Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas

I. Plato’s Allegory of the Cave.

A. What is going on?

1. What happens to the prisoner, and what does it all mean?
-In the Allegory of the Cave, what do the shadows, statues, real things, and
the Sun represent? Who are the “puppeteers”?
-What is the significance of the ascent, and of the prisoner having to turn
his head and whole body toward the light (515c, 518c-d)?
--Think of this in terms of the head corresponding to reason in the
soul, chest to spirit, and gut to appetite.
2. What happens to the Prisoner when he returns to the Cave?
-Here we should hear an echo of the fate of Socrates.
-We might also discern—as early Christians did—a foreshadowing of the
mission and fate of Jesus Christ.
B. What does it represent?
1. Plato’s Allegory of the Cave proposes that the ordinary Athenian (or American,
etc.) is in a somewhat similar predicament: We think we are dealing with reality
and know what is important and good, but really we are living among echoes and

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shadows. We need to be turned around, head and body, and helped up the steep
rough path and into the light of day.
2. What are these shadows? They are the opinions we receive and uncritically
accept from our society (or our peers) about human nature, goodness, justice, etc.
They might be close to truth (if we are lucky) or far from it (if we are not), but
either way, it is a matter of luck.
-Consider sexism in Victorian England, racism in the Jim Crow South, or
the society of Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451.
-Can we escape the Cave simply by “being authentic,” thinking critically,
choosing our own way, etc.?
--What would a “free-thinker” in one of the above societies look
like?
-Plato thinks not (unless this critical thinking is done in a special way, as
part of a larger process of moral education, the ascent from the Cave).
3. Plato thinks that only if we ascend into the light of the Sun (the Form of the
Good) and see things as they really are (the Forms of Justice etc.) are we able to
make informed critical judgments and come to knowledge. With this knowledge,
we could, in the Cave of ordinary political life, tell which shadows (or statues) are
the best resemblances of real things.
-This would mean, e.g., knowing which of the actions the prisoners think
just really are, or are close to being, just (or courageous, etc.).
C. What is the upshot?
1. What does the Prisoner know when he knows the Forms?
-Among other things, the essence of goodness, justice, courage, etc.
-He knows which actions and ways of life are good and evil, right and
wrong, just or unjust.
-He knows the true moral theory and how to live by it
2. How does he come to know?
-Partly, Plato says, through philosophical education.
-But also through moral education, the acquisition of a certain character
--This is the significance of the head (reason) turning toward the
light (truth), but needing to be followed by the chest (ambition,
fear, hope, etc.) and gut (appetite).
--If they do not follow, they will lead, pull the head back around to
concern for reputation, pleasure, etc.

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--The Cardinal Virtues:

---Wisdom turns the head toward the light and helps it see
clearly
---Courage brings the heart under the rule of the head
(aligns fear, ambition, anger, etc. with reason)
---Temperance brings the gut under the rule of the head
(helps restrain appetites as directed by reason)
---Justice is the overall harmony of the parts of the soul; it
can be considered a form of spiritual health and integrity
3. The theories we’re looking at each try to provide the relevant philosophical
education; they pay differing amounts of attention to the character piece Plato
stresses.

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III. Introduction to Aristotle.

A. Brief Bio.
-Macedonian, lived 384-322 BC
-Student of Plato, tutor to Alexander
-Philosopher, member of Plato’s Academy, founder of Lyceum
-Composed works on logic, biology and other natural sciences, metaphysics,
rhetoric, political science, and ethics
-“The Philosopher”: Important figure in later Greek thought, dominant influence
on medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian philosophical thought
B. A Word on the Nicomachean Ethics:
-Edited set of lecture notes (explains occasional choppiness)
-Its topic is the moral life, the pursuit of happiness or flourishing, which is
attained through the exercise of the moral virtues (justice, generosity, courage,
etc.). It focuses on neither rules (Kant) nor consequences (Mill), but rather on
character, virtue (as does Plato).
-The Ethics is divided in to ten “books” (chapters); each book is further divided
into “chapters” (sections)—I.7 = book one chapter seven
-There are alphanumeric designators in the margins (e.g., 1129b5), called Bekker
numbers. These refer to the page (1129), column (b), and line (5) of the standard
edition of the complete works of Aristotle (they are needed due to the many
different editions of Aristotle’s works—the passage “Though human beings pray
for these and pursue them …” is on p. 68 of the Irwin translation I have; it may be
on p. 82 of a different edition you have, but we can both locate it by going to
1129b5).

