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Stalin and Bandera: Politics of Totalitarian Leaders in Contemporary Ukraine

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 Stalin and Bandera: Politics of Totalitarian Leaders in Contemporary Ukraine

Ivan Katchanovski, Ph.D.

School of Political Studies

University of Ottawa
Ottawa, ON
K1N 6N5, Canada
Tel. 613-407-1295
ikatchan@uottawa.ca

Paper presented at the 45th Annual Convention of the Association for Slavic, East European, and
Eurasian Studies, Boston, November 21-24, 2013.

Draft

1
 Abstract

This paper analyzes public perceptions of Joseph Stalin and Stepan Bandera in modern Ukraine.

It uses data from a national representative survey conducted in September 2013 by the Kyiv

International Institute of Sociology for this study. The analysis reveals major determinants of

attitudes toward the leaders of, respectively, the Soviet Union and the Organization of Ukrainian

Nationalists, amid continuing attempts to recast their political identities in contemporary

Ukraine.

2
 Joseph Stalin and Stepan Bandera: Historical Memory and Politics in Ukraine

Historical memory became a salient issue after Ukraine became independent from the

Soviet Union, especially after the “Orange Revolution” in 2004. Public attitudes,

commemoration, and policies toward Joseph Stalin and Stepan Bandera are an important element

of politics in the post-Communist Ukraine (See Katchanovski, forthcoming; Marples, 2006,

2007; Narvselius, 2012; Rudling, 2006, 2011). Stalin (Iosif Dzhugashvili) and Bandera were

leaders on opposite sides of the political spectrum. Stalin was a leader of the Soviet Bolshevik

(Communist) party and the Soviet Union, while Bandera led the biggest faction of the

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which was named after him (OUN-B). Even though

Stalin and Bandera are often perceived as ideological opposites, they both were totalitarian

leaders. Certain controversies also characterize academic studies on Stalin and Bandera.

Public positions and views concerning these two historical leaders differ significantly and

often conflict among major political parties and politicians in Ukraine. For example, nationalist

politicians and parties publicly condemn Stalin for organizing the artificial famine in Ukraine in

1932-1933, which they characterize as genocide. Three to four million people died from the

famine. During the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, Stalin was posthumously convicted for it.

By contrast, some leaders and activists of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), which joined

parliamentary coalitions with the ruling Party of Regions, try to deny, minimize, or justify

Stalin’s role in the famine. They cast him as a great leader who transformed the Soviet Union,

including Ukraine, into an industrial power and won World War II. A Stalin monument was

erected on the grounds of the regional committee of the CPU in Zaporizhzhia in the Eastern

Ukraine.

3
 Nationalist politicians and parties in Ukraine present Stepan Bandera and the Bandera

faction of the OUN as national heroes who fought for an independent Ukraine against both the

Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. In 2010, President Yushchenko posthumously awarded

Bandera the title of Hero of Ukraine. This award was annulled by a Ukrainian court after Viktor

Yanukovych came to power later that year. But Bandera continues to be celebrated as national

hero by local authorities, politicians, and mass media in regions of the Western Ukraine.

Monuments of him were erected and streets named after him in numerous cities and villages in

Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and the Ternopil Regions in Galicia, including Bandera’s native village.

Major cities, such as Lutsk, Rivne, and Volodymyr-Volynsk, in Volhynia, also have streets

named after him, and his monuments are in various stages of completion. Svoboda, which

presents itself as an ideological successor of the OUN-B and hails Bandera as a national hero,

won local elections in all three regions of Galicia, and it entered the national parliament of

Ukraine after receiving more than 10% of the vote in the 2012 parliamentary elections.

Analysis of the politics of history regarding Stalin in Ukraine is relevant to understanding

public attitudes toward this historical leader in other post-Soviet states. He is both popular and

divisive in Russia, Armenia, and Georgia. Similarly, the study of Bandera can shed light on the

memory of other fascist and radical nationalist leaders, such as Ante Pavelic in Croatia, Miklos

Horthy in Hungary, Mihai Antonescu in Romania, and similar far-right leaders in the Baltic

States.

This paper uses data from a national September 2013 survey by the Kyiv International

Institute of Sociology of the most important determinants of public perceptions of Stalin and

Bandera in contemporary Ukraine. The research question is which factors are the most important

determinants of public support for these two historical political leaders in modern Ukraine. The

4
study begins by comparing the leaders and briefly reviewing previous studies on this topic, and

then proceeds to analyze the determinants of their public support in Ukraine.

