In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold: (1) to prove

beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with
the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor,
because, even if the commission of the crime is a given, there can be no conviction
without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained. 1 An ample proof
that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly
prove the offender's identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused
enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties.2

People v. Teehankee3 held that in determining the admissibility and reliability of

out-of-court identification, the Court must look at the totality of the circumstances and
consider the following factors, namely: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy
of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the length of time between the crime
and the identification; (5) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. In relation to
this, in  People v. Pineda4, the High Court identified 12 danger signals that might indicate
erroneous identification:

1. the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone; 2. the
identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made no accusation
against him when questioned by the police; 3. a serious discrepancy exists
between the identifying witness' original description and the actual
description of the accused; 4. before identifying the accused at the trial, the
witness erroneously identified some other person; 5. other witnesses to the crime
fail to identify the accused; 6. before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to
identify him; 7. before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited
opportunity to see the accused; 8. the witness and the person identified are of
different racial groups; 9. during his original observation of the perpetrator of the
crime, the witness was unaware that a crime was involved; 10. a considerable
time elapsed between the witness' view of the criminal and his identification
of the accused; 11. several persons committed the crime; and 12. the witness
fails to make a positive trial identification. (Emphasis supplied)

The greatest care should be taken in considering the identification of the accused,
especially when this identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment in the case
totally depends on the reliability of the identification. 5 Here, the identification of the
accused only came from the private complainant who is the victim of the alleged crime.
His identification of Alonsagay was not arrived at because of state action such as police
1
People v. PO1 Lumikid, G.R. No. 242695, June 23, 2020.
2
Id.
3
People v. Teehankee, G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995
4
People v. Pineda et al., G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004
5
Supra note 2.
line-up or a show-up, but because of what Marvin Basbas had relayed to him after his
(Marvin’s) drinking spree with the accused. While admittedly, the circumstances as to
how the private complainant knew of the identity of Alonsagay did not arise from state
action which could have led to the inadmissibility of the said identification, this should
have been taken into account as evidentiary matter by the Court in arriving at a finding
regarding the accused’s identity.6 In the first place, the manner through which Marvin
Basbas knew of the purported commission of the crime is through the accused’s
purported act of narrating to him the circumstances thereof, and not through his
eyewitness account of the incident. Surely, this counts as hearsay, for he lacks first-hand,
personal knowledge regarding the facts, circumstances and commission of the crime. 7,8
His subsequent act of narrating to the private complainant the said account made it
double hearsay.9,10 For another, this Marvin Basbas did not testify in Court, thereby
depriving the Defense of the opportunity to cross-examine him regarding the
circumstances of how he acquired such information regarding the supposed commission
of the crime.

The hearsay character of the account of Marvin Basbas is compounded by his act
of showing only the photograph of the accused to the private complainant. On this matter,
People v. Pineda11 is instructive:

Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the established methods of

identifying criminals, the procedure used in this case is unacceptable. The first rule
in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of photographs
must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect. xxx Thus: [W] here a
photograph has been identified as that of the guilty party, any subsequent

6
People v. Ansano (G.R. No. 232455, December 2, 2020) provides that “It is true that the latter finding — on
the possible effect of BBB on the identification — did not arise from State action; thus, this finding would not
amount to a violation of Ansano's right to due process that would render the identification inadmissible. This
does not, however, preclude the courts from taking the said finding into consideration as evidentiary inquiries
do not end on questions of admissibility. ‘Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence.’ Hearsay evidence, for instance, cannot be given credence whether objected to or not for it has no
probative value.”
7
Sec. 37, Rule 130.
8
TSN March 23, 2022
Q (Atty. Tapalla on cross): And you confirmed that your cousin was never with you on December 9, 2014,
while you were driving your motorcycle?
A (Mervin Menicane): Yes ma’am, he was not with me.
9
People v. Manhuyod, Jr., G.R. No. 124676, May 20, 1998.
10
TSN March 23, 2022
Q (Pros. Quicho on re-direct): Mr. Witness, what did Mervin Basbas tell you regarding these two?
A (Mervin Menicane): He told me that they were the persons who stabbed me.
Q: Were you able to know how did your cousin Mervin Basbas was able to know that fact?
A: Because they had a conversation with each other.
Q: Who had the conversation Mr. Witness?
A: Garry Alonsagay Ramos and my cousin had a conversation in a drinking spree.
11
Supra note 4.
 corporeal identification of that person may be based not upon the witness’s
recollection of the features of the guilty party, but upon his recollection of the
photograph. Thus, although a witness who is asked to attempt a corporeal
identification of a person whose photograph he previously identified may say,
"That’s the man that did it," what he may actually mean is, "That’s the man whose
photograph I identified." x x x A recognition of this psychological phenomenon
leads logically to the conclusion that where a witness has made a photographic
identification of a person, his subsequent corporeal identification of that same
person is somewhat impaired in value, and its accuracy must be evaluated in light
of the fact that he first saw a photograph.

