Father’s Day conjures thoughts of a relaxing day with your family and spending

time with your Dad. On June 17, 2001, Father’s Day, the New York City Fire
Department (FDNY) experienced one of the most challenging and deadly fires in
its long and illustrious history. It was a fire that started out as what appeared to
be a routine fire. It ended in tragedy. It left those who were on the FDNY on June
17, 2001 thinking that it cannot get any worse than this fire.
12-20 ASTORIA BOULEVARD: This building is designated as the original fire
building. Both this building and 12-22 Astoria Boulevard were interconnected and
formed the “Long Island General Supply” hardware store. It was a two-story brick
and wood joist (class 3 construction) structure. It was 20 feet x 55 feet. The first
floor occupancy was a hardware store. The first floor and cellar of this building
were interconnected with exposure 2 (12-22 Astoria Boulevard). There was a 27
foot wide opening in the common wall at the store level between the fire building
and exposure 2. The second floor was used for storage for the hardware store.
The cellar was used for storage for the hardware store.
12-22 ASTORIA BOULEVARD: This building is designated as exposure 2. It was a
two-story brick and wood joist (class 3 construction) structure. It was triangular in
shape and it was a corner building. The dimensions were 51 feet x 60 feet. It
bordered on Astoria Boulevard and 14th Street. The second floor of this building
had two apartments.

The two buildings were interconnected on the first floor and the cellar. The
cellar opening had a metal sliding fire door. This fire door was illegally propped
open with a piece of wood so that it would not activate in the event of a fire. The
opening in the cellar walls between the two buildings was 2 ½ feet wide.

Neither the original fire building nor exposure 2 were sprinklered in the
cellar or the first floor.

14th Street sloped downward from Astoria Boulevard. Due to the slope of
the ground, the buildings were three stories in the rear. The rear of the fire
building and exposure 2’s cellar was exposed and above ground in the rear. There
was a masonry free-standing wall that extended from the rear corner on the 14th
Street side of exposure 2 that had a roll down security door. This masonry wall
extension was in place to provide security for storage of materials in the rear
yard.
 EXP. 3
Cellar 8' 20' 2"

Diagram

5'
th
14
Street
'

59' 11"
75

EXP. 2
2'-6"

54'-11"
First 8'
EXP. 3 20'-2"

UP UP

Floor

5'
51' 8" 20' 2"

EXP. 1 th
14 Dia
Astoria
Street

27'
'

59' 11"
75
EXP. 2

54'-11"
UP UP

51' 8" 20' 2"

EXP. 3 EXP. 1 Astoria Blvd.

8' 20'-2"

Second
5'

Floor
Diagr
EXP.
Similar
Attached
'

59' 11"
75

2 EXP. 4
54' 11"

Down Down

51' 8" 20' 2"

EXP. 1 Astoria Blvd.

 There was a door in the rear of
the fire building that gave access to
the cellar. It was an inward opening
door. However, this door was heavily
fortified. It was a black metal door
with a heavy padlock. Inside the
door, there was a steel gate that was
further secured with 2 bars
horizontally across the door opening.
This was further fortified by having
two vertical metal rods against the
horizontal rods extending from the
cellar floor to the concrete ceiling
above. These vertical steel rods were
secured by inserting them into holes
in the concrete floor and ceiling.
 A little after 2:00 PM on June 17, 2001, two teenagers were about to vandalize
the “Long Island General Supply” hardware store. They were 13 year-old Joey
Valderrama and 15 year-old Michael Morena. Michael Morena lived in the
building next to the hardware store and Joey Valderrama lived about a block
away. According to reports, the two youths wanted to burn graffiti on the rear of
the building by using gasoline. In the process, the can filled with gasoline was
knocked over by Joey Valderrama. The gasoline flowed down the slope of the
doorway entrance and underneath the rear door to the hardware store. The
volatile inflammable liquid quickly vaporized and the vapors were ignited by the
pilot light of the hot water heater inside the cellar of the hardware store. This set
into motion one of the most difficult fires in memory.
 FDNY units were operating at a different box on 21st Street for a Freon leak
at a supermarket. The incident was mitigated and units were starting to “take
up”. It was 1420 hours and the Queens Fire Alarm Dispatchers transmitted box
7512 for a telephone alarm reporting a fire at 12-22 Astoria Boulevard. Engine
260, Ladder 163 and Battalion 45 were dispatched. Squad 288, led by Captain
Denis Murphy, left the scene at 21st Street. While returning to quarters, they
were flagged down by a woman stating that there was a fire at 14th Street and
Astoria Boulevard. They notified the dispatcher and responded to the scene.

Upon Squad 288’s arrival, an adult male spoke to Captain Murphy and told
him that he knew where the fire was. There was light smoke coming from behind
the roll-down gates of the “Long Island General Supply” hardware store. The
civilian took Captain Murphy into the cellar of exposure 4 (12-18 Astoria
Boulevard) and out into the rear yard. They crossed over to the address where
the fire was reported and Captain Murphy could hear fire crackling behind the
door. There was an odor of smoke and gasoline near the door. Captain Murphy
wondered how this guy knew that there was a fire here with relatively minor
indicators. It turns out that this man was the father of one of the teenagers that
started the fire and he was the person who called 911.

