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Sarai Goncalves Subero, Enrique Navarro Javierre, Jorge Leal Jiménez

Camboya

Abstract:

This project shall study the causes, development and consequences of the Cambodian
Civil war (1968-1975), as well as the regime that followed it, the Khmer Rouge, and its
behavior and characteristics. Special focus will be given to the perpetration of the
Cambodian genocide, given its historical transcendence and political and human impact.
A delve into the main aspects of Pol Pot’s regime will concentrate on the sociological,
political and economic aspects of its policies, as well as studying the reasoning and
motivations behind the commitment of one of the most atrocious crimes against
humanity in history. This investigation produces a series of conclusions about the nature
of Cambodia’s Civil War, Pol Pot’s regime and the perpetration of the genocide that
aim to understand in a more precise manner the predominant causes and motivations
lying beneath the surface of all these actions and events.

Introduction:

Starting with this short trial it is important to geographically locate the country.
Cambodia is located in Southeast Asia and about 6 million people currently reside there;
most of this population is ethnic Khemer, or Khmer. It is surrounded to the west by
Thailand, to the north by Laos and to the east by Vietnam, having between them a
natural border, the Mekong River. The southern part of the country overlooks the China
Sea, and has one of the largest nature reserves inside, Lake Tonle Sap.1
As for its more ancient history stands out the so-called Khmer empire, which managed
to control much of Southeast Asia. Its power progressively weakened after the 12 th
Century because of a number of internal factors such as diseases that plagued its
population, and external environmental factors, as well as successive wars with nearby
populations, such as the Cham dynasty in Vietnam, or Siam's empire in Thailand.2
In the XIX Century it became part of the French colony of Indochina, which included
Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. This French colonial period will be key for explaining
the problems that will come a century later. On the one hand, by unifying these regions
into a single colonial region called Indochina, it will cause its borders to be significantly
diluted, just as the implementation of the French social model will end the social
structures previously in force, based on a strong difference between the countryside and
the city. On the other hand, the French trained Khmer elites educationally. It was in the
1
Alegre López, «Kampuchea democrática».
2
Alegre López.
1950s that a group of scholarship students in France received a number of influences
coming from Stalinist socialism and communism; fascinated by these ideals, they will
see them as a feasible solution to the problems that plagued Cambodia. These students
will join the Communist Party of Kampuchea, after their return to the country, which
will end up being called ‘Khmer Rouge’ (this fact will be analyzed in depth throughout
this essay).3
Cambodia by the 1960s was a country with a notable economic backwardness in the
process of industrialization and development; it should be noted that it had been only a
decade since its French independence in 1953. The center of political and commercial
life was a trade based on exchanges with China, and which was monopolized mostly by
China, was located in Phnom Pehn and rotated more specifically around the Royal
Palace. The king at the time enjoyed increasing popularity due to his participation in
colonial independence, King Sihanouk. After the achievement of independence, the
king decided to abdicate in favor of his father, since it is important to mention that he
was crowned at the young age of 19 by the French, who assumed that he would be
easily manipulated. Until now the Cambodian regime had been completely absolutist,
feudalist and based on Hindu traditions and myths; the king was crowned with a
Buddhist divine character.4
In 1955 the King decided to abdicate in favor of his father. After this, he intended to
modernize the country, to bring it to the same level of the Western powers. He formed a
party, the Sangkun, and proposed an election, in order to democratize the country and
thus overcome the danger posed by the Vietnam War and the communist forces coming
from it. The King won the elections, as most of the population was illiterate and revered
him as a god. At this time Cambodian communist forces that had participated in the first
Indo-Chinese war against the French had evaporated completely after the country´s
Independence.5
As the main causes of the conflict, two basic issues will be highlighted, which we will
discuss below. The first would be the serious difference between the countryside and the
city, given by the social model imported directly from France. While in the city most of
its citizens and neighbors spoke in French and were more cultured and accustomed to a
higher standard of living, in the countryside Cambodians had been living in the same
way for centuries, a complete economic and social backwards region. In turn, U.S.
intervention was also a key element. The king wanted to remain a neutral power away
from both influences; for him the United States was another colonizing power, so he
focused on its neutrality within the Cold War always fighting for the national
sovereignty of peoples away from American influence. This gave impunity to
Vietnamese communist guerrillas and allowed them to settle on Cambodian territory.
This democratizing economic and political development is slowly broken, both by the
strong social conflict given by the differences between the countryside and the city, and
by the secret support that Prince Sirik Matak and General Lon Nol are receiving from
the United States, as both were willing to receive the help of the Americans and become
3
Alegre López.
4
Aguirre, Camboya.
5
Aguirre.
a satellite country of the US In the late 1960s there were a number of insurrections
given by the poor situation of the rural population. Until now the Khmer Rouge had
very little support.6

Lon Nol´s coup:

In March 1970, General Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matakstaged a coup d’etat, which was
victorious, with the help and support of the United States, as this change of government
within the Cambodian regime will meant the end of the impunity imposed by the former
monarch before of the Vietnamese communist guerrillas (Vietcong). And this will mean
the starting of an open against Vietnam on Cambodian territory.
Lon Nol's government will also be one of the main causes of the civil war in Cambodia
years later. His government received financial support from the United States and
approved of secret bombings in rural areas where Vietnamese guerrillas associated with
the Khmer Rouge, who were in were hiding. These bombings will be further analyzed
in the next chapter. A strong, autocratic and strongly centralized system was
implemented. This centralization in the city led to a large number of problems in rural
areas. They implemented a regime of strong control in the economy, leading to brutal
corruption and strong political repression, with strong censorship.7
All these measures ended with an increase in one of the main problems that have come
since the French colonial era, the difference between the countryside and the city. This
significantly increased the discontent of the inhabitants of these rural villages, and this
issue was taken full advantage of by the Khmer Rouge, who succeeded in drawing
positions with them, and receiving their support.8