In the instant case, it must be noted that Marvin Basbas showed to the private
complainant the lone photo of the accused. 12 This manner of identification is being
lamented to by the High Court in a catena of cases not only as “highly suggestive” but
also as an “impermissible suggestion”.13 While the Records do not bear the time during
which Marvin told the private complainant regarding what he had learned from
Alonsagay, it could also have been around July 2015 when Marvin informed private
complainant’s brother regarding the same information. At any rate, Marvin apparently
suggested to the victim the identity of the perpetrator by showing only the accused’s
photo several months after the incident subject of this case.

Records show that the instant case originated from a complaint which was filed
with the police around August 2015, or eight (8) months after the commission of the
crime on December 2014. While case law provides that delay in revealing the identity of
the perpetrators will not affect the credibility of witness if sufficiently explained 14, here
there was no plausible explanation offered by the victim regarding the delay in filing a
complaint. While a longer passage of time per se will not automatically make an
eyewitness recollection unreliable, it certainly impacts its overall reliability when
considered along with the other factors in the totality of circumstances test.15 If, in
People v. Rodrigo, the High Court considered a lapse of five and a half (5 1/2) months as
unreliable, this makes even more suspect the identification made more or less eight (8)
months after the incident. Along this line, People v. Nuñez held that “people are less
accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts after a long retention interval than
after a short one. Ideally then, a prosecution witness must identify the suspect
immediately after the incident.” To stress, the private complainant here had not identified
the suspect immediately after the incident.

12
TSN May 19, 2022, p. 7.
13
People v. Pineda et al., G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004; People v. Rodrigo, G.R. No. 176159, September
11, 2009; People v. Ansano, G.R. No. 232455, December 2, 202; People v. PO1 Lumikid, G.R. No. 242695,
June 23, 2020.
14
People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 131116, August 27, 1999.
15
People v. Ansano, G.R. No. 232455, December 2, 2020.
 There could be no plausible explanation to the said delay other than the possibility
that, as the first circumstance in Teehankee, the victim did not have such opportunity to
view the accused as to accurately remember his physical features. Notably, the victim did
not know the accused before the incident, and during the incident, it was his first time
meeting them.16,17 En route to Sta. Lourdes, the private complainant testified that he was
not looking at the two (2) accused because he was driving. 18 The victim’s degree of
attention, as the second factor in Teehankee, is highly suspect either, for two persons
committed the crime, and the victim’s attention could not have zeroed in on any one
assailant alone.19 Strikingly, the Prosecution did not introduce in evidence a police
blotter, which not only could have contained the distinctive physical features of the
accused as reported by the victim to the police immediately after the incident, but also an
initial identification against which any subsequent physical characterization by the
private complainant could have been compared.20 In effect, initially, the accused initially
could not identify anyone as his assailant. On this matter, People v. Nuñez21 is highly
instructive:

The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the degree of

certainty demonstrated by the witness at the moment of identification. What is
most critical here is the initial identification made by the witness during
investigation and case build-up, not identification during trial.

On another matter, private complainant mentioned about the accused’s tattoo on

his right hand as identification mark, but it is baffling as to why, as mentioned, there was
no documentary evidence presented such as a police blotter in which he could have
mentioned such identification mark at the earliest opportunity. In People v. Maguing22,
where the private complainant, in purportedly identifying the accused, first mentioned of
the accused’s tattoo nine years after the incident, the Court held:

[i]t is beyond comprehension how she could have failed to mention an important
factual detail such as the tattoo, especially in the initial stages of the investigation,
when she knew that it was the only means by which her identification of the
assailant could be substantiated.