Captain Murphy called his Chauffeur, Fr. Adam Rand, and told him to
transmit a 10-75. Engines 262, 312, Ladder 117 and Battalion 49 would be
dispatched. Ladder 116 would be assigned as the Firefighter Assist and Search
Team (FAST) and Rescue 4 would be dispatched as well.

Firefighters from Squad 288 started working on the roll-down security

doors at the front of the building. They also stretched an 1 ¾ inch hand line to the
front of the building. Captain Murphy returned to the front of the building and
told his Firefighters to stretch a 2 ½ inch hand line because it is a fire in the store,
not the occupancy on the second floor.
 The first to arrive Battalion Chief was Bill Seelig of the 49 Battalion. He saw
that Squad 288 was working on the roll-down gates. The same civilian that took
Captain Murphy around to the rear did the same with B.C. Seelig. Chief Seelig
saw the rear door and identified it as a good point of attack rather than having an
engine company trying to fight their way down an interior stairway to attack the
fire.

Captain Pat Horne was the officer of Ladder 116. Ladder 116, the
designated FAST Truck, was the first ladder company to arrive at the scene and
they would be put to work as the first due ladder. Ladder 116’s Forcible Entry
team started working on gaining entry to the front of the store along with Squad
288. Captain Horne made a brief survey of the second floor and quickly returned
to his Forcible Entry team. Ladder 116’s aerial ladder was positioned on 14th
Street and raised to the roof of exposure 2. Ladder 116’s Roof Firefighter and
Outside Ventilation Firefighter started vertical ventilation. Ladder 116’s Outside
Ventilation Firefighter was Joe Vosilla.

Engine 262, Ladder 117, and Battalion 49 would all arrive within seconds of
each other at around
1425 hours. Ladder
117 would assume
the second due
ladder duties and go
to the second floor
for search and to
check for extension.

B.C. Seelig told

Engine 262 to stretch
a hand line to the
rear of the building.
They initially started
to stretch the 1 ¾
inch hose line that
Squad 288 started, but the Officer of Engine 262 told them to stretch a 2 1/2inch
hose line. The third Engine, Engine 260 arrived and helped Engine 262 in the
stretch. Engine 260 would eventually finish the stretch of the 1 ¾ inch hose line
to the rear and man it as a back-up hose line. Engine 262 would man the 2 ½ inch
hose line in the rear.

Haz-Mat Co. 1 arrived and reported to B.C. Seelig. He ordered them to the
security gate on exposure 2 side. They were told to force it open so we would
have easier access to the rear yard and the point of attack. Haz-Mat 1 would not
be assigned to the box. They offered their assistance to B.C. Seelig and he asked
them to start forcible entry on the rear door to the cellar.

Captain Pat Horne of Ladder 116 made a brief search of the second floor of
exposure 2. There were two apartments on the second floor. He evacuated the
occupants from the second floor.
 At 1427 hours, Ladder 115 would be assigned to the fire to act as the
replacement FAST Truck.

At 1428 hours, Tower Ladder 163 arrived at the fire

as the third ladder company. Lieutenant Brendan
Manning was in command.
Also on Tower Ladder 163’s
apparatus was Firefighter
John Downing. He positioned
Tower Ladder 163’s apparatus
at the exposure 2/3 side. It
was in position to vent the
rear windows and reach the
roof. Lieutenant Manning
reported to Battalion Chief
Seelig. He was ordered to
perform forcible entry on the
rear door to the cellar, the point of attack.

Engine 312 arrived

at the fire as the fourth
engine. They assisted in
stretching hose lines and
eventually was ordered by
B.C. Seelig to stretch a 2 ½
inch hand line to the front
of the building.

Fire conditions were

worsening. The smoke
was getting thicker. There
was a sound of aerosol
cans popping in the cellar.
At 1429 hours, Battalion
49 transmitted the “All-Hands” and stated that they have heavy smoke pushing
out. Division 14 was sent to the fire.

Inside the store on the first floor, Captain Denis Murphy of Squad 288
found the interior
stairway that led to
the cellar. It was
about 30 feet
inside the building
from the front
door. Captain
Horne and Ladder
116 encountered a
heavy smoke
condition without
a high heat
condition. Captain
Horne opened the
interior cellar stairway door and found flames coming up the stairway. He closed
the door to keep fire from racing up the stairway. Squad 288 positioned their
hose line so it could be advanced down the stairs. The sound of popping aerosol
cans coming from the cellar was almost constant.

Rescue 4 arrived at the fire at 1430 hours. The forcible entry team was
Captain Brian Hickey, Firefighter Brian Fahey, and Firefighter John Gaine. They
assisted in forcing the remaining roll-down security gates. They made entry with
Squad 288 and Ladder 116 already inside the store. Ladder 116 had performed a
search of the first floor. Squad 288 had stretched their 2 ½ inch hose line to the
cellar stairway entrance. Rescue 4 was performing searches and used their
thermal imaging camera (TIC) to check for fire extension to the first floor.

