ARTICLE IN PRESS

Marine Structures 17 (2004) 261–273

www.elsevier.com/locate/marstruc

Opportunities to improve the operational and

technical management of jack-up deployments
Rupert J. Hunta,, Philip D. Marshb
a
Shell UK Exploration and Production,UK
b
Shell International Exploration and Production,UK

Abstract

In a 9-month period in 2002, two jack-up drilling units on contract to Shell Group operating
companies suffered leg damage whilst performing cantilevered drilling operations over
company assets. These two events came against a back drop of other incidents, which included
jack-up collapses in the Gulf of Mexico and the Persian Gulf. The prevalence of these incidents
indicated that some of the control measures necessary for the successful deployment of a jack-
up drilling unit were not in place. A review of the procedures used to contract a rig and the
operational controls when on-hire, are described. Opportunities to improve the contractual,
operational and technical management of jack-up deployments are identified.
r 2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Keywords: Jack-up; Damage; Safety; Integrity; Assessment; Collapse

1. Introduction

Recent industry incidents during jack-up drilling operations have resulted in

substantial structural damage to the units themselves, and to adjacent platforms,
risers and pipelines. The number of these incidents indicates that some of the
basic control measures, necessary for the successful deployment of a jack-up
drilling unit, are absent. This paper presents, some methods for ensuring that the

Corresponding author.

0951-8339/$ - see front matter r 2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

doi:10.1016/j.marstruc.2004.08.005
 ARTICLE IN PRESS
262 R.J. Hunt, P.D. Marsh / Marine Structures 17 (2004) 261–273

necessary control measures are in place so that the risks associated with structural
and/or foundation failure are managed effectively. Several opportunities
for immediate improvement have been identified as a result of in-house and
industry discussions following the GlobalSantaFe Monarch and Transocean
Roger Mowell leg damage incidents. These improvement opportunities are
presented below.

2. Identifying the risks

An overview of the key ‘‘structural’’ risks being managed during each stage of a
jack-up deployment, are identified in Table 1. The term structural is used to
distinguish these risks from those associated with the unit’s other activities, such as
accommodation, drilling, hook-up, production or even lifting operations.
Whilst the format of Table 1 suggests that the management of the structural risks
associated with deploying a rig to a new location can be segregated, it is readily
apparent that site specifics, such as soil strength, will have a real impact on the
management of ‘‘Stage 2’’ and ‘‘Stage 3’’ risks. This table also illustrates the range of
technical skills (Marine, Metocean, Naval Architect, Geotechnical, Geophysical,
Offshore Structural, Mechanical, Survey) that are required to manage these risks
more closely.

Table 1
Structural risks associated with each stage of a jack-up deployment

Stage of deployment Risks

1 In transit  Loss of towline/headway

2 Jacking –up/down & pre-loading/pre-driving
3 In situ (brakes on & where applicable chocks
inserted)
 Green water damage
 Flooding
 Capsize
 Punch through during pre-load/pre-drive
 Leg/jacking system failure
 Eccentric leg load causing leg/rack/pinion/
gear/brake failure
 Hull buoyancy tank damage from leg-to-
hull contact
 Contact with platform/riser/pipeline
 Leg retrieval systems failure
 Wave loads on hull due to loss of air gap
 Leg punch through in storm due to
insufficient pre-load
 Loss of foundation stability (scour)
 Rig overturning/slide
 Leg/jacking system/brake failure
 Contact with platform/riser/pipeline
 Ship impact
 Differential rig/platform lateral motion
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R.J. Hunt, P.D. Marsh / Marine Structures 17 (2004) 261–273 263

