also awarded but only due to: mishap resulting to death of passengers,
carrier was in bad faith even if death did not result, action was culpa aquiliana, if passenger suffered injury.
RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE
Lopez v. PAN-AM
16 SCRA 431 (1966)
Senator-Passenger and family had tickets for first class seats on PAN-AM bound for San Francisco. When
they arrived in Tokyo, the plane’s crew found out that the first class tickets had been oversold, and they
were compelled to take the economy seat. When the plane arrived at San Francisco, Filipino officials and
the Filipino community with a band waited for Senator Lopez to appear from the first class section, but he
did not as he was in the economy section. Lopez was humiliated; thus, he filed this suit to recover moral
damages.
Held: PAN-AM should have informed Lopez of possible downgrading to prevent humiliation. The Court
awarded Lopez large amounts (P300,000 in moral damages and P150,000 as attorney’s fees), in view of the
importance of the person of the passenger.
Zulueta v. PAN-AM
43 SCRA 397 (1972)
Zulueta was on a PAN-AM flight with his family from San Francisco to Manila. On a stopover at Wake Island,
the passengers were told that the plane would leave in 30 minutes. After 30 minutes, Zulueta failed to
show up, the crew had to look for him. When he was found, the plain captain called Zulueta a “brown
monkey”. Zulueta answered back and a bitter exchange followed. Captain got angry and ordered the crew
to unload Zulueta’s baggage, and he was left behind. Zulueta filed an action in Manila to recover moral
damages.
Held: Court awarded P500,000 as moral damages and aP50,000 as attorney’s fees for the harsh treatment
of Zulueta
Although exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right, nonetheless the grant of exemplary
damages was in order since respondent has been found entitled to temperate damages, especially so
when the airline acted in bad faith by not informing the passengers of the erroneous cancellation of
their bookings on the flight.
The common carrier, in breach of its contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger, is liable
to pay the following:
a) Indemnity for death (P50,000);
b) Indemnity for loss of earning capacity; and
c) Moral damages
People v. More
321 SCRA 538 (1999)
NET EARNING CAPACITY: Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income - Less living expenses
Where:
● Life expectancy =2/3 x (80 - age of the deceased)
● Gross Annual Income = Deceased’s annual income before deduction of the living expense
● Living Expenses = 50% of gross annual income
DOCTRINE OF “LAST CLEAR CHANCE” states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity
of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent is considered in law as solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident
“Solely liable” means one and only liable. Hindi magiging liable yung other person.
Is this a good defense in the liability of a Common Carrier? The Supreme Court said that this doctrine
is applicable only in a suit between owners and drivers of colliding vehicles.. It is not applicable when action
is based on breach of contract or culpa contractual (eg: when you are the passenger). Thus, in this situation,
it is not a good defense. Only in collisions, yung nagbanggaan lang. Hindi sa culpa contractual
Tiu v. Arriesgado
437 SCRA 426 (2004)
Doctrine of last clear chance is applicable only in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding
vehicles (eg: in case of quasi-delicts) it does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from
the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations (culpa contractual), for it is inequitable to exempt a
negligent driver and owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence
Note that the Supreme Court made mention that, “... it is inequitable to exempt negligent driver
and owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence”
KABIT SYSTEM
KABIT SYSTEM - An arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public
convenience allows other persons who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes
for a fee or percentage of the earnings.
Although the parties to such agreement are not outrightly penalized by the law, the kabit system is
invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and therefore void and inexistent under Art. 1409
of the Civil Code. Lim v. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRa 394 (2002)
Villanueva v. Domingo
438 SCRA 485 (2004)
Registered owner of vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to the public while it is being operated;
and whether the driver is authorized or not by the actual owner is irrelevant to determining the liability of
the registered owner whom the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or
death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways. The main purpose of vehicle
registration is the easy identification of the owner who can be held responsible for any accident, damage
or injury caused by the vehicle.
This case partakes the registered owner rule (directly liable to the public; easy identification of
owner who can be held liable for any accident caused by the vehicle). The victim can run after the
registered owner, and then the latter will ask for reimbursement from the actual offender
BOUNDARY SYSTEM
BOUNDARY SYSTEM - An arrangement whereby the vehicle’s registered owner allows another person to
operate it as a common carrier under a lease agreement, and thereby avoiding the establishment of either
an employer-employee or a principal-agent relation.
Magboo v. Bernardo
7 SCRA 952 (1963)
An employer-employee relationship is deemed to exist between a jeepney-owner and driver under the
“boundary system”, the features which are: driver does not receive a fixed wage but gets only the excess
of the amount of fares collected by him over the amount he pays to the jeep-owner; and gasoline
consumed is for the account of the driver — are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them
from that of employer and employee. Jeepney-owner is subsidiarily liable as employer under Art. 103 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The relationship is basically one of employer-employee, and not lessor-lessee under the boundary
system. Therefore, jeepney operator is subsidiary liable.
BILL OF LADING
BILL OF LADING - is a written acknowledgment of receipt of the goods and an agreement to transport and
deliver them at a specific place to a person named or on his order.
FUNCTIONS
a) Best evidence of existence of contract of carriage of cargo
b) If negotiable, ownership over the goods represented may be transferred by negotiation. Art. 1636
of the Civil Code mentions bill of lading as a document of title;
c) It serves as the receipt of the cargo
d) It defines the rights and liabilities of the parties in reference to the contract of carriage.
The shipowner’s or agent’s liability is merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total
loss thereof in its extinction. The total destruction of the vessel extinguishes maritime liens because there
is no longer any res to which it can attach. “No vessel, no liability” expresses in a nutshell the limited
liability rule.
This is quite important when it comes to marine transportation.. Basically what this doctrine says is
that If there is no vessel, there is no liability on the part of the ship owner. Thus, total loss of a vessel
results in the extinguishment of liability of the ship owner.
Take note that this doctrine is applicable only on civil liabilities which arise from (1) the conduct of
the captain; (2) collision and (3) unpaid wages
EXCEPTIONS
a) When the injury to or death of a passenger is due either to the fault of the shipowner or to the
concurring negligence of the shipowner and the captain
NOTE: If the carrier failed to overcome the presumption of negligence, the limited liability
rule does not apply (Aboitiz Shipping v. New INdia Ins. Co. Ltd., 488 SCRA 563 (2006))
b) When the vessel is insured(to the extent of the insurance proceeds);
c) In Workmen’s Compensation claims;
d) Claim for death benefits under POEA- SEC (POEA Standard Employment Contract;
e) Claim is not maritime like collision of vessels used for transportation of goods in rivers.