Joseph Stalin was a supreme leader of the Communist one-party dictatorship, which

required universal acceptance of its power and political ideology, and prosecuted any ideological

and political opposition and dissent. For example, Stalin pursued policies of executions and

arrests of former members of prohibited parties, including mensheviks and nationalist parties.

Yevhen Konovalets, the founder and the first leader of the OUN, was assassinated by a Soviet

security service agent in the Netherlands in 1938. Similar policies concerned dissenting factions

among the Bolsheviks, for example, supporters of Leon Trotsky, who was killed by a Soviet

agent in Mexico in 1940.

Although Bandera, in contrast to Stalin, never achieved such a power, he also led a semi-

totalitarian political party. During its period of greatest influence, when it came closest to gaining

power at the national level during World War II, the OUN-B pursued a one-party dictatorship in

Ukraine in alliance with totalitarian Nazi Germany. The OUN-B rejected a political party label

and tried to eliminate or subjugate other political parties or organizations by force, not only the

Communists but also another faction of the OUN, led by Andrii Melnyk (OUN-M). The OUN-B

ordered or organized assassinations of a large number of the OUN-M leaders and members

(Ukrainskie, 2012). Leading members of the OUN-B admitted that Omelian Senyk and Mykola

Stsiborsky, two OUN-M leaders were murdered on OUN-B orders in Zhytomyr in the end of

August 1941.

The Communist ideology, exposed by Stalin, was on the far left of the political spectrum.

However, many previous studies in the West and increasingly in post-Soviet Russia downplay

his Communist ideology even though it was a central element publicly embraced by the

5
Bolshevik (Communist) party of the Soviet Union and Stalin himself in his numerous writings,

speeches, confidential documents, and private correspondence.

These studies, primarily by historians, often try to cast Stalin more or less as a Russian

nationalist, whose dictatorial and repressive rule is linked to autocratic traditions of the Russian

Tsars (See, for instance, Montefiore, 2003). However, Stalin was not a Russian but an ethnic

Georgian. Even though his version of Marxism and Leninism deemphasized world Communist

revolution in favor of socialism in one country and incorporated certain elements of Russian

nationalism, especially after World War II, Stalin’s policies were based to a large extent on

Communist ideology. Such polices included collectivization, state-led industrialization, and

elimination of capitalist classes, including the physical annihilation of upper classes, kulaks (rich

peasants), and “bourgeois intelligentsia” during the Great Terror and the artificial famine in the

1930s. These policies were implemented in the Soviet Union, including the Soviet Ukraine in the

1920s and 1930s, and then extended to the Western Ukraine after it was incorporated into the

Soviet Union as a result of the Soviet-Nazi pact of 1939 and the Soviet victory in World War II.

Many historians in the post-Soviet Ukraine, and to a certain degree in the West, present

the Soviet Union, specifically during Stalin’s rule, as a reincarnation of the Russian Empire, and

Ukraine as a Russian colony. However, at the time Stalin was a member of the Bolshevik

leadership and minister in charge of nationalities, the “Soviet Union” was specifically adopted as

a name of the new Communist state to distinguish it from the Russian Empire and to open the

possibility of unification with other Communist countries. After the Bolshevik Revolution, its

leaders, including Vladimir Lenin, envisioned Communist revolutions in other states, especially

more developed ones in Western and Central Europe, such as Germany. After the Soviet victory

in World War II, Stalin backed Communist takeovers and imposition of Communist political and

6
economic systems in Eastern and Central European countries, such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,

East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, and East Asian countries, such as China, North

Korea, and North Vietnam.

The status and policies toward Ukraine and Ukrainians in the Soviet Union were different

than those of traditional colonial powers, such as France, Great Britain, Portugal, and Spain.

Many Ukrainians joined the Communist Party, and many of them rose to leadership positions in

the party and the Soviet state. For example, the number of ethnic Ukrainians among the members

of the Ukrainian branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union increased from 87,000 in

1927 to 319,000 in 1940 and 413,000 in 1950, while their proportion in the membership was

52% in 1927, 63% in 1940 and 59% in 1950 (Storinky, 1990, p. 484).

However, by the beginning of the 1930s, Stalin reversed a Soviet policy of Ukrainization

in favor of Russification. The Great Terror, which he masterminded, included executions,

imprisonments, or exiles to remote areas of the Soviet Union for absolute majority of former

members of Ukrainian nationalist parties, Ukrainian communists accused in nationalism, and a

significant proportions of Ukrainian intelligentsia Several hundred thousand Ukrainians met

these fates (Politychnyi, 2002, p. 770).

