Phil 102: Introduction

to Philosophy:
“Knowledge & Reality”
A sampler of questions and issues

Professor Amy M. Schmitter, Department of Philosophy

 Plan for the week
2
´ Remember your first assignment is due this evening!
´ Way to get started with analyzing philosophical questions in
writing.
This week:
´ Delving more into metaphysics, or “first philosophy”
´ First, an example: Plato’s notion of the “forms” (Eidos, pl. Eidē)
´ And his analogy with the sun and the model of the divided line
´ Then, Aristotle’s description of “first philosophy.”
´ (and a few points about its contrasts with Plato’s metaphysics.)
´ On Wednesday, we will turn to a particular issue and a particular
argument in the Proslogion of (St.) Anselm of Canterbury
´ An argument for the existence of God (“the ontological argument”)
´ Which leads him to an analysis of the various attributes that this
“God” (which must exist) has.
´ “Theistic” conception of God
´ With Anselm’s Proslogion, we will be doing hard-core metaphysics
(”special metaphysics”)
´ Using tools of conceptual analysis and deductive argument.
 3 Metaphysics!
´ What is metaphysics?
´ ”1a. The branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles
of things or reality, including questions about being, substance,
time and space, causation, change, and identity (which are
presupposed in the special sciences but do not belong to any one
of them); theoretical philosophy as the ultimate science of being
Examples of and knowing.” (Oxford English Dictionary, first of the 4
metaphysical “philosophical and related uses”)
issues, but too ´ “Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that studies the essence
narrow of a thing. This includes questions of being, becoming, existence,
and reality.” (“Metaphysics,” Wikipedia)
´ “It is not easy to say what metaphysics is. . . .” (Peter van
Inwagen, “Metaphysics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
´ The title of the various books that Aristotle considered “first
philosophy” given by a later editor, because it appeared after the
works on nature (the Physics)
´ What does Socrates want to know about in the ”Phaedo” selections?
´ Causes
´ . . . But in what sense?
 “True causes” in the Phaedo
4 ´ Causes [aitia] give explanations.
´ Explanations of how things change & become (something else)
(see Phaedo 96a)
´ Explanations of what things are made up of (see Phaedo 98c)
´ Explanations of what it is to be
´ Explanations of why things are the way they are:
´ “If one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or
perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be,
or to be acted upon, or to act.” (97c-d)
´ In contrast to, e.g., Anaxagoras who would say that “the reason
[Socrates is] sitting here is because [his] body consists of bones and
sinews . . . “ (98c).
´ This is to “neglect to mention the true causes” . . .
´ “Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause from that
without which the cause would not be able to act as a cause.”
(99b)
´ Why is this sort of explanation not a true cause?
´ It does not suffice to explain why Socrates is there (in prison),
´ It is not a reason; it only gives the material conditions.
´ Can keep on asking why the material conditions are as they are.
 5 The “Forms” (Eidos, Idea) as
Textual note: true causes
The
Euthyphro
does not say ´ What would Socrates consider a true cause?
anything as ´ “I am going to show you the kind of cause with which I have
explicit as concerned myself . . .” (100b).
this. Both the
Phaedo and ´ Working from particular examples of beautiful, good, or great
the Republic things, “I assume the existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself, of a
seem to have Good and a Great and all the rest. . . . if there is anything
been written beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other
later. In
reason than that it shares in that Beautiful.”
them, Plato
offers ´ The ”Form” of X itself is the true cause that Socrates (Plato)
explanations seeks.
of what
Socrates ´ “Form” or “Idea” or even “Kind” [εἶδος or eidos]
seemed to be ´ The Theory of Forms is a theory of what most is – a theory of
looking for being.
in the earlier
dialogues.
 Sharing in the forms.
6
The Taj Mahal is beautiful.
This cat is beautiful.
Examples of beautiful
particular things
That is, the form (Eidos)
of Beauty, which is
completely (perfectly)
beautiful and explains
what it is to be
beautiful.
Pyramid Lake is beautiful.
This drawing is beautiful.
´ Why assume the separate “existence of a Beautiful, itself by itself?”
´ None of these things is the Beautiful, itself by itself: they are
beautiful, but not the being of beauty; they are only imperfectly
beautiful.
´ The Taj Mahal could fall into ruins; Pyramid Lake could become
polluted; The drawing could be stained; The cat could get
dandruff and mange.
Ø Then, they would become not-beautiful.
´ That the cat is beautiful is not the same and doesn’t explain why
the Taj Mahal is beautiful.
´ We can ask what makes these things beautiful – why they are
beautiful.
´ Plato’s answer: they “share” in the Beautiful itself.
´ For these particular things to be (imperfectly) beautiful, there must
be a separate Form of the Beautiful that remains what it is even if the
particulars change.
 The Metaphysical & Epistemological
7 Picture in the Sun Analogy
´ The Sun Analogy (508a-509e ) from the Republic.
´ In order for seeing to take place, there must be both eyes with
the power to see and things that can be seen.
´ But both are enabled by “a third thing” – light.
´ Which gives the eye its ability to see & makes things visible.
´ The (ultimate) source of light is the sun.
´ This is an analogy for what is needed for knowing.
Ø . . . . or understanding, or even just thinking.
´ How does the analogy work?
´ In order for there to be knowing, we must have the ability to
know (understand, or think) and there must be things that are
knowable (understandable, intelligible, thinkable).
´ What enables both our faculty of understanding (what Plato calls
“our soul”) and the intelligibility of knowable things . . . ?
 The analogy between sun and
8 the Good
´ What enables both our faculty of understanding and the
intelligibility of knowable things?
´ The ultimate source of intellectual illumination is “the This is a
Good:” pretty
mysterious
´ “what gives the truth to what is known and the notion, but
ability to know to the knower, . . . the cause of try to see
knowledge and truth” (508d-e). the role it is
´ But “in objects of knowledge, not only is the ability playing.
to be known present, thanks to the Good, but also
being and reality is in them because of it, although
the Good is not being, but reaches even farther
beyond it in rank and power” (509b).
´ The Good is something distinct from both the soul
and the individual Forms (which the soul tries to
know) -- it illuminates and enables them.
´ The good is the ultimate cause of the being of what is and
of what is known: it makes them what they are, explains
them and gives them a reason and unity.
 The picture continued: The divided line
(Republic 510a-511e)
9
The Good
Objects: States of soul (mental states):