It is the shipowner who can invoke the limited liability rule. He is the person for whom the rule has been
conceived. The charterer cannot invoke the limited liability rule as a defense especially against the
shipowner (De La Torre v. CA, 653 SCRA 714 (2011))
Fault is on the part of the shipowner or concurring negligence of the shipowner and ship captain,
applicable ung doctrine of limited liability
CHARTER PARTY
CHARTER PARTY
A charter party is a contract by which the entire ship or some principal part thereof is let by the owner to
another person for a specified period of time or voyage.
If the charter is a Contract of Affreightment, which leaves the general owner in possession of the ship as
owner of the voyage, the rights and the responsibilities of ownership rest on the owner. The charterer is
free from liability to third persons in respect of the ship (San Miguel Corp. v. Heirs of Inguito, G.R. Nos.
141716 & 142025, (July 4, 2002))
● BUT we do not apply the provisions on common carriers; like presumption of negligence.
○ We apply the applicable provisions on damages because private carrier na siya
BOTTOMRY
Bottomry - Loan secured by the shipowner or ship agent guaranteed by the vessel itself and payable only
upon safe arrival of vessel at destination
It is a contract in the nature of a mortgage, by which the owner of the ship borrows money for the use,
equipment and repair of the vessel for a definite term, and pledges the ship as a security for its
repayment, with maritime or extraordinary interest on a account of the maritime risks to be born by the
lender, it being stipulated that if the ship be lost in the course of the specific voyage or during the limited
time, by any of the perils enumerated in the contract, the lender shall also lose his money.
Umutang ang ship owner, and the security is the ship itself
● It is payable only upon safe arrival of the vessel. If the vessel does not arrive, then obligation to pay
is extinguished
● Loan is available only to to shipowner
Respondentia - loan secured by the owner of the cargo payable upon safe arrival of cargo at destination.
The lender must be paid his principal and interest through the ship perishes, provided that the goods are
saved.
Like bottomry, if the ship or cargo did not arrive then obligation is extinguished
Right to recover from debtor is not extinguished if Right to recover is extinguished if the thing put up
the thing put up as security is lost or destroyed as a security is lost or destroyed
A stevedoring company which is charged with the loading and stowing cargoes, does not operate business
that is classified as a common carrier. Consequently, it had duly exercised the required degree of
diligence in loading and stowing cargoes, which is the ordinary diligence of a good father of a family.
There is no specific provision of law that imposes a higher degree of diligence than ordinary diligence of a
stevedoring company or one who is charged only with the loading and stowing of cargoes.
ARRASTRE OPERATOR
Arrastre refers to a contract for the unloading of goods from a vessel. In Mercantile Law, the term has a
technical meaning as it applies to overseas trade. When a person brings in cargo from abroad, he cannot
unload and deliver the cargo by himself. This is done by the arrastre operator, which will then deliver the
cargo to the importer consignee.
Arrastre operator’s services are clearly not maritime in character as to both the nature of its function and
the place of their performance. The relationship between arrastre operator and consignee is akin to that
between a warehouseman and a depositor. Thus, an arrastre operator is not bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence of a common carrier.
In a claim for loss filed by a consignee, the burden of proof to show compliance with the obligation to
deliver the goods to the appropriate party devolves upon the arrastre operator, who must prove that the
losses were not due to its negligence or its employees
WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention is an international convention which regulates liability for international carriage
of persons, luggage, or goods performed by aircraft. It unified certain rules in relation to international
carriage by air.
The Convention applies to international transportation by act. There is international transportation when:
a) The place of departure and the place of destination are within the territories of two contracting
countries regardless of whether or not there was a break in the transportation or transshipment, or
b) The place of departure and the place of destination are within territory of a single contracting
country if there is an agreed shopping place
a) Passenger – injury took place (1) on board the aircraft; (2) in the course of any of the operations of
embarking; (3) in the course of disembarking, or (4) when there was or because of delay (Secs. 17
and 19, WC)
b) Checked baggage or goods – damage occurred during air transportation or when there is delay
(Secs. 18 (1) and 19, WC)
These are the instance where the carrier could be held liable for damage/injury under the warsaw
convention
Exception:
1) By special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability (Alitalia
v. IAC, G.R. No. 71929 (December 4, 1990))
2) The limit for passenger death or injury is $75,000 inclusive of legal fees and costs where the US is
the origin, destination or stopping place (Sec. 1 CAB Econ. Reg. (ER) No. 9 (2012)).
The warsaw convention sets the limit on the liability of the carrier:
XPN:
● If there’s a special contract between the carrier and the passenger agreeing to a higher limit of
liability
Exception: If the passenger or consignor has made, at the time when the package was handed over the
carrier, a special declaration of interest in delivery at destination and has paid a supplementary sum if the
case so requires. In that case, the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum,
unless (1) he can prove the damage or loss was due to willful misconduct; (2) the damage or loss was
due to gross negligence, (3) absence of a baggage check, (4) the carrier did not issue a ticket; and (5)
in case of waiver by the carrier.
c. Objects of which the passenger takes charge himself – 5,000 francs per passenger
Objects of which the passenger takes charge himself (Hand-carry) - 5,000 francs per passenger
NOTE: if you’re a plaintiff, prefer to file in the Philippines, so long as the case falls under any of the four
instances under Article 28 (1)
JURISDICTION/VENUE
Under Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before:
1) The court where the carrier is domiciled;
2) The court where the carrier has its principal place of business
3) The court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
4) The court of the place of destination
NOTICE OF CLAIM
File a notice of claim/complaint, 3 days from receipt of the baggage. In case of delay of delivery,
within 14 days from the time the baggage was placed at the disposal of the passenger. In case of goods, 7
days from delivery.
PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION
1) If you have a cause of action against the airline, the case must be filed within 2 years from receipt in
case of an action for damage to passenger baggage. You have only 2 years.
2) If the action is for tort including humiliation, the prescriptive period is 4 years.
3) If the case filed involves both/combination of damage to baggage and tort for humiliation, the
Supreme Court held to still apply the 4-year prescriptive period under the Civil Code.
4) Notice of claim is mandatory and should be filed within 3 days from receipt of baggage, within 14
days in case of delay of delivery, 7 days in case of goods.
