Evidence 

for a proposition is what supports this proposition. It is usually

understood as an indication that the supported proposition is true. What
role evidence plays and how it is conceived varies from field to field.
In epistemology, evidence is what justifies beliefs or what makes
it rational to hold a certain doxastic attitude. For example, a perceptual
experience of a tree may act as evidence that justifies the belief that
there is a tree. In this role, evidence is usually understood as a private
mental state. Important topics in this field include the questions of what
the nature of these mental states is, for example, whether they have to
be propositional, and whether misleading mental states can still qualify
as evidence. In phenomenology, evidence is understood in a similar
sense. Here, however, it is limited to intuitive knowledge that provides
immediate access to truth and is therefore indubitable. In this role, it is
supposed to provide ultimate justifications for basic philosophical
principles and thus turn philosophy into a rigorous science. However, it is
highly controversial whether evidence can meet these requirements.
Other fields, including the sciences and the law, tend to emphasize more
the public nature of evidence (for example, scientists tend to focus on
how the data used during statistical inference are generated).
[1]
 In philosophy of science, evidence is understood as that
which confirms or disconfirms scientific hypotheses. Measurements of
Mercury's "anomalous" orbit, for example, are seen as evidence that
confirms Einstein's theory of general relativity. In order to play the role of
neutral arbiter between competing theories, it is important that scientific
evidence is public and uncontroversial, like observable physical objects
or events, so that the proponents of the different theories can agree on
what the evidence is. This is ensured by following the scientific
method and tends to lead to an emerging scientific consensus through
the gradual accumulation of evidence. Two issues for the scientific
conception of evidence are the problem of underdetermination, i.e. that
the available evidence may support competing theories equally well,
and theory-ladenness, i.e. that what some scientists consider the
evidence to be may already involve various theoretical assumptions not
shared by other scientists. It is often held that there are two kinds of
evidence: intellectual evidence or what is self-evident and empirical
evidence or evidence accessible through the senses.
Evidence for a proposition is what supports this proposition. It is usually
understood as an indication that the supported proposition is true. What
role evidence plays and how it is conceived varies from field to field.
In epistemology, evidence is what justifies beliefs or what makes
it rational to hold a certain doxastic attitude. For example, a perceptual
experience of a tree may act as evidence that justifies the belief that
there is a tree. In this role, evidence is usually understood as a private
mental state. Important topics in this field include the questions of what
the nature of these mental states is, for example, whether they have to
be propositional, and whether misleading mental states can still qualify
as evidence. In phenomenology, evidence is understood in a similar
sense. Here, however, it is limited to intuitive knowledge that provides
immediate access to truth and is therefore indubitable. In this role, it is
supposed to provide ultimate justifications for basic philosophical
principles and thus turn philosophy into a rigorous science. However, it is
highly controversial whether evidence can meet these requirements.
Other fields, including the sciences and the law, tend to emphasize more
the public nature of evidence (for example, scientists tend to focus on
how the data used during statistical inference are generated).
[1]
 In philosophy of science, evidence is understood as that
which confirms or disconfirms scientific hypotheses. Measurements of
Mercury's "anomalous" orbit, for example, are seen as evidence that
confirms Einstein's theory of general relativity. In order to play the role of
neutral arbiter between competing theories, it is important that scientific
evidence is public and uncontroversial, like observable physical objects
or events, so that the proponents of the different theories can agree on
what the evidence is. This is ensured by following the scientific
method and tends to lead to an emerging scientific consensus through
the gradual accumulation of evidence. Two issues for the scientific
conception of evidence are the problem of underdetermination, i.e. that
the available evidence may support competing theories equally well,
and theory-ladenness, i.e. that what some scientists consider the
evidence to be may already involve various theoretical assumptions not
shared by other scientists. It is often held that there are two kinds of
evidence: intellectual evidence or what is self-evident and empirical
evidence or evidence accessible through the senses.
Evidence for a proposition is what supports this proposition. It is usually
understood as an indication that the supported proposition is true. What
role evidence plays and how it is conceived varies from field to field.
In epistemology, evidence is what justifies beliefs or what makes
it rational to hold a certain doxastic attitude. For example, a perceptual
experience of a tree may act as evidence that justifies the belief that
there is a tree. In this role, evidence is usually understood as a private
mental state. Important topics in this field include the questions of what
the nature of these mental states is, for example, whether they have to
be propositional, and whether misleading mental states can still qualify
as evidence. In phenomenology, evidence is understood in a similar
sense. Here, however, it is limited to intuitive knowledge that provides
immediate access to truth and is therefore indubitable. In this role, it is
supposed to provide ultimate justifications for basic philosophical
principles and thus turn philosophy into a rigorous science. However, it is
highly controversial whether evidence can meet these requirements.
Other fields, including the sciences and the law, tend to emphasize more
the public nature of evidence (for example, scientists tend to focus on
how the data used during statistical inference are generated).
