566 [Jury 15, 1939] ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTS ANNOTATED [Vol. 3 HARTOG »v. COLIN & SHIELDS. [Kine’s Bencn Drviston (Singleton, J.), June 27, 1939.] Mistake—Price of subject-matter of transaction—Goods offered at certain prices per pound instead of per piece—Offerce’s knowledge of mistake—Whether acceptance of such offer a binding contract. The defendants contracted to sell to the plaintifi 30,000 Argentine hare skins, but by an alleged mistake they offered the goods at certain prices per pound instead of at those prices per piece, the value of a piece being approximately one-third that of a pound. In verbal and written negotiations which took place prior to the sale, reference had always been made to the price per piece and never to the price per pound, and expert evidence was given that Argentine hare skins were generally sold at prices per piece :— Herp: the plaintiff could not reasonably have supposed that the offer expressed the real intention of the persons making it, and must have known it to have been made by mistake. The plaintifi did not, by his acceptance of the offer, make a binding contract with the defendants [EDITORIAL NOTE. An intending purchaser is not permitted to “snap up” an offer which he knows to have been made under a mistake. There have been decisions on this matter as a point in the law of contract, but there is no previously reported decision of a case of this kind where tho contract was ono for tho sale of goods. As 70 Misraxe in Paice Orrrnep, see HALSBURY, Hailsham Edn., Vol. 23, p. 138, para, 195; and ror Cases, see DIGEST, Vol. 35, pp. 108, 109, Nos. 132- 140.) Cases referred to : (1) Tamplin w. James (1880), 15 Ch.D. 215; 35 Digest 101, 84; 43 L.T. 520. (2) Webster v. Cecit (1861), 30 Beav. 62; 35 Digest 108, 133. (3) Paget v. Marshall (1884), 28 Ch.D. 255; 35 Digest 128, 291; 54 L.J.Ch. 575; 51 LT. 351. (4) Harris v. Pepperell (1867), L.R. 5 Eq. 1; 35 Digest 111, 164; 17 L.-T. 191. (5) Wood v. Scarth (1855), 2K. & J. 33; 35 Digest 140, 385; 26 L.T.0.8. 87. (8) Islington Union v. Brentnall & Cleland (1907), 71 J.P. 407; 35 Digost 108, 137. (7) Smith v. Hughes (1871), LR. 6 QB. 697; 35 Digest 107, 125; 40 L.J.Q.B. 221; 25 L.T. 329. Acrion for damages for breach of a contract of sale of goods. ‘The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had agreed to sell him 30,000 Argentine hare skins and had failed to deliver them. He claimed loss of profit, or, in the alternative, the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time of the breach. The defendants pleaded that their offer was by mistake wrongly expressed. They alleged that they had intended to offer the goods sold at certain prices per piece, and not at those prices per pound, as their offer was expressed. They further alleged that the plaintiff was well aware of this mistake on their part, and fraudulently accepted an offer which he well knew that the defendants had never intended to make. In the circumstances, the defendants denied that any binding contract was entered into, and, if there was, counterclaimed for its rescission. E. Holroyd Pearce and H. J. Phillimore for the plaintiff.K.B.D.) HARTOG »v. COLIN & SHIELDS 567 H. C. Marks for the defendants. [Counsel referred to Tamplin v. James (1), Webster v. Cecil (2), Paget v. Marshall (3), Harris v. Pepperell (4), Wood v. Scarth (5), Istington Union v. Brentnall & Cleland (6), Smith v. Hughes (7), Harssury’s Laws or ENGLAND, Hailsham Edn., Vol. 23, p. 23, p. 138, para, 195, and Portock on Conrracrs, 10th Edn., p. 485.) Sincxeto, J.: In this case, the plaintiff, a Belgian subject, claims damages against the defendants because he says they broke a contract into which they entered with him for the sale of Argentine hare skins. ‘The defendants’ answer to that claim is : “There really was no contract, because you knew that the document which went forward to you, in the form of an offer, contained a material mistake. You realised that, and you sought to take advantage of: it.” Counsel for the defendants took upon himself the onus of satisfying me that the plaintiff knew that there was a mistake and sought to take advantage of that mistake. In other words, realising that there was a mistake, the plaintiff did that which Jamus, LJ., in Tamplin v. James (1), at p. 221, described as “snapping up the offer.” It is important, I think, to realise that in the verbal