RELEVANT JURISPRUDENCE (Penned by J. Caguioa)
Sanico v. Colipano
G.R. NO. 20969 (September 27. 2017)
FACTS: A passenger filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages against the Jeepney
owner and his driver.
In her complaint, the passenger claimed that she was made to sit on an empty beer case at the edge of
the rear entrance/exit of the jeepney with her sleeping child on her lap. And, because of an uphill incline
in the road, the jeepney slid backwards because it did not have the power to reach the top.
The passenger pushed both her feet against the step board to prevent herself and her child from being
thrown out of the exit, but because the step board was wet, her left foot slipped and got crushed
between the step board and a coconut tree which the jeepney bumped, causing the jeepney to stop its
backward movement. The passenger’s leg was badly injured and eventually amputated.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not both the jeepney and the driver breached the contract of carriage with the
passenger
2) Determination of the owner’s liabilities
3) Validity of the waiver made by the passenger
HELD:
1) Only the owner breached the contract of carriage. Since the cause of action is based on a breach
of contract of carriage, the liability of the owner is direct as the contract between him and the
passenger. The driver of the jeepney cannot be made liable as he is not a party to the contract of
carriage.
2) The operator is liable.
Being an operator and owner of a common carrier, he was required to observe extraordinary
diligence in safely transporting the passenger. When the passenger’s leg was injured while she was
a passenger, the presumption of fault or negligence on operator’s part arose and he had the burden
to prove that he exercised the extraordinary diligence required of him.
However, operator failed to rebut the presumption of fault or negligence under the Civil Code.
More than this, the evidence indubitably established the operator’s negligence when its driver
made the passenger sit on an empty beer case at the edge of the rear entrance/exit of the
jeepney with her sleeping child on her lap, which put her and her child in greater peril than the
other passengers
While the first two requirements can be said to exist in this case, the third and fourth
requirements are, however, lacking.
For the waiver to be clear and unequivocal, the person waiving the right should understand what
she is waiving and the effect of such waiver. Both the CA and RTC made the factual
determination that Colipano was not able to understand English and that there was no proof that
the documents and their contents and effects were explained to her.
For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good
customs. To uphold waivers taken from injured passengers who have no knowledge of their
entitlement under the law and the extent of liability of common carriers would indeed dilute
the extraordinary diligence required from common carriers, and contravene a public policy
reflected in the Civil Code.
Additional Fact: The bus company shouldered the hospital expenses and had the passenger sign a waiver
entitled “affidavit of desistance with quitclaim”.
Filed culpa contractual / breach of contract against the jeepney owner and the driver
● The person waiving the right should understand what she/he is waiving
● Colipano was not able to understand English, therefore, third requisite is absent
UNITRANS V. ICNA
G.R. No. 203865 (March 13, 2019)
FACTS: Several musical instruments were shipped from Australia to the Philippines. Upon arrival in Manila,
the container was discharged from the vessel and was received by Unitrans, a freight forwarding entity.
Unitrans then delivered the subject shipment to the consignee. After further inspection, it was found out
that two units of musical instruments were damaged and could no longer be used.
ISSUE: Whether a freight forwarder such as Unitrans can be considered as a common carrier.
HELD: YES, since Unitrans engaged itself "to handle the cargo and to make sure that it was delivered to
the consignee from the port of Manila to the consignee." As noted by the CA, "Del Rosario also admitted
that in so far as the subject shipment is concerned, Unitrans acted as a local agent of BTI Logistics, which
was duty bound to deliver the same to the right party.
Moreover, to reiterate, in its Answer with Counterclaim, Unitrans had already expressly admitted that San
Miguel also engaged its services as customs broker for the subject shipment; one of its obligations was to
pick up the shipment and then transport and deliver the same to the consignee's premises in good
condition.
Another case, Unitrans vs. ICNA. Take note, yung vessel, Unitrans, petitioner of case, hindi sya ang
nag-transport ng goods, sila lang ang nag-receive ng container, because they are freight forwarding entity.
Two units of musical instruments were damaged. Issue was whether Unitrans can be considered as common
carrier. SC said YES since Unitrans engaged itself to make sure it reach the consignee from port of Manila.
One of the contract state the pickup of the shipment and transport to consignee’s premises in good
condition. Freight forwarding, strictly speaking, is not exactly a common carrier, function tlaga is to mere
make arrangement on movement of goods from origin to consignee. But why did SC said Unitrans is a
common carrier. Because they undertook the delivery instead of merely arranging for their transportation.
● Take note: A freight forwarding company is not automatically a Common Carrier. The ruling in this
case is unique to the circumstances of the party
● Generally, it is not a Common Carrier that transports goods. it merely makes arrangement, akin to a
travel agency.
A Common Carrier is a person or company that actually transports goods or persons pursuant to Article
173 of the Civil Code.
Freight Forwarder is a person or company that organizes shipments for individuals or corporations to get
goods from origin to destination, forwarders typically contract with a carrier to move the goods
A freight forwarder’s liability is limited to damages arising from its own negligence, including negligence
in choosing the carrier; however, where the forwarder contracts/undertakes to deliver goods to their
destinations instead of merely arranging for their transportations, it becomes liable as a common
carrier for loss or damage to goods. A freight forwarder assumes the responsibility of a carrier, which
actually executes the transport, even though the forwarder does not carry the merchandise itself.
FINAL MESSAGE
“Be faithful in studying subjects coupled with prayer. Back in my day, they said passing the bar is
40/40/20
● 40 - study
● 40 - prayer
● 20 - luck
I think it should be 60/40
● 60 - prayer
● 40 - aral
Try to convince our Boss up there that you want to be a lawyer so He can give you this blessing to
become a lawyer.
Sa instances na hindi mo talaga alam ang sagot kahit anong tumbling ang gawin mo. just close your eyes and
invoke the guidance of the holy spirit. The first thing that comes into your mind, write it down - ay type it
down. Because more often that not, it is inspired by the Holy spirit.”
OPEN FORUM
Q: DNV?
A: LTFRB is trying to regulate bc it is considered CC
Q: Accommodation passenger in CC?
A: It depends on what manner - gratuitous passenger or as to a negotiable instrument?
● If it is gratuitous, then stipulation limiting liability is valid as to goods. If as to passengers, then it is
not valid unless there is stipulation limiting such liability.
○ EXAMPLE: A cab driver gave a ride gratuitously to his crush then met an accident - absent
stipulation to limited liability, the cab driver shall be held liable.