IV. The Reading Questions:

 What is it that everything seeks?
 What is the point of the first paragraph of I.2?
 “Happiness” (eudaimonia) is introduced in I.4 as the common name for what?
 What are the “three most favored lives” (I.5)?
 Are any other likely candidates missing?
 What does Aristotle himself take to be “the human good” (I.7)?
 What are the three types of goods discussed in I.8, and which are needed for happiness?
 If Aristotle thinks that our final end is our own happiness, does this make his theory
egoistic? Why or why not (consider what he means by “happiness” or eudaimonia)?

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 How do we acquire a virtue such as temperance (II.4)? Besides being what a virtuous
person would do, what criteria must an action meet to count as being a virtuous action
(these criteria concern that state of the person doing them)?
 In II.5, Aristotle mentions three “conditions of soul”—what are they, which does Aristotle
say virtue is, and why?
 Looking at II.6, and in particular at 1106a23-24 and 1107a1-9, put in your own words
what a virtue is.
 In II.7, we are given a list of particular virtues, which Aristotle reads “from the chart.”
Where does he get this list—is it simply a catalogue of contemporary Athenian views, or
is there some ground for listing these? Are these virtues outdated, or do they apply to us
today, and to all?

 What is it that everything seeks? We seek X (=?), and X is thus an end for us.
Must the things we pursue be good, or must we at least think them good? In what
sense of “good”?
In action we may pursue, as an end, simply an activity itself (a game of pick-up
basketball, exchanging funny stories) or a product (a paper, a bridle). But these
ends themselves may be pursued for the sake of (FSO) some further end, which
itself may be pursued FSO some still further end … E.g., what is the end of
producing a bridle, and what is the end of that (see I.1)? What further ends might
a game of basketball serve?
“A for the sake of B” … A a means to B, or, A a part of B
 What is the point of the first paragraph of I.2?
“Final End”: Can a chain of ends stretch on forever, without end (pun foreseen but
not intended)?
Aristotle goes on to say that we should learn what the best good is so that, in
thinking about how to live, we will, like archers, have a target to aim at.

 “Happiness” is introduced in I.4 as the common name for what?

Happiness (eudaimonia, flourishing, “living well and doing well”) is the name of
“the highest of all goods achievable in action;” this is the “best good” from I.2; it
is the final end of human life. Aristotle says that “the many and the cultivated”
agree on this … does this give us our target to aim at—i.e., if we know that
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happiness is our final end, does this tell us how to live; if not, what do we still
need to know?

 What are the “three most favored lives” (I.5)? Are any other likely candidates missing?

The three most favored lives are common conceptions of what a happy life is …
what are they? How does Aristotle assess them? Are there any common or
plausible conceptions of a happy life that simply do not make his list?

 What does Aristotle himself take to be “the human good” (I.7)?

Aristotle first states that the human good (=happiness=our final end) must be
complete (choiceworthy FSO itself and not FSO anything further) and thus self-
sufficient (all by itself it makes life choiceworthy and lacking nothing). Why
would our final end need to be complete and self-sufficient? Think of it this way:
if it failed to be complete or self-sufficient, could it be our final end, or would it
leave us seeking something further (and thus not be final)?
Measure the “most favored lives,” or other conceptions of happiness, by these
criteria—how do they do?
Aristotle thinks that the human good “proves to be … ” (1098a17). He means that
we have a “function” or characteristic activity—human lives have certain features
determined by our species or form of life as rational animals, and that for them to
be good human lives, this activity must be done well=with excellence=with (or
“in accord with”) virtue. To grasp fully what he means, we’ll need to see just what
he means by virtue, and what he thinks the virtues are.
Why does he add, “in a complete life”? Can we not be happy for a short time?

 What are the three types of goods discussed in I.8, and which are needed for happiness?

