Khalil 1995

History of Political Economy
Has Economics Progressed? Rectilinear,

Historicist, Universalist, and
Evolutionary Historiographies
Elias L. Khalil
Introduction
I attempt to offer here a taxonomy of the different existing historiogra-
phies of economic paradigms or research programs. I The proposed four-
way taxonomy of historiographies is constructed around the question of
whether economics has progressed. To be clear, I do not present here a
theory of the history of economics, but rather I present a way to classify
the historiographies that are concerned with such a theory.*
What does it mean to state that economics has progressed? To start
with, progress needs to be differentiated from evolution in the sense of
mere change. Only a few historiographers (namely, universalists) doubt
whether economic theory has evolved. But many of them challenge
whether it has progressed. The idea of progress involves a judgment of
whether the theoretical shift has also entailed improvements, according
Correspondence may be addressed to Professor Elias L. Khalil, Department of Economics, Ohio

State University, Mansfield, OH 44906. The paper was presented at the History of Economics
Society meeting at George Mason University, May 31-June 2, 1992. Without implication
of responsibility, the author appreciates the comments of Mark Blaug and Syed Ahmad, the
correspondence on relevant matters with Mary Douglas, and especially the remarks of two
anonymous referees on earlier drafts. He also recognizes the technical help of Carole Brown
and Patricia Markley.
1. I use the terms “paradigm” and “research program” interchangeably, detached from the
connotations accorded by the works of Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos.
2. For a bibliographical review of early historiographies, see Oreste Popescu 1964.
History of Political Economy 27: 1 @ 1995 by Duke University Press. CCC 0018-2702/95/$1.50
Published by Duke University Press

44 History of Political Economy 27: I ( I 995)
Degree of Theoretical Abstractness

Periphery Core
Local Change Local Change

Extent of of Periphery of Core
Theoretical
Change Global
of Periphery of Core
Figure 1 Four areas of historiographical research.
to one criterion or another, as opposed to retrogressions; or still, whether

the ranking of theories should be regarded as dubious.
Given that progress entails improvements, does “local” theoretical
change of a certain “periphery” or subfield of a single research core
qualify as improvement? For example, do the diverse theories of money
springing from the Keynesian hard core constitute progress? Does “local”
theoretical change of the “core” of a single research agenda, like the key
concept of effective demand within the Keynesian core or the elemen-
tal idea of stability within the neoclassical general equilibrium theory,
count as improvement? Are “global” theoretical changes of a certain
“periphery,” such as the theory of international trade across the Marxian,
Keynesian, neoclassical, and other agendas, improvements? Or still, are
“global” theoretical changes of the hard “core,” such as the contrast of
the basic thrusts of mercantilist, classical, Marxian, neoclassical, insti-
tutionalist, Keynesian and other approaches, improvements? As stated
tersely in figure 1, I delineate four areas of historiographical research:
local change of periphery, local change of core, global change of periph-
ery, and global change of core. The delineation of the four areas should
help establish a taxonomy of different historiographical perspectives.
The delineation of the four areas of study hinges on two sets of op-
positions, namely, the peripherykore axis and the local/global axis. The
peripherykore axis deals with the degree of abstractness of theory. I
borrow the Lakatosian lexicon of Joseph Remenyi (1979) and restrict

Khalil / Has Economics Progressed? 45
the term “periphery” to what he calls the “demi-core” of a research

paradigm. The periphery as demi-core is not about the protective belt
of the core in general. Rather, it is about the parts of the protective belt
that extend the core statements of a research agenda with reference to
specijc subdisciplines like international trade, monetary theory, public
finance, labor economics, regional economics, health economics, and so
on. Thus, I consider theoretical innovations undertaken to sharpen the
core statements and make them logically consistent, rather than to relate
them to subfields or empirical findings, to be abstract and, hence, involve
the local change of core.
In contrast, the local/global axis deals with the extent of theoret-
ical coverage. That is, are theories being compared within the same
tradition-in which the theories could be either part of the periphery or
involve the core of that tradition? Or are we comparing theories across
traditions-in which the theories, again, could either deal with a certain
subfield or deal with the basic thrusts of those traditions?
The confusion of the two axes, namely, the extent of coverage and the-
oretical abstractness, is very common. For example, Bruna Ingrao and
Giorgio Israel (1990), for example, use Gkrard Debreu’s theory of value
as the frame of reference in order to reconstruct the history of general
equilibrium. “Debreu’s results regarding the existence and uniqueness of
general economic equilibrium include all previous formal developments
in the subject and are thus an important means with which to analyze the
effectiveness of previous results” (Ingrao and Israel 1990,4). Given such
an explicit admission of rational (Whiggish) reconstruction, it is peculiar
that they reject what they call a “cumulative historiographical approach”
because it is not sensitive to “historical specificity” (2).3This seems in-
consistent. But it would not be so if one notes the difference between
the two axes: they admit rational reconstruction in relation to the local
change of core of general equilibrium theory, namely, Debreu’s formula-
tion as better than Walras’s; however, they refrain from applying rational
reconstruction with respect to the global change of core, namely, neo-
classical general equilibrium agenda as more progressive than classical
economics or Keynesian economics.
The focus of this essay is chiefly on the global change of core; that
is, whether the basic vision of the economic problem has progressed.
3. In effect, Ingrao and Israel attend to historical specificity, for example, how Walras’s
concept of equilibrium differs from Debreu’s, in their story of the local change of core of
general equilibrium.

46 History of Political Economy 27: I ( 1 995)
Richard Rorty’s (1984) taxonomy of the historiography of philosophy

could help us to distinguish the chief focus from the global change of
periphery mentioned earlier. He calls the global shift of core “Geistes-
geschichte as canon-formation”:
Geistesgeschichte works at the level of problematics rather than of
solutions to problems. It spends more of its time asking “Why should
anyone have made the question of-central to his thought?” or “Why
did anyone take the problem of-seriously?” than on asking in what re-
spect the great dead philosopher’s answer or solution accords with that
of contemporary philosophers. It typically describes the philosopher
in terms of his entire work rather than in terms of his most celebrated
arguments. (Rorty 1984,57)
That is, the area relating to global change of core asks whether the dif-
ferent views about the “big” question, namely, what is the economic
problem, could be ranked.
In contrast, the area concerning global mutation of periphery asks how
a specific argument by an economist from one tradition or period, like
Thomas Malthus on public finance, relates to another argument from
a different tradition, like Paul Samuelson on the same subject. To an-
swer this, Rorty identifies two’other historiographies that should be fa-
miliar to historians of economics. First, the “rational reconstruction”
or Whiggish perspective basically advocates the “terminus ad quem of
history-of-science-as-story-of-progress” ( 58). This is clearly about how
an economist’s theory from one era comes close to the obvious truth of the
upheld theory. In rational reconstruction, the historian assumes that the
theory from one school could be extracted, without much violence, from
the author’s body of thought, its underpinning vision, and its environ-
mental context. Second, the “historical reconstruction” or contextualist
perspective basically rejects such a surgical procedure. It generally main-
tains that the extraction and comparison of peripheries without regard
to their respective bodies of thought or historical contexts imminently
violates the constitution of one theory in favor of the other.4
In short, Rorty’s idea of canon formation corresponds to the concept
of global shift of core. In addition, Rorty’s notions of rational and histor-
4, An example of the debate concerning global evolution of periphery is discussed by Mark

Blaug (1990,29-30; cf. Samuelson et al. 1991) concerning the difference between Paul Samuel-
son (the Whig) and William Baumol (the contextualist) with respect to interpretationof Marx’s
transformation problem.

ical reconstructions deal, from different perspectives, with another area,

namely, global change of periphery. He does not seem to have attended
to the other two areas identified in figure 1.5
In fact, it is possible to extend Rorty’s notions of rational and historical
reconstructions to areas of local change. As we have seen earlier, Ingrao
and Israel offer a view of local change of core of neoclassical equilibrium
theory according to the principles of rational reconstruction. In contrast,
E. Roy Weintraub ( 1991) offers a historical reconstruction perspective
with regard to the same issue. Ingrao and Israel more or less commence
with Walras, while Weintraub studies the history of stability problems
within the neoclassical core from the 1930s to the early 1960s. Despite
Weintraub’s shorter span of coverage, he argues for historical reconstruc-
tion on the ground that a small community of economists came to define
the stability problem in a way that differs radically from the contributors
in the 1930s.
Without adequately distinguishing between the areas of global progress
of periphery and global progress of core, Mark Blaug (1990) employs
Rorty ’s “rational reconstruction” and “historical reconstruction” to re-
place, respectively, the terminology “absolutism” and “relativism” that
he once used (Blaug 1985,l-2; see also Chalk 1967;Mini 1974,3-9; Hill
1986).6In John Passmore’s ( 1965)typology of the historiography of phi-
5. Besides canon-formation, rational reconstruction, and historical reconstruction, to com-

plete his taxonomy Rorty provides a fourth classification, “doxography.” Doxography is “the
attempt to impose a problematic on a‘canon drawn up without reference to that problematic”
(Rorty 1984,62).This would be equivalent to a book on the history of rent theory or interest rate,
contrasting what Aristotle, Karl Marx, and Paul Samuelson have to say on the matter without
attending to their disparate theories of value. Given its artificial character, Rorty maintains that
doxography should be totally removed from intellectual life. However, Rorty considers “the
remaining three [historiographies] indispensable and [they] do not compete with one another”
(1984,67).
6. In a third piece, Blaug (1976) calls the absolutist position the “internalist” view of the
evolution of ideas, while he dubs the relativist position the “externalist” one. The internalist-
externalist lexicon has a long history that Steven Shapin (1992) traces to Robert Merton’s 1938
classic, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England. In the past decade, as
Shapin observes, this lexicon has fallen out of fashion in the disciplines of history and sociology
of science. For one thing, the schizophrenic opposition between internalism and externalism,
which Shapin describes as a “madhouse,” was “marked by widespread and troubling incoher-
ence” that invited faulty and misguided generalizations (Shapin 1992, 345, 334). To point out
one problem, the internalist-externalist language tends to lump ideological orientations with
historical developments under the umbrella of “external” variables. For example, Craufurd
Goodwin argues that the progress of economics has been premised on “both . . . [the] internal
forward movement in the protective belt and the repeated external shocks which jolt the core or
foundation of basic principles” ( 1980, 6 16). Goodwin enumerates three “external” variables:

48 History of Political Economy 27: 1 (1995)
losophy, absolutism or rational reconstruction amounts to “retrospective”

construction of past ideas, while relativism or historical reconstruction
amounts to “cultural history” of ideas.
I have tried to define four areas of research and some interrelated ter-
minology in order to focus on the historiography of the question of global
mutation of core. The main argument of this article is that there are four
different kinds of relevant historiography :7 first, economic theory pro-
gresses (or regresses) according to scientific standards-as “rectilinear”
historiographers generally judge; second, economic theory changes in re-
sponse to contingent economic events, cultural schemes of thought, and
biographical differences-as “historicist” economists broadly postulate;
third, economic theory merely alters its appearance while preserving an
eternal nucleus or essence-as “universalist” historians like Karl Pri-
bram (1983) stipulate; and fourth, economic theory mutates according to
the same laws which govern the evolution of species-as “evolutionary”
epistemologists advocate.*
The proposed four-way taxonomy of the historiography of economic
theories is necessarily a simplification and may be, in’many instances, a
caricature. Given second- and third-level qualifications, actual historiog-
raphers’ methods do not usually fit neatly and exclusively into one of the
four pigeonholes.’ Nonetheless, the four-way taxonomy might help us
clarify the contending issues that pull historians in different directions.
The attempt at taxonomy here does not aim to rewrite the history
the need to explain distribution on grounds other than the labor theory of value, the Depression,
and the post-World War I1 demand for a theory that explains the non-maximizing behavior of
big business. One may argue, however, that economic developments may act like experiments
that make certain theoretical propositions more or less tenable on internal grounds.
7. The four proposed kinds of historiography could be applied isomorphically to the other
three areas of research.
8. Joseph Spengler ( I968,25-28) offers a terse five-way classification of historiography. First,
a theory could be isolated from the scholar’s set of ideas; second, a theory could be viewed
through its natural stages from birth to rise and decline; third, a theory could be reformulated
in modern lexicon; fourth, a theory could be examined in terms of the creator’s biography; or
fifth, a theory could be studied in light of the creator’s vision. While the proposed four-way
classification captures some of Spengler’s categories, I find his five-way taxonomy to be based
on nonsystematic and arbitrary criteria.
9. It is also possible that historians may choose to be eclectic. For example, Bruce Caldwell
(1982) calls for “methodological pluralism,” which steers away from a positivist method of
appraisal, while not embracing the idea that anything goes like Paul Feyerabend does. In the other
direction, Roger Backhouse (1992a, 3 I ) advocates a “pluralistic approach,” which entertains a
rectilinear program of appraisal for some “bold generalizations,” while not espousing the idea
that one could ignore the historical context altogether. However, such eclecticism leaves us
empty-handed with regard to the question of whether economic theory has progressed globally.

Historiographies
+
Rectilinear
Incrementalist Stadia1
Historicist Universalist Evolutionary
Ecologicalist Culturalist Biographicalist
r-11
Progressive Regressive
I
Ideological Temperamental
Figure 2 A four-way taxonomy of historiographical perspectives.
of thought in terms of a championed historiography. Although related,

the attempt does not discuss methodology in the strict sense, that is,
verificationism, instrumentalism, or falsificationism in light of the works
of Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, and so on.” Rather, the
exercise, as summarized in figure 2, ventures to expose critically the
four historiographies and their subspecies with regard to the question of
the global progress of economic paradigms. Thus, the exercise here is a
third derivative: it is a taxonomy of the historiographies of paradigmatic
theories of the economy.
Rectilinear Historiography
Frank Knight assumes that economics tends to change toward the correct
views. “On the assumption that the primary interest in the ‘ancients’ in
such a field as economics is to learn from their mistakes, the principle
10. I discussed these methodological issues elsewhere (Khalil 1987a; 1989). In this context,
I want only to mention Peter Galison’s (1988) unusually clear-headed treatment of the link
between philosophy of science and periodization. He argues for a “critical postmodern peri-
odization.” The proposal is intended to supersede the shortcomings of “positivist periodization”
and “antipositivist periodization.” While the former reduces theories to empirical findings, the
latter reduces empirical findings to theories. In contrast, the critical model avoids “the un-
warranted assumption-shared by both positivist and antipositivist-that there is a universally
fixed, hierarchical relation between experiment and theory.” The task at hand is “to discover
and articulate the mediative processes by which experiments and theories each constrain the
other’s activity” (1988, 208).

50 History of Political Economy 27: I ( I 995)
theme of this discussion will be the contrast between the ‘classical’ sys-
tem and ‘correct’ views” (1956, 37). There is some plausibility to this
claim if the extent is local change of periphery. But Knight is claiming
more than that; he claims that the superiority of the modern resides in its
negation of the core or basic vision of the ancients.
Such a view is rectilinear because paradigms are judged to be correct
or incorrect from supposedly neutral grounds. While those employing
the rectilinear approach might pay some attention to the historical con-
text, they generally regard theoretical analyses as commensurable. Their
project is to arrange different traditions in terms of desirability. This ul-
timately means the dislodging of traditions from their diverse questions
or specific historical baggage.
According to Piero Mini, the rectilinear tendency ultimately portrays
economic theory as timeless-as if economics were “a nonThumanen-
deavor, independent of space and time and of their qualities, independent,
therefore, of the thinkers and their philosophies, world view, and convic-
tions” (1974,3). For Mini, the approach “might be called the Little Jack
Horner theory of the genesis of economics” (3).
The rectilinear approach comes in two varieties: the incrementalist
outlook, which deems theoretical change as gradual, and the stadia1 ap-
proach, which regards it as discontinuous.
Incrementalist Outlook
The incrementalist perspective is usually not interested in traditions that
have failed to win a wide audience. Change of theoretical content is
regarded, according to one criterion or another, as incremental improve-
ments with regard to a perennial economic problem. However, it is the-
oretically possible to conceive of incremental change as a regression.
This would amount to stating that, for example, there was no marginal
revolution, or Alfred Marshall’s outlook is more irrelevant than David
Ricardo’s. But no one, as far as I am aware, adheres to such regressive
incrementalism.
Thus, I review only the progressive kind of incrementalism which Jurg
Niehans defended most recently as the underpinning perspective of his
book. “Modern mainstream economics, in all its vagueness and imper-
fection, is taken as a standard of reference. The economic literature of
the last three centuries is then scanned for pieces of innovative anal-
ysis that have become part of modern mainstream economics” (1990,

Khalil / Has Economics Progressed? 5 1
2). According to this approach, the historiographer should not criticize

past efforts because, if they are faulty, they would have failed in any
case to register an impact on modern economics. That is, the history of
economics itself would have deleted them as pieces of analysis that do
not “deserve to appear onstage in the first place.” As in biological se-
lection, the fitness of theory should not be judged by the historiographer
“but by its survival” (2). In his tale of economics as a process of “cu-
mulative progress,” Niehans organizes the material around individuals
rather than around schools of thought. While he divides the different
personalities into three eras-the classical, the marginalist,.and the eco-
nomic models-these are simply convenient lines of organization. That
is, the idea that the history of economics proceeds in stages, in which
each stage has its own typical research agenda, “seems to reflect more
the aesthetic needs for an intellectually pleasing architecture than the
true dynamics of science” (4). Niehans employs historical periods only
to reflect changes of style and certain peculiar practices-not to reflect
presumed substance-because history is an incremental flow. “A play is
usually divided into acts, separated by curtains. History is no stage play.
It evolves in a continuous flow without curtains or intermissions. This is
also true for the history of economics. It consists of a seemingly chaotic
flow of contributions blending imperceptibly into one another” (4).
The classic defense of such progressive incrementalism comes from
the work of George Stigler. For him, the “dominant influence upon the
working range of economic theorists is the set of internal values and pres-
sures of the discipline” (1960,40). That is, economic theory progresses
in a manner in which the emergence of certain techniques is inevitable
because they are planted by the untidiness of previous theories. Thus,
economic theory is supposedly immune from events and policies. Other-
wise, there would be no science, no profession, and certainly no academic
’’
tenure in economics. Stigler even downplays the role of originality in
scientific progress because “science, like nature, moves at most by short
jumps” (1955,294). “Great Economists are those who influence the pro-
fession as a whole, and this they can do only if their doctrines do not
involve too great a change from the views and knowledge of the rank and
1 1. Although stemming from a different sentiment, Spengler also observes the effect of pro-
fessionalization of economics. “Today, Western society is undergoing an intellectual sundering.
At least two cultural worlds are emerging: that of the scientist, which no longer is being in-
terpreted to the underlying mass, and that of an underlying mass which draws its constructs
mainly from media which , . . are replacing the book” (Spengler 1968, 30).

52 History of Political Economy 27:l (1995)
file of the science. It is simply impossible for men to apprehend and to

adopt wholly unfamiliar ideas” (294). Such an assessment might be an
appropriate description of local progress, that is, the normal unfolding of
a certain scheme of thought. But Stigler makes no differentiation between
local progress and global progress. In fact, Stigler (1969) denies that the
so-called marginalist revolution has changed the “essential elements” of
classical theory. For him, scientific change consists of minute cumula-
tive additions. This assumes that all theories-minute and major-are
symmetrically susceptible to the selection forces of the efficient market
of ideas. I 2
If the market of ideas is efficient, the marginal cost of learning a non-
successful doctrine must be, in most cases, greater than the marginal
benefit. Such a doctrine is probably “mostly out of date” like “the weather
forecast of 1800” (Stigler 1969, 218).13 Given such an attitude, it is
no wonder that many neoclassical economists considered Stigler as the
unofficial spokesman of the justification of why they should neglect the
history of thought.14 Supposedly, the full theoretical value of past ideas
must have been either internalized in the more elegant forms of modern
theory or found to be erroneous.I5
To complete the story of progressive incrementalism, one cannot but
allude to the works of Samuel Hollander and Michio Morishima. They
argue that classical economics represents a primitive version of Wal-
rasian general equilibrium. Hollander (1980; 198l ; 1982) does not even
recognize that there was a marginalist revolution: classical economics
is merely the body of thought of a historical period and does not pro-
fess a different kind of theory. Morishima (1973) offers an exposition of
12. As shown below, Darwinian evolutionary epistemology has ramifications that ironically
rebut Stigler’s version of rectilinear historiography.
13. Donald Gordon shares the same sentiments when he uses Kuhn’s idea of “normal science”
to justify the decline of interest in the history of economic thought in forty major university
departments in the United States: “Economic theory is very much like a normal science and
that, like a normal science, it finds no necessity for including its history as a part of professional
training” ( 1 965, 126).
14. In this light, L. M. Rantala’s eulogy is enigmatic. “Stigler’s lifelong interest in the
intellectual history of economics was an important factor in keeping this branch of the discipline
alive during the latter part of the twentieth century” (1991,595).
15. S. Todd Lowry tells the story that Stigler in a meeting, “out of deference to the power
of rational analysis from David Ricardo to the present, emphatically rejected the notion that
scholars could “mine the past” for analytic insights useful to modern economic theory. He went
so far as to specifically deny ‘tenure’ to Aristotle as a legitimate subject of study in the history
of economic thought” (Lowry I99 I , 135).