3. Safety performance benchmarking

In a recent industry publication on jack-up safety performance [1], accident

statistics were compiled to show the trend with time for total losses, severe accidents
and fatalities. From the data provided in that reference, a ‘‘cost’’ curve has been
derived (Fig. 1) with cost defined as the consequence of each incident (expressed in
US dollars) divided by the operating rig count at the time of the incident. As was
done by the original authors, a 5-year rolling mean has been used to smooth out
‘‘spikes’’ caused by the comparatively small working population, especially in the
early years. Fig. 1 shows that the safety performance of jack-ups has improved
significantly in the period 1955–2000.
However, in this same period no less than 270 lives have been lost. Attributing
these human losses to the different stages of the jack-up deployments results in the
data presented as Table 2.
Table 2 illustrates that whilst the management of risk for the in situ jack-up is
important, particularly the drilling risks, the in-transit, jacking and pre-loading
phases of the operation are also vulnerable. Treating these events as being
statistically representative (and not a one-off event that could never be repeated),
then each fatality represents a large population of serious injuries, minor injuries and
near misses. Consequently, a thorough understanding and dissemination of the
population of minor incidents and near misses can prevent the more serious events
from developing.
The improvement in jack-up life-safety performance in the period 1955–2000 is a
testament to many key risks being identified and managed. For the in-transit stage,
the management of risk has focussed on better weather forecasting and (if necessary)
early evacuation, whilst for the in situ phase, improvements in soils mechanics
techniques have been successfully applied to address punch through risks. The Ensco
51 blow-out in March 2001 in the GOM was a confirmation that drilling risks still
remain.

5.0

4.5

4.0
Cost (US$M/operating rig year)

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
5 Years To

Fig. 1. Total cost of jack-up incidents (5-year rolling mean).

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264 R.J. Hunt, P.D. Marsh / Marine Structures 17 (2004) 261–273

Table 2
Jack-up fatality statistics 1955–2000

Stage of deployment Fatalities Cause (for fatalitiesX5)

1 In transit 106 20—Qatar 1; collapsed during tow, 1956

2 Jacking-up/down
and pre-loading
3 In situ
3 In situ (drilling)
13—Ocean express; capsized during tow; 1976
72—Bohai 2; sank during tow; 1979
14 13—Sea gem; collapsed due to brittle fracture; 1965
38 18—Gemini; punch through/leg failure; 1974
8—Ranger 1; fatigue; 1979
5—60 years of Azerbaijan; seabed failure/volcanic action;
1983
5—Al Mariyah; jack failure? when skidding derrick; 2000
112 7—Little Bob; blow-out explosion and fire; 1968
70—Bohai 3; blow-out explosion and fire; 1980
5—Ocean King; blow-out explosion and fire; 1980
19—Ron Tappmeyer; Blow-out; 1980
5—Al Baz; blow-out and fire; 1989

4. Recent incidents (1996–2003)

Since the Al Mariyah accident in 2000, there have been no reported fatalities
associated with structural failures. Initial press reports on the loss of life associated
with the collapse of the Arabdrill 19 in 2002 have since been found to be incorrect.
However, the recent improvement in life safety performance has not been matched
by a reduction in the number or severity of incidents. Some of the more widely
known incidents that have occurred in the last 7 years are presented in Table 3. A
preliminary assessment of the background to each incident has also been made to
enable the incident to be allocated to one of the deployment stages.
The amount of information available on these incidents varies from a few lines in
industry journals to a conference paper or formal report [2,3]. For those that are
currently under investigation, it is hoped that the outcome of the investigations will
be made public so that lateral learning opportunities can be realised.
Despite the lack of detailed information on many of the incidents, some general
observations may be made about the data presented in Table 3.

 The incidents are not confined to a particular part of the world

 The prevailing weather conditions will have played little or no part in many of the
incidents
 The incidents are not confined to one particular design of jack-up
 Where leg damage is noted, this will almost certainly have required a shipyard
repair with the attendant impact on costs and schedule
 Two of the rigs destroyed the adjacent platform over which they were drilling
when they collapsed
Table 3
Jack-up ‘‘Structural’’ incidents 1996–2003

Stage Rig Design Incident Location Weather Date

R.J. Hunt, P.D. Marsh / Marine Structures 17 (2004) 261–273

2 Jacking–up/ Victory Modec 300C-35 3-legs damaged form punch- South Fair Nov 1996
down & pre- through Australia
loading Harvey Ward F & G Mod II 3-legs damaged from punch Indonesia Fair Jan 1998
through?
Al Mariyah BM 150-IC Slewed & dropped Persian Gulf Fair April 2000

