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Justification (epistemology)
Justification (also called epistemic justification) is the property of belief that qualifies it as
knowledge rather than mere opinion. Epistemology is the study of reasons that someone holds a
rationally admissible belief (although the term is also sometimes applied to other propositional
attitudes such as doubt).[1] Epistemologists are concerned with various epistemic features of belief,
which include the ideas of warrant (a proper justification for holding a belief), knowledge,
rationality, and probability, among others.
Debates surrounding epistemic justification often involve the structure of justification, including
whether there are foundational justified beliefs or whether mere coherence is sufficient for a
system of beliefs to qualify as justified. Another major subject of debate is the sources of
justification, which might include perceptual experience (the evidence of the senses), reason, and
authoritative testimony, among others.
Many philosophers from Plato onward have treated "justified true belief" (JTB) as constituting
knowledge. It is particularly associated with a theory discussed in his dialogues Meno and
Theaetetus. While in fact Plato seems to disavow justified true belief as constituting knowledge at
the end of Theaetetus, the claim that Plato unquestioningly accepted this view of knowledge stuck
until the proposal of the Gettier problem.[1]
The subject of justification has played a major role in the value of knowledge as "justified true
belief". Some contemporary epistemologists, such as Jonathan Kvanvig assert that justification
isn't necessary in getting to the truth and avoiding errors. Kvanvig attempts to show that
knowledge is no more valuable than true belief, and in the process dismissed the necessity of
justification due to justification not being connected to the truth.
Conceptions of justification
William P. Alston identifies two conceptions of justification.[2]: 15–16 One conception is
"deontological" justification, which holds that justification evaluates the obligation and
responsibility of a person having only true beliefs. This conception implies, for instance, that a
person who has made his best effort but is incapable of concluding the correct belief from his
evidence is still justified. The deontological conception of justification corresponds to epistemic
internalism. Another conception is "truth-conducive" justification, which holds that justification is
based on having sufficient evidence or reasons that entails that the belief is at least likely to be
true. The truth-conductive conception of justification corresponds to epistemic externalism.
Theories of justification
There are several different views as to what entails justification, mostly focusing on the question
"How sure do we need to be that our beliefs correspond to the actual world?" Different theories of
justification require different conditions before a belief can be considered justified. Theories of
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William P. Alston criticizes the very idea of a theory of justification. He claims: "There isn't any
unique, epistemically crucial property of beliefs picked out by 'justified'. Epistemologists who
suppose the contrary have been chasing a will-o'-the-wisp. What has really been happening is this.
Different epistemologists have been emphasizing, concentrating on, "pushing" different epistemic
desiderata, different features of belief that are positively valuable from the standpoint of the aims
of cognition."[2]: 22
See also
Dream argument
Münchhausen trilemma
References
1. "Epistemic Justification" (http://www.iep.utm.edu/epi-just). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Retrieved 6 July 2020.
2. William. P. Alston, Beyond "Justification": dimensions of epistemic evaluation, Cornell
University Press, 2005, ISBN 0-8014-4291-5
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External links
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic
Justification (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/)
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Epistemology, 2. What is Justification? (http://pla
to.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#WIJ)
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of
Epistemic Justification (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/)
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/)
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