ARAGHI - 1995 - Global Depeasantization 1945 - 1990

Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990
Author(s): Farshad A. Araghi

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring, 1995), pp. 337-368
Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of the Midwest Sociological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4120791 .
Accessed: 20/10/2012 08:08
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Wiley-Blackwell and Midwest Sociological Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to The Sociological Quarterly.
http://www.jstor.org
Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990
FarshadA. Araghi
FloridaAtlanticUniversity
connect."
"Only
- E. M. Forster
INTRODUCTION
In his introductionto Peasants and Peasant Societies, TeodorShanin(1987, p. 8) warnsus
that "any images of peasanthouseholdor a peasantcommunitywith no 'external'ties are
conceptualconstructs,exceptions,miscomprehensions or caricatures.... The massive exten-
sion in intensityof those ties duringthe last decademadethem more centralthanever to any
effort at the understandingof the peasantry."Despite this caveat, most studies ordinarily
allow the geographyof analysis (i.e., the broadersocial context)to be specifiedby a given
geographyof observation(i.e., the locationof particularpeasantries).The microlevelstudies
that focus on the peasantryof a countrywithoutattemptingto conceptualizethe global con-
nection numberin the thousands. Even Shanin'stwo collections of essays ([1971] 1987,
1990) containonly a few studiesthatseekto understandlocal socialphenomenaas simultane-
ously global processes. Justas peasantshave playedtheirpartin the process of nation-state
building in this century(e.g., in Mexico [1910], Russia [1905-1917], China [1921-1949],
Vietnam[1945-1975], Algeria [1954], and Cuba[1958]) so nation-centeredanalysesprevail
in peasantstudies.' Althougha numberof authors(Vandergeest1989; Alavi 1987 p. 189;
Saul and Woods 1987 p. 81; Foweraker1978 p. 139) have notedthe relevanceof the global
context,this is barelyexploredin theiranalyses.2 Surveyingstudieson the transformation of
the Europeanpeasantriesbetween 1500 and 1900, BryanRoberts(1990 p. 365) suggeststhat
"similarwork needs to be done on contemporarytrendsin developingcountries."
As importantas it is to recognizethe global dimensionof the local social processesof our
time, my aim is not to substituteabstractglobalismfor localism. As EduardoArchettiand
Svein Aass (1987, p. 125) have suggested,the analysisadvancedin this articleis informedby
a world-historicalview that seeks to conceptualize social phenomena as local-global
processes within a specifiedhistoricalcontext(McMichael1990; Tomich 1990; McMichael
and Buttel 1990). In this perspective,local and global processes (re)constituteeach other
throughpolitical mediationof the state (e.g., Llambi 1990; Friedmann1993; Buttel 1989).
ElsewhereI arguethat consideringthe role of ideology as a constitutivesocial force would
Please directall correspondence

to FarshadAraghi,Sociology,Divisionof Social Sciences,FloridaAtlanticUniversity,2912 College
Ave. Davie, Fl 33314.e mail:araghi@acc.fau.edu
The SociologicalQuarterly,Volume 36, Number 2, pages 337-368.

Copyright ? 1995 by The Midwest SociologicalSociety.
All rights of reproductionin any form requested.
ISSN: 0038-0253.
338 THESOCIOLOGICAL Vol. 36/No. 2/1995
QUARTERLY
advancesuch a perspective(Araghi 1991). To use AnthonyGiddens'sterminology(1984),

the world-historicalapproachis concernedwith the analysis of structurationof macro and
micro social processes. Thus, by conceivingof the world economyas a social and political
process,the world-historicalapproacheschewsthe maindangerin globalisttheorizing,that is
the problemof reification. By rejectingteleology, the world-historicalapproachprovidesa
nonfunctionalistframeworkfor analysisof social change.By avoidingessentialism,this ap-
proach allows for a nondeterministinterpretation of social phenomenaas historicallycon-
structedprocesses.
Workingwithin such a framework,my aim in this articleis to analyzewhat I call "global
depeasantization,"a conceptabstractedfrom the social historyof our time. It expressesthe
experience of the Third World peasantriesbetween 1945 and 1990, when an increasing
numberof people who were involved in agriculturewith directaccess to the productionof
theirmeans of subsistencebecamerapidlyand massivelyconcentratedin urbanlocations. In
1950, only 29 percentof the total worldpopulation,and 16 percentof the ThirdWorldpopu-
lation lived in urbanareas. By the year 2000 nearly half of the world populationand 41
percent of the Thirdworld populationwill live in urbanareas. In Latin America and the
Middle East approximately70 percent of the populationis alreadyurbanized(UN 1988;
1990). As EricHobsbawm(1992, p. 56) asserts,this period"sawthe most spectacular,rapid,
far-reaching,profound,and worldwidesocial change in global history... [This] is the first
periodin which the peasantrybecamea minority,not merelyin industriallydevelopedcoun-
tries, in severalof which it hadremainedvery strong,but even in the ThirdWorldcountries."
Spatially,as I will argue,globaldepeasantizationis expressedin deruralization(depopulation
and decline of the ruralareasof the world) and overurbanization (massive concentrationof
peoples and activitiesin growingurbancentersof the world),bothof which arein turnreflec-
tive of a patternof differentiationof geographicalspace particularto the post-WorldWar II
developmentof worldcapitalism.Figure1 capturesthe globaldimensionof deruralization in
this period.
Beforedevelopingmy argument,however,I wish to criticallyexaminethe debateon the so-
called "peasantquestion."This is a century-olddebateconcerningthe "future"of the peas-
antryundercapitalism. Originatingin late nineteenth-century Europe,the debatehas since
continuedundervastly differentworld-historicalcontexts. A criticalreview of this debate
will, I hope, clarifythe methodologyas well as the substantiveanalysisof this article.
QUESTIONING THE "PEASANTQUESTION":REVIEWOF A DEBATE
The main protagonistsin this debateare, on the one hand,those who have arguedthat the
inevitableexpansionof capitalism will lead to the disappearanceof the peasantryfrom the
countryside.Thus, sooneror later,rapidlyor slowly, directlyor indirectly,peasantswill be
transformedinto wageworkersand capitalistfarmersin the countryside.This is the so-called
disappearancethesis. On the other hand, the advocates of the "permanencethesis"
(campesinistasin the LatinAmericandebate)have arguedthatpeasantsocieties, for various
reasons,do not abideby the "laws"of industrialcapitalismandthat,on the contrary,peasant
economieshave a developmentallogic of theirown thatresultsin the survivalof the peasantry
and its conditionsof reproductionin the countryside.I will commentmore specificallyon
each of these theoreticalorientations.
Global Depeasantization 339
100
90
80 China
70 Africa
1:460 SoutheastAsia(ex uorld
50tnorea &e Japan)
ti
20
0
10
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

YEAR
Figure 1 * TimePath and PercentageRuralin DifferentPartsof the World,1950-2000
Modernityand the "DisappearanceThesis"
First, let us considermodernityand the "disappearance thesis." As the worldviewof the

age of industrialism, nineteenth-century developmentalism drew a sharpdistinctionbetween
traditionalandmodernsocieties. Traditionalsocietieswere Ideal-typicallydesignatedas sim-
ple, undifferentiated,and rural(gemeinschaft),while modem societies were designatedas
differentiated,complex,industrial,andurban(gesellschaft).3Moreimportantly,progression-
ist rationality,in rejectingits own pastpositeda historicalmovementawayfromgemeinschaft
to gesellschaft-from undifferentiated wholestowardscomplexandheterogeneousones. Tel-
eology, therefore,becamean integralcomponentof modemtheoriesof social change.4 Such
was the hegemonyof developmentalist/teleological thinkingin nineteenth-centuryEuropethat
in the end even Marxism,which was in parta critiqueof modernity,couldnot resist adopting
its language(e.g., Marx[1859] 1971;Engels [1884] 1972)- although,as the growinglitera-
ture shows (Sayer 1887; Shanin 1984), Marxwas certainlyboth grapplingwith problemsof
evolutionismandconcernedwith developingan open-endedhistoricalsociology. In the main,
however, Karl Marx and FriedrichEngels ([1848] 1975, p.38) explicitly equatepeoples of
non-Westernoriginswith "nationsof peasants"and those nationswith "barbarian and semi-
barbariancountries,"which "civilization"was of necessity subordinatingto itself. In the in-
dustrializingwest, too, the peasantry,as Marxremarked,was "theclass which,withinciviliza-
tion, represent[ed]barbarism" (Marx[1850] 1924,p.91). As such,peasantsdid not andcould
not make history;in their capacityto bringthe past into the future,as Marx set himself to
show in TheEighteenthBrumaireof LouisBonaparte,they temporarilyinterruptedthe course
QUARTERLY
of history. Incapableof even representingitself (Marx [1852] 1972, p. 106), the peasantry
was a class with no future. This line of thinkingwas not peculiarto Marxism:Emile Durk-
heim, in his analysisof the division of labor,and Max Weber,in his analysis of increasing
economizationand rationalizationof social life, generallyrelegatedthe primitive/traditional/
ruralphenomenato a peripheraland moribundstatus.
The cultureof modernity,therefore,providedthe intellectualcontext in which Marxism
originallyposed the disappearancethesis-a thesis that arguedfor the necessarydissolution
of the peasantryas a logical consequenceof the advancingprocessof class differentiationin
the ruralareasof (European)nations. The smallpeasant,in Engels's words,"likeevery other
survivalof the past mode of production,is hopelessly doomed. He is a futureproletarian"
([1894] 1977, p. 460). Thus,withinthe discourseof progressionistMarxism,"differentiation
was destiny."If therewas a question,it was not aboutthe inevitabilityandthe logical neces-
sity of peasantdifferentiation,it was aboutits timing: will the peasantsdisappearbefore the
impendingsocialist revolutionsin Europe? The answer,of course,was in the negative, be-
cause, by the end of the nineteenthcentury,it was apparentthat even in Europecapitalism's
modernizing/rationalizing/civilizing mission was far from its "conclusion." The question,
then, was what shouldthe socialist partiesdo aboutthe peasantryin the upcomingpolitical
conflicts. Posed by Engels in ThePeasant Questionin France and Germany([1894] 1977)
this issue came to be knownas the "peasantquestion"(laterthe "agrarianquestion"). At the
heartof this problematicwas (1) a teleologicalassumptionaboutthe transientcharacterof the
peasantpopulationand (2), at that historicalconjuncture,a political and pragmaticconcern
with the fact thatthe peasantrieswere still "a very essentialfactorof the population,produc-
tion and politicalpower"(Engels [1894] 1977, p. 457).
Teleology,togetherwith the emergingpoliticalinterestin defining(a segmentof) the peas-
antryas agentsof revolutionarychange,renderedan intellectualatmospherein which the two
most influentialanalyses, V. I. Lenin's The Developmentof CapitalismIn Russia ([1899]
1960]), and Karl Kautsky'sThe AgrarianQuestion([1899] 1988) were carriedout. Both
publishedin 1899, these works furtherexplicatedthe "peasantquestion"(and in turn influ-
enced the developmentof laterdebateand analysis). While Kautsky,who relied upon data
from Germany,France,Britain,and the United States, aimed at refiningthe originaldisap-
pearancethesis by recastingit as a tendencysubjectto countervailinginfluences(Kautsky
[1899] 1988, p. 449), Lenin's intent was to show that capitalism,contraryto what the
Narodnickideology declared,was in fact developingin the Russiancountrysideand that the
Russianpeasantrywas a differentiatedand differentiatingentity. Thus, "the old peasantry
[was] not only 'differentiating,'it [was]being completelydissolved,it [was] ceasingto exist,
it [was] being oustedby absolutelynew types of ruralinhabitants... a class of commodity
producersin agricultureanda class of agricultural wage-workers" (Lenin[1899] 1960, p.174).
Based on this analysis,Leninlinkedthe proletarianization of the peasantryto the growthof a
home marketand,later,forcefullyarguedfor a reconceptualization of the role of the peasantry
in the makingof history.5 I will returnto this point later.
Withthe rise of ThirdWorlddevelopmentalism in the post-WorldWarII period,therewas
a renewedinterestin extendingthe latenineteenth-century debateon the "peasantquestion"to
the ThirdWorld. While muchless concernedwith the politics of the "peasantquestion,"the
proponentsof the disappearance thesis in the ThirdWorldhaveretainedbothits teleology and
the nation-stateorientation(see, for example,on Bangladesh,Rahman1986;on India,Patnaik
1987; 1990; on Uganda,Mamdani1987; on Egypt,Richards1982; on Turkey,Seddon and
Margulies1984). The progressionistframeof referenceand the presumptionof an end-state

