INITIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOMETRIC CHARACTERISTICS OF

THE MORAL COGNITION INVENTORY

HUMBOLDT STATE UNIVERSITY

by

Jessica Black

Thesis Presented to

The Faculty of Humboldt State University

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts in Psychology

May, 2012
 INITIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOMETRIC CHARACTERISTICS OF

THE MORAL COGNITION INVENTORY

HUMBOLDT STATE UNIVERSITY

by

Jessica Black

Approved by the Master’s Thesis Committee

Dr. William M. Reynolds, Major Professor Date

Dr. Christopher Aberson, Committee Member Date

Dr. John W. Powell, Committee Member Date

Dr. Christopher Aberson, Graduate Coordinator Date

Dr. Jená Burges, Vice Provost Date

 Initial development and psychometric characteristics of

the Moral Cognition Inventory

Jessica Black

The need for a measure that encompasses the various components of moral decision-

making has become increasingly apparent as different areas of psychology, particularly

cognitive neuroscience, focus more time and resources on how people make moral

choices. My ultimate purpose is to develop the Moral Cognition Inventory (MCI), a

comprehensive measure of moral cognition that will facilitate investigation of the

construct’s distinct aspects. The MCI will include four components, Responsibility,

Identity, Cognition, and Community. The primary objective of this research was to

validate the first two scales, Moral Responsibility and Moral Identity, and to test a partial

structural model.

Three surveys were offered through Survey Monkey. The first included the MCI and

eight validation measures. The second included the MCI and the Defining Issues Test 2.

The third was a brief retest survey. A sample of over 450 participants (mean age = 35.5)

recruited through the HSU Psychology Department Research Participation pool and via

online social networking completed the MCI and one or more of the validation scales.
iii
The Moral Identity Scale, which measures the salience of integrity and moral values

within a person’s character, proved reliable (rα = .90, N = 438) and valid, with strong

correlations to measures of similar constructs. The Moral Responsibility Scale (rα = .86,

N = 389) with its three subscales, Moral Agency, Identification, and Consequences,

assesses a range of moral behavior; hypotheses related to its validity were similarly

confirmed, although CFA demonstrated a need to perfect the scale. Structural Equation

Modeling of MCI constructs was a success: the hypothesized model was a good fit, and

other similar models were excellent. Further model testing in different populations is

needed to finalize model selection.

iv
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to everyone who has

helped me through the process of ideating, developing, carrying out the research for, and

writing my thesis. Staff and faculty at Humboldt State have been wonderful sources of

information and support. I could not have done it without them.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. William Reynolds,

for his guidance and instruction throughout the process, particularly for his unusual

flexibility in adapting to my harried timeline. I am extremely grateful for all that time

and knowledge he has shared with me.

Dr. Chris Aberson has been a constant source of information and encouragement.

Few professors are willing to answer questions on all things statistical at all hours, even

when on paternity leave. Beyond that, Dr. Aberson has given me advice and support on

many aspects of my academic career.

I came to HSU to study psychology, but not long after my first semester began, I

made my way to the philosophy department to talk with Dr. John Powell. Ever since

then, Dr. Powell’s kindness and his willingness to discuss philosophy (and even, when

pressed, moral psychology) have been a delightful part of my learning process.

I would also like to thank Dr. Ethan Gahtan for reminding me of the trolley

problem and making me aware of its focal point in recent research on moral cognition.

v
The investigation of explanations for the way people react to such dilemmas set me on

the path that led to this thesis.

Most of my professors and classmates have had to put up with my obsession with

moral dilemmas, and I am grateful for their forbearance and support. My fellow graduate

students have been particularly kind and reassuring, despite having listened to several

variations on the theme over the last two years.

Many friends outside of the university have also been sources of information and

willing participants in brainstorming sessions, item tryout, and bad-idea-squashing, not to

mention survey completion and distribution. I am particularly indebted to Sue, Jim,

Maeve, and Ben Moore for countless evenings of emotional, intellectual, and physical

nourishment, and many days of enduring two extra children.

Above all, I would like to thank my family—my parents and brothers, who have

encouraged me in this and all endeavors, and my children, Ian and Rodrigo, who have

taken in stride my return to university, and complemented it with their own independence

and natural academic ability.

vi
 Table of Contents

CHAPTER I ........................................................................................................................ 1
Defining Moral Cognition................................................................................................... 1
Morality ........................................................................................................................... 1
Cognition ......................................................................................................................... 3
Moral Cognition .............................................................................................................. 4
Moral character ............................................................................................................ 5
Towards a Comprehensive Measure of Moral Cognition ................................................... 6
CHAPTER II ....................................................................................................................... 8
The Moral Cognition Process ............................................................................................. 8
Conscious Deliberation ................................................................................................... 9
The Kohlberg model. ................................................................................................... 9
Moral disengagement. ............................................................................................... 11
Moral agency ............................................................................................................. 12
Models Based on Moral Identity or Personality............................................................ 12
The Self-Model. ......................................................................................................... 13
Integrity. .................................................................................................................... 13
Other identity-centered explanations. ........................................................................ 15
Unconscious Processes: Emotion .................................................................................. 16
The Social Intuitionist Model and Moral Foundations Theory ................................. 17
Dual Process Approach ................................................................................................. 18
Measurement of Moral Decision-making ......................................................................... 19
Tests Based on the Standard Model .............................................................................. 20
The Moral Judgment Interview. ................................................................................ 20
The Defining Issues Test. .......................................................................................... 22
The Sociomoral Reflection Measure ......................................................................... 23
Measures of Moral Responsibility ................................................................................ 24
Ascription of Responsibility Scale. ........................................................................... 24
vii
 Moral Disengagement Scale. ..................................................................................... 25
Measures of Moral Identity ........................................................................................... 27
The Integrity Scale..................................................................................................... 27
The Moral Identity Scale ........................................................................................... 28
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire .......................................................................... 30
CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................... 32
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 32
Moral Responsibility Scale ............................................................................................... 33
Moral Agency................................................................................................................ 33
Moral Identification....................................................................................................... 35
Moral Consequences ..................................................................................................... 35
Moral Identity Scale .......................................................................................................... 36
Integrity ......................................................................................................................... 37
Moral Self...................................................................................................................... 37
Importance of Proposed Research .................................................................................... 37
Hypotheses ........................................................................................................................ 39
Primary Hypotheses ...................................................................................................... 39
Validity .......................................................................................................................... 39
Moral Responsibility. ................................................................................................ 39
Moral Identity (MI). .................................................................................................. 43
Structural model. ....................................................................................................... 45
Secondary Hypotheses .................................................................................................. 46
Age-related differences.............................................................................................. 46
Gender differences ..................................................................................................... 49
Education. .................................................................................................................. 50
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 50
CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................... 52
Method .............................................................................................................................. 52
Participants .................................................................................................................... 52
viii
 Instrumentation.............................................................................................................. 52
Moral Responsibility ................................................................................................. 52
Moral Identity ............................................................................................................ 54
Ascription of Responsibility Scale ............................................................................ 54
Integrity Scale ............................................................................................................ 55
Defining Issues Test .................................................................................................. 55
Moral Identity Scale .................................................................................................. 56
Interpersonal Reactivity Index................................................................................... 56
Machiavellian Personality Scale ................................................................................ 57
Social Desirability Scale—Short Form ..................................................................... 57
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale .................................................................................... 58
Procedure ....................................................................................................................... 58
Internet based sample ................................................................................................ 58
Retest survey.............................................................................................................. 59
Risks and Benefits ......................................................................................................... 59
Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 60
Data screening. .......................................................................................................... 60
Preliminary analyses, item selection, and validity measure comparisons. ................ 60
Structural modeling: Fit criteria and model comparison. ......................................... 61
Chapter V .......................................................................................................................... 63
Preliminary Analyses: Scale Item Analysis and Selection ............................................... 63
Moral Responsibility Scale ........................................................................................... 63
Moral Agency. ........................................................................................................... 63
Moral Consequences (MRC). .................................................................................... 63
Moral Identification (MRI). ....................................................................................... 63
Moral Identity................................................................................................................ 68
Reliability of Moral Cognition Inventory Scales .............................................................. 68
Moral Responsibility ..................................................................................................... 68
MR subscales. ............................................................................................................ 68
ix
 MI subscales .............................................................................................................. 72
Validity of the Moral Cognition Inventory Scales ............................................................ 72
Moral Responsibility ..................................................................................................... 72
Criterion validity........................................................................................................ 72
Convergent validity. .................................................................................................. 72
Discriminant validity ................................................................................................. 74
Factorial validity ........................................................................................................ 74
Moral Identity................................................................................................................ 74
Criterion validity........................................................................................................ 74
Convergent validity ................................................................................................... 74
Construct validity. ..................................................................................................... 75
Structural Model of the Moral Cognition Inventory ......................................................... 75
Moral Identity as Antecedent to Moral Responsibility. ................................................ 76
Model 1. ..................................................................................................................... 76
Model 2. ..................................................................................................................... 78
Model 3 ...................................................................................................................... 78
Model 4. ..................................................................................................................... 78
Model 5. ..................................................................................................................... 78
Moral Responsibility as Antecedent to Moral Identity. ................................................ 82
Model 6 ...................................................................................................................... 82
Model 7 ...................................................................................................................... 82
Model 8 ...................................................................................................................... 82
Model 9 ...................................................................................................................... 82
Alternative Models. ....................................................................................................... 84
Model 10 .................................................................................................................... 84
Model 11 .................................................................................................................... 84
Post hoc models ............................................................................................................ 84
Model 12. ................................................................................................................... 87
Model 13. ................................................................................................................... 87
x
Secondary Hypotheses ...................................................................................................... 87
Age-related Differences ................................................................................................ 87
Gender differences ........................................................................................................ 87
Moral Responsibility. ................................................................................................ 87
Moral Identity. ........................................................................................................... 90
Education ....................................................................................................................... 90
Moral Responsibility. ................................................................................................ 90
Chapter VI......................................................................................................................... 94
Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 94
Moral Identity................................................................................................................ 96
Moral Responsibility ..................................................................................................... 99
The Defining Issues Test ............................................................................................. 102
A Structural Model of Moral Cognition ...................................................................... 106
Secondary Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 108
Age........................................................................................................................... 108
Gender. .................................................................................................................... 108
Education ................................................................................................................. 108
Limitations .................................................................................................................. 109
Future Directions ......................................................................................................... 110
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 111
References ....................................................................................................................... 113
Appendix A ..................................................................................................................... 130
Pilot Study....................................................................................................................... 130
Appendix B ..................................................................................................................... 133
Moral Responsibility Scale ............................................................................................. 133
Moral Agency.............................................................................................................. 133
Moral Consequences ................................................................................................... 134
Moral Identification..................................................................................................... 135
Appendix C ..................................................................................................................... 138
xi
Moral Identity Scale ........................................................................................................ 138
Appendix D ..................................................................................................................... 140
Validity Measures ........................................................................................................... 140
Appendix E ..................................................................................................................... 150
Data Analyses. ................................................................................................................ 150
Outliers. ....................................................................................................................... 150
Normality. ................................................................................................................... 150
Appendix F...................................................................................................................... 156
Demographics ................................................................................................................. 156
Appendix G ..................................................................................................................... 157
Consent Forms ................................................................................................................ 157
Retest form .................................................................................................................. 158

xii
 List of Tables

Table 1 Summary of explanations for moral decisions. ................................................... 31

Table 2. Psychometric instruments used in present research. .......................................... 40

Table 3. Demographics for total sample .......................................................................... 53

Table 4. Item analysis: Moral Agency.. ........................................................................... 64

Table 5. Item analysis: Moral Consequences. ................................................................. 65

Table 6. Item analysis: Moral Identification. ................................................................... 66

Table 7. Item analysis: Moral Identity .............................................................................. 69

Table 8. Reliability statistics. ........................................................................................... 71

Table 9. Hypothesized and final correlations ........................................................................ 73

Table 10. Correlations between MCI scales and subscales. ............................................. 77

Table 11. Model comparison data for models with Moral Identity as cause. .................. 80

Table 12. Model comparison data for models with MR as cause. ................................... 85

Table 13. Model comparison data for best hypothesized and post hoc models ............... 88

Table 14. Gender differences for MCI scales and subscales. .......................................... 91

Table 15. Level of education ........................................................................................... 93

Table 16. Correlations between MCI scales and validity measures. ............................... 98

Table 17. The Defining Issues Test 2. ........................................................................... 105

xiii
 List of Figures

Figure 1. The proposed structure of the Moral Cognition Inventory ............................... 34

Figure 2. Hypothesized Correlations ............................................................................... 47

Figure 3. Proposed Partial Model of Moral Cognition .................................................... 48

Figure 4. Proposed structural model with standardized coefficients. .............................. 79

Figure 5. Alternative models in which MI causes MR; ................................................... 81

Figure 6. Models in which MR causes MI. ...................................................................... 83

Figure 7. Alternative models............................................................................................ 86

Figure 8. Post hoc models. ............................................................................................... 89

xiv
 1
CHAPTER I

Introduction

Defining Moral Cognition

In this section, I will provide a working definition of moral cognition. An

understanding of morality is necessary in order to determine what is moral. What

cognition includes is also described below.

Morality

Morality involves right or wrong actions. The study of morality has focused on

what one ought to do with reference to a given code of conduct (Casebeer, 2003). For

absolutists, there is a single code according to which all people should live. For

relativists, there are many different codes relevant to different societies or individuals. In

both cases, morality is essentially social and depends upon communication and

relationships between people. People tend to think of morality as normative, but it is

often used as a descriptive term for the distinct standards that different groups use to

judge behavior (Gert, 2011). According to Haidt (2007), there are multiple moralities

worldwide, but they all rest upon five moral foundations that give rise to different moral

norms. Harris (2010) holds that while there are different ways to maximize well-being,

all of these can be scientifically supported and all contribute to an overall moral

‘landscape.’
 2
Philosophers have traditionally explained morality according to three main

normative theories (Casebeer & Churchland, 2003). Consequentialism or utilitarianism

appeals to the greatest good for the greatest number. Deontology is duty-based ethics

that focuses on the acts rather than consequences. For example, Kant’s (1785)

categorical imperative stipulates that one always act in accordance with a maxim that one

could will to be a universal law. Virtue theory emphasizes moral character: one should

act in each situation in a virtuous way (kind, honest, fair, and so on) not for any practical

or egotistical reason, but rather for the sake of virtue itself (Hursthouse, 2007). Doing so

is enabled by practical knowledge gained through experience, and only through virtuous

behavior may people obtain eudaimonia, loosely translated as well-being. This may well

involve attaining to deontological or utilitarian principles, but these should not be the

guiding force.

It then follows that an action is moral provided that it adheres to the prevailing

moral code, but how do people decide whether it does so? Following utilitarianism, an

action is good if more people benefit than are harmed. Following deontological

premises, an action is good if it has people as ends, and not means, and would be

considered good in all circumstances. Traditionally, the assumption has been that people

think about the problem and come up with a rational solution or judgment (Hauser,

Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007). Based on Piaget’s work and a distinctly

Kantian paradigm, Kohlberg (1971) outlined six phases of moral development that all

people in all cultures were expected to surmount on the way to moral maturity.

Kohlberg’s theory rests on an assumption of rational agency: moral reasoning relies on

 3
conscious motives, and the morality of an action is determined by the actor’s

interpretation (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Virtue theory, with its roots tracing to

Aristotle, allows emotion a causal role in moral judgment. Hume believed that moral

sentiment (emotion) determined decisions (Foot, 1963). Recent research supports the

involvement of emotion (e.g. Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong,

2006; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004), and has led to theories that

postulate emotion and/or intuition as a driving force behind moral judgment (Haidt, 2001;

Greene, 2009; Sunstein, 2005).

Cognition

Most theorists allow that cognitive processing plays into moral decision-making

at some point (e.g. Greene, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Lapsley & Hill, 2008; Kohlberg,

1971). Whether the influence of cognitive processes is conscious or unconscious seems

to be a matter of debate (cf. Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010; Cosmides & Tooby, 2006;

Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Cognition refers to the acquisition, encoding, and

use of knowledge, through experience or thought (Anderson, 2004). Cognitive means

“relating to cognition” or “of, relating to, being, or involving conscious intellectual

activity (as thinking, reasoning, or remembering)” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary).

According to the first definition, not all cognition is conscious. Experimental results

have shown that although people make choices according to underlying moral principles

or rules, they tend to be unaware of doing so, and frequently cannot explain their choices

(Cushman et al., 2006). Heuristics, as the result of the internalization and automatization

of rules and knowledge, depends on conscious cognition at first, but then becomes
 4
unconscious (Sunstein, 2005). Some moral decision-making happens at an unconscious

level; recent evidence supports the theory that activity initiates in the brain up to 10

seconds before a conscious intention is reported (Smith, 2011).

If everything that participates in the acquisition and application of knowledge

pertains to cognition, then participating unconscious processes must also be considered

part of the domain of cognition. Moral cognition therefore includes the conscious

thought involved in reasoning, as well as any underlying heuristics or intuitions that

follow perceptible decision rules. Emotion is generally considered separately from

reasoning or cognitive process (Haidt, 2001; Hauser, 2007). Although many researchers

are investigating the emotional bases of moral judgment, they are doing so through

experimental research (see Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008) and brain imaging

studies (e.g. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Emotion cannot

be appropriately included in a psychometric measure of moral cognition.

Moral Cognition

Based on the abovementioned research and writing, I will define moral cognition

as all the conscious and unconscious mental processes that determine whether a given

action is right or wrong according to the prevailing moral paradigm. This raises the

question of which paradigm out of the many should be referenced. My intention is not to

rank order moral systems, but to identify the common processes people use to determine

what is moral in a given situation. What all descriptive moralities and moral theory seem

to have in common is the basic precept of avoiding harm to other persons within the

community (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2010). Deception is also
 5
considered wrong, but is more context-dependent and can be justified; helping is

encouraged but not obligatory, and ideas of justice and fairness vary widely (Gert, 2011;

Hauser, 2007). I therefore propose that a situation demanding action be considered a

question of morals insofar as it concerns the possibility of harm to another person. This

excludes some ethical questions that do not involve harm to other people, such as the

moral instincts of purity and respect for authority that Haidt (2007) proposes. It does

include moral character, and the ability of a person to perceive the possible harm to

others in situations involving indirect or future harm can be considered part of that

person’s character.

Moral character. Moral character refers to dispositional psychological traits

that affect a person’s moral functioning (Lapsley, in press). It includes aspects of

personality such as empathy, as well as learned moral values. As previously outlined,

virtue theory emphasizes moral character (Hursthouse, 2007), but the ability to adhere to

deontological duty also depends on character formation (Lapsley, in press). Moral

character encompasses integrity (Blasi, 1980; Schlenker, 2008) and responsibility

(Bandura, 2002). A vital aspect of moral character development is agency, or the

perceived capacity of a person to determine his or her acts: this means that individuals

must identify with and feel responsible for their actions (Lapsley, 2010). Moral agency

refers to the ability of individuals to determine their moral behavior; Bandura (2002)

defines it as the ability to avoid inhumane acts and pursue humane ones. Blasi (2005)

refers to self-control or the willpower necessary to pursue the self-consistency and virtue

that define moral character.

 6
Towards a Comprehensive Measure of Moral Cognition

Moral character is one of many factors that determine moral decisions and is itself

complex. Moral agency is a prerequisite of taking responsibility for actions (Pasupathi &

Wainryb, 2010), but by itself does not guarantee that the agent will act in a moral manner

(Lapsley, 2010). The extent to which people value moral qualities will be a better

predictor of their decisions as a moral agent (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Moral judgment

does not always lead to moral action (Monin & Merritt, 2011). Blasi (1983) holds that

the primary motivation for moral action is the desire for consistency between judgment

and act. This is part of integrity (Schlenker, 2008). Even when judgment and actions are

consistent, if this consistency is only secondary to a desire to create or maintain a self-

serving reputation, there is a fundamental hypocrisy in the agent (Monin & Jordan, 2009).

For Blasi (2005), an act is moral only to the extent that it is understood as such by the

actor; this supposes a rational, free agent with the ability to consciously choose a course

of action.

The present research assumes effective conscious reasoning, while

acknowledging that the process of moral choice is complex. Moral decisions reflect

underlying character traits as well as responding to intuitions, heuristics, and emotion.

These in turn are influenced by experience: much of how we distinguish right from

wrong has been learned from family, friends, and our broader community. This

preliminary investigation focuses on moral agency and the individual differences in

character that lead people to respond in their own way to the complexities of any given

situation. It models Moral Responsibility (agency plus interpretation of and identification

 7
with consequences) and Moral Identity (integrity and moral self-concept). The influence

of social groups will be included in the Community scale of the final Moral Cognition

Inventory.
 8
CHAPTER II

Literature Review

In this section, I will first introduce some important theories of moral psychology.

Secondly, I will discuss the psychometric instruments that have been used to measure

aspects of moral cognition.

The Moral Cognition Process

At some point, we all make the assumption that people are capable of rational,

deliberate choice between good and bad actions. Deontological, consequentialist and

virtue theories of ethics presuppose agency. Our legal system depends upon it; schools,

families, religious and social groups base their implicit and explicit rules on it. When

people are deemed incapable of freely choosing their actions, they are not considered

responsible or held liable for them. Nevertheless, the question of whether people can

really choose and how its answer affects moral responsibility has been debated

philosophically for millennia (Eshleman, 2009). Libet’s (1985) original research

showing that the impulse to act arises in the brain up to 10 seconds before people are

aware of making a decision has been replicated many times (see Fried, Mukamel, &

Kreiman, 2011, for a recent article). Some theorists (Haidt, 2001) believe unconscious

processes are the driving force behind moral choice and others (Kohlberg, 1971; Blasi,

1983) have upheld fully conscious moral reasoning. Others (Greene, 2009) advocate a

dual process approach.

 9
Conscious Deliberation

Although the following theorists do not deny the existence of intuitions, emotions,

or other unconscious processes, they highlight the importance of a rational, self-aware

deliberator. For some, an action can only be moral if it is understood as such by a

conscious agent (Kohlberg, 1971; Blasi, 1983).

The Kohlberg model. Kohlberg (1971) laid the groundwork for years of

research grounded on what came to be considered the Standard Model (Walker, 2002).

According to Kohlberg’s theory, moral development progresses through six stages that

loosely correspond to Piaget’s preconventional, conventional, and postconventional

(autonomous) developmental levels (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). Like Piaget, Kohlberg

emphasized the educational development of children, and recognized the important moral

influence of schools (Kohlberg & Hersh). Children learn moral knowledge from their

environment, but Kohlberg outlined the overriding importance of cognitive structure that

leads to a universal developmental progression that supercedes any ethical relativism.