American secret bombings:

About the secret American bombings on Cambodian soil, there has been evidence of
American bombings since 1965 to some Vietnamese temples on Cambodian territory.
But it is known that the intensity and greater frequency of these bombings date from
1969. They were kept secret given that President Nixon, who authorized these
bombings, knowing fully well that bombing neutral territory is totally illegal and is
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution itself. This was one of the main reasons that led to his
near-impeachment and resignation.9
These bombings were focused on weakening the bases and roads of the Vietnamese
communist army, which were on Cambodian territory, given the impunity the previous
king had given them. The peak of these bombings will occur in 1973, 10 and this is when
one of the most basic questions appears: Why do the bombings continue after the Treaty
of Paris in 1973? It is obvious that the United States military was not interested in the

6
Aguirre.
7
Alegre López, «Kampuchea democrática».
8
Alegre López.
9
Aguirre, Camboya.
10
Aguirre.
triumph of the Khmer Rouge in the country, so there will be a slight intervention in the
Cambodian civil war conflict. Not as obvious as in the Vietnam War itself, but there
was some intervention.
These bombings were entirely supported by the prince's government and the general.
This fact significantly increased social conflict and helps explain the rapid rise of the
Khmer Rouge.

Khmer Rouge:

The name Khmer Rouge was given by King Sihanouk. When he created the FUNK
(Kampuchea National Union Front), in order to combat Lon Nol's government, the
monarch sought to approach the Communist Party of Cambodia, which he had repressed
harshly during his tenure, reaching the point of relegating them to the jungle.11
As in many other Western countries, the revolutionary leaders of the Khmer Rouge
came from privileged families and middle classes, which had been educated in the
1950s in France, such as Pol Pot, Iang Sary and Khieu Samphan. It will be at this time
that they received these socialist ideas, of which they will be sympathetic of given the
strong anti-imperialist character that they possessed.
They began their training at the hands of Vietnamese communist guerrillas on
Cambodian territory in 1973 with the first American bombings, in response to these,
since at first they were not in favor of their training given their ideological differences.
After this issue and after the Paris agreements, Vietnamese communist guerrillas left
Cambodia. But the Khmer Rouge was able to take advantage of the situation in its
entirety, utilizing a very upset peasantry with American bombings, and very angry to
see that its own government supported these bombings, so this led to a very rapid rise in
the number of members of the army.12
Its programme was mainly based on an anti-imperialist doctrine with a strong social
character in favor of rural areas and against those with large fortunes, and the support of
this entire rural mass was immediate. After the departure of vietnamese guerrillas from
the country there is a rapid movement of the Khmer Rouge and as they take a large
number of cities very quickly and effectively. Compared to the Vietnamese case, it
occurs much faster than the Vietnamese communist guerrillas took over the cities. The
Khmer Rouge had a strong nationalist character.13

Cambodian Civil War:

In this civil war, three factions will be differentiated. On the one hand the Communist
Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and its armed arm called the Khmer Rouge guerrillas, as the
base military force of the front. Apart from this clearly differentiated side, two other
factions will take part against the lon Nol government: on the one hand the pro-
Sihanouk realists, and on the other hand, the pro-Vietnam of North Khmer Issarak.
11
Alegre López, «Kampuchea democrática».
12
Aguirre, Camboya.
13
Aguirre.
By 1974 the Khmer Rouge began to enclose Phnom Pehn; the economy was in ruins,
given the general's mismanagement and strong corruption; the war was very bloody and
had almost no prisoners, as they were brutally executed on both sides.14
Finally, on 17 April 1975 Phnom Penh falls into the hands of the Khmer Rouge, led by
Pol Pot. The reaction of the inhabitants of the city will be remarkable in its entirety, as
they do not resist and go out into the street with open arms eager for everything to
return to normal. But their positive reaction is nothing less than away from reality, since
from the moment of their arrival the peasants began to ‘avenge themselves’ with the
inhabitants of the big cities. And the guerrillas began executions to all those who had
been related to the PUNK regime.

About Pol Pot:

Pol Pot was the war name of Saloth Sar (1925-1998). He was born into a wealthy
peasant family and had some kinship at the Cambodian Palace due to family
connections with an important royal ballet dancer, which will allow him to continue him
studies at a university in France, where he will receive his main communist influences,
recalling in the period of strong Stalinism in which he was, this is where he will meet
other relevant party figures such as Son Sen and Ieng Sary and join a Communist Party
for the first time.
In 1966 the Cambodian Communist Party stopped being called the Workers' Party, as
was the case in Vietnamese and it is possible to see this direct influence of Vietnamese
communism (and which in turn significantly influenced the Khmer Rouge during their
guerrilla formation at the hands of Vietnamese communist guerrillas), to be renamed the
Communist Party of Kampuchea. It was in the same year that Pol Pot traveled to China,
a China under Maoist dictatorship and in the middle of the so-called Cultural
Revolution; this fact significantly influenced Pol Pot's ideology, and contributed to his
subsequent socialization and how he decided to act in his years as dictator in Cambodia.
After the influence of this Cultural Revolution China can observe its economic policy
which was based solely on rice cultivation, and is fully observable as it is entirely
destined for failure. It is curious how despite having direct Chinese influences one can
see how his regime never had a strong personalistic character, since they never built him
statues in his honor, except for a few the last years of his tenure.15