Q: What is the nature of liability of foodpanda and grab drivers as Common Carriers since they are
considered as individual contractors?
A: Then the liability of foodpanda and grab drivers themselves (eg: ordered from pizza hut through
grabfood, then it shall be grabfood that is liable)
Always go back to definition. If the seller is merely engaged in making goods, then it is not their
liability. They can merely replace the food in case of accident
SCRIBES TEAM: Maria Christina Arce| Abby Apasan Aquino | Sherry Jane Pagay | Maria Teresa Gemora |
Christine Huan | Pamela Caryl Dela Cruz | Quimberlyn Ranchez
CHECKED BY: Adrian Macasaquit (Deputy for Academics) | Hannah Keziah Morales (Chairperson for
Academics)
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
● Practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. There should be faithful compliance
with the rules of the legal profession, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, and
adherence to the standards of mental fitness (Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
79690-707, April 7, 1983).
● Practice of law is not a money-making venture. Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits.
The returns it bears are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered.
○ It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy freedom from government
interference, is impressed with public interest for which it is subject to State
regulation.
● Practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with
the rules and the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. (Manalang v. Buendia, A. C.
No. 12079, November 10, 2020
● Power of admission to the practice of law is vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.
The said power to admit candidates to the legal profession is a judicial function and involves
the exercise of discretion.
○ A petition to that end is filed with the Supreme Court as are other proceedings
invoking judicial action.
■ The Supreme Court, in turn, acts through a Bar Examination Committee
composed of a Bar chair and the examiners.
○ Acting as a liaison between the Courts and the Bar chairperson, on the one hand and
the individual members of the Committee on the other is the Bar Confidant who is at
the same time Deputy Clerk of the Court.
■ The acts of the Committee that involve exercise of discretion as regards
admission is subject to the final approval of the Court.
C. Who may practice?
● Any person who has been duly licensed as a member of the Bar in accordance with the statutory
requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
● Note the two (2) basic requirements to be complied with for a person to be engaged in the
practice of law:
1. Admitted to the bar - this requirement involves various phases consisting of:
a. Furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications
b. Passing the bar examinations
c. Taking the lawyer’s oath before the Supreme Court
d. Signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the Clerk of the Supreme Court a
certificate of license to practice.
2. A lawyer must remain in good and regular standing which is a continuing requirement to the
practice of law
a. He must remain a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
b. Payment of dues - Regularly pay all Integrated Bar of the Philippines membership dues
c. Assessment - Other lawful assessment, as well as annual privilege tax
d. Ethics - Faithfully observe the rules on ethics of the legal profession
e. Subject to disciplinary control - Be continually subject to judicial disciplinary control
● The rigid requirements and conditions are designed to admit to its ranks ONLY those who are
adequately prepared mentally and morally to discharge the duties of an attorney and to exclude
therefrom those who cannot live up to its exacting standards.
○ The purpose is to protect the public, the Court, and the Bar from incompetence and
dishonesty of those who are unfit to become members of the legal profession.
○ In other words, only those who are competent, honorable, and reliable may practice law and
every lawyer must pursue only the highest standards in the practice of his calling.
D. Qualifications for admission
An applicant to admission to the practice of law must be:
1. Citizen of the Philippines
2. A resident thereof
3. At least twenty-one (21) years of age;
4. Of good moral character
5. He must also show no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines
6. Possess the required educational qualifications
7. Pass the Bar examinations
● Regarding the requirement of Filipino citizenship and residence of the Philippines, authority speaks
that this is based on wise and sound principles of public policy, which takes into account that those
connection of the practice of law, with the administration of justice, and the other branches of the
government.
● An alien cannot well maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, which is required in the
oath of a lawyer.
○ However, a Filipino who was naturalized in another country but subsequently re-acquires
Filipino citizenship under the Citizenship Retention Reacquisition Act of 2003 or R.A. No.
9225, may be allowed to practice law once again.
○ He or she has to secure another an authority to practice from the Supreme Court after
conferring the following conditions:
1. Update and pay in full of the annual membership dues in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines;
2. Pay professional tax;
3. Complete at least thirty-six (36) credit hours of Mandatory Continuing Legal Education;
4. Retake the lawyer’s oath
E. Age, Maturity, and Discretion
● Every applicant or admission to the Bar must be of age because maturity and discretion are required
in the practice of law.
○ A requirement of possession of good moral character aims to maintain and uphold the high
moral standard and the dignity of the legal profession.
● Jurisprudence teaches that this end is achieved by admitting to the practice of the profession only
those who are shown to be honest, and those who are shown to possess good moral character.
● Good moral character may realistically be defined in terms of acts which have been historically and
traditionally considered as ambiguity of moral turpitude.
● Jurisprudence describes moral turpitude as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty,
and good morals.
○ An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellowman and to society in general. Contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, and good
morals.
● On Educational Qualifications, the Rules of Court requires that an applicant must pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university, college or school:
1. A four-year (4) High school course;
2. A course of study prescribed for a Bachelor’s degree in Arts or Sciences; and
3. A four-year (4) Bachelor’s degree in Law
● Such requirements are meant to adequately prepare persons for the highly technical work and
growing complexities of advocacy.
● Jurisprudence also teaches the reason that the lawyer is entrusted with the protection of life,
liberty, property or honor and to officially approve one who is not adequately prepared to dedicate
himself to such a delicate mission is to create a social danger.
○ Knowledge of and proficiency in law are among the requirements designed to avoid such
social danger.
● Furthermore, the courses of study leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws must be taken
progressively in the usual manner.
○ If you recall the case of Caronan v. Caronan (A.C. No. 11316), the respondent whose real first
name was Richard was barred from admission to the Bar for his failure to pursue and
satisfactorily complete a pre-law course.
○ For emphasis, however, as this also relates to a requirement as discussed a few moments ago.
Although the Court did not discount the possibility that Richard may later on complete his
college education and earn a law degree under his real name, the Supreme Court nonetheless
ruled Richard’s false assumption of his brother’s name, identity, and his educational record
had rendered him unfit for admission to the Bar. The Court, therefore, emphasized that the
practice of law is a privilege limited to the citizens of good moral character.
● An applicant’s learning and proficiency in law is ascertained by requiring him to take the Bar
examinations.
○ The subjects chosen to this examination are designed to eliminate whose general intelligence,
learning, and mental capacity are inadequate to enable him to assume and discharge the
duties of an attorney.
