Generation Cohorts and Personal Values: A Comparison of China and the United States

Author(s): Carolyn P. Egri and David A. Ralston

Source: Organization Science, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), pp. 210-220
Published by: INFORMS
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/30034725
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 Organization Science inf
Vol. 15, No. 2, March-April 2004, pp. 210-220 DOI 10.1287/orsc. 1030.0048
ISsN 1047-7039 I EISSN 1526-5455 104 150210210 C 2004 INFORMS

Generation Cohorts and Personal Values: A Compariso

of China and the United States

Carolyn P. Egri
Faculty of Business Administration, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada V5A 1S6,
carolyn_egri @ sfu.ca

David A. Ralston
University of Oklahoma, 306 West Brooks, Norman, Oklahoma 73091, dralston@ou.edu

his sionals.
study investigated thegenerations
The three Chinese generation cohort value
(Consolidation, orientations
Cultural of Social
Revolution, 774 Chinese and 784
Reform) since U.S. managers
the establishment of and profes-
Communist China were significantly more open to change and self-enhancement but less conservative and self-transcendent
than the Republican Era generation. The value orientations of U.S. generations (Generation X, Baby Boomer, Silent gener-
ation) followed an age-related pattern with the exception of self-transcendence values. The least similar value orientations
were between Chinese and U.S. generations that had grown up during Communist China's closed-door policy. The more
entrepreneurial value orientations of the most recent Chinese generations appear to be compatible with organizational
changes currently under way in China's state-owned sector.

Key words: cross-cultural values; international management; demographic differences; China; United States

"Culture is an evolving set of shared beliefs, values, to future culture change, a generation's values orienta-
attitudes, and logical processes which provide cognitive tion becomes more pervasive in a national culture as it
maps for people within a given societal group to per- becomes the majority in societal positions of power and
ceive, think, reason, act, react, and interact. This defini- influence (Inglehart 1997).
tion implies that culture is not static; rather, it evolves While there has been extensive research on U.S. gen-
over time" (Tung 1996, p. 244). In other words, cultural eration cohorts (Strauss and Howe 1991, Thau and
change is an ongoing evolutionary process that involves Heflin 1997), very little research has been conducted
changes in the priorities of values at both individual on the existence or characteristics of generation cohorts
and societal levels. While cross-cultural value differ- in China (Pan et al. 1994, Ralston et al. 1999). The
few cross-cultural studies on generational values change
ences in national cultures have been studied extensively
have used common age groups or median year of birth
(Inglehart 1997, Schwartz 1997, Triandis 1995), there
has been little cross-cultural research on the value ori- as proxies for generation rather than the sociohistorical
events that more accurately define a country's generation
entations of national subcultures (Smith and Schwartz
cohorts (Inglehart 1997, Pan et al. 1994).
1997).
This paper reports on a cross-cultural investigation of
Generation is one type of national subculture that
the value orientations of generation cohorts in China and
reflects the value priorities emphasized during a coun-
the United States. Our primary focus is on the nature of
try's particular historical period. Generation subcul-
culture change in China and the implications of Chinese
ture theory proposes that significant macrolevel social,
generation cohort differences (and similarities) in value
political, and economic events that occurred during a orientations for corporate transformation in China. The
birth cohort's impressionable preadult years result in a United States was selected as the comparison country
generational identity comprised of a distinctive set of for two reasons. First, the significantly different cultural,
values, beliefs, expectations, and behaviors that remain socioeconomic, and political histories of China and the
relatively stable throughout a generation's lifetime United States (Pan et al. 1994) mean that these cross-
(Inglehart 1997, Strauss and Howe 1991). Generation cultural comparisons provide a strong test of the relative
subcultures are important for understanding the evolu- influence of national culture and generation subculture.
tionary process of culture change. In that generation Second, the United States has been identified as a dom-
cohorts reflect the values emphasized during a particu- inant influence in predictions that modernization and
lar historical period, they encapsulate the nature of cul- industrialization processes are creating a common global
ture change that has taken place in a country. In respect business culture (Barnet and Cavanaugh 1994). As such,
210

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Egri and Ralston: Generation Cohorts and Personal Values
Organization Science 15(2), pp. 210-220, C 2004 INFORMS 211

