Aviation Safety and Security Systems (AERO2495)

COURSE CODE AERO2495

COURSE TITLE Aviation Safety and Security Systems

ASSESSMENT TITLE Assignment 1: Individual Assignment (SMS)

LECTURER NAME Yuen Meng Kee

STUDENT NAME / ID NUMBER R Thanasrubhen / S3917592

STUDENT EMAIL S3917592@student.rmit.edu.au

SUBMISSION DATE 20 February 2023

WORD COUNT 1604 words

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Table of Contents

1. Table of Abbreviations…………………………………………………..…..3

2. Abstract………………………………………………..…………………….4

3. Introduction…………………………………………………………….……5

4. Safety Management System……………………………………...………….6

5. Safety Management System Evolution……………….…….…..…………7-9

6. How Safety Management System Improves Safety Culture & Safety Gaps

Identified …………………………………………………..……….…..10-12

7. Conclusion……………………………………………………………….....13

8. References………………………………………………………………14-15

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 1. Table of Abbreviations

Abbreviation Full Term

AOI Accident Or Incident

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation

SARPs Standards And Recommended Practices

SC Safety Culture

SM Safety Management

SMS Safety Management System

SSOS State Safety Oversight System

SP Safety Promotion

SPAO Safety Policies And Objectives

SRA Safety Risk Assurance

SRAH Safety Risk And Hazard

SRM Safety Risk Management

SSP State Safety Programme

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 2. Abstract

SMS is a business-based proactive and ongoing approach that addresses identifying SRAHs,

introducing and continuing to use mitigation steps and analysing the data collected to evaluate

the effectiveness of the solution. SMS has evolved and will continue to evolve as the aviation

industry transitions from a technical era in which the emphasis was on safety improvements after

AOIs investigations to a holistic approach that includes human and organisational factors.

According to the case study, management was dismissive of multiple SRAHs raised by their

employees because it was profit-driven, which resulted in costly consequences. Thus, having a

positive SC in an organisation where management leads and is accountable for having safety

policies and practises that employees embrace and adhere to positively while being open and

able to confidentially report on new SRAHs or risks is critical.

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 3. Introduction

Since the 1900s, SM has been constantly evolving. SM was parked within each Annex, but in

2013, the importance of it becoming a designated Annex (Annex 19) was decided at ICAO’s

2010 High-Level Safety Conference (ICAO 2017). It encompasses SMS, SSP framework, SSOS,

and data collection, analysis and exchange, aiming at proactively addressing SRAHs, stressing

the notion of holistic safety performance, managing and supporting strategic regulatory and

infrastructure developments and reiterating a state’s role in managing state-level safety with

service providers (SKYbrary 2022). An organisation should embrace SMS's four pillars through

SP to foster a positive SC, SPAO, SRM and SRA.

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 4. Safety Management System

SMS is a proactive, methodical and continuous business approach used throughout an

organisation to identify and assess safety issues and manage and mitigate potential SRAHs,

through data collection and analysis and using of accountabilities and policies. This enables an

aviation organisation to identify, prioritise and control SRAHs by efficiently managing its

resources before any AOIs are caused to individuals or infrastructure.

Moreover, SMS has four pillars: SPAO, SRM, SRA and SP, under ICAO’s Document 9859, a

guided SM manual for all members to develop and implement an obligated SSP and SSOS in

compliance with SARPs (ICAO 2017). All aviation organisations ranging from air traffic service

providers to maintenance organisations would require an organisation-wide implemented SMS

(McKechnie Aviation 2022).

SPAO establishes management's commitment to continuously improve safety and defines

strategies and processes to accomplish organisational safety objectives. SRM assesses the

ongoing effectiveness of risk-control techniques that have been applied. SRA enables continuous

hazard detection, leading to a risk assessment process to develop appropriate control strategies.

SP entails training, communication and other steps to build an organisational-level SC

(SKYbrary 2022).

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 5. Safety Management System Evolution

The 1900s–1960s was the technical era, where emphasis on safety improvements was placed on

technical factor investigations, which took a significant amount of time. During the 1950s, the

number and frequency of AOIs decreased gradually, owing largely to aircraft technological

advancements. Regulatory compliance and control were also added to safety processes. (ICAO

2017)

The 1970s to the mid-1990s was the human factors era, where aviation AOIs significantly

decreased in frequency due to enormous safety regulations in the early 1970s made to

technological advancements and changes. Berling T. (2021) mentioned that aviation became the

safest transportation means, but AOIs occurrence continued, leading to more emphasis on safety

efforts and information, which were broadened to include human factor issues such as the

man/machine interface. However, did not fully address the issue, as these human factors were

intended to concentrate on the individual without accounting for operational and organisational

settings. This gave rise to the SHELL model, which was created by Elwyn Edwards. The model

enabled a better understanding of the connection between the aviation environment and human

factors, which included elements such as software (procedures and policies), hardware

(equipment and aircraft), environment (physical and organisational) and liveware (individuals

and teams). It was not until the early 1990s that it was recognised that individuals operate in a

complex environment with various elements that have the capacity to influence behaviour in

certain instances, expanding the SHELL model to include a liveware-culture relationship as

shown in Diagram 1. (ICAO 2017)

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 Diagram 1: ICAO SHELL Model

Source: ICAO Document 9859, Safety Management Manual (4 th edition, 2017)

The organisational era was born thereafter and lasted till the 2000s, where safety began to be

considered from a systemic standpoint, which included human and technical factors alongside

organisational factors, resulting in accounted organisational culture and policies when evaluating

the SRM's effectiveness. Traditional data collection and analysis methods, where data were only

collected during investigations of AOIs, were replaced with proactive ones to allow monitoring

and detection of known and emerging SRAHs and efficiently react to them. These improvements

and progress propelled the aviation industry towards an SM approach, which resulted in