During the preconventional stages (1 and 2), threat of punishment motivates moral

judgments; during the conventional stages (3 and 4), identification with the group and

respect for authority determine moral choice. In the postconventional stages (5 and 6),

people abide by the universal ethical principles with which they have chosen to identify.

According to Kohlberg, the goal of education should be to facilitate the natural ability of

children to reach the highest stages of moral and intellectual development (Kohlberg &

Hersh).
 10
Kohlberg’s theory makes three theoretical assumptions (Colby & Kohlberg,

1987). First, it makes the phenomenological assumption that moral judgments are the

result of the conscious deliberation of rational beings. Second, it focuses on the structure

of moral thought, and how it changes developmentally, rather than on the content of

specific moral dilemmas. Third, Kohlberg’s theory holds that people construct their

reality in that their judgments grant moral meaning to actions and context. People can

learn to apply reason to complex moral dilemmas, and as their intellectual ability

increases, they are better prepared to make decisions according to universal principles

rather than responding to the pressures of their immediate environment. Kohlberg

believed that the moral education of children should include the presentation and

discussion of moral dilemmas that would help them attain the ability to apply universal

moral laws (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977).

As Lapsley and Hill (2008) point out, Kohlberg based his theory on Kantian

ethics. At the highest stages of moral development, people explain their moral choices

with reference to universal norms, having outgrown the relativist tendencies of lower

stages. Kohlberg took deontological duty as a starting point, and his developmental

stages reflect the assumption that contextual factors are of secondary importance, and that

rationality is the primary determinant of moral judgment. Partly for this reason, and

partly because not all cultures seem to foster the attainment of Kohlberg’s last stages

(Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007; Hauser, 2007), the various versions of the

Standard Model reflect an inherent bias, which is worsened by adjustments to meet their

own definition of stratified moral development. Although Gilligan’s (1982) critique of

 11
Kohlberg’s theory focused on gender differences, its great strength is that it draws

attention to the potential bias brought to ethical theories by the assumptions of their

authors. In Kohlberg’s case, this meant basing theory on analytical reasoning and ethical

absolutism.

A larger issue is that of motivation. Why make the moral choice rather than a

self-serving one? Gilligan’s (1982) answer was caring for others according to relative

contextual factors. Kohlberg believed morality to be self-motivating: as people progress

to later stages, they will naturally prefer to base their decisions on deontological duty

(Walker, 2002). However, even when they know what they should do, people do not

always do it, and the purely rational model of cognition does not provide a full picture of

what motivates moral choice.

Moral disengagement. Bandura (2002) uses moral disengagement to explain the

discrepancy between moral ideals and actions. His theory also assumes a rational,

conscious deliberator, but social and situational pressures can threaten moral agency by

facilitating disengagement from actions that are immoral a priori. Individuals can resist

disengagement by employing inhibitive moral agency. When they decide to act morally,

they are showing proactive moral agency. Societies can encourage proactive moral

agency and discourage moral disengagement, but the individual agent is ultimately

responsible for moral action.

Although his theory embraces behavior at all ages and levels of society,

Bandura’s research on moral disengagement has focused on children (e.g. Bandura,

Barbaranelli, Vittorio Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). Using his Moral Disengagement
 12
Scale (MDS), Bandura found evidence of increased delinquent and violent behavior, and

decreased prosocial behavior, with greater moral disengagement (Bandura et al.). Pelton,

Gound, Forehand, and Brody (2004) also reported moderate positive correlations between

MDS scores and aggression and delinquency. Pelton et al. found that moral

disengagement mediated the relationship between positive parenting and levels of

delinquency and aggression: more positive parenting deceased moral disengagement,

which in turn meant less delinquency and aggression.

Moral agency. Pasupathi and Wainryb (2010) propose a model of narrative

moral agency that allows for intuitive reactions or unconscious processing as well as

agency. Individuals may well behave in an immoral manner due to situational pressures

or automatic reactions, but as they understand the moral implications of their behavior,

they internalize it, learn from it, and include it in the narrative they tell themselves and

others. It is a developmental model that allows learning from mistakes that were perhaps

inevitable, given the individual’s experience up to the moment, but can be used to avoid

future errors. The narrative moral agency model integrates contextual factors,

unconscious processes, and conscious choice based on learning. It also allows for a

conscious agent who makes an immoral choice (Lapsley, 2010). What motivates moral

rather than immoral decisions remains uncertain.

Models Based on Moral Identity or Personality

Theories of moral psychology based on personality or moral identity are better

able to explain motivation. Personality models focus on individual differences in moral

 13
character, and identity models explain moral decisions through the importance morality

has to the individual (Monin & Jordan, 2009).

The Self-Model. Blasi (1983, 1980) highlights the inability of the Kohlberg

model to account for the discrepancy between moral judgment and action. Blasi outlines

a theory that proposes consistency as the overriding moral motivation. The Self-Model

also supposes a conscious deliberator that first determines what the morally right thing to

do is (Blasi calls this a “Responsibility Judgment”), and then decides whether doing so is

obligatory. This decision depends on the motivation derived from self-definition. In a

certain sense, Blasi’s model is dual process, for he recognizes two motivating forces:

consistency, or acting according to the cognitive appraisal of the morally correct action,

and the satisfaction of irrational impulses. For Blasi, self-consistency exerts a stronger

pull, especially as individuals mature. Blasi (1983) distinguishes between the content of

identity (moral ideals, or what should be done) and the subjective experience of identity

that determines action in a given moment. As people mature and what is important to

their sense of identity becomes fixed, their subjective experience becomes more

consistent with moral identity content (Hardy & Carlo, 2005).

Integrity. Self-consistency is closely related to integrity. For Blasi (2005),

integrity is felt as both responsibility and identity. The desire for consistency that is part

of self-concept is seen in moral identity; integrity that pertains to identification with

moral actions is reflected in moral responsibility (Lapsley, in press). However, just as a

sense of agency has no necessary moral implication (Lapsley, 2010), integrity can be
 14
separate from adherence to accepted moral norms. Integrity is moral only to the extent

that actions are moralized (Lapsley, in press).

Self-consistency is a motivational force, but lack of consistency does not

necessarily signify moral hypocrisy (Monin & Merritt, 2011). Prior good behavior

balances out inconsistencies. Monin and Merritt (2011) call this moral credentials, and

highlight the tendency for people to view an established reputation as license to act

immorally. Inconsistency does not necessarily mean hypocrisy, which can occur even

when actions are apparently moral. According to Monin and Merritt, when people do

moral things for immoral reasons, they are moral hypocrites. Integrity must come from

internal commitment to moral actions, which is expressed in external behavior.

In one way, it makes sense to limit moral hypocrisy to acting moral for immoral

reasons. Even those who value integrity find it hard to live by. Batson, Kobrynowicz,

Dinnerstein, Kampf, and Wilson (1997) give plentiful experimental evidence of moral

hypocrisy in research with undergraduates: people try to appear moral (judging by their

responses on self-report questionnaires) while acting in self-serving manner. For

example, Batson, Thompson, and Chen (2002) carried out a series of experiments in

which female students had to assign an agreeable and a disagreeable task to themselves

and someone else. In all cases, regardless of whether the participant sought to appear fair

(the other person knew how the assignment was made, so a coin could be tossed) or could

choose secretly, participants assigned the easier task to themselves.

Although this supports Monin’s (2009, 2011) theory, it could be that the study

participants did not see moral relevance in the experimental venue. Before individuals
 15
can be morally motivated, they must interpret the situation as moral. The moral character

of any given scenario depends on whether or not a moral judgment has been made (Blasi,

1983). This in turn depends on individual disposition to interpret events in a moral

manner (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2005). Schlenker (2008) holds that

individual differences exist within the construct of integrity itself. The strength of

commitment to moral principles determines whether one acts in accordance with what

one knows is the morally correct thing to do. People who refer to what Schlenker calls

principled ideologies, or general rules for moral conduct, are more likely to strive for

consistency between belief and action than are those who follow expedient ideologies,

which hold that context should determine moral principles.

Other identity-centered explanations. Others have also sought to explain

motivation by individual differences in moral identity. These theories are often based on

Blasi’s model, although most focus on morality rather than identity (Hardy & Carlo,

2005). Assuming moral agency means assuming a self who defines his or her personality

and obligations in one manner and not another (Bergman, 2002). Some focus on a social

cognitive approach (cf. Narvaez et al., 2006; Schwartz & Howard, 1984; Aquino & Reed,

2002). For example, using the Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002), Aquino,

Freeman, Reed, Lim, and Felps (2009) tested a mediated interaction model with business

students in which the effect of a moral prime was strong in participants with low

centrality of moral identity (as reported on the Internalization factor of Aquino and

Reed’s scale), but weak in participants who already placed high values on Moral Identity.

They found similar effects when manipulating the accessibility of moral identity. In
 16
other words, people who held moral identity important tended to act morally despite

situational influences.

Although identity-based explanations of moral behavior allow consideration of

individual differences in motivation based on personality, many fail to account for

developmental changes (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010). Research should incorporate

developmental aspects, but at the same time, it is necessary to include moral identity in

any comprehensive model of moral cognition. Besides providing information regarding

the varied reactions of distinct individuals to the environment, it can explain some of the

intuitive responses to morally charged situations.

Unconscious Processes: Emotion

Recent research in neuroscience and psychology has drawn attention to the

involvement of emotion in moral judgment (see Greene, 2011, for an overview). Images

of neural activity have shown differences in emotional involvement as moral stakes and

conflict were increased, according to the degree to which participants identified with the

moral scenario. In a study carried out at a hospital in Brazil, Moll et al. (2002) found

strong evidence of emotional involvement in adult men and women (mean age = 27),

demonstrated by activation of areas associated with emotion such as the amygdala.

Studies of patients with adult-onset damage to areas of the prefrontal cortex, especially

the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, support fMRI research, as such damage results in

increased willingness to violate emotionally charged personal prohibitions in favor of a

utilitarian judgment (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, La`davas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; Koenigs et

al., 2007).
 17
Further support for the importance of emotional processing of moral judgment

comes from research that involves the manipulation of emotions. Valdesolo and Desteno

(2006) used comical videos to encourage positive emotions before presenting adult

participants with the trolley and footbridge dilemmas and asking them to judgment the

appropriateness of ethical decisions. Compared to controls (N = 38) receiving neutral

stimuli (documentary), participants that had viewed comedies (N = 41) reported more

positive feelings, and were more likely to approve the utilitarian decision in the

footbridge problem. In a series of experiments with students at four different

universities, Schnall et al. (2008) demonstrated that disgust could influence moral

cognition by comparing the moral judgment of participants who smelled a disgusting

odor with controls; they also showed that sadness, which along with disgust has been

specifically associated with the amygdala, had a different effect.

The Social Intuitionist Model and Moral Foundations Theory. Haidt (2001)

centered his Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) on the primacy of emotion. The SIM

maintains that moral decision-making happens automatically and unconsciously. The

conscious deliberation that we do is simply post hoc justification of an intuitive,

emotional reaction. Haidt (Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2007)

expanded the SIM to include a full model of sociopolitical morality, Moral Foundations

Theory (MFT), according to which moral judgments are a reflection of five basic

instincts. MFT is firmly grounded in evolutionary psychology, and takes into account

adaptive explanations for human moral behavior. There are, Haidt claims, certain

intuitive reactions that we cannot control or explain with reasoning, although we can
 18
make new decisions based on our original reactions. Understanding these reactions can

help explain the conflicting nature of liberal versus conservative ideologies. Essentially,

however, intuitive reactions trump rational agency.

To the extent that this actually happens, the possibility of measuring and molding

moral character is limited so much that speaking of morality may be pointless. Blasi

(1999) claims that emotions cannot motivate moral behavior insofar as they are

automatic, uncontrolled reactions. The moral quality depends on intentions, and emotion

by itself cannot be intentional.

Dual Process Approach

Greene (2004, 2009) proposes a dual process model that is compatible with

Haidt’s theory. Research has shown that people of all ages respond differently to

scenarios invoking emotional reactions and involving personal contact (cf. Cushman et

al., 2006, Greene et al., 2001). In a series of studies with adults recruited in public

venues (N = 968, mean age = 31) and through various anonymous online sources (N = 91,

mean age = 31), Greene (2009) showed that decisions about situations that entail highly

emotional reactions tend to be made according to deontological principles, while those

that allow emotional distance tend to be more utilitarian. Intuitive processes and

emotional reactions are decisive when it comes to personal situations, but deliberate

reasoning dominates in scenarios demanding consequentialist or utilitarian decisions.

The two are governed by distinct neural systems. When there is conflict between the two

ethical theories (as happens in the footbridge dilemma, where meeting the demands of

utilitarian accounting means violating a deontological prohibition), this is reflected in

 19
brain imaging studies and the inability of participants to explain their responses (see

Cushman et al., 2006, Greene et al., 2009). In an experimental context with

undergraduate students (N = 81), Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, and Cohen

(2008) showed that adding to participants’ cognitive load interfered with utilitarian

processing of decisions, further supporting the theory that conscious deliberation controls

these decisions.

Wallach, Franklin, and Allen (2010) also allow for both automatic and

deliberate processing, although they focus on the domain general nature of the neural

bases for moral cognition. Moral behavior results from two types of processing: bottom-

up unconscious intuitive reactions and top-down critical evaluation of moral decisions.

In contrast to Greene’s theory, the top-down processing includes conscious application of

deontological rules, although emotions and heuristics are considered bottom-up. Wallach

et al. are proposing a computational model, but the parallels are clear. Moral cognition is

not the result of straight-forward, single domain processing or of automatic reactions, but

rather an amalgam of both. Lapsley and Hill (2008) also take a dual process approach.

They group unconscious processes such as SIM and heuristics along with automatic,

schema referenced judgments as System I theories, and define deliberate reasoning

models such as Kohlberg’s and Blasi’s as System II theories.

Measurement of Moral Decision-making

The complexity of moral decision-making makes dual process approaches

attractive, and some experimental research supports them (e.g. Greene, 2009). A

psychometric measure that addresses the multiple facets of moral cognition does not
 20
exist. Unfortunately, some of the most coherent simpler theories are either not testable or

have not been tested adequately. Experimental studies and brain-imaging research has

addressed some issues, and has born witness to the similarities across culture, gender, and

age. Few valid psychometric instruments address individual differences in moral

cognition, even though they would be useful in combination with experimental design.

The scales that do exist have limited validity; comparisons with other constructs have

provided little information because of the low correlations reported. Some researchers

(e.g. Batson et al., 1997) have attempted to measure the different aspects of moral

cognition by administering a battery of scales, which they use to gauge relationships

between reported moral character and action as revealed through experiments. A brief

description of such instruments that are relevant to the present research is provided

below.

Tests Based on the Standard Model

Kohlberg originally developed a scale of moral judgment for his dissertation in

1958 (Kurtines & Greif, 1974). The scale presented a series of ethical dilemmas, and

participant responses were rated to fit the six stages of moral development. Kohlberg’s

theory did not demand predictive validity or temporal reliability, and standard statistical

measures of internal consistency were not reported for decades (Kurtines & Greif). There

were also serious problems of interrater reliability. Furthermore, the test did not

distinguish between delinquents and non-delinquents, or predict moral activism.

The Moral Judgment Interview. To address such issues, Kohlberg and his

associates developed what became known as the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI; Colby,
 21
Kohlberg, Gibbs, Lieberman, Fischer, & Saltzstein, 1983), in a 20-year longitudinal study

of 58 boys. The focus of the measure changed from content to perspective-taking. At

lower stages, people see the world from an egotistical point of view, while at higher

stages, their choices reflect an understanding of universal duties and needs. Three forms

(A, B, and C) were elaborated, together with standardized probes and scoring rules.

Interrater reliability for the initial validation varied between 53% to 100%

depending on the forms used and the stages reported (Colby et al., 1983). Test-retest

reliability depended on the rater and the form, varying from .59 to .99, although alternate

form reliability was 100% for forms A and B (.82 A and C, .84 B and C). Cronbach’s

alpha was also reported, and ranged from .92 to .96, depending on the form. Validity

remained a matter of interpretation. Theoretically, people should not regress, but

participants did sometimes go from a higher to a lower stage over time, especially from

high school to university (Colby et al. attribute part of that to interrater issues and the

effect of college). Scores on the MJI were low to moderately correlated with

socioeconomic status (.22 < r < .60), according to age, with the lowest correlation in the

late twenties and highest for 10 and 36 year olds. MJI scores were moderately to highly

correlated with education (.54 < r < .77) and low to moderately correlated to IQ for adults

(.37 < r < .60).

While Colby et al. (1983) provided a more reliable measure, the MJI still has

questionable validity, and focuses on only one aspect of moral reasoning. Furthermore, it

is a time-consuming interview. Followers of Kohlberg soon developed various

alternatives, some of which are discussed below.

 22
The Defining Issues Test. The original Defining Issues Test (DIT) was

developed in 1974; the slightly shorter DIT2 uses revised dilemmas, different reliability

checks, and a new scoring system (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999). Both tests

address the problem of stage regression. Rather than expect people to judge consistently

according to the criteria of the highest stage reached, the makers of the DIT assume that

people show a preference for one stage, but may judge according to others depending on

the situation (Elm & Weber, 1994). The DIT presents a series of moral dilemmas similar

to the MJI. The main difference between the two is procedural: the DIT is a written

survey with Likert-types responses that can be administered by untrained personnel to a

group. The original DIT includes six dilemmas and takes about 45 – 50 minutes to

complete. The DIT2 has five dilemmas and takes about five minutes less. Although the

scoring system for both versions is simpler than that of the MJI (scored in 17 steps

described by Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), it is still complex, resulting in a P index, which is

calculated from the relative ranking given to stage 5 and 6 moral criteria (Rest, Thoma,

Narvaez, & Bebeau, 1997). Rest et al. (1997) promote the use of the N2 score, which

combines the prioritization of the P index with the relative rating of lower stages 2 and 3.

Rest et al. (1999) provide reliability and validity information for the DIT2 as well

as the DIT, based on samples of participants from four educational levels (ninth grade,

high school seniors and recent graduates, college seniors, and graduate and professional

school students). The participant reliability checks required discarding more cases from

the first version. For both, scores increase with age and education. The two versions are

highly correlated (r = .79, using new index). Both are low to moderately correlated with
 23
attitudes towards public policy: r = .40 and .51 for DIT and DIT2 respectively,

controlling for politics and religion. An online version is also offered, and has been

shown to have similar reliability and validity in a sample of 109 undergraduates and

graduate students (Xu, Iran-Nejad, & Thoma, 2007).

Education level, religion, and political affiliation are all possible confounds of the

DIT (rs from .5 – .6). In multivariate regression analyses, politics and religion have

predicted scores on both versions ( Rs from .7 to .8; Rest et al., 1999). Fisher and

Sweeney (1998) asked 132 upper-division college students to respond from an

“extremely liberal” point of view first, and two weeks later from an “extremely

conservative” point of view, regardless of their own political opinion. They were also

asked to respond from their own perspective (liberal, moderate, or conservative).

Regardless of personal political persuasion, responses made from a liberal point of view

meant higher P scores (effect sizes were d = .49 for liberals, d = .50 for conservatives,

and d = .58 for moderates). Education has been shown to have low but significant

correlations with both P (r = .27) and N2 (r = .28) scores (Maeda, Thoma, & Bebeau,

2009).

The Sociomoral Reflection Measure. Gibbs, Widaman, and Colby (1982)

developed a paper and pencil version of the MJI called the Sociomoral Reflection

Measure (SRM). The advantage of the SRM was that it could be administered to groups,

but it was an open-ended response format that made larger demands on participants and

had the same interrater issues that the MJI had (along with very similar reliability

statistics). To address these limitations, Gibbs et al. (1984) produced a multiple choice
 24
version, the Sociomoral Reflection Objective Measure (SROM). The SROM presents 16

dilemmas: participants read scenarios and decide whether given explanations (based on

stages of development) for moral judgments are close to their interpretation. The score

gives the mean stage level based on the participant’s choice of closest or close.

Gibbs et al. (1984) report reliability and validity for the SROM based on a series

of studies in children and adults (11 – 65 years old). Test-retest reliability was .82.

Internal consistency was acceptable to good depending on the sample (r = .77, .84).

Concurrent validity was judged with correlations to the MJI (r = .73, .93). Social

desirability had no significant correlation with the SROM (r = .03). A major weakness

was that the SROM did not distinguish between delinquents and non-delinquents once

covariates were factored out, while the SRM did. The designers assumed that the

cognitive load of reading the dilemmas affected the validity, and went on to develop a

dilemma-free short form (SROM—SF; Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992). The SROM—

SF also distinguishes between moral types, emphasizing maturity and justifications of

decisions.

Measures of Moral Responsibility

Both of the scales discussed here focus on the willingness of individuals to take

responsibility for their actions. The extent to which they deny responsibility predicts

delinquent behavior (Bandura et al., 1996) and incongruence between moral ideals and

behavior (Schwartz, 1968).

Ascription of Responsibility Scale. Schwartz’s Ascription of Responsibility

Scale (ARS; 1968, 1973) is based on the assumption that people’s willingness to accept
 25
responsibility and understanding of the consequences of morally relevant actions will

determine how closely their behavior matches what Schwartz called their personal

norms. Schwartz envisioned ARS as a moderator of the relationship between norms and

behavior. In the original validation study carried out with 118 religiously diverse but all

male undergraduates, Schwartz (1968) compared peer-ratings to self-reported reliability,

considerateness, and helpfulness. For those scoring high on the ARS, correlations were

much higher than for those with low scores (e.g. .37 compared to .02). In a later study,

Schwartz (1968) found that ARS moderated the relationship between norms and altruistic

behavior in 144 adults recruited at a blood donation clinic. In research with early and

middle adolescents (N = 138, mean age = 15.8, 80 girls), Carlo, Hausmann, Christiansen,

and Randall (2003) found a positive correlation between altruism and the ARS (r = .48

for middle adolescents); ARS was also positively correlated with other aspects of

prosocial tendencies.

The ARS is a 28 items measure that asks participants to whether they agree with

statements regarding moral responsibility on a four-point scale. It has seen limited use in

recent years, and researchers have tended to administer it along with other measures of

moral cognition (e.g. Batson et al., 1997). Schwartz reported internal consistencies

(Cronbach’s alpha) of .82 (1968) and .78 – .81 (1973), and test-retest reliabilities of .61

and .81 in samples of college students.

