MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

What is malicious Prosecution?

Malicious Prosecution refers to the malicious institution against another of unsuccessful

criminal, or bankruptcy, or liquidation proceedings, without reasonable or probable cause. It
refers to those proceedings that have been instituted maliciously without any reasonable or
probable cause to justify such proceedings. In the case of West Bengal State Electricity Board
v. Dilip Kumar Ray, the Supreme Court defined malicious prosecution as a judicial
proceeding that is instituted by one person against another, wrongful or improper motive and
without probable cause to sustain that the case is of the nature of malicious prosecution.

Further, the court also clarified the misconception of malicious prosecution being
synonymous to abuse of power. It stated that malicious prosecution refers to maliciously
causing procedure to be issued while an abuse of power is the initiation of a legal procedure
for purposes other than those for which it was instituted.

Elements/ Essentials of Malicious Prosecution

1. The plaintiff was prosecuted by the defendant.

 Prosecution refers to setting the law in motion and it includes two elements.
One being that the plaintiff was prosecuted and the second being that the
defendant was the prosecutor. It includes a wider sense of meaning where
even criminal proceedings by way of appeal is included and it does not end at
trial. So, in order to file a suit of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must be
prosecuted by the defendant and there has to be more active participation than
giving just giving mere information as held in the Khagendra Nath v. Jacob
Chandra case.
 The preparation of medical reports or forensic reports or appearing on the
stand as an expert witness does not amount to prosecution. Additionally, in a
suit for malicious prosecution, the burden of proving the absence of reasonable
and probable cause and the existence of malice lies with the plaintiff as held in
the Antarajami Sharma v. Padma Bewa.
 In the case of Musa Yakum v. Manilal, the Bombay High Court held that the
defendant cannot excuse himself stating that he initiated the procedure under
 the order of the court if the court was moved by the false evidence provided by
the defendant.
2. The prosecution resulted in the exoneration of the plaintiff or in the termination of the
plaintiff
 As stated by Salmond, this does not mean determination of the plaintiff’s
innocence, but the absence of judicial determination of the plaintiff’s guilt.
This can happen through a verdict of acquittal, discontinuation of the
prosecution by leave of the court, quashing the indictment because of a defect
in it, or corum non judice proceedings.
 In the landmark Reynolds v. Kennedy, the principle that no action can be
taken if the plaintiff has been convicted is still being followed. This principle
holds good even in situations where the conviction is later appealed. Further,
no action can be brought when the prosecution or the proceedings is still
pending. It is a rule of law that no one shall be allowed to sue for malicious
prosecution in the case of a pending suit.
 The cause of action for malicious prosecutions arise on the date of termination
in favour of the plaintiff and even if the plaintiff is convicted of a lesser
offence, he can bring an action under the law of malicious prosecution.
3. Lack of reasonable or probable cause
 The plaintiff has to prove that the defendant prosecuted him without any
probable or reasonable cause. Reasonable and probable cause refers to an
honest belief in the guilt of the accused on the basis of reasonable grounds. So,
if the defendant can show that the prosecution was initiated without having an
honest belief in the truth of the charge, then he cannot claim to have
reasonable or probable cause.
 Ramdeo v. Birdichand Sumermal held that probable or reasonable cause is not
the same as sufficient cause and reasonable cause has to be judged from the
position of a reasonably prudent and ordinary man.
 As held in the case of Niaz Mohammad Khan v. Deane, the question related to
the lack of reasonable or probable cause must be decided by the court after
examining all the facts of the case.
 Further, it is essential that the lack of reasonable or probable cause be
understood in an objective manner and is not subjective to the understanding
 of the accuser. Mere circumstances and suspicion does not amount to
reasonable or probable cause. Additionally, the plaintiff being acquitted is not
prima facie proof that the allegation made was false.
 In the case of Girija Prasad Sharma v. Umashankar Prasad, it was held that
while the investigating authority is to maintain a certain measure of discretion
and can reject the evidence if it is believed to not be reasonable, it is not the
duty of that authority to scrutinize the evidence like a court and hold the
accused guilty. If the evidence to show the commission of the offence is from
an apparently credible source, it may pass the investigating authority’s
discretion and can enable him to perform his duty of bringing the accused to
trial.
 In the case of Mohanlal Raghunath Prasad v. Diwan Lacchman Singh and
Another, the fundamental principles of malicious prosecution was laid down.
Firstly, a person has the right to put the law in motion with an honest
intention. The intention may be to protect personal or public interest.
Secondly, if the law is put in motion through malicious intentions and without
reasonable or probable cause for anticipating success, then it is an abuse of
that right.
 A defendant will be deemed to have reasonable cause if and when he took
reasonable care to communicate true facts. He honestly, but erroneously
believed in his information, and if that information were true, then it would
afford a prima facie case for the prosecution.
 In the case of State of Bihar v. Rameshwar Prasad Baidya, it was held that
when cognizance of the criminal case was quashed by the High Court in the
opinion that the allegation was malicious, and the circumstances justified such
finding, it could not be said that there was probable or reasonable cause on
behalf of the defendant.
4. Existence of malice
 This kind of malice refers to the malice in fact that indicates that the suit was
actuated through spite or ill-will towards an individual or through direct or
indirect motives and not done in furtherance of justice.
 Factors like haste, recklessness, omission to reasonably enquire, enmity,
revenge are taken into account to determine the existence of malice.
  In Bank of India v. Lekshmi Das, it was held that to prove malice, the absence
of reasonable or probable cause must be proved. In the case of Bhim Sen v.
Sita Ram, it was held that malice may be inferred from the absence of honest
belief in initiation of suit and the consequent want of reasonable and probable
cause for instituting the prosecution complained of.
 Further, it is not essential that malice must exist since the beginning of suit.
Malice can be developed in any stage of the proceedings and if and when it
does, a suit for malicious prosecution will stand. If during the proceeding, the
defendant gets information that the accused is innocent, and even then if the
prosecution continues, then it will be observed as malicious in nature.
5. The plaintiff suffered damage
 The existence of damage is essential to claim remedy under a suit for
malicious prosecution. Damage can be done to the plaintiff’s reputation, to the
plaintiff’s person and the plaintiff’s property.

When does prosecution commence in a suit for malicious prosecution?

The prosecution is not deemed to have commenced before a person is summoned to answer
the complaint. In the case of Khagendra Nath v. Jacob Chandra, it was held that merely
bringing an issue before the executive authority does not amount to the commencement of
prosecution and as held in the same case, there needs to be some sort of active participation
for it to constitute prosecution.

As held in Mohamed Amin v Jogendra Kumar, the prosecution commences on taking

cognizance of the complaint under Section 190 of the Criminal Procedural Code, when
examination of the complainant under oath as per Section 200 of the Criminal Procedural
Code, when an open inquiry in the Court under Section 202 of the Criminal Procedural Code
occurs and when the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedural
Code occurs.

In the case of Dattatraya Pandurang v. Hari Keshav, the plaintiff was remanded to police
custody with investigation still pending. This was not held to be a part of the prosecution
process as issue of process does not play a role in it. In the case of Mohammed Amin v.
Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee, it was held that to constitute prosecution, the test is not
dependent on a particular stage the criminal proceedings have reached, rather it depends on
whether the proceedings have reached a stage where the plaintiff has suffered damage.
American jurisprudence states that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to be arrested and
imprisoned to show that he was maliciously prosecuted. It is enough if it appears that the
action against him was malicious and without probable and reasonable cause. The Supreme
Court of Canada in the case of Casey v. Automobiles Renault Canada Ltd., held that when a
magistrate receives information within his jurisdiction and he has heard and considered the
facts of the case and information provided, a prosecution has commenced even if the
information is later withdrawn without any issue of summons or warrant against the accused.

While these views are assertive, the Calcutta High Court in the Bishun Prasad Narain Singh
v. Phulman Singh case held that the prosecution commences as soon as a complaint is made
to the Magistrate. This view was upheld by the Bombay High Court in the Ahmad Bhai v.
Framji case, and the Oudh High Court in the Gursaran Das v. Israr Haidari case. The Madras
High Court and the Odisha High Court stated that a suit for malicious prosecution does not lie
where no process has been issued to the plaintiff to appear. The Patna High Court in
Zahiruddin Mohammad v. Budhi Bibi stated that if no process is issued, but an order for the
issue of process is actually recorded and the accused then appears, then it must be held that
the prosecution has started.

In the Babulal Bhikarilal v. Ghasiram case, it was held that the position at which the
prosecution commences may vary depending on the defamatory nature of the case. If it is not
defamatory, then the question of damage may cease to exist thus not satisfying the essentials
to constitute a suit under malicious prosecution. So it will be said that the criminal
proceedings did not reach a stage at which damage results. Further, if it is defamatory in
nature, the stage at which the plaintiff has suffered damage would be reached when the
magistrate takes cognizance of the complaint and sends it for police investigation.

Who is the prosecutor?

When the defendant is the person on whose complaint the court takes cognizance of against
the plaintiff, then it is the defendant who is the prosecutor. However, in certain cases, as held
in the Balbhaddar v. Badrisah case, it can be a question of fact whether the defendant is the
prosecutor which has to be answered with regards to the circumstances of the case.
Additionally, it was held in this case that if a person lodges knowingly false information with
the police naming the plaintiff as the accused and further holds the same stance in court, then
he will be the prosecutor in a suit for malicious prosecution.
While it is essential for the prosecutor to set the law in motion, that is not the only criteria to
be considered. The conduct of the complainant before and after making the charge must be
considered. Further, as observed in the Gaya Prasad Tewari v. Bhagat Singh case, while it is
not a universally followed principle, theoretically, it is the crown that is the prosecutor,
however, in practicality, this duty usually lies in the hands of the person who has been
immediately aggrieved by the offence, who pro hac vice represents the crown.

Further, it is to be noted that the investigating authority who takes charge of the case on the
basis of a false report and evidence cannot be held liable as a prosecutor unless he was also
involved in procuring the false reports and evidence.

What are the remedies?

Damages under a suit for malicious prosecution can be claimed under three heads. Firstly
under the damage to reputation, secondly damage to person or bodily freedom, and thirdly,
damage to property including expenses that the defendant might have incurred in defending
himself, so financial interest.

As held in the case of Badri Das v. Nathu Mal, when both the plaintiff and the defendant are
actuated by malicious motives, nominal damages will be awarded. Nominal damages refers to
compensation given when the person has not suffered any substantial injury or loss for which
he must be compensated. Further, as held in Nicholas v. Sivarama Ayyar, malicious
prosecution is one kind of tort that allows aggravated damages considering the motives and
the conduct of the defendant and the amount of injury to the plaintiff. In Huff v. Price,
aggravated damages refer to those damages that are awarded by the courts to reflect the
extent of injury caused to the plaintiff and that it was an award, augmentation of an award, of
compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses. They are measured on the extent of the
plaintiff’s suffering.

In the case of Shriram v. Bajranglal, it was held that the court was entitled to take the
aggravation of damages into consideration as reckless allegations were made against the
character of a professional lawyer and the suit ended in favour of him. So, the law on
malicious prosecution protects the interest in the reputation of a person.

Malicious Civil Proceedings

Malicious Civil Proceedings will not lie in the courts as such a case would not naturally and
necessarily involve damage to the party that is suing. A false civil action will generally be
dismissed at the hearing. Further, when dismissed, the defendant’s reputation will be cleared
and he will be indemnified against his expenses by the award of costs against his opponents.
However, a suit for malicious prosecution includes suits for bankruptcy or liquidation
proceedings as well which are civil proceedings and affect the credit and the reputation of the
party against whom such proceedings are initiated.

The United Kingdom Supreme Court in a majority vote in the case of Wellers v. Joyce
allowed a claim for malicious prosecution to go on trial even when it was a civil proceeding.
However, in the case of Gregory v. Portsmouth City Council, the same was not allowed by
the House of Lords.

Malicious Legal Process

Malicious Legal Process refers to the commencing the process of law maliciously and
without any reasonable or probable cause and causes damage with respect to body,
reputation, or property. This differs from malicious prosecution because malicious legal
process does not have include prosecution. In the case of Premji v. Govindji, it was held that
malicious legal process in that instant matter was when a process is obtained for arrest of the
plaintiff or for the attachment of his property.