the United States serves as a benchmark for moderniza- Generation cohorts are societal subcultures whose
tion in China. value orientations reflect the significant cultural, politi-
The identification of generations' value orientations cal, and economic developments that occurred during
is especially relevant for Chinese organizations that are a generation's preadult years (Strauss and Howe 1991,
in the midst of transformational change. Knowledge Thau and Heflin 1997). In contrast, a life-stage theory
regarding significant generational value differences can proposes a universal developmental sequence through-
help organizations predict the degree of receptivity out the human life cycle (childhood, adolescence, early
(and resistance) of their workforce to planned corporate adulthood, middle adulthood, and old age). As peo-
changes. Managerial flexibility in responding to gener- ple age, they become more collectivistic, conservative,
ational differences in values and motivational goals can and self-transcendent, and less individualistic, open to
also enhance the development of effective work relation- change, and self-enhancing (Erikson 1997, Smith and
ships and organizational effectiveness (Jurkiewicz and Schwartz 1997, Stevens-Long 1990).
Brown 1998, Kupperschmidt 2000). Inglehart's (1997) theory of intergenerational values
In sum, this study sought answers to the following change is based on two hypotheses: the socialization
three research questions: hypothesis and the scarcity hypothesis. The socialization
* Given the major changes in the recent social and hypothesis proposes that adults' basic values reflect the
socioeconomic conditions of one's childhood and ado-
economic history of China, how have personal values
changed over the generations? lescence. Longitudinal research has shown that this value
* What are the changes in the corresponding periods orientation remains relatively stable throughout one's
in the United States? lifetime (Inglehart 1997, Lubinski et al. 1996, Meglino
* Have personal values converged or diverged be- and Ravlin 1998, Sears 1981). Although societal con-
tween these two countries as a result of modernization ditions can change the relative importance a generation
or corporate transformations in China in recent years? attributes to various personal values, these are only tem-
porary shifts with generations' value orientations return-
ing to previous levels once stability is regained (Inglehart
1997).
Literature Review and Hypotheses
Inglehart's scarcity hypothesis proposes that the great-
"Values specify an individual's personal beliefs about
est subjective value is placed on those socioeconomic
how he or she 'should' or 'ought' to behave" in his
environmental aspects that are in short supply during a
or her social environments (Meglino and Ravlin 1998,
generation's youth. Thus, generations growing up during
p. 354). In this study, we used Schwartz's (1994, 1997)
periods of socioeconomic and physical insecurity (e.g.,
values model, which has been used extensively in cross-
social upheaval, war, economic distress) learn modernist
cultural studies of individual values (Smith and Schwartz
survival values (e.g., economic determinism, rational-
1997). Incorporating values identified in a diversity of
ity, materialism, conformity, and respect for authority).
cultures, the Schwartz values model and the reliability
Alternatively, generations growing up during periods of
of its measurement have been cross-culturally validated
socioeconomic security learn postmodernist values (e.g.,
with 97 samples in 44 countries, including China and
egalitarianism, individualism, interpersonal trust, toler-
the United States (Schwartz 1994, 1997). ance of diversity, self-transcendence).
The Schwartz Values Survey (SVS) identifies 10 uni- In terms of Schwartz's values typology, societal
versal values that are organized into a system ofinsecurity would result in a generational emphasis on
four types of higher-order values: openness to changeconservation and self-enhancement values, whereas soci-
(self-direction, stimulation), conservation (conformity,etal security would result in a generational emphasis on
security, tradition), self-enhancement (achievement, openness to change and self-transcendence values. Fur-
hedonism, power), and self-transcendence (benevolence,ther, socioeconomic development and democratization
universalism). Openness to change values relate to thehave been found to be positively related to the impor-
importance of personal autonomy and independence, tance of openness to change and self-transcendence
variety, excitement, and challenge. Conservation valuesvalues and negatively related to the importance of
relate to the importance of self-control, safety, and conservation and self-enhancement values (Schwartz and
stability in societal and personal relationships, and toRos 1995, Schwartz and Sagie 2000).
respecting cultural traditions. Self-enhancement values
relate to achieving personal success through demon- Generations and Personal Values in China
strated competence, attaining social status and prestige,The history of China since the end of the Qing Dynasty
and control over others. Self-transcendence values relate in 1911 has been one of radical social, political, and
to protecting and enhancing the well-being of those with economic changes (Ladany 1988, Vohra 2000). The
whom one has close contact, as well as the welfare ofRepublican Era (1911-1949) was a period of extreme
all people and nature. poverty, natural disaster, war, and political instability,

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 Egri and Ralston: Generation Cohorts and Personal Values
212 Organization Science 15(2), pp. 210-220, C 2004 INFORMS

