BEHAVIORTHERAPy 23, 173-194, 1992

Philosophical and Psychological Epistemologies

in Behaviorism and Behavior Therapy
WILLIAM O ' D o N o H U E
Northern Illinois University

LAURENCE D . SMITH

University of Maine
We argue for the following conclusions: (1) that despite what has traditionally been
the received view, the epistemology of behaviorism is not similar to, was not histori-
cally influenced by, is not consistent with, and therefore does not share a linked fate
with, logical positivism; (2) that this tradition of unfortunate exegesis and misattribu-
tion is alive and well in that some behavior therapists (e.g., Mahoney, 1989) have tried
to construct arguments against radical behaviorism by falsely linking radical behaviorism
with certain philosophical positions that they regard as erroneous; (3) that there has
been a surprising variety of views on behavior therapy's epistemological commitments;
(4) that developments within philosophy and philosophy of science, especially by Quine
and Popper, are largely in agreement with naturalized psychological epistemologies
such as Skinner's. Therefore, behavior therapists may not need to rely on philosophy
for insights into epistemological questions, but rather may look toward neo- behaviorist
theories of knowledge.

Traditionally epistemology has been a branch of philosophy that studies

knowledge. Its principle concerns have been such questions as: What is knowl-
edge? Is knowledge possible? If so, what are the sources of knowledge? Be-
cause knowledge is the goal of all scholarly activity and is critical to the solu-
tion of practical problems, there has been an interest in understanding what
special properties (e.g., truth, justification, survival of attempted falsification)
and procedures (e.g., unbiased empirical observation, Cartesian methodical
doubt, revelation, conjecture and refutation) distinguish knowledge from that
which is not knowledge (e.g., false claims, unjustified assertions, mispercep-
tions, accurate lucky guesses).
Epistemology dates at least as far back as Plato in the fourth century B.C.
However, in the 20th-century there have been two dramatic changes in the
study of knowledge. First, science has become a major subject of study for
epistemologists because it is commonly viewed as having produced an un-
precedented acceleration in the growth of knowledge. Philosophy of science
is concerned chiefly with epistemology and often takes as its starting point
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174 O'DONOHUE & SMITH

the question of what is special about science that allows such a growth of
knowledge.
The second major development in the 20th century is that not only has
science been the focus of study but it has also increasingly been the method
for the study of epistemological questions. The study of knowledge is no longer
the exclusive province of philosophers. Linguists, neurologists, biochemists,
computer scientists, evolutionary biologists, and, as we shall see, psycholo-
gists have provided their own answers to the major questions of epistemology.
Part of the underlying rationale for this move has been that if science is the
best method for producing knowledge, then it should be used to gain knowl-
edge about knowledge. Additional grounds for such an approach- sometimes
called naturalized epistemology- come from the belief that human knowers
and human knowledge are part of the natural world and therefore should be
studied with the same scientific techniques that are used to study other parts
of nature.
Why should practicing scientists, concerned with their own particular sub-
stantive questions, also be concerned about epistemology? Implicitly, scien-
tists (as well as applied scientists such as behavior therapists) rely on answers
(good or bad, formal or informal, well or poorly articulated) to the major
questions of epistemology. Scientists begin their investigations by claiming
either that nothing is known about the field or that certain things are known
and therefore may serve as a secure starting point for their investigations. Scien-
tists engage in their investigations because they believe that their methods are
reliable ones for producing knowledge. They typically end their investigations
with knowledge claims such as "It is not the case that p" or "These results
provide evidence for the truth of such and such." Again, questions can be
raised about what theory of knowledge scientists are relying on in assessing
the knowledge state of their area of inquiry, in assessing the epistemic fecun-
dity of the methodology used, or in asserting the conclusions of the research.
It is the hope of some philosophically interested scientists that a clearer, more
systematic understanding of epistemological questions can lead to less error
and more efficient production of knowledge.
In addition, epistemological concerns are often forced on the scientist by
criticism from rival approaches. For example, behavior therapists (Wolpe &
Rachman, 1960) and behaviorists (Skinner, 1974) have criticized Freud of using
an unreliable method for the generation of knowledge, and psychoanalysis
of having other properties (e.g., unobservable entities, lack of clear theoret-
ical predictions) that render the generation of knowledge impossible. In addi-
tion, behaviorists have criticized one another over the issue of whether cogni-
tions can be known and thus whether they should be included in or excluded
from any science. For example, Skinner (1974) characterizes some behaviorists
(methodological behaviorists such as Watson) as requiring intersubjective
verifiability for knowledge claims, which excludes Cognitions as knowable en-
tities. Skinner rejects this criterion and admits knowledge of cognitions (though
not in the form of internal copies of the world) because the thinker can know
these. This epistemological controversy has obvious extensions into the cog-
nitive/behavioral debate in behavior therapy. Below we will examine some of
 EPISTEMOLOGY 175