The essentials of malicious legal process are the same as that of malicious prosecution which
necessitates the existence of malice, lack of reasonable or probable cause, damage, the
plaintiff having been prosecuted by the defendant, and the prosecution resulting in the
exoneration or termination of the plaintiff. In the case of Roy v. Prior, the defendant alleged
with his own evidence that the plaintiff was evading the service of summons by the courts.
Owing to this allegation, the defendant obtained a warrant for the plaintiff’s appearance
before the court and as a witness in a criminal case. The plaintiff was later arrested and
released later. It was held that the warrant was obtained maliciously and without any
reasonable or probable cause. Thus, the suit for damages was maintainable.

Section 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides the summary remedy to a defendant to get
compensation when an arrest or attachment before judgement has been affected or temporary
injunction has been granted. As per this section, if such arrest, attachment, or injunction was
applied for on insufficient grounds, or if the plaintiff fails in the suit and there was no
reasonable or probable grounds to institute the suit, then remedies can be granted. As per this,
the defendant has to present an application to the court and the court can give compensation
subject to its pecuniary jurisdiction, but only to a limit of Rs. 1,000.
The remedy under this code is optional and an injured defendant may file a regular suit
against the plaintiff for compensation if he has not already sought relief under Section 95 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an alternate remedy
that does not interfere with the principles regulating suits for damages for Malicious Legal
Process. In the case of Wilson v. Kanhya Sahoo, it was held that if the complainant believes
that the compensation awarded under the Code of Civil Procedure is insufficient, then the
defendant has the choice of filing a separate suit.

There are multiple kinds of malicious legal process namely;

1. Malicious Arrest
2. Malicious Search
3. Malicious Process against Property
4. Procuring erroneous decision of the court.

Malicious Arrest refers to a suit that is to recover damages for an injury caused by malicious
arrest and it is maintainable when the defendant obtained an order from court or the authority
to arrest the plaintiff. Further, the order must have been obtained maliciously in the absence
of reasonable and probable cause through either knowingly giving a false statement to the
judge, by stating facts that he believes is true when he knows nothing about it, or when he
asserts his belief in a statement when he had no cause to justify his belief. There must also be
some sort of damage to the plaintiff in terms of injury to reputation, injury to his person, or
his financial interests. Additionally, the process that was issued for arrest should have been
superseded or discharged later. In the case of Thakdi Halji v. Bududin Sahib, it was held that
it is not actionable if the defendant has placed all the facts before the officer having
discretionary power to order such arrest and that officer having complete knowledge of all the
facts orders the arrest in his discretion.

Malicious Search, as held in the Gibbs v. Rea case, refers to an action for procuring or issuing
a house search warrant with the element of malice and the absence of reasonable or probable
cause. The principle of Damnum Sine Injuria which translates to ‘Damage without legal
injury’ has been observed to be applicable in this kind of malicious legal process. It refers to
actions performed which cause some sort of damage that are not wrongful and do not amount
to some legal injury. In the case of Dr. Mohammed v. Dr. Mehfooz Ali, it was held that the
defendant maliciously filed false complaints owing to which the plaintiff’s premises were
searched. The court held that while there was damage, it did not infringe or violate any legal
right and that it was a case of damnum sine injuria thus stating that the suit was not
maintainable.

Malicious Process against Property, as held in Waterer v. Freeman states that an action for
damages under malicious process against property can be held if the suit is through means of
civil proceedings, has the element of malice and lacks reasonable or probable cause, and
procures the execution or distress against the property of another. Proceedings in which the
wrongful attachment is complained of should have terminated in favour of the plaintiff or the
particular process issued should have been superseded or discharged, as held in the Kedarnath
v. Biharilal case. Further, as observed in the Nasiruddin Karim Mahomed v. Umerji Adam &
Co, it is not necessary if the nature of the proceedings make it incapable of terminating it.
Additionally, as held in the Kisorymohan Roy v. Hursookh Das case, proof of malice is not
required when the property of a stranger who is not a party to the suit is taken into execution.
The claim for damages for a suit for wrongful attachment of property usually falls in two
heads. One being trespass, and the other being malicious legal process. When the property
wrongfully attached belongs to a person who is not a party to the suit, the action is that of
trespass. However, when the act of wrongful attachment is done under judicial sanction,
though at the instance of a part, the remedy is that of an action of malicious legal process. In
the former instance, the plaintiff has to only prove trespass and it is the defendant that has to
provide a good reason or excuse. In the latter instance, the plaintiff has to prove absence of
reasonable or probable cause and malice.

No action can lie against a person for procuring an erroneous decision of the court. Erroneous
refers to instances where the courts act without jurisdiction or where its order or judgement is
invalid for some other reason. In the case of Rani Mina Kumari Bebi v. Surendra Narain
Chakravarty, the plaintiff’s land was kept under attachment for a year under an erroneous
order under Section 146 of the Criminal Procedural Code. The defendant was sued as it was
upon his complaint that led to the inquiry which subsequently led to the order. A court of
justice is not an agent or a servant of litigants so as to make the litigant responsible for errors
made by the courts and the basic principle of every person is entitled to rely on the
presumption that the court will observe its own jurisdictional limits and decides correctly
based on facts and the prevailing laws. So, it was observed that the procedure will not lie
against the defendant as no action will lie against a person for acting in pursuance with an
order of the court even if it is erroneous.
Damages for malicious arrest includes the costs and expenses that the plaintiff incurred
because of the arrest and in obtaining the discharge. These factors must be taken into
consideration. Further, if the defendant’s acts were without probable or reasonable cause and
was performed on malicious intent, the damages should be in the nature of penalties as well
as compensation.

In the case of Goma Mahad Patil v. Gokuldas Khimji & Tapidas Khimji, it was held that in
the event of loss of goods arising from wrongful attachment, the measure of damages will be
the value of the goods at the time of wrongful attachment. In the case of Kissori Mohan Roy
v. Hursookh Das, it was observed that the litigation, delay, and depreciation of the value of
goods by an intermediate fall in the market between attachment and sale are natural
consequences of the unlawful law and are recoverable as damages.

Abuse of Legal Process

In the case of Grainger v. Hill, the defendant was held to be liable for getting the plaintiff
arrested apparently for the non-payment of debt. He did it with the intention of coercing him
illegally to surrender the registration of a vessel without which the vessel could not be taken
into the sea. Legal process in proper form was utilized, but for illegal and improper purposes
for which it was not designed.

In this tort, as held in the Filmistan Distributers (India) Pvt. Ltd., Bombay v. Hansaben
Baldevdas Shivlal, the proving of existence of reasonable and probable cause or termination
of the proceedings in favor of the plaintiff’s favour is not essential. The plaintiff alleging the
commission of such tort must show that the predominant purpose of the defendant in using
the legal process was not for the purposes it was designed for and owing to this misuse he has
suffered damage.

Misfeasance in Public Office

When an administrative order is successfully challenged as invalid or void, it does not

necessarily mean that the executive authority or officer who followed such an order can be
sued. If the public officer acts with malice and with an aim to injure thus resulting in damage,
liability arises and the officer can be sued under this tort. As established in the Jones v.
Swansea City Council case, the person holding public office must have powers conferred for
public benefit. He must have misconducted himself by maliciously exercising his power and
the motive, as stated earlier must to be injure another person or he must have knowledge that
he was acting out of his jurisdiction and ultra vires to his powers which results in damage to
the plaintiff. In this instant matter, if the plaintiff proves that the majority of councilors voted
for a resolution with the objective of harming the plaintiff, it can be said that the council will
be liable for misfeasance in public office.

The House of Lords contended that this tort has 2 forms. One being cases of targeted malice
where public power was exercised for an improper purpose of injuring a person and the other
being cases of untargeted malice where a public officer subjectively acted in the knowledge
that he had no power to do the act complained of and that it would injure the complainant. In
the latter form, the public officer’s reckless indifference to the outcome of his act and the
probability of harm is enough to establish a case under this tort.

In the case of Three Rivers District Council v. Bank of England, it was held that to constitute
a claim under this tort, the plaintiff must prove that;

1. There exists an abuse of power given to a public officer.

2. The abuse was constituted by a deliberate act or deliberate omission by the public
officer with knowledge that the act or omission was wrongful or with recklessness as
to whether or not the act or omission was wrongful.
3. The public officer acted in bad faith
4. The public officer knew that his act or omission would probably injure the plaintiff or
was reckless as to the risk of injury to the plaintiff and that he suffered a loss owing to
this omission or action.

This case also laid down 6 propositions as features of this tort that encompass all the
essentials and requirements.

1. Firstly, this tort is concerned with a deliberate and dishonest wrongful abuse of
powers given to a public officer.
2. Malice in the sense of an intention to injure the plaintiff or a person in a class of
which the plaintiff is a member, and knowledge by the officer that he has no power to
do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff or a person
in a class of which the plaintiff is a member are alternative, not cumulative
ingredients to the tort.
3. For purposes of the requirements that the officer knows that he has no power to do the
act complained of, it is sufficient that the officer has actual knowledge that the act was
unlawful or, in circumstances in which he believes or suspects that the act is beyond
 his powers, that he does not ascertain whether or not that is so or fails to take steps as
would be taken by an honest and reasonable man to ascertain the true position.
4. For the purposes of the requirement that the officer knows that his act will probably
injure the plaintiff or a person in a class of which the plaintiff is a member it is
sufficient if the officer has actual knowledge that his act will probably damage the
plaintiff or such a person or, in circumstance in which he believes or suspects that his
act will probably damage the plaintiff or such a person, if he does not ascertain
whether that is so or not or if he fails to make such inquiries as an honest and
reasonable man would make as to the probability of such damage.
5. If the state of mind in (3) and (4) does not amount to actual knowledge, they amount
to recklessness which is sufficient to support liability under the second limb of the
tort.
6. Where an action of misfeasance in public office is maintainable if the plaintiff can
prove malice in acting and that he suffered loss as a result.

This tort is not actionable per se and requires the element of damage to the plaintiff as
reaffirmed in the Watkins v. Secretary of State for the Home Department case.

In the Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India case, a two judge bench of the
Supreme Court in a PIL under Article 32 of the Constitution set aside the allotment of petrol
pumps to fifteen people made by a central minister from the discretionary quota on the
ground that the discretion was exercised with mala fide. The Supreme Court also issued a
notice to the minister to show-cause why he should not be held personally liable to pay
damages for this action on the ground that this action amounted to misfeasance in public
office. The minister failed in doing so and was asked to pay Rs. 50 Lakhs as exemplary
damages to the Government Exchequer. The court held that exemplary damages can be
awarded for oppressive, arbitrary, and unconstitutional action by the servants of the
government. In a review petition, the Supreme Court agreed that the action by the minister
was atrocious, but did not satisfy the conditions to construe the tort of misfeasance in public
office. With respect to the essentials of this tort, there needs to be an identifiable plaintiff
whose interest was damaged by the public officer acting maliciously which was missing in
this case. The court also stated that the state cannot claim the right of being compensated in
damages against its officers on the ground that they had contravened or violated fundamental
rights of a citizen.
 CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

What is a complaint?

As per Section 2 (6) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, a complaint refers to any
allegation that is made by a complainant in writing that

1. Any unfair or restrictive trade practice has been adopted by the trader;
2. The goods bought by him or agreed to be bought by him suffer from one or more
defects;
3. The services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by him suffer from
some deficiency in any respect;
4. The trader has charged for the goods a price higher than the price fixed or displayed
on the goods or the price list containing them, under any law for the time being in
force or something that is agreed between the parties;
5. Goods which will be hazardous to life and safety when used, are being offered for sale
to the public in contravention of the provision of any law for the time being in force,
requiring traders to display information in regard to the contents, manner and effect of
use of such goods.
6. Services that are hazardous to life and safety of the public when used, are offered by a
person who provides this service and know it to be injurious to life and safety.
7. Claim for product liability actions against the manufacturer, product seller or service
provider.