16
TSN August 5 2021 p. 5.; TSN March 23, 2022, p. 9.
17
In People v. Rodrigo, G.R. No. 176159, September 11, 2009, the High Court pronounced that “[t]his fact can
make a lot of difference as human experience tells us: in the recognition of faces, the mind is more certain
when the faces relate to those already in the mind’s memory bank; conversely, it is not easy to recall or
identify someone we have met only once or whose appearance we have not fixed in our mind.”
18
TSN March 23, 2022, p. 9.
19
People v. Rodrigo, G.R. No. 176159, September 11, 2009.
20
Id.
21
G.R. No. 209342, October 4, 2017.
22
G.R. No. 144090, June 26, 2003.
In People v. Caliso23, the Court held that the test to determine the moral certainty of an
identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To
achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique
physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the
distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical
facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity. When the records are bereft
of any indication that an eyewitness has given a description that will enable an
anonymous person to point to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, the court cannot
judge whether a correct and proper identification has been made. 24 In the instant case, it
is strangely convenient for the accused to first mention such tattoo only in his Salaysay
which was executed on August 14, 2015, more than eight (8) months after the date of the
incident, shortly after Marvin Basbas mentioned to him that the accused is his assailant.
Strangely enough, there was never any mention either of the said tattoo during the private
complainant’s in-court testimony.

The information that it was the accused who is his assailant was only supplied to
him by Marvin Basbas, similar to what happened in Rodrigo25:

Significantly, this identification came a month after the crime – a long month
when the police appeared to have achieved no headway in their investigation xxx.
By her own account, Rosita only learned the names of the robbers from
information given by one Chito Alicante who never appeared as a witness in the
case. The photographic identification was made at the police station by showing
her the lone photograph of Rodrigo who was expressly noted in the Sinumpaang
Salaysay as a "suspect." Thus, Rosita, who did not know the robbers, initially
fixed them in her mind through their names that Chito Alicante supplied, and
subsequently, linked the name Lee Rodrigo to the faces she saw in the photograph
the police presented as the suspect. Note that by providing only a lone photograph,
complete with a name identified as the suspect, the police did not even give Rosita
the option to identify Rodrigo from among several photographed suspects; the
police simply confronted her with the photograph of Rodrigo as the suspect.

Private complainant’s turnabout seven (7) months later after what Marvin Basbas had
done – from his lack of initial recollection to resoluteness in identifying the accused – is
eerily suspicious and doubtful at best. In the absence of a sound explanation as to his
sudden change of tune, the similarity with the factual circumstances in the Rodrigo case
is revealing: that Marvin initially fixed the name of the accused to the victim’s mind, and
subsequently linked the said name to the face that the victim saw in the lone photo
Marvin showed to him.26 After having no leads for about eight (8) months, the victim was
23
G.R. No. 183830, October 19, 2011.
24
Supra note 22.
25
Id.
26
Id.
driven by a desire to conform27 to Marvin’s impermissible suggestion. All in all, the
criminal complaint against the accused would not have been filed were it not for Marvin
Basbas’ hearsay account and highly suggestive act of showing the picture to the private
complainant.28

The accused was consistent in his testimony that at the time of the incident, he was
at the place of Mercy Cramer as an employee thereof. The nature of his job as the
caretaker of, and lifeguard at, the resort required him to be continuously present thereat
especially when there are guests at the said place at the late hours of the night. This was
corroborated by the testimony of his employer Mercy Cramer. Moreover, his common-
law wife straightforwardly testified that at the time, she had not been allowing her
common-law husband to go out of the said place in the absence of compelling reason, for,
apart from his job, he has to take care of their newborn child.