The Kampuchea from a Soviet point of view:

For the analysis of the hermetism that Cambodia suffered internationally during its
years of dictatorship under the Khmer Rouge we will use Vladimir Simonov's Soviet
point of view, collected in his book called "Kampuchea: Crime and Failure of Maoism".
With Pol Pot's arrival in power there is a strong hermetism, in which it is impossible to
access any type of information from Kampuchea, only one link can be maintained from
Beijing, and it is true that Beijing is in similar closed-down-state at the moment. This
14
Aguirre.
15
Aguirre.
hermetism is easily observable with the fact that only 10 embassies were maintained in
the country and all were located on the same street and from which not much
information was received about what was going on inside Kampuchea. It will not be
until the end of the mandate that the fall of the lute dictatorship begins a slow process of
making known to the world those heinous crimes that had been happening in the long
four years of dictatorship from 1975 until its fall in 1979.
Kampuchea relied on Mao's ideals, bringing to his society a society without industry,
without commerce, without science, without schools, without culture, without personal
property, without private life and without cities. They basically created a concentration
camp across the country.16

Brief introduction to the Khmer Rouge regime:

With the arrival of the CPK under Pol Pot's leadership, the Democratic Kampuckea or
the Khmer Rouge regime was established. It will be based on a mutilation of
Cambodian society in its entirety. It will begin with the evacuation of cities to rural
areas. They will seek to establish a strictly peasant society based on increased
agricultural production. To this end, they will exterminate the officers and officials of
the old regime, as well as teachers, doctors, lawyers, students and higher members of
the Sangha (Buddhist clergy).17

Democratic Kampuchea: beginnings and beliefs

The Khmer Rouge regime, known by the official name of Democratic Kampuchea,
ruled over Cambodia from 1975 to (nominally) 1979, when it was defeated by the
Vietnamese invasion of 1978. During these three years, Pol Pot and his acolytes
implemented a series of policies and reforms ideologically based around the principles
of Maoism, Marxism and Khmer ethno-nationalism. The Khmer Rouge’s goal was the
eradication of all Cambodian tradition and societal and cultural norms, along with the
creation of a new social order; an agrarian republic in which all traces of wealth, class,
inequality and individuality would disappear. To this end, Pol Pot began to impose a
number of radical measures that led to some of the more monstrous atrocities of the 20 th
century. These shall be analyzed and explained later on in this study.
To comprehend the violence that arose from the Khmer Rouge’s takeover, it is
essential to understand their motives, ideology and intentions; to delph into the rationale
of the massacres of Pol Pot’s rule it is necessary to study its beginnings, evolution and
development. Therefore, the structure, organization and political projects of the regime
16
Vladimir Simonov, Kampuchea: Crimen y fracaso del maoísmo.
17
«Desarme, desmovilización y reintegración en Camboya - ProQuest».
are an important object of study in this analysis. Beforehand, however, it is necessary to
understand the state of mind of Khmer Rouge at the moment the war ended. After years
of incessant warfare, repression, strife and violence, the Khmer Rouge’s views had
radicalized both in action and thought; Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China acted as an
inspiration to Pol Pot and his followers, and centuries of de facto servitude of peasants
to urbanites had served to radicalize the first against the latter. The stage was set for a
radical and brutal transformation of the entirety of Cambodian society, through a brutal
and merciless repression that fanatically went about conducting its business and
implementing its policies.
After entering the city of Phnom Penh, the 17th of April, 1975, the Khmer Rouge
began to evacuate the city. Two million citizens were forced to leave the city without
prior warning; hospitals were emptied, and a generalized coerced march to the outside
of the city began. Thousands died at the hands of the soldiers, many pregnant women
gave birth on the way and many others died due to sickness or other ailments. The
objective of this was to use them as forced labor to begin the process of building the
agrarian socialist republic that the Khmer Rouge aimed to construct. A witness of this,
So Ry of Takeo, narrates this day in the following manner:
“The Khmer Rouge soldiers asked us to leave town. I said, “I cannot go because I am
pregnant and my husband is seriously injured.” They forcibly insisted that we had to
go. We were crying a lot because my husband could not walk. Then we found a horse
cart, so I carried my husband on to the cart. I tied the cart with my scarf, put the scarf
around my neck and towed it. We wanted to go to Takeo, but the soldiers forced us to
go forward on National Road 5. We passed Prek Kdam and stopped in order to cook
rice. After eating, they told us to go forward. I towed the cart until my groin became
inflamed. On the way, my husband was taken and killed. I cried a lot, but could do
nothing. Finally, I arrived at Chamkar Leu district, Kampong Cham province. One
month later, I gave birth to my daughter.”

Also, the soldiers’ desire for revenge had only grown through the previous war-ridden
years, as well as for all the grievances the peasantry had suffered at the hand of
Cambodia´s urban population. This led to an even greater massacre. In the words of one
Khmer Rouge soldier, “We were so angry when we came out of the forest, that we
would not have spared a baby in its cradle” 18. Foreigners and Cambodians alike sought
18
Clayton, «Building the New Cambodia».
refuge at the French Embassy, but the occupiers forced the Cambodian refugees to come
out, while foreigners stayed trapped at the embassy for two weeks, before being taken to
the Thai border. High-ranking members of Lon Nol’s government were executed:
Minister Long Boret, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, and Lon Non, brother of Lon Nol,
among them.