can be seen, for example,in the work of T. J. Byress (1986, p. ix) who notes that "a central
distinguishingcharacteristicof economicbackwardnessis an unresolvedagrarianquestion."
Such backwardnessexists when capitalismhas not "yet rooted out and destroyed.. . non-
capitalist [agrarian]relations"(Byress 1991, p. 7). The matterof peasant differentiation,
Byress (1986, p. x) points out, is centralto understandingthe natureof the agrarianquestion
in backwardcountries. Put simply, progressfrom backwardnessto civilizationinvolves the
"resolution"of the "peasantquestion."In the contextof the ThirdWorldwherepeasantshave
been numerous,the disappearancethesis has been qualified.The fundamentalassumptions
underlyingthis perspective,however,have not changed.6Thereare threeimportantvariants
of the originalthesis.
To providesome flexibilityto deterministicformulations,one variantof the disappearance
thesis allows for "historicalvariation."The structureof the argument,however,remainstele-
ological, becausethe end-statetowardwhich social changeprocessesare alleged to be work-
ing or evolving is presumed(or deducedfromthe analysisof a prior"completed"case). The
end point is fixed, thoughthe roads or paths to thatpoint are historicallyvariable. Byress's
recent contributionis a splendid example of such an attempt,for his work implies that
althoughpeasantdifferentiationis inevitable,it follows a greatvarietyof historicallynegoti-
atedpaths. One value of such an exercise,as Byress (1991, p.60) maintains,is "to emphasize
the dangersof a narrowlydogmaticview which assumes that only a single transition(or
maybe one or two forms of transition)is possible." Certainly, a "manypaths"model is
"better"than the "one path"or "two paths"models. In fact, given the wealth of current
historiographic research,argumentssupportingthe one or two pathsmodelsarehardlytenable
anymore. The centralproblemwith this versionof the disappearance thesis, then, is precisely
its neo-evolutionistnotion of "destinedpathways."
A second variantof the differentiationthesis agreesthatpeasantshave not disappearedas
(fast as) they should have but accountsfor this by referringto the positive consequencesof a
peasanteconomyfor capitalaccumulation.If the "traditional" sectorsurvives,it is becauseit
servesthe needs of the "modem"sector. It is thereforeto the advantageof the modem sector
to maintainor preservethe traditionalsectorin orderto provideitself with cheap suppliesof
labor on a continuingbasis. Kautsky'swork ([1899] 1988) representsan early attemptto
qualify the disappearancethesis in this way. One element of his more complex argument
maintainedthatthe preservationof the peasantsectorwasfunctionalto the "needs"of capital-
ist reproduction([1899] 1988). Otherauthorshave since developedargumentsthatemphasize
the functionalityof the peasantsectoras the reproducerof cheaplaborfor the urbansectoror
the adjoiningcapitalistenterprises(Rey 1975;Meillassoux1981;Arrighi1973;Wolpe 1972).
Alain de Janvry(1981) most elegantlystatesthis pointof view when he arguesthatthe exist-
ence of "sectoraldisarticulation" and"functionaldualism"in ThirdWorldeconomiesexplain
the "systemiclogic" of peasantpersistence. Functionaldualismis contradictory,and it will
eventuallybecome dysfunctionalas nationaleconomiesbecome articulated(de Janvry1981,
p. 32-45); full proletarianizationof the peasantrywill ensue.De Janvrynotes that"thereis no
theoreticalpossibility peasantsto remainin their contradictoryclass position. However
for
lengthyand painfulthe processmay be, theirfutureis full incorporationinto one or the other
of the two essentialclasses of capitalism."Functionalism,as we know, is a formof teleology
that, by invoking post hoc reasoning,explains the existence of social phenomenaby their
consequencesor effects (Ryan1970). Besides,as the earlycriticsof de Janvryhavenoted,the
QUARTERLY
extendedreproductionof capitalismdoes not dependon a generalor universalnecessity to

eithermaintainor destroyprecapitalistmodes of production(Goodmanand Redclift 1982, p.
62; Assies 1987; see also Bradly 1975).7
Accordingto a thirdversion of the disappearancethesis, those who reject the reality of
peasantdifferentiationin the ThirdWorldcountrysidesfail to distinguishbetween the "es-
sence"and the "appearance."Whathas happened,of course,is not peasantdifferentiationin
its classic formbut a form of "differentiationin disguise." Drawingon Marx'soriginaldis-
tinctionbetweenformalandreal subsumptionof laborto capital([1866] 1977, p. 934-1084),
the proponentsof this version of the disappearancethesis arguethat what appears to be an
undifferentiatedmass of peasantryis, essentiallyspeaking,a differentiatedentity. Fromthis
perspective,peasantcommodityproducersare in fact concealedwageworkers(Banaji 1977,
p.36). In JairusBanaji's(1990, p. 298) formulation,we must discernthe "social functionof
wage-laborbehindits misleadingformsof appearance."Similarly,Tom Brass(1990, p. 298)
arguesfor the existenceof a class of de factoproletarianson the LatinAmericancountrysides.
AlthoughBrasshas correctlycritiquedNola Reinhardt(1988) for her "peasantessentialism,"
he fails to see thathis own argumentis a variantof "wage-laboressentialism."8In additionto
eventualistassumptions,one importantproblemwith the thirdversion of the disappearance
thesis is its reductionism,which stems from an improperunderstandingof the relationbe-
tween theoreticalcategoriesandempiricalphenomena.The searchfor a disguisedproletariat,
in otherwords, is only mandatedby a positivistconceptionof the categoryof wage labor.
AlthoughI have discussedthese orientationsseparately,they are not mutuallyexclusive.
Elements of each may be combinedin an argument(e.g., de Janvryand Garramon1977).
Such a synthesisis possible preciselybecausethese are differingargumentswithinthe same
discourseunited by both neo-evolutionaryassumptionsand the acceptanceof the national
economy as the appropriate unit of analysis. Remarkably,as we shall see, the proponentsof
the persistencethesis-those on the oppositeside of the debate-share both the essentialism
and the nation-stateorientationof their opponents.
The RomanticReaction:The PermanenceThesis
The proponentsof the permanencethesis arguethatthe economiclaws thatgovernpeasant

societies aretheoreticallydistinctfromthosethatgoverncapitalistsocieties. Peasantsocieties
persistbecausethey operateaccordingto a logic thatenablesthemto resist the expansionary
forces of capitalism. The main point of disagreementbetweenthe proponentsof the persis-
tence and the disappearancetheses is not so much the disintegratingnatureof the forces of
capitalismas it is the inherentability of rural/peasantsocieties to resist those forces. The
intellectualorigin of this position goes back to the late nineteenth-century debatesbetween
Marxismand Russianpopulism(Walicki 1969; Shanin 1984). Inspiredby the thoughtsof
Nicolai ChemyshevskiiandAleksandrHerzen,the Russianpopulists(e.g., Nicolai Danielson)
agreedwith one side of Marx'scritiqueof capitalism,thatit was a destructive(butnot simul-
taneouslya progressive)force andthatit was neitherpossible nor desirablefor capitalismto
develop in Russia-a thesis whose refutationwas at the heart of both G. V. Plekhanov's
anticritique9in the mid-1880s and of Lenin's The Developmentof Capitalismin Russia
([1899] 1960). Thus, if the dominanceof capitalismand industrialurbanism,along with the
hegemony of the idea of progressin late nineteenth-century England,providedthe social
contextfor the rise of the disappearance thesis it was antimodernity,expressedas anti-indus-
trialismand antiurbanismin late nineteenth-century Russianpopulismthat characterizedthe

intellectualclimate of the rise of the permanencethesis.
The most originaland sophisticatedstatementof the permanencethesis came from A. V.
Chayanov. In The Theoryof Peasant Economy([1925] 1987), Chayanovformulateda spe-
cific theoryof what may be called a "peasantmode of production."Drawingon marginalist
economicsto addressthe problemsof progressionistMarxism,Chayanov'saim was to show
that Marx's listing of modes of productionin A Contributionto the Critiqueof Political
Economy([1859] 1971) could be expandedto includethe peasanteconomy. Diametrically
opposedto the prognosisof evolutionaryMarxists,which statedthatpeasantproductionwas
but a transitoryformof pettycommodityproduction,Chayanovtreatedpeasantproductionas
an economicsystemin its own right,with laws of productionandreproductionthatenabledit
to outcompeteagrariancapitalism. Chayanov'smain thesis is that in the absence of Marx's
categoryof "sociallynecessarylabortime,"the determinantsof peasantproductivebehavior
are subjective,ratherthan objective. In a peasanteconomy,therefore,a peasant'saim is not
to maximizeprofit,for he or she is not, to use Weber's term, a "rational"actor. Instead,
peasantsaim at maximizingthe satisfactionof familyneeds to the point that their subjective
distastefor manuallaboroutweighsthe possible increasein output(Chayanov[1925] 1987).
Since peasantsproducein orderto live, ratherthanto profit,they persistunderconditionsthat
capitalistswould not.
Gavin Kitching(1989, p. 46-47) classifiesChayanov'swork as "neo-populist,"describing
it as a sophisticatedattemptat restatingthe populistposition while accountingfor the new
conditionsin the Russiancountrysidein the 1920s. Shanin(1990, p. 331), on the otherhand,
rejectssuch a designationas a miscomprehension of Chayanov'swork.In general,Kitchingis
right. I shouldnote here,however,thattherearepassagesin TheTheoryof PeasantEconomy
that suggestthat Chayanovwas awareof the world-historicalspecificityof his argumentand
that he was analyzingRussia's agrarianconditionsin the context of the breakdownof the
world marketafterWorldWarI, and in the contextof the implementationof New Economic
Policies in the 1920s.10 Daniel Thorner's(1987) "PeasantEconomyas a Categoryin His-
tory,"for example,is sympatheticto such an interpretation of Chayanov. Read in this way,
Chayanov'sworkaddsto ourknowledgeof the historicalformsof small-scaleproductionand
their workings. The second interpretation, in contrast,sees in Chayanov'swork a timeless
and universalargumentfor peasantpersistence.As the title of his work suggests, Chayanov
has a strongtendencyto advancejust such a thesis. It is this readingthatis essentialist,which
promotesa sui generisconceptionof nationalpeasantries,and whose originscan be tracedto
Narodnichestov.It is also this readingthat predominatesin the work of scholarswho have
triedto explainpeasantpersistencein the ThirdWorldin the post WorldWarII era (Vergo-
poulos 1978;Taussig 1978;Reinhardt1988;Attwood1992;for views on the MiddleEast that
blend essentialistwith orientalistassumptions,see Glavanisand Glavanis 1990). As Peter
GibbonandMichaelNeocosmos(1985) argue,"1andas Luis Llambi(1988) demonstrates,an
analysisof commodityproducingpeasantriesneed not be couchedin deterministic,essential-
ist, and ahistoricalterms (Mann 1990; Mooney 1988). Such presumptionsare the central
problemwith the persistencethesis, which,in its searchfor the essentiallogic of persistence,
abstractsfrom the changingworldmarketcontexts.
In contrastto these two approaches,in this articleI proposeto analyzedepeasantization
in
its world-historicalcontext. In orderto avoid the methodologicalproblemswith both the
persistenceand disappearancetheses, I specify the process of transformationof the Third
344 THESOCIOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY-Vol.
36/No. 2/1995
World peasantriesby outliningthe postwarinternationalorder(and disorder)and locating

depeasantizationwithin that changingglobal complex. As I will argue at length, there are
two phases of depeasantization, consistentwith a particularperiodizationof the world econ-
omy: (1) 1945 to ca. 1973, the periodof the constructionof the worldmarketand the estab-
lishment and institutionalization of the new global political and economic order underthe
hegemony of the American state,and(2) ca. 1973 to the present,the periodof the collapse of
that order as reflected in the ongoing process of reorganizationof the world political and
economic institutions(Arrighi1994; Block 1977; Chase-Dunn1989; Harvey 1989). I will
discuss each phase of depeasantizationwith the aim of contextualizingit, by linking each
phasewith the majorpoliticalanddominantideologicalcurrentsandmovements(e.g., nation-
alism and internationalism, decolonizationand globalization,communismand anticommun-
ism, modernityand postmodernity,etc.) withinthe specifiedperiods.
AND DEPEASANTIZATION,
POSTWARNATIONALISM 1945-1973
On a worldwidescale the politicaland ideologicalcompetitionof two broadlydistinguished
categories of nationalisms - "socialist" or "state" nationalisms and "pro-West"or
"promarket" nationalisms(for the lack of betterterms)-mediated the processof expansionof
the world economyin the periodextendingfromthe late 1940s to the late 1980s. Therewas
competitionwithineachgroupof nation-states,but it was mainlycompetitionbetweenthe two
camps that providedthe social contextof the constructionof the world market.
The emergenceof nationalliberationmovementsopenedup a new arenafor competition
between the two camps. This competitionwas expressedpoliticallyin the cold war in the
form of rivalrybetween the United States and the Soviet Union. How could this new and
powerfulwave of nationalismsin areasas vast as Africa,Asia, andLatinAmericabe tackled?
There were three possible approaches:a reactive response, which was followed by the
Europeans,mainlyby BritainandFrance;an inactivestance,whichwas the favoredapproach
by the isolationistcurrentin the United States;and a proactiveresponse,which had already
been adoptedby the SovietUnion, andalso becamethe favoredresponseof the international-
ist currentswithinthe UnitedStates. Fromthe viewpointof the internationalists, who had by
now a political representationwithin the Americanstate12, both the reactive and inactive
approachesprovidedno solutionat all; in practicethey meanteithera returnto the recon-
structionof the old colonial blocks-an idea whose time had alreadypassed, and, in any
event, one thatwas quiteincompatiblewith the U.S. hegemonicproject--or, even worse, and
moreprobable,a rapidexpansionof "socialist"nationalismson a globalscale. Thus,boththe
Soviet and the Americanstates favoredthe proactiveapproach,the differencebeing that the
Soviet state, for historicreasons,had in its possession a clearly definedand programmatic
solutionto the problemat hand. The key to this was the linkingof the "nationaland colonial
question"with boththe "peasantquestion"andthe workers'movement. Lenin([1907] 1971c,
p 155) formulatedthis in the contextof Russianconditionswell before the Octoberrevolu-
tion:13"The agrarianquestionis the basis of the bourgeoisrevolutionin Russia and deter-
mines the specificnationalcharacterof this revolution."Reversingthe stanceof the Marxism
of the FirstInternational (in which peasantswere conceivedof as a reactionaryforce), Lenin
argued for the political importanceof bringingthe rural,urban,and nationalmovementsin
relationwith each otheras they were emergingin the earlydecadesof the twentiethcentury.14
Explainingthe need for a lastingalliancewith the peasantry,Leninurgedcarryingthe "class
struggleinto the countryside"([1901] 1971a,p. 12) throughan active supportof the peasant
movement and its demands, such as land confiscation. With the victory of the October
revolution,which was based on such principles,this formulationfound a prominentplace in
the CPSU's policy makingapparatus.
In the UnitedStates,the New Deal administration hada clearvision of the basic framework
of the postwareconomic orderas far as the interestsof Americanand Europeancapitaland
laborwere concerned,but it was less clearaboutthe place of the postcolonialstatesand their
peasantriesin this order.
The Zapatamovementand its crucialrole in the transformation of the Mexicanlandtenure
system in the aftermathof the 1910 revolutionwas noticed.15 It was not, however,until the
Chineserevolution(1948) thatHarryTrumandeclaredthe PointFourprogramin 1949,just as
the Cubanrevolutionof 1959 spurredthe adoptionof the Act of Bogota in 1960 and the
formationof the Alliance for Progressthe next year duringJohn F. Kennedy'sadministra-
tion.16 Hence,just as the powerof laborbetween 1933 and 1941 (Davis 1980) succeededin
incorporatingthe demandsof an importantsectionof the Americanworkingclass in the new
(intensive)regimeof accumulationin the formof collectivebargainingrightsandhigherwage
levels (Aglietta 1979; Braverman1975), the demandsof the Third World peasantriesand
urbannationalistshad to be acknowledged.At a time when anticolonialmovementswere
rapidlygrowingall over the underdeveloped world,"promarket" nationalismshadto be incor-
porated, for the alternative was the expansion of "socialist"nationalisms.17
This was done by acceding to nationaldevelopmentalistprogramsthat emphasizedbal-
ancedinternalgrowth. In the 1950s,these programswere developed in the UnitedNationsby
the Economic Council for Latin America under the leadershipof Raul Prebisch.'8 That
formulawas centeredon inward-orientedgrowthstrategiesthat viewed import-substitution
industrialization,as opposedto outward-oriented agriculturalproductionfor export,not only
as the key to nationaldevelopment but also as a strategythatcontainedthe economiccontent
of a programfor national independence. This was largelyan illusion,and I will laterdiscuss
depeasantization in its first phase with specific reference to the contradictionsof nationalist
developmentalism. Here we must note the social basis of these ideological illusions. First,
import-substitution industrialization was not specifically postwarinvention. Its originswent
a
back to the 1930s, when countriessuch as Argentina,19Iran,Brazil, and Chile experienced
rapidindustrialization following their abandonmentof export-ledgrowth. This happenedin
the contextof the rise of protectionismin the Northwhich in effectforced these countriesto
give up agriculturalproductionfor exportin favorof domesticindustrialization between 1930
and 1945. Whatwas laterforgottenwas that"balanced"nationaldevelopmenthad a world-
economicdimensionin thatit had occurredin connectionwith a particularphasein the devel-
opmentof the world economy(the breakdownof the worldmarket,domesticproductionand
protectionof agriculturein the core countries,rapiddecline of world prices for agricultural
commodities,disinvestmentin the South). Second, postcolonialnationalismsdrew on the
experienceof the United Statesbetweenthe 1890s and 1945 when a growingdegree of do-
mestic integrationof agricultureandindustrycharacterized U.S. economicdevelopmentin the
era of decliningBritishhegemony. This is arguedby HarrietFriedmannand Philip McMi-
chael (1989, p. 111)whopointout that"asthe hegemonicpower,Americancapitalismbecame
the model for post-wartheoriesof developmentappliedto the ThirdWorld."
For more thantwenty-fiveyears afterthe war,the Americanmodel definedthe framework
in which the official discourseon developmentwas carriedout in the United Nations and in
the U.S. publicandprivateThirdWorlddevelopmentresearchinstitutions.The ideal of redu-
QUARTERLY
plicationof the Americanexperienceguidedthe U.S. approachto ThirdWorldagriculturein