Forms (e.g., the Knowledge,

of

Beautiful Itself, the understanding

rld

Pious, the Large) (apprehending first

ing ble s,
wo

principles)
be lligi uly i
int at tr

Depends on and is explained by

Mathematical objects “thinking” (discursive
Wh
e

(e.g., the ideal reasoning using

triangle) hypotheses) (dianoia)
ng
mi
be rs,

Sensible particulars, Belief, (mere) opinion

co
of ea

examples (e.g., a beautiful

rld pp

cat, a pious act)

wo at a

Metaphysical

Images, reflections, Completely uncritical “imagination”

Wh

dependence

shadows (apprehension by images)(eikasia)

Nothingness (not-being)??
 ´ Born in Macedonia, in Stagira (called “the Stagirite,” as well
as “the Peripatetic,” “the Philosopher.”)
10
´ Student of Plato; after Plato’s death went to several places in
present-day Turkey, before returning to Macedon to tutor the
son of Philip of Macedon – Alexander the Great.
´ Later returned to Athens to found his own school, the
Lyceum; left (perhaps under threat) just before he died.
´ Cicero said that if Plato’s prose was silver, Aristotle’s was a
flowing river of gold.
´ Probably less than 15% of Aristotle’s work survives.

Some ´ Lost works include dialogues and popular works.