Captain Pat Horne from Ladder 116 opened the cellar door a second time.
This time, there was no flame, but there was a considerable black smoke
condition coming up the stairway. He could hear Battalion Chief Bill Seelig say
that he didn’t want the stairway door
opened. Chief Seelig said that they
had a hose line coming in from the
rear. He told Captain Murphy of
Squad 288 to hold their position to
prevent fire from coming up the
stairway.

Battalion Chief Kevin Duffy of

Battalion 45 arrived at the fire at 1430
hours. Battalion 45 was the “10-75
Chief”. B.C. Seelig ordered B.C. Duffy
to supervise the forcible entry and
hose line advancement at the rear
cellar door. He would have Tower
Ladder 163, and Engines 261 and 263
assigned to his sector. At 1443 hours,
Battalion 49 advised the Queens Fire
Alarm Dispatcher that Squad 288 was
being used as an Engine Company.
Squad 41 would be dispatched as the
replacement Squad.

Lieutenant Brendan Manning of Tower Ladder 163 began to supervise his

unit’s forcible entry of the rear door. Their initial attempt was to use
conventional forcible entry tools (Axe & Halligan tool.) on the inward opening
door. Their initial attempt failed. They tried to use the “Rabbit Tool” (a hydraulic
forcible entry tool). The Rabbit Tool failed. A power saw with a metal-cutting
blade was tried. Lieutenant Manning had Firefighter John Downing go back to the
apparatus to get the “Hurst Tool”. They tried the Hurst Tool and the door was still
a formidable obstacle. The arms of the Hurst Tool were actually twisting. The
Hurst Tool had minimal success in opening the door. It only opened 15-18 inches.
There was a light brownish/yellowish smoke coming from the rear door. The time
was 1440 hours.
 Upon hearing over the
handi-talkie that the forcible
entry efforts on the rear door
were moving slowly, Captain
Horne of Ladder 116 decided to
try to descend the interior
stairs to the cellar. He
encountered a sheet of
plywood on the stairs. The
plywood was there so that
store employees could slide
materials down to the cellar.
The plywood was moved. The
stairway was narrow and there was shelving on either side of the stairway. The
stairway was filled with smoke and it was hot. He got about 2/3rds of the way
down the stairs and the conditions were deteriorating. The continuous sound of
popping aerosol cans could not be ignored. He retreated up the stairs and the
stairway door was closed.

The conditions inside the store were continuing to get worse. Smoke was
pushing out of cracks in the floor. The cellar door blew open from the pressure
being generated by the
fire. When the door
blew open, blue flames
filled the lower half of
the doorway. Then,
the flames went out.
Then, the flames re-
ignited. This time, the
color of the flames was
orange. Firefighter Tim
Geraghty was the
Nozzle Firefighter from
Squad 288. He opened up the
nozzle while the interior cellar
door was open for a few seconds.
The Firefighters recognized that
the flames were an unusual color
and there was an unusual odor,
not the odor of burning wood.
Throughout the building, there
were reports of an odor of
lacquer or paint thinner. There
was a discussion about advancing
down the interior cellar stairs.
Battalion Chief Seelig from
Battalion 49 told Squad 288 to hold their position. “They were working on the
door in the rear (at cellar level) and they would have water on the fire shortly.”

At approximately 1439 hours, Firefighter Harry Ford, the Chauffeur of

Rescue 4 started to vent the rearmost windows giving access to the cellar, on the
14th Street side (exposure 2). He would be joined by Firefighters John Downing of
Ladder 163 and Joe Vosilla of Ladder 116. They would continue to perform
horizontal ventilation on the front window on the 14th Street side giving access to
the cellar.

Battalion Chief Seelig of Battalion 49 was becoming frustrated with the lack
of progress of the operation in the rear. He told Captain Denis Murphy of Squad
288 that they may have to advance down the interior cellar stairs with their hose
line.

At 1442 hours, Battalion 49 gave a progress report to the Queens

Dispatcher. “We have three lines stretched and in operation. Trucks are opening
up. We have a basement fire; progress is slow due to blockage and explosions in
the basement. K”

At 1443 hours, Ladder 163 succeeded in opening the rear door about 18
inches. Lieutenant Brendan Manning and Battalion Chief Kevin Duffy of Battalion
45 squeezed into the cellar. Lieutenant Manning used his TIC to see what the
heat conditions were in the cellar. It caused the screen to show “red”. B.C. Duffy
exited the cellar and told Ladder 163 to continue to remove the entire door with
their power saw.