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Monitor F & G Mod V 1-leg damaged from uneven CNS Fair June 2000
sea-bed
101 KFEL’s modif’d 1-leg damaged from adjacent CNS Fair June 2000
F & G Mod V footprint
Ekhabi Lev MSC CJ50 Punch-through Persian Gulf Fair July 2001
57 F & G Mod II Rapid leg penetration event SCS Fair Oct 2002
Endurer BM 350-IC Rack/pinion damage from SNS Fair April 2003
brake release failure
3 In situ Harvey Ward F & G Mod II Ship impact Indian Ocean Fair Dec 1996
Wijslift 6 Wijsmueller Stern dropped CNS Fair Aug 2000
Monarch F & G Mod V 2-legs damaged from uneven SNS Fair Jan 2002
sea-bed scour
Arabdrill 19 BM 200-H Overturned and sank Persian Gulf Fair Sept 2002
Roger Mowell F & G Mod II 1 leg damaged SCS Fair Sept 2002
John Sandifer Levingston 111S 1 leg damaged from extra leg GOM Hurr. Lili Oct 2002
pen.
Dolphin 105 Pen Eng. Overturned GOM Hurr. Lili Oct 2002
Houston MLT 52S Overturned GOM Hurr. Lili Oct 2002

265
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 Most of the major rig owners have suffered an incident of some description
resulting in damage or loss

Although neither the rig owners nor the operating company for which they are
working are presented in Table 3, the pattern of these incidents do not appear to be
substantially influenced by either.
Once an incident has occurred it is important to establish if the ‘‘capacity’’ of the
system (e.g. jack-up itself and/or foundations) was less than expected or if
the ‘‘demand’’ (e.g. loading) was greater than expected, or both. The capacity of
the jack-up can be confirmed by reviewing the design, fabrication and maintenance
history of the unit. Capacity of the foundation can be confirmed by a review of
the geophysical & geotechnical data. Confirmation of the operational demands
imposed on the system may present more of a challenge, particularly when extreme
event wind and wave loadings are being considered. Once the characteristics of
the incident are understood, it should be possible to distinguish between those
incidents that have occurred because well-known industry practices were not being
adhered to, and those incidents that have highlighted a need to improve industry
practice.
One issue, that appears to fall into the latter category, and has been found to be
common to four of the incidents listed, is the management of leg distortion when
rack chocks are disengaged. For those rigs designed with rack chocks, which protect
the leg braces from extreme (storm) loads, removal of the leg chocks before jacking
or their non-application after jacking can result in the leg braces being loaded to a
high percentage of their design capacity. This loading on the braces may be due to
eccentric foundation support beneath the leg, particularly if the seabed is uneven. If
the brace load increases further, the brace buckles as an indicator that progressive leg
failure has commenced.
To ensure the rig is being operated inside its design envelope, and to ensure that
the safety margins associated with the jacking operation are consistent with other
stages of the jack-up deployment, the design limit value of vertical leg distortion
(Rack Phase Difference [RPD]) must be known. The RPD design limit value may
then be used as the performance standard during the Jacking Procedure and as such
provides an effective method of mitigating against leg failure. The use of RPD data
in this way is already a feature of one owner’s rig move procedure [4]. Recognition of
the RPD value that causes brace failure then allows the RPD ‘‘integrity envelope’’ to
be defined.
Both BP and the Shell Group operating companies have issued internal safety
alerts [5,6], based on their concerns with operational safety in general and RPD
management in particular. In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) issued
a Safety Notice to the industry on RPD management [7]. In response to a request
from Shell Expro for the IADC jack-up committee to consider the preparation of an
‘‘RPD recommended practice’’, the committee has stated that they do not believe it
to be an issue that should be addressed as an industry-wide initiative at this
point, recommending that it be treated by individual owners and designers as
appropriate [8].
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Even though the root cause(s) of many of the other incidents in Table 3 may
appear to be (and may indeed be) very different, the volume of these incidents
indicates that many improvement opportunities exist. Whilst some rig owners have
substantially revised their procedures (e.g. Refs. [9,10]), it is also useful for the
operator company responsible for taking the rigs on hire to look at their own
procedures and ensure that the risks associated with deploying a jack-up alongside
their assets are being managed.