Who is a consumer?
As per Section 2 (7) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, a consumer refers to a person
who;
1. Buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid
and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user
of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or
promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment,
when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a
person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or
2. hires or avails of any service for a consideration which has been paid or promised or
partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and
includes any beneficiary of such service other than the person who hires or avails of
the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or
under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the
approval of the first mentioned person, but does not include a person who avails of
such service for any commercial purpose.

What is service?
As per Section 2 (42) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, service refers to service of any
description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the
provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing,
supply of electrical or other energy, telecom, boarding or lodging or both, housing
construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but
does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal
service;

What is deficiency in service?

As per Section 2 (11) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, a deficiency in service refers to
any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of
performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in
force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or
otherwise in relation to any service and includes—

(i) any act of negligence or omission or commission by such person which causes loss
or injury to the consumer; and
 (ii) deliberate withholding of relevant information by such person to the consumer;

Vexatious Complaints

Section 93 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 states that if an officer who is exercising his
powers under Section 22 of the act, searches or causes to be searched any premises or seizes
any record, register, or other document or article when he knows that the complaint given had
no reasonable grounds, shall be punished with a term of imprisonment that may extend to one
year and/or a fine which may extend to Rs. 15,000.

Further, in Consumer Protection Act, 1986 that was repealed with the enactment of
Consumer Protection Act, 2019, Section 26 deals with vexatious complaints in specificity. It
states that, ‘Where a complaint instituted before the District Forum, the State Commission
or, as the case may be, the National Commission, is found to be frivolous or vexatious, it
shall, for reasons to be recorded in writing, dismiss the complaint and make an order that the
complainant shall pay to the opposite party such cost, not exceeding ten thousand rupees, as
may be specified in the order.]’

In the case of Sapient Corporation Employees Fund Trust v. HDFC & Ors., the complainant
claimed that the respondent, the bank, was providing inadequate service. The court likewise
dismissed that argument, ruling that the complainant's lawsuit was frivolous and that the act
was social legislation that did not impose court expenses. Further, owing to the fact that such
false complaints must be guarded against, the complainant was fined 25,000 rupees for filing
a frivolous complaint.
In the case of Dr. Mano KR. Singh v. Singapore Airlines (P) Ltd., the complaint stated that
the complainant had lost a lot of time in his studies because he had to obtain a duplicate
license. The respective forum dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it was not a valid
ground for a complaint and there was no evidence to support that the complainant failed
owing to this.
In the case of Saleemuddin v. Dr. Sunil Malhotra, the complainant claimed compensation for
medical negligence and produced certain documents and prescriptions that were torn. Further,
there were inconsistencies between the complaint and the documents produced and this made
the forum question the genuineness of the complaint and later concluded that the complaint
was an abuse of process of consumer law. The complaint was dismissed and the complainant
was ordered to pay Rs. 25,000 to the opposite party for the vexatious complaint.
Features of COPRA, 2019
Introduction:
 The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 replaced the older Consumer Protection
Act, 1986 with new and features to provide better security to consumers when
compared with the 1986 act. It promotes the taking up of multiple approaches
to settle complaints and includes the newer and growing aspect of the E-
Commerce Sector including online sales, teleshopping, direct selling and so
on.
 The objective of the act is;
"To provide for protection of the interests of consumers and for the said
purpose, to establish authorities for timely and effective administration and
settlement of consumers' disputes and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto”.
Features of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019
 Definition of the term ‘Consumer’ -
 In Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the definition of a consumer which forms
the basis of the act has been generalized to include individuals that are
engaged in the consumption process through online or offline purchases
through teleshopping or direct sales or multi-level marketing.
 As per Section 2 (7) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, a consumer refers
to someone who;
a) Buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised
or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred
payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person
who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid
or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when
such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not
include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any
commercial purpose; or
b) hires or avails of any service for a consideration which has been paid
or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of
deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such service other
than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration
 paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any
system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the
approval of the first mentioned person, but does not include a person
who avails of such service for any commercial purpose.
 Further, the term ‘Telecom’ has been added to the definition of services under
Section 2 (42) of the act to bring telecom service provides under the ambit of
the act. However, this does not refer to telecommunication service providers
as defined under the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act which
includes internet, cellular, and data service providers.
 Consumer Rights –
 In accordance with Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Consumer Protection Act,
2019 also guarantees consumers, rights including the ;
a) Right to Safety: Be secure from the selling of life and property
threatening goods, products, or services. For example, a consumer has
the right to be protected from defective gas cylinders, or defective
electrical appliances that has the potential to cause harm to the
consumer, his property, or his dependants.
b) Right to Information: Be notified, as required, of the nature,
quantity, efficacy, consistency, value, and price of goods, products or
services, so as to protect the consumer from unfair trading practices.
For example, while purchasing a food product, a consumer has the
right to know what ingredients have been utilised in making this and
other essential things that may persuade the consumer to either buy or
not buy the product.
c) Right to Choose: To be assured exposure to a range of commodities,
products or services at fair rates whenever possible. For example, if a
consumer goes to the shop to purchase a product that satisfies certain
needs of the consumer, the consumer must have multiple choices from
which he can choose the product that will satisfy him the most.
d) Right to be Heard: To be recognized and assured that the concerns of
consumers would be provided due consideration at the respective
forum. This includes the right of a consumer to have someone to
represent him or to advocate his interest. In case a consumer has been
 exploited or if he has any complaint against the product or service,
then he has a right to be heard in a legal forum with adequate
jurisdiction to hear the matter.
e) Right to seek redressal: To pursue relief from unfair trade and
commercial practices that unscrupulously exploit the consumer. This
right ensures that the consumer gets justice if and when he is
exploited. It includes gaining compensation in the form of money or
replacement of goods or repair the defect in the goods as per the
consumer’s request.
f) Right to Consumer Education: A consumer has the Right to acquire
knowledge and skilled to be informed as a consumer.
g) Right to Satisfaction of Basic Needs: Basic needs includes access to
adequate food, clothing, shelter, healthcare, education, public utilities,
water and sanitation and every consumer has the right to get these
needs satisfied.
h) Right to Healthy and Sustainable Environment: This includes the
right to have a safe environment to live in and work in that is not
threatening to the person and furthers the well-being of present and
future generations thus focusing on sustainability.
Central Consumer Protection Authority -
 This authority who derives its power from Sections 10 – 27 of the act,
performs the duties of;
a) Investigating and pursuing complaints of infringements of consumer
rights at the appropriate forum.
b) Issuing orders for the recall and/or removal of dangerous products, a
refund to the consumer and the discontinuation of deceptive and
unscrupulous trade practices.
c) Issuing guidance to the consumer.
d) Imposing penalties
e) Issuing safety notice to the consumer against unsafe goods and
services.
 E-Commerce –
  As per Section 2 (16) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, E-Commerce
refers to the buying or selling of goods or services including digital products
over digital or electronic network. This element that is new allows the Central
Government to take steps and draft guidelines to discourage and prevent
discriminatory E-Commerce activities.
 Grounds to file Complaints –
 The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 provided 6 grounds to file a complaint
and the new act has increased it to 7 and further altered one ground.
 an unfair contract or unfair trade practice or a restrictive trade practice
has been adopted by any trader or service provider;
 the goods bought by him or agreed to be bought by him suffer from
one or more defects;
 the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by
him suffer from any deficiency;
 a trader or a service provider, as the case may be, has charged for the
goods or for the services mentioned in the complaint, a price in excess
of the price—
a) fixed by or under any law for the time being in force; or
b) displayed on the goods or any package containing such
goods; or
c) displayed on the price list exhibited by him by or under
any law for the time being in force; or
d) agreed between the parties;
 the goods, which are hazardous to life and safety when used, are being
offered for sale to the public—
a) in contravention of standards relating to safety of such
goods as required to be complied with, by or under any
law for the time being in force;
b) where the trader knows that the goods so offered are
unsafe to the public;
 the services which are hazardous or likely to be hazardous to life and
safety of the public when used, are being offered by a person who
 provides any service and who knows it to be injurious to life and
safety;
 a claim for product liability action lies against the product
manufacturer, product seller or product service provider, as the case
may be;
 Product Liability –
 An important addition to the new act, it imposes stringent legal requirements
on traders. A product manufacturer, service provider, and or retailer may be
held responsible for any damage done by a faulty product made by the
manufacturer or serviced by the service provider or sold by the product seller.
The extent of their liability is collectively specified under Section 84 – 86 of
the act.
 As per Section 2 (34) of the new act, product liability refers to the
responsibility of a product manufacturer or product seller, of any product or
service, to compensate for any harm caused to a consumer by such defective
product manufactures or sold or by a deficiency in services relating there to.
 Further, Section 2 (35) of the new act defines Product Liability Action as a
complaint that is filed by a person before a District, State or National
Commission for claiming compensation for the damage done to him.
 Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission –
 The new act empowers respective governments to establish a National
Commission for the Redressal of Consumer Disputes, a State Commission for
the Redressal of Consumer Disputes, and a District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission. These commissions have the authority to deal with
concerns from consumers about certain products or services that violated their
rights.
 Further, the new act provides the National Commission for the Redressal of
Consumer Disputes and the State Commission for the Redressal of Consumer
Disputes authority to deal with grievances related to unfair contracts.
 It additionally provides the right of judicial review which will require
Consumer commissions to reconsider their decisions and reduces the pressure
imposed by certain petitions to correct abnormalities. Further, differing from
the 1986 act, the new act mandates appeals from the State Commission to the
 National Commission even if they raise serious legal issues. Further, appeals
to the Supreme Court can be made only from challenges made against the
National Commission’s orders.
 Penalties for misleading or false advertisements –
 The Central Consumer Protection Authority is also allowed to take measures
against false or misleading advertisements. For each subsequent breach, this
authority will leave a penalty extending to Rs. 1 million and then, 5 million.
 Penalties may be levied on endorsers as well. So, actors and actresses that
endorse brands can be penalized. However, if they state and prove that they
conducted due diligence to validate the claims made by the brand or the
product before accepting to endorse it, they can escape liability.
 Mediation –
 The new act also provides for the settlement of disputes through mediation in
case there is a possibility of compromise after the complaint has been
accepted. However, this can be done only post consent of the parties involved.
For accelerated settlement, a mediation cell will be attached to all the
commissions and its regional branches.

Redressal Commissions:
The Hierarchy of the Commissions set up under the Act go as District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, State Commission for the Redressal of Consumer Disputes, National
Commission for the Redressal of Consumer Disputes, and then the Supreme Court,
District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission:
 Under Section 28 (1) of the act, the State Government is to establish at least
one District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in every district of the
State. If the government deems it fit, then it can establish more than one
commission per District as well.
 Every District Commission needs to have at one president and at least 2
members. However, it can have more than members also post approval from
the Central Government. Further, if the value of redressal is Rs. 1 Crore or less
only can a consumer approach this forum.
 As per Section 35 (1) of the act, the people who can file a complaint at the
district commission are;
  Consumer - The Consumer to whom the defective goods are
delivered, sold or agreed to be sold or to whom such deficient service
has been provided or agreed to be provided. The consumer in this
instance can refer to the person who alleges unfair trade practices in
respect of the deficiency.
 Consumer Association – Any voluntary consumer association that is
registered under the law can file a complaint under this forum. Further,
the membership of the aggrieved consumer in the association is
irrelevant.
 One or more consumers appearing on behalf of all consumers with
a common interest - One or more consumers appearing on behalf of
all consumers with a common interest can file a complaint with the
District Commission for the aggrieved consumer. However, prior to
filing such complaint, permission from the District Commission is
necessary.
 The Government – The Central or the State government or the
Central Consumer Protection Authority can also file a case under this
section.
 Under Section 34 (2) of the new act, a complaint can be filed at the District
Court under within whose local limits are;
 The opposing party, or each of the opposing parties, if there are more
than one, usually lives, runs a business, has a branch, or works for
profit.
 Any of the opposing parties normally lives, conducts business, or
works for a living.
 Where the cause of action originates entirely or in part.
 Where the complainant lives or works for a living.
 The Commission must admit or reject the complaint within 21 days of
receiving it after it is filed. Section 36 makes it illegal for the commission to
dismiss a complaint without first hearing the complainant. Every meeting must
also be presided over by the President and at least one other member. When a
member who has been assigned to sit for a particular proceeding is
unavailable, the proceeding can be continued using a different procedure.
 Further, once the complaint has been admitted, the District Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission must;

 Send a copy of the complaint to the opposing party within 21 days of

its admission and instruct it to provide its side of the tale within 30
days or the extended period given by the commission.
 If the opposing party denies the claim or fails to take any action in
response to the complaint, the district commission must proceed as
follows.
 The allegedly defective items must be sealed and sent to the authorised
laboratory after being authenticated in the required manner. It must
order the laboratory to investigate any actual flaws in the items and
report its findings to the commission within 45 days, or as long as the
commission allows.
 Before the goods are delivered to the library, the complainant must be
instructed to deposit the amount required for testing in the
commission's account.
 If any of the parties disagree with the laboratory's findings, the parties
must be directed to submit their objections to the commission in
writing.
 Allow the opposing party or the initiating party a reasonable
opportunity to be heard on their objections.