the epistemological criticisms of behaviorism. To the extent that behaviorism

serves as a philosophy of psychology for some branches of behavior therapy
(and, as we shall see, as a basis for some influential forms of naturalized episte-
mology), an understanding of this issue is essential.
One of the chief lessons of postpositivist philosophy of science is that the
traditional distinctions between science and philosophy do not hold up to scru-
tiny, and in particular that science cannot be categorically segregated from
philosophy. Historical (Koestler, 1959; Kuhn, 1957), philosophical (Quine,
1969), and contemporary survey (Krasner & Houts, 1984) studies have shown
that scientists not only hold philosophical beliefs, or metaphysical commit-
ments, but also rely on them in framing hypotheses and choosing between
theories. As one philosopher has put it, the scientist is often "metaphysicien
malgr6 lui" [metaphysician despite himself] (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 86). Even in
applied science, it has been argued that given the role of philosophical beliefs
in clinical research and practice, the scientist-practitioner is more accurately
understood as a metaphysician-scientist-practitioner(O'Donohue, 1989a). As
a consequence of these claims, those who study science have come to acknowl-
edge the value of discerning, criticizing, and assessing the ontological and
epistemological commitments of practicing scientists- if only because the pro-
cess is relevant to the assessment of their scientific theories (Laudan, 1977).
Yet the benefits of making philosophical presuppositions explicit and subjecting
them to criticism cannot be realized unless the commitments of the scientists
(or their paradigms or research traditions) are correctly identified in the first
place (Krasner & Houts, 1984).
This is not to say that philosophy provides an extra-scientific or supra-
scientific position from which science can be advised and judged. Although
this has perhaps been the hope of some philosophically minded scientists, we
will see that the matter is more complex than this. Epistemological holism
implies an intermingling of what has typically been considered "philosophy"
and "science" in any pursuit of knowledge. We shall also see that the recogni-
tion of the role of science in philosophy has been no less difficult for
philosophers. We will rely upon the work of one of the most eminent 20th-
century philosophers (Quine) and one of the most eminent 20th-century
philosophers of science (Popper) to depict some of the roles of science in episte-
mology.
Behavioral Epistemology and Logical Positivism: A Case Study
A useful case study for our purposes from the not-so-distant history of psy-
chology involves the widespread view that logical positivism formed the
philosophical basis, as well as historical provenance, of neobehaviorism. As
Smith (1986) has shown, the standard view of neobehaviorism's philosophical
affinities comprises three distinct theses: (a) the importation thesis, stating that
major neobehaviorists imported their philosophical and methodological be-
liefs from logical positivism (Koch, 1959, 1964); (b) the subordination thesis,
stating that the neobehaviorists subordinated their psychological views to these
prior philosophical commitments (Mackenzie, 1977); and (c) the thesis o f linked
fates, according to which the fate of neobehaviorism was thus linked to the
176 O'DONOHUE & SMITH

fate of logical positivism such that when the latter was discredited as a viable
philosophy of science, the neobehavioral psychologies were likewise discredited
(Koch, 1964; Leahey, 1980). These theses will be considered in turn, using the
major neobehaviorists Edward C. Tolman, Clark Hull, and B. E Skinner as
test cases.
Importation thesis. From the 1930s to the early 1960s, behaviorism enjoyed
a dominance in American psychology just as logical positivism dominated
the scene in philosophy of science. The two schools of thought did share cer-
tain general outlooks on science, including a generally empiricist orientation
and an advocacy of operational definition and experimental control. Close
examination of the historical record, however, shows that these similarities
are deceptive and in particular that the major neobehaviorists did not derive
their outlook from that of the logical positivists. Tolman's operationism, for
example, derived from his early exposure to the proto-operational view of his
neorealist mentors at Harvard, Ralph Barton Perry and Edwin B. Holt, well
before he encountered logical positivism (Smith, 1982; 1986, chapter 3; Tolman,
1952). (Neorealism, an early 20th-century philosophical movement that helped
pave the way for behaviorism, adopted William James' relational view of con-
sciousness and hence held that mental events can be known in terms of their
relations to the physical environment; see Robischon, 1967.)
Hull's conspicuous interest in hypothetico-deductive method, despite some
similarities with logical positivism, was likewise developed by Hull prior to
his contact with the logical positivist movement, and, in fact, arose from his
early interest in machine simulations of behavior rather than from any partic-
ular philosophical interests (Hull, 1952; Smith, 1986, chapter 6). Similarly,
Skinner's positivism was adopted from his early reading of Ernst Mach's
(1905/1976) biologically grounded positivism before he had encountered the
formalist brand of positivism espoused by the logical positivists (Smith, 1986,
chapter 9). Thus, in each case, the neobehaviorist's views were well formu-
lated before contact with logical positivism occurred; moreover, these views
placed serious limits on the neobehaviorists' receptiveness to logical positivism
once that contact did occur.
Subordination thesis. According to the traditional account of behaviorism
and logical positivism, the neobehaviorists were guilty of subordinating the
subject matter of psychology to the demands of the external methodologies
prescribed by logical positivist epistemology. Again, this thesis fails to apply
to any of the major neobehaviorists. Tolman's (e.g., 1925) application of oper-
ational definitions to the purposes and cognitions of organisms followed from
the neorealists' view that such higher-order psychological attributes are open
to direct observation in suitably arranged circumstances (such as complex
mazes), a view that itself rests on a realist theory of perception and knowledge
(Smith, 1986, chapter 3).
This neorealist perceptual and epistemological theory was inherent to
Tolman's psychology, not imported from logical positivist epistemology. The
indigenous psychological character of Tolman's epistemology is further evinced
in his (1936/1966) view that operationism applies equally to the scientist and
the subject:
 EPISTEMOLOGY 177

the observed behavior itself turns out to be a set of opera-

tions performed by the observed organism relative to its
own environment. In a word, the activities of both of us,
the observing and conceptualizing organisms, and of them,
the observed and behaving organisms, are all ultimately
to be characterized as operations of organisms upon en-
vironments. (pp. 115-116)

Such a naturalized behavioral epistemology was, in fact, incompatible with

both the formalism of logical positivism and its treatment of the scientist as
operating on an epistemological plane distinct from, and higher than, that
of the subject (Smith, 1986, chapter 5). Far from subordinating psychology
to an extraneous methodology, Tolman developed his operationism out of a
deep-seated indigenous conception of organismic behavior.
An analogous story can be told about Hull. Although Hull did advocate
the use of logic to formalize theories (e.g., Hull et al., 1940) and the use of
hypothetico-deductive method to test them (e.g., Hull, 1937), these positions
were drawn not from logical positivism but rather from Hulrs conception of
behavior as a mechanical process of adaptation to an environment. In Hull's
metaphysics, the world is seen as an elaborate Newtonian machine, and the
organisms in it are complex machines whose knowledge of, and adaptations
to, the world consist of covert S-R chains that mirror the external world (Hull,
1930; Smith, 1990a).
Moreover, for Hull, the rigidly mechanical S-R chains composing organismic
behavior are best captured through the determinate structure of logic (Smith,
1986, chapter 6). Hull's use of logic in theorizing was thus grounded in his
indigenous conception of behavior as machine-like, not in the formalist
prescriptions of logical positivism. As did Tolman, Hull viewed human as well
as infrahuman knowledge psychologically. He developed a behavioral episte-
mology in which even the theories of scientists were seen as implicit S-R chains,
as sequences of symbolic stimuli that parallel some part, organic or inorganic,
of the world-machine (Smith, 1986, chapter 8). As with Tolman, the scientist
and the subject were construed as being on an epistemological par.
Skinner, too, has been accused of subordinating the subject matter of psy-
chology to the demands of imported methods (e.g., Suppe, 1984; Wolman,
1968). Skinner's Machian positivism, however, was grounded in biology rather
than logic and was based on the requirement that all behavior-- whether that
of scientist or subject- meet the demands of biological economy (Smith, 1986,
chapter 9; in press). As will be discussed further below, knowledge for Skinner
is a special form of behavior (Skinner, 1957, 1974; Zuriff, 1985), and all be-
havior is governed by environmental contingencies.
In the case of scientific knowledge, those methods that produce effective
contact of the scientist with the subject matter and ensure other forms of effec-
tive behavior on the part of the scientist are more likely to produce useful
knowledge that will further the chances of cultural survival. Skinner's
methods-ranging from his unorthodox version of operationism (Skinner,
1945) to his rejection of formal methods such as hypothetico-deductivism
178 O'DONOHUE & SMITH