Before going into depth on the Khmer Rouge’s regime program and
development, it is necessary to understand their ideological background; the political
framework in which they operated. The Khmer Rouge combined a Maoist conception of
communism with a fervent Khmer nationalism, that aimed to restore Cambodia to the
international position they thought it deserved. Mao’s cultural revolution and Great
Leap Forward acted as examples to follow, as well as Enver Hoxha’s Albania 19. Th
regime’s main goal was the abolishment of all individual action and ambition in favor
of the state. Cities would be evacuated, and agricultural collectivism would be the main
form of economic organization in the country. The achievement of communism, Pol Pot
argued, could be done in this manner, thereby skipping many intermediary steps
essential in classical Marxist thought (industrialization, development of the
proletariat…). Peasants were understood to be the ‘base people’ of the state, while
urban citizens were seen as ‘new people’, who had to be reeducated or killed.
Reeducation was a basic component of Maoism: in order to become members of the
new communist society, they had to be ‘clenched’ of their old beliefs and attitudes and
transformed into willing members of the system. This process usually consisted on
forced agricultural labor, and in many instances ended in execution.
Along with Marxism, nationalism played a key role in Democratic Kampuchea’s
development. In fact, for many peasants who joined the guerrillas, it was their
adherence to tradition and custom that convinced them to do it. This is exemplified by
the fact that around 50,000 peasants who joined the guerrillas did so when Prince
Sihanouk began supporting them; not Marxism, but rather traditionalism and
nationalism were at the root of peasant mobilization. This played a substantial role in
Cambodia’s relationship with the rest of the world, and with its neighbors.
As to the regime’s vision of religion, its atheistic nature and nominal support of freedom
of worship did not translate into tolerance for theistic beliefs. These acted as causes of
19
Tyner y Molana, «Ideologies of Khmer Rouge Family Policy».
state repression, as the Khmer Rouge saw them as an impediment to the development of
their ‘new society’20.
The ideological framework of the Khmer Rouge, therefore, can be summarized into a
symbiosis of Maoist communism and Khmer nationalism, both skewed to their extreme
versions. To build a new, agrarian society based upon these principles, it was necessary
to establish a series of reforms whose nature was transformative, radical and violent.
Before analyzing said policies, however, the political framework in which they were
implemented must be explained; the creation, organization and structure of the state of
Democratic Kampuchea must be established, as in said process lie the fundamental
principles on which Pol Pot’s regime stood on.

Organization and Structure of the Regime


After the fall of Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge took control of the state of
Cambodia. Therefore, that is where one can de facto place the birth of Democratic
Kampuchea, the name given by the Communist Party of Kampuchea to the new state.
De jure, however, it was not officially declared as such until the 5th of January, 1976. In
the fall of 1975, Prince Sihadnouk had traveled internationally to gain recognition for
the new regime, of which he acted as Head of state until April of 1976, when he
resigned and was placed on house arrest21. The day of its inauguration, the government
(headed by Pol Pot) unveiled and officialized the new state constitution. The
Kampuchean People’s Representative Assembly (KPRA) was created, as a legislative
body whose 250 members were elected by the Standing committee of the KPC. In fact,
it was this organization (Angkar), that held real power. Pol Pot acted as its secretary,
while Nuon Chea was his deputy. The KPC was characterized by its secrecy, as well as
its absolute power in determining the economic, political and social path to be followed
by the state. The latter’s organic institutions were all subordinate to the party. As was
the case in all communist countries, it was the party’s leadership that held real power
and control over the state and its structure. Pol Pot had near total authority in dictating
policy and action, as the party was structured in a hierarchical disposition that
consequently placed him atop the entire power structure.
Territorially, Democratic Kampuchea was divided into six geographical zones, which at
the same time were divided in 32 total regions. Zones were governed by secretaries

20
Clayton, «Building the New Cambodia».
21
Khamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-1979.
named by the party. Most secretaries (So Phim or Ney Sarann aka Ya, for example) were
purged or committed suicide (to avoid the first option). This shows the brutal nature of
the regime, and how the brutal political infighting and paranoia that surrounded the
party had dreadful consequences for many of its members; in a similar way, for
example, that the Cultural Revolution in China, in which many (perceived) dissidents
were exiled, incarcerated or murdered.