 If the above-mentioned method cannot be performed owing to a shortage of

goods from which to take a sample or if the alleged flaw is in the opposing
party's service. The commission will then resolve the conflict as follows:

 On the basis of evidence presented by the complainant or, if the

opposite party challenges the charge, on the basis of evidence provided
by the opposing party.
 Make an ex parte judgement if the other party fails to respond to the
allegations.
 If the complainant fails to appear for the hearing, decide the case on its
merits.
  If it is inconvenient for the party to appear in person before the commission,
you can file an application for a video conference hearing or examination of
the parties, and if the district commission agrees with the reasons, it may
accept it after recording the reason.
 The commission must handle the issue as quickly as feasible, with a goal of
resolving it within three months if no analysis or testing is required, and five
months if analysis and testing are required.
 Further, the District Commission has the same legal power as the District
Court as guaranteed under the act. If a party is dissatisfied with the district
commission's decision, they may file an appeal with the State Commission
within 45 days after receiving the decision. Despite the fact that the State
Commission may hear the appeal after 45 days provided the party provides
acceptable justification. If a party is required to pay a specified amount
ordered by the District Commission, the State Commission will not hear the
appeal. Before the State Commission will hear the appeal, at least half of the
money must be paid.

State Commission for the Redressal of Consumer Disputes:

 Under section 42 (1) of the Act, the State government establishes a State Commission
for the Redressal of Consumer Disputes in the state through notification and can even
establish regional branches if it sees proper. Each State Commission shall have 1
President, no fewer than 4 members, and no more than as many as are required.
 Under Section 47 of the new act, the State Commission for the Redressal of
Consumer Disputes has jurisdiction to entertain;
 Complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as consideration
exceeds Rs. 1 Crore but does not exceed Rs. 10 Crore. Provided, however, that
where the Central Government deems it expedient, it may prescribe such other
value as it sees fit;
 Appeals against rulings of any District Commission within the State;
 Complaints against unfair contracts where the value of goods or services paid
as consideration does not exceed ten crore rupees.
 Apart from that, it has the authority to order the production of records and issue
appropriate orders in any consumer dispute pending before or decided by any District
 Commission within the State, where the State Commission believes that such District
Commission has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to
exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in an unlawful manner.
 A bench of the State Commission must consist of a President and one member or
more if the president deems it fit. 
 Section 48 gives the State Commission the authority to transfer proceedings from one
district commission to another. The State Commission can do so either on its own
initiative or in response to a request from the parties. But it has to be for the sake of
justice.
 The State Commission follows the same procedure as the District Commission and
has the authority to assess its own cases.
 If the verdict is unfavourable, the aggrieved party may file an appeal with the
National Commission within 30 days after receiving the state commission's order.
After 30 days, if sufficient cause is proven, the National Commission for the
Redressal of Consumer Disputes can consider the appeal.
 If the person who is required to pay a specific sum under a State Commission for the
Redressal of Consumer Disputes ruling has not paid at least half of the amount
ordered to be paid, the national commission will not hear the appeal.
 The appeal must be handled quickly, and every effort must be made to resolve the
appeal within 90 days of its admission.

National Commission for the Redressal of Consumer Disputes:

 The Central Government creates a National Commission for the Redressal of

Consumer Disputes by issuing a notification under Section 53 (1) of the new act. The
National Commission's main office is in the national capital region; however the
Central government might create regional branches by issuing a notification. The
National Commission for the Redressal of Consumer Disputes must have 1 president
and at least 4 members, with a maximum of whatever the national government
specifies.
 Under Section 58 of the new act, the National Commission for the Redressal of
Consumer Disputes has jurisdiction;
 To hear:
a) complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as
consideration exceeds ten crore rupees;
 b) Complaints against unfair contracts where the value of the goods or
services paid as consideration exceeds ten crore rupees;
c) Appeals against unfair contracts where the value of the goods or
services paid as consideration exceeds ten crore rupees;
d) Complaints against unfair contracts where the value of the goods or
services paid as consideration exceeds ten crore rupees and;
 To order the production of records and issue appropriate orders in any
consumer dispute pending before or decided by any State Commission where
the National Commission believes that such State Commission has exercised a
jurisdiction not vested in it by law, has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so
vested, or has acted illegally or with material bias in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
 A bench in the National Commission must have at least the President and 1 member,
although the President can add additional if he sees fit.
 The National Commission decides cases in the same way that the district commission
does, but it also reserves the ability to review cases Suo Moto or based on a request
from one of the parties.
 In addition, Section 65 (1) stipulates that all notices required by this Act to be served
shall be served by delivering or transmitting a copy thereof by registered post
acknowledgment due addressed to the opposite party against whom the complaint is
made or to the complainant by speed post or by such courier service approved by the
District Commission, the State Commission, or the National Commission, as the case
may be, or by any other mode of service approved by the District Commission, the
State Commission, or the National Commission, as the case may be, or by any other
mode of service approved by the District.
 If a consumer feels that he has been wronged by the judgement, they have 30 days to
file an appeal with the Supreme Court.

NUISANCE

Definition:

Nuisance to an unlawful and unreasonable interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of

land, or some right over it, or in connection with it.
Acts that put one's comfort, health, or safety in jeopardy are examples of nuisance.
Interference can be caused by noise, vibrations, heat, smoke, scent, fumes, water, gas,
electricity, excavation, or disease-producing bacteria. Trespass and nuisance must be
distinguished. Trespass is defined as the use of materials or tangible objects to cause direct
physical interference with the plaintiff's landholding. Both annoyance and trespass require the
plaintiff to prove that he owns the property in question. There may be times when they both
apply, and nuisance may be included in the definition of trespass.

Difference between Trespass and Nuisance

 It is deemed trespass if the interference is direct; it is considered nuisance if it is

indirect. When you plant a tree on someone else's land, you are trespassing. When a
person grows a tree on his own land and the roots or branches reach over or over the
land of another person, it is a nuisance. Trespassing is throwing stones on your
neighbour's land; permitting stones from a collapsed chimney to fall on their property
is a nuisance.
 Trespassing is when someone infringes on someone else's right to possession of land.
When a person's use or enjoyment of land is harmed, it is considered a nuisance. Even
if there is no interference with possession, this form of interference with use or
enjoyment may exist. On his own land, a person could, for example, offend his
neighbour by producing foul odours or making loud noises.
 Furthermore, trespass interference is always accomplished by the use of a significant
or palpable object. Intangible objects that might create annoyance include vibrations,
gas, noise, scent, electricity, and smoke.
 Apart from that, a trespass is actionable per se, but in a nuisance case, special damage
must be demonstrated.

Public Nuisance –

Public nuisance is a criminal offence, but private nuisance is a civil offence. Infringement of
a public right is often deemed a public nuisance and is punished accordingly. Obstructing a
public path by digging a trench or constructing structures on it is a public nuisance. Although
a huge number of persons may be inconvenienced, no one should be able to launch a civil
action for it; otherwise, a single act of public nuisance could result in hundreds of lawsuits.
To avoid a barrage of litigation, the law makes public annoyance a criminal offence.
Private Nuisance –

 Any person who suffers a distinct or unique injury that is different from what is
imposed on the general public in certain situations has a civil right of action. What is
otherwise a public nuisance becoming private nuisance in the case of the person who
suffers exceptional harm. "Special damage" refers to harm done to a party at the
expense of the wider public in this context.
 For example, digging a trench on a public highway may be inconvenient for the
general population. No member of the public who is impeded or forced to take a
diversion with others can sue under civil law. However, if one of them is injured more
severely than the general public, such as by falling into the trench, he has the right to
sue in tort. To establish a civil action for a public nuisance, proof of distinctive and
particular damage is required.
 In the case of Dr. Ram Raj Singh v. Babulal, the defendant installed a brick grinding
machine adjacent to the plaintiff's medical clinic. The brick grinding machine polluted
the air by releasing dust into it. The plaintiff's consulting chamber was filled with
dust, causing physiological discomfort as well as a crimson covering on his and his
patients' apparel. Damage was proven, and the defendant was ordered to stop
operating his brick grinding equipment in the region for the rest of his life.
 In the case of Rose v. Milles, the defendant moored his boat inappropriately over a
public navigable stream. Because the plaintiff's barges were unable to advance, he
was compelled to spend a large amount of money emptying the cargo and transporting
it by land. It was determined that the plaintiff had suffered exceptional losses in
support of his claim.

Essentials of Nuisance:

 Unreasonable Interference:
 Interference may cause damage to the plaintiff's property or cause personal
discomfort to the plaintiff while on the property. Every obstructive component
is a non-issue. To be called a nuisance, interference must be unjustified. In
order for society's members to enjoy their own rights, they must put up with
certain loudness, vibrations, odours, and other things. Because reasonable
efforts were taken to prevent it from becoming a nuisance, irrational behaviour
cannot be excused.
 In the case of, Radhey Shyam v. Gur Prasad, the petitioner filed a complaint
requesting a permanent injunction to prevent the defendant from establishing
and operating a flour mill on their property. The mill would be a nuisance to
the plaintiffs, who lived on the first floor of the same building, because the
plaintiffs' tranquillity would be disturbed by the flour mill's rattling noise, and
their health would suffer as a result. The plaintiffs were entitled to an
injunction against the defendants since the operation of the contested devices
greatly increased the noise in a noisy environment, severely disrupted their
physical comfort, and thereby constituted nuisance.
 In the case of Ushaben v. Bhagya Laxmi Chitra Mandir, the plaintiff sought
a permanent injunction preventing the defendants-respondents from playing
the film "Jai Santoshi Maa." According to the case, the plaintiff's religious
sensibilities were damaged when Goddesses Saraswati, Laxmi, and Parvati
were depicted in the film as envious and humiliated. Injuring religious
sensitivities was ruled not to be a penal offence. The plaintiffs were also given
the option of refusing to see the film again. The defendants' convenience
factor was found to be in their favour, and there was no annoyance.
 Making excessive noise, even in a crowded situation, is a nuisance. In the case
of Polsue and Alfiery Ltd. v. Rushmere, the plaintiffs sued to prevent the
defendant company from erecting printing machines next door, which
compelled him and his family to stay awake at night. Because there was a
significant increase in the noise that was previously there, the court issued an
injunction against the defendants. In such cases, a person's position may be
crucial.
 Sensitive Plaintiff:
 When the harm, however significant, is caused entirely due to the
plaintiff's sensitivity or the use to which he puts his property, an
otherwise legitimate act does not become unreasonable and actionable.
If a given type of traffic isn't bothersome to a healthy person, it won't
enable a sick person to sue if he suffers as a result, even if the damage
is significant. If some noises do not bother or annoy the average
person, but only the plaintiff in his work or sleep because of his
hypersensitivity, it is not a nuisance against him.
  By engaging in a particularly delicate trade, one cannot increase the
liabilities of his neighbours. In Robinson v. Kilvert, the plaintiff kept
brown paper in a structure. The defendant's heat from his own business
in the basement of the same building dried up the plaintiff's brown
paper, lowering its value. The plaintiff suffered a loss as a result of a
highly delicate trade, and the defendant's conduct had no impact on
paper in general. The defendant was found not guilty of causing the
nuisance.
 In the case of Health v. Mayor of Brighton, the court refused to grant
an injunction to the incumbent and trustees of a Brighton church to
prevent the defendant's power station from creating "a Buzzing noise."
The loudness did not upset anyone other than the incumbent, nor did it
divert the attention of regular churchgoers, it was determined in this
case.
 Nuisance is frequently a repeating blunder. A nuisance is defined as a
continual sound, odour, or vibration, and a single act of escape is not usually
considered a nuisance.
 In the case of Stone v. Bolton, the plaintiff was injured by a cricket ball struck
from the defendant's ground while standing on a highway, but her nuisance
claim was denied. It was observed that such accusations do not amount to
nuisance as the act must be a continuous state of affairs and not just a one-time
event.
 In a few of circumstances, isolated actions of dangerous goods escape may
entitle the plaintiff to compensation for property damage. As a result, whether
the improper escape is continuous, intermittent, or isolated, it is actionable.
Intermittent interference is more likely to annoy than continuous interference.
In the case of Dollman v. Hillman Ltd., the plaintiff stumbled on some fat on
the sidewalk outside the defendant's butcher shop. The defendant was judged
liable for the plaintiff's injury as a result of this one-time act in nuisance and
negligence.
 Existence of malice:
 In the case of Mayor of Bradford Corp. v. Pickles, the House of Lords
concluded that an act that is generally lawful does not become
 unlawful just because it is done with a bad motive. It was observed
that the act, and not the reason behind the act that must be analyzed.
 The defendant's act, on the other hand, can be prosecuted if it is done
with an evil motive and results in an unreasonable interference. A
person has the right to make reasonable use of his or her own property,
but such use is no longer reasonable if it causes severe distress to
others.
 In the case of Christie v. Davey, the defendant was irritated by the
plaintiff, a music instructor who resided in the opposite house, and
maliciously caused the plaintiff to suffer by slamming against the
partition wall, beating trays, whistling, and screeching. The court
awarded the defendant an injunction.
 In the case of Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd. v. Emmett, the
plaintiff's company, was in the business of breeding silver foxes on
their property. Females of these creatures are exceedingly agitated
during breeding season, and if they are disturbed by any loud noise,
they will not breed, miscarry, or kill their own babies. In order to hurt
the plaintiff by interfering with vixen breeding, the defendant
purposely caused guns to be shot on his land, as close as possible to
the breeding pens. The plaintiff was entitled to an injunction and
damages notwithstanding the fact that the shooting occurred on the
defendant's own territory, which he had the right to fire over.
 Interference with the use or enjoyment of land:
 Injury to Property:
 Unauthorized interference with the use of another person's property by
some object, tangible or intangible, that causes damage to the property
is classified as a nuisance. Allowing a tree's branches to overhang over
another's property, or the escape of a tree's roots, water, gas, smoke, or
odours, etc. onto another's property, or even vibrations are instances.
 In the case of St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, fumes from the
defendant company's activities harmed the plaintiff's trees and bushes.
Because the harm was to the defendants' property, they were deemed
 to be accountable. The claim that the region was set aside for such
projects was rejected.
 Interference with the right of land and building support:
 Removal of support, whether lateral or from underneath, is
inconvenient because a person has a "natural" right to have his or her
land supported by that of his or her neighbour. Only undeveloped land
is eligible for the natural right of help from a neighbour's land. As a
result, no such right exists for houses or other land-based structures.
Although the law does not recognise a building's right of support, an
action for withdrawal of support may be initiated if the harm to the
building is caused by the loss of the land's natural right of support.
 In the case of Stroyan v. Knowles, the plaintiff was harmed by the
removal of support from the ground on which the plant had been built.
The soil sinking was caused by the defendant's mining operations, and
the factory's weight had no influence on the situation. Despite the fact
that there was no prescription right for the factory's support, it was
determined that the loss was caused by the subsidence of the land on
which the factory was built, and that the plaintiff was entitled to
damages.
 Interference with right to Light and Air:
 England - The right to light is not a natural right in England, and it
must be secured through a grant or prescription. Once a right has been
acquired, any severe interference with it is an actionable nuisance.
Demonstrating that the plaintiff's building receives less light than
previously is insufficient. A significant reduction in light must be
proved before it may be implemented. The defendant's construction of
a building simply decreased the light in a space on the ground floor
that was used as an office and required electric light on a regular basis
in Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores Ltd. The defendant was judged
to be not guilty. A grant or prescription can be used to obtain a right of
air. Once a right has been acquired, infringing on it is a pain. However,
obtaining a right of air access over a neighbour's land's general,
unrestricted surface is impossible. In Webb v. Bird, for example, the
 defendants' construction of a structure obstructs the passage of air to
the plaintiff's antique windmill. According to the court, the plaintiff did
not possess any prescriptive right to prevent the construction of the
building, hence there was no cause of action. Permission to access air
via a certain channel, on the other hand, can be secured. In the case of
Bass v. Gregory, the defendants impedes a shaft that had been
providing ventilation to the plaintiff's public house for forty years. It
was regarded as an annoyance.
 India - In India, an easement can be used to get the right to light and
air. Sections 25 and 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as well as Section
15 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, include similar conditions for
the form and duration of enjoyment required to acquire this
prescriptive right. When there is a significant infringement of an
easement of light and air, an action for damages can be instituted under
Section 33 of the Indian Easements Act. Section 33 goes on to describe
what constitutes a serious infringement of an easement, following the
logic of Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores Ltd. A person does not
have the right to all light just because he has had access to some for 20
years. A right of action arises only when there is a significant reduction
in light that has been enjoyed for 20 years, allowing the owner of a
tenement that has experienced this enjoyment to prevent his neighbour
from building on his own land.
 Injury to comfort or health:
 It is forbidden to cause significant disruption to the comfort and
convenience of those who use the premises. It's actionable as an
annoyance. It is insufficient to have a slight or fictional discomfort.
‘De minimis non curat lex’ is a rule that states that the law does not
apply to minor matters.
 Depending on the season and location, the amount of comfort varies.
The measure of nuisance is not how a specific plaintiff would react;
rather, it is how an ordinary man in the same region would react.
There's a chance the complainant is excessively sensitive. The noises
 of horses in a structure that had been transformed into a stable during
the case of Ball v. Ray caused a disturbance.
 Similarly, as in Walker v. Brewster, a large and loud throng outside a
pub that stays open until 3 a.m. and a group of noisy and disruptive
people outside a structure where music and fireworks have been
organised for profit are examples of nuisance. Smoke, noise, and filthy
vapour can be an inconvenience even if they are not injurious to one's
health, as the case of Crump v. Lambert demonstrated.
 Damage:
 Unlike trespassing, which can be prosecuted on its own, a nuisance case needs
proof of actual damage. The plaintiff can only bring a tort action against a
public nuisance if he can establish that he has incurred a distinctive harm.
Despite the fact that harm is a critical consideration in private nuisance claims,
the law typically assumes it. In the case of Fay v. Prentice, the cornice of the
defendant's house hung over the plaintiff's garden. The mere fact that the
cornice stretched over the plaintiff's garden establishes a presumption of
rainfall penetration and damage to the garden, which requires no proof. It was
an inconvenient situation.

Nuisance on Highways:

 Obstructing a highway or creating dangers on or near it is a nuisance. It is not

necessary for the obstruction to be total. The impediment, however, must be irrational.
As a result, it's inconvenient to cause delays without completely blocking the public
path. Due to enormous queues at the defendant's theatre, admission to the plaintiff's
premises, a boarding home, became extraordinarily difficult at certain hours in Barber
v. Penley. The theatre's management was held liable for the blockage, which was
regarded a nuisance.
 During a severe potato scarcity in Dwyer v. Mansfield, on the other hand, long lines
formed outside the defendant's shop, which, despite having a licence to sell fruit and
vegetables, only sold 1-pound potatoes per ration book. The queues ran the length of
the roadway, causing traffic congestion and inconvenience to surrounding businesses.
The defendant was ruled not responsible in a case brought by neighbouring businesses
for causing disruption because his acts were not unreasonable because he was going
about his business as normal during the potato shortage.
  The defendant's window panes were damaged during an air raid on a building on the
side of a highway in the case of Leanse v. Egerton. After the defendant refused to
make any repairs, the plaintiff was injured by a fragment of glass falling from the
window the following Tuesday. Despite the fact that the owner had no actual
knowledge of the condition of his property, he was held liable to the plaintiff because
he was considered to be aware of the hazard that constituted a nuisance.

Defences to Nuisance:

 Prescriptive right to commit nuisance:

 Prescription can be used to acquire permission to engage in behaviour that
would otherwise be considered offensive. If a person engages in an activity on
another person's land for 20 years or more, he acquires the legal right to
continue doing so in the future. An easement to commit a private nuisance can
be obtained if it has been peacefully and openly enjoyed as an easement and as
of right for at least 20 years, without interruption. After the 20-year period has
expired, the nuisance becomes legalised from the outset, as if it had been
granted permission by the owner of servient land. The 20-year time does not
begin to run until the alleged act becomes a nuisance.
 In the case of Sturges v. Bridgman, the defendant was a confectioner with a
kitchen in the back of his home. He smashed confectionery ingredients in his
kitchen with giant pestles and mortars for more than two decades, and the
plaintiff, a physician who lived next door at the time, did not perceive the
noise and vibrations to be a nuisance. The physician constructed a consulting
room in his backyard, and for the first time, he considered the noise and
vibrations produced in the confectioner's kitchen to be an annoyance and a
major hindrance to his practise. The court granted an injunction against the
confectioner, and his claim of prescriptive right to use mortars and pestles
there was denied, because the interference had not been an actionable irritation
for the previous 20 years. The annoyance began when the physician built the
consulting room at the back of the house.
 Statutory Authority:
 An act undertaken under the authority of a statute is known as a complete
defence. There is no tort liability for a nuisance that is unavoidably associated
with anything allowed by a statute. As a result, in the case of Vaughan v. Toff
 Vale Rail Co., a railway company authorised to run railway trains on a track is
not liable if, despite taking reasonable precautions, the engine's sparks set fire
to nearby property or the value of adjoining property is depreciated due to
train operations' noise, vibrations, and smoke.
 In the case of London Brighton and South Coast Rail Co. v. Tunnan, it was
observed that if the functions performed are such that they would amount to
nuisance, but they are performed after authority to do so has been given by the
Parliament would not amount to nuisance and those committing it will be
protected from such claims.

