Heads up!

: a 2nd assignment is
coming to eClass tomorrow

Phil 102: Introduction

to Philosophy:
“Knowledge & Reality”
A sampler of questions and issues

Professor Amy M. Schmitter, Department of Philosophy

 Where we are . . . and where we are
2
going . . .
´ Last time, we looked at what sorts of questions metaphysics addresses:
´ Hard to get hold of, but also basic.
´ Plato’s theory of the “forms” gives us a picture of one kind of
answer,
´ We also have Aristotle’s description of “first philosophy.”
v Today, we will continue with a few points of contrast between Aristotle’s
and Plato’s metaphysics,
v Before turning to the reading on the schedule, from the Proslogion of (St.)
Anselm of Canterbury,
v which concentrates on one particular metaphysical issue:
v The existence of God.
v That’s not (just) a religious issue, but a metaphysical one.
v And Anselm gives an argument for it (“the ontological
argument”).
v So we can use it to practice using the philosophical tools of
conceptual analysis and deductive argument.
 The divided line (Republic 510a-511e)
3
The Good
Objects: States of soul:

Forms (e.g., the Knowledge,

understanding

f
do
Beautiful Itself, the (apprehending first
rl Pious, the Large) principles)
ing ble s,
wo
be lligi uly i
int at tr

Depends on and is explained by

Mathematical objects “thinking” (discursive
Wh
e

(e.g., the ideal triangle) reasoning using

hypotheses) (dianoia)
ng
mi
be rs,

Sensible particulars, Belief, (mere) opinion

co
of ea

examples (e.g., a beautiful

rld pp

cat, a pious act)

wo at a

Images, reflections, Completely uncritical “imagination”

Wh

shadows (apprehension by images)(eikasia)

 How Aristotle’s Approach
4
Differs from Plato’s
´ Many points of agreement:
´ Philosophy deals with wisdom that is desirable for its
own sake.
´ Particularly of “first causes and the principles of
things.”
´ And the higher and more comprehensive the
cause, the higher the form of knowledge.” (M I.i).
Aristotle ´ As is the case with questions of what it is to be.
´ But Aristotle conceives of how we build up to knowledge
(384–322 of principles and causes differently from Plato:
B.C.E) ´ sense-perception and memory give “experience” and a
kind of “know-how,” but restricted to instances
(particulars) already encountered, not causes.
´ Knowledge is concerned with “universals.”
´ Still, we can get to many forms of knowledge by
working from experience and generalizing.
v Aristotle’s understanding of universals is different
from Platonic forms, and so is the relation between
universals and particulars.
 Metaphysics, knowledge and
5 “Universals”
´ A universal is “what can be predicated of many” – a kind. E.g.
human being, not John, Sallie, or Igor.
´ Genuine knowledge is about universals:
´ For example, if one has medical “art” [technē], they understand
how to cure human beings in general, not just the experience
of what worked for Igor in the past.
´ Understanding universals is what enables teaching.
´ So, like Plato, Aristotle takes it that knowledge is directed at a
metaphysically different object from simple experience (sense-
perception and memory).
´ For Plato, those objects are separable forms.
´ For Aristotle, “universals” are kinds, rather than individuals, but
they do not exist separately from particular individuals.
´ Knowledge of many sorts (e.g., medical technē) is not a matter
of seeing through particulars to some separate world of pure
forms, but of generalizing from them.
 Just FYI, A bit more on Aristotle’s differences
in case you’re
interested . . .
6
with Plato
´ No knowledge, not even the highest kind of knowledge of first principles &
causes, has objects that exist in some separate world.
´ For Aristotle, universals would not exist if it were not for individuals –
universals are always predicated of, or attributed to individual things.
´ They describe the kinds that individuals can be grouped into, or the
properties individuals have, or the relations individuals enter into, or the
positions individuals take, or the activities individuals engage in, etc.
´ For example, Socrates is human, in the agora, snub-nosed, 1.75 meters
high, sitting, engaged in conversation, getting the side-eye, etc., etc.
´ All of these are ways of being, ways that depend on Socrates.
´ Socrates can be many things, and still remain one and the same.
´ Aristotle emphasizes the many ways in which something can be said to be –
but unlike Plato, takes them all to depend on individual things.
´ Individual things that have many aspects and properties, but remain one and
the same are the basic beings of Aristotle’s metaphysics.
´ Which he calls “substance” (ousia).
´ Aristotle still thinks that first philosophy (metaphysics) deals with first causes
and principles – they just do not exist separably from the individual things
that they explain.
´ Picking them out is a matter of conceptual analysis, not dealing with entirely
different objects.
 For these reasons, Aristotle’s metaphysics
7 is not like Plato’s – the divided line
doesn’t suit his approach
´ Aristotle offers many reasons for preferring his views to Plato’s
´ Better fit with the way the world appears to us
´ Better fit with common-sense concepts
´ Simpler model for explaining the structure of beings
´ Clearer conceptual analysis
´ A few fairly devastating arguments that are supposed to show that
Plato’s Forms cannot explain what they are supposed to explain:
´ E.g., “The Third Man Problem”
´ Tools in metaphysics:
´ Conceptual analysis
´ Arguments
´ Considerations of explanatory fit, simplicity and power
´ [Evaluating those requires understanding what the questions
that are to be explained are.]
8
Turning to Anselm
But first, some tools . . .
 Deductive Arguments
´ Deductive arguments: argument that are supposed to guarantee
This means
there are 2 their conclusions, such that if the premises are true, the conclusion
ways to must be true.
evaluate ´ An example from last week: Socrates’s argument against
arguments: do Meletus’s claim that Socrates deliberately makes the youth of the
they have the
city (in which he lives) worse.
right relation
between ! [0. Unstated: If somebody corrupts a person, that person becomes
premises and wicked]
conclusion ! 1. The wicked do harm to those around; the good benefit others.
(formally), and ! 2. Everybody wants benefits [the good], and does not want harm.
do they start
from true ! 3. If Socrates corrupts the youth in his city, he may be harmed. (by
premises? P0 and P1)
! 4. Socrates does not want to be harmed. (by P2)
Ø Socrates does not want to corrupt those around him. [”Either
[Socrates does] not corrupt the young, or, if [he does], it is
unwilling . . . ” (26a).]
 For more, see
resources in eClass, or
A Rulebook for
Arguments.
Varieties of Arguments
Ø Not all arguments are deductive . . .
Ø Sometimes we can give reasons for a conclusion, but the
reasons do not guarantee that the conclusion follows.
Ø E.g., causal arguments
Ø These arguments employ “defeasible” reasoning.