(Skinner, 1956)-are thus indigenous to his conception of learned behavior

and its capacity for meeting the criteria of biological economy. In regard to
Skinner's (1945) operationism, this means that operationism is not a quest
for intersubjective definitions of mentalistic terms (as it was construed by log-
ical positivists and such methodological behaviorists as E. G. Boring and S. S.
Stevens), but rather an analysis of the scientist's verbal behavior to determine
the environmental variables that govern its emission and its effectiveness in
the environment (see Baum, 1974; Flanagan, 1980; Smith, 1986, pp. 284-287).
In sum, the major neobehaviorists neither imported their epistemologies
and methods from logical positivism nor subordinated their psychologies to
external philosophical precepts. Rather, their epistemological and methodo-
logical views stemmed from their indigenous psychological-metaphysical con-
ceptions of organismic behavior. The sharp differences between the neobe-
haviorists' indigenous epistemologies and logical positivism are most clearly
revealed in the fact that all three of the neobehaviorists discussed here eventu-
ally applied their behavioral epistemologies to the interpretation of logic in
psychological terms, clearly violating the logical positivist doctrine of anti-
psychologism (Smith, 1986). In doing so, they brought their epistemologies
closer to pragmatism and Quinean holism and rendered them strictly incom-
patible with logical positivism.
Thesis o f linked fates. As mentioned earlier, the accurate identification of
a scientist's philosophical affinities gains its importance from the fact that those
affinities are relevant to evaluating the scientist's theories. The shortcomings
of logical positivism are now widely recognized, even to the point where it
is said that logical positivism "is dead, or as dead as a philosophical move-
ment ever becomes" (Passmore, 1967, p. 56). To the extent that behaviorists
have embraced logical positivism and used it to support their theories and
research methods, the demise of logical positivism does presumably count
against the adequacy of those theories. Only further historical analysis can
determine exactly which behaviorists may have actually relied on logical posi-
tivism (e.g., on Kenneth Spence's relation to logical positivism, see Smith,
1990b). But in regard to Tolman, Hull, and Skinner-the major neobehaviorists
who established behaviorism's chief modern lineages - enough has been said
here to indicate that the thesis of linked fates fails for the simple reason that
the alleged links did not exist, either historically or philosophically. Whatever
the remaining merits or liabilities of these neobehaviorists' theories, they cannot
in fairness be tarred by some reputed association with a now-defunct phi-
losophy.

Continued Exegetical Problems and Misattributions

In this section we examine a more recent attempt (Mahoney, 1989) to criti-
cize behaviorism by falsely linking it with a repudiated philosophy. We also
show that an accurate reading of Skinner results in very different claims about
the epistemology of radical behaviorism. Finally, we outline the logical ter-
rain of the criticism of Skinner's epistemology.
 EPISTEMOLOGY 179

Mahoney's Exegetical Errors

As another example of misrepresentation of the relationship between be-
haviorism and certain philosophical commitments, consider Mahoney's (1989)
treatment of objectivism, which he apparently takes to characterize some of
the broad philosophical doctrines of radical behaviorism and which he be-
lieves to have fallen into disrepute. For Mahoney objectivism encompasses
the following claims: (a) "an objectively separate 'real world' lies beyond the
organism and exists independently of being perceived"; (b) "true or valid knowl-
edge about that world is ultimately rendered through sensory experience"; and
(c) "such knowledge c a n . . , be totally separated from the individual knower"
(p. 1374). Mahoney takes these to be the central problematic positions of rad-
ical behaviorism and to be intimately connected with radical behaviorists' al-
leged scientism. Therefore, problems with Mahoney's indictment of objectivism
also reduce the force of his philosophical criticisms of radical behaviorism.
First, there are problems in the way Mahoney characterizes these positions.
Most egregious is his phrasing of (b). The pleonastic phrase "true or valid
knowledge" is confused (as opposed to what, "false and invalid knowledge"?).
Moreover, validity is a property of arguments and not of knowledge or knowl-
edge claims (Kalish & Montague, 1964). The characterization (a) is also poorly
drawn. In opposing (a) does Mahoney really want to deny the existence of
an external world? This is especially confusing given that the existence of "or-
ganisms" seems to be unproblematic for him. His ontology appears to involve
a lot of organisms, none of which apparently is in the external world of any
other.
Second, even if these claims can be drawn better, Mahoney fails to give any
arguments to suggest that they are false. Initially he simply slurs these claims
by asserting that "with recent developments in physics, philosophy, her-
meneutics, biology, and the cognitive sciences. . . . common-sense objectivism
has come under increasingly critical scrutiny" (p. 1374). Notice the actually
innocent but very ominous sounding phrase "increasingly critical scrutiny."
What is the outcome of this "critical scrutiny"? What exactly are these alleged
developments, and do they actually refute the claims in question? Similarly,
does the existence of our criticism (along with others': Lonigan, 1990; Morris,
1990; Wyatt, 1990) of Mahoney place his position under "increasingly critical
scrutiny," and should it therefore also be dismissed on this basis? Mahoney
casts aspersions on the objectivist positions by simply asserting that there has
been a "shift away" from them "in favor of" supposedly incompatible posi-
tions. Such sociological reporting, even if correct, is at best an interesting rhe-
torical strategy but does not constitute a valid counterargument. Moreover,
it is not even clear whether such "shifts" have occurred. We are not privy to
any poll, but we offer as counterevidence the observation that realism and ob-
jectivism have been advocated by such influential contemporary philosophers
as Quine (1973), Harr6 (1970), Goldman (1986), and Popper (in his Objective
Knowledge, 1972, and Realism and the Aim o f Science, 1983).
180 O'DONOHUE & SMITH