Ineffectual Defences for Nuisance:

 Nuisance due to the acts of others:

 Even if any one of them acting alone would not cause annoyance, the act of
two or more people acting independently of each other can cause annoyance.
Any of them can be sued, and it is not a defence that the defendant's act would
not be a nuisance if done alone, and that the annoyance was caused by others
doing the same. In Thrope v Brumfit, it was held that if a hundred people
leave their wheelbarrows in a location, and a single wheelbarrow could not
have caused the nuisance, action can be taken against all of them, and none of
them can claim that their act could not have caused any damage to the
complaint on its own.
 Public Welfare:
 Claiming that what is a nuisance to one plaintiff is beneficial to the general
public is not a defence; otherwise, no public utility business could be held
liable for the unlawful interference with individual rights. Strong vibrations
occurred during the defendants' building of an electric powerhouse, causing
damage to the plaintiff's residence in Shelfer v. City of London Electric
Lighting Co. The defence contended in response to the plaintiff's motion for
an injunction that if the facility was not completed, the entire city of London
would suffer from the loss of light that the proposed powerhouse would offer.
The court threw out the plea and issued an injunction against the defendant.
 In the case of Adams v. Ursell, an injunction was obtained prohibiting the
operation of a fried fish store in a residential part of a street, despite the fact
that the order would, as alleged, inflict the defendant and his 'poor' customers
 tremendous hardship. In the R v. Train case, an action for public nuisance
caused by the building of dangerous tram lines in the roadway, the fact that
trams would give convenience to the general public was found to be no
defence.
 Reasonable Care:
 Taking reasonable precautions to prevent causing harm is not a defence in
most situations. The defendants' stables, which were erected to accommodate
200 horses to pull their trams, caused a substantial odour that was declared a
nuisance in Rapier v. London Tramways Co. The defendants' claim that they
took all reasonable efforts to avoid the nuisance was judged to be untrue, and
they were found guilty. If an operation cannot be carried out with reasonable
care and skill without causing a nuisance, it cannot be carried out at all, unless
with the consent of those who would be hurt or under the authority of a law.
 Presence at scene of alleged nuisance:
 The presence of the plaintiff at the nuisance site is not a defence. A person
cannot be expected to avoid buying land where a nuisance already exists, and
the plaintiff is entitled to compensation even if the problem existed before he
arrived.
 The maxim volenti non fit injuria cannot be used in this case. The fact that
business had been going on for three years before the plaintiff came was ruled
to be no defence in Bills v. Hall, 00/a nuisance complaint for "various
noisome, noxious and disagreeable vapour, fumes, odour and stenches"
emanating from defendant's tallow-chandlery.
DEFAMATION
 According to Blackstone, every man has an inherent personal right to reputation as a part
of right to personal security. It is a right against the entire world or jus in rem.
 Defamation is injury to the reputation of a person which exposes him to hatred, ridicule or
contempt.
 It also includes statements which cause the defamed person to be shunned or avoided or
which has tendency to injure him in his office, profession or trade.
 According to Winfield, “Defamation is the publication of statement which tend to lower a
person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or which tends to
make them shun or avoid the person.”
 The wrong of defamation safeguards one's reputation, while defences to the wrong, such
as truth and privilege, safeguard one's right of freedom of speech.
 No one has the right to harm another’s reputation with malafide intentions.
 The existing law of defamation is a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right of
freedom of speech and expression conferred by Article 19 (1) (a) of the Indian
Constitution and is saved by clause (2) of Article 19.
 Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes that
respect for the reputation of other people operates as a limit to freedom of expression.

Historical development of defamation

 Provisions against defamation occur in Bible, in ancient Roman law and in the Anglo-
saxon codes.
 Defamation is a private matter, a civil wrong. However, from its inception there has been
a recognition that attacks upon reputation had consequences for public peace.
 It comes within the ambit of Torts Law and has been mainly borrowed from the English
Common Law.
 Under the English Law, Criminal Libel is generally traced back to medieval statutes
enacted to punish ‘devisers of tales whereby discord or occasion of discord have thence
arisen between the King and his people or great men of this realm.’
 The first such statute, known as Scandalum Magnatum, was passed in 1275.
 Similar laws were enacted in the following centuries, but by the 16th century such ‘tales’
were seen as an affront to the individuals referred to, as well as an undermining of public
order.
 There was a cult of reputation, overriding importance of reputation.
 Many of the punishments, the stocks, the pillory, the apology read out in the marketplace,
were based upon the theory that public humiliation was a more effective penalty than a
fine.

Defamation under Indian Law

 In India, defamation is both a civil and criminal offence.
 Civil wrong provides compensation whereas criminal wrongs seek to punish a wrongdoer
and act as a deterrent. In Indian laws, criminal defamation has been specifically defined
as an offence under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) whereas civil defamation is based on
Law of Torts.

Criminal offence of Defamation

 Section 499 of the IPC defines what amounts to criminal defamation and few subsequent
provisions specify what the punishment for having committed defamation would be.
Section 499 states defamation could be through words – spoken or intended to be read,
through signs, and also through visible representations.
 These can either be published or spoken about a person with the intention of damaging
the reputation of that person, or with the knowledge or reason to believe that the
imputation will harm his reputation.
 Section 500 stipulates an imprisonment of up to two years, with or without fine, for
someone held guilty of criminal defamation. However, criminal defamation is a
compoundable offence and parties can seek a closure of the case by reaching a
compromise.
 Elements:
a) The statement made must be false
b) It may be made either by way of speech or writing
c) The statement must be defamatory, it should affect the reputation of the person
d) The statement has to be communicated to a third person
 Illustration: A says to B that C is suffering from Covid-19. C is fit and absolutely fine. A
will be liable for defamation.

Reputation
 If a person injures the reputation of another, he does so at his own risk, as in the case of
an interference with property. A man's reputation is his property, more valuable than
other property.
 All legal systems, including ancient India, have a concept of reputation, honor, and
importance that pervades everything.
 Slander's catastrophic ramifications have been examined in a number of literary works,
and Shakespeare's Othello reflects its cultural significance.

Defamatory Statements
The test of whether or not a statement is defamatory is whether the words complained of tend
to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society generally, or
whether they would tend to make the plaintiff shunned or avoided by right-thinking people.
In Sim v. Stretch, the plaintiff’s housemaid started working for the defendant. The defendant
sent a telegram to the plaintiff asking for the maid’s possession, money borrowed from her
and her wages. The plaintiff claimed damages for libel, alleging that these words were
defamatory. The plaintiff also claimed that by these words, the defendant meant and was
understood to mean that the plaintiff was facing pecuniary difficulties, he had been compelled
to borrow and had in fact borrowed money from his housemaid, that he had failed to pay her
wages, and that he was a person to whom no one should to give any credit.
The court held that the words complained of were not defamatory as the words would not
tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally.
In Mitchell v. Faber, the Court held that while deciding whether or not the statement is
defamatory, it is necessary to consider the reaction of the reader who are neither unduly
suspicious nor unduly naive. They should be capable of reading in between the lines,
detecting implications, and should not be prone to assuming a derogatory meaning where an
innocent one could apply.
Ramakant v. Devilal – In applying this test, the statement has to be read as a whole and the
words used in it are to be given their natural or ordinary meaning as ascribed to them by
ordinary men.
Hayward v. Thompson – Meaning of words in a libel action “is a matter of impression as an
ordinary man gets on the first reading not on a later analysis.” – because ordinary man after
reading the writing does not contemplate of reading it again & again for deriving its meaning.
Charleston v. News group Newspapers Ltd. - Although the article made it clear that the
people in the picture were not Smith and Charleston, they sued on the basis that anyone who
just read the headline and looked at the pictures might think that they had been involved in
pornography.
Held:
Using defamatory headlines could be ‘playing with fire’, but the defamatory effect had to be
judged against the article as a whole. Impression created by one part of the statement that it is
defamatory is not enough as the statement has to be taken as a whole.
In this case, although the headline looked defamatory, a reader only had to glance through the
first paragraph to see that in fact the paper was not making any defamatory allegation.
The situation might be different if, for example, the headline was potentially defamatory and
the words which explained it and removed the defamatory meaning were not found until well
into the article, so that casual readers might not see them.
Kinds of defamation
Mainly because of historical reasons, English law divides actions for defamation into: Libel
and Slander.
A libel is a publication of a false and defamatory statement which injures the reputation of
another person without lawful justification or excuse. The statement is expressed in a
permanent form.
Illustration: Publishing in a newspaper that X is a murderer, even though this is false.
A slander is a false and defamatory statement made by spoken words or gestures that tend to
injure the reputation of another.
Illustration: A tells B that eating at XYZ restaurant causes food poisoning even though it is
not true.
Difference between Libel and Slander
S. Criteria Libel Slander
No.
1. Mode of publication It is a permanent It is a transient form
form of defamation. of defamation. This
This includes includes spoken
waxwork, effigy, words or gestures.
printing, pictures
and writing.
2. Addressed to The eyes The ears
3. Civil wrong/Criminal offence:

Position under Common law- Only a civil wrong

Position under Indian law- Criminal offence Criminal offence

under Section 499, under Section 499
IPC IPC
4. Presumption of malice There is a Slander may be
presumption of uttered in the heat
malice as of the moment or
reduction of charges sudden
in writing and provocation, without
subsequent prior
publication involves deliberation.
greater deliberation
5. Period of limitation:

Position under Common Law- 6 years 2 years

Position under Indian Law- 1 year 1 year

6. Whether damage to be proved and
when actionable:

Position under Common Law- Actual damaged Special damage or

need not be proved; imputations need to
Actionable per se. be proved subject to
exceptions; becomes
actionable per se in
certain instances.

Position under Indian Law- Actionable without Actionable without

proof of special proof of special
damage damage

Essential elements of Defamation

The following are the essential elements of defamation:
1. A false statement must be made
2. The statement should be in written or a permanent form.
3. The statement should be defamatory in nature.
4. The statement must be published.

1. A false statement must be made:

 The falsity of the charge is presumed in the plaintiff’s favor.
 The burden of proof that the words are false does not lie upon the plaintiff. Defamation of
a person is taken to be false until it is proved to be true.
 When false & defamatory statements are made, malice (without just cause or excuse) is
also assumed. Hence, it is customary for plaintiff to allege the imputation to be false &
malicious.
 Motive of defamation in making the false statement is irrelevant in determining liability.
 In D.P. Choudhary v. Manjulata, there was publication of a statement in a local daily in
Jodhpur on 18.12.77 that Manjulata went out of her house on the earlier night at 11 p.m.
on the pretext of attending night classes and ran away with a boy named Kamlesh. She
belonged to a well-educated family and was herself also a student of B.A. class. She was
17 years of age. The news item was untrue and had been published with utter
irresponsibility and without any justification. Such publication had resulted in her being
ridiculed and affected her marriage prospects. The statement being defamatory, the
defendants were held liable.

2. The statement should be in written or permanent form:

 The defamatory statements may be made in writing or in printing, or may be conveyed in
the form of caricatures or any other similar representations.
 In Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Limited, Princess Irina of Russia,
the wife of Prince Youssoupoff, claimed damages for libel contained in a sound film. She
alleged that pictures and words in the film were understood to mean that she, therein
called “Princess Natasha”, had been raped by Rasputin. The jury ruled in favor of the
Princess and awarded damages.
 In Monson v. Tussauds, Madame Tussauds in London erected a waxwork of Monson at
the entrance to its Chamber of Horrors which had figures of notorious criminals, bearing
a gun. Monson had been tried for murder by gunshot in Scotland but was proven not
guilty. Monson sued the company for defamation and was awarded compensation.
 Under the Defamation Act, 1952, the broadcasting of words by means of wireless
telegraphy-radio and television, is treated as publication in permanent form.
 Similarly, by the Theatres Act, 1968, (UK) theatrical performances are treated as
publication in permanent form/Libel.
3. The statement should be defamatory in nature
Defamatory statement is one which tends to injure the reputation of the plaintiff. Any words
will be deemed defamatory which:
i) expose a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy; or
ii) tend to injure him in his profession or trade; or
iii) cause him to be shunned or avoided by his neighbors.
In G. Sreedharamurthy v. Bellary Municipal Council, a Municipal Council out of ill will
and malice and without justification served a notice of distraint warrant and seized furniture
and books of a practicing advocate, the conduct of the Municipal Council was held to be
defamatory.
In Byrne v. Deane, it was held that a statement is not defamatory if the person suffers in only
a section of community while the majority of the community would approve his action.
4. Defamatory statement must refer to the plaintiff
 In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has to prove that the statement of which he
complains referred to him.
 It is immaterial that the defendant did not intend to defame the plaintiff.
 If the person to whom the statement was published could reasonably infer that the
statement referred to the plaintiff, the defendant is nevertheless liable.
 It is not necessary that defendant should be described by his own name. It is sufficient
that he is described by the initials of his name or a fictitious name. But, the plaintiff must
satisfy the court that he was the person referred to.
 In E Hulton & Co. v. Jones, it was held that it is immaterial whether defendant intended
the defamatory statement to apply to the plaintiff, or knew of the plaintiff ’s existence.
When the statement does not expressly refer to the plaintiff, extrinsic evidence is
admissible to show that persons knowing the plaintiff reasonably understood the
statement to refer to him.
 If any sensible & reasonable person reading the article would think that it is a mere
imaginary person, then it is not actionable. But if people suppose it to mean some real
person, then action is maintainable.
 In C.M.G. Ogilvie v. Punjab Akhbarat & Press Company Ltd., it was held that to
conclude whether certain words and phrases refer to a particular individual or not, view of
an ordinary reasonable reader of the article should be given effect to and not the opinion
arrived at after a careful analysis. They article should be considered in its entirety.
 In Newstead v. London Express, it was held that a statement referring to a real person
and alleging something true about him may yet be defamatory for another person bearing
the same name.