How might a loss of goods of the body (health, beauty, fitness) affect your
chances to live a happy life?
What about external goods (wealth, friends, and decent political community)?
And goods of the soul (good habits or virtues, skills, pleasure, knowledge)?
Notice how this puts requirements on the life of virtue (e.g. it must be pleasant),
and also qualifies it (a life of virtue deprived of external or bodily goods will not

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be happy) … thus qualified, the human good turns out to be something like “a life
of virtuous activity in friendly circumstances”).

 If Aristotle thinks that our final end is our own happiness, does this make his theory
egoistic? Why or why not?
Consider what he means by “happiness” or eudaimonia.
Consider also a point guard analogy: If you had the goal of being the best point
guard you can be, would that be selfish? Why or why not?

V. Virtue and the Virtues.

 The “genus” of virtue:

Actuality ----- Feeling, Action

Intermediate ----- State, Disposition, Habit Virtues (and vices) here
Potential ----- Capacity
 Virtues are excellences, good habits. In Ethics II.6 1107a, Aristotle defines virtue,
roughly, as a disposition that is a mean b/n two vices (one of excess and one of
deficiency), and that governs both actions and feelings IAW reason, so that one
does and feels neither too much nor too little.
 Lion/child/jeep example
 Virtues: Are a mean, feel the mean, perceive the mean, do the mean

 So, how do we acquire habits? And how do we ensure those habits are good ones?

 What are the virtues (which traits are virtues) … to live well, we must live well in each
area or field of our lives. E.g., dealing with frustration might be one field of life.
 What other fields of life are there, and are any of them universal (common to
ancient Athens, medieval Europe, current America or China or Ethiopia)?

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 Plato individuated the virtues by looking to the parts of the soul. Aristotle thought
the soul had similar parts: Reason (practical and theoretical), Irascible Appetite
(seat of emotions such as ambition, fear, daring, hope; similar to Plato’s Spirit),
and Concupiscible Appetite (desire, love, aversion; similar to Plato’s Appetite)—
the latter two he says are not rational but are amenable to the rule of reason—
what does this mean, and why is it important?

 Nevertheless, he individuates the virtues differently. In II.7 Aristotle gives a list

and initial descriptions of the moral virtues. It looks like a laundry list, but in fact
he recognizes certain universal dimensions or fields of activity w/n human life,
and assigns a virtue(s) to govern each:

Dangers Pleasures/Pains Frustrations Possessions Honors Social Intercourse Dues Deliberation

Courage Temperance Mildness Generosity “Ambition” Good Humor Justice Prudence
Magnificence Magnanimity Civility
Truthfulness

VI. Aristotle on some particular virtues.

A. Friendliness or Civility (see Ethics IV.6).
1. Virtue are means or middle points between vices. What are the vices friendliness lies
between, and what are they like?

2. What is friendliness like? What is its attitude toward causing pleasure or pain? In what
sense does it treat “familiar companions and strangers without distinction,” and in what
sense does it treat them differently?

3. Is friendliness (or civility as it might be called) just a social nicety, or is it morally

important enough to be considered a moral virtue? Why or why not.

B. Justice (Ethics V).

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1. The lawful and the fair—what is good for the city, good for citizens. Justice is the
disposition to give to the other what is due to him or her (or it—the other might be an
organization or the city as a whole).

2. Kinds of Justice.
a. Legal or General Justice. This concerns chiefly the common good of the
community, and is the virtue of the good and law-abiding citizen, giving what is due to
the city (taxes, military service, obedience to laws) and to its citizens as prescribed by
law (e.g., not cheating or stealing).
b. Special Justice. This concerns chiefly the good of individual others, and deals
with the unfair or the overreaching. Aristotle gets at this with the example of two men
who commit adultery, one from appetite and the other in order to make a profit—the
first is essentially intemperate and accidentally does what is unjust; the second is unjust
and only accidentally does what is contrary to temperance (I don’t mean he commits
adultery “by accident,” just that intemperate pleasure is not what his primary aim).
i. Distributive. This has to do with the city’s distribution of wealth and
honors to its citizens in a way proportionate to their worth.
ii. Commutative. Deals with involuntary and voluntary transactions
between individual citizens.
-Exchange. The paradigm example concerns economic trade.
Our mutual needs ensure that we need to trade with each other
(products for services for currency …), and here justice ensures fairness
in the trading. Other forms of exchange are covered too: murder,
robbery, assault, slander—these would all be instances of commutative
injustice.