Moral Disengagement Scale. Bandura’s Moral Disengagement Scale (MDS;

Bandura, et al., 1996) was designed to measure the inclination to avoid moral

responsibility through diffusing responsibility and ascribing blame to others,

 26
misinterpreting consequences, using euphemistic speech, comparing acts to worse

instances of behavior, justification, and dehumanizing victims. In a study of 799 children

from 10 to 15 years, Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .82. Written in language and

content accessible to children, the scale has 32 items to which participants respond agree,

disagree, or not sure. High scores on the MDS were associated with greater delinquency

(e.g. self-rating, junior high, r = .45, p < .001; teacher rating, r = .27, p < .001) and

aggression (e.g. self-rating, elementary age: r = .52, p < .001; peer rating: r = .46, p <

.001), and negatively correlated with prosocial behavior (-.40 < rs < -.16). Bandura et al.

provide a structural model relating moral disengagement to aggression, guilt and

restitution, prosociality, and delinquent behavior in children and adolescents.

In a longitudinal study of 366 Italian adolescents (tested every two years from age

12 to age 20), Paciello, Fida, Tramontano, Lupinetti, and Caprara (2008) confirmed the

structural model described by Bandura et al. (1996). Paciello et al. found that moral

disengagement predicted verbal and physical aggression as well as violence; females

were less morally disengaged, and correspondingly less aggressive and violent than

males. Although moral disengagement declined over time for all participants, it did

predict behavior over time. Detert, Treviño, and Sweitzer (2008) found comparable

results in 307 undergraduates in business and education. Females were less disengaged

than males(r = .30, p < .001; dichotomously scored with male = 1 and female = 0); moral

disengagement was negatively correlated with empathy (r = -.27, p < .001) and scores on

Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Moral Identity scale (r = -.24, p < .001), and positively

correlated with unethical decisions (r = .34, p < .001).

 27
In later writing, Bandura applies his theory of moral disengagement to everything

from lack of concern for global warming to genocide to corporate malfeasance (Bandura,

1999, 2002, and private communication 2011). Moral disengagement signifies the

disinclination or refusal to act as a moral agent. Bandura defines moral agency as the

ability both to refrain from acting immorally or inhumanely, regardless of situational

pressures, and conversely to engage in prosocial behavior. The MDS measures only the

denial of moral responsibility and agency, particularly in children, but the theory

encompasses all human behavior.

Measures of Moral Identity

Consonant with moral identity theories, these scales seek to provide instruments

that can be used to explain the relationship between what people think they should do,

and their actual behavior.

The Integrity Scale. Schlenker (2008) developed his Integrity Scale (IS) to

measure commitment to principled ideologies. The IS does not seek to define right and

wrong, but rather aspires to determine how closely respondents follow their own ethical

ideals. However, some ethical assumptions are made. For example, lying must be

wrong, because justifying it means a lower score. In a series of validation studies with

psychology undergraduates as participants (N = 595, 27% male), internal consistency was

acceptable, with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .84 to .90 in five independent samples.

Test-retest reliability at 2 – 5 weeks was .82. The IS was compared to scores on

psychometric instruments and morally relevant behavior such as volunteering (r = .28, p

< .001), cheating (r = -.30, p < .001), stealing (r = -.38, p < .001), and fraud (r = -.37, p <
 28
.001). Schlenker found moderate negative correlations with both Machiavellianism (r = -

.47, p < .001), and Moral Disengagement (r = -.51, p < .001).

Low correlations with comparison measures undermine the validity of the IS, but

experimental research has given some support. Integrity is seen as a social virtue (Monin

& Jordan, 2009), and the importance that people give to principled ideologies is reflected

in how they see others. As a self-report form, the IS cannot directly measure the

relationship between ideals and actions. However, psychology students who scored

higher on the IS are also considered more principled by their friends, and prefer

evaluators that value principled rather than expedient ideologies (Miller & Schlenker,

2011). Scores on the IS predict the kind of hero participants prefer: high IS scorers

(journalism undergraduate majors) admired heroes who show greater integrity, while low

scorers tended to admire heroes that show expedient behavior (Schlenker, Weigold, &

Schlenker, 2008).

The Moral Identity Scale. Aquino and Reed (2002) developed a scale to

measure how much individuals include moral values in their self-concept. The theory

behind the Moral Identity Scale (MIS) draws on Blasi’s assumption of a rational agent

that strives to act consistently with moral traits, as well as echoing Gilligan’s (1982)

emphasis on values like caring. Social influences determine the traits and the way they

are embedded in a social moral framework.

The MIS has two subscales, internalization and symbolization, with five items

each. Internalization refers to how persons see themselves—Aquino el al. (2009) call it

moral identity centrality. Symbolization measures the extent to which individuals define
 29
their moral selves in reference to social groups and outward image (Aquino & Reed,

2002). Internal consistency was acceptable in the original validation study with adults,

college students and adolescents (rα = .83 for internalization) and in later studies among

all age groups, though these primarily use the internalization subscale (e.g. Aquino et al.,

2009). The MIS was compared to established measures with different samples, including

the DIT (r = .32, p < .05 for Internalization subscale), Davis’s (1980) empathy scale (r =

.32, p < .001 for Internalization subscale), and similar instruments. Discriminant validity

was established with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (r = .07, p > .05, for

Internalization subscale), as well as locus of control and social anxiety measures.

Volunteerism was found to be positively correlation to both subscales (r = .19, p < .001

for Internalization; r = .23, p < .001 for Symbolization).

Although the correlations reported for validity measures are low, the MIS has

seen frequent use in research. The Internalization subscale has been used primarily to

look at morality within a social context. It reflects the social nature of moral behavior

(Hardy & Carlo, 2011). From research with samples of business school undergraduates,

Aquino et al. (2009) present moderation and mediation models of moral identity

centrality, situational influences, and prosocial behavior. In their research with adults

from an online panel (N = 233, mean age = 45) and undergraduates (N = 401), Winterich,

Mittal, and Ross (2009) found an interaction between the MIS, gender, and in-group/out-

group identification, with charitable donations as the dependent variable.

 30
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire

Haidt’s (2007) Moral Foundations Theory can be tested with the Moral

Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Graham et al. 2010). The

MFQ is structured in five sections that reflect the five universal intuitions upon which the

theory is based: harm vs. care, fairness and reciprocity, in-group loyalty, respect for

authority, and purity/sanctity (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). Participants are asked to rate the

relevance of moral criteria to making moral judgments on a six point scale. The latest

version of the MFQ was validated with over 30,000 adult respondents who participated

through an internet survey on www.yourmorals.org (Graham et al., 2010). Confirmatory

factor analysis supported the five factor structure.

Criterion validity was established through comparison to similar instruments (e.g.

Davis’s Interpersonal Reactivity Index, the Schwartz Value Scale), political attitudes, and

social groups (Graham et al., 2010). The structural model held across cultures, although

the authors recognize the limitations of an Internet-based survey offered on an academic

site. Females scored higher in harm (d = 0.58), fairness (d = 0.22), and purity (d = 0.15).

Men scored only slightly higher on the loyalty and authority subscales (ds < 0.06). The

gender differences were much greater and more pronounced across cultures than the

differences between Eastern and Western cultures.

The MFQ provides an interesting framework from which to consider moral

behavior, but it does not measure moral reasoning or provide any indication of how

people will act when faced with everyday moral dilemmas. It is based on Haidt’s SIM,

and is rightly claimed to give insight into moral intuitions, rather than deliberate choice.
 31
Table 1
Summary of Explanations for Moral Decisions.
Psychometric
Theory Relevant Citations instruments
Conscious deliberation
Stages Developmental stages are Colby & Kohlberg 1987; Moral Judgment Interview
reflected in reasoning on Rest, 1979; Gibbs et al., (Kohlberg); Defining Issues
moral dilemmas 1992; Tests (Rest); Sociomoral
Reflection Scale (Gibbs)
Moral Denial of responsibility and Bandura, et al. 1996; Moral Disengagement Scale
responsibility inability to accept the consequences Schwartz, 1968, Schwartz (Bandura); Ascription of
of actions leads to delinquent and/or & Howard, 1984 Responsibility Scale (Schwartz)
immoral behavior.
Moral agency People learn from their Pasupathi & Wainryb, none
mistakes and use them to 2010)
construct a narrative moral
agency that determines future
moral decisions.
Moral identity
Moral Desire to make actions consistent Blasi none
Self-concept with moral judgment motivates
moral action
Integrity Commitment to principled Schlenker, 2008 Integrity Scale
ideologies determines moral
behavior.
Moral The degree to which the Aquino & Reed, 2002 Moral Identity Scale
identity individual values moral
identity affects moral
judgment.
Unconscious processing
Social Intuitionist Model: post hoc Haidt, 2001 Moral Foundations
reasoning justifies intuitive reaction Questionnaire
Heuristics, which can be Sunstein, 2005 none
determined by prior learning,
determine most moral decisions
Dual Process Moral cognition relies on two Greene et al. 2009; none
Theories distinct cognitive Greene, 2009; Lapsley &
mechanisms, one dedicated to Hill, 2008; Wallach et al.
intuitive reactions, and the 2010.
other to deliberate reasoning.
 32
CHAPTER III

Statement of the Problem

Introduction

Despite the increasing prevalence of general audience books and scientific

research on moral decision-making, there has been no corresponding development of

valid psychometric measures. Most of the research and measurement of moral reasoning

has been based on Kohlberg’s stages of moral development (see Walker, 2002 for an

overview; also Gibbs et al., 1992; Lind, 1992). These scales are often difficult to score

and built to confirm their own biases (see Gibbs et al., 2007). Bandura et al. (1996)

provided theory and a method for assessing moral disengagement, but focused on

explaining deviation from morally responsible behavior. There is ample writing on moral

identity, but few measures available for use in research (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Most of

these measures focus on prosocial attitudes and fail to identify developmental differences

(Lapsley, 2010).

My purpose is to devise a measure of moral cognition that will facilitate

investigation of the construct’s distinct aspects. The design rests on the assumption that

people can and do take ownership of their moral choices, even though these may reflect

certain automatic processes. Structural equation modeling will permit the inclusion of

latent variables. Modelling will also aid in drawing conclusions about the relationship

among the various components of moral cognition. The Moral Cognition Inventory will
 33
ultimately include four components, Responsibility, Identity, Cognition, and Community

(See Figure 1). The present research concerned the validation and modelling of the first

two components, Moral Responsibility and Moral Identity.

Moral Responsibility Scale

The extent to which people assume responsibility for moral actions is addressed in

this first domain. Moral responsibility is often a legal question, concerning how much

people can be held responsible by others for their actions, or considered primarily as

motivation for prosocial behavior (Fischer, 1999). The present research considers moral

responsibility from the point of view of the individual. Three conditions are necessary

for persons to be held and to feel morally responsible: they must be able to choose their

actions freely, they must understand the moral consequences of the actions, and the

chosen action must have a causal relationship with these consequences. From the

individual’s point of view, if any of these three conditions are absent, or are interpreted as

not having been met, there will be less motivation to act in a morally responsible manner.

The Moral Responsibilty Scale (MR) is structured accordingly in three subscales:

Moral Agency (MRA), Moral Identification (MRI), and Moral Consequences (MRC).

All three subscales are scored in the direction of greater moral responsibility. The three

subscales are totaled to give an overall Moral Responsibility score.

Moral Agency

Items on the first subscale assess moral agency, or the belief in one’s ability to

choose moral actions freely and to effectively carry them out. Agency has no necessary

connection to morality (Lapsley, 2010). Agency is moral when chosen actions affect the
 34

MORAL
COGNITION
INVENTORY

Moral Moral Moral

Moral Identity Cognition Community
Responsibility
Scale Scale Scale
Scale

Agency Consequences Identification Integrity Moral Self

14 items 13 items 9 items 15 items 10 items

Figure 1

Figure 1. The proposed structure of the Moral Cognition Inventory includes the
Community and Cognition components. which were not part of the present research.
 35
well-being of other people (Bandura, 2002). MRA addresses the extent to which

participants feel they can control their moral behavior, and will include questions such as

“I have a choice whether to treat people well or badly”; “If I feel pressured into doing

something, I’m not as responsible as when I decide on my own” (reverse scored); and

“No one can make me do something I know to be wrong.” Participants indicate their

agreement on a five-point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

Moral Identification

Moral agency partly depends on the ability of individuals to understand and

identify with their acts (Lapsley, 2010). Items on the second subscale assess moral

identification by how much participants feel associated with the results of their actions.

They are asked to indicate how responsible they are (five points, from fully to not at all)

for actions such as: “You’ve noticed that the brakes on the company car aren’t working

properly, but you forget to mention it when you turn it in and go on holiday. In your

absence, your colleague takes the car, the brakes fail, and gets in a bad wreck.”

Moral Consequences

The third subscale deals with how participants understand moral consequences.

Before individuals take responsibility for their acts, they must understand the extent to

which these acts can affect the well-being of others. The MRC asks respondents to rate

whether actions such as “Spray-painting a traffic sign so that it cannot be read properly”

and “Drawing on the outer walls of a local restaurant” would be likely to harm other

people (five point scale: harm them a lot, might harm them, can’t tell, probably wont

harm anyone, won’t harm anyone.)

 36
Moral Identity Scale

This scale assesses the importance people give to their moral principles and to

acting according, conceptualized as subscales of moral self and integrity. Moral behavior

is not only a question of knowing what should be done; the knowledge that something is

morally right or wrong does not always result in corresponding action. The sense of

moral self is a primary motivating force for moral behavior: once the necessary judgment

of what is morally good is made, individuals want to do so in order to maintain self-

consistency (Blasi, 1983). This concurrence of thought and action is integrity. The

stronger the sense of moral self, the more a person will desire to act consistently with her

principles. Little research has been done to provide support for this claim, though

Lombrozo (2009) found that at least some people (those who prefered consequentialist

solutions in her study) try to make their moral judgments consistent. In light of Batson et

al.’s (1997) research, the evidence seems to indicate a tendency towards moral hypocrisy.

However, there are individual differences in the way people value integrity (Schlenker,

2008), independently of their ability to meet their own standards.

The Moral Identity Scale assesses both the differences in integrity values and

differences in perceived moral self, conceived as two subscales, Integrity (MIS—I) and

Moral Self (MIS—MS). All items are presented in one format: responses will be on a 5-

point Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Higher scores mean greater

importance placed on moral values and integrity. Confirmatory factor analysis will be

used to verify the final structure.

 37
Integrity

The integrity subscale measures the desire to make intention and action

consistent, and how important it is to the respondent that others also act in accordance

with their expressed principles (“It is important that people practice what they preach”).

It assesses how much value participants place on acting consistently with moral

principles (“If you believe that cheating on an exam is wrong, you should never cheat no

matter what the reason.”), as well as integrity in the sense of equality of private and

public action (“There is no point in going out of my way to do something good if no one

is around to appreciate it’).

Moral Self

Integrity is supported by a the importance people place on being moral. Moral

identity involves how people define their personality (Bergman, 2002). When people see

themselves as moral brings, they are more likely to interpret situations in a moral manner

and to act accordingly (Narvaez et al., 2006). The MIS—MS subscale measures how

closely participants identify with moral values with questions such as “Not hurting other

people is one of the rules I live by” and “I want other people to know they can rely on

me.”

Importance of Proposed Research

As research highlights the neural complexity of moral cognition, the need for a

measure that encompasses its various components is apparent. Current psychometric

instruments suffer from domain underrepresentation, and the validity of their claims to

measure even limited aspects of the moral domain is questionable. Correlations cited to
 38
provide evidence of valid measurement are rarely more than moderate, and most are low.

The distinct processes that contribute to moral decision making are complex and varied,

indicating the suitability of a structural model. A good model is not feasible without

valid measurement of its separate factors, however. Currently, models and theories are

based on an amalgam of different psychometric instruments, experimental results, and

behavior reported by self and others (cf. Bandura et al., 1996; Aquino & Reed, 2002;

Carlo et al., 2003; Winterich et al., 2009).

The proposed research aims to meet the need for an instrument that can measure

different aspects of moral cognition. By developing and validating multiple scales

intended to be used together, it will lay the groundwork for coherent, reliable

measurement. The two scales currently presented will provide means to assess

differences in moral responsibility and moral identity, as well as data to test a partial

model of moral cognition. This study will validate two domains of the scale in adults.

Item analysis and preliminary validation of the Moral Responsibility Scale was carried

out in a pilot study (see Appendix A for results). The present research will provide

further validity for Moral Responsibility. It will also include item analysis and validation

of the Moral Identity Scale. Although it does not presume to test all aspects of moral

cognition, it covers important components. It will be the first to measure moral

responsibility within a wider nomological network, and it incorporates moral identity as a

key component relating self-concept to moral action.

 39
Hypotheses

The domains of the Moral Cognition Inventory are not meant to add up to a

general score of morality. They are expected to reflect research and theory, and to

demonstrate good reliability and validity. The following sections will outline specific

hypotheses for each scale and subscale along with some general research questions. All

of the validity measures are scales that have been widely used. However, most of them

have limited reliability and validity in their own right, as cited correlations with criterion

and convergent measures are rarely as high as .51. Nevertheless, they will serve as a

common metric that can provide useful information regarding the MCI and its

relationship to the literature. Predicted correlations, however, will therefore be less

precise than would otherwise be desired, and must be considered best estimates.

Primary Hypotheses

Demonstrating reliability and validity is an essential step in the development of

any psychometric measure. The Moral Cognition scales will be tested for reliability and

validity as two independent wholes, and in each subdomain. Expectations regarding

different tests necessary for its validation are detailed in the following hypotheses. See

Table 2 for a list of psychometric instruments.

Validity

Moral Responsibility. This domain covers the extent to which participants 1)

identify with and are willing to take ownership of the results of their actions; 2) see

themselves are free agents when it comes to making a moral decision; and 3) understand

the consequences of their actions.

 40

Table 2
Psychometric Instruments Used in Present Research.
Internal
Scale Items Response format Consistency

Moral Responsibility 5 point Likert-type, varied

36 .86
(scale in development) responses

Moral Identity 6 point Likert-type, strongly

25 .90
(scale in development) disagree to strongly agree

Ascription of Responsibility 4 points, strongly agree to

28 .84
(Schwartz, 1968) strongly disagree

The Defining Issues Test 5 dilemmas, Likert-type

85 .85
(Rest et al., 1999) responses

Moral Disengagement Scale 5 point Likert-type, strongly

32 .92
(Bandura et al., 1996) disagree to strongly agree

5 point Likert-type, end point

Interpersonal Reactivity Index
22 only, describes me well… does .85
(IRI; Davis, 1980)
not describe me well

Integrity Scale 5 point Likert-type, strongly

18 .85
(Schlenker, 2008) disagree to strongly agree

7 point, Likert-type, endpoint

Moral Identity Scale, Internalization
5 only, Strongly disagree… .82
(Aquino & Reed, 2002)
Strongly agree
Machiavellian Personality Scale,
5 point Likert-type, strongly
Amorality factor 5 .85
disagree to strongly agree
(Dahling et al., 2009)
Social Desirability Scale—Short Form
13 true/false .74
(Reynolds, 1982)
Self-Esteem Scale 4 points, strongly disagree to
10 .87
(Rosenberg, 1965) strongly agree

Note. All values for internal consistency are Cronbach’s alpha except SDS-SF, which used
KR20.
 41
Criterion validity hypotheses. There is no scale available that measures moral

responsibility as described above. However, it is closely related to Schwartz’s (1968)

Ascription of Responsibility Scale (for adults), which will serve as criterion for this

study.

Hypothesis 1a. A moderate to strong positive correlation is expected between

with the Ascription of Responsibility Scale (Schwartz, 1968) and moral responsibility.

Based on the pilot study mentioned above, I predict .52 ≤ r ≤ .80.

Hypothesis 1b. The Defining Issues Test (DIT2) has been widely used for

educational and research purposes. It is the best instrument of Kohlberg’s classic model

available, and it is appropriate for current dual process explanations of moral reasoning as

it reflects both reasoning and intuitive schema referencing (Narvaez & Bock, 2002). Its P

index gives a score that indicates the preferred stage of moral development through

calculation of the percentage of responses corresponding to the stages. Scores on Moral

Responsibility are expected to correlate strongly and positively with DIT2 P scores (r ≥

.60).

Convergent validity hypotheses. Instruments that measure similar constructs are

used to establish convergent validity.

Hypothesis 2a. Integrity has been shown to be negatively correlated to moral

disengagement (r = -.51) in a study comparing the Integrity Scale (Schlenker, 2008) to

Bandura’s (1996) scale (Wowra, 2007). As such, moderate to strong positive correlation

(.45 ≤ r ≤ .70) is expected between Moral Responsibility and the Integrity Scale.
 42
Hypothesis 2b: A moderate negative correlation is expected between the Moral

Disengagement scale (Bandura et al., 1996) and total Moral Responsibility scores (-.55 ≤

r ≤ -.40). The correlation is expected to be particularly strong with the Agency subscale

(r ≤ -.55).

Hypothesis 2c: Experimental research has shown that participants who report

more empathy are more likely to demonstrate prosocial and helping behavior (Batson et

al., 1997; Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, & Reiser, 2000). Although theory supports a strong

relationship, it has generally been low to moderate. Eisenberg (2000) points out the

possible interactions between personal distress (which interferes with the ability to reason

about moral issues), knowledge, and context. Detert et al. (2008) found a low negative

correlation with moral disengagement (r = -.27). While empathy can be expected to

correlate positively with moral responsibility insofar as it increases the ability to see

situations from others’ points of views, it will have a distinct relationship with the

different subdomains. A moderate correlation (.40 ≤ r ≤ .50) is expected between the

Identification and Agency subscales and empathy, measured by the Interpersonal

Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980).

Discriminant validity. Attention to societal expectations of moral behavior can

be expected to act as a motivating factor in moral choice. However, not all components

of moral cognition should reflect the influence of social pressure unless there is a

significant bias caused by the tendency to give socially desirable answers. Therefore,

Moral Responsibility is expected to have a low correlation with social desirability as

measured by a 13 item short form of the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale

 43
(SDS-SF; Reynolds, 1982). Reynolds and Ceranic (2007) found low correlations

between both moral judgment and moral behavior and social desirability; therefore, a

very low correlation is expected with the Identification subdomain (r < .35).

To further define the concept, Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale will be used as

discriminant validity. Aquino and Reed (2002) found a very low, non-significant

correlation between moral identity and self-esteem (r = .07). Total moral responsibility

should have a low correlation with self-esteem (r < .20).

Construct validity. Items in the Moral Responsibility domain are conceptualized

in three subscales as described above. Therefore, confirmatory factor analysis is

expected to reveal three factors, all with moderately strong correlations to the overall

scale score.

Moral Identity (MI). This scale tests two subdomains: Moral self or how

important morality is to self-concept; and Integrity, or how important it is to act

according to moral principles.

Criterion validity hypothesis. Schlenker’s (2008) Integrity Scale (IS) assesses

commitment to ethical principles. Although it measures a self-proclaimed characteristic

and not actual behavior, scores on the scale corresponded to similar peer estimates of the

participant’s integrity. Those high in integrity also professed a preference for principled

evaluators in experimental context (Schlenker, Miller, & Johnson, 2009).