Marx that makes him little different from a general equilibrium theorist
like Walras. Such a position, and progressive rectilinearism in general,
is different from progressive stadialism.
Stadia1 Outlook
The stadia1 perspective is generally more sensitive to the historical and
biographical context of theories than the incrementalist stand. Stadialism
allows for the idea that theories could be lumped into contending schools
separated by gaps. But stadialism shares with the incrementalist outlook
the idea that theories presumably could be (not without effort) salvaged
from the jaws of historical contingencies. Thus, for the stadialist agenda,
paradigms could ultimately be submitted to some neutral test or rational
argument and then could be ranked. Such an outlook is shared by both
progressive and regressive strands of stadialism.
Progressive Stadialism While the advocates of progressive stadialism

regard the historical trend as consisting of the eventual triumph of su-
perior agendas, they recognize differences among schools of thought.
The recognition that the past was different amounts to being “honest,”
according to Paul Samuelson (1988; cf. Kurdas 1988). However, for
Samuelson one is still compelled to view the past from the vantage of
the present since there is a progression of “cumulative knowledge.” In
his defense of his rational reconstruction of Marx’s transformation prob-
lem, Samuelson argues for a “Whig History of Science”: “In it we pay
past scholars the compliment of judging how their works contributed (al-
gebraic) value-added to the collective house of knowledge. . . . I have
thought it valuable to treat Marx not as an historic deity or oddity, but
rather to appraise his arguments on the transformation problem in the
way a journal referee would treat any serious contributor” (1974,76; see
also Samuelson 1987).
As Roy Weintraub puts it, Whiggish history “is history as exemplar
of the march of wisdom, of progress, from the dark and uninformed past
to the enlightened and scientifically sophisticated present” (199 1, 5). A
Whig reading of the history of the stability problem of general equi-
librium, for example, entails the construction of the diverse economic
knowledge of the 1930s as if it leads to the papers on dynamics by Ken-
neth Arrow and others in the late 1950s, passing through Samuelson’s
Foundations of Economic Analysis (Weintraub 1991, chap. 2). Kenneth

Boulding (197 1) notes that a Whiggish history of economics leading to

Samuelson’s contributions, or anybody else’s, has contributed to the un-
dermining of the teaching of the history of economic thought in graduate
programs.
The most unrecognized progressive Whig historian is Karl M a x . He is
the one who coined the Petty-Smith-Ricardo tradition as “classical” eco-
nomics and reconstructed, in Theories of Surplus Value, its contributions
as leading to his theory of value. For example, he took Adam Smith’s no-
tion of “labor-commanded” as the attempt to camouflage the exploitative
origin of profit (see Khalil 1991). When Marx came under the scrutiny
of Ian Steedman (1977), the labor theory of value was subjected to a
progressive stadialist evaluation according to Sraffa’s theory of price.
Steedman argued that labor measures cannot be known independently
of prices of production (at which there is a uniform rate of profit). More
importantly for Steedman, there was no need to dwell on essentialist,
although historically specific universalist, notions like labor values in
order to account for surface phenomena like prices of production. While
many Marxists, like Paul Sweezy (in Steedman et al. 1981), admit to the
technical argument by Steedman, they appeal to the contextual meaning
of Marx’s qualitative assessment of capitalism and the exploitative origin
of profit. William Baumol, as recorded by Blaug (1990,29-30), likewise
expressed an anti-stadialist account of Marx with regard to Samuelson’s
rational reconstruction.
In addition, progressive stadialism vitiates the sophisticated histori-
ography of Joseph Schumpeter. His magisterial history is the history
of progress of “scientific or analytical economics”: “When we use the
concepts and theorems that we have inherited from our predecessors,
these concepts and theorems-which we call the analytic apparatus of a
science-change in our hands. We add here and correct there and so this
apparatus slowly develops into a different one” (1954, 1141). However,
this does not refer to global incremental refinements in Stigler’s sense
of the phrase. Rather, Schumpeter is alluding to local progress, such as
the consolidation of neoclassical economics before World War I, which
formed the basis for the progress of later work. “The one thing that can
be confidently asserted about the work of the period we have been sur-
veying is that the theory of 1945 is greatly superior to the theory of 1900
as regards technique” (1 145).
Besides the adherence to the 1ocal;progress of periphery, Schumpeter
believed that economic theory changes in a punctuated, periodic manner.

Each theoretical epoch is fashioned after the philosophical, ideological,

intellectual, and political trends of its period. However, Schumpeter (38-
48 1) contended that it is possible to evaluate the analytical content of such
periods apart from their pre-analytic vision. In reference to Adam Muller,
he argues that the “methods of analysis” and “philosophic vision” “are
two different worlds that do not touch anywhere and neither of which
can tell us anything about the phenomena . . . in the other without
reducing its own arguments to futility” (422).16This assumes that each
contribution could be stripped of its philosophical and historical baggage
and examined from the more advanced, modern theoretical perspective.
Schumpeter based such a contention on the controversial distinction be-
tween “vision” and “analysis.” Such a positivist distinction resembles
the well-known differentiation made by conventional philosophers of
science between the context of discovery and the context of verification
or falsification.
Blaug, approving of Schumpeter’s visiodanalysis distinction, writes
“the problem is not denying the presence of propaganda but . . . sepa-
rating the scientific ideas from the ideology in which they are invariably
embedded and to submit these ideas to scientific tests of validation”
(1985, 5). Blaug continues, “Political prejudices may even assist scien-
tific analysis” (5). On this basis, ideas of the past should be subjected
to the same criteria as current theories. But Donald Walker (1988) puts
it more radically: the ideas of the past should be “evaluated” from the
perspective of modern equilibrium theory.
Of course, Blaug (1985) is ready to concede that such a progressive
outlook has its limits. There is an “uneven rate of improvement,” and
“much of what is still valuable gets discarded in an enthusiasm over
the latest novelty” (4). Furthermore, Blaug recognizes that major shifts
in economics, like the marginalist and Keynesian revolutions, cannot be
explained solely by intrinsic scientific tendencies of intellectual improve-
ments. However, such qualifications come at second and third approxi-
mations of his progressive stadialist agenda. Blaug (1987) is careful to
distinguish his progressive stadialism from the progressive incremental-
ism of Hollander, Stigler, and others. Blaug contends that the classical
16. In connection with the influence of psychology, Schumpeter maintains that the propo-
sitions of “James Mill’s little treatise on economic theory . . . are completely independent
of associationist psychology and are just compatible with any other” (1954, 447). He notes
also that the analytical economics of John Locke or David Hume is independent of the upheld
psychology and philosophy of each (447n).

56 History of Political Economy 27: 1 ( 1 995)
theories of value, wages, rent, and distribution are different, albeit infe-
rior to neoclassical theories. Unlike the advocates of regressive stadial-
ism, Blaug regards the neoclassical theory of value, based on marginalist
analysis, to be more successful than the surplus approach of its classical
predecessor.
Regressive Stadialism Regressive stadialism, broadly speaking, main-

tains that what has been replaced defines the economic problem better
than the dominant neoclassical school. This view is usually advanced
by heterodox economists ranging from institutionalists and Austrians to
neo-Ricardian and Marxian theorists.
The neo-Ricardian or Sraffian school (see, for example, Garegnani
1984) regards the demise of the surplus approach and the rise of marginal-
ist analysis as a set-back. Likewise, Vivian Walsh and Harvey Gram
( 1980), inter alia, undertake a regressive reconstruction of Walrasian gen-
eral equilibrium from the premises of neo-Ricardian economics. Along
similar lines, Robert Heilbroner (1979) eloquently expressed the the-
sis that twentieth-century economics, in its most fundamental core, has
taken a wrong turn: the neoclassical focus on efficiency is inferior to
the classical concern with grand historical trends or worldly philoso-
phies. Such a view, like progressive historiography, reconstructs the his-
tory of economics from a supposed superior theory, albeit an underdog
one.
From a Marxist view, Maurice Dobb (1973), Michel DeVroy (1979,
and E. K. Hunt ( 1992) explain the regression of economic theory because
of ideology. According to them, the classical labor theory of value be-
came unsatisfactory in the last quarter of the nineteenth century because
of its ideological implication. l7 With respect to institutionalist thought,
Hunt (1992) argues that the ideas of Thorstein Veblen and Clarence
Ayres were rejected by the mainstream because they implied that the
success of business culture is not the result of catering to the needs of
consumers. Such needs are supposedly manipulated by profit-motivated
corporations.
In this light, when Marxian and other heterodox economists cite ide-
ological special pleading as being behind the triumph of neoclassical
economists, they are not usually, contrary to Blaug’s (1985,2) and Mini’s
17. Goodwin ( I 980,615) also maintains that the shift from classical to neoclassical economics
was probably the result of the demand of politicians for a theory of distribution grounded in the
production process, rather than in the bargaining power of classes.