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-Rectification. When one citizen has done injustice to another,

this must be rectified by the offender being required to make amends to
restore the equality that was disrupted.
a. Decency. The laws are universal in character, but sometimes special situations
arise that require special consideration that could not be written into law in advance.
Decency is the virtue that allows for rectification of the letter of the law IAW the spirit of
the law.
1. E.g., a judge exercising leniency, or a private person taking less than
one is strictly entitled to by the law.
2. (For Jane Austen fans) Consider Darcy’s treatment of Wickham with
respect to the execution of his (Darcy’s) father’s will.
C. At least two large questions arise:
1. First, who is missing on the schematic above? What is owed to non-citizens? (In the
Biblical terms Aquinas will later use, “Who are my neighbors”—only fellow-citizens??)
2. What if the laws of our city are themselves unjust? (What if our city rests in a
particularly deep and dark recess of the Cave—Nazi Germany, Jim Crow South, the
society of Fahrenheit 451?)
D. Aristotle is not without some answers—he offers a few remarks on natural affinity between all
human beings, and on natural justice as a standard. But, we find these ideas much more developed in
Aquinas.

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VII. Introduction to Aquinas.

A. Biographical details for St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274):
-Seventh son in a noble Italian family
-Groomed for an abbacy at a Benedictine Monastery, but chose the Dominican Order
-Kidnapped by family and held for a year in a family castle (prostitute sent in to
tempt him away from life in a begging order; chased out w/ hot poker)
-Studied under Albert the Great, and served two tours as regent master at Paris
-Stopped writing months before his death after a vision made all he had written “seem
as straw”—had the Biblical book about romantic/religious love, Song of Songs, read to
him on his deathbed
-Some of his teachings condemned by the Bishop of Paris in 1277—Canonized in 1323
--“Official” philosopher of the Catholic Church? Not really.
B. Reading the Summa.
a. The basic form of Scholastic argument is the disputation: In the university classroom, a
question is taken up. Authorities and arguments are assembled for opposing answers, perhaps
by the teaching master, perhaps by the students. The master puts forward and argues for his
own position, and then replies to opposing arguments. The Summa reflects this format.
b. Structure: -Parts Ia. God, Providence, and Creation
Ia-IIae. The Moral Life as the pursuit of “happiness” (beatitudo,
blessedness, flourishing)—this concerns how human beings
establish the right relation to God and to each other; law, grace,
and the virtues as the core of the moral life.
IIa-IIae. The Theological Virtues (Faith, Hope, Love) and Cardinal
Virtues (Prudence, Justice, Courage, Temperance).
IIIa. Christ and Sacraments.
IV. Supplementum. Drawn from other works, completed after his
death.
-Each Part is composed of Questions concerning a topic such as the
essence of law.
-Each Question is composed of Articles taking up particular issues within
that topic, such as whether law is concerned with the common good
rather than the good of the ruler.
c. Articles: Objections to the position he will stake out (often drawn from
philosophical or theological predecessors)
On the contrary: A citation of a consideration in favor of his position
(often a passage of Scripture or from a recognized authority).
Response: Aquinas’s own argument for his position.

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Replies to the objections.

d. The structure of the article reveals something: Aquinas sees himself as working
within, summarizing, and developing a tradition. His attitude is one of deep respect for those
who have written before him (Christians and “pagans” alike), but clearly not one of servile
acceptance. He seeks to capture the truth in each opinion, and to reconcile them where
possible, but always bases his own view on argument.

VIII. Human and Natural Law.

A. From the basic idea that a law is a rule governing human actions in society, Aquinas moves to
a precise definition: Law is an ordinance of reason, for the common good, made by the one who has care
of the community (proper authority, say a duly elected legislature), and promulgated (made publicly
known).
B. Yet some human laws are unjust, and may or even should be disobeyed—we need to be able
to appeal to some standard beyond human law to judge whether a law is reasonable, or truly serves the
common good. Consider the following:
One may well ask, "How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?"
The answer is found in the fact that there are two types of laws: there are just laws,
and there are unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that "An unjust law is no
law at all." Now, what is the difference between the two? How does one determine
when a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares with the
moral law, or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the
moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law
that is not rooted in eternal and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is
just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust.
-Martin Luther King, A Letter from Birmingham Jail
C. The natural law is the moral law based upon our nature as rational animals, and provides a
standard by which to judge human laws.