Many historians in Ukraine, and some in the West, argue that Stalin specifically

masterminded an artificial famine in Ukraine in 1932-33 as genocide of Ukrainians.i

Ukrainian nationalist politicians, such as former President Viktor Yushchenko, made this view a

centerpiece of their policy toward Stalin and commemoration of the famine. However, Stalin’s

policies and the artificial famine were not confined to Ukraine, but also affected other

agricultural regions, specifically, Southern Russia, the Volga Region, and Kazakhstan. The

7
artificial famine can be characterized as a part of class-based genocide. (See Katchanovski,

2010).

Stalin has many biographies exploring his role in mass terror, World War II, and foreign

relations, especially the Cold War. In contrast, the number of academic studies concerning

Stepan Bandera is small, but increasing. The first English-language biography, based on a

doctoral dissertation, is expected to appear soon.

Unlike Stalin’s Communist ideology, Bandera’s semi-fascist and radical nationalist

ideology was on the far right of the political spectrum. The ideology of the Bandera faction of

the OUN at that time combined elements of fascism and radical nationalism. For example,

Bandera’s title of providnyk, Slava Ukraini [Glory to Ukraine], the OUN-B greeting

accompanied by a salute with straight raised right-hand, and its red and black flag were modeled

on similar titles, greetings, salutes, and flags of other fascist parties, in particular the Nazi Party

in Germany (Rossolinski-Liebe, 2011).

Some scholars argue that other terms, such as integral nationalism, are more applicable to

the OUN than fascism (Armstrong, 1963, Zaitsev, 2013). Fascism is also regarded as ideology of

nation-states, and therefore, not applicable to the OUN, because this organization was never in

power in a Ukrainian state (Motyl, 1980).

Many historians in Ukraine deny the fascist elements of the Bandera ideology and his

party and minimize or justify by tactical reasons collaboration of Bandera and the OUN-B with

Nazi Germany at the beginning of the war. Bandera is presented as a leader of a popular

movement for a national liberation and independence of Ukraine. They argue that Bandera and

many leaders and members of the OUN-B were prosecuted after Bandera’s deputy, Yaroslav

8
Stetsko, proclaimed Ukrainian independence in Lviv on June 30, 1941 (See, for instance,

Posivnych, 2008).

However, various sources provide evidence of collaboration by Bandera and the OUN-B

with Nazi Germany, primarily during the first two years of World War II. Such evidence

includes Bandera’s own statements during a meeting with German representatives in the

beginning of July 1941 (See OUN, 2006, pp. 274-281). German, Soviet, OUN-B, and U.S.

sources confirm formal and informal collaboration between Bandera and many other OUN-B

leaders and Abwehr and other security agencies of Nazi Germany (Katchanovski, forthcoming;

Stepan Bandera, 2009). Similarly, OUN leaders informed in advance the German government

and security agencies concerning their intentions to declare a Ukrainian state (see OUN, 2006,

pp. 178-189; Protokol, 1945).

The OUN-B marching groups and local activists organized militia and local

administration in the occupied Ukraine, primarily in the Western region, after the invasion of the

Soviet Union by Nazi Germany and its allies. The OUN-B-organized militia took active part in

anti-Jewish pogroms and assisted in Nazi-led mass executions of Jews and Soviet activists

(Himka, 2011a, 2011b; Rudling, 2011; Katchanovski, 2012). Bandera was arrested by the

German security forces in the beginning of July, but it was an honorary arrest, and he was

confined in privileged conditions. He was released in 1944 along with many other OUN-B

leaders as the result of a deal between the OUN-B and German security agencies.

Even though the OUN-B discarded many totalitarian elements of its ideology from its

public documents and propaganda materials after 1943, such elements remained in practice to a

large extent. For example, although the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council nominally led the

Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and after 1944 was led by a non-OUN-B member, the OUN-B

9
de facto controlled the UPA. In 1943 and 1944, the OUN-B and UPA organized and conducted

an ethnic cleansing, murdering several dozen thousand Poles in Volhynia and Galicia. Both

groups also killed tens of thousands of people, primarily civilians and Ukrainians, during their

anti-Soviet terrorist campaign and insurgency (See Kudelia, 2013; Politychnyi, 2002, pp. 770-

771).