negotiations which took place in this country, and in all the discussions there had ever been, the prices of Argentine hare skins had been discussed per piece, and later, when correspondence took place, the matter was always discussed at the price per piece, and never at a price per pound. Those witnesses who were called on behalf of the plaintiff have had comparatively little experience of dealing in Argentine hare skins. Even the expert witness who was called had had very little. One witness, Mr. Caytan, I think, had had no dealings in them for some years, though before that he had had some, no doubt. On the whole, I think that the evidence of Mr. Wiloox, on behalf of the defendants, is the more likely to be right—namely, that the way in which Argentine hare skins aro bought and sold is generally per piece. ‘That is shown by the discussions which took place between the parties in this country, and by the corre- spondence. Then on Nov. 23 came the offer upon which the plaintiff relies. It was an offer of 10,000 Argentine hares, winters (100 skins equalling 16 kilos.), at 103d. per Ib. ; 10,000 half hares at 63d. per Ib. ; 10,000 summer hares at 5d. per Ib. Those prices correspond, roughly, in the case of the winter hares, to 3}d. per piece, half hares 2d. per piece, and summer hares 1Jd. per piece. The last offer prior to this, in which prices were mentioned, was on Nov. 3 from the defendants, and the price then quoted for winter hares was 103d. per piece. Even allowing that the market was bound to fall a little, I find it difficult to believe that any- one could receive an offer for a large quantity of Argentine hares at a price so low as 33d. per piece without having the gravest doubts of it. I mention merely the price of the winter hares, because Mr. Wilcox told me, and I accept his evidence, that at some time the price of568 [Jury 15, 1939] ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTS ANNOTATED [Vol. 3 Argentine winter hares fell to 9d. I am satisfied, however, from the evi- dence given to me, that the plaintiff must have realised, and did in fact know, that a mistake had occurred. What did he do? Mr. Hartog put it forward as being a bona fide act on his part that he at once went to Mr. Caytan and entered into a contract with him. Tam not sure that it points to a bona fide act at all. Mr. Caytan, who was called before me, A apparently entered into an arrangement with him on that same day, Nov. 23, to buy Argentine winter hares at 113d. per Ib., so that the price, if there had been a contract at 10}d. per Ib., has risen on the sale of the goods to Mr. Caytan to 113d. per lb, ‘That is 14d. up, which is a considerable increase, and much greater than that which he had been B offering to pay in the letters which passed earlier. It is a much greater increase. I cannot help thinking that, when this quotation in pence per pound reached Mr. Hartog, the plaintiff, he must have realised, and that Mr. Caytan, too, must have realised, that there was a mistake. Other- O wise I cannot understand the quotation. ‘There was an absolute difference from anything which had gone before—a difference in the manner of quotation, in that the skins are offered per pound instead of per piece. I am satisfied that it was a mistake on the part of the defendants or their servants which caused the offer to go forward in that D way, and I am satisfied that anyone with any knowledge of the trade must have realised that there was a mistake. I find it difficult to under- stand why, when Mr. Caytan bought in this way at 11d, per Ib., he could not tell me what the total purchase price was, and I cannot help thinking that there was an arrangement of some sort, amounting rather to a division of the spoil. That is the view I formed, having heard the witnesses. I do not form it lightly. I have seen the witnesses and heard them, and in this case can form no other view than that there was an accident. The offer was wrongly expressed, and the defendants by their evidence, and by the correspondence, have satisfied me that the F plaintiff could not reasonably have supposed that that offer contained the offerers’ real intention. Indeed, I am satisfied to the contrary. ‘That means that there must be judgment for the defendants. Solicitors: J. H. Fellowes (for the plaintiff); Wild, Collins 4 Crosse (for the defendants). [Reported by W. J. AtpERman, Esg., Barrister-at-Law.]