Skinner's Epistemology
Beyond these confusions, however, Mahoney's points are not particularly
relevant because he does not properly characterize the epistemological theory
of radical behaviorism. Below we will do this and suggest that radical be-
haviorist epistemology actually fares well by Mahoney's own evaluative criteria
for epistemological theories.
Skinner (1945, 1957) naturalized epistemology and in doing so offered a
different kind of theory than is found in philosophical epistemologies. Skinner's
radical naturalism strives to eliminate all normative concepts such as truth,
confirmation, or validity (Kitchener, 1979). His account is a naturalistic, causal,
empirical a c c o u n t - in short, what may be taken to be a scientific account (as
Skinner intended it). This fact underlies Skinner's longstanding indifference
to philosophical developments in epistemology, presumably including the sup-
posed philosophical developments cited by Mahoney. When the young Skinner
was told by Alfred North Whitehead that a psychologist should closely follow
developments in philosophy, Skinner replied, "It was quite the other way
a r o u n d - w e needed a psychological epistemology" (Skinner, 1984b, p. 29).
It is noteworthy that Skinner is not alone h e r e - i n addition to Tolman and
Hull, such psychologists as Cattell, Piaget, and even Maslow also developed
naturalized epistemologies (Kitchener, 1979).
The rationale for Skinner's account of knowledge arises largely from his
concern with learning and his naturalistic approach to it. From a behavioral
perspective an adequate theory of learning translates directly into a theory
of knowledge: knowledge is simply effective behavior that is shaped through
the contingencies of survival and reinforcement. Knowledge claims are also
b e h a v i o r - v e r b a l b e h a v i o r - a n d are conditioned by the verbal community.
For example, Skinner states:

A proposition is true to the extent that with its help the

listener responds effectively to the situation it describes
(1974, p. 235) . . . . We confirm any verbal response when
we generate additional variables to increase its probability
(1957, p. 425) . . . . If it turns out that our final view of
verbal behavior invalidates our scientific structure from
the point of view of logic and truth value then so much
the worse for logic, which will also have been embraced
by our analysis (1945, p. 380).

For Skinner, then, knowledge is effective behavior and this behavior, like
other behavior, has been developed and maintained by phylogenetic and on-
togenetic contingencies. His deterministic stance (Skinner, 1974) rules out any
normative justificational epistemology. For if "ought" implies "can," then "One
ought (on the basis of such and such evidence or sound argument) to assert
p" implies "One can assert p." But for Skinner one can do only what the con-
trolling variables determine and therefore such justificational epistemologies
are based on the illusion of free (or at least underdetermined) rational choice.
Moreover, Skinner is remarkably consistent in his v i e w s - the behavior of
 EPISTEMOLOGY 181

the scientist, including Skinner's own verbal behavior about verbal behavior
(knowledge about knowledge), is just additional effective behavior. "Science
is a corpus of rules for effective action" (Skinner, 1974, p. 235). For Skinner
there is never any meta-level from which his system could be evaluated by nor-
mative philosophical criteria:

It would be absurd for the behaviorist to contend that he

is in any way exempt from his analysis. He cannot step
out of the causal stream and observe behavior from some
special point of vantage . . . . In the very act of analyzing
human behavior he is behaving. (Skinner, 1974, p. 234)

In taking Skinner as having some sort of philosophical epistemology, Ma-

honey (1989) misunderstands him. Skinner's theory of knowledge is not a log-
ical positivist epistemology, nor is it any other philosophical epistemology (ob-
jectivist, positivist, or realist). Rather it is an indigenous psychological theory
that is an extension of Skinner's views about other behavior (Smith, 1986).
Evaluating Skinner's Epistemology
An important implication of this accurate exegesis must be noted. Mahoney
(1989) seems to regard an epistemology as acceptable if it is nonjustificational,
if it provides a "motoric/process" model of knowing, and if it entails that "the
knower/observer cannot be removed from either the process or the product
of knowing" (p. 1374). But given a correct reading of Skinner, radical be-
haviorist epistemology should be judged acceptable according to Mahoney's
own evaluative criteria. A behavioral, causal account is nonjustificational par
excellence; operant behavior is a motoric process; and the knower cannot be
removed from his or her (knowledge) behavior.
Moreover, if Skinner's account is inconsistent with some (even allegedly con-
sensual) philosophical account, a natural response for a behaviorist would
be, "So much the worse for the philosophical a c c o u n t - these are not the evalu-
ative criteria that are important to me, and, by the way, how successful is this
philosophical account in identifying controlling variables?" To actually meet
(and possibly defeat) Skinner's account it appears that one needs to show its
inadequacy using Skinner's own criteria, or show that these criteria themselves
are inadequate. That is, claiming that Skinner's account is false or not based
on sound arguments is ineffectual, because the criteria of truth and soundness
are not recognized by the account. This is not to say, however, that radical
behaviorist epistemology is invulnerable to criticism. Indeed, one might claim
that Skinner has actually failed to naturalize epistemology by showing, for
example, that effective action is ultimately a normative concept (Kitchener,
1979). One might also seek to demonstrate that Skinner's account is inef-
fective- that it does not really lead to effective action. This is an open empir-
ical question. The status of behavior therapy, programmed learning, and even
the experimental analysis of behavior would all seem germane to this evalua-
tion. Unfortunately, Mahoney pursues neither of these relevant avenues of
criticism.
182 O'DONOHUE& SMITH