Deputy Chief Artie Messbauer of the 14th Division arrived at the fire at 1445
hours. He checked the rear of the building to get an overall view of the
conditions. He saw Ladder 163 working on the rear door with the power saw. He
walked to the front of the building and saw a smoke condition in the front and a
hose line going into the building. Captain Brian Hickey of Rescue 4 came out of
the building and addressed Deputy Chief Messbauer and told him they have seen
fire extending to the first floor through their TIC and he requested another hose
line in the store. At this time, Deputy Chief Messbauer turned to his Aide and told
him to transmit a 2nd alarm.
 At 1446 hours, Lieutenant
Brendan Manning of Ladder 163
looked back into the rear cellar
door with his TIC. He looked into
the camera and saw “red” (which
means it is very hot). He was
about to tell Battalion Chief Kevin
Duffy of Battalion 45 what he
saw. He didn’t get the word
“red” out of his mouth when the
explosion happened. Lieutenant
Manning was propelled past Chief
Duffy and everyone in the rear
was knocked down. Lieutenant
Manning was severely injured.
He had severe burns on his face
and a fractured orbital socket.
The force of the explosion
knocked Lieutenant Manning
unconscious. Lieutenant
Manning would later be removed
to the New York Cornell Burn Center. Chief
Duffy’s face had blood coming down. A large
section of the rear wall was damaged and in
danger of collapse. Battalion Chief Duffy
transmitted a “Mayday” and had Fire Officers
account for their members.
On the 14th Street side (exposure 2), the entire two/three story masonry wall
collapsed in a curtain wall type collapse. It came down onto Firefighters Harry
Ford of Rescue 4, John Downing of Ladder 163, and Firefighter Joe Vosilla of
Ladder 116. Firefighters Ford and Downing were completely buried by the bricks.
Firefighter Vosilla was buried up to his chest.

On Astoria Boulevard in the front of the building, everyone standing in the

street was knocked down by the force of the explosion.
 Firefighters Mike Milner from Rescue 4 and Brian Kearney of Ladder 117
were on the second floor of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard (exposure 2). The floor
exploded upward. Firefighter Kearney from Ladder 117 was thrown out of a
window. He landed in the rubble with his head down and his legs in the air.
Firefighter Milner from Rescue 4 hit the ceiling and almost fell out of the building.
He saw an opening in the area where the collapsed wall once was. He grabbed a
hanging piece of carpet and a waste pipe. He was able to climb down from the
second floor by coming down the waste pipe.
 Firefighters were on the roof of 12-20
Astoria Boulevard (the original fire building).
Firefighters who were operating on the roof
felt the roof rise-up about two feet. They
were all knocked off their feet. A heavy
smoke condition enveloped the roof. The
Roof Firefighter from Ladder 116 noticed that
the roof of 12-22 Astoria Boulevard (exposure
2) was gone. The Firefighters on the roof
continued to cut holes in the roof in an
attempt to provide relief from the smoke and
heat that anyone inside the building was
experiencing. Fire was showing out of every hole that was cut. They continued
working on the roof until Division 14 ordered them off the roof.

Squad 288, Ladder 116 and Rescue 4 were inside the first floor store
occupancy when the explosion occurred. It was reported that the floor felt like a
wave. The sound came a split second before the shock wave. Captain Denis
Murphy and Firefighter Tim Geherty
and Firefighter John Berna of Squad
288 all sustained fractured left legs.
There was a large fire ball within the
store. They all crawled in the smoke
toward light. The light was there
because that is where the exposure 2
exterior wall once stood. They crawled
out onto the bricks and on to 14th
Street.

Captain Brian Hickey and Firefighter John Gaine of Rescue 4 were blown in
different directions. Firefighter Gaine was blown toward the rear of the store. He
could see Captain Hickey
silhouetted against the ball of
fire. Once the ball of fire
subsided, the heat in the store
increased. Firefighter Brian Fahey
of Rescue 4 was no longer there.
The floor had opened near the
stairway going downstairs and
Firefighter Fahey was swallowed
into the abyss of the fire and
smoke-filled cellar. Multiple “Maydays” were being transmitted over the handi-
talkie. Captain Hickey and Firefighter Gaine were disoriented and dazed.
However, they could hear a voice. The voice was that of Firefighter Adam Rand,
the Chauffeur of Squad 288. They followed the sound of Fr. Rand’s voice and they
crawled out onto Astoria Boulevard.
 Captain Pat Horne of Ladder 116 and
his Forcible Entry Firefighter were near the
front of the building heading out to change
their SCBA cylinders when the explosion
occurred. They were thrown several feet.
They saw light in one direction. They headed
toward the light. The light was the hole in
the exposure 2 side created by the
explosion. They crawled out onto the pile of
brick and rubble. There was heavy fire and
smoke showing on the exposure 2 side. As
the Firefighters from Ladder 116 crawled out
onto the rubble, Ladder 116’s Forcible Entry
Firefighter found Firefighter Joe Vosilla
buried in the bricks and rubble.
 At 1447 hours, the Aide to the 14th Division
called the Queens Dispatcher and said: “Transmit
a second alarm, a full second alarm.” “We have
had a major explosion.”