culminating in the 1945-1949 Civil War

Hypotheses. that ended
We hypothesize that the economically
prosperous Social
with Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Reformin
Party generation
power would place higher
importance
(Vohra 2000). During this period, on openness to change
Confucianism, which values than earlier
Chinese generations.
emphasizes the virtues of benevolence, propriety, Although the pre-industrial Repub-
respect
lican Erato
for social hierarchy, and commitment hadcollective
the lowest level of economic develop-
inter-
ment, the Republican
ests, was at the root of "Chineseness" (Xinggeneration should have a similar
1995).
Western ideas also comingled view
withof openness to change values
Confucian as the Consolidation
ideol-
ogy because of the presence of North American andwhich experienced
and Cultural Revolution generations,
Chinese
European missionaries and trade Communism's
relations suppression
(Xing 1995).of intellectual free-
During the Consolidation Era (1950-1965), the economic and
dom and the imposition of centralized
Chinese Communist Party soughtsocial
togovernance.
replace Confucian-
ism with Maoist and Marxist-Leninist ideology
HYPOTHESIS (Ladany
IA. The Social Reform generation at-
1988) to establish a new communal order
tributes that
higher placed
importance the to change values
to openness
state and the Communist Partythan
above traditional
the Republican, indi-
Consolidation, and Cultural Revo-
vidual and family concerns. Western presence in China
lution generations.
was relegated to a negligible level as ties with the Soviet
Union grew. Political consolidationThebrought
economic and greater
political instability
eco- of the Repub-
lican Era should result
nomic and political stability even though centralized in this generation placing
industrialization and agrarian reform efforts were not values. While
the highest importance on conservation
the Consolidation and Cultural Revolution generations
effective (Yao 2000). Factional conflict increased dur-
experienced socioeconomic and political insecurity
ing the latter part of the Consolidation Era (1961-1965)
(Goodhart and Xu 1996, Yao 2000) as well as enforced
from the rising influence of the more moderate leader-
conformity to Communist ideology, the Cultural Rev-
ship of Deng Xiaoping (Vohra 2000).
olution generation has been found to be relatively
The Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) saw the
more conservative than the Consolidation generation
Chinese Communist Party intensify its attacks on Con-
(Birnbaum-More et al. 1995). And finally, the relative
fucianism and Western influence in its quest for ideo-
stability of the Social Reform Era should result in
logical purity (Bailey 2001, Vohra 2000). The Cultural
this generation attributing the least importance to
Revolution escalated the discrediting of traditional edu-
conservation.
cation, and ideological moderation was actively sup-
HYPOTHESIS
pressed to try to create a classless society 1B. The
thatRepublican
valued generation attributes
higher importance
equality, conformity, and self-sacrifice for to conservation
collective values than the Cul-
turalCultural
interests (Ladany 1988). The early Revolution generation,
Revolutionfollowed by the Consolida-
tion generation from
was a period of extreme poverty resulting and lastly,
thethe Social
civilReform generation.
disorder created by radical political and
Modernist social
value exper-
systems' emphasis on materialism
iments (Yao 2000). Reinstatement
and achievement motivation Deng
of moderate (Inglehart 1997) suggests
Xiaoping as Vice Premier in 1972
that restored a measure
the Social Reform generation would attribute the
of societal and economic order highest
(Bailey 2001),
importance to and Mao
self-enhancement values. Next
Zedong's death in 1976 signaled the
highest end
would of
be the China's
Republican generation, which was
Cultural Revolution.
exposed to capitalistic ideology through trade relations
Deng Xiaoping's modern policies ushered in thewith the West. Although the Consolidation generation
Social Reform Era (1978 to present), which has learned industrialization's materialistic goals, Chinese
encouraged individual achievement, materialism, eco-Communism emphasized centralized power, control, and
nomic efficiency, and entrepreneurship (Tian 1998). self-sacrifice for communal interests. During the early
An "open-door" policy led to Western capitalisticpart of the Cultural Revolution, these principles were
ideologies having more influence in Chinese business given even higher prominence, and industrial develop-
and education (Vohra 2000). China's emerging "networkment was paralyzed.
capitalism" represents a unique blend of Western mar-
HYPOTHESIS i C. The Social Reform generation attri-
ket capitalism and collectivist values (Boisot and Child
butes higher importance to self-enhancement values than
1996), with rapid industrialization and modernization
the Republican generation, followed by the Consoli-
resulting in unprecedented economic growth and pros-
dation generation and lastly, the Cultural Revolution
perity (Tian 1998, Yao 2000). Although social reforms
generation.
have brought Confucius back into official favor, Chinese
youth who have grown up during the Social Reform The influence of Confucian ideology should result
Era have been described as individualistic, materialistic,in the Republican generation placing high importance
hedonistic, and entrepreneurial (Rosen 1990). on self-transcendence values. While Chinese Communist

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Egri and Ralston: Generation Cohorts and Personal Values
Organization Science 15(2), pp. 210-220, C 2004 INFORMS 213