Innuendo
 A statement may be prima facie defamatory and that is so when its natural and obvious
meaning leads to that conclusion.
 Sometimes, the statement may prima facie be innocent but because of some latent or
secondary meaning, it may be considered to be defamatory.
 When the natural and ordinary meaning is not defamatory but the plaintiff wants to bring
an action for defamation, he must prove the latent or the secondary meaning, i.e., the
innuendo, which makes the statement defamatory.
 Innuendo gives a separate cause of action. It should be supported by extrinsic facts or
matter and cannot be found on mere interpretation.
 Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1929)
– Defendant named Cassidy, also known as Corrigan – had gained notoriety in racing
circles and indiscriminate relations with women.
– At a race meeting, he posed with a lady to a photographer & told him that he might
announce that he was engaged to marry her
– Photograph published with the statement underneath: “Mr. M. Corrigan, the racehorse
owner and Miss X, whose engagement has been announced”
– The plaintiff, married to Mr. Cassidy & called herself Cassidy or Mrs. Corrigan.
– She brought an action of defamation – depending on innuendo that the words published
conveyed to her acquaintances that she was an immoral woman & cohabited with Mr.
Cassidy without being married to him. Held, Def. liable.
4. The statement must be published
 Publication means making the defamatory matter known to some person other than the
person defamed, and unless mat is done, no civil action for defamation lies.
 Communication to the plaintiff himself is not enough because defamation is injury to the
reputation and reputation consists in the estimation in which others hold him and not a
man's own opinion of himself.
 In Pullman v. Hill, it was held that dictating a letter to one’s typist is enough publication.
 Makhanlal v. Panchamlal– Sending of a defamatory article to the editor & printer of a
newspaper constitutes publication. Appearance of the article in the paper is a second
publication & constitutes a separate cause of action.
 ‘Multiple publication rule’ – Developed by English courts in mid 1800s. Under English
law, each publication is a separate tort. English Law does not recognize global theory of
jurisdiction & separate actions in each relevant jurisdiction are permissible.
 Significant in determining period of limitation – each publication being a separate tort has
its own action & limitation period from the last date of publication - now statutorily
abolished by Defamation Act, 2013 (UK).
 ‘Single Publication Rule’ introduced in UK by Defamation Act, 2013 – developed by
American courts- publication of defamatory material gives rise to only one cause of
action.

India: Khawar Bhatt v. Asif Nazir Mir & Ors.

• Online defamation cases - ‘single publication rule’ to be more pragmatic in application.
Held, multiple publication rule defeats object of limitation law - which cannot be permitted
• However, if re-publication is targeted for a different or larger public group, there will be a
fresh cause of action.

NEWSPAPER LIBEL
• Newspapers also have the same rule applied to with regards to defamation – no special right
or privilege
• K. Karanjia v. Thakersey (1969) - A journalist like any other citizen has the duty to
comment fairly provided the allegation of fact that he made was accurate and truthful.
• “Newspaper Rule” – Newspapers are not compelled to disclose the source of information at
an interim stage in answer to interrogatories – but newspapers are obligated to disclose if
court requires such disclosure in the interest of justice (McGuinnes v. Attorney General of
Victoria, 1940).
This rule is applied in India – Nishi Prem v. Javed Akhtar
• By virtue of English Contempt of Court Act, 1981 (Sec. 10), newspaper are not compellable
to disclose the sources of their information unless court orders to do so when it falls under
any of the 4 heads of public interest given in Sec 10, viz., interest of justice, national security,
prevention of disorder or crime.
• Rule of ‘responsible journalism’ as held in Reynolds case shall be followed in reporting or
making comments on matters of public interest.
• Whether proprietor/ editor/ printer/ publisher liable for newspaper libel?
Yes - they can be sued separately or jointly. In cases of joint publication – each will be liable.
• Liability of distributors for newspaper libel?
Distributor as well as the principal liable (as sale of each newspaper copy containing libel
constitutes publication)
Exception: Defendant has to prove that:
1. He did not know that it contained libel;
2. That his ignorance was not due to any negligence on his part; and
3. He did not know & had no ground for supposing that the newspaper was likely to contain
libel
The above exception will apply where the defendant is not the printer/ first or main publisher
of a work, but has only played subordinate role in disseminating it, such as those involved in
mechanical distribution (e.g., news agents/ vendors / librarians/ booksellers/ bookbinders/
carriers, etc.)
Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd.
• Distributors of newspapers & periodicals are like conduit pipes in the channel of
distribution – nothing to do with main content.
• Common sense and fairness require that there be no liability unless they knew or ought to
have known that it contained a libel on the plaintiff which could not be justified or excused.
• Burden to prove the same lies on the plaintiff.

SLANDER IN INDIAN LAW

The common law rule that slander is not actionable per se has not been followed in India
except in few decisions. The Indian cases fall under the following categories:
1. Where the words impute a crime - Where imputation is of a criminal offence even slander
is actionable per se.
2. Where the words impute vulgar abuse - A distinction is made between abusive language
which is insulting and abusive language which is both insulting as well as defamatory
Girish Chandra v. Jatadhari [1899]- words like ‘saala’, ‘baperbeta’ is insulting but not
defamatory
Parvathi v. Mannar [1884]- defendant abused plaintiff by saying that she was not the
legally married wife and that she was ejected from several places for her unchastity.
3. Where they impute unchastity to a woman - Narayana Sah v. Kannamma Bai (1931):
unchastity imputed on a Hindu woman- defamation suit maintainable
4. Where they tend to lower the character of a plaintiff in his caste -Gayadin Singh v.
Mahavir Singh [1926] - Even the husband of the plaintiff can bring a suit against defamation
although words uttered are for the plaintiff as it would mean that he has married a lower caste
woman.
5. Repetition of Libel & Slander – Every repetition of defamatory words is a new publication
and furnishes a distinct cause of action. (Watkin v. Hall)
6. Tale bearers are as bad as tale-makers
• When can the originator be held liable for damage resulting from repetition?
a) Where the originator authorized/intended the repetition, or
b) Where the repetition was the natural and probable consequence of his act, or
c) Where there was a moral obligation on the person in whose presence the slander was
uttered to repeat it
In the absence of the above conditions, the person repeating the defamatory words will be
liable.

DEFENCES
1. Truth - The truth of defamatory statements is a complete defence to an action of libel
or slander. The burden of proving truth of the words of complaint lies upon the Deft.
If the matter is true the purpose or motive with which it was published is irrelevant.
 According to I.P.C., it is not enough that the words complained are true, the Deft.
must then prove that not only the words are true, but also that it was for the public
benefit. They should be published what is public good or public benefit is a question
of fact.
2. Fair comment - A fair and bonafide comment on matter of public interest is no libel,
unless it is written maliciously. A legitimate criticism is no tort. This fair comment
covers a) Public conduct of public servant b) conduct of any person touching any
public question, c) Imputation made in good faith by person for protecting his own or
others interest.

Thus, there is Damnum Sine Injuria, but

 The words published must be fairly relevant to some matter of public interest.
 There must be the expression of the opinion and not the allegation of the fact.
 They must not exceed the limit of fair comment.
 They must not be published maliciously.

3. Privilege - When a person stands in such a relation to the fact of the case that he is
justified in saying or writing slanderous or libelous matter. Privilege is of two kinds -
1) Absolute 2) Qualified

i) Absolute Privilege
A statement is absolutely privileged when no action lies for it even though it is false and
defamatory and made with express malice e.g. words spoken in parliament or in course of
Judicial, military, naval or state proceedings. This is based on the principle that interest of
community shall prevail over the interest of the individual.
ii) Qualified Privilege
These are the matters, which are not so important to public as absolute privileges, and the
speaker will not be liable if the statement is bonafide and not made maliciously. These are
the communication made
a) in the course of legal, social or moral duty
b) for self-protection.
c) for protection of common interest.
d) for public good.
e) Report of parliamentary and judicial proceeding.
Absolute privilege is attached to –
 Parliamentary proceedings.
 Judicial proceedings.
 Military or Naval proceedings.
 State proceedings.
 4. Consent - Leave and License or Volentia non fit injuria, which means if the
defamation is made with the consent of the defamed person then no action shall lie
against such Deft. Thus one who has given consent has to suffer for the consequence
of it.

5. Apology - It is made by wrong doer and it is accepted by wronged, or aggrieved

person then no action shall lie provided such apology must be made voluntarily.

DEFAMATION OF DECEASED PERSON

• It is not a tort to defame a deceased person because plaintiff to succeed in a defamation suit
must prove that the offending words referred to him.
• If the statement though referring to the deceased reflects upon the plaintiff and affects his
reputation, then an action will be maintainable.
• S. 499 IPC, Explanation 1: Person defaming a dead person may be criminally prosecuted if
imputation would have injured the reputation of the person, if living, & is intended to be
hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives.

DEFAMATION OF A CLASS OF PERSONS

• Any member of the class can sue by proving that they were meant for him.
• “All lawyers are thieves” or “All law students are lazy”
• To bring an individual action, there must be something in the word and the manner of
publication which shows the plaintiff was the target of the attack
Knuppfer v. London Express Newspapers Ltd (1944)
Knuppfer (K) was the head of the British branch of the Young Russia Party. The respondents
published a newspaper article in 1941 which alleged association between Hitler and the Party
stating that this émigré Russian group was a fascist organization.
The group had approx. 2,000 members, of whom 24 were based in the UK. K was a Russian
immigrant living in London and he brought an action for defamation.
Was the accusation of fascism aimed at the class of people or it singled him out?
• In libel cases the key question is whether the words were published “of the plaintiff” as an
individual rather than whether they were spoken of a class.
• A partnership firm cannot sue because a firm name is merely a compendious artificial name
adopted by the partnership & is not itself a legal entity. But an individual partner may
personally sue if defamed.
INFO IF NEEDED:
When the words refer to a group of individuals or a class of persons, no member of that group
or class can sue unless he can prove that the words could reasonably be considered to be
referring to him. Thus, "If a man wrote that all lawyers were thieves, no particular lawyer
could sue him unless there was something to point to the particular individual." In Knupffer
v. London Express Newspapers Ltd., the appellant was the member of a party, the
membership of which was about two thousand, out of which twenty-four members including
the plaintiff were in England. The respondents published a statement of the party as a whole.
Some of the appellant's friends considered the article to be referring to him. It was, however,
held that since the article referred to such a big class, most of the members of which were
resident abroad, it could not reasonably be considered to be referring to the appellant and the
respondents were not liable. It was stated by Lords Atkin in Knupffer v. London Express
Newspapers Ltd., "There can be no law that a defamatory statement made of a firm, or
trustee, or the tenants of a particular building is not actionable, if the words would reasonably
be understood as published of each member of the firm or each trustee or each tenant. The
reason why a libel published of a large or indeterminate number of persons described by
some general name generally fails to be actionable is the difficulty of establishing that the
plaintiff was, in fact, included in the defamatory statement."
In Dhirendra Nath Sen v. Raj at Kanti Bhadra, it has been held that when an editorial in a
newspaper is defamatory of a spiritual head of a community, an individual of that community
does not have a right of action.
Where the statement though generally referring to a class can be reasonably considered to be
referring to a particular plaintiff, his action will succeed. In Fanu v. Malcolmson, in an article
published by the defendants, it was mentioned that cruelty was practiced upon employees in
some of the Irish factories. From the article as a whole including a reference to Waterford
itself, it was considered that the plaintiff's Waterford factory was aimed at in the article and
the plaintiff was, therefore, successful in his action for defamation.
A partnership firm is not a legal entity. The partners collectively are known as a firm.
Defamation of partnership firm may, therefore, mean the defamation of partners of that firm.
No suit for defamation is maintainable by a firm as it is not a legal person. Suit in such a case
may be brought by the individual partners. In P.K. Oswal Hosiery Mill v. Tilak Chand, the
Punjab High Court explained the position as follows: "It is well-known that a firm is merely a
compendious artificial name adopted by its partners and is not itself a legal entity. Libel or
slander of a partnership firm may indeed amount to defamation of its partners. But then it is
the partners who may in such an eventuality sue and not the firm. The remedy of an
association like a partnership concern really lies at hands of its individual members who can
personally sue if they have been defamed. It is not necessary for all the members of the firm
to join in such an action. Anyone or more of the partners who feel aggrieved may sue and the
others may be joined as proforma defendants."