Haz-Mat Company 1 called the Queens

Dispatcher immediately after the explosion and
said: “Haz-Mat 1
Urgent, Have another
Rescue – two Rescues
respond. We possibly
have Firemen trapped
under collapse, K”.
Rescue 2 and Rescue 3
would respond.

At 1448 hours,
Deputy Chief Artie
Messbauer grabbed his
Aide and told him to
call the Queens
Dispatcher and transmit a full 4th alarm. Just three
minutes later, Deputy Chief Messbauer transmitted
the 5th alarm.

At 1450 hours, Captain Hickey of Rescue 4

was conducting a roll call of his members. He did
not get a response from his Chauffeur, Fr. Harry
Ford. He did get a response from his Forcible Entry
Firefighter Brian Fahey. Fr. Fahey stated: “Rescue
Irons, I’m trapped in the basement.”

As Captain Pat Horne of Ladder 116 got out of

the rubble, he started walking toward the front of
 the building. As he was
making his way there,
he noticed that the
front parapet wall was
leaning precariously and
was in danger of
imminent collapse. He
quickly told Battalion
Chief Seelig of his
observation. B.C. Seelig
immediately removed
firefighters from the
area. The entire front
parapet wall collapsed
at 1502 hours.

Citywide Tour Commander Donald Burns

arrived at the scene of the fire. He conferred with
Deputy Chief Messbauer. Chief Burns established the
Command Post and D.C. Messbauer went to supervise
rescue efforts on 14th Street. Chief of Department
Peter Ganci would respond to the fire from home. He
was active in trying to get to Fr. Fahey by crawling
through the hole that would be breached in the cellar
walls. Chief Medical Officer Kerry Kelly would also respond from home. She
would later perform CPR on one of the fallen firefighters.
 Squad 41 was the first Special Operations
unit to arrive at the scene after the explosion.
They arrived at 1453 hours. Led by Lieutenant
Rich Portello, they saw Firefighter Mike Milner
climbing down the drain pipe from the second
floor. Deputy Chief Messbauer was in the
middle of conducting a roll call to try to
determine who was missing and who is need of
rescue. Portable ladders were being raised on
the exposure 1 and 2 sides to evacuate
firefighters from the second floor. Deputy Chief Messbauer assigned Squad 41
and Ladder 115 to the rescue effort. Initially, both units started working on the
14th Street side to search for Fr. Ford and Fr. Downing.

The Officer of Engine 312

was able to spot the bunker coat
stripes of Firefighter Brian Fahey
from Rescue 4 through a hole in
the floor. He was unable to talk to
him via radio. Battalion Chief
Seelig of Battalion 49 went into
the building and could see Fr.
Fahey’s
bunker coat.

Captain Brian Hickey and Fr. John Gaine of Rescue 4

started cutting the stairs and flooring leading to the second
floor of 12-20 Astoria Boulevard. The heat coming up
through the floor was intense and untenable. Visibility was
near zero. Fr. Gaine lost his helmet in the explosion and only
had his protective hood on to protect his head from the
searing heat. Firefighters manning hose lines directed hose
streams over his head to keep him cool.

At 1457 hours, Fr. Brian Fahey of Rescue 4 transmitted

another “Mayday” message. He stated: “I’m trapped under the stairway, come
and get me.”

Lieutenant Rich Portello of Squad 41

had his unit start working on the stairway,
along with Captain Hickey and Fr. Gaine to
enlarge the hole to reach Fr. Fahey.
Battalion Chief Seelig removed all
firefighters from that area when the threat
of a collapse of the front parapet wall was
imminent. Lieut. Portello decided on a
two-pronged attack to rescue Fr. Fahey.
He decided on breaching a hole from the
cellar of exposure 4 (12-18 Astoria
Boulevard). They brought the “Stanley
Hydraulic System” (jack hammers) to the
cellar. The walls were built of old stone
and concrete. The walls were thick and
difficult to break through. After the front parapet
wall collapsed, Lieut. Portello and Firefighter Pat
Hickey returned to the first floor of the fire building
to re-establish their two-pronged attack. Three
members of Squad 41 continued to work on
breaching the hole in the cellar wall.

Conditions in the store continued to get

worse. Supervising the rescue effort at the
stairway was Battalion Chief Ray Downey from
Special Operation Command (SOC). Members of
Rescue 4 and Squad 41 continued to work on
expanding the hole near the stairway. A saw was
called for to cut the front stairway (The stairway
was near vertical as a result of the explosion.).
Eventually, a scissor ladder was called for to get
down the narrow hole. Fr. Pat Hickey from Squad
41 made a gallant attempt to descend through the
heat coming from the cellar, along with Lieutenant Timmy Higgins from Squad
252, Lieut. Rich Portello and Fr. John Gaine. Firefighters were getting burned as
they worked. A hose line from Engine 259 commanded by Captain Sean McBrian
was called for to cool the area of the stairway.
 Progress in this extremely stressful
situation was slow. Battalion Chief John
Moran was supervising the breaching
operation from exposure 4. Eventually, the
breaching operation coming from exposure 4
was successful. There was about three feet of
water in the cellar from all the hose lines
operating. On top of the water was burning
fuel. This fire was spreading in all directions. A
foam operation was set up.