(1974,9) assertions, advancing a historicist perspective. Rather, they are

trying to explain why economic ideas did not progress, that is, change
toward their favored paradigm. The heterodox appeal to ideology (as
exemplified by Meek 1967) is not an epistemological assertion against
reason as much as a sociological observation about why mainstream
economists have failed to see the light.
Historicist Historiography
Historicist historiography, which Donald Walker refers to as ‘‘rnultiplist
explanation” (1988, 1 1l), is informed by a substantivist perspective.
First, it considers the substance or content of each research agenda to be
almost unique, with which stadialist historians generally concur. Second,
it broadly postulates that such uniqueness would be violated once the web
of ideas is ranked according to a supposedly neutral criterion. In fact, a
strong thesis of historicism maintains that there are no neutral grounds
upon which one could adjudicate among competing paradigms.
Paradigms are presumably incommensurable because of their partic-
ular and arbitrary circumstances, which could be classified into three
kinds: the economic environment, the cultural scheme of thought, and
the temperament and ideology of the theorist. Lawrence Nabers com-
bines these three strands and calls the result the “genetic” perspec-
tive. As opposed to the ahistorical approach, which he calls “positive,”
the genetic approach contends “that the evolution of economic thought
can only be understood in terms of the evolution of policy and indi-
vidual values and in turn these assume meaning in the context of the
historical milieu” (1966, 8 1). I review these three strands under the
headings “ecologicalist,” “culturalist,” and “biographicalist” perspec-
tives.
Ecologicalist Perspective
The most obvious historicist strand is ecologicalism. It basically main-
tains that theoretical content is meaningful only with reference to the spe-
cific economic environment that played a crucial role in its formation.
The earliest ecologicalist historiographers who are still read are Wes-
ley Mitchell (1967; 1969) and Alexander Gray (193 1). Stated broadly,
Mitchell and Gray emphasize how theoretical questions are almost posed
by historical events, economic conditions, and institutions. The impor-

58 History of Political Economy 27: 1 ( I 995)
tance of the particular milieu is also accented by Eric Roll (1956) and
Werner Stark (1945).’*
The ecologicalist thesis is strongly advanced by Leo Rogin’s (1956)
work. He emphasizes how the current economic conditions shape the
content of theory. They are usually mediated through the policy concerns
of the economist. These concerns, for Rogin, are marred with ideological
predispositions. According to him, while the institutional premises ver-
ify the meaning of the theory, the theorist verifies his scientific-sounding
judgments through an unconscious process, hiding the value-based in-
spiration for his policy concerns. “Preoccupation with what ought to be
. . . appears to generate the scientific principles of what is-scientific,
because grounded in objectively valid, natural, psychological, and in-
stitutional premises” (1956, 6). “A normative model in its guise of ob-
jectively valid principles . . . becomes an instrument for classifying
prevalent institutions into the normal and the abnormal” (6).
To caution, these writers do not note only how historical events and
policy concerns pose the questions and somewhat influence the theoret-
ical content-many economists admit that much (for example, Eagly,
Meek, Sweezy, and Kurihara [in Eagly 19681). In addition, these writers
also maintain that the content of economic theory is ultimately deter-
mined by the economic conditions and policy imperatives of the age.
Since the policy concerns and economic conditions are presumed to be
erratic historical events, the manufactured theories are specific to the
historical period. This is the case even though theorists, as would be
expected, usually proclaim their products to be of general applicability.
Frank Fetter notes that the institutionally specific theory has a “ten-
dency to take on a universality of time and place” (1965, 139). This
somewhat sets the theory, of course to its detriment, on a track insulated
from historical events. Therefore, the theory persists, despite its irrel-
evance to a different generation, because “originators and intellectual
custodians acquire a vested interest in it” (139).
A recent ecologicalist reasoning surprisingly has been proposed by
Terence Hutchison (1976) and John Hicks (1976). Recanting his 1938
book The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory, which
introduced logical positivism into economics, Hutchison argues that
18. Other writers, like Chalk (1967) and Spengler (in Eagly 1968), restrict the importance of
the environment to pre-neoclassical economics. For them, economic theory became impervious
to exogenous events with the professionalization of economics since the turn of the twentieth
century.

economists cannot have eternal theories as they do in the natural sci-

ences. The object of study in the natural sciences has fixed constants,
while the object of social sciences is continually changing and evolving.
Likewise, Hicks argues that economic theories usually become outdated
because of changing economic realities. That is, there can be no uni-
versal economic theory that will do for us everything we want all the
time.
Adolph Lowe (1983; cf. Heilbroner 1970) concurs, calling for a candid
abandonment of the search for a universal economic theory. He vigor-
ously maintains that economic knowledge is not possible in the positivist
sense, which would require repeatable patterns of interplay among fixed
human motives and given social and physical environments. Historical
events, like the rise of affluent consumers and complex capital invest-
ment decisions, have rendered economic theory a relic of the simpler,
nineteenth-century world. The growth of the role of government and
the ever-changing environment do not allow for the spontaneous rise of
stable paths of linear or cyclical growth.
However, as a final justification for economic theory, Lowe argues
for a normative science of political economy that explicitly employs
what he calls “instrumental inference.” Theory should become an explicit
instrument in the hands of policy makers to control and maintain a growth
path. The role of economists is limited to proposing which kind of private
incentives would be needed to generate certain behavior in order to attain
the macroeconomic goal. In this manner, economic theory at the hand of
Lowe is not a mirror of reality but rather is a participant in the shaping of
human behavior and the construction of the environment. In this sense,
Lowe’s view is the apotheosis of ecologicalism.
Culturalist Perspective
Keith Tribe criticizes ecologicalism on the ground that it ignores the
culturally imbued or discursive perspective of the author. “Even . . .
where mercantile capital produces Mercantilism and manufacturing pro-
duces Classical Political Economy, it is necessary to realise this process
through the mediation of an experiencing author who can translate these
economic conditions into the discursive realm” (1978, 8). For Tribe, the
ecologicalist tendency presents the economy “as prior to or indepen-
dent of its discursive characterisations and the latter conceived of as an
adequate or inadequate reflection of it” (8). This is possible only “on

60 History of Political Economy 27: 1 (1 995)
condition that some dubious metaphysical distinction is made between

the ‘real world’ and the ‘world of ideas’ ” (8).
Instead of emphasizing economic events, the culturalist strand of his-
toricism, as represented in Tribe’s historiography, stresses the regime of
symbols that supposedly precedes the economic environment. In order
to qualify as a culturalist perspective, it is insufficient to simply note the
underlying web of symbols. The crux is the argument that such a web is
almost conventional or as arbitrary as a nomen. Such a position has been
most synonymous with the young Turks in the philosophy of science like
Paul Feyerabend and David Bloor.
But the nominalist agenda of the young Turks can be traced to the
ancient Greek sophists whom Socrates and Plato assailed most vehe-
mently. For my purpose here, the modern sophists are best represented
by the deconstructionist literary approach associated with Jacques Der-
rida and Michel Foucault (see Amariglio 1988). Foucault (1970, 166-
200) attempts to provide a history of modern economics in terms of an
anthropological study of the history of human sciences. For Foucault,
an intellectual history should involve, as the subtitle of his 1970 classic
indicates, an archeological uncovering of the hidden rules of formation
and unspoken conventions of discourse that define the dominant world
view or “episteme” of that period. According to Foucault, the dominant
episteme of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries centers around the
fictional creation of the individual body or “man.” Such an episteme has
shaped the three basic models of the human sciences-economics, biol-
ogy, and philology (Foucault 1970,355-67). Economics has obsessively
attempted to explain prices in terms of measuring a bodily substance.
For classical economics, the ultimate measure is the physical laboring,
or toil of the body. In contrast, for neoclassical economics, the measure
is the psychological desire or utility of the body. l 9
In light of the culturalist approach, Donald McCloskey (1988) ad-
vocates a “thick” history in the study of ideas. “Thick description,”
an expression borrowed from the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973,
chap. l ) , is required in order to expose the unique cultural matrix and
19. Philip Mirowski (l989a, 399; 1989b) and David Levine (1977; cf. Khalil 1987b) offer a
similar critique of the classical and neoclassical traditions. According to them, both traditions
explain market prices in terms of a predetermined substance or conservation principle viewed
as naturally grounded-either labor embodied or psychological utility-rather than in terms of
what they call “social interaction.” Likewise, Joan Robinson ( 1962) describes pejoratively the
classical and neoclassical foci on labor and utility as metaphysical and, hence, nonscientific.

the conventions of discourse of the community of scholars under focus.

Similarly, Arjo Klamer (in Samuels 1990) argues that economics is basi-
cally the creation of texts by minds regulated by negotiated conventions.
Such texts enable economists to conduct a conversation that is ultimately
self-contained or defined in terms of the cultural milieu.
While neither McCloskey nor Klamer has so far written a history
of economics from the culturalist perspective, Weintraub has (199 1).
Through the illustration of the history of modern general equilibrium
theory, Weintraub argues that we do not need methodology or the study
of the philosophy of science. Rather, we need more historical reconstruc-
tions of how an interpretive community arises with its own rules which
impose discursive order. Following Richard Rorty’s and Stanley Fish’s
arguments, Weintraub maintains that literary criticism (to note, of the
deconstructionist genre) shows how knowledge is socially constructed
through the power of culturally imposed conventions.*’
Such negotiated conventions are studied in detail by Philip Mirowslu
(1989a). He argues that “physics envy,” in particular the borrowing of the
energy metaphor, has shaped the content of the modern theory of price.
This has set mainstream economists on a misdirected train from which
they have not been able to jump. To make sense of Mirowski’s thesis,
one must keep in mind that he accords a great role to metaphors. For
him, form or style (which he tries to perfect in a different way as well)
ultimately shape the theoretical content.
Many critics (for example, Rosenberg 1985b, 379-80), however, have
pointed out the circularity or self-refuting character of the culturalist
agenda. With respect to Mirowski, how could he be aware of the mis-
leading train carrying neoclassical economists without some appeal to a
metaphor-free theory of value? That is, if community practices cannot be
but the result of negotiated conventions, what are the bases upon which
culturalist thinkers rely in their reconstruction of economics? One can-
not engage in criticism unless there is some other theoretical alternative
which one believes to be public knowledge. Once one argues that the
community should adopt, for example, a different theory of value, it can-
not be simply because the community is tired of the old ones. Arguments
20. In a recent exchange, Weintraub (1992) defends himself by writing that he does not
go as far as to regard facts as fiction-a charge leveled by Roger Backhouse (1992a). But
Backhouse (1992b) provides a convincing argument that Weintraub, who is mostly interested
in “understanding” rather than in the “appraisal” of history of thought, must eventually view
such a history as based on a community-negotiated, Wittgensteinian language game.