IX. The Structure and Content of Natural Law.

-First Principle of Practical Reason: Good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided (94.2)
-Universal Precepts:
--Act rationally and virtuously (94.3, 4) [live well, pursue eudaimonia] }
--God is to be loved above all (103.3ad1, 11) } Goods to be done
--Neighbor is to be loved as self (103.3ad1, 11) } and pursued
---Fulfill special obligations to do good to neighbors (100.5) }
---Evil is to be done to no one (100.3) } Evil to be avoided
-Natural goods that are ends laid down by our nature, and their contraries, natural evils (94.2): As
sentient, social, and rational animals we have “natural inclinations” toward the following (and away from
their contraries).

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--Life
--Procreation and Education of children
--Life in society (protected and respected place in society)
--Understanding
-Particular Precepts (derived from the above, e.g. from “evil is to be avoided” and “this is evil”):
--Murder is to be avoided (or, murder is wrong)
--Adultery is wrong
--Stealing is wrong
--Lying is wrong …
A few words on absolutes
-Some precepts admit of exceptions: One example he gives is, “Return borrowed items” (don’t
give a weapon back to a madman, e.g.). Aquinas thinks that stealing is also sometimes permissible, e.g. if
you’re starving and have no other options (technically, he thinks that in such a case taking what legally
belongs to another is not really stealing; we won’t go into why here).
-Others are absolutes: While killing can sometimes be justified, murder never can, nor can
adultery. Worth noting: Aristotle too seems to think there are a few absolutes, in that some actions
(murder and adultery are two examples he gives in Ethics II.6 ) are, just as such and regardless of
circumstances, contrary to virtue.
-The natural law prohibiting murder leads directly to an endorsement of the jus in bello principle
of discrimination, and to seeing it too as an absolute.

X. Natural Law and Virtue.

A. From Aristotelian to Thomistic Justice.
1. Scope: The “community of natural law” is universal (all humans share in human nature
—all are “neighbors”), thus addressing the concern about justice for non-citizens.
2. Content: The natural law gives content to Aristotle’s briefly expressed idea of natural
justice, giving us some standard by which to judge the laws of our city.
B. Virtue depends upon the natural law.
1. One of the general precepts of the natural law tells us to acquire and exercise the
virtues. (The natural law directs us to live good human lives, and Aquinas agrees with
Aristotle that this consists chiefly in virtuous activity).
2. The natural law specifies some of the content of virtuous activity (e.g., it gives content
to justice by laying it down that the killing of any innocent is wrong, unjust).
C. The natural law depends upon virtue.
1. Following the natural law can be hard even when we know what it requires (we may
have to overcome fear or desire to do the right thing—virtue “does the mean”).

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2. Knowing what it requires may call for virtue (emotions can not only tempt us to do
wrong, but can blind us to what is right, as anger might make lashing out seem right;
thus, if our emotions are not educated, they may mislead us—virtue “feels the mean”
and thus helps us “perceives the mean”).
-Related to this, virtue may be needed to answer correctly the question, “Who is
my neighbor,” as it can open our eyes to the value of other people (more on this
below).
3. Consider some of the characters in Crimson Tide and how their character and
emotions influenced both how they saw things and what they did: Captain Ramsey
(pride?), Lieutenant Ence (divided loyalties, lack of moral courage?), Commander Hunter
(courage, properly ordered loyalties?).