Thus, with respect to Skinner's theory of knowledge, Mahoney (1989) fails

to present a sound counter-argument (or if one prefers Skinner's naturalized
alternative, he fails to "emit effective verbal behavior"). First, he does not
properly characterize Skinner's theory ("his behavior is not controlled by
Skinner's verbal behavior"); and, second, by his own criteria Skinner's actual
theory is not false ("ineffective"), but rather seems to be sound ("effective").
The Epistemology of Behavior Therapy
Thus far we have discussed issues relating to the epistemology of behaviorism.
Because the relationship between behaviorism and behavior therapy is unclear
and appears to vary depending on the type of behavior therapy and the brand
of behaviorism, the question of the epistemological commitments of behavior
therapists must be treated separately.
Behavior therapists appear not to be committed to any single epistemolog-
ical theory. This is perhaps to be expected given that behavior therapy is a
diverse collection of enterprises and, therefore subsets of behavior therapists
may rely on different epistemologies (e.g., rational emotive therapists may ad-
here to a more rationalistic epistemology than behavior analysts). Moreover,
a behavior therapist may at different times or in different situations adhere
to different epistemologies. Nothing about the practice of behavior therapy
entails the consistent use of a single epistemology, because an adherence to
a particular epistemological theory is not a defining characteristic of behavior
therapy. Thus, behavior therapists may be rather eclectic and opportunistic
in their epistemological commitments.
This apparent epistemological eclecticism may partially account for the
widely diverse claims made by previous writers regarding the epistemology
of behavior therapy. However, the possibility of unfortunate exegesis must
again be acknowledged. For example, Fishman, Rotgers, and Franks (1988)
have baldly referred to logical positivism as "the main underlying epistemology
of behavior therapy" (p. 13), suggesting that the traditional views discussed
above on the relationship of logical positivism and behaviorism have made
their way into behavior therapy. Yet, oddly enough, Fishman et al. (1988) state
elsewhere in their book that the epistemology of behavior therapy is best cap-
tured by the work of Kuhn (1970). Although Kuhn has never been entirely
explicit about epistemological matters, his views are certainly inconsistent with
logical positivism, and seem to depict knowledge as a noncumulative,
relativistic, and sociological phenomenon.
In a survey of 82 psychologists who started the behavior therapy movement
during the 30-year period following World War II, Krasner and Houts (1984)
found that the behavior therapists endorsed more anti-rationalistic items and
fewer anti-empiricism items than did a comparison group of nonbehavioral
psychologists. Although the absolute differences between these two groups were
quite small, this finding lends some evidence for the belief that behavior ther-
apists are relatively empiricistic in their epistemology. Other writers (e.g., Erwin,
1988) have also viewed behavior therapists as committed to empiricism. Con-
temporary psychologists are trained in the view that knowledge is produced
by empirical research.
 EPISTEMOLOGY 183

Thus, specific research methods need to be examined in order to determine

what is special about them that allows the generation of knowledge. It is again
possible that diflerent epistemological theories are involved in different research
methods. Traditional between-group methods favored by the cognitive-
behaviorists have stronger inductive elements (e.g., representative sampling
and generalization) than the single-subject methodologies favored by the be-
havior analysts (O'Donohue & Houts, 1985). Although the epistemology of
these and other research methods cannot be examined more fully here, the
point to be made is simply that if behavior therapists view knowledge as being
derived from the application of research methods, then an examination of
the special features of these methods seems to be critical in explicating be-
havior therapists' epistemologies.
O'Donohue and Krasner (1988) have suggested that behavior therapists do
not practice Popperian falsificationism in that their research designs place the
law of effect at little risk of falsification due to their failure to provide inde-
pendent and systematic procedures for identifying reinforcers and punishers
(see Timberlake & Farmer-Dugan, in press, for another treatment of the same
problem). Also relevant to the issue of falsificationism is Mahoney's (1979)
finding that a sample of prominent behaviorists and behavior therapists were
"neither supportive nor critical of the importance of negative results" (p. 47).
Thus, behavior therapists do not seem, for better or worse, to follow Pop-
perian methodological prescriptions. O'Donohue and Krasner (1988) argued
that behavior therapists appear to behave in accordance with the model of
science proposed by Lakatos (1970) in which certain cherished beliefs of a
research program (e.g., the law of effect) are protected against falsification;
because of this protectionism, the law of effect functions for them as an ir-
refutable metaphysical proposition.
Finally, behavior therapists who have a strong sympathy with behaviorism
and learning theory tend to advocate a more naturalized, indigenous episte-
mology (Houts, 1988). This is not surprising given that these behavior ther-
apists probably have the greatest degree of sympathy with behaviorism and
appear to have extrapolated the epistemology of behaviorism to behavior
therapy.
The epistemologies attributed to behavior therapy in the extant literature
thus range from logical positivism, to Kuhnian and Lakatosian theory, to var-
ious empiricist and inductivist approaches, to naturalized epistemologies.
Which of these views is correct? Although this question is an important one,
we believe it would be premature to attempt an answer. A proper answer would
seem to require a careful review of the historical record, an analysis of the
epistemology underlying research methods, and the drawing of needed dis-
tinctions between types of behavior therapy (e.g., behavior analysis, rational
emotive, environmental design). As we suggested earlier, there need not be
a single epistemological commitment for the diverse collection of enterprises
sometimes summarized as behavior therapy.
Further complicating the picture is the realization that the question of which
view is correct really involves two distinct questions. First is the descriptive
question of what epistemological theory (or theories) a particular behavior
184 O'DONOHUE & SMITH