appealing to logical consistency and to stylized or statistically derived

observations have to be furnished-as in fact Mirowski (199i‘)-does.Such
arguments undermine the idea that norms regulating knowledge-seeking
activities are a priori or conventions impervious to anomalies.
Biographicalist Perspective
While the culturalist approach emphasizes the priority of customs at
the level of the community, the biographicalist perspective examines
pressures at the level of the individual theorist. In this sense, the bio-
graphicalist perspective salvages the autonomy of the thinker from the
clutches of a muscular perspective of cultural conventions. Nonetheless,
the advocates of the substantivist relevance of biography to the meaning
of theory find themselves siding with the culturalist camp when it comes
to the question of the commensurability of schools of thought.
The emphasis on biography could take two related avenues. First, the
biographicalist may find ideology, ethical commitments, and sociopolit-
ical values to be of paramount importance. Second, the biographicalist
may stress idiosyncratic habits of thought and personality characteristics
or, in short, temperament.
Ideological Biographicalism According to the first avenue of biograph-

icalism, ideology greatly informs the meaning of a theoretical construct.
The ideological perspective supposedly infuses the author’s theory with
tacit normative assumptions that generate objective-sounding descrip-
tions of reality. Such “objectivity” is turned into a weapon for advancing
a normative agenda that the theorist has failed to reveal in the first place.
To be clear, ideological biographicalist historiographers assert more
than the simple observation that ideology influences the construction of
theory. The observation is commonly accepted and usually dismissed as
subjective baggage from which the analytical content could be disentan-
gled (for example, Schumpeter 1954,34-43). The biographicalist histo-
rians advocate a stronger thesis: Economic theory cannot be value-free
(for example, Heilbroner in Samuels 1990). That is, they challenge the
textbook distinction between positive and normative economics, which
can be traced in modern thought to David Hume.
I cannot do justice here to the enormous literature on this exhausted
question. I want to point out, however, that it is easy to show how one’s
prognostications may betray one’s normative judgments. This is well-

illustrated by Schumpeter’s panorama of the future of capitalism, as well

as by the cases of some radical institutionalists and neo-Marxists like
David Gordon (198 1). Gordon offers an explanation of the decline of
the rate of growth of productivity (namely, workers’ resistance to dom-
ination and the subsequent rise of expenditure on supervisory “guard”
labor), which is not unlike some neoclassical models analytically. This
shows that divergent ideologies may end up with the same theoretical
explanation.
This phenomenon is further illustrated by the similarity between Karl
Marx’s and Ludwig von Mises’s perspectives on the nature of capitalism.
Marx, like von Mises, basically considers capitalism as a system of di-
vision of labor mediated by market “anarchy.” For Marx, the asymmetry
of power between workers and capitalists is only a secondary, derivative
feature of market anarchy (Khalil 1992a)..In fact, Marx appears to be-
lieve that worker-managed firms in a market context would be subject
to commodity fetishism and other laws of capitalist production (Marx
1981, 276-77). Thus, one may surmise that for Marx, as well as for
Austrian economists (such as Arnold 1987a; 1987b), “market socialism”
would be an oxymoron. Moreover, from the more distant past, the so-
cialist Sismonde Sismondi offers an under-consumptionist theory of eco-
nomic crises, which is not greatly different from the conservative Thomas
Malthus’s. One may conjecture that what differentiates Sismondi’s the-
ory from Malthus’s cannot be reduced to the ideological divide; rather,
it lies, as in many other cases, in the different political conclusions that
can be drawn from more-or-less similar analytical propositions. Thus,
contrary to ideological biographicalism, there is no one-to-one corre-
spondence between ideological orientation and analytical content.
Temperamental Biographicalism For the second avenue of biograph-

icalism, the meaning of a theory is greatly enhanced in light of infor-
mation concerning the economist’s temperamental dispositions and life
experiences. Walker ( 1983) argues that the historiographer should spec-
ify which biographical data are relevant, and he provides a taxonomy
of four basic parts: personal, which deals with character traits and tem-
peraments; professional, which deals with membership in professional
groups and interaction with other economists; environmental (what I
dubbed “ecological” above), which emphasizes the economic, social,
and political events of that time; and bibliographical, which consists of
the economist-written sources of influence. According to Walker, those

components of biography may explain “the circumstances that led an

economist to initiate work on a particular theory” (1983, 5 1).
However, Walker is not a temperamental biographicalist; that is, he
does not subscribe to the view that biographical circumstances are in-
dispensable to the understanding of scientific theories. Walker contends
that biography is more like psychology, whose “central concern is the
creative act rather than the character of scientific ideas” (1983,52). Such
an attitude is still moderate relative to Stigler’s suspicion of the role of bi-
ography. “We should seek to understand a scientist as his contemporaries
understood. That understanding normally involves very little biograph-
ical information: men write for wider audiences than their neighbours
and cronies, and indeed one of the lessons almost every adult learns is
how remarkably few are the people who are interested in his personal
affairs” (Stigler 1976, 61).*’
Donald Moggridge (1989,182)takes issue with the StiglerNalker po-
sition. He argues that biography cannot be dismissed as extra-scientific
“data.” It is true that the biographer necessarily has to select from enor-
mous reserves of information, which makes him susceptible to the charge
of hand-picking for special agendas. However, from the start, “our se-
lection is shaped by the achievements of the subject” (1989, 183). The
achievements of the economist must be more or less recognized by peers.
This calls attention to the problem of channels of communication avail-
able at the time. “Biography,” as noted by Joseph Spengler, “may point
up inquiries into both the channels of economic communication and
the kinds of conditions that are highly favorable to economic inquiry”
(1968,27).
For Spengler, however, the greatest task of the biographicalist approach
is to account for originality and novelty: “How a few innovate novelties,
whether or not assisted by ‘intuition,’ is an important quaesitum for the
historian of economic thought” (26-27). Such a challenge was squarely
met by William Jaffk (1965). He argues that analytical content cannot
be separated from the author’s experiences, characteristics, and idiosyn-
2 1. Stigler’s anti-biographicalism would be convincing if “understanding” a complex text

were a single event. At the outset of his article on the use of John Stuart Mill’s relation, inter
alia, with his father to explain his economics, Stigler writes, “The customary use of biography
in explaining scientific work is, to be quite blunt, shocking. There is no other area which is
remotely scientific in its pretensions which shows half the facility and even the popularity in
the use of The Hand-picked Example, The Implicit Absurdity, the Abhorrence of Evidence”
(1976,61).

cracies. The analysis is not the product of a given social and economic
milieu, where the economist is merely a “catalyst.” He considers the
distinction between biography and analysis, or the “in vitro view of the
relationship of an original discoverer to his theoretical discovery,” to be
“inadmissible.”
At least for the history of economic analysis, if not for a better under-
standing of the analysis itself, a discovery must be studied in vivo. The
discoverer is something more than a catalytic agent. He enters into the
theory he formulates, not as a stereotype, but as an individual possess-
ing an individuality of his own. If we consider carefully a truly original
concept, even one couched in austere mathematical symbols, we find
that it is inevitably composed of an intricate combination of elements
which are derived not only from the discoverer’s social, intellectual,
and physical environment, but also from his own personal traits, atti-
tudes, and endowments. This is frequently overlooked in histories of
economic theory . . . as if the personal aspects of a theory were a con-
taminating substance about which the less said the better. (1965,224)
With respect to Walras, Jaff6 finds that “his general equilibrium theory
must be understood as a work of art, and that, like all works of art, it was
marked with the personality of its creator” (226).
Another example of biographicalism is Robert Skidelsky’s (1985) and,
to a lesser extent, Charles Hession’s (1983) arguments that John Maynard
Keynes’s theory of effective demand could be better understood in light
of his creative, aesthetic temperament. As is well known, Keynes did not
care for axiomatic explications of economics. Following the well-known
foxhedgehog distinction promoted by Isaiah Berlin (see Khalil 1992b),
Keynes’s theory could be described as policy (fox) oriented, rather than
as logically (hedgehog) constructed.
However, can temperament fully account for the specific theory postu-
lated? It can be easily shown that the fox temperament (which arguably
also characterizes Milton Friedman’s monetarist approach) fails to gen-
erate a specific theoretical content. The same point is made by Warren
Samuels when he comments on Michael White’s (1991) thesis. White
maintains that W. Stanley Jevons wrote The Coal Question (1 865) while
employing the classical analytical framework of John Stuart Mill’s Prin-
ciples of Political Economy (1848). This is puzzling since Jevons was
critical of Mill as early as 1860. White successfully shows that the drive
for recognition was the motivation behind Jevons’s usage of the classical

framework. But Samuels notes, “There still remains the question: Why
did Jevons adopt the particular problems and modes of reasoning . . . ?”
(in White 1991, 236) Likewise, as in the case of ideology, it still needs
to be shown that there is a close one-to-one link between temperament
and theoretical content.
Universalist Historiography
The third type of historiography resembles Plato’s radical realism, which
describes theories as merely the variations of eternal Forms or universal
essences. In this sense, current ideas are seen as the expression of old ones
in new bottles; that is, new debates are simply the rehashing, with more
or less the same substance, of old debates. This corresponds to Alfred
Norton Whitehead’s aphorism that the history of Western philosophy is
merely a set of footnotes to Plato, or that everything of significance has
been uttered before by somebody who did not discover it (see Whitehead
1917).22
I suggest the term “universalism,” or what in some literature is called
“realism” or “essentialism,” to denote such a view of the different epochs
of ideas.23I use the term “universalism” because such a historiography
takes a certain problematic to be universally the base of most epochs of
thought. In other words, the epochs are seen merely as variations on the
same universal essence or problematic. While the term “essentialism”
might be equivalent to “universalism” on some occasions, it might indi-
cate, on other occasions, the view that each epoch has a particular “na-
ture.” No such confusion would be the case with the term “universalism.”
The term certainly suggests the view that all epochs are underpinned by
the same nature.
Universalist historiography should not be confused with the apparent
22. In another place, Whitehead (1933, 13-16) classifies all human ideas into two opposing
camps: the senseless drive away from inherited modes of order on one hand, and the formulated
beliefs or aspirations toward the refashioning of order on the other.
23. Universalist or essentialist historiography parallels what is called structuralist anthro-
pology in the school of thought of Claude LCvi-Strauss and structuralist linguistics in that of
Noam Chomsky (see Benoist 1974). It could be argued that it also resembles structuralist,
anti-Darwinian biology as advocated by D’Arcy Thompson and Brian Goodwin (see Webster
and Goodwin 1982; cf. Smith 1992). I intentionally avoid the usage of the term “structure”
to denote “essence” because the term has been employed to denote diverse matters like, infer
alia,spontaneous patterns such as uneven spatial bifurcations, the organization of the division
of labor, and the scheme of institutions and laws.