Hypothesis 3. Moral identity is expected to have a strong positive correlation (r ≥

.70) with the IS. The correlation between the MIS—I subscale is expected to be strongest

(r > .80).
 44
Convergent validity hypotheses. Several scales will be used to examine the

extent to which Moral Identity relates to similar constructs.

Hypothesis 4a. The Defining Issues Test (DIT2) has also been used to establish

validity of identity measures as well as development of moral character. Aquino & Reed

(2002) found a low positive correlation with internalized moral identity (r = .32); a higher

correlation should be expected when integrity is included. Correlations have not been

high, but it provides a useful common metric. A moderate correlation with Moral

Identity is expected (.40 ≤ r ≤ .50).

Hypothesis 4b. The Moral Identity Scale (MIS; Aquino & Reed, 2002) asks

participants to rate how important certain characteristics associated with being moral

(compassionate, kind, honest, etc.), assuming that strong moral character is a

motivational force in moral behavior. The MIS has two subscales, symbolization and

internalization. Moral self-concept is best measured by the internalization subscale (see

review in Chapter 2; Aquino & Reed, 2002). Total Moral Identity scores are expected to

be moderately and positively correlated with scores on the MIS Internalization subscale

(.40 ≤ r ≤ .55).

Hypothesis 4c. Machiavellianism has long been associated with amoral and

manipulative behavior (Dahling, Whitaker, & Levy, 2009). Scores on the Integrity Scale

(Schlenker, 2008) were found to be negatively correlated (r = -.51) with

Machiavellianism (Wowra, 2007). The Machiavellian Personality Scale (MPS; Dahling

et al., 2009) contains a subscale that measures amorality. A moderate to strong negative

correlation (r ≤ -.60) is expected between MPS amorality and MI.

 45
Discriminant validity. Moral Identity as a whole is expected to have a low

correlation (r < .35) with social desirability (SDS—SF). While integrity, which is

viewed as social capital (Monin & Merritt, 2011) could be expected to be moderately

correlated to social desirability, the evidence is mixed. Carlo and Randall (2002), for

example, found no significant correlation between a shortened form of the Crowne-

Marlowe scale and a prosocial moral behavior in a large (N = 248) sample of college

students.

Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale will be used as discriminant validity for Moral

Identity as well. Aquino and Reed (2002) found a very low, non-significant correlation

between moral identity and self-esteem (r = .07); for this study, Moral Identity is

expected to have a very low correlation with self-esteem (r < .15).

Construct validity. Items in the Moral Identity domain are conceptualized as two

factors. Therefore, confirmatory factor analysis is expected to reveal two, with moderate

to high correlations with the overall domain score.

Specific correlational hypotheses are presented in Figure 2.

Structural model. Moral cognition is a complex process that draws on many

conscious and unconscious processes. Wallach et al. (2010) emphasize that there is no

specific cognitive mechanism for moral decision-making. It is a result of both bottom up

intuitive or unconscious reflexes and top down deliberate reasoning. This research

recognizes this complexity.

Within the limitations of modeling based on only two components, only a partial

model is feasible. Research and theory both indicate a causal relationship between moral
 46
identity and responsibility judgments (Blasi, 1983; Schlenker, 2008). People who tend to

interpret situations in moral terms make more moral judgments (Narvaez et al., 2006),

and people whose attention is focused on moral identity are more likely to act morally

(Aquino et al., 2009).

Such research points towards a model in which Moral Identity (integrity and

moral self) have a positive predictive relationship to Moral Responsibility. The Agency

subscale of MR is expected to have a weaker relationship to MR as a whole, and to have

a two-way causal relationship with the Moral Self subdomain. (See Figure 3.)

Alternative models. Four variations on the basic theme of total MI causing total

MR and its subscales will also be tested. Five variations in which the causal direction is

reversed (MR causing MI and its subscales) will also be tested. I expect all of the second

group of models to be worse fits than the first group. Lastly, five models in which there

is no direct causal direction between MI and MR will be tested. In the first, MI and MR

will be allowed to covary. In the second, they will cause each other. The last three will

test models in which only the subscales or latent variables will figure, with no total MR

or MI variables.

Secondary Hypotheses

Age-related differences. Part of the purpose of the Moral Cognition Scale is to

allow assessment of developmental differences. Although sense of identity has been

shown to change and consolidate as children mature (see for example Blasi & Milton,

1991), the current sample of adults cannot demonstrate the developmental differences in

moral identity and responsibility that one would expect to find with a younger
 47

MORAL MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY IDENTITY

Agency Consequences Identification Integrity Moral Self

Figure 2
Criterion Validity (ARS) .52 ≤ r ≤ .80 (IS) r ≥ .70

(DIT2) r ≥ .60

Convergent Validity (IS) 45 ≤ r ≤ .70 (MIS) .35 ≤ r ≤ .55

(MDS) -.55 ≤ r ≤ -.40 (DIT2) .40 ≤ r ≤ .50

(MDS/Agency subscale) ) r ≤ -.55 (MPS) r ≤ -.70

(IRI) .40 ≤ r ≤ .50 (IRI) .35 ≤ r ≤ .50

Discriminant Validity (SES) r < .20 (SES) r < .15

(SDS—SF) r < .35 (SDS—SF) r < .35

Figure 2. Expected correlations between Moral Cognition subscales and validity measures: Ascription of Responsibility (ARS; Schwartz, 1968),

Integrity Scale (IS; Schlenker, 2008), Moral Identity Scale (MIS; Aquino & Reed, 2002), Moral Disengagement Scale (Bandura et al., 1996);

Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), Machiavellian Personality Scale (MPS; Dahling et al., 2009), Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg,

1965), and Social Desirability Scale, Short form (SDS—SF; Reynolds, 1982).
 48

Figure 3. Proposed Partial Model of Moral Cognition

 49
participant pool. Identity formation does not stop at eighteen, however, and adulthood is

arguably the most important epoch for consolidating an independent concept of self

(Arnett, 2000). This period, which Arnett (2000) calls emerging adulthood, is key in the

development of characteristics that are closely related to moral cognition, such as

independence and responsibility. Empathy and prosocial moral reasoning have been

shown to increase with age (Eisenberg, Cumberland, Guthrie, Murphy, & Shepard,

2005). Narvaez et al. (2011) found older adults more likely to interpret events in moral

terms. Consequently, the present research should find age-related differences as follows.

Moral Responsibility: age is expected to have a low to moderate (.20 < r < .45) positive

correlation with Total MR. Moral Identity: age is expected to have a low positive

correlation with Total MI (r < .20).

Gender differences. The idea that males and females take a different approach to

moral questions is the foundation to the ethics of care based on Gilligan’s (1982) work.

The experimental research of Skoe, Eisenberg, and Cumberland (2002) suggests that men

and women do focus on different aspects of morality. Women invested more emotion in

the real-life dilemmas they provided, while men, though exhibiting less emotion on their

real-life scenarios, reported more sympathy on hypothetical scenario scoring. Agerstrom,

Moller, and Archer (2006) also found gender differences in an experimental study where

females demonstrated higher levels of care than did males. On the other hand, no gender

differences have been reported in experimental research using variants on the trolley

dilemma (Mikhail, 2007). Difference hypotheses for the separate domains follow.
 50
1. Moral Responsibility. There was little indication in the literature of gender

differences in moral responsibility. The pilot study found no differences in

overall score or scores on the Consequences subscale, but females (M = 35.9)

scored higher than males (M = 31.3), p = .009, d = .70 in Moral Agency.

Therefore, while gender differences are expected in the MA subscale (females

are expected to score higher than males, d > .60), the overall MR score is not

expected to reflect gender differences (d < .30).

2. Moral Identity. Moral identity and its importance to self-concept are more

likely to differ according to gender. Aquino and Reed (2002) found modest

gender differences with their Moral Identity Scale. In a series of studies looking

at integrity and moral identity, Miller and Schlenker (2011) found that females

scored higher on an integrity scale (Schlenker, 2008) and that integrity had a

greater effect on females’ judgment of persons and situations. Females are

therefore expected to score higher on this domain of the MCI (d > .35).

Education. Scores on different versions of the Moral Judgment Interview (Colby

et al., 1983) and the Defining Issues Test (Rest et al., 1999) have shown moderate to high

correlations with education. Therefore, total scores on both Moral Responsibility and

Moral Identity are expected to have a moderate to strong positive correlation (.50 < r <

.80) with education.

Summary

Few psychometric instruments are available for use in research on moral

psychology, and none bring together the various cognitive processes that contribute to
 51
moral choice. The purpose of this research is to advance the development of a reliable

and valid measure that encompasses different aspects of moral cognition. Two domains

are to be tested in the present study, Moral Responsibility and Moral Identity. Validation

of the subscales will require confirmation of the hypotheses outlined above. Further

research questions that are relevant to future research and further validation of the Moral

Cognition Inventory are also posed.

 52
CHAPTER IV

Method

Participants

Four hundred and fifty-nine participants (69% women; see Table 3 for

demographics details) finished at least one questionnaire between 9 January and 27

March 2012, by which point all responses necessary for analyses of the MCI had been

obtained. Of the 471 original participants, twelve were eliminated either because they

took too little time to complete the survey or because the data was obviously bad (e.g.

vertical flat-lines or failing reverse-score checks). Eighty-one completed the Defining

Issues Test 2, and of these two were deemed invalid: 79 cases were sent to the Center for

the Study of Ethical Development at the University of Alabama to be scored; one did not

pass the DIT reliability checks, leaving a total of 78 valid cases. 423 cases were used for

the final CFA of the Moral Responsibility Scale.

Instrumentation

Moral Responsibility. Preliminary item tryout and validation had been carried

out in a recent pilot study (N = 71; see Appendix A for details). The three subscales were

conceptualized as three separate constructs and as such were presented as separate

questionnaires.
 53

Table 3
Demographics for Total Sample (N = 459).
Total Females Males

Age (mean and standard deviation) 35.5 (15.3) 35.9 (15.3) 34.6 (15.3)

Ethnicity (percent)

African American or Black 2.8 2.6 3.7

American Indian or other native American 3.5 4.2 2.2

Asian or Pacific islander 2.6 2.9 2.2

Hispanic 12.4 11.7 14.7

White 61.2 65.9 55.9

Undeclared or other 17.4 12.7 21.3

Education (percent)

Less than High School 0.5 0.4 0.9

High School degree 8.2 7.7 9.6

Some college 46.9 46.3 47.8

Bachelor’s degree or equivalent 24.4 25.3 22.6

Master’s degree 13.0 14.0 10.4

Doctoral degree 7.0 6.3 8.7

 54
Identification subscale. Participants were asked to indicate how responsible they

would feel for a series of scenarios presented in 14 items. Nine items were chosen for the

final subscale. Answer choices were fully responsible, mostly responsible, somewhat

responsible, partially responsible, and not at all responsible, scored from 0 to 4, with

fully responsible worth 4 points.

Consequences subscale. The Consequences subscale also included 14 items, 13

of which were kept. Participants were asked to rate the degree to which actions could

harm other people on a 5 point Likert-type scale (harm them a lot = 4, might harm them,

can’t tell, probably wont harm anyone, won’t harm anyone = 0.)

Agency subscale. The Agency subscale consisted of 18 trial items, 14 of which

were selected for the final measure. Participants were asked to indicate their agreement

with statements on a 5-point Likert scale (strongly agree = 4, to strongly disagree = 0.)

Moral Identity. Item tryout had left 39 items on the MI subscale to be tested in

the present study; 25 were selected for the final scale. Participants were asked to indicate

their agreement with statements on a Likert-type scale ranging from strongly agree (= 4)

to strongly disagree (= 0). Higher scores mean greater preference for moral values and

integrity.

Ascription of Responsibility Scale. The 28-item Ascription of Responsibility

Scale (Schwartz, 1968; Schwartz & Howard, 1984) measures the tendency to deny

responsibility for acts that could harm others. Participants indicate the degree to which

they agree with the statements on a 4-point scale that ranges from strongly agree to

strongly disagree. While the original scale scored denial of responsibility, coding was
 55
reversed for this study so that high scores mean greater ascription of responsibility to self.

Cronbach’s alpha for this study was .84.

Integrity Scale. The Integrity Scale is an 18-item self-report questionnaire

designed to measure commitment to moral principles (Schlenker, 2008). Participants are

asked in indicate their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale (strongly agree to strongly

disagree) to questions such as “It is important to me to feel that I have not compromised

my principles.” and “It is foolish to tell the truth when big profits can be made from

lying.” Internal consistency was good for this study, rα = .85.

Defining Issues Test (2). Sixty participants will be invited to complete the DIT2

along with the MR and MI scales. The DIT2 presents five moral dilemmas. Participants

are asked what should be done, and then to rate twelve reasons or criteria used to make

the decision. Finally, they are asked to rank the criteria. Scores are traditionally given in

terms of the probability of preference for each stage (P score). Internal consistency is

calculated with the scores at the story level: in this study, rα = .87. Scoring includes a

series of participant reliability checks that screen for random responses, missing data,

nondiscrimination of items, and bogus data (Rest et al.) The data was sent to the Center

for the Study of Ethical Development at University of Alabama for scoring (See

Appendix C).

Moral Disengagement Scale. The Moral Disengagement Scale (MDS; Bandura

et al., 1996) was designed to measure the inclination to avoid moral responsibility

through diffusing responsibility and ascribing blame to others, misinterpreting

consequences, using euphemistic speech, comparing acts to worse instances of behavior,

 56
justification, and dehumanizing victims. Written in language and content accessible to

children, the scale has 32 items to which participants respond agree, disagree, or not

sure. For this study, the MDS was reworded in language more appropriate for adults.

Internal consistency was rα = .92.

Moral Identity Scale. The Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) asks

participants to consider a person with characteristics often associated with moral probity,

such as fair, kind, caring, honest. They are then told to keep such as person in mind as

they decide the extent to which they agree with 10 statements by circling the appropriate

number on a 7-point Likert scale (Only endpoints: strongly agree and strongly disagree.)

Statements include “Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of

who I am.” and “The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify

me as having these characteristics.” The scale has two factors, internalization and

symbolization; the 5 item internalization subscale was used in the present research, rα =

.82 in this study.

Interpersonal Reactivity Index. The IRI was designed to provide a global

measure of empathy based on four subscales, Perspective-Taking, Fantasy, Empathic

Concern, and Personal Distress (Davis, 1980). There was a large gender difference on all

four subscales, with women giving higher reliability coefficients in all cases. Davis

(1983) compared the IRI to other measures of empathy, social functioning, and sensitivity

to others, and found differences among IRI subscales, with perspective-taking showing

the most validity as measured by higher with the Hogan Empathy Scale. Pulos, Elison,

and Lennon (2004) performed a confirmatory factor analysis to test the validity of a
 57
single score of empathy and found that eliminating the Personal Distress subscale gave

the best results. The present study used the Perspective-Taking and Empathic Concern

subscales (14 items altogether) to compute a total empathy score; Cronbach’s alpha for

the two subscales combined was .85.

Machiavellian Personality Scale. The term Machiavellianism has been used to

refer to the tendency to distrust others and seek power, and the willingness to manipulate

others, including the use of immoral or amoral means. The MPS (Dahling et al., 2009) is

a recent measure of Machiavellian characteristics with four factors, Amorality, Desire for

Status, Desire for Control, and Distrust of others. The Amorality subscale (rα = .85 in

this study) consists of 5 items with which participants indicate their agreement on a 5

point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree.) Examples are “I believe that lying is

necessary to maintain a competitive advantage over others,” and “I am willing to be

unethical if I believe it will help me succeed.”

Social Desirability Scale—Short Form. Social desirability refers to a response

style that can bias the results of self-report measures, as well as a psychological construct

reflecting the need to please others or satisfy perceived social norms (Reynolds, 1982). A

13-item short form (Reynolds, 1982) of the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale

will be used to discriminant validity. In a sample of 608 students, he SDS –SF showed

acceptable reliability (KR20 = .76) and a .93 (p < .001) correlation with the original 33

item scale. Participants are asked to respond True or False to questions such as “There

have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.” Internal

consistency in this study was .74.

 58
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Rosenberg’s (1965) Self-Esteem Scale is widely

used measure of self-concept that is equally valid when administered on a computer

(Vispoel, Boo, & Bleiler, 2001). Participants are asked to indicate their agreement on a

four point scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree) with 10 statements, such as “On the

whole, I am satisfied with myself.” Cronbach’s alpha for this study was .87.

Procedure

Internet based sample. Four surveys were offered via Survey Monkey: all

included the full MCI questionnaires. Survey 1 also included all of the validation

measures except the DIT2. Survey 2 was composed of the DIT2 and the MCI. Survey 3

was a slightly shorter version of Survey 1, and Survey 4 included only the MCI and the

MDS (Bandura et al., 1996).

People were invited to participate in individual emails, and through links on social

networking sites. The consent form specified that participants had to be at least 18 years

old. Links were posted on my Facebook and MySpace profiles and shared on Twitter.

Other links were posted on the walls of specific Facebook groups, such as Evolutionary

Psychology and alumni connections. People were invited to share links with colleagues.

A separate link was created for each contributing group.

The survey was also made available to HSU psychology students through the

HSU Psychology department research participation pool. A link to Survey Monkey was

provided through the Sona-Systems website, which automatically coded responses in

order to facilitate credit granting.

 59
Retest survey. An email was sent after eight days to those participants who had

provided and email to participate in the retest survey. If no response was received, a

reminder was sent 7 days after the first email. The email contained a web link to the

survey, as well as instructions for HSU students on how to qualify for the retest while

taking the second survey (DIT) through the Psychology Department Research Pool.

Those who completed the retest survey and left their email address were entered in a

drawing for a $50 Amazon gift certificate.

Risks and Benefits

No risks were associated with the completion of the survey, and participants were

not asked to provide sensitive information. Participants’ identities were protected by

disabling the email tracking feature on the Survey Monkey, which provides SSL (Secure

Sockets Layer; the same system that protects online financial transactions) encryption

protection for survey completion. The email addresses provided for the retest survey

were disassociated with the data, and identified with a retest code in separate file. The

codes were then used to match the test-retest data. The email addresses have not been

stored with the data. Similarly, the identification of HSU participants automatically

provided through the participation pool data gathering process will be kept confidential

and had not been associated with the data. Only the researcher and faculty supervisor

will have access to the data, which will be stored on password protected computers for

five years after publication of the results.

Participants may have gained insight by taking the survey and thinking about

moral dilemmas and moral responsibility. Conscious consideration of morally relevant

 60
information may facilitate moral development (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). The focus on

moral consequences may encourage people to interpret actions morally, which has been

shown to lead to increasingly moral judgments (Narvaez et al., 2006). More importantly,

the development of a comprehensive Moral Cognition Inventory that includes valid

psychometric instruments has the potential to facilitate future research into how people

make moral decisions, and the costs and benefits of moral education.

Data Analysis

Data screening. Initial inspection of the data was done on Survey Monkey.

Participants who had completed the survey in less than 20 minutes were discarded;

completion in less than 30 minutes warranted detailed inspection. Responses were also

screened for validity with reference to reverse-scored items and variation. Questionnaires

on which all items had received the same response were discarded.

Variables were also screened for normality prior to correlational analyses and

structural modeling. Negatively skewed variables were reflected and transformed (see

Appendix E for details). Scatterplots also were used to identify outliers in correlational

analyses; outliers were discarded in some cases, especially when the sample size was

small (test-retest analyses; see Appendix H for an example). In AMOS, univariate and

multivariate normality was verified during structural analyses. Some variables (parcels)

were transformed in order to correct kurtosis, which can compromise tests of variance

and covariance (Byrne, 2010).

Preliminary analyses, item selection, and validity measure comparisons.

SPSS (versions 19 and 20) and R (version 2.14.2) were used for all basic analyses,
 61
including internal consistency, descriptive statistics, and group comparisons. Initial item

selection for all MCI scales was made based on scale reliability and dimension reduction

data obtained with SPSS. Exploratory factor analysis (principle axis factoring, oblique

rotation) was used to determine the structure of the Moral Identity scale. Meng’s FZT

Computator was used to compare correlations. Schmitt (1996) recommends the

presentation of corrected inter-scale correlations, especially for unidimensional

psychometric instruments. Both uncorrected scale inter-correlations and scale inter-

correlations after correction for attenuation are presented, although because the MCI

scales are multidimensional, the uncorrected correlations are referenced. Bootstrapping

(1000 samples) was used to estimate bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals

both for correlations and structural modeling. Paired t tests were used for test-retest

comparisons.

Structural modeling: Fit criteria and model comparison. AMOS (version 18)

was used for confirmatory factor analysis for Moral Responsibility, and to further

substantiate the structure of the MI scale before structural analysis. Items were parceled

according to corrected item-total and inter-item correlations (Little, Cunningham, Shahar,

& Waldman, 2002) prior to structural model testing. Goodness-of-fit statistics were used

to test the appropriateness of each model, both for confirmatory factor analysis and to test

the hypothesized relationship of the MCI scales and subscales. AMOS provides a series

of goodness-of-fit statistics, including the comparative fit index (CFI), which tests the

proposed model against a null model; scores over .95 are considered good fit. The root

mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), together with PCLOSE, which estimates
 62
to likelihood that the model will be a close fit in the population, are used as primary

criteria of model fit. RMSEA values of less than .05 are generally considered good fit

(Byrne, 2010). MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara (1996) suggest that a 90%

confidence interval around RMSEA that is entirely below .05 validates the assumption

that the fit is good in the population; confidence intervals that include .05 indicate that

while a good fit is probable, the possibility that it is not should not be discarded.

Whereas fit indices can tell us whether a model fits the data, and to some extent

allow comparison between nested models, they do not facilitate comparison between non-

nested models. To compare models, both Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and

CAIC, an adaptation of AIC that included a correction for sample size and model

complexity (Bozdogan, 1987). AIC was derived from Kullback-Leibler divergence, and

provides a way to estimate model fitness based on information loss (Anderson, 2008).

For both AIC and CAIC, a value of zero would mean no information loss; thus, the model

closest to zero is presumed the best. I refer to both statistics because although parsimony

should be rewarded, the CAIC has been considered overly parsimonious (Anderson,

Burnham, & White, 1998), especially when the relationship between variables is

expected to be complex, as is the case in this research.

 63
Chapter V

Results

Preliminary Analyses: Scale Item Analysis and Selection

Moral Responsibility Scale

The Moral Responsibility domain is represented by three subscales. Because the

separate subscales were expected to have only low inter-correlations, each subscale was

analyzed separately, item selection was carried out, and factorial validity was tested

individually. Afterwards, scale reliability for total MR was analyzed. Item selection was

based on internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) and corrected item-total correlations for

individual subscales.