ideology and worker communeswere not consistentlythe

emphasized reciprocated
impor- with job security
tance of transcending personal (deinterests
Meuse et al. 2001,
for Tulgan
the 1995).
goodGeneration
of the state, the "closed doors"Xers
ofplace
the lesstwo Communist
importance on job security and sta-
tus, cultural
eras suggest a less-universalistic but more on personal
focus. freedom
Thus, and challenging
the Consolidation and Cultural work, which allows for
Revolution a balanced work-personal life
generations
should place moderate importancestyle
on (Kupperschmidt 2000). While supportive of social
self-transcendence
values. Although the Social Reform generation
liberalism and environmentalism, has
they hold more con-
servative
more postmaterialists than previous political and
Chinese family values than Baby Boomers
generations
(Craig and
(Inglehart 1997) and Confucianism isBennett
again 1997).
in favor,
modem capitalistic ideology may have de-emphasized
Hypotheses. We hypothesize that the characterization
the importance of family and kinship ties. Thus, the
of Generation X and Baby Boomer generations as inde-
Social Reform generation should attribute moderate
pendent free agents who actively seek work and personal
importance to self-transcendence values.
challenges suggests that they would attribute higher
HYPOTHESIS 1D. The Republican importancegeneration
to openness to changeattri-
values than the Silent
generation, which is much less concerned
butes higher importance to self-transcendence valueswith personal
than the Consolidation, Cultural Revolution,
autonomy or change for itsand Social
own sake.
Reform generations.
HYPOTHESIS 2A. The Generation X and Baby Boomer
generations attribute higher importance to openness to
Generations and Personal Values in the
change values than the Silent generation.
United States
In their review of American social history, Strauss and The importance of conservation values is expected
Howe (1991) identified three U.S. generations born to be highest for the Silent generation and lowest for
between 1925 and 1979 that are represented in our sam- the Baby Boomer generation. Although both genera-
ple: the Silent generation (born 1925-1945); the Baby tions experienced the political insecurity of prolonged
Boomer generation (born 1946-1964); and Generationwars, X the Silent generation experienced the greatest
(born 1965-1979). The Silent generation grew up during economic insecurity while the Baby Boomer genera-
the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War tion II. experienced the greatest economic security. Con-
formity to societal norms and upholding traditional
This generation has exhibited a high concern for security
and a desire to avoid the risks and disasters witnessed values are strongly associated with the Silent generation,
during their early years. Silent generation members are while the opposite is true of Baby Boomers. Regarding
viewed as hard-working, dependable, and supportiveconformity, Generation Xers, the individualistic noncon-
of conservative values that emphasize the importance formists who also support traditional family values, are
between
of loyalty, duty, conformity, and security (Strauss and the Silent and Baby Boomer generations.
Howe 1991, Thau and Heflin 1997).
HYPOTHESIS 2B. The Silent generation attributes
The Baby Boomer generation grew up during the
higher importance to conservation values than Genera-
period of unprecedented prosperity and affluence that fol-
tion X, followed by the Baby Boomer generation.
lowed World War II. This large politically and socially
liberal generation was active in radical social changes, Baby Boomers' strong focus on career success and
including the emergence of the civil rights movement, self-gratification suggests that self-enhancement values
protests against the Vietnam War, the women's move- are highly important. While traditional career success
ment, as well as rapid technological change (Strauss and has been identified as a strong motivator for the Silent
Howe 1991). Baby Boomers have been described as very generation, hedonistic impulses have not been. Gen-
eration Xers value individual career achievement, but
individualistic, competitive free agents with high interest
in self-fulfillment through personal growth (Parker andless on the basis of attaining power over others. Thus,
Chusmir 1990). They have demonstrated a strong work Baby Boomers should place higher importance on self-
ethic and high job involvement, which has led to eco- enhancement values than either the Silent or Genera-
nomic security and career success, although often at the tion X generations.
expense of their personal lives (Kupperschmidt 2000).
HYPOTHESIS 2C. The Baby Boomer generation at-
Generation Xers experienced periods of economic
tributes higher importance to self-enhancement values
prosperity and distress (early 1980s recession and down-
than the Silent or Generation X generations.
sizings) and family disruption (high divorce rate for
parents) during their formative years (Kupperschmidt In respect to self-transcendence values, the Silent
2000). They learned to be highly individualistic, finan- generation's strong sense of self-sacrifice, duty, and
cially self-reliant, and entrepreneurial risk takers in responsibility for family and organizational members
an economy where workplace loyalty and commitment suggests very high importance for benevolence values.

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 Egri and Ralston: Generation Cohorts and Personal Values
214 Organization Science 15(2), pp. 210-220, C 2004 INFORMS

and Generation
Baby Boomers' and Generation Xers's high Xself-reliance
generations have had substantially
and independence suggest low importance
more mutual exposureto due
benevo-
to China reopening the doors
and theactivism
lence. In Western societies, political impact of modern
has communication
been technolo-
found to be positively related togies (e.g., the Internet) and
universalism, industrialization.
which is Thus, our
hypothesis regarding
concerned with understanding, tolerance, and cross-cultural
the wel- generational similar-
itiesand
fare of all people and nature (Smith in values orientations is1997).
Schwartz as follows:
Baby Boomers' social, political, and environmental
HYPOTHESIS 3. The most recent generation cohorts in
activism suggests high importance for universalism.
China and the United States (Social Reform and Gen-
Generation Xers' social activism (especially environ-
eration X) have more similar value orientations than
mentalism) suggests that universalism is more impor-
their predecessor generation cohorts (Cultural Revolu-
tant for them than for the Silent generation, which has
tion, Consolidation, and Baby Boomer; Republican and
not been associated with societal activism. In sum, the
Silent generations).
Silent generation's very high valuation of benevolence
and Baby Boomers' very high valuation of universal-
Method
ism suggests that both generations would attribute higher
importance to self-transcendence values than Genera-
tion Xers.
Sample and Procedure
Participants were 774 Chinese and 1,004 U.S. managers
HYPOTHESIS 2D. The Silent andand professionals
Baby Boomer surveyed in 1995. Chinese partici-
gener-
ations attribute higher importance to self-transcendence development pro-
pants were enrolled in management
values than Generation X. grams conducted in the seven regions of China (16%
Beijing, 12% Lanzhou, 14% Dalian, 10% Shanghai,
Cross-Cultural Differences in Generation 16% Wuhan, 14% Guangzhou, and 18% Chengdu).
Cohort Values Chinese participants were employed in state-owned
In general, Chinese have been found to attribute higher enterprises in a variety of industries (8% manufacturing,
importance to conservation and collectivism values, 24% services, 9% financial, and 60% other). Anonymity
whereas U.S. participants attribute higher importance toand confidentiality assurances to participants necessi-
openness to change, self-enhancement, and individual- tated that age data be collected in five-year categories
ism values (McGrath et al. 1992, Ralston et al. 1997, to minimize the perception that exact ages could iden-
Smith et al. 1996). However, national-level compar- tify individuals (89% response rate). U.S. participants
isons of means do not adequately address cross-cultural were obtained by mailing a survey to a national ran-
differences in intracultural values variation that have dom sample of U.S. managers and professionals identi-
important implications for international research and fied through a Dun & Bradstreet database (28% response
management (Au 1999, Schwartz and Sagie 2000). rate). U.S. participants were employed in a variety of
To paraphrase our third research question, whichregions (43% Mid-Atlantic, 6% Midwest, 12% New
Chinese and U.S. generations have the most in common? England, 5% South, and 33% West) and industries (16%
Are within-culture generation value differences greater
manufacturing, 20% services, 17% public nonprofit,
13% financial, and 35% other).
than cross-cultural generation value differences? The
Chinese and U.S. participants were significantly dif-
culture-dominant explanation suggests that values differ-
ferent in terms of demographic characteristics. Chinese
ences between China and the United States are greater
participants were significantly younger (t = -15.67, p <
than value differences between generations within each
0.001), had a higher proportion of males (t = -7.49,
country. However, societal modernization and global
p < 0.001), and were less likely to be married (t =
industrialization may be leading to an international con-
23.30, p < 0.001) than U.S. participants. Chinese partic-
vergence of personal values (Barnet and Cavanaugh
ipants also held lower-level positions (t = -11.89, p <
1994, Yang 1988). Alternatively, a crossvergence of
0.001) and were employed in larger organizations (t =
value orientations may be occurring due to the differ-
-2.45, p < 0.05) than U.S. participants. Given these
ent influences of the global environment and national
sample differences and their potential impact on value
culture (Ralston et al. 1997), with socioeconomic con-
orientations (Meglino and Ravlin 1998), these factors
ditions affecting individualistic values more than collec-
were controlled for as covariates in data analyses.
tivistic values (McGrath et al. 1992).
In developing a hypothesis regarding cross-culturalVariables and Measures
generational similarities, one important factor is the
degree of cultural interaction between China and the Personal Values. The SVS was used to measure per-
United States. Early generations in these two cultures sonal value orientations (Schwartz 1994). The SVS con-
have had very limited interaction, especially during the sists of 56 items that respondents rated using a 9-point
closed-door policy years. Conversely, the Social ReformLikert-type scale. A translated Chinese language version