Lieutenant Dan Buckheit led Ladder 154

that day. They arrived after the explosion.
Lieut. Buckheit would later say that this is the
worst fire he had ever responded to. He
surveyed the scene and saw the rescue operation on
the exposure 2 side. He told his Chauffeur, Bobby
Anderson, to get large spackle buckets they carry on
their apparatus to help remove bricks and
debris. He would leave two firefighters to
work on the brick pile on exposure 2. He
took Fr. Anderson, Fr. Glen Berube, and Fr.
Jerry Brannigan from Ladder 163 to the
rear. They made entry through the door
that was blown off. They entered the
waist-deep water with fire burning on top.
Battalion Chief Bob Turner of Battalion 46
came to the rear to supervise this effort.
They grabbed a hose line to drive the fire
back. The fire returned to their location.

While rescue operations were taking

place to get to Fr. Fahey in the cellar, a
second operational front was taking place
on 14th Street. Firefighter Joe Vosilla from
Ladder 116 was found buried up to his chest, against a white car. He was
extricated at 1510 hours. There was a considerable amount of fire and smoke
hampering the search for Fr. Harry Ford and
Fr. John Downing. Aerosol cans were
exploding and being propelled into the air.
Firefighters from Haz-Mat 1, Rescue 2, and
others worked feverishly to find the two
missing members. A Personal Alert Safety
System (PASS) alarm was heard.
Firefighters dug in that direction.
Firefighter Harry Ford from Rescue 4 was
found near the white car. As Fr. Ford was
being removed, digging continued. Fr.
Downing was found nearby, and while Fr.
Ford was being extricated. They were both
removed from the collapse at 1555 hours
and removed to Elmhurst Hospital.

Rescue 3 arrived at the fire led by

Captain Bart Codd. They assisted in the
breaching of the cellar wall from
exposure 4. They brought down the
hanging parapet wall that was left
unstable from the earlier collapse.

Firefighter Bob Knabbe from Rescue 3

crawled into the store. Visibility was still near
zero, however he was able to find the stairway
going into the cellar. Fire conditions had
abated enough for him to make his way down
the stairway. As he crawled toward the front
of the building, he found the scissor ladder
coming from the floor above that was used in
the previous rescue attempts. He pushed the ladder upward and out of the way.
It was then that he found Fr. Brian Fahey. It was 1830 hours. A Stokes Basket
stretcher was called for. Firefighters from Rescue 4 carried the stretcher of their
fallen comrade.
A priest was on
the scene.
Members
removed their
helmets and
said a prayer.
He was
removed to
Elmhurst
Hospital.
 At the “Father’s Day Fire”, dozens of firefighters were injured,
some seriously. Firefighters Harry Ford, John Downing, and Brian
Fahey perished at this fire. Firefighter Ford was a 27-year veteran of
the FDNY. He was married and had three children. Firefighter Fahey
was a 14-year veteran on the FDNY. He was married and had three
children. Firefighter Downing was an 11-year veteran of the FDNY.
He was married and had two children. May they all rest in peace.
Never forget!
Fire Prevention: At this building, there were fire prevention issues.

1. The propped open sliding cellar fire door; this effectively doubled the area
exposed to fire and allowed more flammable liquids to become involved in the
fire/explosion.
2. The lack of a Sprinkler System in the cellar and the store; both floors were
being used for storage of flammable and combustible liquids and gases.

3. Obstructed stairway leading to the cellar.

4. This building should have been on the schedule to be inspected annually.

Reporting of Unusual Conditions: Many firefighters on the scene of this fire

reported the odor of paint or lacquer in the air. Many firefighters reported the
constant sound of aerosol cans exploding in the cellar.
Also, unusual flame color was reported. Any unusual
condition should be reported to the Incident
Commander. Do not
assume he/she is
aware of it.

Aerosol Cans and the

Backdraft: We
normally associate
carbon monoxide as
being the primary fuel
with backdraft
explosions. At this fire, it was widely reported that
aerosol cans were exploding continuously well before
and up to the time of the backdraft. Generally
speaking, aerosol cans are domed and have working
pressures between 240-400 psi. The propellants in the
aerosol cans are mostly hydrocarbons. The benefit of
using the hydrocarbons as a propellant is
that they maintain a constant pressure for
discharge of the product. Hydrocarbons
from ruptured cans containing aerosol
propellant and the flammable or
combustible product in aerosol cans
greatly increases the likelihood of an
explosion when the fire is in a confined
space of such as a cellar. This is true
especially when numerous aerosol cans
are exploding.

A Level 1 aerosol product has a total chemical heat of combustion of 8600

Btu/lb. or less.

A Level 2 aerosol product has a total chemical heat of combustion of more

than 8600 Btu/lb. or less than or equal to 13,000 Btu/lb.

A Level 3 aerosol product has a total chemical heat of combustion of more

than 13,000 Btu/lb.