Policies and programs

No ideological or theoretical analysis can, however, explain and study the true
political nature of Democratic Kampuchea without studying the application of said
theory into action; to analyze how ideology framed the evolution of the regime, its
plans, economic goals and international diplomacy (or lack thereof, more accurately),
one has to deepen its observation of Pol Pot’s reforms as they were implemented, of his
economic plans as they were attempted and of his social transformations as they
evolved. Empirical observation of the KCP’s program can be more forthcoming about
its motives, ambitions and evolution than any theoretical approach.
The foundation of Pol Pot’s plans was the Four-Year Plan (1977.1980) designed
by the party in 1976. Its main goal was the achievement of economic self-sufficiency
through an extraordinary expansion of agricultural production, especially with regards
to rice, the main and most abundant product in the region. Private property was
abolished, and the state forced its citizenry to live in a permanent communal state, in
which the commune owned a certain piece of land given to it by the state and had to
cultivate and work it themselves22. Rice’s importance also increased due to its status as
the state’s most valuable asset in barter; the Khmer Rouge had abolished currency, and
demanded that all trade and transactions be conducted through barter. They designed a
nation-wide irrigation system so as to not depend on seasonal rains and achieve their
yearly objectives of three tons of rice per hectare. Production, however, never reached
these levels, as Cambodia was unable to muster the resources for such a goal after years
of war, misery and its own logistical impediments. Therefore, the little amount of rice
that was actually produced was delivered to factory workers, soldiers or exported to
China and other socialist countries. This contributed to thousands of deaths due to
malnutrition, famine and disease.
22
Khamboly Dy.
The Four-Year plan, in essence, failed due to its excessive ambition, Cambodia’s
underdeveloped agricultural infrastructures and its inability to produce at the level
required by the regime. Its consequences were hellish for most of the population, as
starvation grew, peasants were exploited and, especially the ‘new people’, citizens were
objected to a repressive zeal which made the regime lose most of its original popularity.
The other fundamental part of the regime’s program was the total reeducation of
the population. Pol Pot had announced, when the Khmer Rouge took over Cambodia,
that 1975 would be ‘Year Zero’, as a new society, and a new civilization, would be born
from the rule of Angkar. Not only would there be a regime change; not only would there
be a seismic cultural, economic and political change; the Cambodian population would
have to be subjected to a process of reeducation characteristic of totalitarian regimes.
Only, in the Cambodian case, it happened far more quickly, and even more violently
than in other cases. Husbands were separated from their wives, children were taken
away from their parents…Entire families were broken up to advance the agenda of
social destruction promulgated by the regime. As Kenneth Quinn argues, the first goal
of the Cambodian revolution was to destroy the old society and its social, economic,
political and cultural infrastructure so completely that it could not be reestablished
again23. Such an evolution could only take place by fragmenting even the most basic
institutions of society, such as the family.
One of the most characteristic programs that the Khmer Rouge implemented was
the use of children as spies. They conceived children as being ‘pure’, without the stain
of corruption on them, and so they would form the basis onto which the new society had
to be built24. The Khmer Rouge organized units, called Kang Chhlop, composed by
children and used to spy on the adult population. In practice, this provided the regime
with a constant flow of information about the behavior, actions and support for the
regime that adults had; ideologically, it fomented a break-up of traditional family
structures, pitting children against their elders in a similar manner to that of the Cultural
Revolution in China.
From 1975 to 1978, the regime stood firm, although from the beginning there
were signs that it was not bound to last: infighting among the party’s elites was
continuous, with purges being caused by bad harvests, political trickery, ambition or
paranoia. Rice production was not near the desired results of the KCP, which in turn had

23
Clayton, «Building the New Cambodia».
24
«Children and Violence».
a hurtful effect on the economy. While economic data from this period is difficult to
extract due to the secrecy of the Khmer Rouge, accounts from witnesses and foreign
diplomats about the living conditions of natives describe a down-trodden, starvation-
ridden environment in which the economy failed to meet the regime’s objectives and
repression was growing more common and widespread by the day. Still, the main cause
for the regime’s eventual and sudden downfall came not from internal dissent or
rebellion, but by the fledging nature of international affairs and the rivalry between
Cambodia and Vietnam.

The End of Democratic Kampuchea


Since ‘Year One’, Democratic Kampuchea had shut itself from the outside
world, maintaining relations only with China and, to an extent, North Korea. Its
relationship with its neighbors, especially Vietnam, was a difficult one. The nationalistic
nature of the Khmer Rouge was traduced into a desire for reestablishing the ancient
Angkor Empire, which occupied most of the territory of Indochina. This clashed with
Vietnam’s hegemonistic tendencies, that had only intensified since the end of its war in
1973. In 1977, Kampuchea’s head of state Khieu Samphan broke off diplomatic
relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, arguing:
“The number one enemy is not US imperialism, but Vietnam, ready to swallow up
Cambodia”25
At the same time, the Khmer Rouge had been provoking skirmishes on the
border between these two countries since 1975, with the objective of acquiring more
and more territory as well as checking Vietnamese ambitions in the region. Anti-
Vietnamese nationalism also provided a motivation for guerrillas to enter into
progressively more violent offensives along the border, chief among them the Ba Chuc
Massacre. This confrontation was also caused by the larger international rivalry between
China and the USSR, both at odds with one another since the 50’s due to their
geopolitical conflict of interests in Asia and their confronting ambition for being the
leader of the communist world. Cambodia was supported by China, while Vietnam was
aided economically and politically by the USSR. Therefore, this conflict can also be
explained as a derivative of the China-USSR political dispute. Still, one can’t ignore the
largely local and regional causes of this conflict; Cambodia’s desire to achieve a
hegemonic position (held by Vietnam at that moment) in Indochina, due to both
25
Clayton, «Building the New Cambodia».
nationalist and economic (more land to plant crops, especially rice, and therefore
achieve a greater amount of production) reasons, combined with Vietnam’s geopolitical
objective of remaining in its position of supremacy in regards to its neighbors26.
Finally, on Christmas Day, 1978, Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia to begin
what would be a successful invasion and occupation of Democratic Kampuchea, taking
Phnom Penh the 7th of January, and declaring the formation of the People’s Republic of
Kampuchea. The KCP’s leaders fled first to the western portion of the country, and later
on to Thailand. The invasion was swift, as Cambodia´s depleted and scarce military
forces could not face up to the well-organized, well-trained Vietnamese army.
International response was also quick, with Prince Sihanouk appealing to the UN for
action against the invasion; China and the US (due to its enmity with the USSR and
Vietnam) led another 5 countries into drafting a resolution that called for a ceasefire and
the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. While in the next few months a
series of summits, conflicts and diplomatic incidents launched the region into war again,
the Khmer Rouge were no longer in power. And they would never be in power again.
Their end had been quick and complete, falling apart in over just one month as
Vietnamese soldiers occupied the entirety of the territory they once had controlled. The
locals were mostly either indifferent or supportive, as the strenuous and continuous
exploitation at the hands at the regime had not particularly endeared it to them.
Three years and seven months. That’s how much the Khmer Rouge maintained
power in Cambodia. A regime based on violence, repression and fanatic nationalism,
which managed to perpetrate one the most horrifying genocides in history. A product of
years and years of warfare, division, foreign intervention, urban-rural confrontation and
radicalization. The Khmer Rouge guerrillas achieved power through its ability to
channel both traditionalist sentiment along with a communist program based on Mao’s
ideals and policies. No regime went as far into implementing its policies, into
transforming society in a radical, total and totalitarian way. Its example serves as a
warning of the dangers that ethnic nationalism can entrail, as well as how easy it is for
political and educated elites to manipulate the anger and vengeful sentiments of large
swathes of the population to further their ideological goals. Pol Pot’s rule represents,
perhaps more than most totalitarian regimes, what Isaiah Berlin said in his work ‘Two
concepts of Liberty’:

26
Khamboly Dy, A History of Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-1979.
“One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the
altars of the great historical ideals – justice or progress or the happiness of future
generations, or the sacred mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even
liberty itself, which demands the sacrifice of individuals for the freedom of society. This
is the belief that somewhere, in the past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the
mind of an individual thinker, in the pronouncements of history or science, or in the
simple heart of an uncorrupted good man, there is a final solution.”27

Madness in Cambodia

The Cold war had, as one of its most fundamental traits, the proliferation of weapons.
This was the direct consequence of the confrontation between blocs and their subsidiary
wars in the imperial margins, a problematic that was inherited during the last three
decades of the century and that has just favored the expansion of conflicts. Also
contributed to this the expansion of mobilization and the growing number of people that
did and have done militia and revolutionary or counterrevolutionary militance a way of
living and a way of survival.

Although it can be already intuited, the civil conflicts of the second half of the XX
century had a cross-border characteristic, almost contagious. The large warlike cycle
that, in a greater or smaller manner, affected the territories compounded in the ancient
French colony of Indochina began between 1941 and 1945. In some way it might seem
similar to some of the civil wars of Europe in the first half of the century. However, the
truth is that in this case, the conflicts of the second half had a distinguishing trait: the
27
Carter, «Positive and Negative Liberty».
long duration, with the war itself being converted into an endemic problem troubled by
the direct or indirect external meddling of several external agents, different phases of
the conflict, interests and changing circumstances and even brief lapsus of relative
peace.

Once more, we are facing an anticolonial war, within which were strung together the
conflict for the definition of national identity, the antiimperialist view of society and the
international stream of confrontation between blocs.

Svetlana Aleksiévich, through a soviet veteran from the afghan-soviet war, left an
astonishing testimony of the character of the wars occurred in the second war of the XX
century, the dynamics they were fed with, the paradox of the Cold War and the way
everything affected the soldiers and civilians:

“I assisted once to the encounter of the “afghan” club… I have not come back.
With one time I had enough. It was an encounter with Americans, with combatants of
the Vietnam War. We were sat in a cafeteria, with one American and three Russian in
every table. One of ours told the American that was with us: “The Americans piss me
off because an American mine made me blow off, it took one of my legs”. To what the
other answered: “Well, in Saigon I was severely injured by a soviet bullet”. So,
everything was settled! Afterwards we toasted and we hugged as brothers in arms. And
the time passed… We got drunk in the Russian way: a drink for the brotherhood and
another for future luck… In that moment I realized a simple matter: a soldier is always
a soldier, and every one of them is identical to the other, dispensable flesh, the same
fodder”28

The proliferation of weapons, the conflict between blocs and the subsidiary wars
attached to it, the insurgent character and the difficulties or lack of interest of
demobilizing population had a basic role in the warlike infections of the Cold War.

As happened in the Chinese and in the Korean civil wars, the situation in Indochina was
deeply printed by the events of the Second World War. This conflict, with its huge
human and material requirements, its dynamics and the narratives it was legitimated on,
disrupted in an irreversible way the international order and the society as a whole.
Between other things, the US support to almost every armed anti-Japanese movement in
the Pacific theatre had wide consequences. The USA presented its war effort as a
defense of freedom and human rights against the dictatorships and racism29.

It is evident that nothing of this matched up with the reality experimented by the
population of the Asian colonies under European control, a rule that had imposed over
them dictatorial regimes based on social and racial segregation, the tactic of divide et
impera. The community of Indochina that lived under the rule of Paris was severely
28
Alexiévich, Los muchachos de zinc, 142-43.
29
Marvel, «Drift and Intrigue: United States Relations with the Viet-Minh».
affected by a social and territorial cleavage. Living conditions in the relevant cities such
as Saigon, Hanoi or Phnom Penh were extensively different from those in the rural
regions of the colony.

On one hand, the urban areas suffered a direct European influence. The trading harbors
and colonial authorities were established there, so the local population saw its standards
of living increasing. The natives working for the Europeans began to increase their
income over time, creating a new bureaucratic class. This process is similar to that
occurred in Europe during the creation of the modern bourgeoise. However, in the
Asian case, the creation of this administrative class was directly attached to the colonial
rule and the local elites that collaborated with it.

On the other hand, the situation in the fields was drastically different. The French rule
maintained the old feudal regime in order to keep discipline, ensured production and
indirect control over the territory. The collaborator landlords kept their power, position
and interest meanwhile they preserved their profits from the farms and the raw materials
by selling them to the Europeans at a good price. This meant that the situation of the
peasantry, in greater numbers than those who lived in the cities, was not good and had
not changed for centuries. Therefore, the cleavage between rural and urban populations
had been growing since the establishment of the French Indochina and before.