generalandthe "peasantquestion"in particular.The GreenRevolutionandlandreformwere,
respectively,interventioniststrategiesadoptedin the midstof social andpoliticalstrugglesto
realizethatideal. Both strategieswere abandonedafter 1973-1974with the fall fromgraceof
nationalistdevelopmentalism20 (Atkins 1988; Griffin1979; Cleaver 1979). I shall returnto
this point later.
How the Americanmodel guidedthe developmentof plansrespondingto peasantunrestin
Asia and Latin Americais particularlyrevealingof the ideological dimensionof develop-
mentalistthinkingin this era. The "ideal"solution,thoughnot necessarilythe practice,was
land reformAmericanstyle, that is, the creationof family-sizedfarm units (as opposed to
"
collectivization la state-socialists).This, of course,was a conceptrootedin America'sown
past and ongoing experiencewith family farming,along with a dosage of cold war anticom-
munismexpressedas concernsfor "thedignityof the individual"and the crucialimportance
of the FamilyFarmphenomenonfor the "futureof democracyin the world." Politically,the
idea was to assimilatepeasantunrestthroughstate-sponsoredagrarianreformprogramsin
orderto achieve three objectives:(1) to curbthe expansionof "state-socialist"nationalisms,
when the allianceof ruraland urbanforces had provento be a practicallyeffective way of
conductingnationalrevolutionsand capturingof the statepower;(2) to instigateagricultural
growthwith state support,which wouldthenbecomea sourceof domesticdemandfor indus-
try21(Rostow, 1963a,p. 310; 1964,p. 180; 1971);and(3) to dismantlelocal serfdoms,where
they were seen as a hindranceto the developmentof nationalmarketsand modernizationof
the state (see UN, 1951, p. 13-15).
Thus,immediatelyafterthe war,the Americanmilitarygovernmentsponsoredlandreforms
in Japan,SouthKorea,and Taiwanwherethe communist-ledand inspiredtenantunions and
peasantstruggleswere at their peak in the countryside.In all three countries,land reform
significantlyincreasedowner-occupancy andreducedtenancy(Tables 1-5). Similarlyin Ger-
many and Southern Italy, land was widely redistributedin response to peasant militancy.
SouthernItaly,the scene of land occupationand confiscationbetween 1944-1947 and 1949-
1950, passed and implementeda series of landreformlegislations. Only between 1944 and
1949, that is, before the land reformof 1950 underthe ChristianDemocrats,"by the most
conservativefigureswe have, 1187 cooperativeswith a total membershipof nearlya quarter
of a million took over more than 165,000 hectaresof land, mainly in Sicily, Calabria,and
Lazxlo" (Ginsborg 1984 p. 94). In Latin Americait took years of peasant struggles,and
large-scaleinvasionsof land,andpoliticalagitationaimedat agrarianchange,notablyin Bo-
livia, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala,and Brazil (Landsberger1969; Huizer 1972;
Stavenhagen1970;Feder1971), as well as the Cubanrevolutionandits sweepinglandreform
of 1959, before the American-supported agrarianreformistmovementsproduceda serious
program(Act of Bogota of 1960 and the Charterof Puntadel Este of 1961). Thus, between
1960 and 1964 Brazil,Chile, Colombia,CostaRica, the DominicanRepublic,Ecuador,Gua-
temala,Nicaragua,Panama,Peru,and Venezuelaall enactednew nationalland reformlaws.
The detailsof these legislationsandtheirprocessesof implementationare too extensiveto
discuss here. The outcomevariedfrom place to place, dependingon priorpoliticalhistories
and particularbalance of class forces. It is importantto note, however,that these reforms
were more real thancosmeticand in most cases, had far-reachingimplicationsfor the future
of ThirdWorldpeasantries.That they came on a "firststruggle,first served"basis reveals
theiressentiallyconservativecharacter.At the same time, whereimplemented,they did alter
Table 1 * Changesin JapaneseLand Tenureby Cultivated

Area,1945-1965
Year % OwnerFarmedLand % Tenanted
Land Total
1945 54 46 100
1965 95 5 100
Source:
Ogura,1968,p. 17.
the structureof nationalpoliticalpower and the patternof landownershipin the countryside.

As we shall see, this outcome is quite relevant for understandingthe particularitiesof
depeasantizationbetween 1945 and 1973.
Table 2 * Changesin JapaneseLand Tenureby Typeof Households,1945-1965
Year % OwnerFarmerFamilies! % TenantFarmerFamilies" Total
1945 51 49 100
1965 95 5 100
Source:
Ogura,1968,p. 17.
' Households
owningover50 percentof theirfarmedland
rentingmorethan50 percent.
b Households
Threepointsshouldbe notedhere. First,in all cases a very substantialpartof the cultivated

landswere excludedfromreformon the conditionthatthey were mechanizedor in the process
of modernization.Consistentwith import-substitution growthstrategies,industrialization of
Table 3 * Changesin TaiwaneseLand Tenureby Cultivated
Area 1948-1959
Year % OwnerFarmedLand %Other Total
1948 56 44 100
1959 86 14 100
Source:
Chen1961,p. 312.
agriculture,productionprimarilyfor domesticmarkets,and exportdiversificationin lieu of

primaryexport specialization(characteristicof the post-1930s era) were promotedthrough
state supportpolicies (Llambi1990, p. 182). Landconcentrationand industrialization
of agri-
culture,therefore,were a directoutcomeof both reformsand accompanyingstate policies.
Second,as David Lehmanhas demonstrated (1982; 1986),in some regionssuchas northern
Ecuador,ArgentinaPampas,SouthernBrazil (Katzmann1978), WesternVenezuela(Llambi
1989) and northernIndiathe reformstogetherwith both privilegedaccess to advantageous
labormarkets(Lehman1982), and statepolicies that ensuredaccess to creditand marketing
(Edelmann1980) have led to the emergenceof severaltypes of capitalaccumulatingfamily
farms (producingoverwhelminglyfor the marketand worked by owners with some hired
labor). Importantly,the emergenceof capitalizedfamily farms has been limited to a "few
places in the underdevelopedworld"(Lehman1982,p. 155), andtheirprofitableoperationhas
348 THE SOCIOLOGICALQUARTERLY
Vol. 36/No. 2/1995
Table 4 * Changesin TaiwaneseLandTenureby Typeof Households,1948-1959
% OwnerFarmer %Part Owner-Farmer % Tenant-Farmer %FarmLaborers

Year Families Families Families Families Total
1948 33 24 36 7 100
1959 59 22 14 5 100
Source:
Chen,1961,p. 312.
been heavily dependenton statesupportas well as specializationin the productionof particu-

lar crops (Llambi 1990, p. 183-4).
Third,and most significantfor our purpose,land reformscontributedto a proliferationof
small, mostly near subsistencefamily-sizedfarm units as a result of either redivision and
Table 5 * Changesin S. KoreanLand Tenureby Typeof Households,1945-1965
% OwnerFarmer %PartOwner-Farmers % Tenant-Farmer %Slash& Burn

Year Families Families Families FarmerFamilies Total
1945 14 34 49 3 100
1965 70 23 7 0 100
Source:
MorrowandSherper,1970,pp. 38-41.
redistributionof landor settlementof new agriculturalfrontiers.Althougha minoritybecame

successfulcapitalizedfamily farmers,most remainedpetty commodityproducersheavily de-
pendenton state subsidiesandpublicandprivatefinancingfor theirproduction,and, increas-
ingly, for their consumptionneeds.
At the same time, as a consequenceof deep penetrationof commodityrelationsinto the
countryside-in part promotedby reforms-small owners became increasinglyexposed to
(world) marketforces, a process that lead to the diversificationof their sources of income
(e.g., dependencepartlyon petty commodityproduction,partlyon rurallabormarkets,partly
on seasonalmigrationas well as occasionalwage laboron largeand capitalizedfarmsduring
peak periods,and, morerecently,on subcontracting income linkedto multinationalcorpora-
tions). For the
example, proliferation of small family holdingsin LatinAmericais illustrated
in Table 6. Between 1950 and 1980 the numberof family farmswith an averageof about2
hectaresincreasedby 92 percent. At the same time, the averagefarmsize declinedfrom2.4
to 2.1 hectares. The dual process of land concentrationand deconcentrationis reflectedin
Table 7. In 1980, 22 percentof large commercialfarms occupied 82 percent of the total
cultivatedarea, while small family holdings, which made up 78 percentof all farm units,
occupiedonly 18 percentof the land area.
The importantpoint is that between 1945 and 1973, notwithstandingthe emergenceof
capitalizedfamily farms, class differentiationin the countryside,in the sense used by the
advocatesof the disappearancethesis (e.g., Lenin [1899] 1960), was not the rule, precisely
becauseof the specificglobal contextin whichpromarketnationalismswere incorporatedinto
the statesystem. Before discussingthis point,however,we need to furtherspecify this global
context;this bringsus to a characterizationof the new internationaldivision of laborin food
productionthatemergedin this period. The postwarinternationalfood orderwas constructed
Table 6 * Numberand AverageSize of SmallFarmsin LatinAmerica,1950-1980
Year Numberof Farms(millions) %Increase AverageFarmSize
1950 4.1 2.4

1980 7.9 92 2.1
Source:
Adoptedfromde Janvry,Sadoulet,andYoung(1989b,p. 407) andde Janvry,Marsh,Runsten,Sadoulet,andZabin
(1989a,pp. 61-62).
underthe aegis of the Americanstatein a way thatadvancedits hegemonicpositionwithinthe

emerging-statesystem. The U.S. aim was twofold:(1) to dispose of the mountinggrainsur-
pluses at home and (2) to makethe best use of food aid as politicalleveragein the processof
constructingthe world market(Friedmann1982; 1993).
Table 7 * Patternof LandOwnershipin LatinAmerica,1980
Category %of TotalFarmUnits %of TotalCultivated

Area
Large commercial agriculture 22 82

Small-family holdings 78 18
Source:
Fromdatain de Janvryet al, 1989a.
By 1945, the pressurefor grain exporthad found a new political dimensionin that the
coalition that had broughtthe New Deal administrationto power includedthe interestsof
Americanfarmerswho successfullylobbiedfor stateand exportsubsidies(Friedmann1982).
Particularlyin the context of rising Europeanprotectionismand cold war traderestrictions
after the KoreanWar, food aid sent to the underdevelopedworld with the aim of opening
marketsfor U.S. grain surplusesfound a prominentplace in Americanglobal agricultural
policies (Cleaver 1977; Friedmann1982; Tubiana1989; Nau 1978).
At the same time, food aid facilitatedboththe projectof incorporating promarketnational-
isms and the extensionof the nation-statesystemto the formercolonies (Friedmannand Mc-
Michael 1989). For theirpart,promarketnationalisms,in their quest for achievingnational
independence-a goal that saw industrialization as its key ingredient-welcomed the emerg-
ing new world food order. Fromthe standpointof the ThirdWorldstates,it made economic
sense to acceptU.S. graineitherwhen it came in the formof food aid or as concessionalsales
at negotiatedprices well below the nationalor world marketprices undersuch termsas "40
years' creditat 1.3 percentinterest"(Tubiana1989, p. 27). By 1965 morethan80 percentof
U.S. wheatexportswere financedby food aid. Even when it didnot come as aid, the oversup-
ply of subsidizedU.S. graindepressedworldprices(Friedmann1982, p. 266). Between 1951
and 1972 low and stablepricesof grainon the worldmarketnot only discouragedits produc-
tion in the formerlyself-sufficientor surplus-producing regionsof the underdevelopedworld,
but also encouragedthe growthof new demand. By 1970 the U.S. shareof world exportin
wheat, maize, and soybeanshad increasedto 35 percent,50 percent,and 90 percentrespec-
tively (Tubiana1989, p. 25).
The end result was, first, the internationalizationof the Americandiet (Morgan1977, p.
120-129) as reflectedin the progressivereplacementof wheat for rice and corn in Asia and
QUARTERLY
Latin America(Friedmann1982, p. 254), wheat or rice for maize in CentralAmerica and