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Egri and Ralston: Generation Cohorts and Personal Values
Organization Science 15(2), pp. 210-220, C 2004 INFORMS 215

of the SVS questionnaire was administered

For the U.S. sample,
to the
Chinese
Silent/Baby Boomer cusp
generation
participants. Only the 45 SVS items had similar openness
that Schwartz found to change and self-
enhancement value
had cross-culturally equivalent meanings werescores to the Baby Boomer cohort,
retained
to measure 10 universal personal but values.
had similarParticipants'
conservation values to the Silent gen
eration cohort.
higher-order value type scores (openness Baby Boomer/Generation
to change, con- X participant
had openness to change andwere
servation, self-enhancement, self-transcendence) conservation value scores
similar
calculated by averaging scores for to the Baby
relevant Boomer cohort, but had self-
personal
values. These value scores were then converted to enhancement value scores similar to the Genera-
tion X cohort. Given the transitional status of these
within-subject standard scores to eliminate cross-cultural
two generation "cusp" groups, Silent/Baby Boomer
differences in scale use (Smith and Schwartz 1997).
(born 1941-1945) and Baby Boomer/Generation X (born
Reliabilities for the value scales were calculated sepa-
1960-1964) participants were excluded from further
rately for each culture by generation group. They ranged
analyses. As a result, the revised sample for hypothesis
from 0.68 to 0.73 for the Chinese generations and 0.77
testing was 1,558 participants (774 for China, 784 for
to 0.80 for the U.S. generations.
the United States). Descriptive statistics on the personal
value scales for the Chinese and U.S. cohorts are pro-
Generation Cohorts. Preliminary within-country vided
anal- in Table 1.
ysis of variance (ANOVA) post hoc group comparisons
Covariates. Gender, marital status, position level, and
of participants' value scores were conducted to deter-
company size were covariates in the analyses. Given the
mine appropriate generation cohort cutoffs. The Chi-
high correlation between participant age and generation
nese and U.S. samples were first segmented into gen-
cohort (China r = 0.97; United States r = 0.91, both at
eration cohorts based on birth years. Then, participants
p < 0.001 level), age was only used to define generation
with birth years in the last five years of a period
cohorts.
were allocated to "cusp" generation cohort groups, and
Analyses. Multivariate analyses of covariance
other participants were allocated to "core" generation
(MANCOVA) and post hoc group comparisons-using
cohort groups (Kupperschmidt 2000). For the Chinese
the least significant differences test-were conducted
sample, group comparisons showed no significant val-
to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 concerning within-country
ues differences between the Republican (born 1930-
generation cohort differences in personal value orienta-
1945) and Republican/Consolidation (born 1946-1950)
tions. In these analyses, the independent variables were
cohort groups. The Consolidation/Cultural Revolution
the generation cohort groups. ANOVAs and post hoc
(born 1961-1965) and early Cultural Revolution (born
group comparisons were conducted to test Hypothesis 3
1966-1970) cohorts had similar value orientations. Par-
regarding cross-cultural generation cohort similarities in
ticipants born in the early and latter parts of the Cultural
values.
Revolution had significant value differences (openness
to change and self-transcendence), which suggests a new
Results
Chinese generation that spent the majority of its youth
in the Social Reform period. In sum, four distinct Chinese
gen- Generation Cohorts
eration cohorts were represented in the ChineseSignificant
sam- Chinese generation cohort differences were
found for all four values (see Table 2). Post hoc group
ple: Republican (born 1930-1950), Consolidation (born
comparisons
1951-1960), Cultural Revolution (born 1961-1970), and are summarized in Table 3. Consistent with
Social Reform (born 1971-1975). Hypothesis 1A, Social Reform generation participants