universalism of incrementalist historiography of Stigler, Hollander, and

Morishima. While they also advocate the idea that there has been more
or less one problematic in the history of economic science, their agenda
is different from universalist historiography on two counts. First, the
universalist approach conceives of theories as regulated by a hidden
archetype, while the incrementalist agenda of Stigler and others holds
that theories exist only at the surface grade. Second, the universalist view,
in its pure construct, or at first approximation at least, does not advocate
progress (or regress) in the history of thought like incrementalist (as well
as stadialist) rectilinearism.
The term “universalism” would also distinguish the historiography at
hand from stadialist rectilinearism as well as historicism. Stated gener-
ally, the latter two conceive of each research core as radically particular, as
if it had a specific essence or problematic unrelated to any universal ques-
tion. In this sense, universalist historiography is symmetrically distanced
from the poles of stadial rectilinearism and historicism. The universalist
approach does not, at a fundamental level, recognize schools of thought as
forming particular essences unrelated to a supposed universal problem-
atic. The stadialist and historicist historiographies, from the standpoint
of universalist historiography, differ only with regard to whether each
school could be contrasted on rational or neutral grounds. Thus, the uni-
versalist perspective equally challenges stadial rectilinearism as well as
historicism.
To illustrate briefly universalist historiography, Filippo Cesarano
(1983) argues that most theories of economics have not, contrary to
Blaug ’s thesis, experienced a rectilinear progression or a “monotonic
path of scientific development” toward the truth. To the contrary, as the
history of monetary theory illustrates, it has exhibited a cyclical or os-
cillatory path. He maintains that the current debate between monetarists
and neo-Keynesians concerning the transmission mechanism-direct or
indirect-between money and money income is a reincarnation, with
some qualifications, of a perennial conflict that runs deep in the history
of thought. Following Cantillon, Galiani, Hume, Marshall, and Fried-
man, an injection of money directly raises prices. In contrast, following
Thornton, Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Wicksell, and Keynes, an injection
of money raises output before the restoration of equilibrium.
Karl Pribram (1983) also offers, although on a grander scale, a uni-
versalist account of theories oscillating between the two opposing ex-

tremes of He reconstructs the contending schools of economics

through the ages as the embodiment of the perennial conflict between the
philosophies of what he calls “nominalism” and “universalism” (which is
basically Platonic realism).25Although related, this is not, as interpreted
by Mark Perlman, an epistemological conflict between “theorizing and
observation” (1986, 15). Rather, the conflict concerns the reality of ab-
stract ideas or common traits like courage, benevolence, customs, and
beauty. Plato proposed, although with some trepidation, a radical univer-
salist position that such abstract ideas are real forms that even precede
and dictate actual phenomena. At the other extreme, nominalists like
Roscelin and William of Ockham attacked all versions of universalism;
they regarded the abstract ideas as nomens.
According to Pribram, Thomistic economics (after St. Thomas Aquin-
as) is rooted in universalism, while the rise of Jesuit scholasticism is based
on nominalism. The Jesuit tradition continued in Cartesian economics
and Baconian mercantilist thinking. The utilitarian basis of such mercan-
tilism encountered opposition from cameralist economics, which is based
on universalist principles. However, the nineteenth century witnessed the
triumph of nominalist economics in the form of Benthamite utilitarian-
ism, which served as the basis of Ricardian economics. This did not spell
the disappearance of universalism. Rather it took the shape of organis-
michationalist economics in the German historical schools. Meanwhile,
the ultimate triumph of nominalism had to await the successful marginal-
ist revolution. This concept gave rise to what Pribram calls “hypothetical
economics.” Pribram’s dualistic universalism had difficulty classifying
Marxist and Keynesian economics. Pribram underemphasized the differ-
ence between Aristotle’s realism as opposed to Plato’s,26 and therefore,
24. Therefore, in light of the presentation below, it is erroneous to treat Pribram, as Hill
(1986) does, as a rectilinear historiographer.
25. In order not to be confused, Pribram describes a doctrine of economics as ‘‘universalist’’
in the same sense I describe Pribram’s historiography as ‘‘universalist.’’The difference is only
a matter of the degree of abstraction: while Pribram reflects on doctrines about the economy, I
reflect on historians who reflect on doctrines about the economy.
26. To substantiate my contention, Pribram takes the difference between the Aristotelian
and Platonist traditions to be mostly about method of inquiry. “The change in the methods of
thinking which was brought about by the adoption of Aristotelian logic consisted, above all, in
a redefinition of the functions of reason. . . . The universals which, according to Neoplatonic
philosophy, were believed to exist in reality, independently of the things of which they were
the prototypes, were now found [according to Aristotelian philosophy] to be directly accessible
to the human mind through processes of analyzing the individual things” (Pribram 1983, 5).
It is true that the Aristotelian revolution begun by Saint Thomas Aquinas incorporated greater

he failed to locate traditions that do not neatly fit the two extremes of
Platonian realism and nominalism.
Influenced by the romanticism of Adam Muller, the Viennese econo-
mist Othmar Spann ( 1930) advocated a universalist social economics
similar to P r i b r a m ’ ~He
. ~ ~also viewed the history of economics as con-
sisting of the struggle between two perennial poles, namely, universal-
ism and individualism. However, Spann’s concept of universalism dif-
fers greatly from Pribram’s. Spann’s concept is actually equivalent to
holism.28 According to Spann, universalists, or holists, deny the exis-
tence of economic science independent of law and social theory. They
consider the state, church, and firms as super-individuals. In contrast, in-
dividualists regard the state or firm as transient, artificial entities which
are merely the outcome of contractual relations among fully independent
individuals-somewhat like Ronald Coase ( 1937) conceives the firm.
In addition, Eduard Heimann’s ( 1945) little-known historiography re-
sembles Spann’s universalist duality. Heimann calls the two alternatives
that define the struggle in economic thought “mechanistic” and “organ-
ismic” views of social order. While the followers of Adam Smith (not
Smith himself) conceived of the law of natural harmony as a mechanical
law, Quesnay conceived of it as an organismic law. The mechanistic con-
ception has prevented economists “to the present day from recognizing
the possibility of functional disturbances and crises in the system” (1945,
17). In contrast, “Quesnay . . . started from a conception of economic
laws modeled on those governing a biological organism, and accordingly
his school was free to introduce the notion of sickness into the theory
emphasis on observations and empirical inquiry, but the Aristotelian tradition also denied that
universals exist in reality, independent of the things they represented. This does not lead to
nominalism, as the Aristotelian tradition testifies.
27. Despite his romanticism, Spann opposed the rise of the Nazis to power and died in a
concentration camp (Heimann 1945,244n).
28. To his credit, Pribram (1983,7,633 n. 9) notes the important difference between the two
meanings of universalism that Schumpeter (1954, 85n,412n) failed to note. In short, Pribram
mainly uses the word universal to denote the non-fictionality or reality of cultural institutions
and common traits that define the classes of entities-as opposed to the view that institutions
and traits are nominal and contingent. In contrast, Spann employs the term “universal” to denote
the non-artificiality or individuality of organizational arrangements like firms and states-as
opposed to the view that organizations could be reduced to their constituent members. Stated
differently, Pribram’s usage is concerned with the reality of phenomena-for example, whether
there are underlying essences below surface similarities or whether the categories about such
essences are merely nomens. In comparison, Spann’s usage is concerned with ontology, such
as whether human organizations express self-subsisting individuality based on common goals,
or whether they are merely vehicles or associations of mutual interests.

of the economic organism. Quesnay’s method is the one adopted in the

modern theory of economic fluctuations” (18).
A less obviously universalist work is Gunnar Myrdal’s (1953) critique
of the different forms of orthodoxy. ’These forms, ranging from natural
law to utilitarianism, are based on the political bias toward a supposed
harmony. The history of economics consists of a continuing struggle
between proponents of politically pregnant theories about natural har-
mony and their critics-among whose company Myrdal counts himself.
Thus, for Myrdal, there are no radical breaks in the history of thought,
outside of admitting normative partiality. “We must look upon the ma-
jority of modern economic doctrines as modified reminiscences of very
old political thinking, conceived in days when a teleological meaning
and a normative purpose were more openly part of the subject-matter of
economics” (Myrdal 1953, x).
A less-noted text which I consider to be in the universalist tradition
is Piero Mini’s (1974) critique of modern economics. He considers the
different types of economic theories as the manifestation of two universal
opposites: thinking and being. While Cartesianism emphasizes “think-
ing,” non-rationalism stresses “being” (as expressed in the works of Kant,
Kierkegaard, Bentham, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Dewey). Cartesianism
embodies the orientation of the classical theory of David Ricardo and
the “hyperclassical” theory of Alfred Marshall and Milton Friedman. In
contrast, non-rationalism incarnates the approaches of Marx, the Ger-
man historical school, Veblen, and especially Keynes. The fundamental
feature of Cartesian economics is the quest for logical, ahistorical truth
based on the supposedly untenable premise that there is a separation of
the intellect and the sensible world. In contrast, non-rational economics
attends to the historical context and the world of experience. “Classical
writings gave us the ‘auto-biography of the mind,’ ” according to Mini,
while “Marx and Keynes came close to giving us a biography of social
life” (1974, 283).
Yet, a universalist agenda does not have to be consciously constructed
as such. It could be the outcome of a certain style of pedagogy as in the
work of S. Todd Lowry (1987). He assesses the history of economics
as more or less the construction of new bottles for old wine. His life-
time work shows systematically how Greek thinkers have anticipated the
concepts of scarcity, monetary circulation, price regulation, cost-benefit
analysis, rationality, entrepreneurship, and utility calculation over time.
In sum, universalist historiography is antithetical to the idea of suc-

ceeding epochs in the history of thought in the sense that each epoch,
has its own unique essence unrelated to other research cores. While the
universalist view introduces clarity to the chaotic history of ideas as pre-
sented by rectilinear and historicist approaches, it does not appreciate
inventiveness nor development. For example, Mini, as we have seen,
lumps Keynes and Marx together as manifestations of non-rational, his-
torical economics.
Aside from the shortcomings of such simplified typology, universalist
historiography introduces a fresh perspective that exposes a common
weakness of rectilinearism, on one hand, and historicism, on the other.
The rectilinear and historicist historiographies, stated broadly, present
different paradigms as consisting of ultimately unrelated schemes of
thought; that is, there are no transhistorical questions that give rise to
the schemes. The two historiographies part company over the question
of the feasibility of rationally ranking or adjudicating such schemes.
In contrast to rectilinearism and historicism, the universalist approach
manages to show that succeeding or even contemporaneous schools are
not radically different. This has tremendous implications with regard to
economic methodology. Here it is sufficient to state that once affinity
is found among schools of thought, the task of adjudication takes on a
meta-theoretical, nonempirical dimension.
Evolutionary Historiography
The last category of historiography, the evolutionary approach, seems to
rectify the failing of the universalist approach by emphasizing change
and innovation. But evolutionary historiography also differs in at least in
one major respect from the rectilinear and historicist views. These views
present shifts in theory as the outcome of human volition and conscious
deliberation (which could arise from a multitude of reasons). In con-
trast, evolutionary historiography portrays theoretical shifts as occurring
somewhat behind the participants.
TO stress, however, in order for a theory to be evolutionary, it does not
need to restrict itself exclusively to invisible-hand explanations associ-
ated with the denial, at least at first approximation, of any role to directed
deliberations. Evolutionary historiography may recognize that there are
leaders in the profession (similar to political leaders) who influence what
is regarded as worthwhile research agendas for less eminent scholars.
Evolutionary historiography of economic thought still needs to be writ-