Moral Agency. Of the 18 original items, one did not contribute to internal

consistency, and three had low item-total correlations (See Table 4). Fourteen final items

were chosen for the final subscale (MRA, or Moral Responsibility—Agency). Final

Cronbach’s alpha was .77.

Moral Consequences (MRC). Only one of 14 items had an item-total

correlation of less than .300. It was discarded, leaving 13 items with high item-total

correlations (see Table 5). Final Cronbach’s alpha was .87.

Moral Identification (MRI). Of the 13 original items, four had item-total

correlations of less than .300, and none of them added to internal reliability. Only nine

contributed to the final subscale (see Table 6). Final Cronbach’s alpha was .73.
 64
Table 4

Item analysis: Moral Agency. Item Content and Corrected Item-total Correlations for
Total MR and the MRA Subscale.
MRA Total
Item
subscale MR
1. I don’t need anyone to tell me something is right or wrong, I
.257 .053
can make my own decisions.*
2. I have a choice whether to treat people well or badly. .273 .122
3. If I feel pressured into doing something, I’m not as responsible
.323 .226
as when I decide on my own.
4. I have no control over the results of my actions.* .236 .248
5. If I get into trouble, it is my own fault even if someone else told
.299 .214
me to do it.
6. If anyone is at fault for general immoral behavior, it’s teachers,
.178 .087
parents, and other authority figures.*
7. I make up my own mind about doing good or bad things. .485 .298
8. Sometimes it seems like fate determines whether my actions are
.369 .238
good or bad.
9. I am just as at fault for breaking the rules when no one knows
.407 .351
as when everyone knows.
10. Doing wrong is not really the fault of individuals when society
.373 .261
enables them.
11. I am the one responsible for my own behavior, good and bad. .551 .344

12. No one can make me do something I know to be wrong. .371 .370

13. I feel responsible for the consequences of my actions. .434 .361

14. When things don’t turn out as I expected, it seems like
.287 .120
someone else took control of things.*
15. Luck more than what you do, is responsible for whether things
.377 .263
turn out for the best.
16. Most of the time I can tell how my actions are going to affect others. .332 .286
17. My actions in most situations are based on what other people
.402 .309
tell me is the right thing to do.
18. In most cases, I can make my own decisions about what is
.546 .362
right or wrong in a situation.
Note. Participants indicated their agreement with each statement on a 5-point scale ranging from
strongly disagree to strongly agree. Items followed by an asterisk were discarded.
 65

Table 5

Item analysis: Moral Consequences. Item Content and Corrected Item-total Correlations
for Total MR and the MRC Subscale.
MRC Total
Item subscale MR

1. Cheating on your driver’s license test.* .289 .277

2. Stealing someone’s lunch money. .428 .364

3. Taking credit for someone else’s hard work. .477 .423

4. Sneaking out of a restaurant without paying. .544 .486

5. Knocking down a stop sign. .462 .440

6. Not warning hikers about a slippery place on the trail you’ve

.504 .455
just walked.

7. Spray-painting a traffic sign so that it cannot be read properly. .504 .454

8. Encouraging kids to disobey school rules. .562 .498

9. Drawing on the outer walls of a local restaurant. .553 .422

10. Stealing from a big department store. .686 .552

11. Littering. .533 .400

12. Pretending to be ill in order to avoid going to work. .636 .494

13. Eating candy from the bulk food bins while you do your
.629 .498
shopping.
14. Propping your apartment building's door open when you have a
.434 .364
party and expect lots of guests.
Note. Participants were asked to rate each item according to the how much each action could
harm other people. Items followed by an asterisk were discarded.
 66

Table 6

Item analysis: Moral Identification. Item Content and Corrected Item-total Correlations
for Total MR and the MRI Subscale.
Item MRC subscale Total MR

1. Your big party is winding down. Your friend Jean has clearly drunk
too much. You offer your spare bedroom, but you don’t insist. On .337 .278
the way home, Jean runs off the road and ends up in hospital.

2. You convince ten friends to play baseball in your backyard. You go

inside for a drink. After you leave, one of your friends hits the ball .258 .325
through your neighbor's window.*

3. The bike rack is full and you leave your bike locked to a sign post.
A person in a hurry doesn’t see your bike until the last minute, and .397 .323
in avoiding it, falls off the sidewalk, spraining an ankle...

4. You volunteer to lead a group of children from a local school on a

camping trip. At the last minute, something comes up, and you .241 .224
cancel. As a result, that group of kids can’t go.*

5. You are leading a review session for the final exam. A student asks
you a question, and although you aren’t entirely sure, you give an
.377 .284
answer. Your answer turns out to be wrong. As a result, many
students miss that question—some of them fail the exam.

6. You’ve noticed that the brakes on the company car aren’t working
properly, but you forget to mention it when you turn it in and go on
.454 .345
holiday. In your absence, your colleague takes the car, the brakes
fail, and gets in a bad wreck.

7. You’ve got connections at the racetrack. When a friend asks you for
a tip on a big race, you tell her Cigarillo is a sure bet—a sure
.375 .199
winner! On Saturday Cigarillo comes in third, and you friend loses
her life’s savings.

8. You arrive early to a party and park in a good spot near the house.
You leave early and are forced to back out down a long driveway
.102 .214
with parked cars. Near the end, there are several cars jutting out, and
you hit one.*
 67

Table 6
Item analysis: Moral Identification. Item Content and Corrected Item-total Correlations
for Total MR and the MRI Subscale. (cont.)

Item MRC subscale Total MR

9. You work at the university Registrar. A student is applying to grad

school and needs a transcript. You tell him that it will be sent within
five days, but it is a busy time of year and it doesn’t get sent for two .393 .309
weeks. The student’s application is not complete at the due date, and
he is not considered for admission.

10. You overhear a group of children planning to sneak onto a

neighbor’s property to steal some apples. You know the neighbor
has just bought some dangerous dogs, but you say nothing. The .401 .326
next afternoon you hear that one of the children was seriously
injured by one of the dogs.

11. You and a friend go to a concert and your friend parks the car on a
side street. He asks you if it is OK to park there. You are not sure,
.397 .286
but you say it is fine. Coming back from the concert the car has a
parking ticket for $200.

12. You are driving in town and look down for a second. At that moment
someone runs across the street from the middle of the block and is .203 .168
hit by your car.*

13. You are taking care of someone’s home when they are away.
.237 .087
During this time the house is broken into and jewelry stolen.*

14. You’ve been putting off changing the tires on your car, and the
tread is almost entirely worn away. On the way to work, you have
.317 .246
a blowout, which causes the car behind you to spin out of control
and crash.

Note. Participants were asked to rate items according to the how responsible they would
be for each. Items followed by an asterisk were discarded.
 68
Moral Identity

Initial inspection indicated the need to drop seven of the original 39 items, based

on Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted statistics. Further consideration of corrected item-

total correlations and item similarities, with a view to the proposed two factor solution,

led to further discards, leaving a total of 25 items, 15 on the Integrity subscale, and 10 on

the Moral Self subscale. See Table 7 for details.

Reliability of Moral Cognition Inventory Scales

Moral Responsibility

Total MR demonstrated good internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha of

.86, 95% C.I. [.83, .88] for the entire sample and for females. Internal consistency for

males was rα = .84 (N = 112). Test-retest reliability at 8 to 14 days was r (97) = .86, 95%

C.I. [.79, .91], with no significant difference between means over time (t(98) = 1.13, p =

.26). See Table 8 for detailed reliability statistics.

MR subscales. The MRA subscale had internal consistency of rα = .77, 95% C.I.

[.73, .80]. Test-retest reliability at 8 to 14 days was r(96) = .73, 95% C.I. [.62, .81], with

no significant difference between means (See Table 8). The MRC subscale had internal

consistency of rα = .87, 95% C.I. [.85, .89] and test-retest reliability at 8 to 15 days of

r(99) = .87, 95% C.I. [.82, .91]. The MRI subscale had internal consistency of rα = .73,

95% C.I. [.69, .77]. Test-retest reliability was r(96) = .71, 95% C.I. [.64, .81] at 8 to 14

days.
 69

Table 7

Item analysis: Moral Identity. Item Content and Corrected Item-total Correlations for
Total MI and its Two Subscales, Integrity (MIn) and Moral Self (MS).
Item Total MI MIn MS

1. I have a very good idea of what it means to be honest. .423 .500

2. I try hard to act honestly in most things I do. .527 .531
3. I believe that it is sometimes necessary to do things that
might harm strangers in order to help my friends and .423 .414
family.
4. I know how people should be treated, but it is not
.298
always possible to treat them that way.*
5. Not hurting other people is one of the rules I live by. .495 .485
6. It is important for me to treat other people fairly. .481 .567
7. I want other people to know they can rely on me. .430 .560
8. If you believe that cheating on an exam is wrong, you
.368
should never cheat no matter what the reason.*
9. It is important for people not to do the things they tell
.255
you are wrong.*
10. It is not that wrong to make promises that I can’t keep.* .417
11. I always act in ways that do the most good and least
.386 .508
harm to other people.
12. If I am with other people, I sometimes do not behave as
.294
well as I know I should.*
13. If doing something will hurt another person, I try to
.540
avoid it even if no one would know.*
14. I often make promises I know that I cannot keep.* .360
15. I often make promises I know that I cannot keep.* .401
16. One of the most important things in life is to do what you
.529 .588
know is right.
17. I believe that it is always wrong for me to steal.* .332
18. If I had to choose, I would harm a few people to save
-.202
many.*
19. It is important that people practice what they preach. .337 .364
20. There are many things in life that are more important
.397 .397
than helping other people.
 70
(Table 7 cont.) Item analysis: Moral Identity. Item Content and Corrected Item-total
Correlations for Total MI and its Two Subscales, Integrity (MIn) and Moral Self (MS).
Item Total MI MIn MS
21. If I leave a store and realize there’s something in the
shopping cart I haven’t paid for, I always take it back to .527 .507
the store.
22. As long as I make a decision to do something that helps
.582 .636
me, it does not matter much if other people are harmed.
23. I don’t think it’s always necessary to do what I said I will do. .530 .444
24. Once I’ve made up my mind about what is the right
.481 .512
thing to do, I make sure I do it.
25. It is ok to do something you know is wrong if the
.618 .652
rewards for doing it are great.
26. If no one is watching or will know it does not matter if I
.460 .519
do the right thing.
27. It is more important that people think you are honest
.613 .628
than being honest.
28. If no one could find out, it is okay to steal a small
.564 .576
amount of money or other things that no one will miss.
29. There is no point in going out of my way to do
.503 .533
something good if no one is around to appreciate it.
30. No one could convince me to do something wrong if it
.404
would hurt other people.*
31. If a cashier accidentally gives me $10 extra change, I
.554 .609
usually act as if I did not notice it.
32. Lying and cheating are just things you have to do in this world. .527 .552
33. I often worry about whether I have made morally right
-.006
decisions or behaviors.*
34. Doing things that some people might view as not honest
.539 .483
does not bother me.
35. Morals are of limited value for people these days.* .198
36. If people treat me badly, I will treat them in the same manner. .504 .549
37. I will go along with a group decision, even if I know it
.451 .489
is morally wrong.
38. I will vote for the lesser of two evils, even if I think
.242
both options are wrong.*
39. Having moral values is worthless in today’s society. .417 .414
Note. Participants indicated their agreement with each statement on a 5-point scale ranging from
strongly disagree to strongly agree. Items followed by an asterisk were discarded.
 71
Table 8

Reliability Statistics.
Scale or subscale N rtt Time M SD t d

Total Moral T1 99.9 13.4

Responsibility 98 .86 1.13 .22
rα (389)= .86
T2 99.0 15.4

T1 43.7 5.8
Moral Agency
97 .73 -0.78 .07
rα (415)= .77
T2 44.0 6.3

T1 35.2 8.1
Moral Consequences
100 .87 0.88 .07
rα (395)= .87
T2 34.9 8.4

T1 21.4 5.4
Moral Identification
97 .71 2.13* .22
rα (412)= .73
T2 20.5 5.3

T1 97.6 14.7
Total Moral Identity
98 .92 -1.40 .15
rα (413)= .90
T2 98.5 15.5

T1 56.6 11.1
Integrity
100 .90 -0.18 .01
rα (438)= .87
T2 56.7 11.4

T1 41.3 4.7
Moral Self
98 .77 -1.07 .12
rα (447)= .82
T2 41.7 5.1
Note. T1 = time one; T2 = retest at approximately 1 – 2 weeks; N = sample size for test-retest
analysis; rα = Cronbach’s alpha (sample size); rtt = test-retest correlation coefficient (retest
sample size). * indicates p < .05.
 72
MI subscales. The Integrity subscale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .87, 95% C.I.

[.85, .89], and test-retest reliability of r(97) = .90, 95% C.I. [.84, .94]. The Moral Self

subscale had internal consistency of .82, 95% C.I. [.79, .84], and test-retest reliability of

r(97) = .77, 95% C.I. [.66, .85]. There was no significant difference between means for

either scale.

Validity of the Moral Cognition Inventory Scales

Moral Responsibility

Criterion validity. A moderately strong positive correlation between total MR

and was hypothesized. This hypothesis was confirmed, r(307) = .59, 95% C.I. [.51, .65].

(See Table 9 for all hypotheses and results.)

A strong positive correlation with the DIT2 was hypothesized, but this hypothesis

was not confirmed. The correlation found was negative and not significant, r(77) = -.05.

Amongst the subscales, only Moral Agency was positively correlated with the DIT2,

r(77) = .19, and again, in a sample of this size it was not statistically significant.

Convergent validity. A moderate to strong positive correlation was also

hypothesized for the relationship between integrity and Total MR. This hypothesis was

also confirmed, r(314) = .62. A moderate negative correlation was hypothesized between

moral disengagement and Total MR scores. This relationship was found to be stronger

than expected, r(311) = -.62. The relationship with the MA subscale was as expected,

r(311) = -.58. A moderate positive correlation was expected between Moral

Responsibility and empathy. The current research confirmed this hypothesis, r(297) =

.45.
 73
Table 9

Hypothesized and Final Correlations Between MCI and Proposed Validity Scales.
Moral Responsibility Moral Identity

Hypothesized Result Hypothesized Result

Criterion (ARS) .52 ≤ r ≤ .80 r = .59 (IS) r ≥ .70 r = .72

Validity [.51, .65] [.66, .77]

(DIT2) r ≥ .60 r = .05 (IS/Integrity subscale) r = .70

[-.27, .17] r ≥ .80 [.62, .74]

Convergent r = .62 r = .57

(IS) 45 ≤ r ≤ .70 (MIS) .40 ≤ r ≤ .55
Validity [.55, .68] [.48, .65]

r = -.62 r = .23
(MDS) -.55 ≤ r ≤ -.40 (DIT2) .40 ≤ r ≤ .50
[-.68, -.55] [.01, .41]

(MDS/Agency subscale) r = -.58 r = -.74

(MPS) r ≤ -.70
r ≤ -.55 [-.65, -.52] [-.78, -.70]

(IRI) .40 ≤ r ≤ .50 r = .45 (IRI) .35 ≤ r ≤ .50 r = .55

[.36, .53] [.46, .63]

Discriminant r = .29 (SES) r < .15 r = .34

(SES) r < .20
Validity [.19, .40] [.23, .45]

(SDS—SF) r < .35 r = .33 (SDS—SF) r < .35 r = .34

[.23, .43] [.28, .48]

Note. 95% Confidence intervals presented beneath correlations. Correlations that met or
exceeded hypotheses in bold. See Appendix E, Table E3 for correlations that have been
corrected for attenuation.
 74
Discriminant validity. A low correlation was predicted between MR and social

desirability. This hypothesis was confirmed, r(312) = .33. A low correlation with self-

esteem was predicted. This hypothesis was not confirmed, as the correlation was found

to be r(305) = .29.

Factorial validity. All final observed variables were used in a second order

structure. The hypothesized model had satisfactory fit (χ2 (591, N = 423) = 1393, p <

.001, χ2:df = 2.36, RMSEA = .057. 90% C.I. [.053, .061]), but the underlying problems

with MRC (shared error variance, possibly due to similarity of items) indicated a need for

post-hoc analyses. A second model, in which error variances for some items on the MRC

subscale were allowed to covary, was tested (See Appendix B for details). This model

was a much better fit, χ2 (583, N = 423) = 1047, p < .001, χ2:df = 1.80, RMSEA = .043,

90% C.I. [.039, .048], PCLOSE = .995 (CAIC = 1632 vs. 1921). A first order model, in

which the three subscales covaried with no Total MR variable, proved a very poor fit.

Moral Identity

Criterion validity. A strong positive correlation was expected between the

Moral Identity scale as a whole and integrity (IS; Schlenker, 2008). This hypothesis was

confirmed, r(327) = .72. The Integrity factor of the MI was expected to have a stronger

correlation with IS, but a similar relationship, r(327) = .70, was found.

Convergent validity. A moderate positive correlation was expected between the

internalization subscale of Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Moral Identity Scale. A stronger

correlation than predicted was found, r(301) = .57. A strong correlation was

hypothesized between total MI and amorality as measured by the MPS (Dahling et al.,
 75
2009). This hypothesis was confirmed, r(322) = -.74. A moderate positive correlation

was expected between total MI and empathy. This relationship was stronger than

expected, r(296) = .55. The hypothesis of a moderate positive correlation with the DIT2

was not confirmed. A low correlation was found, r(77) = .23.

Discriminant validity. A low positive correlation was expected between total MI

and self-esteem. This hypothesis was not confirmed, as the correlation was found to be

higher than expected, r(308) = .34. A low-moderate positive correlation with social

desirability was found, r(312) = .34, and confirmed the hypothesis of r < .35.

Construct validity. Although two factors, moral self and integrity, were

expected, the items were not developed to directly reflect these latent variables.

Therefore, exploratory factor analysis (Principle axis factoring, oblique rotation) was

used to test the underlying structure. Parallel analysis indicated a four-factor solution,

but because two of these factors had only one or two items, negatively correlated to the

other factors, a three factor model was tested and rejected because no items loaded on the

third factor. Confirming hypotheses, a final two factor solution proved best, with 15

items related to integrity loading on one latent variable and 10 items related to moral self

loading on the other (see Table 7 and Appendix C for details).

Structural Model of the Moral Cognition Inventory

An important aspect of the MCI is its intention to integrate the various elements

that underlie the moral decisions people make. An understanding of how the different

scales and subscales relate to each other is vital (see Table 10 for Pearson’s product

correlations among the MCI scales and subscales). Seventeen models (N = 389) were
 76
used to examine the latent variable structure of the MCI. It was originally hypothesized

that Moral Identity, composed of moral self and integrity as a character traits, would

underlie the responsibility judgments that are reflected in the Moral Responsibility

Scales. The relationship between total MR and Agency was expected to be relatively

weak, while a strong relationship between agency and moral self was hypothesized. As

such, the first five models tested posited Moral Identity and its subscales as causes of

total MR and its subscales. Five models with the opposite causal direction (MR causing

MI) were also tested (the four best fits are presented here). Five models in which there is

no direct causal relationship between total MI and total MR were proposed for

comparison; the two best fits are presented. Finally, two post hoc models in which

Agency was not grouped with total MR were also tested.

Moral Identity as Antecedent to Moral Responsibility.

Model 1. Moral Agency was expected to share covariance with Moral Self; the

first model chosen to test the hypothesis reflects the constraints of structural modeling

(see Figure 4). The first model chosen to represent the hypothesis was a very good fit, χ2

(82, N = 389) = 125, p =.002, χ2:df = 1.52, RMSEA = .037, 90% C.I. [.023, .049],

PCLOSE = .961. Although the two-way causation between Moral Self and Agency

seems theoretically confusing, this structure was easy to model despite being non-

recursive, further indication of a good fit.

 77

Table 10

Correlations Between MCI Scales and Subscales.

MI MR MRA MRI MRC Min MS

MI α = .90

MR .67 α = .86

MRA .59 .66 α = .77

MRI .30 .65 .21 α = .73

MRC .50 .84 .37 .37 α = .87

MIn .95 .59 .55 .28 .45 α = .87

MS .79 .53 .53 .20 .41 .58 α = .82

Note. Total Moral Responsibility (MR); Total Moral Identity (MI); Moral Agency (MRA);
Moral Identification (MRI); Moral Consequences (MRC); Moral Integrity (MIn) and Moral
Self (MS). All correlations significant at p < .001. Cronbach’s alpha provided on diagonal.
 78
Model 2. The second model eliminated the path from Agency to Moral Self (see

Figure 6). This model, though simpler, was not as good as the first, χ2 (83, N = 389) =

140, p < .001, χ2:df = 1.69, RMSEA = .042, 90% C.I. [.030, .054], PCLOSE = .868.

Reference to both AIC and CAIC comparisons demonstrates the inappropriateness of this

model (See Table 11).

Model 3. The third model posited total MI as cause of both total MR and Agency

(see Figure 5). It was a good fit, χ2 (83, N = 389) = 126, p =.002, χ2:df = 1.52, RMSEA =

.037, 90% C.I. [.023, .049], PCLOSE = .984. This is the best model according to AIC

and CAIC comparisons. While at first glance, AIC numbers seem to favor Model 4 as

well, the change of less than two with the addition of only one estimated parameter

indicates a pretending variable; in other words, the more parsimonious third model

should be preferred.

Model 4. The fourth model adds two paths (one parameter) to the third, placing

total MI as cause to total MR and its three subscales (see figure 6). It was a good fit, χ2

(82, N = 389) = 125, p =.002, χ2:df = 1.52, RMSEA = .037, 90% C.I. [.023, .049],

PCLOSE = .961. As noted above, while this model appears good, Model three is the best

choice of these first models.

Model 5. This last model with Moral Identity causing Moral Responsibility is the

simplest, with a single path from total MI to total MR. It is an acceptable fit, RMSEA =

.052, 90% C.I. [.041, .063], PCLOSE = .349, but it is not as good as the previous four

models.
 79

Figure 4. Proposed structural model with standardized coefficients.

All path coefficients are statistically significant at p < .001, except AgencyMoral Self
(p =.03) and Moral ResponsibilityAgency (p = .28).
 80

Table 11

Goodness of Fit Statistics and AIC/CAIC Model Comparison Data for Models with Moral
Identity as Cause.