● The Supreme Court, in the exercise of its power to admit applicants to the Bar, may likewise
prescribe such other qualifications or requirements as it may deem necessary to elevate the
standards of the legal profession.
F. Oath, Certificate, and Signing of the roll of attorneys
2. He/she then signs the roll of attorneys to become full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.
● The roll is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are
authorized to practice law
● If you recall the case Atty. Medado who misplaced there is notice to sign the roll of
attorneys and forgotten about it until he was required to provide his roll number
relating to his compliance of his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirement,
the Court in that case mentioned that he could not have been a full-fledged member
of the Philippine Bar when he failed to sign in the roll of attorneys. It was the act of
signing that would have made him so.
● To reiterate, a lawyer must remain in good and regular standing, which is a continuing requirement
for the practice of law.
● This means that he must remain a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, regularly pay all
Integrated Bar of the Philippines membership dues and other lawful assessments, as well as the
annual privilege tax, faithfully observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession, and be
continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
● You have learned that lawyers have duties to society, as seen in Canons 1 to 6, or the legal
profession, Canons 7 to 9 or the courts, Canons 10 to 13, and to the clients, Canons 14 to 22.
A. Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
Prohibitions:
1. Engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01)
2. Counsel or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system. (Rule 1.02)
3. Uphold the constitution
4. Obey the laws of the land
5. Promote respect for law and for legal processes
Duties to society (Canons 1 to 6)
● Jurisprudence teaches that while the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an
obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic
requirements of good citizenship.
○ As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an example for others to
emulate.
● Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community, in so far as respect for the law is
concerned.
● As mentioned in the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer should neither engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct, nor counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
● This is because such acts discredit the legal profession itself and creates a public impression that the
law can be used to advance one’s personal motives.
● With regard to obedience to the law and respect for the law and legal processes:
1. Whether a lawyer could draft a joint will (1951)
2. Whether a lawyer could advise strikers to ignore an order of injunction or temporary
restraining order (1972 and 2013)
3. Whether a lawyer could advise union members to stage a demonstration before a court to
press for the early resolution of their case (2003)
4. Whether a retired judge could still use his protocol plate (2010)
5. Whether a lawyer could draft documents to violate constitutional limitations relating to
ownership of lands (2016)
6. Whether lawyers could insist on marrying each other even though one of them is still married
(2018)
● Lawyer who was asked by a victim to handle a case filed against the person responsible for the
accident (1994, 2011)
● Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man’s cause.
● The reason for the rule is to prevent any barratry and ambulance chasing. Barratry is the offense of a
frequently exciting or stirring up the quarrel either at law or otherwise. It is the lawyer’s act of
forming suits among the individual and offering legal services to one of them for monetary motives
and purposes.
● On the other hand, Ambulance Chasing refers to solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by
laymen employed by an attorney for the purpose of having an attorney itself.
Previous bar questions asked about the propriety of the following actions:
1. A lawyer who represented his client in a case, urged the other person to file a case of estafa against
said client.
2. A lawyer, who, upon discovering a mining accident, personally convinced the victims to file a claim
to his law firm.
3. A lawyer, who acted in bringing an injured person to the hospital, supported the latter’s decision to
file a suit against a bus company.
Encourage clients to avoid, end, or settle controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement (Rule 1.04)
● A lawyer who approached 2 arguing strangers, introduced himself as a lawyer, offered to help settle
their quarrel amicably, then succeeded. (1966, 1979)
● Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of
a fair settlement.
● By express provision of law, fair settlement of cases is also right and encouraged. Take note,
however, that a non-payment of an attorney’s fees is not a ground for the disapproval of a
compromise. The rights of lawyers to peace for services rendered cannot have a higher standing than
the rights of clients’ or the parties themselves.
B. Canon 2 - A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner
compatible with the independence, integrity, and effectiveness of the profession.
● Authorities discuss that this canon requires that legal services should not only be efficient but should
also be made available and accessible to those who need them in a manner compatible with the
ethics of the profession.
● A lawyer who accepts professional employment should be in a position to render efficient and
effective legal assistance. Otherwise, he should find another lawyer who is qualified and able to do
so.
● Any lawyer who is qualified to provide efficient legal services should make available such services to
those who are in need thereof. This is an obligation a lawyer chooses when he takes his oath of
office.
● Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the
oppressed.
Rule 2.01
● Not reject the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed
● Exceptions
○ When he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently (Rule
14.03); or
○ When he is asked to handle a civil case that is groundless (Lawyer’s Oath) or
interposed for delay (Rules of Court)
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to render
legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s rights
Rule 2.02
● Notwithstanding the refusal:
○ Not refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned
○ If only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s rights
■ But remember Rule 15.03 (conflict of interest)
● Lawyer (who had previously been giving legal advice to her friend) could now decline giving
advice when the latter contemplated on having an abortion (2010)
● But still, also remember Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall refrain from giving such legal advice if the reason
for not accepting the case is that he favors under a conflict of interest between him and the
prospective client or between a present client and a prospective client because extending such legal
advice will create an established attorney-client relationship between them and may involve
violation of the rule from representing conflicting interest.
● A bar question in 2010, whether a lawyer who had previously giving legal advice for her friend could
now decline giving legal advice and the latter contemplated on having an abortion.
C. Canon 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified, and
objective information or statement of facts.
● Making legal services known
○ Ethical if:
■ Honest, fair, dignified, objective
● Remember:
○ Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications
or legal services.
■ Not deceptive, unfair, undignified, self-laudatory
○ Rule 3.04 - A law shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass media
in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.
■ Paying media to attract legal business, prohibited
● Canon 2, Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
○ Prohibition on improper solicitation of business
■ Law a profession, not a trade
● It is unethical for a lawyer to advertise his talent as a merchant advertises his wares. Jurisprudence
teaches that the law is a profession and not a trade, the lawyer degrades himself and his position,
stoops to, and adopts the practice of mercantilism by advertising his business or offering them to the
public.
● To allow a lawyer to advertise his stalwart skill, is to commercialize the practice of law. Nowhere in
the provision in public confidence, and lessen his ability to render that high character service to
which every member of the Bar is called.
● Best advertising
○ Good and efficient service
● Advertisements when permissible
○ Compatibility with dignity of legal profession
● The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity and trust which must be earned as the outcome of a character and conduct. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and magnify his success. For solicitation
to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. It may be a modest and
decorous manner and would bring no injury to the lawyer or to the Bar. An exception is the
publication in a reputable law list of a brief biographical and informative data. Simple signs stating
the name or names of the lawyers, professional cards bearing the name of the lawyers or the lawyers
and the office address or modest announcements of said data are not in proper.
● Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The
continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all
its communications that said partner is deceased.
○ No false, misleading or assumed name
● Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall
be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law concurrently.
○ Partner accepting public office
D. Canon 4 - A lawyer shall participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice.
● Authorities discussed that these duties know the sense of public responsibility. The lawyer must
recognize that a law must be part of a vast social network and whether he likes it or not, he has to
interact with the rest of the society. A lawyer must broaden out and continue to be required to grow
in knowledge and competence in order to be able to make the law socially responsive.
Canon 4
● To participate in the improvement of reforms in the legal system;
● Use of a name of
○ A deceased partner (1994 and 2001)
○ A partner who was appointed as Undersecretary of Justice (1980)
○ A public prosecutor who refused to represent the local government unit (2006)
○ A public prosecutor who entered his appearance but no longer appeared in subsequent
hearings (2006 and 2017)
○ A public prosecutor who disclosed to the court the fact that the real perpetrator of the crime
approached him and admitted to committing the crime (2016)
E. Canon 6 - These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.
● Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see
that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing
the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
F. Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the integrated bar.
● Jurisprudence teaches that the respect of the public to the legal profession is immeasurably
enhanced by the faithful performance of the lawyer duties, the court, the society, to his brethren in
the profession, and to his client. Conversely, such respect is inexorably diminished wherenever a
member of the bar betrays his trust and confidence that was reposed in him by his client.
G. Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
● Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.
○ Not use abusive, offensive or improper language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
● Jurisprudence teaches that a lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but
respectful as being an advocate and in keeping the integrity of the profession.
Previous bar question:
1. A public prosecutor uttering sarcastic and insulting words while he was reporting the irregularity
committed by the defense counsel in open court (1949).
● Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice
and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
○ Not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer
○ However,
■ Allowed to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
or neglectful counsel.
● Whether a lawyer may render professional services as collaborating counsel if he was desired by the
client, but was objected to by the present counsel (1951, 2001)
● This proscribes competition among lawyers in the matter of securing clientele. A person without a
retained lawyer is a legitimate prospective client for any lawyer. But as soon as he has retained a
lawyer and had not dismissed the same, efforts of other lawyers constitute encroachment. Take note,
however, that it is the right of any lawyer without fear or favor to give proper advice and assistance
to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
● Note also Rules 9.01 and 9.02, a lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. A lawyer
shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for the legal services with persons not licensed to practice
law, except where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that upon the
latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons
specified in the agreement.
● A lawyer communicating with the opposing party or persuading the opposing party to enter into a
compromise agreement without knowledge of the opposing party’s counsel (1995, 1997, 2001, 2006,
2009).
● A public prosecutor objecting to the defense counsel’s act of interviewing his witnesses (1983, 2009)
Note also:
● Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
○ Delegation of tasks
● Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law,
Except:
a. Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s
death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons
specified in the agreement; or
b. Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
c. Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the
plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.
○ Division of fees for legal services
Duties to the courts (Canons 10 to 13)
I. Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court.
● It’s because a lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. His duties to the court are more
significant than those which he owes to his client. His first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate and his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and the ethics of the profession. For
like the court itself, a lawyer is an instrument to advance the ends of justice. His superior retainer is
with the court, which outlasts all his retainers with his clients. Accordingly, should there be a conflict
between his duty to his client and that to the court, he should resolve the conflict against the former
and in favor of the latter. His primary responsibility being to uphold the cause of justice. It has been
said that it is the lawyer’s sworn and moral duty to help build and not to destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard toward the court so essential to the proper administration of justice.
● Rule 10.02 provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language, or the argument of the opposing counsel or the text of a decision or authority,
or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert
as a fact that which has not been proved.
● The significance of this provision is that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings
of the Supreme Court may lose their proper and correct meaning to the detriment of other courts,
lawyers, and the public who may be misled.
Previous bar questions:
1. A lawyer crafting his statement of facts from his theory of the case to make it appear that it was
based on the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals; and
2. A lawyer quoting an argument of a party to the case and stating it reflected the ratio decidendi of
the decision of the Supreme Court.
J. Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
● Jurisprudence teaches that in criticizing a judge’s decision, the test is whether it is done in good
faith. While the court recognizes a litigant’s right to criticize judges and justices in the performance
of their functions, it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and judges or justices thereof on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to the courts.
● Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
○ Abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing behavior before the Courts
● A lawyer alleging in his petition that a certain court attorney of the Court of Appeals drafted the
assailed decision, that he is ignorant of the law and he should be disbarred (2006)
● Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.
○ File grievances against judges before proper authorities
Previous bar questions that the require the application to this rule:
1. A lawyer advising his client to write to the Office of the Court Administrator to report the frequent
tardiness and absence of a judge (1973).
2. A public relations officer of the All Judges Association issuing press releases to criticize the decision
of a judge (1992).
3. A lawyer, who after receiving an adverse decision, lodged a criminal complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman accusing the judge of rendering a manifestly unjust judgment (2004).
K. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
● Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
Court processes.
○ Not to unduly delay, impede execution or misuse court processes
● A lawyer of the losing party filing a series of petitions to provide time for his client to find a rentable
place (1980)
● Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
○ Avoid testifying on behalf of the witness…
○ Except:
1. On formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument,
and the like; or
2. On substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice,
in which even he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another
counsel.
■ The rationale for the rule lies in the difference between the respective
functions of a witness and an advocate. The function of a witness is to tell the
facts as he recalls them in answer to questions. The function of an advocate is
that of a partisan.
● A lawyer asked by his client to be his counsel and be a witness since he was also present when an
accident occurred. (1980)
L. Canon 13 - A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
● Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity
for, cultivating familiarity with Judges.
○ Not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality
○ Not seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity
● Here, the independence of judges must be protected at all times so that the administration of
justice may not be exposed to destructive suspicions before the scrutinizing eyes of litigants and the
public as a whole.
Previous bar questions:
1. A lawyer who timed his visits to a judge’s favorite coffee shop after requesting said judge to be a
principal sponsor to the wedding of his son (2000)
2. A lawyer who had a chance meeting with a judge in a golf course and had been regularly playing golf
since then (2010)
3. A lawyer asking his fraternity brod to arrange a meeting with the latter’s friend, a judge (2013).
● Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
○ Public statements regarding a pending case
● A lawyer sharing his thoughts with tv reporters on the bias of the judge to whom his case was
currently pending (2003).
