Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PRACTICE OF LAW
The term "practice of law" is difficult to precisely define, and whether a specific
activity falls within its scope depends on the circumstances of each case. Although
there's no exact definition, courts have established general principles to explain its
meaning.
5. **Scope Beyond Court Cases**: The practice of law isn't limited to court
proceedings. It includes offering legal advice and counseling, as well as drafting legal
instruments and contracts that secure legal rights, whether or not they're pending in
court.
However, engaging in activities that require knowledge of law but don't involve an
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing legal articles, may not be
considered practicing law in the traditional sense.
In summary, the practice of law involves performing actions characteristic of the legal
profession, both within and outside the courtroom, to provide legal advice, represent
clients, and secure legal rights. The existence of an attorney-client relationship is a
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fundamental aspect, and the scope extends beyond court proceedings to encompass
various legal activities.
The phrase "practice of law" implies regularly or habitually presenting oneself to the
public as a lawyer and offering legal services for compensation, either as a source of
livelihood or in exchange for services rendered. The act of holding oneself out as a
lawyer can be demonstrated through actions that indicate this purpose.
In summary, the phrase "practice of law" refers to the regular or habitual presentation
of oneself as a lawyer to the public, often for compensation or as a livelihood. Various
actions and circumstances contribute to determining whether a particular activity falls
within the scope of practicing law.
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Engaging in the practice of law is not limited to court proceedings but extends to
representing clients before quasi-judicial, administrative, or legislative agencies.
Whenever a situation requires interpreting laws, applying legal principles, and
presenting evidence to establish specific facts, it falls within the scope of practicing
law.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,m the majority of the court through Mr. Justice Paras held
that a person’s past work experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections that he has been engaged in the active
practice of law for at least ten years and that practice of law need not be habitual
services rendered in litigations in court.
Mr. Justice Gutierrez, in his dissenting opinion, noted that engaging in the
practice of law is also a qualification for appointment of Justices of the Supreme
Court and Judges of lower courts and then asked: What kind of judges or justices will
we have if their main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business or media,
or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or
private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to
pass the bar examinations?”
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Mr. Justice Cruz, in his dissent, stated that from the term “practice of law” as
defined by the majority of the Court, “one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some
law, however, peripherally.”
Mr. Justice Padilla, in his dissent, said that the respondent did not meet the
essential criteria enumerated by the Commission on Appointments as determinative of
engaging in the practice of law, said criteria being the following:
“1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies customarily or habitually holding
oneself out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a ircular announcing
the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque,
8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public,
and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to
practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968). Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127p. 1, 87
Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active practice and that his professional services are available to the public for
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
(People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term ‘practice
of law’ (Ernani Pano, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing
People v. People’s Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an
opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that
extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket
Mfg. Co., 290N.Y.S. 462).
If compensation is expected, ‘all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law are practicing law.’ (Elwood Fitchette, et al. v. Arthur
C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term ‘practice of law.’ (Martin,
supra)
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position
of Chairman of COMELEC.
RULING: Yes, Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position. The
case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava stated that the practice of law is not
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CASE DIGEST: PIMENTEL VS. LEB G.R. NO. 230642 & 242954.
SEPTEMBER 10, 2019
FACTS: Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the
Legal Education Reform Act of 1993 which creates the Legal Education Board.
Petitioners particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional the creation of LEB itself,
LEB issuances and memorandums establishing law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting a system of
continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of RA 7662, and
establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known as the
Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhilSAT pursuant to LEB’s power to
“prescribe the minimum standards for law admission” under Sec. 7 (e) of RA 7662.
Petitioners principally grounded the petitions on LEB’s alleged encroachment upon
the rulemaking power of the Court concerning the practice of law, violation of
institutional academic freedom, and violation of law school aspirant’s right to
education under the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the Court.
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RULING:
Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the
regulation and supervision of legal education:
First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and
regulate legal education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate
admission to the practice of law. This assumption, apart from being
manifestly contrary to the history of legal education in the Philippines, is
likewise devoid of legal anchorage.
Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must
not, arrogate upon itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest
the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to
void RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education
and place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is
to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism.
As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution
covers the practice of law and not the study of law. The present rules
embodied in the 1997 Rules of Court do not support the argument that the
Court directly and actually regulates legal education, it merely provides
academic competency requirements for those who would like to take the Bar.
Furthermore, it is the State in the exercise of its police power that has the
authority to regulate and supervise the education of its citizens and this
includes legal education.
3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly
give the LEB the power to supervise the legal education of those who are
already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such
duration as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s
power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the
education of Lawyer-professors as the teaching of law is considered the
practice of law.
4. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its
charter to prescribe minimum standards for law admission. The PhilSAT,
when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in measuring the
applicant’s aptness for legal education along with such other admissions
policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard.
However, the PhilSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an
applicant’s aptitude for law school. The PhilSAT, as a pass or fail exam,
dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are to be admitted to
any law program. When the PhilSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict
admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhilSAT goes
beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic
freedom, becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional.
CANON I
INDEPENDENCE
Canon 1 – Independence