Model Par df RMSEA PCLOSE CFI AIC ∆AIC CAIC ∆CAIC

1 38 82 .037 [.023, .049] .961 .985 201 1 389 5

2 37 83 .042 [.030, .054] .868 .979 213 13 396 12

3 37 83 .037 [.023, .049] .963 .984 200 0 384 0

4 38 82 .037 [.023, .049] .961 .985 201 1 389 5

5 35 85 .052 [.041, .063] .349 .922 245 45 419 35

Note. Par = model parameters; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; PCLOSE =
test of closeness of fit for RMSEA in the population; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; AIC =
Akaike’s Information Criterion; CAIC = Consistent AIC (adjusted to account for sample size and
to penalize complexity). ∆AIC = difference between “best model” (value closest to zero);
same calculation used for ∆CAIC.
 81

Model 2 Model 3

Model 4 Model 5
Figure 5. Alternative models in which MI causes MR;
Model 3 proved best; standardized regression estimates are provided. All coefficients are
statistically significant at p < .001, except Moral ResponsibilityAgency (p = .11).
 82
Moral Responsibility as Antecedent to Moral Identity.

Five models were used to further test the hypothesized model by reversing the

direction of causation. Compared to those in which Moral Identity was causal, they all

performed poorly, and were difficult to fit. The best four are presented below.

Model 6. This model is identical to Model 1, except for the direction of the path

between total MR and Total MI, which is reversed (see Figure 6). Model 6 was the best

fitting model, χ2 (84, N = 389) = 150, p < .001, χ2:df = 1.78, RMSEA = .043, 90% C.I.

[.031, .055], PCLOSE = .815.

Model 7. Model 7 was the reverse of Model 2 in that the paths between total MR

and MI, and Agency and Moral Self, were reversed (see Figure 6). It also had good fit, χ2

(83, N = 389) = 142, p < .001, χ2:df = 1.71, RMSEA = .045, 90% C.I. [.033, .057],

PCLOSE = .742, although as can be seen in Table it did not compare favorably to the

other models.

Model 8. This model is the opposite of Model 5, and, although simple, the

poorest fitting of these four models, χ2 (86, N = 389) = 162, p < .001, χ2:df = 1.89,

RMSEA = .048, 90% C.I. [.036, .059], PCLOSE = .607. It is also the worst model when

compared to the others, according to both AIC and CAIC.

Model 9. With total MR causing total MI and all of its subscales, this model is

the reverse of Model 4. Though not as good a fit as Model 5, χ2 (87, N = 389) = 160, p <

.001, χ2:df = 1.84 RMSEA = .047, 90% C.I. [.035, .058], PCLOSE = .679, this model has

the lowest CAIC. As such, it is apparently the most parsimonious model, with the least

information lost. However, as it required more constraints to get a unique solution, I

 83

Model 6 Model 7

Model 8 Model 9

Figure 6. Models in which MR causes MI.

 84
believe the simpler Model 6, with a better fit and less information lost according to AIC,

to be the best model amongst those that posit MR as cause (see Table 12 for details).

Alternative Models.

The best model might have been one in which there was no causal relationship

between the two MCI domains. Five were tested, many of which were similar; the two

best fitting models are presented below.

Model 10. Moral Responsibility and Moral Identity could feasibly share

covariance; this model tested that hypothesis (see Figure 7). The model was difficult to

specify, and in order to identify it, the variance on total MR was set to 4.5. With that

constraint, the model was an acceptable fit, χ2 (85, N = 389) = 174, p < .001, χ2:df = 2.05,

RMSEA = .052, 90% C.I. [.041, .063], PCLOSE = .370. Model comparisons showed it

to be a much less satisfactory solution (see Table 13).

Model 11. Four models were tested in which the Moral Responsibility subscales

and the latent variables representing the two factors of Moral Identity were related

without the MR and MI scale totals. This was the best, with acceptable fit, χ2 (83, N =

389) = 155, p < .001, χ2:df = 1.87, RMSEA = .047, 90% C.I. [.036, .059], PCLOSE =

.630. It was a better than Model 10, but still far from the best AIC and CAIC scores.

Post hoc models

Moral Agency is not only theoretically close to Moral Identity, but it also proved

empirically to work well when allowed to relate freely with Moral Self. Furthermore,

when modeled with the other MCI components, it has a negative relationship with total
 85

Table 12

Goodness of Fit Statistics and AIC/CAIC Model Comparison Data for Models with MR
as Cause.
∆CAI
Model Par df RMSEA PCLOSE CFI AIC ∆AIC CAIC
C

6 36 (66) 84 .043 [.031, .055] .815 .978 217 0 396 6

7 35 (65) 85 .045 [.033, .057] .742 .976 222 5 396 6

8 36 (64) 84 .048 [.036, .059] .607 .972 230 13 400 10

9 33 (66) 87 .047 [.035, .058] .679 .974 226 9 390 0

Note. Par = model parameters; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation;
PCLOSE = test of closeness of fit for RMSEA in the population; CFI = Comparative Fit
Index; AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion; CAIC = Consistent AIC (adjusted to
account for sample size). ∆AIC = difference between “best model” (value closest to zero);
same calculation used for ∆CAIC.
 86

Model 10

Model 11
Figure 7. Alternative models.
 87
MR (β = -.225 in Model 3). As such, it seemed appropriate to test models in which total

MR and Agency were not directly related.

Model 12. For this model, the path between total MR and Agency in the

originally hypothesized model was eliminated (see Figure 8), leaving a solution almost

identical to Model 1 in terms of very good fit indices and AIC/CAIC values, χ2 (83, N =

389) = 126, p = .002, χ2:df = 1.52, RMSEA = .037, 90% C.I. [.023, .049], PCLOSE=

.962.

Model 13. The final model groups Agency with the Moral Identity component,

and has a single causal path between total MI and total MR. Model 13 is a very good fit,

χ2 (84, N = 389) = 130, p = .001, χ2:df = 1.64, RMSEA = .038, 90% C.I. [.024, .050],

PCLOSE= .952. It is also the best model for CAIC, and very close to the best for AIC.

Secondary Hypotheses

Age-related Differences

Scores on both total MR and total MI were expected to increase with age.

Specifically, age was expected to have a low to moderate correlation (.20 < r < .45) with

Moral Responsibility and a low (r < .20) correlation with Moral Identity. The first

hypothesis was corroborated in the present sample, r(347) = .36, 95% C.I. [.27, .45]. Age

had a much higher correlation with MI than expected, r(369) = .42, 95% C.I. [.33, .51].

Gender differences

Moral Responsibility. Slight differences on scores for total Moral Responsibility

or its subscales were expected. Specifically, for total MR, an effect of d < 0.30 was
 88

Table 13

Goodness of Fit Statistics and AIC/CAIC Model Comparison Data for Hypothesized
Model, Best Fit with MI as Cause (3), two Best Models with MR as Cause (6,9), two
Alternative Models (10, 11), and two Post hoc Models (12, 13).
Model Par df RMSEA PCLOSE CFI AIC ∆AIC CAIC ∆CAIC

H1 38 82 .037 [.023, .049] .961 .985 201 1 389 9

3 37 83 .037 [.023, .049] .963 .984 200 0 384 3

6 36 84 .043 [.031, .055] .815 .978 217 17 396 15

9 34 86 .045 [.033, .057] .743 .975 222 22 391 10

10 35 85 .052 [.041, .063] .370 .968 244 44 418 37

11 37 83 .047 [.036, .059] .630 .974 229 29 413 32

12 37 83 .037 [.023, .049] .962 .984 200 0.25 384 4

13 36 84 .038 [.024, .050] .952 .983 202 2 381 0

Note. Par = model parameters; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; PCLOSE =
test of closeness of fit for RMSEA in the population; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; AIC =
Akaike’s Information Criterion; CAIC = Consistent AIC (adjusted to account for sample size).
∆AIC = difference between “best model” (value closest to zero); same calculation used for
∆CAIC.
 89

Model 12

0.84 0.49

0.67

.0.77

0.85
0.83

Model 13
Figure 8. Post hoc models. Standardized regression weights (all p < .001)
provided for best fit.
 90
hypothesized, with females scoring higher, especially on the Moral Agency subscale.

The data indicated a moderate effect, with females (M = 101.3, SD = 14.5) scoring higher

than males (M = 98.31, SD = 14.38), d = 0.21, 95% C.I. [-.01, .43]. Contrary to

expectations, the effect was similar on the Agency subscale (see Table 14 for details).

Moral Identity. Females were expected to score higher (d > 0.35) than males on

the Moral Identity Scale. The effect was less than expected, d = 0.29, 95% C. I. [.07,

.50], although the difference between females (M = 58.4, SD = 10.25) and males (M =

54.9, SD = 10.52) on the Integrity subscale was greater, d = 0.34, 95% C.I. [.12, .55].

Education

Scores on both the Moral Responsibility and Moral Identity scales were expected

to have a moderate to strong positive correlation with increasing education (.50 < r <

.80). While increasing level of education did mean greater total MR and MI, the effect

was not as strong as expected. Moral Responsibility was weakly correlated with

education, r(341) = .16, 95% C. I. [.07, .24], as was Moral Identity, r(365) = .21, 95%

C.I. [.13, .31]. Because education was measured by one demographic question on a 6

point scale, and only two participants reported having completed less than high school,

ANOVA was also used to test the effect of education.

Moral Responsibility. There was a main effect for education, F(4, 374) = 3.95, p

= .004, partial eta2 = .04. Tukey HSD tests revealed that the only significant difference

was between those with some college (M = 97.9, SD = 15.5) and those with a bachelor’s

degree (M = 104.1, SD = 14.4). Means for all those with college degrees were higher

than those without: grouping those with bachelor’s degrees and above (M = 103.6, SD =
 91

Table 14

Means (Standard Deviations) and Gender Differences for MCI Scales and
Subscales.
Total Women Men
t p d
M SD M SD M SD

Total MR 100.6 14.49 101.3 14.50 98.31 14.38 1.85 .033 0.21

Total MI 98.60 14.39 99.65 14.06 95.52 15.01 2.65 .004 0.29

Agency 44.10 5.97 44.42 5.68 43.24 6.59 1.80 .037 0.20

Identification 20.96 5.75 21.23 5.73 20.34 5.72 1.43 .077 0.15

Consequences 35.38 8.19 35.73 8.02 34.22 8.49 1.65 .050 0.19

Integrity 57.52 10.39 58.43 10.25 54.93 10.52 3.11 .001 0.34

Moral Self 41.08 5.59 41.23 5.09 40.58 6.67 1.06 .022 0.12
Note. One-tailed independent samples t tests (α = .05) used to compare means.
 92
13.1) and comparing them to a group of those without (M = 97.7, SD = 15.2), one finds

that holding a four-year degree or better resulted in higher MR scores, F(1, 377) = 15.86,

p < .001, partial eta2 = .04. However, when age is entered as a covariate, the effect of

education disappears (p = .53, partial eta 2 = .009). See Table 15 for details.

Moral Identity. The effect of education was larger for total MI scores, F(4, 393)

= 8.67, p < .001, partial eta2 = .08. Again, those with college degrees above AA scored

higher (for all groups, M = 102.6) than those with no higher degree (HS degree: M =

89.9; some college: M = 95.4). Tukey HSD tests confirmed that the differences between

college degree and none were significant at p < .05 for all groups except the mean

difference between some college and doctoral degree. However, once again, when one

controls for age, the effect of education largely disappears (p = .15, partial eta2 = .02).
 93

Table 15

Level of Education: Means and Standard Deviations for Total MR and Total MI
According to Highest Level of Education Achieved.

Moral Responsibility Moral Identity

N M SD M SD

High School 33 96.7 14.6 89.9 14.4

Some college 185 97.9 15.5 95.4 15.6

Bachelor’s Degree 98 104.0 14.4 102.6 13.5

Master’s Degree 52 103.4 11.9 102.6 12.0

Doctoral Degree 26 102.5 10.6 102.7 10.9

 94
Chapter VI

Discussion

This research took the first steps in providing a measure and model of moral

cognition. It had two goals: first, develop the first two scales that form part of the MCI,

Moral Responsibility and Moral Identity, and second, provide a partial structural model

of the relationship among the different aspects of moral cognition, represented by these

scales and their subscales. The result was a very good structural model based on scales

that, while not perfect, are an improvement on existing instruments, especially in the

realm of construct validity.

One of the primary problems with current scales related to moral judgment is the

lack of evidence that they reflect the constructs that they purport to measure. Evidence

given for construct validity tends to cite low to moderate correlations. One main goal of

this research was to provide better proof of construct validity through strong correlations

with related measures. This goal was achieved; indeed, in many cases, correlations with

convergent validity scales were even stronger than expected, as is discussed in the

following sections.

The MCI goes beyond enabling the measurement of the different components of

moral cognition: it offers a way to investigate the relationship amongst them. Blasi

(1983) considers the sense of moral self and the desire to act in accordance with its

dictates the motivating force behind moral action. The structural models tested in this
 95
research support Blasi’s theory: the strongest models, which included the original

hypothesized model, all have Moral Identity in a causal relationship to the Moral

Responsibility Scale and its subscales.

Moral Identity is a trait that persists across all situations that involve moral

judgment; Moral Responsibility becomes evident in actions taken in response to specific

scenarios. It comprises what Blasi (1983) called first a “Responsibility Judgment” and

later the subjective experience of moral identity (Blasi, 1993), or how the individual

reacts in a given situation. It also includes aspects of Bandura’s (2002) moral agency,

which people exert when they inhibit moral disengagement and/or proactively seek to

make choices that will benefit others. The complexity of the domain makes its

measurement difficult; Total MR is not as reliable an instrument as Total MI in part

because the construct includes an amalgam of related factors, represented by the

subscales Moral Consequences, Moral Identification, and Moral Agency.

All three subscales of Total MR are facets of Moral Agency, because without

understanding and identifying with the consequences of moral actions, moral agency is

debilitated. However, agency is the driving force for responsibility judgments, due in

part to its close connection with Moral Identity. The extent to which people perceive

themselves to be free agents has a determining effect on how they act and how much

responsibility they are willing to take for their actions. Structural modeling highlighted

the close relationship between Moral Agency and Total MI: grouping Agency with Total

MI rather than Total MR gave very good model fit.

 96
Although more testing is needed before determining which structural model is

best, the current study clearly supports the theory that Moral Identity, as character trait,

underlies and supports Moral Responsibility decisions. Accordingly, I will discuss the

psychometric properties of Total MI first, before moving on to Total MR.

Moral Identity

Total MI, with its two subscales of Integrity and Moral Self, encompasses the

constructs measured in Schlenker’s (2008) Integrity Scale, used to establish criterion

validity, and Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Moral Identity Scale (convergent validity). Total

MI scores showed strong relationships not only with the hypothesized criterion and

convergent validity measures, but also with the scales used to assess Moral

Responsibility. This is particularly noteworthy when the results of the present research

are compared with studies carried out to validate other measures of moral identity, where

the correlations reported tend to be low to moderate.

The correlation of r(327) = .72 with the proposed criterion measure, Schlenker’s

(2008) Integrity Scale, confirmed expectations. Total MI also had a very strong negative

correlation, r(322) = -.74, with the amorality factor of Dahling’s (2009)

Machiavellianism scale, as well as strong relationships with two other convergent validity

scales, the MIS (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and the perspective-taking and empathetic

concern subscales of the IRI (Davis, 1980). The placement of Total MI within a

nomological network makes the following correlations interesting as well. Total MI was

found to have a strong positive correlation with assumption of responsibility (ARS),

r(308) = .72, 95% C.I. [.66, .77], and a similarly strong negative correlation with Moral
 97
Disengagement (MDS), r(315) = -.69, 95% C.I. [-.74, -.63]. Schlenker (2008) found a

much smaller correlation with the MDS (r(154) = -.51); in this research the correlation

between IS and MDS was r(303) = -.57, p < .001; Steiger’s z for the difference= 3.66

(Total MI – MDS vs. IS – MDS in this study). See Table 16 for details on correlations

with all MCI and validity scales.

In fact, total MI had relatively strong relationships with everything measured,

except politics. Even the supposed discriminant validity scales were more strongly

correlated that expected, particularly in the case of Self-Esteem. However, even when

controlling for self-esteem in a regression model, the correlation between total MI and its

criterion measure of integrity, IS, was .60 (semi-partial correlation, p < .001), indicating

that MI explained 36% of the total variance in integrity over and above the influence of

self-esteem. The same analysis was run for social desirability; similar results (R2CHANGE =

.40) support the strength of the relationship between total MI and IS.

Although no hypotheses were made concerning political orientation, it is

interesting to note that politics, as measured on a seven-point (very conservative = 1 to

very liberal = 6) scale, had no significant correlation to total MI, r(341) = -.08, p = .13.

Once age was controlled, education did not predict Moral Identity either. At the same

time, although the results confirmed the hypothesis of a low correlation with social

desirability, it is not clear that social desirability and self-esteem were the best

discriminant validity measures. Social desirability is not entirely unrelated to the way we

address moral choice. Part of what determines moral character is the desire to follow

social norms and please others. On the other hand, self-esteem can be necessary
 98

Table 16

Correlations Between MCI Scales and Subscales and Validity measures. Correlations After Correction for Attenuation (of
the Validity Measures) in Parentheses.
Total MR Total MI Agency Consequences Identification Integrity Moral self

ARS .59 (.64) .72 (.79) .53 (.58) .45 (.49) .29 (.32) .69 (.75) .46 (.50)

IS .62 (.67) .71 (.77) .54 (.59) .50 (.54) .34 (.37) .70 (.76) .51 (.55)

MDS -.62 (-.65) -.69 (-.72) -.58 (-.60) -.44 (-.46) -.32 (-.33) -.69 (-.72) -.44 (-.46)

MPS -.59 (-.64) -.74 (-.80) -.51 (-.55) -.45 (-.49) -.31 (-.34) -.73 (-.79) -.51 (-.55)

IRI .45 (.49) .55 (.60) .37 (.40) .35 (.38) .29 (.31) .48 (.52) .52 (.56)

MIS .47 (.52) .57 (.63) .36 (.40) .36 (.40) .30 (.33) .47 (.52) .54 (.60)

SES .29 (.31) .34 (.36) .40 (.43) .18 (.19) .08 (.09) .29 (.31) .35 (.37)

SDS .33 (.38) .34 (.39) .29 (.34) .23 (.27) .28 (.33) .37 (.43) .45 (.52)

Note. Ascription of Responsibility Scale (ARS; Schwartz, 1968); Integrity Scale (IS; Schlenker, 2008); Moral Disengagement Scale
(MDS; Bandura et al., 1996); Machiavellian Personality Scale, Amorality subscale (MPS; Dahling et al., 2009); Interpersonal Reactivity
Index, Perspective-taking and Empathic Concern subscales (IRI; Davis, 1980); Moral Identity Scale, internalization subscale (MIS;
Aquino & Reed, 2002); the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale (SES); and the Social Desirability Scale, Short Form (Reynolds, 1982).
All correlations greater than .20 are significant at p < .001.
 99
when a person is faced with pressure to act immorally, either through self-interest (it is

tempting to pocket the extra $10 the cashier accidentally gave us), or through peer

pressure. After taking this into consideration, it does not seem surprising that MI had

low-moderate positive correlations with social desirability and self-esteem.

To better understand the relationships between Moral Identity and the validity

measures, it helps to compare the relative correlations. The correlations Total MI—IS

and Total MI—SES are significantly different when compared using Steiger’s z test, z =

7.83. Conversely, the difference between criterion and convergent validity scales IS—

MI—MIS is much less, z = 3.82. Taken together, the relative correlations give strong

evidence for Total MI measuring integrity and moral self.

Moral Identity was conceptualized as having two factors, Integrity and Moral

Self. However, the items were not designed specifically to measure one construct, so

exploratory factor analysis was used not only to differentiate between the two factors, but

also to aide in item selection. The result, with 15 items loading on Integrity and 10 on

Moral Self, provides a satisfactory solution (see Appendix C for factor loadings). The

reliability of the total MI scale was very good at rα = .90, lending further support to its

adequacy as a measure of Moral Identity.

Moral Responsibility

Whereas the Moral Identity Scale assesses moral character, the Moral

Responsibility Scale seeks to reflect the way people approach moral judgment. As such,

it has three subscales that measure different facets of the decision-making process,

Agency, understanding of Consequences, and Identification with the results of one’s

 100
decisions. The higher reliability of Total MR (rα = .86) compared to its subscales

indicates that all three factors are contributing to one construct. Comparisons with

validity measures were primarily made with Total MR.

The Ascription of Responsibility Scale (ARS; Schwartz, 1968) and the Defining

Issues Test 2 (DIT2; Rest et al., 1999) were proposed as criterion measures. Though

neither is an exact match for Moral Responsibility, the DIT2 is considered the gold

standard in moral judgment measures, and the ARS addresses many of the responsibility

judgments the MR scale seeks to assess. Hypotheses regarding the DIT2 were not

confirmed; this is discussed in the following section. The relationship with the ARS was

a moderately strong positive correlation (r = .59), as predicted.

Although the relationships of total MR with related constructs were not as strong

as those with total MI, all hypotheses except two were confirmed. In the case of Moral

Disengagement (MDS), the relationship was stronger than expected, giving increased

evidence that total MR is measuring moral responsibility. The other exception was self-

esteem, a topic addressed with regard to Moral Identity. Strong self-esteem could

reasonably encourage people to accept the consequences of their actions. Comparing the

correlations between Total MR and its criterion measure (ARS) and self-esteem,

however, we again find a big difference (z = 5.21). A better indication of discriminant

validity is the fact that neither education nor political orientation predicted Moral

Responsibility. Total MR had no significant relationship with political bent, Total MR,

r(365) = -.04, p = .46, and when age was controlled, its mean did not differ with level of

education. At the same time, the relationship between Total MR and its convergent validity
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measures of integrity and moral disengagement were stronger than the proposed criterion

measure; more evidence that Moral Responsibility is strongly related to measures of similar

constructs.

Specific hypotheses were not made concerning the scales used to establish

validity for Moral Identity, but their correlations are worth reporting, as they set Total

MR into a wider nomological network of related constructs. A negative correlation,

r(321) = -.59, 95% C.I. [-.66, -.52], was found between Total MR and the Amorality

subscale of the MPS (Dahling, et al., 2009). A moderate positive correlation, r(304) =

.47, 95% C.I. [.38, .55] was found between Total MR and Aquino and Reed’s (2002)

Moral Identity Scale (MIS).

It is difficult to compare total MR to other moral responsibility scales, because

their authors have used behavior more often than psychometric measures to establish

validity. However, the MDS (Bandura et al. 1996) has been compared to empathy (r = -

.27) and to Aquino and Reed’s MIS (r = -.24; Detert et al., 2008). The current research

gives much better evidence for the relationship of total MR with these constructs: for

MIS—Total MR, r = .47 (z = 3.04 for the difference between MDS—MIS); and for

empathy—Total MR, r = .45 (z = 2.65).