Table 1 Personal Values of Chinese and U.S. Generation Cohorts: Standardized Means and Standard Deviations

Openness to Self- Self-

Change Conservation Enhancement Transcendence
Age
Variables Birth Years Range n M SD M SD M SD M SD

China 774 -0.02 0.39 -0.08 0.28 -0.11 0.41 0.18 0.26
Social Reform 1971-1975 20-24 183 0.14 0.37 -0.12 0.25 -0.10 0.45 0.13 0.25
Cultural Revolution 1961-1970 25-34 215 0.03 0.37 -0.14 0.29 -0.01 0.42 0.13 0.27
Consolidation 1951-1960 35-44 227 -0.07 0.37 -0.07 0.27 -0.11 0.39 0.19 0.25
Republican 1930-1950 45-65 149 -0.22 0.37 0.04 0.26 -0.26 0.35 0.30 0.21
United States 784 -0.01 0.43 -0.08 0.32 -0.17 0.36 0.27 0.25
Generation X 1965-1975 20-30 110 0.11 0.39 -0.18 0.28 -0.03 0.37 0.25 0.31
Baby Boomer 1946-1959 36-49 564 -0.00 0.43 -0.08 0.32 -0.17 0.35 0.28 0.24
Silent Generation 1925-1940 55-69 110 -0.16 0.44 0.06 0.32 -0.29 0.34 0.27 0.28

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 Egri and Ralston: Generation Cohorts and Personal Values
216 Organization Science 15(2), pp. 210-220, C 2004 INFORMS

Table 2 Chinese and U.S. Personal Values: Results of MANCOVA An

Openness to Change Conservation Self-Enhancement Se

Variables F F F F

China
Generation cohort 9.96*** 9.95*** 8.07*** 11.07***
Gender 4.90* 3.71 1.70 0.74
Marital status 4.97* 5.12* 0.26 0.80
Position level 3.51 2.87 6.24* 6.29*
Company size 0.62 0.69 0.14 0.00
United States
Generation cohort 10.64*** 17.95*** 15.69*** 0.71
Gender 0.00 14.42*** 3.77 30.11***
Marital status 3.79 2.22 6.27* 2.66
Position level 3.45 13.71*** 15.67*** 3.88*
Company size 10.09** 4.34* 6.83** 16.19***

Note. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

attributed significantly higherparticipants

importance were
to openness
next highest,
to an
icant difference
change values than other Chinese between Cultural Revolution
generations. Contrary and Social
Reform participants.participants had
to Hypothesis 1A, Cultural Revolution
higher openness to change value No support
scores
was found
than
for Hypothesis
Consol- IC. Instead of
idation participants, who in Social
turn Reform,
had Cultural
higher Revolution participants had the
openness
to change value scores than highest
Republican participants.
self-enhancement values score, while Republican
participantsfor
These results provide partial support had the lowest self-enhancement
Hypothesis 1 A. score.
Minimal support was found Hypothesis iD was largely supported.
for Hypothesis lB. While As hypothe-
Republican participants had sized,
theRepublican
highest participants had the highest self-
conservation
value scores, supporting Hypothesis IB,score,
transcendence value Consolidation
and there was no significant

Table 3 Chinese and U.S. Generation Cohort Values Differences: Hypotheses and Results of Post Hoc Group Comparisons

Variables Hypotheses Generation Cohort Group Differences

China
Openness to change 1A. Social Reform > (Republican, 1A. Social Reform > Cultural Revolution > Consolidation >
Consolidation, Cultural Revolution) Republican
Conservation 1B. Republican > Cultural Revolution > 1B. Republican > Consolidation > (Social Reform,
Consolidation > Social Reform Cultural Revolution)
Self-enhancement 1C. Social Reform > Republican > 1C. Cultural Revolution > (Social Reform, Consolidation)>
Consolidation > Cultural Revolution Republican
Self-transcendence 1D. Republican > (Consolidation, Cultural 1D. Republican > Consolidation > (Cultural Revolution,
Revolution, Social Reform) Social Reform)
United States
Openness to change 2A. (Generation X, Baby Boomer) > Silent 2A. Generation X > Baby Boomer > Silent
Conservation 2B. Silent > Generation X > Baby Boomer 2B. Silent > Baby Boomer > Generation X
Self-enhancement 2C. Baby Boomer > (Silent, Generation X) 2C. Generation X > Baby Boomer > Silent
Self-transcendence 2D. (Silent, Baby Boomer) > Generation X 2D. Baby Boomer = Silent = Generation X
China and United Statesa
Openness to change 3. (Social Reform and Gen X) have more A. (Social Reform, Generation X)> (Cultural Revolution,
Conservation values similarities than (Cultural Baby Boomer) > Consolidation > (Silent, Republican)
Self-enhancement Revolution, Consolidation, and Baby B. (Silent, Republican) > (Consolidation, Baby Boomer)>
Self-transcendence Boomer) or (Republican and Silent) (Social Reform, Cultural Revolution, Generation X)
C. (Cultural Revolution, Generation X)> (Social Reform,
Consolidation)> Baby Boomer > (Republican, Silent)
D. (Republican, Baby Boomer, Silent, Generation X)>
Consolidation > (Cultural Revolution, Social Reform)

Note. aFor Hypothesis 3 results, values similarities for paired Chinese and U.S. cohorts are indicated as follows: italic font for Social Reform
and Generation X; bold italic font for Cultural Revolution, Consolidation, and Baby Boomer; bold font for Republican and Silent.