´ What we have were “esoteric” and probably mostly lecture
Context notes, first drafts, and maybe students’ notes.
´ (The situation is almost the exact opposite of Plato!)
for ´ His works circulated very, very widely throughout the
Aristotle ancient world (especially around the Mediterranean).
Gradually lost to western Europe, while a number were
(384–322 preserved in the Byzantine and Arabic world.
´ Influential in medieval Persian, Arabic, and Jewish
B.C.E) philosophy
´ In the twelfth century, were reintroduced in the Latin west,
and became the standard for much of European philosophy
for several centuries.
 Aristotle’s Conception of
11 Metaphysics This is an
example of
how
Here you see ´ Philosophy begins in wonder [thaumazein], and all humans
Aristotle
an important desire knowledge for its own sake.
often begins
distinction ´ Furthermore, “all men suppose what is called Wisdom to – with what
between deal with the first causes and the principles of things; . . , and is
theory and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature commonly
production of Wisdom than the productive. Clearly then Wisdom is believed.
(or practice) knowledge about certain principles and causes. (Plato
– theoretical ´ And the higher and more comprehensive the cause, the would agree
knowledge is higher the form of knowledge.” (Met I.i). with both
for its own claims.)
sake, not as a ´ How can we build up to knowledge of principles and
means to causes?:
some other ´ sense-perception and memory give “experience” and a
end. kind of “know-how,” but restricted to instances
(particulars) already encountered, not causes.
´ Humans, however, can generalize from sense-perception
and memory to develop the kind of (productive)
knowledge he calls art [technē].
´ That’s because Aristotle thinks technē is concerned with
“universals.”
 Metaphysics and “Universals”
12
´ What is a “universal?”
´ “What can be predicated of many” – a kind. E.g. human being,
not John, Sallie, or Igor.
´ To have genuine medical “art” (technē) would enable an
understanding of how to cure human beings in general.
´ But somebody might have some experience that giving Igor vodka
in the past happened to clear up his lumbago, without knowing
how to cure humans in general.
´ Technē (knowledge of the universal) is what enables teaching
(because that’s what teachers try to pass on).
´ Experience gives a different kind of know-how, but also involves a
metaphysical difference in object.
´ To explain these differences in the kinds of object, Plato appealed to
separable forms.
´ Instead, Aristotle brings in the idea of “universals” – that is kinds,
rather than individuals.
´ Technē not a matter of seeing through particular examples, but
of generalizing from them.
´ They do not exist in some separate world of being.
 Just FYI, A bit more on Aristotle’s differences
in case you’re
interested . . .
13
with Plato
´ No knowledge, not even the highest kind of knowledge of first principles &
causes, has objects that exist in some separate world.
´ For Aristotle, universals would not exist if it were not for individuals –
universals are always predicated of, or attributed to individual things.
´ They describe the kinds that individuals can be grouped into, or the
properties individuals have, or the relations individuals enter into, or the
positions individuals take, or the activities individuals engage in, etc.
´ For example, Socrates is human, in the agora, snub-nosed, 1.75 meters
high, sitting, engaged in conversation, getting the side-eye, etc., etc.
´ All of these are ways of being, ways that depend on Socrates.
´ Socrates can be many things, and still remain one and the same.
´ Aristotle emphasizes the many ways in which something can be said to be –
but unlike Plato, takes them all to depend on individual things.
´ Individual things that have many aspects and properties, but remain one and
the same are the basic beings of Aristotle’s metaphysics.
´ Which he calls “substance” (ousia).
´ Aristotle still thinks that first philosophy (metaphysics) deals with first causes
and principles – they just do not exist separably from the individual things
that they explain.
´ Picking them out is a matter of conceptual analysis, not dealing with entirely
different objects.
 For these reasons, Aristotle’s metaphysics
14 is not like Plato’s – the divided line
doesn’t suit his approach
´ Aristotle offers many reasons for preferring his views to Plato’s
´ Better fit with the way the world appears to us
´ Better fit with common-sense concepts
´ Simpler model for explaining the structure of beings
´ Clearer conceptual analysis
´ A few fairly devastating arguments that are supposed to show that
Plato’s Forms cannot explain what they are supposed to explain:
´ E.g., “The Third Man Problem”
´ Tools in metaphysics:
´ Conceptual analysis
´ Arguments
´ Considerations of explanatory fit, simplicity and power
´ [Evaluating those requires understanding what the questions
that are to be explained are.]