Duties to clients (Canons 14 to 22)
● The lawyer’s failure to deliver upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated the funds for his own use and to the prejudice of his client
● Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter’s race,
sex, creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
○ Make service available without discrimination
● This rule is applicable only in criminal cases where a lawyer cannot decline to represent an accused
or respondent because of his opinion that the said person is guilty of the charge or charges against
him.
● In representing the accused or the respondent, the lawyer must only use means which are fair and
honorable. This is not applicable to civil cases where the lawyer has the duty to counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appeared to him as to be just and such defenses only as he
believes to be honest and debatable under the law.
Previous bar questions requiring the application relating thereto:
1. A lawyer refusing to represent a person because of the latter’s gender preference (2004)
2. A lawyer declining to continue as counsel of the accused because the latter informed him that he
committed the crime charged (1984, 1986, 1994, 2005, 2016)
3. A lawyer discovering in his interview with a prospective client that the latter is guilty of the crime
charged (1965, 1978, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2013, 2014).
● Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as
counsel de oficio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any
of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
○ Not decline appointment as counsel de oficio
● Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
○ Use of information acquired in the course of employment
● Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information from his
files to an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting,
data processing, or any similar purpose.
● Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associate thereof
unless prohibited by the client.
● Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose services
are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidence or secrets of the client.
● Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client’s affairs even with members
of his family.
● Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case except to
avoid possible conflict of interest.
● Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
● There is a conflict of interest when a lawyer represents consists of interest of two or more opposing
parties. The existence of conflict of interest is determined by three tests:
1. When, in representation of one client, a lawyer is also duty bound to oppose it for another
client.
2. When the acceptance of a new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may
injuriously affect the first client. For when called upon in a new relation to use against the
first one any knowledge acquired through their professional connection; or
3. When the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of an attorney’s duty
to give undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.
A question on this area has been asked many times. Expect one in your bar exam.
M. Canon 22 - A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in
the circumstances.
Note Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:
a. When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the
matter he is handling;
b. When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;
c. When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
d. When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out
the employment effectively;
e. When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the
retainer agreement;
f. When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
g. Other similar cases.
● An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of
the Court after due notice and hearing. In which event, the attorney should see to it that the name
of the new attorney is recorded in the case. An attorney who could not get the written consent of his
client must make an application to the court for the relation must not terminate formally until there
is a withdrawal of record.
● Counsel has no right to presume that the court would grant his withdrawal and therefore must still
appear on the hearing dates. Also note the mechanics of substitution of counsel to be valid.
Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
a. The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required the novelty and difficulty
of the questions involved;
b. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c. The importance of the subject matter;
d. The skill demanded;
e. The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f. The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines chapter to which he belongs;
g. The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;
h. The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i. The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j. The professional standing of the lawyer.
● In this regard, we will mention the concept of quantum meruit. It means as much as the lawyer
deserves or such amount which is a service's merit.
● In a contingent fee contract, the lawyer gets paid for his services only if he wins the case for the
client.
● A general or a retainer fee is paid to a lawyer to ensure and secure his future services for a particular
case or work and to remunerate him for being deprived by being retained by one party of the
opportunity of rendering services to the other party.
● Its purpose is to prevent undue hardship on the part of an attorney to obtain the legion of servants of
the rule forbidding representation of conflicting interest.
● In the absence of an agreement to the contrary the retaining fee is neither paid nor received in
consideration of the contemplated service. It is a part from or in addition to what the client has
agreed to pay him for services which he has been employed to perform. In such a case, the fee which
the client will pay his lawyer for the specific matter is called a special retainer fee, in addition to
the general or retaining fee.
● A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a
client. A client may have several cases demanding special or individual attention. If, for every case,
there is a separate and independent contract for attorney’s fees, each fee is considered a special
retainer.
● Champerty is one whereby the attorney agrees to prosecute suits at his one expense without an
obligation of the client to reimburse the attorney. It could also be a suit for the recovery of things or
property belonging to or claimed by the client. The latter agreed to pay the attorney a portion of the
thing or properly recover it as compensation for legal services.
● Difference between champertous contracts and contingent fees
1. In champertous contracts, the attorney undertakes to bear all expenses incident to the
litigation without an obligation of the client to reimburse the attorney while this is not true in
contingent fee contracts.
2. Champertous fees are payable only in kind out of the properties recovered while contingent
fees may be paid in cash.
3. Champertous contracts are void as against public policy and in the ethics of the profession
while contingent fee contracts are valid.
In champertous contracts, the attorney undertakes The attorney does not undertake to bear all
to bear all expenses incident to the litigation expenses incident to the litigation without an
without an obligation of the client to reimburse the obligation of the client to reimburse the attorney.
attorney
Payable only in kind out of the properties recovered Fees may be paid in cash
● Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
● The following are the distinctions between a retaining lien and a charging lien.
● Existence to the right or extent of the right rather. A retaining lien is the power or the right of the
lawyer to retain possession of the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully
come into his possession until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid and apply such funds
to the satisfaction thereof. While charging lien is the right of a lawyer to be paid his fees and
disbursements out of the amount collected from the repeated party by virtue of the judgment for
the payment of money and execution issued in pursuance of such judgment.
● With regard to the existence of the judgment. In retaining lien, there is no need for a judgment to
have been rendered by a court before it is exercised while in a charging lien, there must be a
judgment that has become final and executory to be enforced by execution.
● With regards to execution and enforcement, in retaining lien, there is no need for judicial
intervention for the exercise of the right while in charging lien, the intervention of a court is
necessary.
● As to the existence of a property, in retaining lien there must be a property of the client in the
possession of the lawyer while in a charging lien there is no need for properties of the client to come
to the possession of the lawyer.
Existence to the right A retaining lien is the power or the A charging lien is the right of a lawyer
or extent of the right right of the lawyer to retain to be paid his fees and disbursements
possession of the funds, documents out of the amount collected from the
and papers of his client which have repeated party by virtue of the
lawfully come into his possession until judgment for the payment of money
his lawful fees and disbursements have and execution issued in pursuance of
been paid and apply such funds to the such judgment.
satisfaction thereof.
With regard to the In retaining lien, there is no need for a In a charging lien, there must be a
existence of the judgment to have been rendered by a judgment that has become final and
judgment court before it is exercised. executory to be enforced by
execution.