Egypt, and wheat or rice for millet or sorghumin West Africa (Tubiana1989, p. 27).
Second, and correlatively,wheatproductiondeclinedin Africa,the MiddleEast, Asia, and
LatinAmerica,and in less thantwenty-fiveyears,Asia and LatinAmerica,which had been
once surplus-producing regions,becamedeficitregions(Friedmann1982, p. 264-265). In the
underdevelopedworldas a whole the ratioof food importsto food exportsincreasedfrom 50
percentin 1955-1960to 80 percentin 1975 (Manfredi1978, p. 16). Thus,as Table 8 clearly
demonstrates,between1960 and 1980boththe ruralpopulationas a percentageof total popu-
lation and the agriculturallabor force as a percentageof total labor force declined in all
regions of the ThirdWorld.
Table 8 * RuralPopulationand LaborForce in Agriculture,1960-1980
of RuralPopulation
Percentage Percentof LaborForcein Agriculture
Region 1960 1980 % Difference 1960 1980 % Diference
Latin America' 50.6 35.3 15.3 48.3 32.4 15.9

Middle East & North Africa
Group Ib 71,2 54.7 16.5 66.3 46.5 19.8
Group IIc 67.7 39.8 27.9 57.8 40.3 17.5
SubsaharanAfrica
Western & Easternd 92.8 80.8 12.0 86.9 71.6 9.3
Southern & Centrale 73.7 62.5 11.2 65.8 58.0 7.8
South Asia' 84.2 77.9 6.3 70.0 64.0 6.0
Southeast Asiag 67.5 60.1 7.4 58.8 43.2 15.6
Sources:
fromWorldBank,(1984);UnitedNations,(1980);EconomicCommission
Calculated for LatinAmerica,(1988).
"ExcludingCuba
bAlgeria,Egypt,Sudan,Syria
"Libya,SaudiArabia,Iran,Iraq
d Benin,Cameroon, Malawi,Mali,Mauritania,
Chad,Ethiopia,IvoryCoast,Kenya,Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger,Nigeria,
Rwanda
SSouthAfrica,Zaire,Zambia,Zimbabwe
'Bangladesh,India,Pakistan,SriLanka
9Indonesia,SouthKorea,Philippines,
Singapore,Thailand
Third,as a result,the new internationaldivision of laborin food productionincreasingly

contradictedthe ideal model of inward-oriented nationalgrowththatwas being advocatedby
Americanas well as ThirdWorlddevelopmentalistpolicy-orientedtheorists. In the 1960s,
particularly,the lattertendencywas led by W. W. Rostow22in the Kennedyand Johnson
administrations andby RaulPrebisch(since the 1950s) in the Alliancefor Progress. Between
the late 1940s andthe late 1970s,the very mode on whose basis promarketnationalismswere
to be incorporatedinto the worldsystembecameprogressivelydevoidof content. The coinci-
dence of the process of reformationof the world's agricultural"sector"and the process of
implementingnation-stateorienteddevelopmentalistprogramsaccountfor the relativerather
thanabsolutedeclineof the ThirdWorldbetween1945and 1975. This is reflectedin Table9,
which gives estimatesof the deruralization rate for selected countriesin Asia, Africa, Latin
America, and Europe, as well as NorthAmerica andCanada.Foreach intercensalperiod,the
ratio of the rate of ruralout-migrationto the rate of ruralnaturalpopulationincrease(times
100) reflectsa roughestimateof the rateof deruralization.Hence,while a rate of deruraliza-
tion above 100 percentrepresentsan absolutedecline of the ruralpopulationin the period
underconsideration,a ratebelow 100 percentrepresentsa relativedecline. Mexico's rate of

55 percent,for example,means that more than half of the ruralpopulationgrowthbetween
1960 and 1970 was "drainedoff" as a result of out-migration.23Except for Argentinaand
Chile, all the countriesof the underdevelopedworld representedin the table experienceda
relative decline of their ruralpopulations,increasinglyso in the 1960s as comparedto the
1950s. The rate of deruralization remainedalmostconstantfor the United States, and it in-
creasedsubstantiallyfor Canadain the 1960s. Europe,in contrast,underwenta much larger
ruraldepopulationin the 1960s.
Table 9 * Deruralization in Selected Countries, 1950-1970
MajorRegionand Country Period

Intercensal Rateof Deruralization'
Africa
Ghana 1960-1970 30.3
Morocco 1960-1970 34.2
SouthAfrica 1951-1970 31.45
Latin America
Dominican Republic 1950-1960 27.0
1960-1970 53.5
El Salvador 1950-1961 15.6
1961-1971 13.8
Panama 1950-1960 23.2
1960-1970 43.1
Brazil 1950-1960 60.5
1960-1970 72.5
Chile 1952-1960 101.3
1960-1970 167.2
Ecuador 1950-1962 31.9
1962-1974 25.1
Venezuela 1950-1961 87.6
1961-1971 100.6
Guatemala 1964-1973 23.0
Mexico 1960-1970 55.0
Nicaragua 1950-1963 26.5
Argentina 1947-1960 138.3
Asia
India 1951-1961 9.4
Sri Lanka 1953-1963 19.3
1963-1971 23.9
Bangladesh 1961-1974 11.1
Indonesia 1961-1971 12.7
NorthKorea 1961-1971 87.6
Turkey 1955-1960 39.1
Iran 1956-1966 42.6
Iraq 1957-1965 104.0
Syria 1960-1970 33.1
Western and NorthernEuropeb 1960-1970 309.8
Canada 1951-1961 89.9
1961-1971 139.7
USA 1950-1960 104.9
Source:
UnitedNations(1980).
period,theratioof therateof ruralout-migration
'For eachintercensal increase(times
to therateof ruralnaturalpopulation
100)reflectsa roughestimateof the rateof deruralization.
bAustria,France,Luxembourg, Switzerland, Finland,Norway
QUARTERLY
Thus, on the one hand,as new peasantrieswere created,nationalprotectionof agriculture

throughstatefinancingof inputs,pricesupports,and subsidiesslowed down the rateat which
nakedexposureto marketforceswouldhave otherwiseunderminedthe positionof millions of
small farmowners. On the otherhand,the reorganization of worldagriculture-to the advan-
tage of U.S. farmers and agribusinessesin the era of U.S. hegemony-redefined the global
context and thereforethe meaningof nationalistplanning. Over time, dependingon their
social position in the village priorto landredistribution,the location,quality,and amountof
the land they acquired,the kinds of crops they cultivatedand the level of technologyavail-
able, and the ecosystemsin which they produced(Athreya1990; Llambi 1989; Llambiand
Cousins 1989), some ThirdWorldpeasantsbenefitedfromproductionundersubsidizedcondi-
tions andconsequentlybecamethe net buyersof (rural)labor. Most,however,becamethe net
sellers of labor as part-timewageworkers/cultivators, in varying forms and proportions
(Singelmannet al 1982;de Janvryet al 1989a;Springborg1990;Richardsand Martin1983),
and increasinglyas temporaryor permanenturbanmigrants.24
For the underdevelopedregions,these dataare consistentwith anotherstudywhich shows
that for Latin Americaas a whole the size of the peasantryactuallyincreasednumerically
between 1960 and 1980 (de Janvryet al 1989b,p. 399). A proportionof this growthwas, of
course, due to naturalpopulationincrease. Moreimportantly,however,these data character-
ize a period in which simultaneousprocesses of peasantizationand depeasantizationwere
takingplace.
Thus, contraryto neoclassicalviews which pose "ruralpush factors"at the nationallevel
and commonlyreducethemto factorsrelatedto greaterdensityof ruralpopulations,25it was
the operationof a "globalpushfactor," that,transmittingits impactthroughthe price form,
systematicallyunderminedthe ideal as well as the realityof expanding"independent" petty
commodityproductionin the ruralThirdWorld-thereby reversingan ongoing process of
peasantization.This reversalwas mediatedby stateinterventionat the nationallevel, the first
consequenceof which was a sluggishrate of class differentiationin the ruralThirdWorld.
The same thingwas truefor Americanfamilyfarmersof this period,the differencebeing that
the latterwere generallyprosperous,while the formerwere generallypoor. Accordingto a
U.N. estimate,for example,by the late 1970s close to 50 percentof the ruralpopulationin
Latin Americaas a whole (76.3 million people), lived in absolutepoverty (de Janvryet al
1989a, p. 60). Withinthe new global order,therefore,the family farmersof the North and
those of the Southreproducedeach other.26The second consequenceof the global reversal
of peasantization,again mediatedat the nationallevel by state intervention,was a massive
transferover a periodof twenty-fiveyears of the ThirdWorld'sruralpopulation to (urban)
centersof capitalaccumulation.This is reflectedin Table 10, whichgives datafor the contri-
bution of ruralto urbannet migrationto the growthof the urbanproportionof the popula-
tion.27 Thus, where the urbanrate of naturalincrease equals that of the naturalrate of
populationgrowththe total ratio equals unity, meaningthat all of the growth in the urban
proportionis attributable to in-migration.A figureaboveunityindicatesthatthe urbanrateof
naturalincreaseis slower than the rate of nationalpopulationgrowth,while a figure below
unity shows a highercontributionof urbannaturalincreaseto the growthof urbanproportion.
For the countriesfor which data are available,Table 10 confirmsthat virtuallyall of the
growthin the urbanproportionof the populationis attributable to in-migration(mean, 1960-
1970 = 1.11). Table 11 comparesruralto urbanmigrationin the underdevelopedworld as a
whole (1950-1975) with thatwhichoccurredearlier(1925 and 1950). Whereasbetween 1925
Table 10 * Contribution
of Rural-UrbanNet Migrationto Urbanization
Contribution
of In-Migration
MajorRegionand Country Period
Intercensal to UrbanGrowth
Africa
Ghana 1960-1970 .86
Morocco 1960-1970 .90
SouthAfrica 1951-1960 1.46
LatinAmerica
DominicanRepublic 1950-1960 1.10
1960-1970 .97
El Salvador 1950-1961 1.50
Panama 1950-1960 1.70
1960-1970 1.24
Brazil 1950-1960 1.10
1960-1970 1.12
Chile 1952-1960 1.02
1960-1970 .96
Ecuador 1950-1962 .92
1962-1974 1.12
Venezuela 1950-1961 1.02
Guatemala 1964-1973 1.65
Mexico 1960-1970 1.02
Nicaragua 1950-1963 1.02
Argentina 1947-1960 1.22
Asia
India 1951-1961 .91
1961-1971 1.03
Sri Lanka 1953-1963 1.13
1963-1971 1.04
Bangladesh 1961-1974 .91
Indonesia 1961-1971 .82
NorthKorea 1960-1970 .97
Turkey 1955-1960 1.17
1960-1970 1.13
Iran 1956-1966 .99
1957-1965 .85
Iraq
Syria 1960-1970 .94
Source:
UnitedNations(1980).
and 1950 only 10 percentof the ruralpopulation(100 million people) migratedto the cities,
this figurerose to 25 percentin the next twenty-fiveyears, representingan increaseof 230
percentin the numberof ThirdWorldruralmigrants.
World,1925-1950and 1950-1975
Table 11 * Ruralto UrbanMigrationin the Underdeveloped
Period Numberof People(in millions) %Increase %of RuralPopulation
1925-1950 100 - 10
1950-1975 330 230 25
Source:
WorldBank(1984).
Thus,not only did the internationalization of productionand consumptionof food operate

as a global push factor,it also acted, indirectly,as a "globalpull factor,"in the sense that it
Vol. 36/No. 2/1995
helped refine the objectiveof ThirdWorldstates from balancedgrowthto industrialization.

The importanceof the latter,as both an ideal and a goal that symbolizednationalindepen-
dence, was always strongly felt within "promarket"and "socialist"nationalisms(ECLA
1950). But the availabilityof cheapfood at the globallevel, with its implicationfor lessening
the cost of reproductionof wage laborin nationaleconomies,played a role in elevatingim-
port-substitutionindustrializationto its centralplace in nationaldevelopmentplanningpro-
grams.Indeed, the terms"development"and"industrialization" soon becamesynonymous.28
In fact, furtheranalysisof datafor all of Africa,Asia, and LatinAmericashows a global
pull factorin action. Regroupingthe continentaldataon percentagesof ruralpopulationand
agriculturallabor force accordingto the level of gross nationalproduct(GNP) per capita
demonstratesthatthereis a close relationshipamongthese indicators.This is done in Table
12, which shows the inverserelationshipbetweenthe level of GNPper capitaandthe percent-
ages of ruralpopulationand laborforce in agriculture.As the level of GNP per capitarises,
ruralpopulationand agriculturallaborforce decline. But the ratioof the percentageof rural
populationto the percentageof laborforce in agriculturerises with increasinglevels of GNP
per capita,indicatinga tendencytowardthe "urbanization of the countryside."This bringsus
to a considerationof the second phase of depeasantization.
Table 12 * Levelof GNP/Capita,
RuralPopulation,andAgriculturalLaborForce, 1979
GNPper capita Percentageof Percentageof Labor Ratioof %RuralPopulationto