Document 9859 being introduced. (ICAO 2017)

As the industry grew rapidly, it became critical to have a holistic system approach in SMS,

which gave rise to the total aviation system approach era, which began in the 2000s and will span

into the future. With the global implementation of SMSs and SSPs by many state members, most

SMSs focus on an individual's safety performance and what they can control as an organisation,

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but not the entire industrial system. Thus, there was a need to have a total aviation system

approach, to consider various stakeholders playing a role in aviation safety and to share SMS

resources collaboratively among all parties, including states and service providers, to better

understand and manage safety issues effectively to improve safety performance. States are also

starting to recognise the total aviation system and how they can develop their SSPs and manage

SRMs that cut across different service providers (ICAO 2017).

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 6. How SMS Improves Safety Culture & Safety Gaps Identified

One of the four key pillars of SMS is SC, which includes SP as a key component. While it is

impalpable, it is highly important because it influences how the organisation sees the significance of

safety. A good SC is always looking for ways to improve and employs tools and procedures to monitor

and control SRAHs (FAA 2022).

Safety performance may be continuously improved when the whole organisation advocates and

prioritises safe practices, alongside aligning them at a managerial or national level under the SPAO

and SRA pillars, as various locations have varied views, priorities and expectations of safety.

SC may be positive, negative, or indifferent and it varies depending on how it is viewed, appreciated,

and prioritised within a company. A generative corporation has a strong SC. There are also

pathological (conflicted) organisations and bureaucratic (many red tapes) businesses, both of which

reduce the efficacy of safety. When both employees and management are committed to personal

safety, a positive SC occurs. Workers' faith in the safety system and the availability of a well-defined

set of rules and procedures that ensure the system's integrity, will result in a positive SC (FAA 2022).

The case study emphasises the necessity for an organisation's management to foster a SC. Many

safety-related activities and policies will be declined without the management team's backing

since many safety-related processes increase operating expenditures or affect business time.

However, it would raise SRAHs and cost the company dearly in both direct and indirect costs if

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any AOIs occurred, as seen in the case study's two examples. It would be advantageous for the

organisation to implement gap analysis to detect present safety gaps and avoid safety failures

based on self-auditing against a set of best practices to avoid more indirect and direct costs from

AOIs, which may possibly cause the business to cease operations indefinitely and be liquidated

(ASMSP 2019).

Furthermore, management showed little regard for the pilot staff, who wanted to improve

processes for safety and the overloading of flying jobs, affecting the health and performance of

pilots. Another would be the dismissal of the change request in the current hotels' rest-catered

environments in favour of more conducive ones for pilots to rest well when they take on

outstation flights with rest catered for. Also, the management was too focused on profits and

laughed off the logistic staff’s concern about the poor crate packaging for cargo transported and

how it has affected their pilots' workload, along with the unrepaired trolley brakes. Thus, a good

SC is primarily dependent on trust and respect between workers and management, it must be

built and supported at the top management level. Employees must trust that there will be no

negative consequences for reporting safety deficiencies and that any measures taken in the

interest of SRAHs will be supported and addressed. The organisation should also have a zero-

tolerance policy for wilful violations of safety rules.

Both hazard and voluntary anonymous reporting systems should be present and function with

suitable non-disciplinary regulations. Staff can be educated on the improvements made thanks to

an identity-tagged system. Conversely, though an anonymous system encourages staff to actively

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report SRAHs, it blocks the follow-up process. Easy access to safety reporting systems while

maintaining confidentiality will increase active safety data collection and contribute to proactive

data response by management (FAA 2022).

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 7. Conclusion

SM is never stagnant, it will continuously evolve and enhance over time due to the findings of

new SRAHs that need to be addressed from daily operations and AOIs.

In any organisation, the management-level team should be responsible for ensuring SPAO and

practices are adhered to. However, the responsibility also lies with the staff to embrace and have

a positive mindset for safety, as each member of the organisation has an essential role in

ensuring a healthy and effective SC. Thus, an SMS will ensure safety is well managed and a safe

working environment is present within all aviation organisations, allowing the industry to grow

safely together.

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 8. References

Aviation Safety Management Software Pro (ASMSP) (2019) What is a Gap Analysis in Aviation

SMS?, ASMSP website, accessed 18 February 2023.

https://www.asms-pro.com/modules/safetyassurance/gapanalysis.aspx

Burling T (2021), 'Aviation Safety Management Theory: Three core models and the potential

risk of evolution and change on aviation operations', Research Gate website, accessed 19

February 2021.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351689314_Aviation_Safety_Management_Theory_Th

ree_core_models_and_the_potential_risk_of_evolution_and_change_on_aviation_operations#pf

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (2022), Safety Management System, FAA website,

accessed 18 February 2023. https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms/explained/components

%3e

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) (2017) Safety Management Manual (SMM),

ICAO website, accessed 18 February 2023.

https://www.icao.int/safety/SafetyManagement/Pages/Access%20to%20ICAO%20%20Annexes

%20and%20Guidance%20Material.aspx

McKechnie Aviation (2022), SMS: Safety Management System, McKechnie Aviation website,

accessed 19 February 2023. https://mckechnie-aviation.com/information-for-aircraft-operators/

sms-safety-management-systems

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SKYbrary (2022), ICAO Annex 19, Safety Management, SKYbrary website, accessed 19

February 2023. https://www.skybrary.aero/articles/icao-annex-19-safety-management

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