Ø There are also a variety of kinds of deductive arguments.

Ø One of the most powerful kinds is the reductio ad absurdum:
Guess who Ø Assume the opposite (negation) of the desired
uses a conclusion (Q).
reductio
argument? Ø Show that doing so leads to a contradiction (or more
generally, something impossible or absurd).
Ø This shows that the assumption must be false (it shows
that not not-Q).
Ø So the desired conclusion must be true.
 Anselm of Canterbury
(Saint & Archbishop)

´ Also known as Anselm of Bec (Benedictine

Abbey in Normandy, with a famous school).
´ At Bec, he wrote Monologion (1075-76) and
Proslogion (1077-78), among other works.
´ Anselm’s motto (often applied to Proslogion):
“faith seeking understanding” [fides quaerens
intellectum].
(1033-1109) ´ Proslogion, chap. 2 is the first appearance of the
(or “a”) ontological argument for the existence
of God.
´ Gaunilo(n) of Marmoutiers was another monk
at Bec; wrote “On Behalf of the Fool” (after
1078).
Anselm’s Ontological Argument
(the “single argument that needed nothing but
itself alone for proof”)

´ P1: That than which nothing greater can be thought can be

thought.
´ P2: If that than which nothing greater can be thought can be
thought, it exists in reality.
v Conclusion: That than which nothing greater can be
thought exists in reality.

v Chapter 3 Conclusion: That than which nothing greater can

be thought cannot be thought not to exist.
 More detailed analysis
´ “God” = that than which nothing greater can be thought (NGCT)
´ We think of NGCT.
Ø Therefore (P1), NGCT can be thought (is conceivable).
Ø To think of something is to have it in the understanding.
Ø That is, it has a kind of existence in the understanding)
´ Something that exists in the understanding can also exist in reality (actuality).
Ø Conceivability à Possibility (of actual existence)
´ It is greater to exist in reality than just in the intellect.
Ø Actuality is “greater than” conceivability or possibility.
Ø (We might understand this as having more being . . .)
Ø And we can think of something as existing in reality (or not).
´ The reductio (proof by contradiction or indirect proof):
q Assume the negation: NGCT exists only in the understanding.
q But it is greater to exist in reality.
q So if NGCT were only in the understanding, it would not be NGCT.
´ Therefore NGCT exists in reality:
v “Therefore, there is no doubt that NGCT exists both in the understanding and
in reality.”
´ “This NGCT exists so truly that it cannot even be thought not to exist” (ch. 3).
 The Nature of this argument
Not Anselm’s
´ Why is it called the “ontological argument”? title; it comes
v Argues from concept of God to existence of God much later.
Ø NGCT exists in the understanding à possible existence
Ø If this being is possible, then it must exist
Ø NGCT has necessary existence.
Ø Conceivability of NGCT à Possibility of NGCT à necessity of
NGCT
Ø What do you think of the argument?
Ø Does it work to establish the conclusion?
Ø Are these two claims the same, or necessarily connected?:
o “Therefore, there is no doubt that NGCT exists both in the
understanding and in reality.” (ch. 2)
o “This NGCT exists so truly that it cannot even be thought
not to exist” (ch. 3).
ü Something to think about: how would somebody go about
trying to show a problem with the argument?
 How Anselm Conceives of God
´ “That than which nothing greater can be thought”
Is this
like
´ “The divine nature,” embodies everything that can be thought, Plato’s
absolutely speaking, better for something to be than not to be”. Good?
´ Attributes:
Ø Self-existent (chap. 5),
Ø Creator ex nihilo (chap. 5),
Ø Supremely good, just, truthful, etc. (chap. 5),
Ø Omnipotent (chap. 6),
Ø Understood in whatever way is positive (so cannot be corrupted,
lie, etc.) (chap. 7),
Ø Not in time or space (chap. 13, 19, reply),
Ø No beginning or end,
There are Ø Indivisible, without parts, “simple” (chap. 18),
other Ø Transcendent (chap. 20),
conceptions Ø Greater than what can be thought (chap. 15).
of God
Ø What most is, the “one necessary thing,” complete, total and only
good (chap. 22-23).
´ Classic theistic notion of God: all the positive, omni-properties,
metaphysically “perfect.”
 We continue with this topic
next week
´ In particular, we will see some criticisms offered by the
monk Gaunilon,
´ And Anselm’s response,
´ As well as a modern criticism from J.L. Mackie.
´ There’s also some optional reading and an optional
video lecture in eClass:
´ A different sort of argument for God’s existence –
Thomas Aquinas’s (also a saint) “cosmological”
argument,
´ And a (very funny) criticism from David Hume.
´ For more on arguments, see A Rulebook for
Arguments, and other resources in eClass.
v [This is completely optional.]