(dollars) RuralPopulation Forcein Agriculture laborForce
%Agricultural
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)+(3)
313 79.1 76.4 1.04
953 53.6 46.2 1.16
2192 39.2 25.1 1.56
Sources:
basedon WorldBank(1981);UnitedNations,(1988).
Calculations
1973-1990
AND DEPEASANTIZATION,
DENATIONALIZATION
Given the global context,therefore,the contradictionsof capitalistdevelopmentin the South,

contraryto Leninistexpectations,were manifestedas a strong tendencytowardsderuraliza-
tion as opposedto capitalaccumulationin the countryside.Withincreasingintensity,capital
and labor found each other in the urbanlocations,includingthose fractionsof capital and
labor that became engagedin producingthe means of subsistence. This was relatedto the
of agriculturethatoriginatedin the United Statesand was pro-
internationalindustrialization
gressively extendedto the rest of the world, consequentlyintegratingthe sectors of world
agriculture(Friedmannand McMichael1989). On the otherhand,the continuingprocess of
of world agriculturehas causedthe progressiveblurringof the
internationalindustrialization
traditionaldistinctionbetweenurbanandruralphenomenabased on the exclusive concentra-
tion of agriculturalproductiveactivitiesin the latter.29This is reflectedin Table 13, which
shows the trendin the ThirdWorldtowardurbanizationof agriculturalemploymentand the
expansionover time of nonagricultural activitiesto rurallocalities. Thus,as the expansionof
relationsof real subordinationof laborto capitalhas proceededin world agriculture,so has
the desegregationof urbanandruralspacesat the nationallevel. Beforewe can discuss this,
however,we need to definethe new coordinatesof global changewith referenceto the trajec-
tory of the peasantriesin the post-1973period. We are now in a process of transition.
Table 13 * SpatialIntegrationof Laborin Agricultureand Non Agriculture
Percentageof UrbanLabor Percentageof RuralLabor

Country Period Forcein Agriculture ForceNot in Agriculture
(1) (2)
Morocco 1951 1.7 13.8

1960 2.8 20.1
1971 3.2 23.2
CostaRica 1963 5.6 29.1
1973 6.2 41.1
Ecuador 1962 6.5 19.2
1974 6.8 26.4
Nicaragua 1960 11.0 12.9
1971 11.7 19.9
Peru 1961 18.3 20.1
1972 23.7 18.8
PuertoRico 1960 6.5 56.1
1970 11.8 80.8
Brazil 1970 12.3 15.2
1980 17.7 23.4
Mexico 1970 23.8 23.1
1980 26.0 42.4
United States 1940 2.6 54.4
1950 4.6 64.1
1960 12.3 78.1
1970 13.9 89.2
Sources:
Basedon datain UnitedNations(1980);dataon MexicoandBrazilfromde Janvryet al (1989a).
Withthe declineof U.S. hegemonyafter 1973,the worldhas entereda periodof prolonged

political and economic crisis duringwhich capitalhas been reorganizingitself on a global
scale. Two importanteventsmustbe noted:(1) the breakdownof the BrettonWoods system,
which once symbolizedthe centralplace of the Americanstate in the state system, and (2)
rapidaccumulation,in responseto the worldeconomicdownturn,of a mass of financecapital
that has become increasinglyfree from nationalregulation. Thus, the World Bank and the
InternationalMonetaryFund (IMF), the creaturesof the BrettonWoods system, behave in
their maturityin ways that betraytheir"political"independence.
The consolidationof internationalfinancecapital-the very outcomeof the crisis-is now
mediatingthe globalizationof capital. This mediationinvolves the transnationalization of the
state. The latter is a complex and contradictoryprocess in which the world's public and
privatefinancialinstitutionsact as the agentsof this transformation (McMichaeland Myhre
1991). Although the globalization of the state is a contestedterrain,since the early 1980s
supranational institutions
have successfully linked theirlending/aidpolicies to the implemen-
tation of structuralreformprogramswhose centralcomponentis divorcingthe state from
nationalregulationof capital (Aglietta 1979). It is in this context that import-substitution
developmentalismin the ThirdWorldhas increasinglygiven way to the so-called outward-
orientedor export-ledindustrializationstrategies. Concurrentwith this trend has been the
revivalof postmercantilist/neo-Recardian economictheoriesthatemphaticallyadvocateworld
QUARTERLY
market-orientedspecializationas opposedto nationaldevelopmentalism(Lee 1981; GATT

Study Group 1985; Kruegger1986).
Insofaras the trajectoryof the ThirdWorldpeasantriesis concerned,two importantconse-
quences of the implementationof deregulationistreformsmust be noted. First,where it has
been implemented,the outward-oriented strategyhas led to drasticcuts in farmsubsidiesand
price supportsas well as land marketderegulation,wage freezes,and massive devaluationof
nationalcurrencies(Llambi 1990). The theoreticaljustificationis that these measureswill
bring aboutthe most efficientallocationof the world's naturaland social resourcesand that
this will eventuallybenefiteveryone. In reality,once we rememberthe social originsof agra-
rian reformismin the earlierperiod,it will become clear thatnoninterventionon the partof
the state is in fact a form of intervention,because the existing inequalitiesof wealth and
power will in practicemake the rich-rather than the masses of near-subsistencepeasants/
workers-the mainbeneficiariesof deregulation.Peasants/workers are especiallyvulnerable
if we considerthe factthatthey arealreadyheavilydependenton the statefor the provisionof
low-cost creditand chemical,biological, and mechanicalinputs(see Roy, Tisdell, Alauddin
1992). Second,the pursuitof export-ledgrowthpolicies has led to the promotionof capitalist
productionof cash crops which, on the one hand,is contributingto the decline of the large
subsistencesectorand is furtherdeepeningthe ThirdWorld'sdependencyon the world mar-
ket for basic foods-thereby subjectingmillionsof people in heavily indebtedcountries30to
the vagariesof worldmarketprices-and, on the otherhand,is intensifyingindustrialization
of commercialagriculturewhich is most likely to activatenew technologicalpush factorson
the ThirdWorldcountryside(Tubiana1989, p. 36).
As a countertendency, however,we mustnote the growthof subcontracting wherethe large
agro-industrialcomplexesdeputeparts of the labor process to the peasantry,althougheven
herethereis a tendencyfor subcontracting arrangements to be made with the largeor medium
capitalized farms (Llambi1990).
All in all, then,therearereasonsto believe thatthe transitionto export-oriented production
has acceleratedthe pace of depeasantization.In fact, a close examinationof the availabledata
confirmsthis view. For comparativepurposes,Tables 14 and 15 illustratethe net ruralto
urbanmigrationin Africa,Asia, LatinAmerica,and the ThirdWorldas a whole duringfour
periods. Table 14 comparesthe periodbetweefi1960 and 1975 with the periodbetween 1975
and 1990. Table 15 uses U.N. populationprojectionsto comparethe periods 1950-1975 and
1975-2000. My methodof calculationcontrolsfor the urbannaturalpopulationincrease(de-
scribedin detailat the foot of Table 14). Both tablesdemonstratesimilartrends. Therefore,I
will discuss only Table 14, by noting threeobservations:
First, as columns 1 and 2 indicate,duringthe second period in the three continentsas a
whole and in Asia and LatinAmerica,percentagesof both the absoluteincreasein the urban
populationsand the increasein the urbanpopulationattributable to migrationdecreasedrela-
tive to the firstperiod. This is consistentwith my earlierremarkconcerningthe relationship
between economic growth and the rate of ruralto urbanmigration. That is, as the world
economicrecessionstartedin the post-1975periodtherewas a correspondingdecreasein the
rate of urbanization.Second,if we comparethe ratio of the percentageof increasein the net
urbanin-migrationto thatof absoluteincreasein the urbanpopulation(column3) it becomes
clear that in the ThirdWorldas a whole and in Asia and LatinAmericathis ratio increases
significantly,meaningthat althoughthe total rate of urbanizationhas slowed down in the
second periodcomparedwith the firstperiodthe rate of deruralization has accelerated. That
Table 14 * ContinentalNet Ruralto UrbanMigration,1950-1975and 1975-1990
%ActualIncreasein %IncreaseAttributable Ratioof Increasedue to

Region Period UrbanPopulation to Migration Migrationto AbsoluteIncrease
(1) (2) (3) = (2) + (1) x 100
ThirdWorld 1960-1975 81.9 55.7 67.9

1975-1990 69.8 54.9 78.6
LatinAmerica 1960-1975 86.8 54.4 62.6
1975-1990 63.6 48.1 75.7
Asia 1960-1975 75.0 55.4 73.9
1975-1990 56.5 49.5 87.7
Africa 1960-1975 101.9 59.6 58.5
1975-1990 112.4 65.3 58.1
Sources:
Calculationsbasedon datafromUnitedNations(1988; 1989).Foreachcontinent,the actualincreasewas calculatedby
subtractingurbanpopulation in t2 fromurbanpopulation in ti. ThenI calculatedthe naturalincreaseby multiplyingurban
populationin ti, by thepercentage of naturalgrowthforeachperiod(1960-1975and1975-1990).Thepercentage of natural
growthwascalculated by multiplying theaverageannualnatural growthrateby thenumberof yearswithineachperiod.The
figurefor naturalincreaseis an estimationof whatthe growthof urbanareaswouldhavebeen if no in-migration had
occurred.Subtracting thisfromthe actualincreasegives an estimationof theactualincreasedueto migration.
is, a higherproportionof the increasein the urbanpopulationin the second periodis due to
ruralout-migrationthan in the first period. Third,only for Africa are there no significant
changes in the threeproportionsbetweenthe two periods.
Table 15 * Net Ruralto UrbanMigrationin Africa,Asia, LatinAmericaand the ThirdWorld,1950-
1975 and 1975-2000
%ActualIncreasein %IncreaseAttributable Ratioof IncreaseDue to

Region Period UrbanPopulation to Migration Migrationto AbsoluteIncrease
(1) (2) (3) = (2) + (1) x 100
Third World 1950-1975 176.3 65.5 38.3

1975-2000 141.8 64.7 45.6
LatinAmerica 1950-1975 195.5 65.9 33.7
1975-2000 110.6 52.98 47.9
Asia 1950-1975 153.2 65.4 42.7
1975-2000 117.1 61.6 52.3
Africa 1950-1975 218.2 71.9 33.0
1975-2000 243.8 69.2 28.39
Sources:
basedon datain UnitedNations(1989;1988).
Calculations
This may be a result of (1) an exceptionallylow rate of economic growth in the second
period,relativeto Asia and LatinAmerica. The GNP per capitafor SubsaharanAfrica, for
example,declinedby almost200 percentbetween 1980 and 1990. The correspondingfigure
for Latin Americawas 86 percent. Africa's economy declined at a muchfaster rate in the
second periodas comparedto Asia and LatinAmericain the same period; or (2) an excep-
tionallyhigh urbanrateof naturalpopulationincreasein the secondperiod. While in the first
periodratesof naturalpopulationincreasein the threecontinentsarerelativelyclose, Africa's
rate in the second period is 57 percent higher than Asia's, 35 percent higher than Latin
America's,and42 percenthigherthanthatof the ThirdWorldas a whole. Thus,the average
annualgrowth rate of urbanareas in Africa between 1970 and 1990 was about 30 to 35
QUARTERLY
percenthigherthan those of Asia and LatinAmerica. This is partiallydue to the fact that
urbanproportionsin Africa have been quite small, so any particularabsolutelevel of urban
growthmakesa largeproportionate contributionto urbanpopulation.Africa's urbanpopula-
tion peakedin the periodof 1975-1980while the peakfor urbanLatinAmericawas in the late
1950s.
Whatis not reflectedin these datais internationalmigration,especiallyin the secondperiod
from Africa and Asia to Europeand fromLatinAmericato the UnitedStates. In 1985 alone
more than four million LatinAmericansmigratedto the United States,abouthalf of whom
were from Mexico (calculatedfrom data in UN [1990, p. 221]). Table 16 shows migration
from Africa, Asia, and Latin Americato the main labor-importingcountriesof Europe.It
shows that there were more than 4 million African,Asian, and LatinAmericanmigrantsin
Europein 1985, an increaseof 52 percentfrom 1970. It is difficultto know the percentages
that were of directruraland urbanoriginsor of indirectruralorigins(the recentlyurbanized
peasants); they probablycame from ThirdWorldcities, althoughdirectmigrationfrom the
ruralperipheryto the urbancore does occur, as, for example,in the case of Turkishand
Kurdishpeasantswho become wageworkersin Germanyand Sweden,or the LatinAmerican
peasantswho end up in the U.S. labormarkets. An in-depththeoreticaland empiricaltreat-
ment of this point lies beyondthe scope of this article(see Pellerin1993). We should,how-
ever, note that the process of transnationalizationhas a spatialdimensionleading to a new
differentiationof geographicalspace (Smith 1984). This will have two relatedconsequences:
(1) the collapse of the traditionalboundarybetweenthe nation-statebased categoriesof "ru-
ral"and "urban"and, as a result,(2) an increasingdifficultyin makinga clear-cutdistinction
between internaland interregional/international migration.
Table 16 * ThirdWorldMigration(in Thousands)to the MainLabor-Importing
Countriesof Europe,"
1970-1985
Destination
Region and Countryof Origin 1970 1985 % Increase
Africa 1355.2 1955.3 44.3

Asia 1389.2 2204.6 58.7
Turkey 1195.3 1849.3 54.5
Latin America 7.7 26.8 248.0
Total 2752.2 4186.7 52.1
Source:
Fromdatain UnitedNations(1989).
* Sweden,Switzerland.
Belgium,France,(West)Germany,Netherlands,
CONCLUSION
In this article,I have focused on the internationaldimensionof depeasantizationin the post