ten. Nonetheless, I attend to this potential category because of a rising

chorus in economics, which echoes parallel voices in other disciplines
calling for an evolutionary account of science and knowledge in general.
For instance, Wade Hands cautiously finds evolutionary epistemology to
have “a certain prima facie attractiveness” (1993, 193n). The attractive-
ness lies in its anti-foundationalism. It views the evolution of ideas as
being similar to the evolution of species-as a natural process governed
by an invisible hand. Thus, there is a minimal need on the part of philoso-
phers and methodologists to routinely “lecture” economists. In specific,
Hands considers the usage of the invisible hand metaphor by evolu-
tionary epistemologists as gratifying for economists. Thus, he calls on
economists to examine seriously evolutionary epistemology or the eco-
nomics of scientific knowledge as a potentially fruitful m e t h ~ d o l o g y . ~ ~
The greatest appeal of such an approach is that it is part of epistemo-
logical naturalism in the sense that it is concerned, assisted by scientific
findings, with description rather than prescription. As Philip Kitcher’s
( 1992) extensive survey shows, epistemological naturalism in that sense
is experiencing a revival. By evoking historical and scientific data, episte-
mological naturalism stands out against a long tradition of human-created
foundations or axiomatic criteria, which supposedly generate logical jus-
tifications of scientific theories.
Some philosophers and historians of science (for example, Radnitzky
and Bartley 1987; Munz 1993, chap. 3) advocate the treatment of scien-
tific ideas as subjected to the neo-Darwinian theory of natural ~el.ection.~’
As summed up by Bruce Caldwell in his essay on Karl Popper regarding
economic methodology, the branch of philosophy known as (Darwinian)
evolutionary epistemology
provides the epistemological foundations for critical rationalism. This
doctrine emphasizes the similarities between the growth of animal
(including human) knowledge and the evolution of species. Bold con-
29. Following Michael Bradie’s (1986) clarification, the focus here is on the evolutionary
epistemology of “scientific theories” and the products of human thinking in general. It is not
about the evolutionary epistemology of “mechanism” or the biological organs of the cognitive
apparatus. Concern with the evolutionary aspect of the cognitive apparatus epitomizes the
work of the ethologist Konrad Lorenz. Among the economists, Friedrich von Hayek (1963;
see Weimer 1982 and Herrmann-Pillath 1992) probably comes closest to the study of the
evolutionary epistemology of cognition.
30. Although there are major differences between Darwin’s theory and neo-Darwinism, they
do not concern us here.

jectures are analogous to blind variations (mutations) in nature; the

process of criticism is analogous to the process of natural selection.
Evolutionary epistemology provides an empirical basis for epistemol-
ogy (in processes found in nature) as well as an argument for realism
(the survival of both ideas and organisms depends on their fit within
their environment, and the assumption of an existing environment is
consistent with realism). The goal of the evolutionary epistemologist
is to create an “ecology of rationality” in which the optimal amount
of critical discourse is able to flourish. (Caldwell 1991, 23-24)
Popper is the most fervent proponent of the “ecology of rationality.’’
Such ecology, like Darwin’s natural selection, assures the survival-of-
the-fittest ideas through trial and error-or what he calls “conjecture and
refutation.” As Popper puts it, “new reactions, new forms, new organs,
new modes of behavior, new hypotheses, are tentatively put forward
and controlled by error-elimination” ( 1972, 242). Consequently, “the
objectivity and the rationality of progress in science is not due to the
personal objectivity and rationality of the scientist’’ ( 1981,95).
Working within the Popperian-Darwinian tradition, the psychologist
Donald Campbell (1990a) affirms the non-intentional role of the scien-
tist in the evolution of ideas. Campbell seems to have a more ambitious
program. He wants to discuss cognitive processes as well as scientific the-
dries per se in terms of natural selection applicable to organic evolution.
“An evolutionary epistemology would be at minimum an epistemology
taking cognizance of and compatible with man’s status as a product
of biological and social evolution. [I also argue] that evolutionnven
in its biological aspects-is a knowledge process, and that the natural-
selection paradigm for such knowledge increments can be generalized to
other epistemic activities, such as learning, thought, and science” (1974,
413). In this manner, theories, like traits, are occasioned by what Camp-
bell calls “blind variation and selective retenti~n.”~’
W. W. Bartley, a student of Popper, takes evolutionary epistemology
one step further. He argues that it should be treated as a branch of eco-
nomics. “The central concern of that branch of philosophy known as
3 I . David Hull is another advocate of Darwinian epistemology. In a perspicuous book, Hull

(1988; 1992; cf. Rosenberg 1992) calls the carriers of ideas “memes,” which evolve through the
Darwinian selection process. Such memes shape the content of ideas through the interaction
of the scientist with others. To wit, the memes are replicators in the same sense as genes or
genotypes, while actual ideas are interactors within an environment in the same sense as the
organism or phenotype.

epistemology or the theory of knowledge should be the growth of knowl-

edge. This means that the theory of knowledge is a branch of economics”
(Bartley 1990, 89). For Bartley, evolutionary epistemology is about the
market of ideas. Similar to the competitive markets assumed by the model
of perfect competition, the outcome is non-intentional. It is guided by
the invisible hand toward optimal theories in the sense of efficient alloca-
tion of resources. That is, the invisible hand ensures that only optimum
solutions are selected-even when the theories are the outcome of self-
interested scientists. As Hands eloquently paraphrases this Popperian
position: “It is not from the objectivity of the individual scientists that
we should expect scientific knowledge-just as, in Adam Smith’s words,
‘it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker,
that we expect our dinner’ . . . but rather it is from the open and com-
petitive critical environment of the scientific community in which that
knowledge is produced” (Hands 1993, 168).
Evolutionary epistemology need not be identical with the neo-Darwin-
ian epistemological agenda, however. To wit, the neo-Darwinian agenda
offers only one approach to evolutionary epistemology. While I cannot
discuss here the intricacies and debate surrounding the neo-Darwinian
account (see Rescher 1990), I would like to allude to six basic problems
with the neo-Darwinian evolutionary epistemology.
First, as noted by Hands, there is a circularity in evolutionary episte-
mology, which uses a particular social science theory (namely, the neo-
classical thesis that open product markets assure optimal outcomes) to de-
fend accepted theories, one of which is neoclassical economics, as scien-
tifically plausible because they have withstood the test of fal~ification.~~
As expressed by Hands: “Approaching questions about the methodology
of social science by way of a social analysis of natural science prac-
tice that presupposes a particular methodology of social science clearly
seems to beg far more questions than it answers” (1993, 169).
Second, it could be easily demonstrated that the variation among ideas
does not stem, as the neo-Darwinian theory contends, from an arbitrary
mechanism or chance mutation, irrespective of how constrained the mu-
tations are as a result of inherited schemes or paradigms. The hallmark of
32. The circularity of neo-Darwinian epistemology ironically resembles, to some extent, the
dismissal of the theory of natural selection as non-falsifiable. The theory maintains that nature
favors the survival of the fittest, but then measures fitness in terms of which organisms have
survived. However, received opinion regards such an apparent tautology as largely the result of
confused semantics (Rosenberg 1985a, 126-29, 154-64).

neo-Darwinian theory is that mutation or variation is independent of the

prospect of survival, that is, mutation is not directed. The usefulness of a
trait or idea is supposedly determined by the critical environment. This
means that the neo-Darwinian historiographer has to stretch to entertain
the thesis that ideas arise in a way unrelated to empirical facts.
Third, there are different ,levelsof the selection of ideas, among which
the orthodox version of neo-Darwinian theory does not differentiate at
least at the first level of approximation. For example, the hard-core neo-
Darwinian theory does not distinguish between the selection of a partic-
ular hair texture and the selection of hair itself, which is the character of
a higher taxon. Likewise, a neo-Darwinian historiographer would have
difficulty delineating the selection between a particular theory of the
firm, like Coase’s (1937), and a particular paradigm, like neoclassical
economics.
Fourth, as pointed out by Hands (1993, 186), the market for ideas
might not work efficiently for reasons similar to those as to why actual
markets usually fail to produce Pareto optimality. As any microeconomist
is ready to acknowledge, firms generally experience some market power
over price, externalities, economies of scale, nonexclusivity over re-
sources, minimum control over availability of products to consumers
(public goods), rent-seeking incentives, and so on. Likewise, it is possi-
ble that economic theories are accepted because of the entrepreneurial
character of the originator, the inertia of reputation, asymmetrical access
to funding, failure to neglect sunk costs expended in developing certain
theoretical constructs, and so on. Hands also maintains that even when
the market outcome is not measured through the standard criteria of op-
timality, but rather via an Austrian account of forces behind economic
growth, Bartley ’s economistic theory of knowledge still “has the prob-
lem of working out the forces of economic growth and applying them to
this particular problem” (1993, 186).
Fifth, there is always a struggle to synthesize diverse paradigms of the
economy, or at least to incorporate the points raised by opponents within
one’s approach (for example, the neoclassical synthesis incorporated
Keynes without sacrificing Say’s law). That is, there are no clear breaks
in a major paradigm shift as many authors have noted (for example, Coats
1969; Bronfenbrenner 1971;Kunin and Weaver 1971). We do not witness
such struggle for synthesis among different alleles of genes in the neo-
Darwinian picture. Alleles are supposedly exclusive-otherwise they
cannot be subjected to natural selection. According to neo-Darwinism,