Storage of large quantities of aerosol cans which are Level 2 or 3 require

sprinkler protection. These aerosol cans can be propelled like rockets when
exposed to the heat of a fire.

In addition to the
aerosol cans exploding, it
is reported that Liquified
Petroleum Gas (LPG)
cylinders and cans of paint
thinner failed which
contributed to the force of
the explosion.
Secondary Collapse: At this fire, the explosion caused the collapse of the bearing
wall on 14th Street. Also, the fire intensified. After any collapse, we have the
hazard of a “secondary collapse”. Building components rely upon each other to
resist the pull of gravity. Once building components are radically displaced, the
remaining building components are no longer fully supported. In fact, the
remaining building components may be resisting gravity by an un-designed load
(i.e.: simple beams may now be cantilevered beams). At this fire, the front
parapet masonry wall was no longer plumb and the masonry was no longer in a
straight line. This created an un-designed load on the wall and it collapsed. The
longer firefighters have to work within a collapse zone for rescue, the greater the
danger of secondary collapse to rescuing firefighters.
Wall Collapse:
The wall collapse
of the exposure 2
wall (14th Street)
was a “curtain
wall type” of
collapse. The
wall fell straight
down and created a large
pile of bricks on the sidewalk,
several feet deep. The peak force of
the explosion at this fire was 7-8 psi,
which is enough to knock down brick
walls. 1 psi is enough to knock a firefighter down.
Cellar Fires Strategy: The progression of cellar fire strategy is as follows:

1. Hose lines: This involves advancing a hose line down the cellar stairs to
the cellar floor. Depending upon conditions, this act can require great
tenacity. If a hose line is advanced down a cellar stairway, a back-up line
must be in place to protect the firefighters advancing the hose line down
the stairs. Fire would show at the interior cellar stairway door (rollover).
This back-up hose line would also extinguish extending fire. If there is an
outside cellar entrance door due to a change in grade, that would be a good
choice to mount an attack since the advancing firefighters would not have
to descend through the thermal layers to get to the cellar floor.

The success of
hose lines advancing
down into a cellar fire
may depend upon
ventilation. Cutting a
hole in the first floor
near a window on the
first floor will provide
relief for the Engine
Company advancing
the hose line. The
hole in the floor
should be away from
the stairway the hose
line is advancing
down. In so doing,
the heat and smoke will be drawn to the ventilation hole and away from the
firefighters.
2. Indirect Method: If hose line advancement fails, the
indirect method of attack is called for. This would be
the use of cellar pipes or distributors. This is a
make-shift sprinkler system. Cut a hole in the floor
as close to being over the fire as safety permits and
deploy the cellar pipe. If the “Bresnan Distributor”
is used, a “shut-off” must be placed in-line so the water flow
can be controlled. An additional hose line should be
stretched as a protection line for the firefighters
operating the cellar pipe or distributor. This
strategy will not completely extinguish the fire.
However, it will stop the expansion of the fire.
Deployment of the cellar pipe/distributors in a highly
heated area may break up the explosive atmosphere.
In preparation of using a cellar pipe or distributor, as much ventilation on
the first floor should be performed.

3. : If the indirect method fails, then the high-

expansion (high-ex) method is called for.
Before a high-ex foam operation is started,
there must be enough foam concentrate on
the scene for a sustained operation. If high-ex
foam is used, it must fill 2/3 of the height of
the cellar. If done properly, this will extinguish

80% of the fire. Firefighters would still have to advance

hose lines into the cellar to extinguish the remaining
20% of the
fire.
 4. Master Streams: If the high-ex foam method fails, then we can use master
streams to “flow the floor” (flooding the first floor). This method is used if
the first floor is too dangerous for firefighters to operate on. If this method
is used, protection lines or master streams must be positioned to protect
the exposures.

Change of Strategy: When an Incident Commander decides to change strategy,

an “Urgent” will be transmitted over the handi-talkie.
Chiefs that are Sector Commanders must ensure that
units under his/her command comply with the
orders. All units removed from a building for a
change in strategy should be prepared to answer a
roll call.

Due to the lack of access and the punishing

nature of extinguishing cellar fires, the failure rate of
cellar fires is high. We should be proactive and
prepare for our next strategy as soon as we begin to
mount an attack with a hose line. As soon as a hose line is advanced into a cellar,
initiate the cellar pipe/distributor evolution. If the hose line advance fails, we are
already taking steps towards the next strategy. Alternate strategies take time to
implement (i.e.: holes must be cut, hose lines stretched, high-ex foam
concentrate must be called for and delivered, etc.).

Foam: While most flammable liquid vapors have a gas specific gravity greater
than 1 (heavier than air), the specific gravity of flammable liquids is less than one
(lighter than water). At this fire, flammable liquid was floating on top of three
feet of water in the cellar and it was burning. A foam line operation should be
called for when flammable liquids are burning on top of water.
Quenching, Venting,
Flanking: When
backdraft conditions
exist, firefighters can
protect themselves by
quenching, venting,
and/or flanking.
Quenching is the act of
deploying a hose stream
into a doorway or
window to break-up
superheated gases. This
action may break up an
explosive atmosphere.