WorldWarII period. Methodologically,my aim has been to explorethe processof transfor-
mationof ThirdWorldpeasantriesfrom a global and historicalperspectivethat emphasizes
the interplayamong the social, economic,political,and ideologicalforces at both the local
and global levels. Such a perspectiveallows us to avoidtwo relatedproblemsof sociological
of the
analysis:(1) The problemof reification-in our case, the reificationof the "peasantry"
"nation-state"or of the "worldsystem,"3 and (2) teleologicalassumptionsaboutthe nature
and direction of social change (Abrams 1982; Giddens 1984). Thus, ratherthan posing
depeasantization withina continuousandhomogeneoustemporalcontextand/orconstruingit
as the empirical manifestationof logical categories, I have attemptedto study global
depeasantizationas a componentof a changinginternationalpolitical-economicorder. An
analysisof the social constructionof this orderhas servedas the first step towarda concrete
analysisof depeasantization.The adoptionof such a frameworkis useful, for we see only as
much as our methodologiesallow. As the emergingwork in the sociology of world agricul-
ture demonstrates(e.g., Bonnano,Busch, Friedland,Gouveia, and Mingione 1994; McMi-
chael 1993, 1994,) going beyond the conceptualimpassethat characterizesagrarianstudies
requiresa criticalreassessmentof late nineteenth-century methodsandparadigms.My analy-
sis, I hope, shows thatpeasantsare neithersui generisentities,nor shouldthey be reducedto
ideal typical categories;32peasantriesexist in global social processesthat constitute,and are
constitutedby, otherprocessesof the worldpoliticaleconomy.
Linkingthe changesin the conditionof existenceof the postwarpeasantriesto the transfor-
mation of the world economy and polity, I distinguishbetween two phases of global
depeasantization.The ensembles of economic, political, and ideological processes within
each phasewere distinct,as werethe corresponding processesof depeasantization.In the first
phase, between 1945 and 1973, I show thatthe simultaneous processesof peasantizationand
depeasantization led to a relative,ratherthan an absolute, decline of the ThirdWorldpeasant-
ries. Rather thanoffer a teleologicalor functionalaccount, explainthe peasanttrajectoryon a
I
world scale in terms of the changingpolitical history of capitalism. I thereforehighlight,
amongotherfactors,the cold warcontext,the historicalintersectionof anticolonial/nationalist
and peasantmovements,the rivalrybetween the Americanand Soviet models of national
industrialization,and the rise to prominenceof national-industrialist ideology and practice.
In the secondperiod,between about 1973 and the of
1990, pace depeasantization was accel-
erated. I link this accelerationwith the ongoingtransformation of the world economy since
the early 1970s. One consequenceof globalization, or the process of rationalization of inter-
nationalism,has been the weakeningof nation-states and their ability, if not theirwillingness,
to regulatenationaleconomies. I arguethat denationalization,particularlywith respect to
agriculture,has led to a fast-pacedderuralization of the ThirdWorld.33Againstthe expecta-
tions of the proponentsof the persistencethesis, therefore,depeasantization has been a major
global process of our time. In contrastto the conclusions of the advocates of the disappear-
ance thesis, depeasantization has been neithera unilinearprocess, nor has it takenthe histori-
cally particularformof differentiationin the countrysides within each and every nation-state.
The analysisin this articleconfirmsthatclass formation is an ongoing historical process, "a
happening"in E. P. Thompson's(1965, p.357) words that may (increasingly) include a geo-
graphicaldimension (e.g., Third World peasants/migrants/refugees transforming into city
wageworkerselsewherein the world). Althoughempiricallyoriented,studies based on the
persistenceand disappearancetheses have been contextuallyabstractand thereforemiss the
connectivityof social phenomena.34This article,I hope, providesan alternative.
QUARTERLY
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to acknowledgethe valuablecommentsof GiovanniArrighi,TerenceHopkins,Philip
McMichael,JodieManale,MarkRose, ImmanuelWallersteinandthe Sociological Quarterly
anonymousreviewers. Manythanksto JuneCutright,LindaMcDonald,MargieTowery,and
MarcelaTribblefor theirhelpful suggestions.
NOTES
1. In theage of globalization, however,sucha parochial focusis anachronistic. TheChiapaspeas-
ants,forexample,havealreadylinkedtheirowncircumstances withthechangesin theglobaleconomy
(Cooper1994;Fox 1994,p. 32).
2. Thereareexceptions, butthesearecasestudies.See,forexample,Peltonen(1993)andRoseberry
(1982).
3. Notethesimilarity betweenthegemeinschaft andgesellschaft dichotomy andthepostwardevelop-
mentalist(modernization and neo-Marxist) literature's celebrated conceptsof development and un-
derdevelopment (and their derivatives: more
developing, developed, undeveloped, underdeveloped, less
developed, backward, etc.). See Araghi 1988.
4. Sociologicalfunctionalism conceptualized differentiation asfunctional(e.g.,Comte1896;Durk-
heim1960;Parsons1966;Eisenstadt, 1968).
5. In contrast,theMensheviks, carrying the developmentalist logicto its conclusion, arguedthata
socialistrevolution hadto waituntilcapitalism haddoneits workon thepeasantry.
6. AtiurRahman, forexample,explicitlyacknowledges thathisresearch "makesanattemptto apply
theprincipal of
hypotheses [the latenineteenth- and early twentieth-century]debate to ruralBangladesh"
(1986,p. v). Similarly, JairusBanaji(1990,p. 296)writes,in connection withtheIndiandebate,thatthe
"relevance of TheAgrarianQuestionis certainly as greattodayas it waswhenKautskypublished his
book." I advance two arguments the
against validity of such an effort: the
(1) originaldisappearance
thesis,as we haveseen,wasinparta product of thecultureof modernity and(2) it wasmeantto analyze
an altogether differentensembleof world-historical phenomena.
7. De Janvry, however,hasmadea valuable contribution to ourunderstanding of theLatinAmerican
peasantries. Of particular importance is his attention to theroleof the stateandits foodpolicies.
8. Bernstein's (1979,p. 436)conceptof "wagelaborequivalent" avoidsthereductionism of Banaji
andBrass.Nation-state orientation is, however,the mainproblemwithBernstein's analyticalframe-
work.Thelatteris overcomein Roseberry (1982).
9. Informulating hisviewsagainstthepopulists, Plekhanov ([1885]1961;[1895]1972)resolvedthe
tensionbetweenMarx'sopen-ended historical sociology and his progressionism to theadvantage of the
latter.Plekhanov's workinfluenced a generation of RussianMarxists.
10. Sucha historical readingwouldmakesenseof Chayanov's otherwiseinexplicable assumptions
(e.g.,theimpossibilityof verticalconcentration of peasant production through market andfinancial struc-
tures, the dominationof use value over exchange value on thecountryside, and the unlimitedsupplyof
land).
11. I takeexceptionto someof theirarguments.
12. ElsewhereI havedocumented theexplicitlystatedviewpoints of thiscurrent (Araghi,1991).
13. Thereweredebateson thisissuein the 1920sand1930swithintheCPSU,butthedebateswere
not on the roleof the peasantry; theyaddressed the roleof the nationalbourgeoisie.Thenationalist
elementin thisformulation wasemphasized at theexpenseof its socialistcontentin the Stalinera.
14. "theRussianMarxists... committed thefollowingmistakes:insteadof applyingthetheoryof
Marxto thespecialconditions prevailing in Russia... theyuncritically repeated theconclusions drawn
fromtheapplication of Marx'stheoryto foreignconditions,to a different epoch,"(Lenin[1907]1971c,
p. 161). "Themaintaskis to instillpoliticalconsciousness intothepeasantmovement ... Ourprogram,
forinstance,declaresthatwe recognize therightof nationsto Self-determination" ([1905]1971b,p. 89)
15. As a U.S. officialput it in 1960, "Wecan look at Mexico todayandthankthe Lordthe revolution
occurredandmaturedbeforeSino-Sovietimperialismhadbecomemilitantandpowerful"(Mallory1960,
p. 820). But my surveyof U.S. official documentsindicatesthat all referencesto the role of the peas-
antryin the Mexicanrevolutionof 1910 appearafterthe Cubanrevolutionof 1959. See also the state-
ment by the AssistantSecretaryfor Inter-American Affairs,EdwinMartin(1963, p. 960).
16. As CarlRowan(1962, p. 379), the deputyAssistantSecretaryfor PublicAffairsput it in 1962, "It
would have been nice if the UnitedStatesandLatinAmericanleadershad foundbeforenow the coinci-
dence of events and vision to which we have now come. Unfortunately,however,the exampleof Cuba
was needed first."
17. The expansionof "state"nationalisms,of course,meantthe restrictionof the politicaland com-
mercialspace of the global free enterprisesystem.
18. I have developedthis argumentelsewhere(Araghi1991). See also Clairmonte(1986).
19. It was not an accidentthatthe most coherentstatementof this ideology was put forwardby an
Argentineaneconomist/politician,Raul Prebisch. EasternEuropein the interwarperiod underwenta
similar inward-orientedgrowth,giving rise to a similartheoreticalreformulationthere. Joseph Love
(1980) shows thatPrebischwas familiarwith, and possibly influencedby, the East Europeanliterature.
20. Here the statedgoals of land redistribution coincidedwith those of the GreenRevolution(i.e.,
at the
attempts increasing productivity of agriculturein ThirdWorldeconomiesthroughthe introduction
of improvedgrainvarieties,heavy fertilizerusage, and carefullycontrolledirrigation).
21. See the statementby Americanofficials:Mallory(960), Freeman(1964, p. 397), Lubin(1951, p.
469), Acheson (1951, p. 660), Hope (1951, p. 999) and Brennan(1951, p. I-V).
22. In the ThirdWorld,as Rostowput it, "agricultural productionhas not expandedin such a way as
to take advantagefor the possibilitiesnot merely for providingfor the rapidlygrowing cities but for
providingagriculturalraw materialsfor industryand export"(1963b, p. 310); he thereforeadvocateda
"buildup of agricultural productivity"(1964, p. 180) Interestingly,in the sameyear,OliverFreeman,the
U.S. Secretaryof Agriculture,was stronglyadvocatingthe expansionof Americanagriculturalexportto
the ThirdWorld. See Freeman,1964, (pp. 384-386).
23. On the otherhand,Canada'srateof about140 percentbetween 1961 and 1971 indicatesthatthe
total size of the ruralpopulationactually declined (i.e., the ruralpopulationexperienceda negative
growthrate).
24. I shouldnote herethatin the postwarperiod,depeasantization affecteddifferenttypes of peasant-
ries. Thereare,of course,cases thatmakegeneralizationsdifficult. This articleis not intendedto substi-
tute more detailed(but globally informed)historicalstudies.See Araghi(1987).
25. This is not to deny thathigh populationdensitymay also play a role. But in many countriesof
Middleand SouthAmerica,as well as Africa,high ratesof migrationpersistdespitelow ruralpopulation
densities. Certainlyin NorthAmericaand Europe,populationpressurehas not played a role in recent
experiencesof deruralization.
26. I cannotpursuethis point here further,but comparethis historical/relational accountof the sur-
vival of family farmsto post-Chayanovian logical analyses.
27. This is definedas:
U
nm =
U + (P- N)
Where:
nm = Contributionof rural-urbannet migrationto the urbanpopulation
U = Urbanrate of in-migration
P = Urbanrate of naturalincrease
N = Nationalrate of naturalincrease
28. At the same time, emphasison industrializationdovetailedwith the projectof expandingthe
expansionof metropolitan
social base of the U.S. hegemonyas well as with the "outward-directed"
capitals.
Vol. 36/No. 2/1995
29. RaymondWilliams(1973, pp. 299-302), for example,mistakes"workon the land"with food

production.This is despitehis otherwiseinsightfulanalysis.
30. Debt and depeasantization are linked. The countriesthathave relativelywell-protectedagricul-
turesare also the most heavilyindebtedones: Mexico with a total externaldebt of $107 billion, Brazil
with $124 billion, Indiaand South Korea with $46 and $40 million debts respectively(World Bank
1989).
31. As an intellectualundertakingin the eraof industrialismandnationalism,late nineteenth-century
social science was (a) evolutionistand (b) took the nation-statefor granted.Althoughthe world system
theory has challengedthe latterassumption,it has inheritedthe former.
32. Weberhas warnedus not to hypostatizeideal types ([1903-1917] 1949, pp. 90-103). Indeed,all
historicalquerieswould be superfluousif theoryand historydirectlycoincided.
33. In the 1990s, deruralization is being extendedto the formerSecondWorld.
34. Of course,therearemoreconnectionsto be madethatlie beyondthe purviewof this article. Of
importanceis the utilityof globaldepeasantization as a conceptlinkingruralandurbanstudies(e.g., see
Sincular1991andRoberts1978),andas a conceptrelevantfor the studyof worldhunger(e.g., see Lapp6
and Collins 1986), ThirdWorldhomelessness(e.g., Eyre 1990;"World'sGrowingSlum Cities," 1994),
the developmentof new social movements(Cooper,1994;Fox 1994), fundamentalism (e.g., see Araghi
1989), andurbanunrest(e.g., see WaltonandSeddon1994). Massiveandrapidruralto urbanpopulation
transfersin the ThirdWorldhave resultedin an unprecedented rise in whatwe may call "globalhome-
lessness"and "globalhunger."At the same time, the availabilityof a surplusof wageworkershas con-
tributedto the flightof corecapitalsto the ThirdWorldwith importantconsequences:deindustrialization,
decliningwages, anda weakeningof the powerof organizedlabor. Deindustrialization andurbandecay
in the core, overurbanization in the ThirdWorld,and rising levels of homelessnessand hungeron a
worldwidescale areultimatelyrelatedto globaldepeasantization.By 2000, 17 of the 20 most populated
agglomerationsin the world will be located in the ThirdWorld. Meanwhile,Brazil's and Thailand's
most productivelandswill producea million tons of soybeansand cassava:cash cropanimal feeds for
use in intensivelivestockproductionin the North. LauranceTubiana(1989, p. 36) has suggestedthatthe
new role of ThirdWorldagricultural economiesas the supplierof animalfeeds to the North"is accompa-
nied by a declinein food consumption,the creationof food deficits,andthe greaterdependenceof Third
WorldCountries."KenyaandBotswana,for example,aremajorbeef exportersto Europe.And Lesotho
has become a majorexporterof asparagus,while its people sufferfrom severe malnutrition(see Cheru
1989;HollistandTullis 1987;Wisner1989).Will depeasantization leadto a new wave of peasant resist-
ance movements?The 1994 Zapatistauprisingin Mexicoindicatesthatthe studentsof social movements
shouldfurtherexplorethis question.
REFERENCES
Abrams,Philip. 1982. HistoricalSociology.Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversityPress.
Acheson, D. 1951. "Conferenceon World Land Tenure Problems." Departmentof State Bulletin
25(643):660-664.
Aglietta,Michael. 1979. A Theoryof CapitalistRegulation.London:NLB.
Alavi, Hamza. 1987. "Peasantryand Capitalism:A MarxistDiscourse."Pp. 185-196 in Peasants and
Peasants Societies,editedby TeodorShanin.New York:Basil Blackwell.
Araghi,Farshad.1987."AgrarianClassStructure andObstaclesto CapitalistDevelopmentin Iran."Jour-
nal of Contemporary Asia 17(3):293-319.
. 1988. "The Concept of Development:Smith and Marx Revisited."Sociological Spectrum
8(4):371-390.
. 1989. "LandReformPolicies in Iran:Comment."AmericanJournalof AgriculturalEconomics
74(4):1046-1049.
. 1991. "LandReformand Hegemony."FernandBraudelCenterfor the Study of Economies,
HistoricalSystemsand Civilizations:SUNY-Binghamton, New York.
Archetti,E. and S. Aass. 1987. "PeasantStudies:An Overview."Pp. 107-129in InternationalPerspec-