76 History of Political Economy 27: 1 ( 1 995)
selection works because diversity is preserved-not muddled through

the synthesis.
Sixth, and of most importance, the neo-Darwinian theory, or at least
its hard-core version, vehemently repudiates the idea of progress. The
rabbit brain is as unique and adequate as the salmon or human brain
because each is selected or evolved to fit its particular environment; brains
less successfully adapted do not endure. Thus, advocates of Darwinian
evolutionary epistemology, like Bartley and Popper, should note that
the full implication of their agenda would give credence to historicist
historiographies of the culturalist type.33
As a matter of fact, neo-Darwinists strongly differentiate between the
terms “evolution” and “progress” (see Ayala 1982; 1988). As mentioned
above (but on the basis of a non-Darwinian rationale), the term “progress”
is reserved to denote change, using any criterion, from lower, less de-
sirable features or states to higher, more desirable ones. In contrast, the
word “evolution” is used as synonymous with “change” per se, which
does not denote any directionality or desirability. The theory of natural
selection explains evolution in a way that implies that different species
(of organisms or ideas) cannot be ranked.34Each species is unintention-
ally designed to fit its particular milieu. Thus, it would be ironic for critics
of historicism, like Hands and Blaug, to regard Darwinian, evolutionary
epistemology favorably. To be accurate, however, Hands (1994), at least,
33. Campbell (l990b) is aware of the historicist implications of the neo-Darwinian naturalist
program of blind variation and selective retention. It offers no normative criterion to distinguish
good from bad theoretical agendas. Campbell attempts to strengthen the normative aspect by
invoking Popper’s distinction between scientific theories and other. beliefs, namely, whether
they are susceptible to falsification. “The epistemological issue for scientific beliefs has to do
with the fit between those beliefs and their referents. The selection-theory dogma is that for
this fit to occur, the referents must be involved in selecting the beliefs, however vicariously”
(Campbell 1990b, 12). That is, scientific knowledge is distinguished from religion and other
cultural ideas by the fact that the referents of scientific theories participate in the selection
process. First, however, Campbell’s solution is subject to the problems that surround Popper’s
positivism. Second, and of more significance, the distinction between science and nonscience
invites an axiomatic, antinaturalist, and antievolutionary criterion from the back window.
34. To note, Robert Richards (1992) shows that Charles Darwin did not make the distinction
between evolution and progress. He goes further and argues that Darwin believed that evolution
involves the progress of ever-more advanced traits on the basis of an innate program. This
would make Darwin a subscriber to the rectilinearism of the biogenetic law (that is, ontogeny
recapitulates phylogeny) promoted by his contemporary in Germany, Ernst Haeckel (see Could
1977). If this is the case, Darwin’s position is certainly inconsistent with the neo-Darwinian
principles of random mutation and natural selection (see Khalil 1993). On the basis of these
principles, any discernible directionality in evolution is an accidental by-product of successful
adaptations to disparate environments.

is fully aware of the historicist implications of such an epistemology,

or what he calls an “economics-based analysis of science.” He correctly
considers it one version of the rising sociology of scientific knowledge
that challenges the traditional philosophy of science.
In short, it is difficult to distinguish neo-Darwinian evolutionaryepiste-
mology from historicism. At best, a neo-Darwinian epistemology might
afford a more precise specification than historicism of the rate of suc-
cession of ideas in relation to changes of the selective environment.
Nonetheless, the evolutionary approach should not be made a subcate-
gory of historicism; it should be separated. It is only the neo-Darwinian
version of evolutionary epistemology that is almost indistinguishable
from historicism. Some philosophers of science have already started to
offer extensions beyond Darwinian evolutionary epistemology (for ex-
ample, Hahlweg 1989)35as well as anti-Darwinian epistemology (for
example, Barham 1990),36but such attempts have not yet filtered to his-
toriographers of economics. It would be, however, interesting to find
out how a non-Darwinian evolutionary epistemology unfolds in the his-
toriography of economics. Such an epistemology might simultaneously
retain the anti-foundationalism of evolutionary theory without sacrificing
the standards of theory assessment.
Conclusion
I have attempted to offer a taxonomy of the different historiographies
of economics, and I have tried to show how the universalist view differs
equally from the rectilinear and historicist approaches. I also have sought
to distance the evolutionary approach from the other three historiogra-
phies. The basic thrust of my argument has been to offer a taxonomy
that is simple but still as comprehensive as possible. I would like here to
speculate on the usefulness of historiography.
In light of the above, evolutionary epistemology could infuse the el-
ement of change and, hence, rectify one failing of universalist histori-
35. Kai Hahlweg attempts to integrate Darwinian selectionism with the evolutionary thinking
of C. H. Waddington and Jean Piaget. He goes beyond selectionism by emphasizing goal-
directed behavior and anchors it on the framework of system theory or, in specific, cybernetics.
36. James Barham argues that an adequate anchor for the naturalization of goal-directed
behavior and purpose (which the NewtoniadDarwinian agenda does not recognize) is the
nonlinear dynamical mathematics of Jules Henri Poincark. Interestingly, the indeterminate
Poincarkan dynamics were devised originally to solve the three-body problem in systems that
lack purpose.

ography. Evolutionary epistemology may retain as well one attractive

aspect of universalism, namely, each research core is not about an iso-
lated problem, but is rather about a more or less continuous universal
question. However, so far what has been advocated is a neo-Darwinian
version of evolutionary epistemology. Such a version, despite the intent
of its promoters in economics, is usually a reformulation of historicist
historiography.
The challenge is to find a way to write a history of economics that ac-
counts simultaneously for the continuity of the trunk and for the change
of the branches. The evolution of economic knowledge might resemble
the development of a tree in two metaphoric senses: The development
of knowledge preserves the unity highlighted by universalist historiogra-
phy; it also affords the incorporation of change highlighted by rectilinear
and historicist historiographies. However, theoretical change is neither
rectilinear in proceeding along a ladder nor arbitrary in rolling upon a
patched carpet.
A developmental view of evolutionary change might uncover a greater
role for historians of thought than what is allowed by Blaug’s (1990)
rectilinear approach.37For Blaug, the specialization in the subdiscipline
of history of thought is needed because of the irrepressible inclination
of most innovative economists to use, openly or in disguise, history of
thought in order to demonstrate the advantage of their point of view.
Every economist who has a new idea usually rummages the “attic of past
ideas to establish an appropriate pedigree for the new departure” (Blaug
1990,35).
Thus, in response to the question (Blaug 1985) that suggested the
title of this essay, Blaug affirms that there is progress in the history of
economics. Such progress provides the raison d’etre for the subdiscipline,
rather than just doing economics. However, Blaug’s belief in progress
leading to neoclassical economics makes his defense of historiography
puzzling. It amounts to presenting historiography as an appetizer to a
ready-to-serve school of thought, or in other words, indulging established
economic traditions (neoclassical, Marxian, or whichever is the premised
well-baked school) with showers of self-congratulations.
I think historians of economics have a more important function, which
37. In a personal communication, Blaug (1992) disputes the interpretation that is to follow.
Although admitting he did not make it clear in his 1990 paper, he maintains that the ulti-
mate justification for the history of economic thought is historical reconstruction-taking into
consideration that it is impossible in sknsu stricto.

has been widely recognized. They keep alive embryonic ideas whose crit-
ical insights on current economic problems have not yet had the chance to
develop. This function has long been entertained by Joseph Schumpeter
and others (for example, Backhaus 1986,61). However, such a role would
dispute Stigler’s (1969) thesis that the market of ideas is efficient. He ne-
glects the possibility that the market of ideas is multitextured. That is, it
does not contain the full potential of all diverse insights possible. Thus,
the different paradigms do not compete on an equal footing; a given
theory might have an advantage because its underlying core appeared
earlier in history. I suggest that an initial interpretation or development
usually has an advantage over other interpretations because of increasing
returns; that is, an earlier development is usually set on a non-ergodic
path.
A developmental or evolutionary historiography of economics still
needs to be written. One may speculate as to why the diverse schools of
economics are usually not seen as branches of a developing tree, but one
could certainly assert that such a view would accord the historiographer
a greater importance. The historiographer does not deal with merely
arcane and antiquarian pursuits-even when he thinks so. Rather, he is
the custodian of hoary ideas that have not yet had their chance for full
exploration and reflection. These ideas and the service of the custodian
become most needed when the reigning orthodoxy finds itself-or more
accurately when young challengers find it-driving on a dead-end road.
In this light, it would be a tragic mistake to follow Margaret Schabas’s
(1992) call for historians of economics to break away from the economics
departments and join the history of science departments. Her call is based
on the belief that historical sensibilities could be furthered if historians
distanced themselves from practicing economists when evaluating past
ideas. This would amount to the relegation of the history of economics to
arcane and esoteric pursuits-which is exactly what we should challenge.
While in recent decades economists accorded minimal respect to histo-
rians of thought, this might have been the result of the failure of historians
to highlight the importance of their work. Such importance goes beyond
providing quotations from past authorities in order to buttress already
formulated arguments-a function with which Blaug seems to be con-
tent. The great importance of historiography stems from the possibility
that old texts have potential that has not been exhausted by Stigler’s
supposedly efficient market of ideas.

80 History of Political Economy 27: 1 (1 995)
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History of Political Economy

Has Economics Progressed? Rectilinear,

Correspondence may be addressed to Professor Elias L. Khalil, Department of Economics, Ohio

Published by Duke University Press

44 History of Political Economy 27: I ( I 995)

Degree of Theoretical Abstractness

Local Change Local Change

Figure 1 Four areas of historiographical research.

to one criterion or another, as opposed to retrogressions; or still, whether

Published by Duke University Press

Khalil / Has Economics Progressed? 45

the term “periphery” to what he calls the “demi-core” of a research

Published by Duke University Press

46 History of Political Economy 27: I ( 1 995)

Richard Rorty’s (1984) taxonomy of the historiography of philosophy

4, An example of the debate concerning global evolution of periphery is discussed by Mark

Published by Duke University Press

Khalil / Has Economics Progressed? 47

ical reconstructions deal, from different perspectives, with another area,

5. Besides canon-formation, rational reconstruction, and historical reconstruction, to com-

Published by Duke University Press

48 History of Political Economy 27: 1 (1995)

losophy, absolutism or rational reconstruction amounts to “retrospective”

Published by Duke University Press

Khalil / Has Economics Progressed? 49

Ecologicalist Culturalist Biographicalist

Figure 2 A four-way taxonomy of historiographical perspectives.

of thought in terms of a championed historiography. Although related,

Published by Duke University Press

50 History of Political Economy 27: I ( I 995)

Published by Duke University Press

Khalil / Has Economics Progressed? 5 1

2). According to this approach, the historiographer should not criticize

Published by Duke University Press

52 History of Political Economy 27:l (1995)

file of the science. It is simply impossible for men to apprehend and to

Published by Duke University Press

Khalil / Has Economics Progressed? 53

Progressive Stadialism While the advocates of progressive stadialism

Published by Duke University Press

54 History of Political Economy 27: 1 (1995)

Boulding (197 1) notes that a Whiggish history of economics leading to

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Khalil / Has Economics Progressed? 55

Each theoretical epoch is fashioned after the philosophical, ideological,

Published by Duke University Press

56 History of Political Economy 27: 1 ( 1 995)

Regressive Stadialism Regressive stadialism, broadly speaking, main-

Published by Duke University Press

Khalil / Has Economics Progressed? 57

(1974,9) assertions, advancing a historicist perspective. Rather, they are

Published by Duke University Press

58 History of Political Economy 27: 1 ( I 995)

Published by Duke University Press

Khalil / Has Economics Progressed? 59

economists cannot have eternal theories as they do in the natural sci-

Published by Duke University Press

60 History of Political Economy 27: 1 (1 995)

condition that some dubious metaphysical distinction is made between

Published by Duke University Press

Khalil / Has Economics Progressed? 61

the conventions of discourse of the community of scholars under focus.

Published by Duke University Press

62 History of Political Economy 27: 1 (1995)