Venting can relieve

the pressure in a
structure that has an
explosive atmosphere. If
a backdraft does occur,
some of the pressure will
be diverted upward.

Flanking is the act

of positioning hose lines, and appliances away from doorways and windows.
Depending on conditions, the entire front and/or side of a building may have to
be cleared if there is a collapse danger.
Thanks to the following people who contributed to this essay: Firefighter John
Gaine (Ret.), Firefighter Bob Knabbe (Ret.), Fr. Bob Anderson (Rescue 3), Battalion
Chief Kevin Duffy (Ret.), Assistant Chief Bill Seelig (Ret.), Deputy Commissioner Bob
Turner (Ret.), Deputy Chief Artie Messbauer (Ret.), Lieutenant Rich Portello (Ret.),
Battalion Chief Brendan Manning (Ret.), Battalion Chief Pat Horne (Battalion 44),
Captain Denis Murphy (Ret.), Lieutenant Dan Buckheit (Ret.), Steve Spak
(Photographer), Katy Clements (FDNY Photo Unit), Firefighter Mike Lindy (Rescue
3), Deputy Chief Vincent Dunn (Ret.), Chris Roberto (Engine 48).

Resources: New York Times, NY Daily News, Firehouse Magazine “Remembering

the Father’s Day Fire” by Harvey Eisner. December 5, 2014; FDNY Safety and
Inspection Services Command Investigative Report, Queens Box 5-5-7512;
“Strategy of Firefighting”, Fire Engineering, by D.C. Vincent Dunn (Ret.); N.F.P.A.
Fire Protection Handbook, 19th Ed; “Safety and Survival on the Fireground”, 2nd
Ed., Fire Engineering, by D.C. Vincent Dunn (Ret.); “Collapse of Burning Buildings”,
2nd Ed., Fire Engineering, by D.C. Vincent Dunn (Ret.)

Historical Note: Many members of the

FDNY who operated with great
distinction at the “Father’s Day Fire”,
were killed in the line-of-duty almost
three months later on September 11,
2001.

On September 11, 2001 B.C. Stack and numerous

other Officers and Firefighters involved in this
investigation were killed.
TIP OF THE HELMET TO: The Officers and Firefighters of Battalion 18 who
planned, set-up, and conducted the memorial service at the Firefighter’s
Monument at Riverside Drive on September 11th. It is always a moving service. It
gives us all a place to go, free of speeches and distractions, to honor those who
were killed on that horrific day 17 years ago. Well done.

TIP OF THE HELMET TO: The Officers and Firefighters of Engine 75, Ladder 33,
and Battalion 19 for hosting and conducting the Plaque Dedication for Battalion
Chief Michael Fahy (Promoted to Deputy Chief Posthumously). It was an
emotional service that was well attended. It was a great moment to see
Michael’s Dad, Retired Battalion Chief Tom Fahy, give a speech honoring his son.
Well done.

TIP OF THE HELMET TO: Captain Eddie Boles of Ladder 59 and Firefighter LeRoy
McGinnis of Engine 266 for being named the Emerald Society’s 2018 “Irishmen of
the Year”.

TIP OF THE HELMET TO: The Officers and Firefighters from Engine 95 and Ladder
36 who hosted the Memorial Day collation on October 10th. Well done.
FIREFIGHTER MICHAEL T. McDONALD, LADDER 128 (RET.):
Passed away on Saturday August 11, 2018 from injuries
sustained at Manhattan Box 5-5-8087. This was the rescue and
recovery effort at the World Trade Center after the attacks on
September 11, 2001. May he rest in peace. Never forget!

FIREFIGHTER JIMMY MARTINEZ, ENGINE 157 (RET.):

Passed away on Friday August 24, 2018 from injuries sustained
at Manhattan Box 5-5-8087. This was the rescue and recovery
effort at the World Trade Center after the attacks on
September 11, 2001. May he rest in peace. Never forget!

FIREFIGHTER DENNIS G. HEANEY, LADDER 157 (RET.):

Passed away on Monday September 10, 2018 from injuries
sustained at Manhattan Box 5-5-8087. This was the rescue and
recovery effort at the World Trade Center after the attacks on
September 11, 2001. May he rest in peace. Never forget!

FIREFIGHTER JOHN R. ELGES, LADDER 134 (RET.):

Passed away on Saturday September 15, 2018 from injuries
sustained at Manhattan Box 5-5-8087. This was the rescue and
recovery effort at the World Trade Center after the attack on
September 11, 2001. May he rest in peace. Never forget!

EMT FELIPE A. TORRE, BUREAU OF TRAINING (RET.):

Passed away on Wednesday October 10, 2018 from injuries
sustained at Manhattan Box 5-5-8087. This was the rescue and
recovery effort at the World Trade Center after the attack on
September 11, 2001. May he rest in peace. Never forget!