therapist or research program actually relies on or favors. Answering this ques-

tion would presumably involve a careful review of the historical record along
the lines of Smith (1986) in combination with further empirical work along
the lines of Krasner and Houts (1984).
The second question is the normative one of which epistemological theory
should be a d o p t e d - on grounds of its philosophical quality or according to
other, perhaps empirical, criteria of adequacy-by behavior therapists. For
example, Brown (1988) has proposed that epistemologies can be judged on
empirical criteria regarding their empirical fruitfulness- for example, the ex-
tent to which they lead to success in achieving gains in information and solu-
tions to problems. However, evaluating the diverse epistemological theories
is a difficult oroblem and one that cannot be undertaken here.
However, a crucial step in solving such a problem is to identify and expli-
cate relevant epistemologies. One epistemology that merits the attention of
behaviorists and behavior therapists is evolutionary epistemology. With the
demise of logical positivism in the latter half of the 20th-century there has
also been a decline in the importance attached to physics as the paradigmatic
science and as the field that contains the answers to fundamental epistemo-
logical questions. The logical positivists thought all other sciences could be
reduced to physics. Recently however, biology has been viewed as having more
relevance to epistemology and the philosophy of science (Bartley, 1987). Below
we shall see some of the reasons for this view. We also claim that Skinner,
especially in his later writings, developed an evolutionary epistemology and
that one must thus understand the evolutionary approach to knowledge in
order to fully understand Skinner.
Evolutionary epistemology represents an attempt to naturalize epistemology
and follows Quine's (1990) suggestion that the best science should inform the-
ories o'f knowledge. In this case the science is neo-Darwinian biology (as op-
posed to the logical positivist reliance on physics). The principal evolutionary
epistemologists have been the philosophers Karl Popper (1972), Stephen
Toulmin (1972), and Larry Laudan (1977), the psychologist Donald Campbell
(1956, 1960, 1974, 1988), and the ethologist Konrad Lorenz (1965); and to this
list we would add B. E Skinner 0957, 1974, 1984a), even though Skinner has
commonly been ignored in this literature.
Evolutionary epistemology begins with the premise that organisms are the
exemplifications of knowledge that is produced by random variation, selec-
tion, and retention- that is, by the mechanisms of evolution. Organisms ex-
emplify knowledge in that the phenotype of an organism is itself a solution
to the many enduring problems facing the species; as such, the phenotype is
a literal embodiment of knowledge. As Bartley (1987) has written, "evolution
is a process in which information regarding the environment is literally incor-
porated, incarnated, in surviving organisms through the process of adapta-
tion" (p. 23). A simple example of such an embodiment of knowledge is that
the characteristics of the food in an omnivore's diet (the environment) have
produced the structure, variety, and placement of teeth for tearing and grinding
 EPISTEMOLOGY 185

(the embodiment). The phenotype "knows" the solution to the problem of

food breakdown.
A more interesting example involves sight. An understanding of vision and
perception in general is important for epistemology, as perception often plays
a prominent, if not foundational role, in traditional theories of knowledge.
The evolutionary account starts with the following puzzle. We live in a sea
of electromagnetic radiation. The electromagnetic spectrum ranges from the
long radio waves (meters to hundreds of meters in wavelength) to the infrared
and ultraviolet light waves, to the very short X-rays, gamma rays, and cosmic
rays (measuring 10-8 meters and smaller in wavelength). But why is it that,
from the entire electromagnetic spectrum, we respond only to a very small
range (roughly between 400-700 nanometers)? Campbell (1974) and Wach-
tershauser (1987) suggest that this range of the spectrum is visible for two
reasons. First, in response to food shortages, primitive organisms developed
photosynthesis, and this capability was selected because it provided a new source
of food. However, photosynthesis can occur only in the 400-700 nanometer
range of radiation because longer wavelengths have insufficient energy to fuel
the photochemical reaction and shorter wavelengths destroy proteins and DNA.
Thus, what we call visible light was originally important because it was
"edible radiation." Phototropisms were selected because they allowed the or-
ganism to maximize this use of light. The second important reason why radia-
tion in the 400-700 nanometer range is visible involves a fortuitous coinci-
dence of physical properties. The range of edible electromagnetic radiation
happens to fall into the range for which what is transparent coincides with
what is penetrable. In this range, things that cannot be seen through usually
cannot be moved through: human movement is blocked by solid bodies (the
visually opaque) but not by air and water (the visually transparent). Thus,
an organism that could use vision as a vicarious substitute for direct move-
ment would thereby have a clear selective advantage. Again, the organism is
a physical embodiment of knowledge of the environment.
Another important contention of the evolutionary epistemologists is that
science is itself an evolutionary product and process. Science is an evolutionary
product in that the capacity (and even tendency) for humans to put forth and
test theories itself has selective advantages. As Popper (1972) has stated, ex-
perimentation allows our theories to die in our stead. For the evolutionary
epistemologist, science is also an evolutionary process in that research selects
among variants (competing theories) to produce an increasing adaptation be-
tween theory and fact.
Skinner, especially in his later writings (1974, 1984a), emphasized the selec-
tivist nature of his account of learning and survival and, therefore, qualifies
as an evolutionary epistemologist. Skinner's notion of phylogenetic "contin-
gencies of survival" is essentially a summary term for neo-Darwinian evolu-
tionary processes, and his ontogenetic "contingencies of reinforcement" rep-
resent the evolutionary force of selection by consequences over much shorter
periods. Operant behavior operates on the environment, which in turn selects
186 O'DONOHUE & SMITH

behavior through its consequences by virtue of the organism's evolved sensi-

tivity to such relationships. Skinner (1984a) summarizes the interrelations be-
tween these selective mechanisms as follows:

H u m a n behavior is the joint product of (i) contingencies

of survival responsible for natural selection and (ii) con-
tingencies of reinforcement responsible for the repertoires
of individuals, including (iii) the special contingencies
maintained by an evolved social environment. Selection
by consequences is a causal mode found only in living
things, or in machines made by living things. It was first
recognized in natural selection. Reproduction, a first con-
sequence, led to the evolution of cells, organs, and or-
ganisms reproducing themselves under increasingly diverse
conditions. The behavior functioned well, however, only
under conditions similar to those under which it was
selected. Reproduction under a wider range of conse-
quences became possible with the evolution of processes
through which organisms acquired behavior appropriate
to novel environments. One of these, operant conditioning,
is a second kind of selection by consequences. New re-
sponses could be strengthened by events which followed
them. When the selecting consequences are the same,
operant conditioning and natural selection work together
redundantly. But because a species which quickly acquires
behavior appropriate to an environment has less need for
an innate repertoire, operant conditioning could replace
as well as supplement the natural selection of behavior.
(p. 477)