The colonial rule was lately substituted in 1940 by the Japanese imperialism during the
aggressions in Southern China, in this case under the Coprosperity Sphere of Great
Asia. Even though the pretext of the conquest was to free the Asian people from western
powers, it was no more than the particular version of the Japanese New Order, looking
for legitimacy over the whole region. In fact, one of the biggest consequences of the
violent irruption of Japan was the rupture of the trading circuits, established between the
eastern region of the peninsula and India and within Indochina itself. The economic
inter-dependence between the regions was key in food distribution. The conflict
provoked sever subsistence crisis over the region, as well as a strong fragmentation of
power in the struggle for survival derived from such situation. In the case of the French
colony, the occupation lasted until the surrender of the Japanese government, but during
the effective Japanese rule, the French authorities were maintained, which stained them
as collaborators. The last stands of the Japanese military forces in the pacific, during
1944 and 1945 meant a lack of resources for the occupation garrison and a consequent
harsher conditions for the natives. The isolation due to the loss of sea superiority and
their occupation policies of feeding the troops at cost of the local resources provoked
scarcity and hunger. Around one and two million people perished in this period due to
the systematic raid of rice production in Vietnam and Cambodia.

Under these circumstances, the civil population rose awareness of the need of ending
the colonial dominion, a situation that the small Communist Party of Indochina took
advantage of in order to grow by the creation of wide political fronts with more
anticolonial forces. The military disasters of 1940 in Europe and the expansion of Japan
in the Pacific and Indic oceans were decisive events in the loss of legitimacy and
credibility of the European rule in Asia. The local people started to realize that the
French would not be able to support then. In fact, they implied French authorities in the
atrocities of the Japanese occupation, tiding them to the disasters of the war.

Once the war was over, the western allies faced a serious problem for their interests:
many of the anticolonial movements of national liberation that emerged all around Asia
against Japanese domain were communist, at least the most effective ones. The
immediate recovery of the territories was impossible. Social, economic and political
unrest had emerged in the colonies and the situation in the metropolis was not better.
However, the retaking of international prestige, raw materials and controlling
communist spreading were important considerations in order to reconquer the empires.
The Dutch failed in Indonesia in 1949, due to the power of the already formed
guerrillas, the British lost India and Burma, but managed to recover Malaysia under
wars of counterinsurgency and appealing to suspension of civil rights, population
displacements, establishment of concentrations camps, executions, collective
punishments, raping, etc. Thus, those were the circumstances under which the French
started to establish control again over Indochina.

The United Kingdom established a garrison in Saigon, collaborating with the French,
while they tried to weaken the CPIn (Communist Party of Indochina). However, this
was not done without difficulties. The region around the city rose against the European
control that ended with massacres, such as the one of Cité Heyraud, with 300 Europeans
killed by the crowds. Added to this complex scenario is the particularities of the south
of Vietnam, whose elites and an important part of the population was ethnically khmer
and felt as a different identity respect to their neighbors in the north, so those territories
were claimed by nationalists of Cambodia as a part of a future Great Cambodia.

The isolation caused by the IIWW intensified centrifuge tendencies because the
Mekong Delta region had an autonomy like never known before. Before retreating to
interior areas, the guerrillas employed every way at their reach to reduce the combat
capacity of their enemies: local warlords, Vietnamese or khmer nationalists or foreign
forces. This attribute of guerrilla warfare meant added difficulties for the already harsh
survival conditions of the civil community. Bridges, roads, irrigation channels and
ditches destroyed, armed operations and selective murders. A cycle of violence and
destruction that dragged every side of the conflict but had as a direct consequence the
death of 50.000 people in the south of Indochina, plus the indirect suffering and death of
many more due to hunger and military clashes.

The nature of the conflict, as in any revolutionary movement, implied the local
population into violence, not only in the search for legitimacy, but also in order to know
who the objectives were that had to be taken down. This is the consideration of a
guerrilla fighter about the executions happened in his town:
“Every death sentence was proposed by the people. The definitive decisions
were taken by the district -talking about the local authorities-, but the district has never
rejected a proposal made by the people, because the authorities of the district know
anything. They must trust the judgement of the people. If the people wanted the victims
to die, they would die, or if the people wanted them to live, they would live.”30

With time, and at the same moment all those atrocities were being performed, the
implication of the US in the region was increasing exponentially. It was not only about
fighting communist guerrillas in Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam, but also about avoiding
its expansion towards the neighboring countries such as Thailand or Burma. The
conflict in Vietnam escalated severely between the northern and southern regions,
which implied a deeper implication of the US after the failure of the French and British
forces in establishing control. The counterinsurgent focuses of this period of the conflict
had high-cost consequences in civilian lives, who were considered in the operation
zones as an enemy to be taken down. Every time an area was evacuated, many times
using force, everything that could be useful for the guerrillas’ war effort was destroyed.
The journalist Jonathan Schell explained the case of Bên Súc, a prosperous town in the
north of the Mekong Delta region which had, right before the war, around 3.500
inhabitants, who suffered, apart from being expelled, the loss and raid of their goods:

“The demolition material got to Bên Súc a clear and sunny day […] The
American soldiers went through every street in the village […], empty of people, […]
they strewed with gasoline the houses’ roofs and the stables, and then they set it on fire.
Everything burnt, the anti-bombing shelters were destroyed […]. Before the flames
went down, the bulldozers appeared […]. When the demolition squad retreated, the
town was a conjunction of scrabble, barely visible, flat as the palm of a hand. The
original plan of demolition was not necessary, but loyal to the commander’s project,
the reactors of the Air Force launched their bombs over the ruins, squashing again the
ruins and the scrabble as if, with the destruction already commanded, everything that
once could be a trait of the Bên Súc town must had to be erased.”31