5. Does the operating company have a procedure?

Once the requirement for a jack-up drilling rig has been identified by an operating
company, the challenge is to meet the planned ‘‘rig-on-site’’ date. The procedure
used to meet this date varies for different operating companies, but the fundamental
ingredients remain the same and require that candidate rigs are identified both in
terms of availability and their capacity to perform the work. It is imperative that the
anticipated jack-up deployment meets the required standards for safety and integrity
as specified in both the rig owner’s and the operator’s safety management or
corporate management systems.
Over the years, procedures have been developed by the larger operators to define
the process for performing their own evaluation of the suitability of jack-ups against
identifiable hazards and industry safety norms. The essential nature of such a
procedure is to identify the key technical disciplines that are mobilised to assist the
well engineer in performing a safety & integrity assessment of a candidate rig.
For the purpose of this discussion, Safety and Integrity are defined as follows:
Safety describes the overall adequacy of a unit to operate in a secure and
controlled manner such that a safe place of work is provided for all those on
board, and the unit is capable of responding effectively in the event of an
emergency.
Integrity defines the adequacy of the unit to withstand the environmental and
functional loads experienced during operation. The assessment of a unit’s
integrity is based upon the concept of ‘‘fit for purpose’’ by which the unit is
accepted as adequate for its intended purpose provided that conditions that cause
failure are not reached whilst allowing for some degree of misuse in service. [This
requires the existence of a suitable safety factor between the design and failure
conditions].

The assessment includes;

 Drilling safety
 Marine integrity and operability
 Structural integrity and operability
 Aviation operability
 Safety & Environmental considerations & Emergency response
 Environmental health/medical
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Recent incidents suggest that if an operator’s Safety and Integrity assessment

procedures for taking jack-up units on-hire are active, they are probably neither
adequate/appropriate nor current. In particular, the incidents indicate that if the
structural integrity and operability part of the assessments are being performed, they
are flawed.
A key role in the management of the structural risks associated with jack-up
deployments is played by the Marine Warranty Surveyor (MWS). Rig owners look
to the MWS to issue a Certificate of Approval (COA) or Site Approval Certificate
(SAC) for the target location but they may also attend the rig move itself, as required
by insurance companies and underwriters.
The agreement between the rig owner and the MWS will dictate the amount of
engineering assessments that are performed by the MWS as part of the delivery of
the site approval certificate. To compliment the SAC, some rig owners will perform
their own in-house engineering checks, and some operators will fund independent
third-party assessments. However, instances have arisen where few or no engineering
checks have been performed by any of the involved parties, perhaps each believing
that the other was doing it. The subsequent rig deployment may then represent a
level of risk that is unacceptable, and introduces the possibility of having to re-learn
some costly lessons.
From an operating company perspective, the company representative needs to
confirm that the necessary engineering checks have been performed. This may be
achieved by a review of the work performed by the MWS or the funding of work by
third parties. The latter alternative may require a reconciliation stage, particularly if
the results from the two assessments are markedly different. The role of the
operating company Technical Authority is key in ensuring that the correct industry
standard is being used and the data required for the assessment (e.g. soils data,
shallow seismic data) is sufficient. If additional data are required (e.g. borehole data)

Table 4
Operating company opportunities for improvement—procedural

1 Confirm that the procedure is current and reflects existing company organisation in terms of
ownership, roles and responsibilities.
2 For locations where site-specific data are available (boreholes data, shallow geophysics seismic data,
metocean data), ensure that the procedure identifies the need for a site-specific assessment in
accordance with SNAME 5-5A rev 2 2002 at invitation to tender
3 For locations where site-specific data are unavailable at invitation to tender, ensure that the
procedure can accommodate this
4 Ensure that Technical Authorities in key disciplines are identified in procedure and are actively
engaged
5 Recognises that the Marine Warranty Surveyor’s assessment may be the only one being performed
and confirm its fitness for purpose
6 Confirm that the rig inspection part of the procedure include verification of the actual physical
condition of the jack-up structure (legs, pinions etc.)
7 Identify the procedure that will be activated to safeguard adjacent company assets, if the rig has a
structural failure
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the Technical Authority should participate in the definition of the scope of work.
Some other opportunities for improvement of operating company procedures are
presented as Table 4.