tives in RuralSociology,editedby HowardNewby. New York:JohnWiley.
Arrighi,Giovanni.1973. "LaborSuppliesin HistoricalPerspective:A Studyof the Proletarianization of
the AfricanPeasantryin Rhodesia."Pp. 107-129 in Essays on the Political Economyof Africa,
editedby J. S. Saul and GiovanniArrighi. New York:MonthlyReview Press.
Arrighi,Giovanni.1994. TheLong TwentiethCentury.London:Verso.
Assies, Willem. 1987. "The AgrarianQuestionin Peru:Some Observationson the Roads of Capital."
Journal of Peasant Studies 14(4):500-532.
Athreya,V. 1990. BarriersBroken:ProductionRelationsandAgrarianChangein TamilNadu. Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
Atkins, Fiona. 1988. "LandReform: A Failure of Neoclassical Theorization?"WorldDevelopment
16(8):935-946.
Attwood,DonaldW. 1992. Raising Cane: ThePolitical Economyof Sugar in WesternIndia. Boulder,
CO: WestviewPress.
Banaji,Jairus.1977. "Modesof Productionin a MaterialistConceptionof History."Capitaland Class,
2:1-44.
. 1990. "IllusionsAbout the Peasantry:Karl Kautskyand the AgrarianQuestion."Journal of
Peasant Studies 17(2):288-307.
Bernstein,Harry.1979. "AfricanPeasantries:A TheoreticalFramework." Journal of Peasant Studies
6(4):421-443.
Block, Fred. 1977. The Originsof InternationalEconomicDisorder:A Studyof UnitedStates Interna-
tional MonetaryPolicy from WorldWarII to the Present. Berkeley:Universityof California
Press.
Bonnano,Alessandro.1994. "TheLocus of Polity Action in the GlobalSetting."Pp. 251-265 in From
Columbusto ConAgra:The Globalizationand Agricultureand Food, edited by A. Bonnano.
Lawrence:Universitypress of Kansas.
Bonnano,Alessandro,LawrenceBusch, WilliamFriedland,LourdesGouveia,and Enzo Migione, eds.
1994. From Columbusto ConAgra:The Globalizationand Agricultureand Food, edited by A.
Bonnano. Lawrence:Universitypress of Kansas.
Bradly,B. 1975. "TheDestructionof NaturalEconomy."Economyand Society4(2):127-167.
Brass, T. 1990. "PeasantEssentialismand the AgrarianQuestionin the ColombianAndes."Journalof
Peasant Studies 17(3):444-456.
Braverman,H. 1975. Laborand MonopolyCapital. New York:MonthlyReview Press.
Brennan,C. F. 1951. "Preservingthe FamilyFarm."Family Farm Policy Review,June 11, i-vii. U.S.
Departmentof Agriculture.
Buttel, FrederickH. 1989. "TheU.S. FarmCrisisand the Restructuring of AmericanAgriculture:Do-
mestic and InternationalDimensions."Pp. 46-83 in The InternationalFarm Crisis, edited by
David Goodmanand MichaelRedclift New York:St. Martin'sPress.
Byress, T. J. 1986. "Foreword."Pp. ix-xxxvii in Peasants and Classes:A Studyin Diferentiation in
Bangladesh,by AtiurRahman,London:Zed Books.
. 1991. "TheAgrarianQuestionand DifferingFormsof CapitalistAgrarianTransitions:An Es-
say in Referenceto Asia."Pp. 3-76 in RuralTransformation in Asia, editedby Jan Bremanand
SudiptoMundle.Delhi: OxfordUniversityPress
Chase-Dunn, C. 1989. Global Formation: Structuresof the World Economy. Cambridge:Basil
Blackwell.
Chayanov,A. V. [1925] 1987. The Theoryof Peasant Economy.Madison:Universityof Wisconsin
Press.
Chen, 1961. LandReformin Taiwan.Taipei:ChinaPublishingCompany.
C.
Cheru,Fantu.1989. TheSilentRevolutionin Africa:Debt,Development,and Democracy. London:Zed
Books.
Vol. 36/No. 2/1995
Clairmonte,F. 1986. "Prebischand UNCTAD: The Banalityof a Compromise."Journalof Contempo-

raryAsia. 16(4):427-456.
Cleaver,H. 1977. "Food,Famineand the International Crisis."Zerowork2:7-70.
. 1979. "The Contradictionsof Green Revolution."Pp. 223-233 in The Political Economyof
Developmentand Underdevelopment editedby CharlesK. Wilber.New York:Random House.
Comte, A. 1896. ThePositive Philosophyof AugustComte.London:Bell.
Cooper,Marc. 1994. "TheZapatistas."OpenMagazineno. 30:1-18.
Davis, M. 1980. "TheBarrenMarriageof AmericanLaborand the DemocraticParty."New LeftReview
124:43-84.
de Janvry,Alain. 1980. "Social Differentiationin Agricultureand the Ideology of Neopopulism."Pp.
155-168 in Rural Sociology of AdvancedSocieties, edited by FrederickButtel and Howard
Newby. Montclair,N.J.: Allanhead,Osmunand Co.
. 1981. TheAgrarianQuestionand Reformismin LatinAmerica.Baltimore,MD: JohnHopkins
UniversityPress.
de Janvry,A., and C. Garramon.1977. "TheDynamicsof RuralPovertyin LatinAmerica: An Interpre-
tation."Journalof Peasant Studies(4)3:206-216.
de Janvry,A., R. Marsh,D. Runsten,E. Sadoulet,and C. Zabin. 1989a. RuralDevelopmentin Latin
America.Coronado,Costa Rica: Inter-American Institutefor Cooperationon Agriculture.
de Janvry,A., E. Sadouletand L.W. Young. 1989b. "Landand Laborin Latin AmericanAgriculture
from the 1950s."Journalof Peasant Studies 16(3):396-424.
Durkheim,tmile. [1893] 1960. TheDivision of Laborin Society.Glencoe:Free Press.
EconomicCommissionfor LatinAmerica(ECLA).1950. TheEconomicDevelopmentof LatinAmerica
and the PrincipalProblems.New York:UnitedNations.
. 1988. StatisticalYearbookfor LatinAmerica.New York:UnitedNations.
Edelmann,M. 1980. "Agricultural Modernizationin Small-holdingAreas of Mexico: A Case Study in
the SierraNorte de Puebla."LatinAmericanPerspectives27(4):29-49.
Eisenstadt,S. N. 1968. "Evolution:Social Evolution."Pp. 228-234 in InternationalEncyclopediaof
Social Sciences,editedby D. L. Sills. New York:Macmillanand Free Press.
Engels, Friedrich.[1884] 1972. Originsof the Family,PrivateProperty,and the State. London:Law-
rence & Wishart.
- [1894] 1977. ThePeasant Questionin France and Germany.Pp. 457-475 in Karl Marx and
FriederichEngels, Selected Works3. Moscow:ProgressPublishers.
Eyre, L. Alan. 1990. "TheShantyTowns of the CentralBombay." UrbanGeography11(2):130-152.
Feder,E. 1971. TheRape of the Peasantry:LatinAmerica'sLandholdingSystem. New York: Anchor
Books.
Foweraker,Joseph.1978."TheContemporary Peasantry:ClassandClassPractice."Pp. 131-158in Inter-
nationalPerspectivesin RuralSociology,editedby HowardNewby. New York:JohnWiley.
Fox, Jonathan.1994. "TheRoots of Chiapas."Dollars and Sense no. 194, 30-33.
Freeman,OliverL. 1964. "Improvingthe Effectivenessof U.S. Assistanceto InternationalRuralDevel-
opment."Departmentof StateBulletin,September14, 370-390.
Friedland,WilliamH. 1994."TheNew Globalization: The Case of FreshProduce."Pp. 210-231 in From
Columbusto ConAgra:TheGlobalizationandAgricultureand Food, editedby A. Bonnanoet al.
Lawrence:UniversityPress of Kansas.
Friedmann,Harriet.1982. "ThePoliticalEconomyof Food:The Rise and Fall of the PostwarInterna-
tional Food Order."AmericanJournalof Sociology 88: s248-s286.
- . 1993. "The PoliticalEconomyof Food:A GlobalCrisis."New Left Review 197:29-57.
Friedmann,Harrietand PhilipMcMichael.1989. "Agricultureand the State System:The Rise and De-
cline of NationalAgricultures:1870 to Present."SociologiaRuralis29(2):93-117.
GeneralAgreementon TariffsandTrade(GATT)StudyGroup.1985. TradePoliciesfor a Better World.
Geneva:GATT.
GibbonP. andM. Neocosmos. 1985. "SomeProblemsin the PoliticalEconomyof 'AfricanSocialism.'"

Pp. 153-206 in ContradictionofAccumulationin Africa:Studiesin Economyand State,editedby
H. Bernsteinand B. K. Campbell.BeverlyHills, CA: Sage.
Giddens,Anthony.1984. TheConstitutionof Society:Outlineof the Theoryof Structuration.Berkeley:
Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Ginsborg,Paul. 1984. "The CommunistPartyand the AgrarianQuestionin SouthernItaly, 1943-48."
History WorkshopJournal 17:81-101.
GlavanisKathyand PandeliGlavanis,eds. 1990. TheRuralMiddleEast: Peasant Lives and Modes of
Production.London:Zed Books.
GoodmanDavid andMichaelRedclift. 1982.FromPeasant to Proletarian:CapitalistDevelopmentand
AgrarianTransitions.New York:St. Martin'sPress.
Griffin,Kieth. 1979. ThePolitical Economyof AgrarianChange:An Essay on the GreenRevolution,
Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress.
Harvey,David. 1989. The Conditionof Postmodernity:An Inquiryinto the Originsof CulturalChange.
Oxford:BlackwellBlackwell.
Hobsbawm,Eric. 1992. "TheCrisis of Today's Ideologies."New Left Review, 192:55-64.
Hollist,W. Ladd,andF. LaMondTullis,eds. 1987. PursuingFood Security:Strategiesand Obstaclesin
Africa,Asia, LatinAmericaand the MiddleEast. Boulder,CO: LynneReinner.
Hope, CliffordR. 1951. "The U.S. Conceptof AgrarianReformas a Foundationfor World Peace."
Departmentof StateBulletin25(651):988-1000.
Huizer,Gerrit.1972. TheRevolutionaryPotentialof Peasantsin LatinAmerica.MA: LexingtonBooks.
Katzmann,M. T. 1978. "Colonizationas an Approachto RegionalDevelopment:NorthernParana,Bra-
zil." EconomicDevelopmentand CulturalChange26(4):797-24.
Kautsky,Karl. [1899] 1988. TheAgrarianQuestion,2 vols. Translatedby Pete Burgess. Winchester,
U.K.: Zwan Publications.
Kitching, Gavin. 1989. Developmentand Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective. New York:
Routledge.
Kruegger,Ann. 1986. "TheEffects of TradeStrategieson Growth."Pp. 216-221 in InternationalTrade
and Finance, edited by RobertBaldwinand J. David Richardson.Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company.
Landsberger,H. A., eds. 1969. LatinAmericanPeasantMovements.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.
Lappe,F. M., and J. Collins. 1986. WorldHunger:TwelveMyths.New York:Grove Weidenfeld.
Lee, Eddy,ed. 1981.Export-LedIndustrializationandDevelopment.Geneva:International LaborOffice.
Lehman,D. 1982. "AfterChayanovandLenin:New Pathsof AgrarianCapitalism."Journalof Develop-
mentEconomics11:133-161.
. 1986. "TwoPathsof AgrarianCapitalism,or a Critiqueof ChayanovianMarxism."Compara-
tive Studiesin Societyand History28(4):601-627.
Lenin, V. I. [1899] 1960. TheDevelopmentof Capitalismin Russia.Moscow:ForeignLanguagesPub-
lishing House.
Lenin,V.I. [1901] 1971a."TheWorkers'Partyand the Peasantry."Pp. 9-17 in Alliance of the Working
Class and the Peasantry,V.I. Lenin.Moscow:ProgressPublishers.
. [1905] 1971b."Reporton the Resolutionof the Supportof the PeasantMovement."Pp. 86-90 in
Alliance of the WorkingClass and the Peasantry,V. I. Lenin.Moscow: ProgressPublishers.
. [1907] 1971c."TheAgrarianProgrammeof Social-Democracyin the FirstRussianRevolution."
Pp. 155-163 in Allianceof the WorkingClass and the Peasantry,V. I. Lenin.Moscow:Progress
Publishers.
Llambi,L. 1988. "SmallModernfarmers:NeitherPeasantsnor Fully-FledgedCapitalist?"Journal of
Peasant Studies5(3):350-372.
. 1989. "Emergenceof CapitalizedFamily Farmsin Latin America."ComparativeStudies in
Society and History31(4):745-774.
QUARTERLY
. 1990. "Transition
to andWithinCapitalism:AgrarianTransitionsin LatinAmerica."Sociologia
Ruralis30(2):175-196.
Llambi,L., and A. Cousins.1989. "PettyCapitalistProductionin Agriculture:Lessons fromFive Case
Studiesin Venezuela.LatinAmericanPerspectives6(1):71-82.
Love, Joseph.1980."RaulPrebischandthe Originsof the Doctrineof UnequalExchange."LatinAmeri-
can ResearchReview. 15(3):45-72.
Lubin,I. 1951. "LandReformProblemChallengesFreeWorld."Departmentof StateBulletin,no. 638,
467-474.
Mallory,L.D. 1960. "TheLandProblemin the Americas."Departmentof StateBulletin. November28,
815-822.
Mamdani,Mahmood.1987. "ExtremeBut Not Exceptional:Towardsan Analysisof the AgrarianQues-
tion in Uganda."Journalof Peasant Studies 14(2):191-225.
Manfredi,E. M. 1978. WorldEconomicConditionsin Relationto AgriculturalTrade. Washington,
DC: US Departmentof Agriculture.
Mann, Susan. 1990. AgrarianCapitalismin Theoryand Practice. ChapelHill: Universityof North
CarolinaPress.
Martin,E. M. 1963. "TheEconomicRevolutionin Mexico."Departmentof StateBulletinDecember23,
959-963.
Marx,Karl.[1850] 1924. TheClass Strugglesin France: 1848-1850.New York:New YorkLaborNews
Company.
- [1852] 1972. TheEighteenthBrumaireof Louis Bonaparte.Moscow:ProgressPublishers.
- [1859] 1971. A Contributionto the Critiqueof Political Economy.London:Lawrenceand
Wishart.
- [1866] 1977. "Resultsof the ImmediateProcessof Production."Pp. 948-1084 in Capital,vol. 1.
New York:VintageBooks.
Marx,K. and FreidrichEngels. [1848] 1975. Manifestoof the CommunistParty. Peking: ForeignLan-
guages Press.
McMichael,Philip, ed. 1994, TheGlobalRestructuringof the Agro-FoodSystem.Ithaca: N.Y. Cornell
UniversityPress.
. 1993. "World Food System Restructuringunder a GATT Regime." Political Geography
12(3):198-214
. 1990. "Incorporating ComparisonWithina World-Historical Perspective."AmericanSociologi-
cal Review55(2):285-297.
McMichael,Philip and FrederickButtel. 1990. "New Directionsin the PoliticalEconomyof Agricul-
ture."SociologicalPerspectives33(1):89-109.
McMichael,PhilipandDavidMyhre.1991."GlobalRegulationvs. the NationState:Agro-FoodSystems
and the New Politics of Capital."Capitaland Class, 43: 83-106.
Meillassoux,Claude.1981. Maidens,Meal andMoney: Capitalismand theDomesticCommunity. Cam-
bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Mooney, Patrick.1988. My OwnBoss?: Class, Rationality,and the FamilyFarm. Boulder,CO: West-
view Press.
Morgan,Dan. 1977. Merchantsof Grain. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Morrow,R. B. and K. H. Sherper.1970."LandReformin SouthKorea."Pp. 1-6 in InternationalDevel-
opment,SpringReviewof LandReform,3. WashingtonD.C.: U.S. Departmentof State.
Nau, HenryR. 1978. "TheDiplomacyof WorldFoods:Goals, Capabilities,Issues,and Arenas."Inter-
national Organization32(3):775-809.
Ogura,T. 1968. "TheEconomicImpactof PostwarLandReformin Japan."LandReform,Land Settle-
ment and Cooperatives1, 14-43.
Parsons,Talcott. 1966. Societies:Evolutionaryand ComparativePerspectives.EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
Patnaik,Usta. 1987. Peasant Class Differentiation:A Study in Methodswith Referenceto Haryana.