The testimonies of his wife and employer should not have been rejected outright
for purportedly having been tainted with bias due to their connection with the accused
and their interest in his acquittal. Their testimonies, consistent with each other and
straightforward, should rise and fall on their merits, especially since the defense of alibi
gains significance in light of the evidence presented by the prosecution regarding the
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. At any rate, even if the
defense of the accused may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the
prosecution failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability.29

The circumstances leading to the identification of the accused and the filing of this
case is highly suspect. This makes the motive of the informant Marvin Basbas to
27
People v. Nuñez, G.R. No. 209342, October 4, 2017.
28
TSN March 23, 2022
Q (Atty. Tapalla on cross): Mr. witness, you filed this case against accused Garry Ramos Alonsagay and
Romnick Cario alyas Bugaro only in August 2015 or 8 months after the incident, correct?
A (Mervin Menicane): Yes, ma’am.
Q: And you only got the names of Garry Alonsagay from your cousin, correct?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: It’s because you do not personally know this Garry Ramos Alonsagay whom you are accusing in this
case, correct?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And without such information from your cousin you would never have filed this case against Garry
Alonsagay Ramos, correct?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And when did your cousin tell you about Garry Alonsagay Ramos?
A: I cannot recall the exact date when he mentioned it to me.
Q: And during this conversation with your cousin he described to you the appearance of a certain Garry
Alonsagay Ramos, correct?
A: At first, he did not describe the appearance of Garry Alonsagay Ramos but as days passed, he described it
to me personally.
Q: And your cousin alo showed you photos of Garry Alonsagay Ramos, correct?
A: Yes, ma’am.
29
People v. PO1 Lumikid, G.R. No. 242695, June 23, 2020.
implicate the accused deserving of more look. To stress, Marvin Basbas did not testify in
this case. Hence, the defense was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him
regarding how he was able to supposedly acquire information from the accused regarding
the facts, circumstances, and commission of the crime. Evidence suppressed will be
adverse if produced.30 With that, the motive of Marvin Basbas gains significance. The
accused was consistent in his testimony that Marvin Basbas implicated him in this case
because prior to the incident subject of this case, he mentioned to his in-laws that Marvin
had been using illegal drugs.31 This enraged Marvin to the point that they had a heated
argument in front of Mercy Cramer’s resort in Irawan. 32 Afterwards, they no longer had
any contact with each other.33 Considered along with the admission of the private
complainant that this case would not have been filed had Marvin Basbas not come to
know of the accused’s story (despite how truthful that story might be, and despite how
genuine his drinking spree with the accused might be despite their falling out), the motive
of Marvin Basbas in mentioning the accused as the perpetrator in this case sticks out like
a sore thumb.

A conviction for a crime cannot be based on the accused’s inherently weak

defenses of denial and alibi. Rather, guilt should be premised on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence. But in the face of the deficiency in the proof submitted by the
prosecution anent the identity of the perpetrator of the crime, the alibi of the accused
assumes credence and importance. While the defense of alibi is by nature a weak one, it
assumes commensurate significance and strength where the evidence for the prosecution
is also intrinsically weak.34 Unless the identity of the culprit is established beyond
reasonable doubt to the exclusion of all others, the charge must be dismissed on the
ground that the constitutional presumption of innocence has not been overcome. When
there is even a scintilla of doubt, the Court must acquit.35

G.R. No. 113779-80 February 23, 1995

ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Judges should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi. Alibi should be
considered in light of all the evidence on record for it can tilt the scales of justice in favor
of the accused. 36 In People vs. Omega,37 we held:

30
Sec. 3(e), Rule 131.
31
TSN 7 November 2022, p. 6.
32
Id., p. 16.
33
Id., p. 7.
34
Supra note 1.
35
Supra note 29.
 Although alibi is known to be the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to
concoct and difficult to disprove, nevertheless, where the evidence for the
prosecution is weak and betrays lack of concreteness on the question of
whether or not the accused committed the crime charged, the defense of
alibi assumes importance.

The case at bench reminds us of the warning that judges seem disposed more readily to
credit the veracity and reliability of eyewitnesses than any amount of contrary evidence
by or on behalf of the accused , whether by way of alibi, insufficient identification, or
other testimony. 38 They are unmindful that in some cases the emotional balance of the
eyewitness is disturbed by her experience that her powers of perception becomes
distorted and her identification is frequently more untrustworthy. Into the identification,
enter other motives, not necessarily stimulated originally by the accused
personally — the desire to requite a crime, to find a scapegoat, or to support, consciously
or unconsciously, an identification already made by another.39

G.R. No. 176389               December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A.
GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER
ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is
truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such
accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that
a defense of alibi is a hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I
saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi
which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For
how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing
over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping
into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a
case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime
should not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying
witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness
can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.