6. Site-specific assessment

It is imperative that the structural integrity and operability part of an assessment

includes a site-specific assessment of the jack-up, where the structural characteristics
of the rig (hull dimensions, spud can shape, leg length, strength, etc.) are matched
against the specifics of the intended site (soil profile/strength, local bathymetry,
location/depth of any existing footprints and local metocean conditions). The timely
collection and collation of the site data in advance of the rig-on-site date, can
represent a real challenge and needs to be slotted into the rig move sequence as early
in the process as possible. Spud can penetrations achieved by other rigs at the
intended site can provide valuable insights into the application of soils data,
particularly for locations where only limited bore hole data is available, but do not
guarantee the safety of subsequent rigs.
A procedure for performing site-specific assessments was developed by repre-
sentatives of all parts of the jack-up industry working in a Joint Industry Project,
and is published by the Society of Naval Architects & Marine Engineers (SNAME).
The SNAME Technical & Research Bulletin 5-5A ‘‘Guidelines for Site-Specific
Assessment of Mobile Jack-up Units’’ includes an extensive and thorough
‘‘Recommended Practice’’ (RP) for performing the work. A first edition of the RP
was published in May 1994 with revisions 1 and 2 being published in May 1997 and
January 2002, respectively. The RP forms the basis of the up-coming ISO document
and its use is recommended.
Whilst structural reliability assessment techniques were only used in a relative
sense during the development of the SNAME document, faithful application of the
RP is considered to deliver an effective method of managing the risks associated with
the in situ stage of a rig deployment [11]. The preservation of a ‘‘gap’’ between the
crests of the extreme waves and the underside of the hull is seen as a key contributor
to the achievement of this reliability. Loads generated by waves acting directly on the
hull of a jack-up can quickly become much greater than those developed on the legs
with the result that the structural system’s safety margins are rapidly eroded [12].
Several opportunities for improvement have been identified and are presented in
Table 5. Wherever possible these improvements should form part of the technical
specification at the Invitation to Tender (ITT).