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Egri and Ralston: Generation Cohorts and Personal Values
Organization Science 15(2), pp. 210-220, C 2004 INFORMS 217

difference between Social Reform and Cultural Revolu- Discussion

tion participants. Inconsistent with Hypothesis iD, Con-Returning to our three research questions, we begin
solidationu participants scored the lowest. with the Chinese findings. The three Chinese generations
since the establishment of Communist China were found
U.S. Generation Cohorts to be significantly more open to change and more self-
enhancing but less conservative and self-transcendent
Significant U.S. generation cohort differences for open-
ness to change, conservation, and self-enhancement than val- Republican Era Chinese. Although there was a gen-
ues were found, while no differences across cohorts eral age-related pattern in Chinese generations' value
were found for self-transcendence (see Tables 2 andorientations,
3). the Cultural Revolution generation was
Consistent with Hypothesis 2A, Generation X and more self-enhancing than the Social Reform generation.
This finding suggests a generation effect (rather than
Baby Boomer participants attributed significantly higher
importance to openness to change values than Silent an age effect) in that the youngest generation was not
participants. Contrary to Hypothesis 2A, Generation theXmost self-enhancing. Examination of the individ-
participants attributed significantly higher (rather than
ual values that comprise self-enhancement revealed that
similar) importance to openness to change values than the Cultural Revolution generation attributed the high-
Baby Boomer participants did. Partial support was foundest importance to the power value of all Chinese gen-
for Hypothesis 2B. As hypothesized, Silent generation erations. One explanation for this generation effect is
participants attributed significantly higher importancethat the extreme societal instability of the Great Cultural
to conservation values than other U.S. cohorts. How- Revolution engendered modernist survival values such
as the pursuit of personal power and status (Inglehart
ever, Baby Boomer participants had significantly higher,
rather than lower, conservation value scores than Gener-
1997). What is particularly interesting about this find-
ation X participants. ing is that personal status differentials were eschewed
Hypothesis 2C was partially supported. Baby Boomer by Chinese Communist doctrine during this period.
participants attributed higher importance to self-en- With one exception, an age-related pattern in the value
hancement values than Silent generation participants, orientations of U.S. generations was found with more-
which supports Hypothesis 2C. However, Generation X generation cohorts being more open to change
recent
participants attributed higher, rather than lower, impor-
and more self-enhancing but less conservative than ear-
tance to self-enhancement values than Baby Boomer par- lier generations. The absence of significant U.S. genera-
ticipants. Minimal support was found for Hypothesis tion2D. differences in the importance of self-transcendence
Although there was no significant difference between values supports Inglehart's (1997) proposal that there is
Silent and Baby Boomer participants supporting Hypoth- a high proportion of self-transcendent postmaterialists-
regardless of age-in industrialized countries.
esis 2D, Generation Xers attributed similarly high impor-
tance to self-transcendence. The importance of studying generation subcultures
as antecedents of intracultural variation (Au 1999) was
Comparisons Between China and the United States clearly demonstrated by the cross-cultural comparisons
The ANOVAs between Chinese and U.S. generation of similarly aged generation cohorts. The very similar
cohorts were all significant at the p < 0.001 level (open-
value orientations of the Republican and Silent genera-
ness to change: F = 17.32; conservation: F = 12.17; tions were consistent with life-stage theory predictions
self-enhancement: F = 11.15; self-transcendence: F(Stevens-Long
= 1990). In contrast, the dissimilar value
16.58). Table 3 presents the results of the post hoc cohort
orientations of the Consolidation and Baby Boomer gen-
group comparisons. No support was found for Hypoth- erations could be attributed to the radically different
esis 3, which proposed that the most recent Chinese socioeconomic environments and low cultural interac-
and U.S. generation cohorts would have more similar tion during these generations' formative years. Contrary
to predictions of a universal convergence of values
value orientations than earlier generation cohorts. Social
Reform and Generation X participants were similar in
(Barnet and Cavanaugh 1994), the value differences
respect to two values: high openness to change and low
between the most recent Chinese and U.S. generation
conservation. Baby Boomer participants had onlycohorts one suggests a cultural crossvergence in values ori-
value similarity with Cultural Revolution (intermediateentations between Chinese and U.S. managers and pro-
openness to change) and Consolidation (intermedi- fessionals (Ralston et al. 1997).
ate conservation) participants. Republican and Silent All U.S. generations attributed higher importance to
generation participants were similar in respect to all self-transcendence
four values than the three most recent
values (low openness to change and self-enhancement; Chinese generations. This finding is consistent with pre-
high conservation and self-transcendence). In sum, theresearch that has found a higher level of postmate-
vious
recent-generation cohorts in the two countries share rialism
less (self-transcendence) in prosperous industrial and
rather than more similarity in personal values than the
postmodern societies (Inglehart 1997). U.S. managers
earliest generation cohorts. have also been found to have a stronger humanistic goal