This tendency of destruction was executed all over the Indochina Peninsula. The local
population, especially those living in the fields suffered every kind of attack, loss or
expulsion. An immense waste of projectiles was made, launched randomly over a space
were the enemy was supposed to be. The objective of this technique was to bother the
guerrillas, and, in the best case, avoid them from repositioning. The data about the
amount of ammunition that fell over Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam is obiusly not clear,
but several works highlights that every 30 seconds, an American bomb of around 250
kilos was ejected over Indochina during the US presence. The war inside Vietnam and
Cambodia drafted a proportion of nine civilians dead out of ten kills by the US and the
European armies, with the tenth being a guerrilla fighter. The image the outsider had of
this conflict was that of a yellow tide emerging from the ground and the jungle. The
30
Elliott, The Vietnamese War, 338-39.
31
SCHELL, LA DESTRUCCION DE BEN SUC Cronica de la guerra en Vietnam, 166-67.
enemy had no face, the civilians were also a potential threat to the development of the
conflict. Everyone was the enemy.

All the filmography related to the conflict of Vietnam truly shows how the American
marines used napalm gas, which granted the destruction of over 10.000 square
kilometers of jungle in order to eliminate the guerrillas’ advantage of the use of terrain
to hide or ambush. Added to this, 1.000 square kilometers of agrarian land were terribly
affected or completely destroyed in Cambodia, forcing their inhabitants to migrate
towards the urban areas in search if shelter and help. The use of napalm has had serious
consequences in the health of over 3 million people in Indochina, with over a million
newly born babies with deformities.

However, the Vietnamese guerrillas had also an impact over Cambodian population
following expansionist ideals and nationalist clashes. Exemplary executions in order to
enforce discipline were an example of this. The studies estimate that between 1965 and
1975 around 40.000 and 160.000 people were killed by the Northern Vietnamese army
and the guerrillas inside eastern Cambodia.

However, if the Cambodian king Sihanuok had recognized the existence of Vietnamese
camps in the East, which he was perfectly aware of, the neutrality position that the
Cambodian State had been taking would be lost. Although the actions of the US over
Cambodian field were the direct cause of the open conflict in the country, the truth is
that the existing political and social actors had the will and the capacity to dispute the
power of the Cambodian State. The breeding ground had been growing since the
Second World War and beyond, with a lot of factors conflicting in the social, political
and economic arenas. The enormous economic inequalities over the control of rice
production, the wide cleavage between the rural and urban societies had big impact.
Cambodia was facing the last step of the decolonization. On one hand, the transition
was responsibility of the old autochthonous elites, favored by the colonial authorities in
its last stand of holding the power. On the other hand, different sign groups appeared,
especially communist, with a more democratic and revolutionary vision of the share of
power and wealth. Everything with the special role of nationalism.

It is important to realize that Cambodia was a recently born country, with inherited
borders from the colonial era, without a modern State’s experience, with multiethnic
and multireligious societies, affected by inequalities and with political agents with their
own homogenization programs based on an subjetive tradition. The process of
decolonization, the independence, the trials of State-building and the revolutionary
projects in the Third World are the result of crossing a labyrinth.

Despite the catastrophic situation, the violence in the Cambodian conflict seriously
exceeded the average that can be found in other scenarios around the globe. During the
last quarter of the XX century and the XI century, different studies have worked this
special and painful characteristic, explaining it with different hypothesis. Firstly, the
established consensus before 1990 explained the development of the Cambodian
killings as purely irrational, only explained by ancient hatreds between ethnics.
However, the newer studies suggest that the reason is far deeper. Following Omar
McDoom’s thesis, the role of the elites in directing followers into committing said
actions was strictly relevant. In the case of Cambodia, with the goal of establishing a
Maoist form of communism, conceiving it as an agrarian republic. Thus, with the first
deliberation of violence being commanded by the elites, a process of radicalization
begins. The performing of violence led to the transformation of attitudes and beliefs of a
person; des-humanization of the victims followed, justifying the act of violence in a
moral sense, usually through the adoption of the arising nationalism or ideological
principles. In addition, the subjective creation of in-groups and out-groups took also an
important part in the deliberation of violence. A clear division in social standing
between clashing groups (akin to class struggle) played a definitive role in the
progressive dehumanization of the victims.

All those factors are important in order to explain not only this, but almost every
conflict that evokes in mass killings. However, there is a specific characteristic this war
had that is not easy to be found anywhere else: the Cambodian struggle lasted too long.
Since the colonial era, the social scene was unstable due to the conflicts in the fields and
the imperialist collaboration with the nobility. The occupation of the Japanese forces
lasted only 4 years but started a cycle of blood and powder that would not be stopped
until 30 years after. All the violence the Cambodian population had experienced
constructed a deformed cosmovision of society, which was deeply engrained in the
collective imaginary, but specially in those who had been part of the fighting: the
Khmer Rouge Guerrillas.

TERCERA PARTE
Escritos sobre el porqué de la violencia. Mítico Omar mcdoom y Hinton. Madness in
cambodia.
Extreme forms of ideology. Nationalism. Sihanouk
Violencia progresiva fomented by elites.
Role of revenge. Urban-Rural. Role of peasentry.

Conclusión de mi parte: Cambodia as the main example of progressive violence.


Muchos factores al mismo tiempo. La cosa está jodida.
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