7. Is the contract appropriate?

The contract should reflect the operating company procedure and provide the
necessary protection in the areas of indemnification for personnel and property and
consequential damages. There is also a need to limit any liabilities that are assumed
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270 R.J. Hunt, P.D. Marsh / Marine Structures 17 (2004) 261–273
Table 5
Opportunities for improvement—technical
General
1 Ensure SNAME 5-5A default load factors of
1.15/1.25 are applicable for the intended
location?
2 Identify any special input parameters
3 Identify assessment results required by
Technical Authority
4 If low spud can penetration is expected or leg
stomping over existing foot prints may be
required , then the definition of the spudcan
‘‘sweet spot’’ will contribute to the
management of these situations
5 If intended location is prone to rapid leg
penetration events (punch through) a punch
through leg load check may be appropriate
Table 6
Opportunities for improvement—contractual
General
1 Identify general conditions of contract
2 Identify special conditions of contract
3 For locations where site-specific data is
unavailable at invitation to tender, ensure
that the contract specifies responsible party if
subsequent assessment reveals that
substantial (costly) upgrades are required
4 Identify any rig-related platform
modifications required for cantilever access
over the platform
5 Identify platform shut-down requirements
due to special interfacing or de-interfacing
issues
6 Is insurance protection adequate and are
policies up to date?
Specific
Develop long-term loading parameters that
deliver the required reliability for a
permanently manned or manned-evacuated
jack-up deployment so that load factor is
explicit in ITT
e.g. metocean parameters, air gap
requirements, soil strength, mudline
topography, any existing ‘‘footprints’’ at final
& stand-off positions
e.g. spudcan penetration, leg strength
utilizations, hull lateral motions
Calculations showing limit of vertically
eccentric spudcan load based on brace
strength (no moment carried by pinions or
rack chocks) and pinion capacity (no shear
loads carried by braces) will define the
amount of eccentric leg load that can be
carried
Punch through rating required e.g. 20 ft. [13]
Specific
Ensure local/regional terms & conditions
have full legal review in conjunction with this
issue
e.g. operating company model contract that
contains learning from previous contracts
Particular examples are leg strength, leg
length or spudcan design
Include the cost of any platform
modifications in contract evaluation
Include the cost of deferred production in
contract evaluation
Operating company is listed as an additional
insured and the policy contains waiver of
subrogation in its favour
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Table 7
Opportunities for improvement—operational
General
1 Elastic design limit RPD for chock
supported legs
2 RPD measurement method for
chock supported legs
3 Use of RPD data during jacking
operation
4 Use of RPD data during leg
stomping operation
5 RPD control methods
6 Loss of RPD control
7 Leg chocks must be deployed once
on location
8 Are the leg penetrations achieved
during the jacking operation
consistent with those predicted?
9 Does the Operations manual
distinguish between leg reaming and
leg stomping?
10 Is the person performing the jacking
operation competent?
11 The practice of ‘‘walking’’ a rig onto
location should only be permitted in
special circumstances
12 Weather forecast
271
Specific
The elastic RPD limit to be specified in Operations
Manual. This is the value of RPD, which, if
exceeded, causes the operation to be halted so that
onshore resources can be mobilized
Electronic measurement systems should be a pre-
requisite for those rigs with a history of losing
control of RPD. Systems to be subject to regular
manual checks
Must be defined in Jacking Procedure. Some RPD
management techniques (e.g. sequential brake
release, single chord jacking, hull trim adjustments)
are complex and must only be performed by
specialized personnel
Must be defined in Jacking Procedure
What are they (e.g. single chord jacking) and who
is allowed to use them
Does the rig owner have an Emergency Response
Procedure for this and does it state who will be
called on to perform the recovery operation
Achieving preload does not preclude deterioration
of the foundation support. Requirement for the leg
chocks to be inserted must be stated in Op’s
Manual
Leg load versus leg penetration prediction curves
must be available to the rig move personnel so that
any potential for punch through can be identified.
Discrepancies between predicted & actual leg
penetration should be resolved
Leg reaming, achieved by moving a leg up and
down under its own weight whilst the hull is in the
water, may enable initial spudcan penetration to be
controlled but will not substantially alter mudline
topography or the potential for interaction with
existing footprints. Leg stomping requires
considerable load to be applied to the mudline soils
Identity and qualifications of person responsible
for the jacking operation must be stated. Define a
minimum competency standard for persons
performing these operations
Leaving one leg down on the sea-bed whilst
rotating the jack-up by tow line can introduce
significant torsional loads in the legs
Recommend that a single reliable forecast is
obtained. Forecast is to benchmarked from site
observations and/or by gaining access to data from
adjacent metocean stations
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by the operating company when soil borings and/or bottom surveys are conducted
by the operating company and supplied to the rig owner. In the event that
modifications to the sea-bed are required (e.g. leg stomping, gravel dump), the
contract should cater for this. Other opportunities for improvement are presented in
Table 6.

8. Are the appropriate operational controls in place?

It will have been apparent from Table 1 that a SNAME 5-5A site specific
assessment in isolation will not provide a sufficient understanding of the challenges
the rig will face at a new location. The risks associated with the in-transit and jacking
stages of a deployment are typically covered by the owners rig move procedures with
the operating company providing marine advisors. Several specific opportunities for
improvement have been identified and are presented in Table 7. These range from the
data provided in the Rig owner’s Operations Manual and/or Jacking Procedure to
the actions defined in the rig’s Emergency Response Procedure.

9. Future safety performance

On the understanding that the hazards associated with offshore jack-up drilling
operations have not diminished, future safety performance will hinge on the ability
to continue to manage those risks. Some of the key activities required to achieve this
goal are believed to be the delivery of a consistent approach to risk management
across the industry, and the dialogue between all parties that makes this possible.
The issues raised in this paper are intended to contribute to this dialogue.

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