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 Egri and Ralston: Generation Cohorts and Personal Values
218 Organization Science 15(2), pp. 210-220, C 2004 INFORMS

orientation than Chinese managersOur

in sample of Chinese orga-
state-owned managers and profession-
nizations (Chen 1995). Additional post
als was hoc in
employed comparisons
state-owned enterprises that have
for the individual self-transcendence values revealed no
been viewed as less entrepreneurial and productive than
significant Chinese or U.S. generation cohort differ-China's growing private sector (Goodhart and Xu 1996).
ences for universalism, which would support a cross- Compared to earlier generations, the Social Reform
cultural convergence effect. Instead, generation cohort
and Cultural Revolution generations have the more
differences in self-transcendence were due to differencesentrepreneurial value orientations (McGrath et al. 1992)
in benevolence values that relate to interpersonal con- needed for implementing the competitive market reforms
cern and responsible social behavior. Previous research mandated for the state-owned sector (Vohra 2000).
has shown benevolence to be positively correlated with Social Reform and Cultural Revolution generations' rel-
individual commitment to religion (Smith and Schwartz atively low benevolence suggests that they may be less
1997). Although the United States is regarded as hav- concerned than previous generations with maintaining
ing very high religiosity and China as having very low coworker relationships when making reward-allocation,
religiosity (Inglehart 1997, Schwartz and Ros 1995), the downsizing, and restructuring decisions. This values ori-
influence of Confucian ideology differentiates Republi- entation is conducive for transforming the organizational
can Era Chinese from more recent generations. Whereas cultures of state-owned enterprises to be strongly mar-
all Chinese and U.S. generations supported benevo- ket focused (Deshpande and Farley 2000). However,
lence, Chinese Communism may have resulted in a de- one consequence may be less-cooperative and supportive
emphasis of benevolence toward others. relationships that facilitate workplace coordination and
In summary, a primary finding of this study was long-term organizational success (Zhou and Martocchio
the importance of generation cohort and life stage in 2001).
ascertaining the personal value orientations of managers
and professionals. Significant shifts in intergenerational Limitations
value orientations were found for both China and the
One limitation of this study is that it focused on only
United States (Inglehart 1997). This finding advances
two countries. Further research using participants from
previous cross-cultural studies that have focused on
other cultures is needed to determine, for example, the
country culture as the primary predictor of values
universality of life-stage differences in value orienta-
orientations (Smith and Schwartz 1997, Smith et al.
tions (Stevens-Long 1990) and the effect of different
1996). Our findings also draw into question the gen-
antecedents of intercultural value variation (Au 1999).
eralizability of cross-cultural research that is based on
Further research is also needed to confirm our finding
limited demographic groups (such as students) to mem-
regarding the lack of significant country or genera-
bers of other demographic groups. This is particularly
tion cohort differences in the universalism value com-
important in cross-cultural research between countries
ponent of Schwartz's self-transcendence values dimen-
with significantly different sociopolitical histories.
sion. Additionally, these findings are based on cross-
Implications for Management sectional data. There is a need for longitudinal research
One implication of this study is that the "generationdetermine the degree to which major sociopolitical
to
gap" and potential for intergenerational values conflictevents impact the value-formation process as well as the
relative influence of generation cohort and life stage on
appears to be at least as great in China as in the United
personal value orientations.
States. Thus, there is a need in both countries for flexible
managerial and human resource practices (e.g., workAnother limitation was that our Chinese sample was
employed in state-owned enterprises and was enrolled in
team formation, career development, compensation sys-
tems) to accommodate generational value differences management-development programs, whereas the U.S.
(Jurkiewicz and Brown 1998, Kupperschmidt 2000). sample was not confined to any type of firm or industry.
The recommendation that independent GenerationEven X so, our Chinese and U.S. samples were signifi-
cantly
employees be given entrepreneurial work assignments is larger and more diverse in terms of industries
and
also appropriate for Social Reform generation employ- geographic location than similar China-U.S. man-
ees. Compared to U.S. managers, Chinese managersager in studies (Chen 1995, Zhou and Martoccio 2001).
Although China today offers more diverse opportuni-
state-owned enterprises have exhibited a stronger pref-
erence for differential performance-based (rather thanties due to greatly increased demands for professional
equalitarian) reward-allocation criteria (Chen 1995), managers,
but the state-owned sector currently employs 69%
are similar in emphasizing work performance over work-of the Chinese workforce (China Internet Information
place relationships (Zhou and Martocchio 2001). This Center 2002). While the Chinese sample may or may not
study's findings clarify that individualistic rewardsbe representative of the Chinese private sector, it repre-
are
more compatible with the value orientations of more a significant proportion of the professional labor
sents
recent Chinese generations than earlier generations. force in the Chinese economy.

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Egri and Ralston: Generation Cohorts and Personal Values
Organization Science 15(2), pp. 210-220, C 2004 INFORMS 219

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