With regards to In retaining lien, there is no need for In charging lien, the intervention of a
execution and judicial intervention for the exercise court is necessary.
enforcement of the right.
As to the existence of In retaining lien there must be a In a charging lien there is no need for
a property property of the client in the properties of the client to come to the
possession of the lawyer possession of the lawyer.
This is also a favorite bar topic so expect a question from this area.
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS (RULE 139 AND RULE 139- B)
III. Suspension, Disbarment and Discipline of Lawyers (Rule 139 and Rule 139- B)
● Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions– adherence to the rigid standard of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, and faithful compliance with the rules
of legal profession are the conditions required for the remaining member in good standing of the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice of law. Any breach by the lawyer of these conditions makes
him unworthy of the trust and confidence with the court and clients reposed in him or unfit to
continue the exercise of his professional privilege. His misconduct justifies disciplinary action against
him or the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
● The Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Courts may exercise disciplinary powers over lawyers who
appear before them as counsel or litigants. However, either court can only impose suspension or a
lesser sanction after due process. These courts can recommend to the Supreme Court disbarment
of a lawyer or order in suspending him.
● When the penalty of suspension is imposed upon a lawyer, the lawyer shall not practice law until
further action by the Supreme Court.
● A lawyer may be subject to discipline on a ground apart from the abovementioned grounds, for acts
done contrary to justice, honesty or good morals.
● “Conduct” is not limited to those in connection to the performance of the lawyer’s professional
duties; it includes those not connected to his professional duties which shows unfitness or
unworthiness as a member of the Bar.
● Acquittal in a criminal case does not foreclose disbarment proceedings. It has been held that the
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape
the penalties of criminal law.
● With regard to executive pardon, absolute pardon by the President is one which operates to wipe out
conviction, as well as the offense itself, and a grantor of, in favor of a lawyer is a bar for proceeding
of disbarment against him based solely on the commission of the said offense. The reason is that the
respondent lawyer, after the absolute pardon, is as guiltless and innocent as if he never committed
the offense at all.
○ However, an absolute pardon subsequently granted to a lawyer who had been previously
disbarred for conviction of a crime does not automatically reinstate him to the Bar.
○ If, however, the disciplinary action is based not solely on the respondent’s commission of the
offense but on a transaction involved or related therein which culminated in his conviction,
the absolute pardon for the offense may not be an obstacle for a disciplinary action against
him for while the pardon relieves him of the penal consequences, it does not restore his
character.
● Similarly, a conditional pardon or a remission of the expired portion of his sentence does not operate
as a bar to disciplinary proceedings. The disciplinary action will be judged upon the act of conviction
without regard to the conditional pardon extended to the respondent.
E. Disciplinary Proceedings
● May be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio upon the filing of the verified complaint of any
person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
● The complaint shall state clearly the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of the
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged, and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
F. Penalties
1. Warning
2. Reprimand
3. Fine
4. Suspension
5. Disbarment
6. Contempt
7. Imprisonment
G. Lifting of Suspension
● Any suspension imposed by the Supreme Court is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the
period but only upon its order.
● The suspended lawyer should serve his or her suspension, then file a verified petition to lift the
suspension.
● The verified petition shall:
○ State the date of receipt of the order, decision, or resolution or notice of his suspension;
○ The lists of the lawyer’s engagement affected by the suspension, indicating the relevant
court, tribunal, or other government agencies, if any; and
○ Attach supporting documents.
● If the Supreme Court finds that the petition is compliant in form and substance, it shall order the
lifting of such the suspension.
H. Reinstatement to the Roll of Attorneys
● A disbarred lawyer may file a verified petition for judicial clemency after five (5) years from the
receipt of order, decision, or resolution of disbarment.
● The petition should allege:
1. That the verified petition was filed after 5 years from the receipt of order, decision or
resolution of disbarment;
2. That the disbarred lawyer has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior
disciplinary orders, including orders for restitution;
3. That he or she recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of his misconduct for which he or
she was disbarred by:
a. showing positive acts evidencing reformation;
b. That he or she has reconciled or attempted in good faith to reconcile with the
wronged private offended party in the disbarment case, or if the same is not possible,
an explanation as to why such an attempt of reconciliation cannot be made;
c. In cases where there is no private offended party, the plea for clemency must contain
a public apology; and
d. Notwithstanding the conduct for which he is disbarred, that he has the requisite of
good moral character and competence.
● Petition may also state that he or she has productive years that can be put to good use, if given a
chance or there is a showing of promise, such as intellectual attitude, learning, or legal acumen, or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system, or administrative and
other relevant skills, as well as potential for public service.
● If the petition has prima facie merit, the Supreme Court shall refer the petition to the bar confident
of any fact-finding body for investigation and recommendation.
● If the petition fails to show any prima facie merit, it shall be denied outright. The Office of the Bar
Confidant, or any other fact-finding committee designated shall conduct an investigation and submit
to the Supreme Court a recommendation within 90 calendar days of receipt of the referral.
● The Supreme Court shall decide the petition on the basis of clear and convincing evidence.
QUESTION & ANSWER AND OTHER BAR TIPS
Q2: When do we raise the Lawyer's oath as the basis of our answer?
● A: Some say, if you don't know the exact rule or canon, then you can use the Lawyer’s oath. Some
have said that it is an encapsulated form of canons. But ideally cite the proper canon or rule.
○ There was one question that required at least the application of the portion of the lawyer's
oath from a question way back in supporting or handling a losing criminal case versus handling
losing civil case.
○ For criminal cases, you can still hand them because despite your opinion of the accused, you
should still render service. But with regard to losing a civil case, you can decline service
because what you should do is to support meritorious cases and not interpose for delay.
Q3: Some law officers have social media accounts. Are there any restrictions imposed for law offices posting
on their social media accounts? Are they allowed or totally prohibited?
● A: I’m giving perspective. If you encounter a question in the bar, apply the canons strictly. In other
words, you consider that as solicitation or advertising.
● But, you know social media, the internet, these are relatively new things. In other words, in the real
world, it’s debatable. Of course, some say it is prohibited or allowed. But for your Bar, apply the
rules strictly.
Q4: Since Rule 1.01 being a catch-all provision, is it possible to use this as a basis in a hypothetical problem?
● A: It should be the last resort. If you know the exact canon or rule or principle, use that. For my
mentees, I discovered that they have this answer, they will have points but they will not obtain
maximum points.
NOTE: For the purposes of the bar, apply the canons strictly even if the topic is debatable in the real
world.
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