XI. Aquinas on Virtue.

A. Aquinas and Aristotle roughly agree with Plato in thinking there are three “parts” of the soul:
Reason, Spirit (“Irascible” appetite), and Appetite (“concupiscible” appetite).
B. Aquinas also agrees with Plato that there are four “cardinal” virtues: Prudence (practical
wisdom), Justice, Courage, and Temperance.
C. Aquinas aligns them as follows:
a. Reason ---- Practical Reason Prudence
l ---- Will (rational desire) Justice
b. Irascible appetite Courage
c. Concupiscible appetite Temperance
D. What then becomes of all the other virtues on Aristotle’s list? Aquinas sees them as parts or
aspects of the cardinal virtues. E.g., the cardinal virtue of justice has to do with giving to
others what is their due. Truthfulness is an aspect of justice that has to do with giving others
their due in the communication of information. Here’s how Aquinas aligns the virtues:
Cardinal Virtues Prudence Justice Courage Temperance
Special Virtues Generosity Magnificence Mildness
Civility Magnanimity Humility
Truthfulness
Etc. Etc. Etc.
E. We’ve talked a bit about a few of the particular virtues (justice, civility); we’re going to go on
to look at a few more, both to get more of a sense of what the virtues are, and of how they
enable and guide good actions, both by regulating emotions and orienting us correctly to our

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neighbors. In addition, these virtues will be relevant to later discussions of distributive

justice and freedom of expression.
a. The cardinal virtue of prudence which guides deliberation and decision.
b. The cardinal virtue of justice and the virtues of civility and truthfulness, which are
annexed to justice and have to do with what we owe others in ordinary social
intercourse.
c. The virtue of humility, which moderates the emotion of ambition and is annexed to
temperance.
d. Friendship in its various forms (including charity).

XII. Aristotle and Aquinas on some particular Virtues.

A. Civility and Truthfulness. On these virtues Aquinas basically agrees with Aristotle; what he
adds is their subordination to the cardinal virtue of justice. E.g., truthfulness for Aristotle
consists in doing well in representing oneself (and one’s thoughts) accurately to others;
Aquinas adds that this is a “moral debt,” something that we owe the other as an equal.
B. Humility. This virtue Aquinas takes from Christian tradition rather than from Aristotle, and
has to do primarily with moderating ambition, not seeking honors beyond one’s merits, etc.
a. It has of course a religious application regarding subjecting oneself to God, but it has
also a natural human application, and this is our concern.
b. He asks whether humility requires subjecting oneself to others, and if so in what
way. There is a lot that goes on in this short passage (IIaIIae q161a3) as Aquinas
seeks, in good Aristotelian fashion, to carve out a mean between two vices (pride
and self-abasement). Here is the relevant point for us: any other human being will
have something “of God’s,” some gift, some potential, that we should respect.
i. This point is made in stronger fashion in his discussion of the precept of love
of neighbor (IIaIIae q44a7): “both as to the natural image of God, and as to
the capacity for glory.”
c. Aquinas is speaking in religious terms, but there is something here available to those
who may not accept his religious beliefs:
i. First, it is first and foremost human nature (what we are) and potential
(what we can be and do) that makes someone worthy of love and respect—
everyone is my neighbor.
ii. Second, what makes us bearers of the image of God is what which makes us
persons—reason and will; what makes us capable of glory is our capacity
(realized or not) to become good, to attain human excellence.
iii. Aquinas’s language will have greater resonance with religious believers, and
the excellence attainable will be greater if these religious beliefs are true;

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still, the appeal to human nature and potential need not presuppose
religion.
d. Humility is the virtue that prompts us to look for and find that “divine spark” in each
person, and thereby recognize him or her as a neighbor to be loved and respected.
C. Friendship and Charity.
a. A friend is someone we love, and who returns the love. But Aristotle points out that
we love things in three ways: We might love something (seek it, care about it)
insofar as it’s useful (you might care about your car in this way), or pleasant (thus
you might love cake), or intrinsically good or beautiful (a natural habitat, perhaps).
b. Accordingly, there are three kinds of friendships:
i. Useful (a business partner)
ii. Pleasant (a drinking buddy)
iii. Complete (a “true friend”)
iv. One loves the first two kinds of friend for one’s own sake; the third one
loves for the friend’s sake.
v. Aristotle believes that complete friends are the greatest external good (in
fact, one cannot attain eudaimonia without them), and that one can have
only a few of them due to the time and effort it takes to develop and
maintain such a friendship. But, the idea of complete friendship can be
extended to similar cases.
c. Civic Friendship. Aristotle himself suggests we can have a kind of friendship with our
fellow citizens, insofar as we have common experiences and common goals
- Team spirit analogy.
d. Charity. Aquinas models his understanding of charity on complete friendship—it
involves loving one’s neighbor for one’s neighbor’s sake, and it extends to the love of
“sinners” and “enemies,” and indeed to any who may come into one’s life. Here,
again, moral concern is extended beyond the political community.