DEFAMATION OF COMPANY OR CORPORATION

• Can a corporation sue for libel charging it with insolvency/dishonest or incompetent
management?
• Can it sue for libel charging it with corruption? Does it have a mind to indulge in
malice/fraud? Is it not the individuals who can be guilty of it rather than the individuals?
• Alter ego theory & lifting of corporate veil
• A corporation is entitled to sue for defamatory matters (libel/slander) which have a
tendency to injure its reputation w.r.t its trade/business.
• Is proof of special damage required, when it refers to:
– company’s property, trade or business? – Not required.
– personal character or reputation of its officers? – Required
• English rule: Where no financial loss- trading corporation can still sue in libel for general
damages
• This English rule not compatible with European Convention & this was reaffirmed in
Jamaica v. Wall Street Journal.
DEFAMATION OF GOVERNMENT, LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND POLITICAL
PARTIES
Goldsmith v. Bhoyrul (1997) –
Government and public administration are always open to criticism and therefore it is
contrary to public interest to permit them to sue for defamation.
City of Chicago v. Tribune Co. –
Every private citizen has right to speak freely & criticize the Government and other local
authorities without fear of civil or criminal action – based on public interest doctrine.
Hector v. A.G. of Antiqua and Barbuda –
In a free democratic society those who hold office in Government & who are responsible for
public administration must always be open to criticism. Any attempt to stifle or fetter such
criticism amounts to political censorship of the most insidious and objectionable kind.
Derby Shire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd. –
“Chilling effect” induced by threat or civil action for libel. Often facts justifying defamatory
publication are known to be true, but admissible evidence capable of proving those facts is
not available - preventing publication of important public matters.
• Position in US, UK, South Africa, India –
Government, Local and other authorities exercising governmental power, and Political Parties
cannot maintain defamation suit.
DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
Position in US:
Background - Before Sullivan’s case, there were nearly 300 million dollars in libel actions
outstanding against news organizations - by Southern officials who used defamation lawsuits
to prevent critical coverage of civil rights issues in news publications.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan –
Facts:
Ad titled “Heed Their Rising Voices”- openly criticized the police department in the city of
Montgomery, Alabama for its treatment of civil rights protestors. Some particulars were false
Montgomery Public Safety commissioner, Sullivan - not named in the ad- but argued it
referred to him indirectly & inaccurate criticism of police actions was defamatory to him as
well, due to his duty to supervise the police department.
Plaintiff demanded the ad be retracted. Defendant was puzzled as to why the Plaintiff thought
the advertisement reflected adversely on him.
Jury: Ad libelous per se & actionable without proof of malice. Awarded $500,000 damages.
Defendant lost appeal in the SC of Alabama, he further appealed to US Supreme Court - ad
was not meant to hurt Sullivan's reputation and was protected under the First Amendment.
Court’s ruling: Public official cannot recover damages for a defamatory statement relating to
his official conduct unless he proves "actual malice" –
- that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or
- with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false.
Effect of the Ruling: Such claims by public figures rarely prevail because of:
- extremely high burden of proof on the plaintiff, and
- difficulty of proving the defendant's knowledge and intentions.
Thus, actual malice standard countered the efforts by public officials to use these claims to
suppress political criticism.
Position in India: Same principle is applied in India.
Kartar Singh & Ors. v. The State of Punjab -
Persons holding public offices must not be thin-skinned with reference to the comments made
on them.
Even where they know that the observations are undeserved and unjust, they must bear with
them and submit to be misunderstood for a time.
Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu:
Auto Shanker convicted of six murders and sentenced to death. Chennai-based Tamil
magazine, Nakkeeran announced that they'd be printing Shankar's 'sensational
autobiography'-which they claimed he'd written in prison and sent them through his lawyer.
Prison officials then forced Shanker to write to the magazine requesting that the
autobiography not be published and also wrote to the petitioners threatening legal action if
they proceeded with publishing.
Petitioners then brought action to prevent the respondents from violating the magazine’s and
the prisoner’s Freedom of Expression.
Verdict: Petitioners have a right to publish anything based on public records, including court
records even without one’s consent or authorization.
The question of consent/authorization could not be verified as Shankar, his wife and lawyer
were not parties to the case.
No prior restraints can be imposed by the State or its officials on the publication of materials
it considers defamatory of the state.
The remedy of the affected public officials/public figures, if any, is after the publication.
• Rule: Any publication concerning one’s personal life matters, whether truthful or otherwise
and whether laudatory or critical, is a violation of right to privacy, when published without
his consent.
• 1st Exception to this Rule: Any such publication becomes unobjectionable if based upon
public records including court records - once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the
right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press
and media among others.
However, in the interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this
rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence
should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicized
in press/media.
• 2nd Exception to this Rule: Right to privacy cannot be claimed by public officials with
respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties, even in case
of false publication, unless malice /personal animosity /reckless disregard for truth is proved
by plaintiff.
• In such a case, defendant only has to prove that he acted after a reasonable verification of
the facts; not necessary to prove that what he has written is true.
 3rd Exception to this Rule: Judiciary, Parliament and legislatures are also protected from
actions in libel & slander.
 4th Exception to this Rule: Government, local authority and other organs and institutions
exercising governmental power cannot maintain a suit for damages for defaming them.

The 2nd, 3rd & 4th Exceptions do not, however, mean that Official Secrets Act, 1923, or any
similar enactment or provision having the force of law does not bind the press or media.
Time, Inc v. Hill
• In the case of public officials, insofar as their official function is involved, they are
substantially without a right to privacy.
• The acts and conduct of a person who holds office in Government and responsible for
public administration are always open to criticism. If such criticisms are attempted to be
avoided, it would amount to political censorship.
• Factual error and content defamatory of official reputation or both, are insufficient for the
award of damages for false statements unless actual malice & knowledge that the statements
are false or reckless disregard of the truth is alleged and proved.
• In a democratic set up a close and microscopic examination of private lives of public men is
the natural consequence of holding of public offices.
• What is good for a private citizen who does not come within the public gaze may not be true
of a person holding public office. What a person holding public office does within the four
walls of his house does not totally remain a private matter.
• The scrutiny of public figures by media should not also reach a stage where it amounts to
harassment to the public figures and their family members and they must be permitted to live
and lead their life in peace.
Rule of prior verification – whether applicable to all cases?
• The SC in R.Rajagopal's case has not laid down that the prior verification of the facts is
must in all such cases. All that the SC indicated is that the proof that the member of the press
or media acted after a reasonable verification of the facts would be sufficient.
• One cannot be asked to seek prior verification from the public officials before publishing
any articles and publish the denial, if any, of the officials.
• However, the Supreme Court in R.Rajagopal's case has clearly held that a citizen has a right
to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child
bearing0 and education, among other matters and none can publish anything in reference to
the above matters without his/her consent whether laudatory or critical.
Reynolds v Times News Papers Ltd., (1999) 4 All ER 609
Facts : Albert Reynolds- Former Ireland PM, until a political crisis in 1994.
The Times had published an article relating to the political crisis in Ireland in 1994
culminating in the Plaintiff ’s resignation and the collapse of the Irish government. The
Plaintiff claimed that the words bore the meaning that he had deliberately lied to mislead the
Dail and his cabinet colleagues. This article was then published in the United Kingdom.
However, the UK version omitted an explanation that Reynolds had given for the events,
which had been printed in the original article
• Reynolds brought an action for defamation. Times Newspapers Ltd appealed that the
defense of qualified privilege be considered but it was not allowed.
• Court agreed: traditional limits of qualified privilege should be extended to afford
protection to communication of information & comment on political matters by ‘responsible
journalism’.
• Also, the duty-interest to be applied, i.e., whether public entitled to know the particular
information
Lords Nicholls: Illustrative ten-point test of 'responsible journalism’ - If reporters and editors
followed these points, they would enjoy a degree of protection from libel action, even if they
could not prove factual allegations:
1. The seriousness of the allegation - more serious the charge, more, misinformed the public
and more liability for publisher if its untrue
2. The nature of the information, and the extent to which the subject-matter is a matter of
public concern.
3. The source of the information – How impartial; some informants have no direct knowledge
or are paid for their stories
4. The steps taken to verify the information – whether verified from other sources.
5. The status of the information – the allegation may be an ongoing investigation, deserving
respect
6. The urgency of the matter.
7. Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff - a right of reply
8. Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff's side of the story – If the subject has
spoken on the matter before, was their version reflected in the coverage/whether that was
given proper weight in the coverage - possession of information others do not have or have
not disclosed – approaching plaintiff not always necessary
9. The tone of the article – "neutral reportage" -whether raises query or calls for
investigation- need not adopt statements as allegations as statement of fact.
10. The circumstances of the publication, including the timing.
• Reynold’s defence:
• A type of "qualified" privilege
• Protects the maker of an otherwise defamatory statement so long as he had a legal
duty to communicate the information to someone who had a material interest in
receiving it.
Seaga v. Harper
• Principle: The material should be looked as a whole, not dissected or assessed piece by
piece, without regard to the whole context.
• Facts:
– Seaga, a leader of opposition of Jamaica – S referred to the Deputy Commissioner, Harper
as “an activist and a distinguished supporter of the ruling party”.
– Seaga relied upon Reynolds principle for his defense.
Publication to non-media publication?
Court held: The protection of Reynolds privilege extends to any publications made by any
person who publishes material of public interest in any medium, so long as the conditions
framed by Lord Nicholls as being applicable to ‘responsible journalism’ are satisfied.
Reynolds principles applies but defence failed – because no sufficient care taken to verify
reliability of the information which S disseminated.
• The Defamation Act 2013 replaces Reynolds privilege with a new defence of 'publication
on matter of public interest'.
• The statutory defence aims to provide a broader protection for freedom of expression than
was previously found under the common law.
• The ingredients of this defence are:
i. that the statement complained of was or formed part of a statement on a matter of public
interest
ii. and the defendant must have reasonably believed that publishing the statement was in the
public interest.
• In determining whether the defence is made out, the court is directed to have regard to all
the circumstances of the case, such as if the journalism was conducted in a responsible
manner and is likely to apply an approach which is similar to that adopted in the Reynolds
and Jameel.
DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC FIGURE
The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 5th Edition:
• A famous person whose life and behavior are the focus of intense public interest and
scrutiny.
• Law: A person who is determined to be sufficiently well-known or famous as to prevail in a
lawsuit for libel or slander only when the defendant is shown to have acted with malice.
Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu -
• Public figures have an influential role in ordering society; access to mass media
communication both to influence policy & to counter criticism of their views; and a citizen
has a legitimate & substantial interest in the conduct of such persons.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)
• The Saturday Evening Post printed an article accusing Butts (Plaintiff), the coach of the
University of Georgia football team, of conspiring to fix a 1962 Georgia-Alabama game by
giving Paul Bryant, the Alabama coach, crucial information about Georgia’s offensive
strategy. Evidence showed that the article was published with reckless disregard for truth.
• Plaintiff sued Defendant for libel and a jury awarded him $60,000 in general damages and
$30,000 in punitive damages.
• After New York Times case was decided, Defendant (publishers) requested a new trial.
Issue: Do the constitutional safeguards required under New York Times v. Sullivan apply to a
public figure who is not a public official?
Holding: The same principle as applicable to public officials is applicable to public figures in
or out of Government as well
Ratio (as in Rajagopal’s Case): Public figures like public officials have an influential role in
ordering society; access to mass media communication both to influence policy & to counter
criticism of their views; a citizen has a legitimate & substantial interest in the conduct of such
persons.