Although Mach's biological positivism was an important early influence on

Skinner, it was only in Skinner's later works that an explicit emphasis on evo-
lution as a context and a homologue for operant psychology emerges. Thus,
behavior therapists following Skinner would seem to have an affinity toward
evolutionary epistemology, and could presumably find sympathizers among
this group and profit from the literature emerging in this field.
Research, Hypothesis Testing, and the Web of Belief
Finally we turn to the renowned American philosopher, Willard Quine. One
of the most telling critiques of logical positivism was Quine's (1951) essay "Two
Dogmas of Empiricism," which attacked the positivists' analytic-synthetic dis-
tinction and their view that every meaningful statement can be reduced to
statements about immediate sense experience. Quine's account of the relation
between sense experience and observation statements is a behavioral one: for
him, the relationship is not a matter of correspondence, entailment, or refer-
ence but rather a matter of conditioning. According to Quine (1969), "Lan-
guage is a social art which we all acquire on the evidence solely of other people's
 EPISTEMOLOGY 187

overt behavior under publicly recognizable circumstances" (p. 2 6 ) - a view that

shares important similarities with Skinner's (1957) account of verbal behavior.
(Quine and Skinner were both Junior Fellows at Harvard in the 1930s, remained
life-long friends, and eventually held the same named chair at Harvard.)
Although Quine advocates a naturalized epistemology and countenances
the role of evolution in knowledge processes, he tends not to emphasize it
as much as the evolutionary epistemologists. Quine (1981) has explained his
epistemological views as follows:

Naturalism does not repudiate epistemology, but assimi-

lates it to empirical psychology. Science itself tells us that
our information about the world is limited to irritations
of our surfaces, and then the epistemological question is
in turn a question within science: the question how we
human animals can have managed to arrive at science from
such limited information. Our scientific epistemologist
pursues this inquiry and comes out with an account that
has a good deal to do with the learning of language and
with the neurology of perception. He talks of how men
posit bodies and hypothetical particles, but does not mean
to suggest that the things thus posited do not exist. Evo-
lution and natural selection will doubtless figure in this
account, and he will feel free to apply physics if he sees
a way. (p. 72)

Thus, in Quine we see a rejection of the notion that there is a "first philos-
ophy" in which science is answerable to some supra-scientific tribunal. Rather,
philosophy is "natural science trained upon itself and permitted free use of
scientific findings" (Quine, 1981, p. 85). Here we see one of the most influen-
tial 20th-century philosophers agreeing with the neobehaviorists discussed
above that epistemology is a branch of psychology. Moreover, there are strong
similarities between Quine's and Skinner's accounts of language and in their
use of the process and limitations of language learning in constructing their
accounts of knowledge.
Elaborating on the work of the French philosopher-physicist Pierre Duhem
(1914/1962), Quine (1959) has argued for a radical revision in the epistemology
of experimentation. According to Quine, an experiment does not test a single
hypothesis but rather evaluates the consistency of an entire set of beliefs. This
state of affairs is partially due to the logical fact that a prediction failure cannot
logically refute the experimental hypothesis because a hypothesis alone does
not entail observable consequences. Rather, a variety of auxiliary hypotheses
(e.g., pertaining to the control of extraneous factors, the degree of precision
of measurement, the manner in which abstractions are connected to observ-
ables) are needed to obtain particular observation statements. In fact, in com-
pletely explicating the rationale of various aspects of the research and the ra-
tionales for these rationales (with many levels of such iteration), the entire
web of belief comes into play. Quine has argued that the researcher is logically
188 O'DONOHUE & SMITH

free to apportion blame for a prediction failure to any belief in the w e b - it

is even logically permissible to conclude that the observation statement is false
(due perhaps to misperception or instrument error) or that logic or mathematics
needs to be revised. Logically speaking, prediction failures indicate only that
if the researcher holds the hypothesis and all other beliefs involved directly
or indirectly in making the prediction, then the researcher holds at least one
pair of logically inconsistent beliefs.
Quine claims that there are two important implications of this logical state
of affairs: (a) that the unit of empirical significance is the whole of s c i e n c e -
the entire web of b e l i e f - r a t h e r than specific scientific hypotheses taken one
by one; and (b) the boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural
science becomes blurred as a consequence. The resulting holism implies that
because there is no sharp demarcation between philosophy and science, it is
misguided in any pursuit to attempt to use only one of these supposed fields
to address some question. Thus, "scientific" questions are never purely scientific
questions, but have philosophical dimensions; conversely, "philosophical" ques-
tions have empirical, scientific dimensions.
Regarding the second implication of Quine's holism thesis, O'Donohue
(1989a) has argued that so-called metaphysical statements play an essential
role in clinical research and practice. Metaphysical statements - general claims
about the way the world i s - are sometimes difficult to demarcate but, as Quine
argues, they are not categorically distinct from scientific statements. Examples
of the manner in which such statements function in science may help clarify
this point.
First, metaphysics has an influence in problem choice in that problems imply
an o n t o l o g y - a commitment to what there is. A problem statement inevitably
makes an ontological commitment when it makes reference to certain kinds
of entities. "What modification in the scheduling of reinforcement caused this
depressive behavior?" and "What symbolic object loss caused this depressive
neurosis?" involve different ontological commitments in that the latter is com-
mitted to the existence of certain mental entities while the former is not. It
is also important to point out that the theories implicit in these two problem
statements display some metaphysical commonalities in that they both presup-
pose that the world has a causal structure and, presumably, that supernatural
entities are not involved in this causal nexus. However, even when making the
same ontological commitments, different metaphysical beliefs can result in
different research questions or interpretations of clinical events. For example,
the general belief that African-Americans and whites are by nature equal in
intelligence results in questioning what is there about the testing situation (cul-
turally biased tests?) that causes whites to score higher on the WAIS-R. The
opposite metaphysical belief may result in questions about the differences in
brain structures between the two groups.
Second, metaphysics influences research design in that a proper design must
rule out plausible rival hypotheses. But what counts as plausible is influenced
by metaphysics because metaphysics determines what are countenanced as se-
rious possibilities. Typically, behavior therapists do not control for astrolog-
ical signs or the client's history of sin. Although the interested reader is re-
 EPISTEMOLOGY 189