XIII. Plausible Guidance.

A. One major objection to virtue ethics is that it does not help us decide what to do and how to live
—it does not provide plausible guidance.
B. If we have the virtues, they themselves (not the theory) will guide us, help us see what is to be
done (virtue “perceives the mean”).
- Analogy with a craftsman or quarterback.
C. Acquire and Exercise the Virtues. Long-term advice, doesn’t help today …
D. Find a virtuous mentor … if one is available.
E. Natural Law theory provides some basic guidance
1. Absolute precepts such as don’t kill the innocent etc.

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2. General precepts such as return borrowed items—but when to make an exception?

3. V-rules (do what is just, kind, brave, etc.).
F. Prudence. Prudence or practical wisdom is the virtue that enables excellent practical reasoning.
Even if we do not yet have it, we can work at it, as a young quarterback works to make decisions
in the way a seasoned veteran does. The following is some of what prudence involves (these are
some of what Aquinas calls the “integral parts” of prudence):
1. Memory: Recall what worked or didn’t in similar situations in the past
2. Docility: Be teachable; reflect on past advice or seek new advice now
3. Reason: How do the general rules I know (precepts, v-rules) bear on the present
situation (I know I should be fair (just) and truthful and kind (generous); is this a time to
tell my young protégé a hard truth (be frank and fair), or a time to be comforting?).
4. Foresight: Consider how future probabilities bear on how actions may serve your end
(you are looking to give an oft-traveling relative a practical gift—are her travels in the
coming year more likely to take her to the tropics, or to Antarctica?).
5. Circumspection: Consider how current circumstances may bear on how actions serve
your end (suppose I am working on my civility, and seek to pass the time pleasantly with
some colleagues at a work party; the conversation moves in a particular direction—is it a
“decent” conversation, will it give offense to anyone in earshot, will it exclude someone
who should be included, etc.?).
6. Caution: Consider and avoid the evils that may be mixed together with the good in a
certain course of action (suppose I wish to help my ne’er-do-well uncle—if I give him
cash, he’ll spend it on liquor; if I give him an expensive coat, he’ll pawn it for cash (for
liquor); if I give him a used but serviceable coat, he might just keep it and stay warm).
G. Cases.
1. Commander Hunter’s counseling of Petty Officer Rivetti: Without, of course, consciously
thinking of Aquinas or employing the terminology he does, Hunter must have, with the
facility granted by practice and good habits, brought to bear much of the above: the
requirements of justice and civility, memory, circumspection, etc.
2. Consider the case below, approaching it this time from an Aristotelian-Thomistic
perspective of prudence and the moral virtues (civility and truthfulness are probably
particularly relevant, as of course is prudence and its integral parts).

You live in a country (maybe ours in the future) that legally recognizes any form of marriage between two or more
consenting adults. You are on a university board that determines which outside speakers to invite to campus, and
oversees promotion, logistics, and so forth for such talks. A religious student group has asked to invite Dr. Jennifer
Martinez, a controversial opponent of polygamous marriage, to speak. Martinez voices religious objections to
polygamy, but also offers secular moral arguments against it (arguing, e.g., that the practice is generally harmful to
women). Word of the possible invitation has gotten out, and while a silent majority seems not to care, a divided

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minority is being anything but silent, some supporting Martinez, some just wanting to hear her views, and others
strongly opposed. The last group thinks inviting her would implicitly support views they characterize as hateful;
some were raised in polygamous families and claim that her speaking at their university, their home away from
home, would make them feel unsafe, would threaten their identity (some of the pro-Martinez students counter
that having someone banned from campus for espousing views they share would threaten their identity). What
decision would you make?

Quiz #3:
Plato: Allegory of the Cave (unless covered on previous quiz or midterm)
Aristotle: Nature of our final end, nature of virtue, justice
Aquinas: Natural law and its precepts, cardinal virtues
Both: Particular virtues (civility, truthfulness, prudence, humility), absolutes, criteria
Reading Question: Drawn from Aristotle or Aquinas passage (Aristotle on friendliness/civility or generosity,
or Aquinas on prudence or humility)

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