Delhi: OxfordUniversityPress.
, ed. 1990. AgrarianRelationsand Accumulation:The "Modeof Production" Debate in India.
Delhi: OxfordUniversityPress.
Pellerin,Helene. 1993. "GlobalRestructuring in the WorldEconomyand Migration:The Globalization
of MigrationDynamics."InternationalJournal48(2):240-254.
Peltonen,Matti. 1993. "ThePeasantEconomyand the WorldMarket:FinnishPeasantFarmingin the
Age of AgrarianCrisis:1880's 1910's."Review:A Journalof theFernandBraudelCenterfor the
Studyof Economies,HistoricalSystemsand Civilizations16(3):357-378.
Plekhanov,G. V. [1885] 1961. SelectedPhilosophicalWorksvol 1. London:Lawrenceand Wishart.
, [1895] 1972. In Defense of Materialism:TheDevelopmentof the Monist Viewof History.New
York:International Publishers.
Rahman,Atiur. 1986. Peasants and Classes: A study in Differentiationin Bangladesh. London:Zed
Books.
Reinhardt,Nola. 1988. OurDaily Bread: ThePeasant Questionand FamilyFarmingin the Colombian
Andes.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Rey, P. P. 1975. "TheLineageMode of Production."Critiqueof Anthropology,3:17-79.
Richards,Alan. 1982. Egypt'sAgriculturalDevelopment.Boulder,CO: WestviewPress.
Richards,H. and R. L. Martin.1983. Migration,Mechanizationand AgriculturalLaborMarket,edited
by H. Richardsand R. L. Martin. Boulder,CO: WestviewPress.
Roberts,Bryan. 1978. Cities of Peasants. London:EdwardArnold.
, 1990. "Peasantsand Proletarians." AnnualReviewof Sociology 16:353-377.
Roseberry,William. 1982. Coffeeand Capitalismin the VenezuelanAndes.Austin:Universityof Texas
Press.
Rostow,W.W. 1963a."TheNationalizationof Takeoff."Departmentof StateBulletin,May 27, 824-829.
1963b. "EconomicDevelopment:Some Lessons of a CommonExperience."Departmentof
,
State Bulletin,September16, 422-430.
, 1964. "Shapingthe Future."Departmentof StateBulletinFebruary3, 177-183.
, 1971. TheStages of EconomicGrowth:A Non-Communist Manifesto.Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress.
Rowan,CarlT. 1962. "New Directionsin ForeignPolicy."Departmentof StateBulletinMarch5, 378-
381.
Roy, K. C. Clem Tisdell, and M. Alauddin.1992. "Rural-Urban Migrationand Povertyin South East
Asia."Journalof Contemporary Asia 22(1):57-71.
Ryan, A. 1970. ThePhilosophyof Social Sciences.London:Macmillan.
Saul, J. S., and R. Woods. 1987. "AfricanPeasantries."Pp. 80-88 in Peasants and Peasants Societies,
editedby TeodorShanin. New York:Basil Blackwell.
Sayer,Derek. 1887. The Violenceof Abstraction:TheAnalyticFoundationsof HistoricalMaterialism.
New York:Basil Blackwell.
Seddon,David and RonnieMargulies.1984. "ThePolitics of the AgrarianQuestionin Turkey:Review
of a Debate."Journalof Peasant Studies 11(3):28-59.
Shanin,Teodor,ed. 1984. Late Marxand the RussianRoad, Teodor Shanin. N.Y.: MonthlyReview
Press.
1987. "Introduction:Peasantryas a Concept."Pp.1-12in Peasantsand PeasantSocieties,edited
,
by Teodor Shanin.New York:Basil Blackwell.
, 1990, ed. Defining Peasants, editedby TeodorShanin. Cambridge:Basil Blackwell.
Sincular,D. T. 1991. "Pocketsof Peasantsin IndonesianCities:The Caseof Scavengers."WorldDevel-
opment19(2/3):137-162.
Singelmann,Peter, SergiuQuesado,Jesus Tapia. 1982. "LandWithoutLiberty:Continuitiesof Periph-
eralCapitalistDevelopmentandPeasantExploitationamongthe CaneGrowersof Morelos,Mex-
ico." LatinAmericanPerspectives9(3):29-46.
Vol. 36/No. 2/1995
Smith, Neil. 1984. UnevenDevelopment:Nature, Capital,and the Productionof Space. New York:
Basil Blackwell.
Springborg,Robert.1990. "RollingBack Egypt's AgrarianReform."MiddleEast Report20(5):28-35.
Stavenhagen,R., ed. 1970. AgrarianProblemsand Peasant Movementsin LatinAmerica,New York:
AnchorBooks.
Taussig, M. 1978. "PeasantEconomicsand the Developmentof CapitalistAgriculturein the Cauca
Valley, Colombia."LatinAmericanPerspectives5(3):62-92.
Thompson,E. P. 1965."Peculiaritiesof the English."Pp. 370-390 in TheSocialistRegister,editedby R.
Milibandand J. Saville. London:MerlinPress.
Thorner,Daniel. 1987. "PeasantEconomyas a Categoryin History"Pp. 62-68 in Peasantsand Peasant
Societies, editedby TeodorShanin.New York:Basil Blackwell.
Tomich,Dale. 1990. Slaveryin the Circuitof Sugar:Martiniqueand the WorldEconomy,1830-1848.
Baltimore,M.D.: JohnHopkinsUniversityPress.
Tubiana,Laurence.1989. "WorldTradein AgriculturalProducts:From Global Regulationto Market
Fragmentation." Pp. 23-46 in The InternationalFarm Crisis, edited by David Goodmanand
MichaelRedclift. London:Macmillan.
United Nations (UN). 1951. Measuresfor the EconomicDevelopmentof UnderdevelopedCountries.
New York:UN Publications.
. 1980. Patternsof Urbanand RuralGrowth.New York:U.N. Publications.
. 1988. WorldPopulationProspects.New York:UN Publications.
. 1990. WorldPopulationMonitoring1989: SpecialReport:ThePopulationSituationin the Less
DevelopedCountries.New York:UN Publications.
Vandergeest,Peter. 1989. "PeasantStrategiesin a WorldContext:Contingenciesin the Transformation
of Rice and Palm SugarEconomiesin Thailand."HumanOrganization48(2):117-125.
Vergopoulos,Kostas.1978. "CapitalismandPeasantProductivity." Journalof PeasantStudies5(4):446-
465.
Walicki,A. 1969. The Controversyover Capitalism.Oxford:ClarendonPress.
Walton,John,and David Seddon. 1994. Free Marketsand Food Riots. Cambridge:Basil Blackwell.
Weber,Max. [1903-1917] 1949. TheMethodologyof Social Sciences.Glencoe:Free Press.
Williams,Raymond.1973. The Countryand the City.London:Chattoand Windus.
Wisner,Ben. 1989. Power and Need in Africa.Trenton,N.J.: AfricaWorldPress.
Wolpe, Harold. 1972. "Capitalismand Cheap Labor-Powerin South Africa: From Segregationto
Apartheid."Economyand Society 1(4):425-456.
WorldBank. 1981, 1984, 1987, 1989. WorldDevelopmentReport.Washington,DC: The WorldBank.
"The World'sGrowingSlum Cities." 1994. Worldand L 9(4):268-273.

ARAGHI - 1995 - Global Depeasantization 1945 - 1990

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

ARAGHI - 1995 - Global Depeasantization 1945 - 1990

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Global Depeasantization, 1945-1990

Author(s): Farshad A. Araghi

Please directall correspondence

The SociologicalQuarterly,Volume 36, Number 2, pages 337-368.

advancesuch a perspective(Araghi 1991). To use AnthonyGiddens'sterminology(1984),

QUESTIONING THE "PEASANTQUESTION":REVIEWOF A DEBATE

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Modernityand the "DisappearanceThesis"

First, let us considermodernityand the "disappearance thesis." As the worldviewof the

Margulies1984). The progressionistframeof referenceand the presumptionof an end-state

extendedreproductionof capitalismdoes not dependon a generalor universalnecessity to

The RomanticReaction:The PermanenceThesis

The proponentsof the permanencethesis arguethatthe economiclaws thatgovernpeasant

trialismand antiurbanismin late nineteenth-century Russianpopulismthat characterizedthe

World peasantriesby outliningthe postwarinternationalorder(and disorder)and locating

plicationof the Americanexperienceguidedthe U.S. approachto ThirdWorldagriculturein

Table 1 * Changesin JapaneseLand Tenureby Cultivated

the structureof nationalpoliticalpower and the patternof landownershipin the countryside.

Year % OwnerFarmerFamilies! % TenantFarmerFamilies" Total

Threepointsshouldbe notedhere. First,in all cases a very substantialpartof the cultivated

Year % OwnerFarmedLand %Other Total

agriculture,productionprimarilyfor domesticmarkets,and exportdiversificationin lieu of

Table 4 * Changesin TaiwaneseLandTenureby Typeof Households,1948-1959

% OwnerFarmer %Part Owner-Farmer % Tenant-Farmer %FarmLaborers

been heavily dependenton statesupportas well as specializationin the productionof particu-

% OwnerFarmer %PartOwner-Farmers % Tenant-Farmer %Slash& Burn

redistributionof landor settlementof new agriculturalfrontiers.Althougha minoritybecame

Table 6 * Numberand AverageSize of SmallFarmsin LatinAmerica,1950-1980

Year Numberof Farms(millions) %Increase AverageFarmSize

1950 4.1 2.4

underthe aegis of the Americanstatein a way thatadvancedits hegemonicpositionwithinthe

Category %of TotalFarmUnits %of TotalCultivated

Large commercial agriculture 22 82

Latin America(Friedmann1982, p. 254), wheat or rice for maize in CentralAmerica and

Latin America' 50.6 35.3 15.3 48.3 32.4 15.9

Third,as a result,the new internationaldivision of laborin food productionincreasingly

underconsideration,a ratebelow 100 percentrepresentsa relativedecline. Mexico's rate of

MajorRegionand Country Period

Thus, on the one hand,as new peasantrieswere created,nationalprotectionof agriculture

Period Numberof People(in millions) %Increase %of RuralPopulation

Thus,not only did the internationalization of productionand consumptionof food operate

helped refine the objectiveof ThirdWorldstates from balancedgrowthto industrialization.

GNPper capita Percentageof Percentageof Labor Ratioof %RuralPopulationto

Given the global context,therefore,the contradictionsof capitalistdevelopmentin the South,

Percentageof UrbanLabor Percentageof RuralLabor

Morocco 1951 1.7 13.8

Withthe declineof U.S. hegemonyafter 1973,the worldhas entereda periodof prolonged

market-orientedspecializationas opposedto nationaldevelopmentalism(Lee 1981; GATT

Table 14 * ContinentalNet Ruralto UrbanMigration,1950-1975and 1975-1990

%ActualIncreasein %IncreaseAttributable Ratioof Increasedue to

ThirdWorld 1960-1975 81.9 55.7 67.9

%ActualIncreasein %IncreaseAttributable Ratioof IncreaseDue to

Third World 1950-1975 176.3 65.5 38.3

Africa 1355.2 1955.3 44.3

In this article,I have focused on the internationaldimensionof depeasantizationin the post

29. RaymondWilliams(1973, pp. 299-302), for example,mistakes"workon the land"with food

Archetti,E. and S. Aass. 1987. "PeasantStudies:An Overview."Pp. 107-129in InternationalPerspec-

Clairmonte,F. 1986. "Prebischand UNCTAD: The Banalityof a Compromise."Journalof Contempo-

GibbonP. andM. Neocosmos. 1985. "SomeProblemsin the PoliticalEconomyof 'AfricanSocialism.'"

Patnaik,Usta. 1987. Peasant Class Differentiation:A Study in Methodswith Referenceto Haryana.

You might also like