When considering all of the evidence based on correlations with Moral

Responsibility, one must take into consideration the reliability. While an alpha of .86 is

acceptable, some information is lost when running the correlations, especially when the

validity measures themselves have less than perfect reliability. If one corrects for

attenuation in the construct validity measures, the correlations are much stronger” for
 102
example, the r = .59 for the correlation between Total MR and its criterion measure, the

ARS, becomes r = .64 (see Appendix E for all corrected correlations). The MR subscales

were expected to have better reliability; this too compromises the comparisons, as well as

the structural model. Confirmatory factor analysis showed that the proposed factor

structure was the best model, but underlying weaknesses in the subscales debilitate the

model. The Consequences subscale in particular presented difficulties. At first glance, it

seemed that two of its items would be better grouped with Identification, but when these

models were tested, the results were worse (∆CAIC = 56). The best solution was to allow

several MRC items to share error variance. The fact that parceling the subscale rendered

an excellent model fit (χ2 (24, N = 423) = 28, p =.24, χ2:df = 1.17, RMSEA = .028, 90%

C.I. [.000, .025], PCLOSE = .93) suggests that the items are very similar, which

enhances scale reliability but indicates a need for further development.

The Defining Issues Test

Although the Kohlberg stages of moral judgment are closer conceptually to the

Moral Cognition component of the MCI, Moral Responsibility was expected to have a

strong positive correlation with the Defining Issues Test, and Moral Identity was

expected to have a moderate positive correlation. Neither hypothesis was confirmed, and

while the relationship with Moral identity was simply weaker than expected, there was no

significant correlation with total MR or any of its subscales. While a larger sample

would have provided sufficient power to find a small effect, the relationship would still

be very weak, and most interestingly, probably negative (the confidence interval for both

P and N2 scores is broad, and largely below zero).

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The DIT is largely about how one explains moral judgments. Scores are intended

to reflect the Kohlberg stage, where higher scores correspond to post-conventional stages

5 and 6. People at these stages supposedly refer to universal norms when making moral

choices. For example, believing that these considerations are important in deciding

whether or not to steal means higher stages of moral development:

Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of a
society?
What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation?
Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned or
wouldn't it?

Placing more importance on such questions as “Shouldn't the community's laws

be upheld?” and “Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from tree

bark?” means one is at a lower stage of moral development. Participants are asked to

rank 12 such considerations as well. Scoring is a complex process that totals participant

scores for stages 2-6 and looks at relative reference to each. The P score reflects the

percentage of scores in stages 5 and 6—Rest et al. (1999) define it as the preference for

post-conventional thinking. The N2 score incorporates the relative ranking of stage 2 and

3 items compared to higher stage items into the post-conventional percentage of the P

index.

In order to better understand the results of the comparison with the MCI scales,

scores from the DIT2 were also compared to the validity measures, age, politics, and

education. As mentioned in the literature review, the DIT usually reflects politics and

education. There was no significant correlation with education, or politics when

considered as a continuum on a 6 point scale. However, when responses to political

 104
orientation are grouped into liberal and conservation, liberals (M = 39.98, SD = 13.74)

scored higher than conservatives (M = 25.60, SD = 17.15), t = 3.29, p = .002, d = .99.

The only validity scale with a reported correlation to the DIT is Aquino and

Reed’s Moral Identity scale. Aquino et al. (2009) found a low-moderate correlation (r =

.32, p < .05.) with the internalization subscale. In the present research the correlation was

stronger (r = .37, 99% CI [-.10, .70]), but, though this was the highest correlation with

DIT2 scores found, from such a small sample no conclusions can be drawn. The

Ascription of Responsibility Scale (Schwartz, 1968) and the Integrity Scale (Schlenker,

2008) also had low-moderate positive correlations; Moral Disengagement (Bandura et al.,

1996) and Machiavellianism (Dahling et al., 2009) had similar negative correlations. The

number of people that took both the DIT2 and the other validity scales was so small that

no specific conclusion can be drawn regarding their relationships. However, it is

probably safe to say that there are no strong relationships. See Table 17 for zero-order

correlations of the DIT with all measures in the present study.

The aspect of moral judgment that the DIT2 assesses seems to be qualitatively and

quantitatively different from those aspects measured by the MCI scales and related

validity measures. Part of the difference is that MCI strives to be simple enough for

people of all educational backgrounds and intelligence to complete; the goal is to

measure moral cognition, not demographic variables. The wording of the DIT alone

makes it a measurement of education (e.g. “Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the

culpability of stealing?”) and willingness to decipher complex meaning.

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Table 17

Correlations of the Defining Issues Test 2 (P scores and newer N2 Scores) with MCI and
Validity Scales, Age, Education, and Politics.
Scale P Score N2 score N
Moral Cognition Inventory

MORAL IDENTITY .155, [-.056, .336] .230, [ .011, .413] 78

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY -.069, [-.282, .144] -.049, [-.270, .168] 78

MORAL AGENCY .102, [-.133, .333] .188, [-.047, .411] 78

MORAL IDENTIFICATION -.015, [-.221, .205] -.044, [-.233, .157] 78

MORAL CONSEQUENCES -.181, [-.385, .037] -.186, [-.384, .029] 78

Validity Scales

Ascription of Responsibility .329, [ -.017, .617] .350, [ .027, .649] 37

Integrity Scale .265, [ -.039, .545] .289, [ .000, .592] 37

Moral Disengagement Scale -.256, [-.541, .185] -.336, [-.597, .125] 37

Machiavellian Personality -.141, [-.505, .275] -.251, [-.567, .140] 37

Self-Esteem Scale .127, [-.222, .531] .175, [-.126, .570] 37

Moral Identity Scale .278, [-.205, .588] .373, [ -.102, .698] 37

Empathy and Perspective-taking .109, [-.304, .453] .194, [-.237, .548] 37

(IRI)
Social Desirability .182, [-.289, .583] .019. [-.379, .426] 37

Note. 95% Confidence Intervals presented for MCI scales; 99% CI were used for post hoc
analyses of correlations with validity scales. Significant correlations in bold type.
 106
Considering everything, I do not believe that the lack of relationship with the DIT

in any way invalidates the MCI scales. Reference to the relative correlations with other

validity scales supports this conclusion. Future research with a bigger sample, including

the Moral Cognition domain of the MCI, will inform any ultimate conclusions made.

A Structural Model of Moral Cognition

The idea of moral identity as a precursor to moral responsibility determined the

hypothesized model, which was a very good fit. More importantly, all the models in

which Moral Identity in some way caused Moral responsibility worked very well,

especially in comparison to models in which the causal direction was reversed, or in

which there was no direction (see Table 14). As mentioned earlier, this lends credence

theories in which moral identity determines decision-making and judgment (e.g. Blasi,

1983; Lapsley, in press; Narvaez et al., 2006), most of which supply little empirical

evidence to back up their claims. Although a structural model cannot substitute for

experimental testing, it can indicate where to expect relationships, and what form they

may take.

The best fitting model that accords with the hypothesized structure of the MCI,

Model 3, had total MI causing both total MR and Moral Agency. Of all the models

tested, the post hoc one (Model 13) that eliminates the path between total MR and Moral

Agency is best when compared with AIC and CAIC. Although Model 3 has a lower AIC

value, it is only 2 better, with the addition of one parameter: this would be considered a

pretending variable (Anderson, 2008), and a more parsimonious model is preferable.

However, confidence intervals for ECVI (the Expected Cross-validation Index can also
 107
be used to compare single-sample models; Byrne, 2010) overlap, as indeed they do for all

the best models, including the hypothesized one. Are there significant differences in

model fit? It is hard to tell without further research.

Conceptually, Moral Agency fits best with Moral Responsibility. Agency is a

necessary part of any responsibility judgment (Lapsley, 2010; Pasupathi & Wainryb,

2011). Perhaps, however, it is part of the character traits that form moral identity. The

original hypothesized model reflected this in the two-way causation between Moral Self

and Agency. Parsimony advises the selection of models that are simpler; thus getting rid

of parameters improves models, even when all are good fits. In this fashion we end up

with post hoc Model 13. The question is whether the relationship between the latent

variable in the MCI is truly simple.

One of the weaknesses of correlational research is lack of context. Any given

participant may think, while filling out a survey, “It depends.” Items are designed to

address this issue by using language such as most of the time and giving a range of

answer choices. In real life one simply responds, with or without deliberation, to the

precise stimulus. Agency may not be the same in each situation, yet a general trait of

independence could influence all situations. The result of one moral decision may form

character and thus affect all later judgments.

In short, the relationship between MCI constructs is not likely to be simple, even

if a more parsimonious model may be a better aide to comprehension. Given that this is

only a partial modeling of the inventory, I am particularly hesitant to select a “best”

model over all the good models. The addition of the other two domains will no doubt
 108
change the relationship between the ones included in the present research. There is

strong evidence that Moral Identity antecedes Moral Responsibility, but the details of the

relationship merit further study.

Secondary Hypotheses

Age. Both Moral Responsibility and Moral Identity increased with age. The

hypothesis of a low-moderate positive correlation between total MR and age was

confirmed. The relationship with total MI was stronger than expected. A lower

correlation had been hypothesized primarily because while identity formation continues

into adulthood, a greater effect would be seen with a sample that included teens and

children. The stronger correlation may indicate the importance of emerging adulthood

(Arnett, 2000) in the consolidation of moral character.

Gender. There were little differences between males and females in this study.

Females did have higher scores than males on all scales and subscales, but the effects

were for the most part small. As predicted, there were greater gender differences in

Moral Identity than in Moral Responsibility. However, the effect was smaller than

previous research had led me to expect. Because the purpose of the MCI is to assess

moral cognition independently of gender, this could be an unexpected strength, although

further research is needed to confirm the lack of gender bias.

Education. Because increasing education consistently predicts higher scores on

scales based on the Kohlberg Model, moderate to strong positive correlations were

expected with both MCI scales. This hypothesis was not confirmed; even before

controlling for age, the correlations were very weak. Once age was controlled, all effect
 109
of education disappeared. Depending on how one views the formation of moral

character, this could be seen as an ideal scenario; moral cognition should not depend on

education level. However, because of the range restriction in the present sample (there

were only two participants that reported less than a high school completed), there is no

way to tell if the MCI scales are truly education independent.

Limitations

The lack of ethnic and social diversity presents a major limitation to this study.

The advantage of an online study is that one can gather many responses from all over the

world very quickly. However, participation will of necessity be restricted to literate,

computer-savvy individuals. Furthermore, much of the recruiting was either through my

own social networking contacts, or through contacts of my contacts. Almost all of the

participants garnered through anonymous websites had to be thrown out because they had

taken the survey too quickly. The HSU research participation pool provided participants

that were unconnected to the researcher, but a college sample also has limitations, such as

restriction of age range (while internet participation made this a minor problem, there

were more young adults than other age groups).

Another limitation common to academic research is the preponderance of liberal

ideology. Despite conscientiously recruiting conservative participants, there were very

few people who identified as very conservative (see Table E4 in Appendix E). A similar

issue arises when one considers religious belief: most people in this sample declared

themselves Agnostic, Atheist, or had no religious affiliation (one could argue that these

are all the same thing). Religion is a driving force behind many people’s sense of
 110
morality, particularly insofar as it strengthens in-group bonding (Graham & Haidt, 2010).

While it will be a stronger influence for the Community domain of the MCI, a religiously

diverse sample may also change the relationships between the constructs included in the

present research.

Further limitations come from the scales themselves. While the Moral Identity

scale and subscales proved very reliable and valid, the domain of Moral Responsibility is

not as well-represented. Both Moral Agency and Identification had lower reliability than

was expected, and Consequences proved difficult to model efficiently. Based on the

results of structural model consideration, it may be that the Moral Agency scale needs to

be expanded. The Consequences scale may need to be better defined in regards to item

specificity. Moral Identification needs further refinement as well. The inclusion of

different validity scales to assess constructs such as attribution style and guilt may aide in

refining the scale.

Future Directions

The limitations of the current research indicate a clear road for further study.

First and foremost, the current scales, Moral Responsibility and Moral Identity need

further testing in different populations. Not only should ethnic, political, and religious

diversity be sought, but also a paper-and-pencil version will need to be presented to a

non-internet-based sample. Even before that is done, the present sample (data collection

is ongoing) can be randomly split before retesting all the structural models. It can also be

tested for gender differences in structural models.

 111
Testing in a delinquent and/or psychiatric population is also necessary. Previous

research has shown that people with brain damage respond differently moral dilemmas

(Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007), and one of the failings with the current

measures of moral judgment available is that they do not necessarily reflect a difference

between delinquents and the general population (Kurtines & Greif, 1974).

Previous research has shown that despite high scores on self-report questionnaires,

people tend to act in ways that do not support their claims of moral worth (Batson, 1997).

MCI results may be similarly non-predictive of actual behavior. Experimental research can

test the extent to which hypocrisy or weakness comes into play.

Beyond the improvement of the two domains covered in this study, continued

research is needed to develop and test the remaining two components of the MCI,

Community and Cognitive Processing. Once these are validated, all four scales will be

translated into Spanish, and possibly other foreign languages. A version suitable for

children would facilitate developmental studies.

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this research was to develop and validate the first two

scales of the Moral Cognition Inventory, the Moral Responsibility Scale and the Moral

Identity Scale. A partial structural model of Moral Cognition was then tested with these

two scales and their respective subscales. Secondary hypotheses regarding gender, age,

and education further illustrated the relationship of the MCI to demographic variables.

Measuring the underlying traits and situational judgments that affect how people make
 112
moral decisions is an ambitious and complex project: this study began what will be long

term research into the various facets of the problem.

Much work remains to be done before the MCI is completed, but the current study

demonstrates the viability of the undertaking . It provides strong evidence for the

reliability and validity of two MCI scales. The Moral Identity Scale, which seeks to

assess character traits that affect all moral action, has demonstrated high reliability and

validity in comparison with measures of related constructs. The Moral Responsibility

Scale, in its endeavor to measure moral agency as well as our understanding of and

identification with the consequences of their actions, has proven more difficult to

measure precisely. Its lower reliability makes comparison with other scales more

difficult; however, its relationship with both Total MI and other scales demonstrated a

solid placement in the nomological network of reported moral judgment. Confirmatory

factor analysis supported its three-part structure.

The ultimate goal of the MCI is to provide an instrument that can measure the

distinct aspects of moral cognition and how they relate to each other. At the moment,

hypothesis testing is limited by the lack of the final two MCI scales, but the scales and

subscales of Moral Identity and Moral Responsibility afford an estimate of the strength

and feasibility of the research. A series of powerful structural models suggested

relationships between the latent constructs that can be tested in future research. In fact,

perhaps the greatest strength of the present research is that it clearly indicates many roads

to take in the future study of moral cognition.

 113
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Appendix A

Pilot Study

In a preliminary validation of the Moral Responsibility Scale (MRS), seventy-one

HSU students completed the MRS along with four validity scales; 19 took the MRS again

after one week.

Two of the Moral Responsibility subscales were included in this study, Moral

Agency (MA) and Moral Consequences (MC). Of 57 items initially generated, 22 were

selected for inclusion in the study. Item analysis left 11 items in MC for a subscale with

high internal consistency, rα = .84, 95% CI [.79, .89]. The MA subscale after analysis

had 7 items and acceptable internal consistency, rα = .72, 95% CI [.63, .82]. Test-retest

reliability at one week was high for MC (r = .88, p < .001) and moderate for MA (r = .61,

p = .006). Although both MC and MA were strongly correlated with total MRS (rs = .83,

.58; ps < .001), they were not related to each other (r = .03, p = .84), confirming the

expectation of two independent factors.

Concurrent validity was established through comparison to the Ascription of

Responsibility Scale (ARS; Schwartz, 1968). MRS was strongly correlated with ARS (r

= .68, p < .001). The Guilt Inventory (GI; Kugler & Jones, 1992) and the Perspective-

taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). As expected,

MRS and GI were moderately correlated (r = .29, p = .02). The relationship between

MRS and IRI was weaker than expected (r = .25, p = .04), while the correlation with the

discriminant validity measure, a short form of the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability

 131
Scale (Reynolds, 1982) was higher than expected (r = .33, p = .01). See Table 1A for all

correlations.

This research indicated the need to refine the MA subscale. One item was

determined to be misplaced, and was moved to the Moral Identity Scale. Another item

was rewritten to be more applicable to adults. Nine more items were created, for a total

of 16 items to be tested in the present study.

Detailed results, with gender differences (Table 2A) are presented below.
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Table A1
Correlations Between Moral Responsibility Subscales (MC = Consequences; MA =
Moral Agency), their total (MR) and validity scales in pilot study: Ascription of
responsibility (ARS), Guilt Inventory (GI), Perspective Taking IRI subscale (IRI – PT),
and Social Desirability (SDS).
Scale Total MR MC MA ARS GI IRI-PT SDS
Total MR --
MC .827* --
MA .582* .0250 --
ARS .676* .565* .376* --
GI -.286* -.0790 -.396* -.2300 --
IRI-PT .250* .1160 .282* .356* -.0310 --
SDS .332* .0830 .470* .347* .332* .256* --
* p < .05

Table A2
Gender Differences.
Cohen’s d -
N (% female) Males Females males vs. t p
females
Total MR 67 (76%) 55.2 (9.6) 59.4 (6.8) -0.50 -1.967 .053
MC 67 (76%) 23.9 (4.6) 23.5 (4.1) 0.09 .304 .762
MA 67 (76%) 31.3 (7.6) 35.9 (5.4) -0.70 -2.695 .009
 133
Appendix B

Moral Responsibility Scale

Moral Agency

Table 1B

Final Items Included in Moral Agency Subscale.

Corrected
Item item-total Parcel
correlation
1. I have a choice whether to treat people well or badly. .272 A
2. If I feel pressured into doing something, I’m not as responsible
.325 C
as when I decide on my own.
3. If I get into trouble, it is my own fault even if someone else told
.355 A
me to do it.
4. I make up my own mind about doing good or bad things. .469 B
5. Sometimes it seems like fate determines whether my actions are
.316 C
good or bad.
6. I am just as at fault for breaking the rules when no one knows as
.415 A
when everyone knows.
7. Doing wrong is not really the fault of individuals when society
.367 A
enables them.
8. I am the one responsible for my own behavior, good and bad. .538 A
9. No one can make me do something I know to be wrong. .400
10. I feel responsible for the consequences of my actions. .437 A
11. Luck more than what you do, is responsible for whether things
.384 C
turn out for the best.
12. Most of the time I can tell how my actions are going to affect
.349 B
others.
13. My actions in most situations are based on what other people
.386 B
tell me is the right thing to do.
14. In most cases, I can make my own decisions about what is right
.537 B
or wrong in a situation.
Note. Parcels used for structural modeling.
 134

Moral Consequences

Table 2B

Final Items Included in Moral Consequences Subscale.

Corrected
Item item-total Parcel
correlation
1. Stealing someone’s lunch money. .420 A
2. Taking credit for someone else’s hard work. .463 C
3. Sneaking out of a restaurant without paying. .565 C
4. Knocking down a stop sign. .446 B
5. Not warning hikers about a slippery place on the trail you’ve
.512 B
just walked.
6. Spray-painting a traffic sign so that it cannot be read properly. .502 A
7. Encouraging kids to disobey school rules. .570 C
8. Drawing on the outer walls of a local restaurant. .559 C
9. Stealing from a big department store. .698 A
10. Littering. .540 A
11. Pretending to be ill in order to avoid going to work. .657 B
12. Eating candy from the bulk food bins while you do your
.648 B
shopping.
13. Propping your apartment building's door open when you have
.424 A
a party and expect lots of guests.
Note. Parcels used for structural modeling.
 135
Moral Identification

Table 3C
Final Items Included in Moral Identification Subscale.
Corrected
Item item-total Parcel
correlation
1. Your big party is winding down. Your friend Jean has clearly drunk too
much. You offer your spare bedroom, but you don’t insist. On the way .344 B
home, Jean runs off the road and ends up in hospital.

2. The bike rack is full and you leave your bike locked to a sign post. A person
in a hurry doesn’t see your bike until the last minute, and in avoiding it, falls .378 A
off the sidewalk, spraining an ankle...

3. You are leading a review session for the final exam. A student asks you a
question, and although you aren’t entirely sure, you give an answer. Your
.393 B
answer turns out to be wrong. As a result, many students miss that
question—some of them fail the exam.
4. You’ve noticed that the brakes on the company car aren’t working properly,
but you forget to mention it when you turn it in and go on holiday. In your
.491 A
absence, your colleague takes the car, the brakes fail, and gets in a bad
wreck.

5. You’ve got connections at the racetrack. When a friend asks you for a tip on a
big race, you tell her Cigarillo is a sure bet—a sure winner! On Saturday .373 A
Cigarillo comes in third, and you friend loses her life’s savings.

6. You work at the university Registrar. A student is applying to grad school

and needs a transcript. You tell him that it will be sent within five days, but
it is a busy time of year and it doesn’t get sent for two weeks. The student’s .401 C
application is not complete at the due date, and he is not considered for
admission.
7. You overhear a group of children planning to sneak onto a neighbor’s
property to steal some apples. You know the neighbor has just bought some
.465 C
dangerous dogs, but you say nothing. The next afternoon you hear that one
of the children was seriously injured by one of the dogs.

8. You and a friend go to a concert and your friend parks the car on a side
street. He asks you if it is OK to park there. You are not sure, but you say it .472 B
is fine. Coming back from the concert the car has a parking ticket for $200.

9. You’ve been putting off changing the tires on your car, and the tread is almost
entirely worn away. On the way to work, you have a blowout, which causes .301 C
the car behind you to spin out of control and crash.

Note. Parcels used for structural modeling.

 136

Figure B1. Final model used for total Moral Responsibility Scale, with
added covariances for Consequences subscale.
 137
Table 4C
Standardized and Unstandardized Coefficients for Final MR Model.
Latent construct or
Item β B SE
subscale
MRA1 Moral Agency .342 1.000
MRA2 Moral Agency .322 1.353 .295
MRA3 Moral Agency .411 1.609 .308
MRA4 Moral Agency .598 1.559 .259
MRA5 Moral Agency .327 1.336 .289
MRA6 Moral Agency .482 1.670 .299
MRA7 Moral Agency .409 1.409 .270
MRA8 Moral Agency .644 1.435 .234
MRA9 Moral Agency .489 1.992 .355
MRA10 Moral Agency .530 1.180 .204
MRA11 Moral Agency .397 1.326 .258
MRA12 Moral Agency .404 1.140 .220
MRA13 Moral Agency .430 1.252 .235
MRA14 Moral Agency .637 1.402 .229
MRI1 Identification .374 .689 .116
MRI2 Identification .455 .996 .144
MRI3 Identification .487 .891 .123
MRI4 Identification .593 1.046 .128
MRI5 Identification .433 .931 .140
MRI6 Identification .493 1.157 .158
MRI7 Identification .546 1.255 .161
MRI8 Identification .545 1.000
MRI9 Identification .380 .689 .114
MRC1 Consequences .490 1.000
MRC2 Consequences .523 .988 .108
MRC3 Consequences .649 1.383 .158
MRC4 Consequences .407 .773 .118
MRC5 Consequences .472 .922 .127
MRC6 Consequences .443 .837 .120
MRC7 Consequences .573 1.301 .158
MRC8 Consequences .645 1.989 .227
MRC9 Consequences .761 2.199 .233
MRC10 Consequences .563 1.515 .186
MRC11 Consequences .664 1.730 .195
MRC12 Consequences .651 1.915 .220
MRC13 Consequences .417 .996 .149
Note. All statistics significant at p < .001.
 138

Appendix C

Moral Identity Scale.