[1]
 In philosophy of science, evidence is understood as that
which confirms or disconfirms scientific hypotheses. Measurements of
Mercury's "anomalous" orbit, for example, are seen as evidence that
confirms Einstein's theory of general relativity. In order to play the role of
neutral arbiter between competing theories, it is important that scientific
evidence is public and uncontroversial, like observable physical objects
or events, so that the proponents of the different theories can agree on
what the evidence is. This is ensured by following the scientific
method and tends to lead to an emerging scientific consensus through
the gradual accumulation of evidence. Two issues for the scientific
conception of evidence are the problem of underdetermination, i.e. that
the available evidence may support competing theories equally well,
and theory-ladenness, i.e. that what some scientists consider the
evidence to be may already involve various theoretical assumptions not
shared by other scientists. It is often held that there are two kinds of
evidence: intellectual evidence or what is self-evident and empirical
evidence or evidence accessible through the senses.
Evidence for a proposition is what supports this proposition. It is usually
understood as an indication that the supported proposition is true. What
role evidence plays and how it is conceived varies from field to field.
In epistemology, evidence is what justifies beliefs or what makes
it rational to hold a certain doxastic attitude. For example, a perceptual
experience of a tree may act as evidence that justifies the belief that
there is a tree. In this role, evidence is usually understood as a private
mental state. Important topics in this field include the questions of what
the nature of these mental states is, for example, whether they have to
be propositional, and whether misleading mental states can still qualify
as evidence. In phenomenology, evidence is understood in a similar
sense. Here, however, it is limited to intuitive knowledge that provides
immediate access to truth and is therefore indubitable. In this role, it is
supposed to provide ultimate justifications for basic philosophical
principles and thus turn philosophy into a rigorous science. However, it is
highly controversial whether evidence can meet these requirements.
Other fields, including the sciences and the law, tend to emphasize more
the public nature of evidence (for example, scientists tend to focus on
how the data used during statistical inference are generated).
[1]
 In philosophy of science, evidence is understood as that
which confirms or disconfirms scientific hypotheses. Measurements of
Mercury's "anomalous" orbit, for example, are seen as evidence that
confirms Einstein's theory of general relativity. In order to play the role of
neutral arbiter between competing theories, it is important that scientific
evidence is public and uncontroversial, like observable physical objects
or events, so that the proponents of the different theories can agree on
what the evidence is. This is ensured by following the scientific
method and tends to lead to an emerging scientific consensus through
the gradual accumulation of evidence. Two issues for the scientific
conception of evidence are the problem of underdetermination, i.e. that
the available evidence may support competing theories equally well,
and theory-ladenness, i.e. that what some scientists consider the
evidence to be may already involve various theoretical assumptions not
shared by other scientists. It is often held that there are two kinds of
evidence: intellectual evidence or what is self-evident and empirical
evidence or evidence accessible through the senses.
Evidence for a proposition is what supports this proposition. It is usually
understood as an indication that the supported proposition is true. What
role evidence plays and how it is conceived varies from field to field.
In epistemology, evidence is what justifies beliefs or what makes
it rational to hold a certain doxastic attitude. For example, a perceptual
experience of a tree may act as evidence that justifies the belief that
there is a tree. In this role, evidence is usually understood as a private
mental state. Important topics in this field include the questions of what
the nature of these mental states is, for example, whether they have to
be propositional, and whether misleading mental states can still qualify
as evidence. In phenomenology, evidence is understood in a similar
sense. Here, however, it is limited to intuitive knowledge that provides
immediate access to truth and is therefore indubitable. In this role, it is
supposed to provide ultimate justifications for basic philosophical
principles and thus turn philosophy into a rigorous science. However, it is
highly controversial whether evidence can meet these requirements.
Other fields, including the sciences and the law, tend to emphasize more
the public nature of evidence (for example, scientists tend to focus on
how the data used during statistical inference are generated).
[1]
 In philosophy of science, evidence is understood as that
which confirms or disconfirms scientific hypotheses. Measurements of
Mercury's "anomalous" orbit, for example, are seen as evidence that
confirms Einstein's theory of general relativity. In order to play the role of
neutral arbiter between competing theories, it is important that scientific
evidence is public and uncontroversial, like observable physical objects
or events, so that the proponents of the different theories can agree on
what the evidence is. This is ensured by following the scientific
method and tends to lead to an emerging scientific consensus through
the gradual accumulation of evidence. Two issues for the scientific
conception of evidence are the problem of underdetermination, i.e. that
the available evidence may support competing theories equally well,
and theory-ladenness, i.e. that what some scientists consider the
evidence to be may already involve various theoretical assumptions not
shared by other scientists. It is often held that there are two kinds of
evidence: intellectual evidence or what is self-evident and empirical
evidence or evidence accessible through the senses.