ferred to O'Donohue (1989a) for a more thorough exposition of the ways that
metaphysics influences clinical research and practice, it must be stressed that
the same points apply to therapy. Metaphysics influences how we conceptu-
alize the client's problems; what we think is important to observe; how we
interpret what we observe; how we modify our beliefs about the case to en-
compass anomalous results; and how we design therapy (what entities are in-
volved in the causal nexus, or more radically whether therapy relies strictly
on causal mechanisms or also uses reasons to persuade rational agents).
If correct, these considerations call for a broader training model for the
clinical psychologist. The "bolder model" would include training in philo-
sophical methodology as well as a critical appraisal of major metaphysical
systems. Moreover, if the best philosophy is informed by the best science, this
model would also call for a general education in the sciences. In addition,
these considerations would entail a move away from the cult of dustbowl em-
piricism in matters of research, and suggest that theories and models-the
beliefs animating research and therapy--should no longer be relatively
neglected and maligned but rather become the objects of further development
and critical scrutiny. Clinically, one possible implication is that an examina-
tion and modification of the client's larger system of beliefs might be called
for instead of viewing cognitive problems as resulting from specific isolated
irrational ideas in the fashion of Ellis; indeed, holism may help explain the
maintenance of a client's irrational beliefs (if, for example, the force of
refutating experiences is shifted to other beliefs).
Finally, we turn to a discussion of some of the practical consequences of
the first implication of Quine's holism thesis, namely, that an empirical test
involves our entire web of belief rather than a single hypothesis. Convention-
ally most researchers believe only a single hypothesis is under test at a given
time, but if Quine is correct then such a view is erroneous. To better explicate
the web of belief immediately involved in research, O'Donohue (1989b) has
proposed a modification, along Popperian lines, of Toulmin's (1958) model
of practical or jurisprudential argumentation.
Each of the nodes in Figure 1 answers a substantive question. The following
list is modeled after Bromley (1970):

Since Warranted SinceWarranted Since Warranted ] Since Warranted SinceWarranted

by Warrant 1 by Warrant 2 by Warrant 3 I by Warrant 4 by Warrant 5

On Account of On Account of On Account of On Account of On Account of

Backing 1 Backing 2 Backing 3 Backing 4 Backing 5

FIG. 1.
190 O'DONOHUE & SMITH

P: What is the problem?

T: What is your best hypothesis regarding a solution?
D: What data have you to go on?
C: What are you saying?
Q: How sure are you?
W: What permits your move from the evidence to the conclusions?
R: What are you assuming?
B: What proof have you?
For example, a simple argument that could be found in behavior therapy would
have the following form:
P: Does John Doe have pedophilic interests?
T: Given the low base rates of this problem, John probably does not.
D: Under penile plethysmographic assessment John Doe does not display
penile tumescence to child stimuli, but does to adults. Moreover, John denies
such an interest and his wife reports a normal adult heterosexual sex life.
C: So, Doe does not have a deviant pedophilic arousal pattern.
Q: Presumably.
W: Penile plethysmography is generally a reliable and valid measure of sexual
interests for people like Doe, and self-report, though somewhat less reliable,
is still commonly thought to be a useful index of sexual interests.
R: The conclusion is correct unless Doe's testing was improperly ad-
ministered, or Doe succeeded in controlling his arousal, or the sample of stimuli
shown to Doe was not representative of what arouses him, or unless Doe be-
comes aroused to children only subjectively, or unless penile plethysmography
does not accurately track pedophilia, or unless Doe and his wife were lying, etc.
B.' The conclusion is held on account of the theory that takes penile circum-
ference changes to be an index of sexual arousal and of the numerous studies
(O'Donohue & Letourneau, 1991) attesting to the reliability and discriminant
validity, although moderate, of penile plethysmography; and on account of
the theory that people generally tell the truth and that clinical psychologists
are skilled at discerning when they are not.
A web of belief emerges when this one unit of argumentation becomes linked
with others, when elements themselves are called into question and become
conclusions (Cs) o f other arguments also of this form. In this way, the sub-
sidiary arguments supporting aspects of this primary argument become man-
ifest. Dubious claims are made explicit so that points of contention can be
precisely defined, perhaps for further testing. In the example above, the backing
regarding the validity of self-report and clinician's ability to discern lying is
weak and poorly formed, and therefore may represent one node in need of
further scrutiny.
This model of the beliefs involved in clinical research and practice is useful
because it provides a more complete understanding of all the kinds of con-
siderations that are relevant to the epistemic situation at hand. Bromley (1970)
provides an example of the explication of beliefs involved in disengagement
theory in gerontology. It would be an interesting and valuable exercise to per-
form similar analyses for theories in behavior therapy (e.g., the learned help-
lessness model of depression, self-efficacy theory, Beck's cognitive theory,
 EPISTEMOLOGY 191

Lewinsohn's reinforcement-reduction theory of depression). Such an exercise

would have numerous benefits: the original problem would be more clearly
delineated and not lost sight of; the tentative theory could be explicated and
the role of other beliefs could be more clearly seen and educed; epistemic
qualifiers for conclusions could be highlighted; the chain of reasoning by which
the implications of the data are drawn out would be clearly specified; the im-
plications of all this for the new status of the problem would be delineated;
the warrants or inference rules would be specified and justified, and the va-
lidity of the inferences thereby made open to inspection; and finally, the
qualifiers or boundary conditions would be clearly explicated.
In employing this approach, inquiry becomes the use of a system of
philosophical and empirical methods designed to test claims against evidence
and thereby progressively reduce error (Bromley, 1970; Popper, 1972). As error
is reduced through the ongoing process of testing, selection against weak or
unfit beliefs presumably results in a gradually increasing fitness in the pool
of remaining theoretical beliefs that have survived the rigors of testing. It is
hoped that by more thoroughly explicating all the components involved in
research and clinical practice, this model can create conditions more favorable
to the evolutionary growth of knowledge.
Finally, we have also seen that Skinner's naturalized, behavioral epistem-
o l o g y - far from being connected with logical positivism (and thereby called
into question) or with the allegedly problematic objectivist philosophy de-
scribed by Mahoney (1989)-actually accords with important contemporary
theories of knowledge such as evolutionary epistemology and Quine's natural-
ized epistemology. Therefore, behavior therapists who would pursue a be-
havioral, evolutionary epistemology along the lines advocated by Skinner need
not be troubled by Mahoney's claim that they would be philosophically un-
fashionable in doing so.

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R~CEtWD: September 6, 1991

ACCEPTED: November 17, 1991

Requests for reprints should be sent to William O'Donohue, Department of Psychology, Northern
Illinois University, De Kalb, IL 60115.