Table 1C
Final Items Selected for Moral Identity Scale.
Corrected
Item Item-Total Parcel
correlation
1. I have a very good idea of what it means to be honest. .411 B
2. I try hard to act honestly in most things I do. .518 C
3. Not hurting other people is one of the rules I live by. .395 A
4. It is important for me to treat other people fairly. .499 B
5. I want other people to know they can rely on me. .489 C
6. I always act in ways that do the most good and least harm to other people. .414 A
7. One of the most important things in life is to do what you know is right. .376 A
8. It is important that people practice what they preach. .529 C
9. I don’t think it’s always necessary to do what I said I will do. .317 C
10. Once I’ve made up my mind about what is the right thing to do, I make
.389 B
sure I do it.
11. I believe that it is sometimes necessary to do things that might harm
.535 B
strangers in order to help my friends and family.
12. There are many things in life that are more important than helping other people. .602 C
13. If I leave a store and realize there’s something in the shopping cart I
.506 C
haven’t paid for, I always take it back to the store.
14. As long as I make a decision to do something that helps me, it does not
.471 B
matter much if other people are harmed.
15. It is ok to do something you know is wrong if the rewards for doing it
.633 A
are great.
16. If no one is watching or will know it does not matter if I do the right thing. .458 C
17. It is more important that people think you are honest than being honest. .631 C
18. If no one could find out, it is okay to steal a small amount of money or
.579 C
other things that no one will miss.
19. There is no point in going out of my way to do something good if no
.535 A
one is around to appreciate it.
20. If a cashier accidentally gives me $10 extra change, I usually act as if I
.572 B
did not notice it.
21. Lying and cheating are just things you have to do in this world. .513 B
22. Doing things that some people might view as not honest does not
.518 B
bother me.
23. If people treat me badly, I will treat them in the same manner. .516 A
24. I will go along with a group decision, even if I know it is morally wrong. .449 A
25. Having moral values is worthless in today’s society. .414 A
Note. Items 1 – 10 belong to the Moral Self subscale; items 11 – 25 represent Integrity. Factors
represent the parcels used for structural modeling.
 139

Table 2C
Factor Loadings and Communalities for Final Items on the Moral Identity Scale.
Item number Integrity Moral Self Communality
15 .714 .386 .659
14 .673 .369 .589
17 .672 .450 .654
20 .628 .361 .525
18 .619 .422 .561
19 .591 .354 .475
21 .586 .294 .430
16 .577 .201 .373
23 .570 .322 .429
13 .543 .422 .463
24 .517 .249 .329
22 .506 .446 .455
25 .455 .280 .271
11 .436 .252 .254
12 .410 .271 .242
5 .269 .660 .510
4 .365 .653 .560
7 .424 .640 .589
2 .447 .585 .542
6 .251 .572 .390
10 .385 .563 .465
3 .423 .558 .490
1 .310 .557 .406
9 .476 .480 .457
8 .256 .375 .206
Note. Principle Axis Factoring, Oblique rotation, was used for exploratory factor analysis.
 140
Appendix D

Validity Measures
Table 1D
Moral Integrity Scale (Schlenker, 2008).
Neither
Strongly Strongly
Please tell us whether you agree with the following statements. Disagree agree nor Agree
disagree agree
disagree
1. It is foolish to tell the truth when big profits can be made from
1 2 3 4 5
lying.
2. No matter how much money one makes, life is
1 2 3 4 5
unsatisfactory without a strong sense of duty and character.
3. Regardless of concerns about principles, in today’s world
you have to be practical, adapt to opportunities, and do what 1 2 3 4 5
is most advantageous for you.
4. Being inflexible and refusing to compromise are good if it
1 2 3 4 5
means standing up for what is right.
5. The reason it is important to tell the truth is because of
what others will do to you if you don’t, not because of any 1 2 3 4 5
issue of right and wrong.
6. The true test of character is a willingness to stand by one’s
1 2 3 4 5
principles, no matter what price one has to pay.
7. There are no principles worth dying for. 1 2 3 4 5
8. It is important to me to feel that I have not compromised
1 2 3 4 5
my principles.
9. If one believes something is right, one must stand by it,
even if it means losing friends or missing out on profitable 1 2 3 4 5
opportunities.
10. Compromising one’s principles is always wrong, regardless
of the circumstances or the amount that can be personally 1 2 3 4 5
gained.
11. Universal ethical principles exist and should be applied
1 2 3 4 5
under all circumstances, with no exceptions.
12. Lying is sometimes necessary to accomplish important,
1 2 3 4 5
worthwhile goals.
13. Integrity is more important than financial gain. 1 2 3 4 5
14. It is important to fulfill one’s obligations at all times, even
1 2 3 4 5
if nobody will know if one doesn’t.
15. If done for the right reasons, even lying or cheating are
1 2 3 4 5
okay.
16. Some actions are wrong no matter what the consequences or
1 2 3 4 5
justification.
17. One’s principles should not be compromised regardless of the possible
1 2 3 4 5
gain.
18. Some transgressions are wrong and cannot be
legitimately justified or defended regardless of how much one 1 2 3 4 5
tries.
 141
Table 2D
Ascription of Responsibility Scale (Schwartz, 1968).
Each of the items below is a statement of an attitude or opinion some people have. There are no right or wrong responses to these
statements. For each item, circle the number which best indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with it. If you are not certain,
answer agree or disagree according to which comes closest to your opinions.
Please circle the appropriate response. Strongly strongly
agree
agree disagree
aRs disagree
1. If a good friend of mine wanted to injure an enemy of his, it would be my duty to try to stop
4 3 2 1
him.
2. Failing to return the money when you are given too much change is the same as stealing
4 3 2 1
from a store.
3. I wouldn’t feel that I had to do my part in a group project if everyone else was lazy. 4 3 2 1
4. If I hurt someone unintentionally, I would feel almost as guilty as I would if I had done the 1
4 3 2
same thing intentionally.
5. Gossiping is so common in our society that a person who gossips once in a while can’t 1
4 3 2
really be blamed so much.
6. When a person is nasty to me, I feel very little responsibility to treat him well. 4 3 2 1
7. I would feel less bothered about leaving litter in a dirty park than in a clean one. 4 3 2 1
8. No matter what a person has done to us, there is no excuse for taking advantage of him 4 3 2 1
9. When a man is completely involved in valuable work, you can’t blame him if he is
4 3 2 1
insensitive to those around him.
10. If I damaged someone’s car in an accident that was legally his fault, I would still feel
4 3 2 1
somewhat guilty.
11. When you consider how hard it is for an honest businessperson to get ahead, it is easier
4 3 2 1
to forgive shrewdness in business.
12. When a person is pushed hard enough, there comes a point beyond which anything he
4 3 2 1
does is justifiable.
13. Even if something you borrow is defective, you should still replace it if it gets broken. 4 3 2 1
14. You can’t blame basically good people who are forced by their environment to be
4 3 2 1
inconsiderate of others.
15. No matter how much a person is provoked, he is always responsible for what he does. 4 3 2 1
16. Being upset or preoccupied does not excuse a person for doing anything he would
4 3 2 1
ordinarily avoid.
17. As long as a businessperson doesn’t break laws, he should feel free to do his business as
4 3 2 1
he sees fit.
18. Occasionally in life a person finds himself in a situation in which he has absolutely no
4 3 2 1
control over what he does to others.
19. I would feel obligated to do a favor for a person who needed it, even though he had not
4 3 2 1
shown gratitude for past favors.
20. With the pressure for grades and the widespread cheating in school nowadays, the
4 3 2 1
individual who cheats occasionally is not really as much at fault.
21. I wouldn’t feel badly about giving offense to someone if my intentions had been good. 4 3 2 1
22. Extenuating circumstances never completely remove a person’s responsibility for his
4 3 2 1
actions.
23. You can’t expect a person to act much differently from everyone else. 4 3 2 1
24. It doesn’t make much sense to be very concerned about how we act when we are sick
4 3 2 1
and feeling miserable.
25. You just can’t hold a store clerk responsible for being rude and impolite at the end of a
4 3 2 1
long work day.
26. Professional obligations can never justify neglecting the welfare of others. 4 3 2 1
27. If I broke a machine through mishandling, I would feel less guilty if it was already damaged
4 3 2 1
before I used it.
28. When you have a job to do it is impossible to look out for everybody’s best interests. 4 3 2 1
 142
Defining Issues Test: The DIT2 (online version) will be purchased from the Office for
the Study of Ethical Development (http://www.ethicaldevelopment.ua.edu/; see contact
information below). Results will be sent to the center for scoring. One pays for the
quantity of tests scored. The cost for 75 participants is $108.75. For an example of the
dilemmas, see Figure 1D.

Office for the Study of Ethical Development

307 Carmichael Hall
BOX 870231
University of Alabama
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0231

Phone: (205) 348-4571

ethicalstudy@bamaed.ua.edu
 143

Figure 1D. Defining Issues Test 2 (Rest et al., 1999). The first scenario is pasted above
as an example.
 144
Table 3D. Moral Disengagement Scale (Bandura et al., 1996), revised.
The following statements describe how people might act in different situations. Please indicate
if you strongly disagree (0), disagree (1), neither agree nor disagree (2), agree (3), or strongly
agree (4) with each of the statements.
1. It is alright to fight to protect your friends and family. 0 1 2 3 4
2. Slapping and shoving someone is just a way of joking.
3. Damaging some property is no big deal when you consider that others are beating people up.
4. A person in a gang should not be blamed for the trouble the gang causes.
5. If people are living under bad conditions they cannot be blamed for behaving aggressively.
6. It is okay to tell small lies because they don't really do any harm.
7. Some people deserve to be treated like animals.
8. If people misbehave at work it is their supervisor's fault.
9. It is alright to beat someone who bad mouths your family.
10. To hit obnoxious people is just giving them "a lesson".
11. Stealing some money is not too serious compared to those who steal a lot of money.
12. A person who only suggests breaking rules should not be blamed if other people go ahead
and do it.
13. If people are not disciplined they should not be blamed for misbehaving.
14. People do not mind being called names because it shows interest in them.
15. It is okay to treat badly someone who behaved inappropriately
16. If people are careless where they leave their things it is their own fault if they get stolen.
17. It is alright to fight when your group's honor is threatened.
18. Taking someone's car without permission is just "borrowing it."
19. It is okay to insult a co-worker because beating him/her is worse.
20. If a group decides together to do something harmful it is unfair to blame any person in the
group for it.
21. People cannot be blamed for using bad words when all their friends do it.
22. Teasing someone does not really harm them.
23. Someone who is obnoxious does not deserve to be treated like a human being.
24. People who get mistreated usually do things that deserve it.
25. It is alright to lie to keep your friends out of trouble.
26. It is not a bad thing to "get high" once in a while.
27. Compared to the illegal things people do, taking some things from a store without paying for
them is not very serious.
28. It is unfair to blame a person who had only a small part in the harm caused by a group.
29. People cannot be blamed for misbehaving if their friends pressured them to do it.
30. Insults among people do not hurt anyone.
31. Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt.
32. People are not at fault for misbehaving if their friends and family bug them all the time.
 145

Table 4D

The Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Internalization subscale
Listed below are some characteristics that might describe a person:
Caring Compassionate Fair Friendly Generous Helpful Hardworking Honest Kind
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a
moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics.
Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of
what this person would be like, answer the following questions.
Strongly Agree Strongly Disagree

1. It would make me feel good to be a person who

1 2 3 4 5 6 7
has these characteristics.
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
important part of who I am.
4. I would be ashamed to be a person who had these
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
characteristics.
7. Having these characteristics is not really important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
to me.

10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

 146

Table 5D

The Machiavellian Personality Scale (Dahling et al., 2009). Amorality subscale.

Please indicate the degree to which you agree strongly not strongly
disagree agree
with the following: disagree sure agree

1. I am willing to be unethical if I believe it

0 1 2 3 4
will help me succeed.
2. I am willing to sabotage the efforts of other
0 1 2 3 4
people if they threaten my own goals.
3. I would cheat if there was a low chance of
0 1 2 3 4
getting caught.
4. I believe that lying is necessary to maintain a
0 1 2 3 4
competitive advantage over others.
5. The only good reason to talk to others is to
0 1 2 3 4
get information that I can use to my benefit.
 147

Table 6D

Short form of the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982).

Please circle T for true or F for false according to which best describes you.

1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. T F

2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way. T F

3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too
T F
little of my ability.
4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority
T F
even though I knew they were right.
5. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. T F

6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. T F

7. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. T F

8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. T F

9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. T F

10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from
T F
my own.
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of
T F
others.
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. T F

13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings. T F
 148

Table 7D

The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980), without personal distress or Fantasy
subscales.
0 = Does not describe me very well …. Describes me very well = 4

1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 0 1 2 3 4

2. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. 0 1 2 3 4

3. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.

4. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.

5. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.

6. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their
perspective.

7. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.

8. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's
arguments.

9. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.

10. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.

11. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.

12. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.

13. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.

14. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.
 149
Table 8D

The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale.

Instructions: Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself.
If you strongly agree, circle SA. If you agree with the statement, circle A. If you disagree,
circle D. If you strongly disagree, circle SD.
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. SA A D SD

2. At times, I think I am no good at all. SA A D SD

3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. SA A D SD

4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. SA A D SD

5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. SA A D SD

6. I certainly feel useless at times. SA A D SD

7. I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane SA A D SD

with others.

8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. SA A D SD

9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. SA A D SD

10. I take a positive attitude toward myself. SA A D SD

 150
Appendix E

Data Analyses.

Outliers.

Before analyses were run, scatter plots were used to identify extreme outliers,

which were then excluded from the analysis. See Figure E1.

Normality.

All variables used in correlational and regression analyses were screened for

violations of normality. See Table E1 for details; all variables not mentioned were

normally distributed.

For structural equation modeling, kurtosis becomes problematic due to covariance

analyses (Byrne, 2010). Transformations were performed on parcels that had high

kurtosis rations (> 3). However, there was no noticeable difference in model fit, and only

analyses with untransformed variables are presented.

 151

Figure E1. Example of outliers eliminated for correlation analyses. In this

example, the two starred cases were discarded.
 152
Table E1

Transformations Used to Correct for Violations of Normality.

Variable Problem Transformation used

Total Moral Identity Negative skew Reflected square root

Moral Self Negative skew Reflected square root

Moral Disengagement (MDS) Negative skew Reflected square root

Amorality (MPS) Positive skew Square root

Moral Identity Scale (MIS) Negative skew Reflected log

Note. All other variables were normally distributed (skew and kurtosis critical ratios < 3.0), as
were the above variables after transformation.
 153

Table E2

Correlations Between Validity Measures. Correlations Corrected for Attenuation Above

the Diagonal.
MDS ARS IS MIS MPS IRI SES SDS

MDS rα = .92 .78 -.64 -.52 .69 -.46 -.40 -.27

ARS -.69 rα = .84 .77 .58 -.79 .56 .33 .41

IS -.57 .65 rα = .85 .61 -.69 .49 .36 .40

MIS -.45 .48 .51 rα = .82 -.57 .62 .36 .30

MPS .61 -.67 -.59 -.48 rα = .85 -.48 .34 -.44

IRI -.41 .47 .42 .52 -.41 rα = .85 .24 .49

SES -.36 .28 .31 .30 -.29 .21 rα = .87 .40

SDS -.22 .32 .32 .23 -.35 .31 .32 rα = .74

Note. Ascription of Responsibility Scale (ARS; Schwartz, 1968); Integrity Scale (IS; Schlenker,
2008); Moral Disengagement Scale (MDS; Bandura et al., 1996); Machiavellian Personality
Scale, Amorality subscale (MPS; Dahling et al., 2009); Interpersonal Reactivity Index,
Perspective-taking and Empathic Concern subscales (IRI; Davis, 1980); Moral Identity Scale,
internalization subscale (MIS; Aquino & Reed, 2002); the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale
(SES); and the Social Desirability Scale, Short Form (Reynolds, 1982. All correlations
statistically significant at p < .001.
 154
Table E3

Hypothesized and Final Correlations, with Correction for Attenuation Between MCI
and Proposed Validity Scales.
Moral Responsibility Moral Identity

Hypothesized Result Hypothesized Result

Criterion (ARS) .52 ≤ r ≤ .80 (IS) r ≥ .70

r = .64 r = .77
Validity

(DIT2) r ≥ .60 (IS/Integrity subscale)

r = .05 r ≥ .80
r = .76

Convergent
(IS) 45 ≤ r ≤ .70 r = .67 (MIS) .40 ≤ r ≤ .55 r = .63
Validity

(MDS) -.55 ≤ r ≤ -.40 r = -.65 (DIT2) .40 ≤ r ≤ .50 r = .25

(MDS/Agency subscale)
r = -.60 (MPS) r ≤ -.70 r = -.80
r ≤ -.55

(IRI) .40 ≤ r ≤ .50 r = .49 (IRI) .35 ≤ r ≤ .50 r = .60

Discriminant (SES) r < .15

(SES) r < .20 r = .31 r = .36
Validity

(SDS—SF) r < .35 r = .38 (SDS—SF) r < .35 r = .39

Note. Correction for attenuation made for validity measure reliability only: rxy/(ryy)0.5.
Corrected correlations that met or exceeded hypotheses in bold.
 155

Table E4

Political Orientation (N = 398) and Religious Affiliation (N = 406).

Frequency percent

Politics
Very conservative 7 1.8
Conservative 30 7.5
Moderate conservative 56 14.1
Moderate liberal 96 24.1
Liberal 105 26.4
Very liberal 68 17.1
Libertarian 7 1.8
No political orientation 25 6.3
Other 4 1.0
Religion
Agnostic 77 16.8
Atheist 78 17.0
Buddhist 9 2.0
Catholic 57 12.4
Protestant 38 7.8
Other Christian 46 10.0
Jewish 11 2.4
Mormon 2 0.4
Muslim 4 0.9
Pagan/Wiccan 8 1.7
No religious affiliation 131 28.5
 156

Appendix F

Demographics

Age _____ Gender: ___

What most reflects your political orientation?

Very Liberal – Liberal – Moderate Liberal – Moderate Conservative – Conservative –
Very conservative
Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic?
Yes/No
Ethnicity __________________
Religion __________________

Survey Monkey participants only:

Current Residence: (pull down menu for country, followed by pull down menu for state
if USA is selected)
Nationality (pull-down menu);
Level of education completed: High school Some college Bachelor’s degree Graduate
degree
Occupation _____________________

HSU Participants only:

Grade Level: Fresh Soph Junior Senior Grad not in school

Grade point average (GPA) ______

 157
Appendix G

Consent Forms

You are invited to participate in research entitled “Knowing right from wrong: An investigation into
how moral decisions are made.” Your responses on this survey will contribute to the study of how
people make decisions. The purpose of this research is collect data that will be used to ensure that the
questionnaires are reliable and valid. Participants must be 18 years or older.

You will be asked to read a number of statements and to provide an opinion such as Agree/Disagree,
True/False, etc. Please read all the questions carefully and answer honestly. Remember there are no
right or wrong answers.

There are no risks associated with the completion of this survey. Your participation is entirely
voluntary and you will not be identified in any reports. All data will be kept anonymous, stored on a
password-protected computer, and destroyed five years after publication of the results.

Withdrawal from the Study: You can stop participating in research at any time, for any reason. Your
decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not affect will not affect
the credit you receive for participation or your class grade.

If you would like to participate in a further survey in which you will be asked to complete only a
subset of questionnaires, you will be requested to provide your email address so we can send you a
reminder email in one week. Your email address will not be associated with the data and will not be
stored. Should you choose to participate in the second survey, you will be eligible to enter a drawing
for an amazon gift certificate of $50.

If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to contact the principal investigator, Jessica Black, at
jeb130@humboldt.edu (7076335362), or Dr. William Reynolds at wr9@humboldt.edu (7078263162).

I understand that my participation in any study is entirely voluntary and that I may decline to enter this
study or may withdraw from it at any time without jeopardy. (I agree / I disagree)

I understand that Ms. Black and/or Dr. Reynolds will answer any questions I may have concerning the
investigation or the procedures at any time. I also understand that my participation in any study is
entirely voluntary and that I may decline to enter this study or may withdraw from it at any time
without jeopardy. I understand that the investigator may terminate my participation in the study at any
time’

If you have questions regarding your rights as a participant, any concerns regarding this project, or
any dissatisfaction with any part of this study, you may report them—confidentially, if you wish—to
the Dean for Research & Sponsored Programs, Dr. Rhea Williamson at Rhea.Williamson@humboldt.edu
or (707) 8264189.
Before continuing, please assure that you will have 40 – 50 minutes of uninterrupted time. Please try
to avoid distractions and to read through each item carefully and respond in a thoughtful manner. We
thank you in advance for your participation.
 158
Retest form

You have agreed to participate in the retest part of this study.

As before, no risks are expected to be associated with the survey. Your participation is entirely
voluntary and you will not be identified in any reports. All data will be kept anonymous, stored
on a password-protected computer, and destroyed five years after publication of the results. Once
your responses on the retest are linked to your previous responses, your email will no longer be
associated with the data you provide, and will not be stored. You can stop participating in
research at any time, for any reason

At the end of the survey, you can choose to enter a drawing for an Amazon gift certificate of $50.
If so, you will be asked to provide an email so we can contact you if you win.

If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to contact the principal investigator, Jessica
Black, at jeb130@humboldt.edu, or Dr. William Reynolds at wr9@humboldt.edu.

I understand that my participation in any study is entirely voluntary and that I may decline to
enter this study or may withdraw from it at any time without jeopardy.

I agree / I disagree

If you have questions regarding your rights as a participant, any concerns regarding this project,
or any dissatisfaction with any part of this study, you may report them—confidentially, if you
wish—to the Dean for Research & Sponsored Programs, Dr. Rhea Williamson at
Rhea.Williamson@humboldt.edu or (707) 826-4189.

Before continuing, please assure that you will have 15 minutes of uninterrupted time. Please try
to avoid distractions and to read through each item carefully and respond in a thoughtful manner.
We thank you in advance for your participation.