Previous studies of public opinion of Stalin and Bandera in Ukraine, as well as in other

countries, such as Russia, were mostly non-academic. They typically presented survey data

concerning attitudes toward specific aspects of these historical leaders, without systematic

analysis of determinants of such attitudes. In addition, a popular television show in Ukraine

presented Bandera as being one of the most popular Ukrainian personalities, but the survey data

collected for this show were unrepresentative of the national public opinion since their results

were affected by self-selection and multiple votes by supporters or activists.

Data and Methodology

This study analyzes data from a brief national survey designed by the author and

conducted face-to-face by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in Ukraine in

September 2013. The survey of more than 1000 respondents was based on a representative

national sample of adult residents of Ukraine. It included similar questions concerning attitudes

toward Stalin and Bandera.

In addition, it contained political party preferences question and socio-demographic

questions concerning such potential determinants of views towards there two historical political

leaders as a region of residence, ethnicity, language, age, gender, education, religious confession.

Previous studies identified these factors as determinants of political attitudes and public attitudes

10
towards historical leaders and events in Ukraine. Specifically, political party preferences among

likely voters, historic regions, religious preferences, ethnicity, language, and age are expected to

have significant effects on the views of the residents of Ukraine towards Stalin and Bandera.

(See, for example, Birch. 2000, Katchanovski, 2006, forthcoming).

In addition to differences in political orientations, differences in respondents’ historical

experiences or those of their parents and grandparents of Stalinism or the OUN-B and UPA are

likely to impact these views as well. For instance, the OUN-B and, since 1943, the UPA were

much more active in Galicia and Volhynia during the 1940s than in other regions of Ukraine.

Similarly, Stalin exiled the Crimean Tatars at the end of World War II and prohibited the

Ukrainian Autocephalous Church before the war and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church after

it.

Public attitudes toward Stalin and Bandera are likely to be negatively associated because

their ideologies occupy opposite sides of the political spectrum and because of the violent

conflict between the OUN-B and UPA and Stalin’s Soviet Union. This study also expects to find

a degree of communality in perceptions of these totalitarian leaders. There is anecdotal evidence

that many former Communists and Komsomol activists turned into nationalists and active

supporters of Bandera, the OUN-B, and the UPA after the collapse of Communism and the

Soviet Union. For instance, they include politicians such as former president Viktor Yushchenko

and Iryna Farion, one of leaders of Svoboda, and writers, such as Oksana Zabuzhko. However, a

communality of support for these totalitarian leaders has not been tested systematically in

previous studies.

Survey Results

11
 The 2013 KIIS Survey shows Stalin (15%) and Bandera (19%) are viewed positively by

similar proportions of Ukrainian respondents. They also command similar proportions of neutral

responses (25% and 30%, respectively). However, negative perceptions of Stalin (49%) are more

prevalent than those of Bandera (36%). Respondents are also somewhat more likely to reply that

they do not know or are not sure about Bandera (16%) than about Stalin (10%).

There is a strong negative association between supporters of Stalin and Bandera.

However, the survey also shows a significant percentage of Stalin’s supporters (15%) express

positive views of Bandera (Table 1).

[Table 1 about here]

Attitudes toward Stalin and Bandera differ significantly by region. While in all major

regions of Ukraine positive views of Stalin are in a minority, Western Ukraine and Kyiv City are

more negatively predisposed toward the Soviet leader than the rest of Ukraine. Just 2% of the

respondents in Kyiv City, 3% in Galicia, 4% in Transcarpathia, and 10% in Volhynia view Stalin

favorably, compared to 16% in Central Ukraine, 17% in the South, and 22% in the East.

Bukovyna is a partial exception with 16% of its residents mostly positive about Stalin, but this

region has a relatively small number of the respondents in the sample. Negative views of Stalin

are much stronger in Galicia (81%), Kyiv City (71%), and Bukovyna (63%) than in the South

(38%) and the East (39%) (Table 2).

By contrast, Galicia demonstrates the highest positive preferences for Bandera (77%).

This is only region in Ukraine where the majority of residents express a very positive view of the

OUN-B leader (53%), and where just 1% have a negative attitude and 2% no opinion. The 2013

KIIS Survey data indicates an emergence in this former Austrian province of a contemporary

public cult of personality of Bandera, even though he was a totalitarian semi-fascist and radical

12
nationalist leader and collaborated with Nazi Germany in the beginning of World War II. (Table

2).

[Table 2 about here]

Favorable attitudes toward Bandera are also stronger in Volhynia (34%), Bukovyna

(22%), and Kyiv City (21%) than in the Central (14%), Southern (7%), and Eastern Ukraine

(7%). Only 4% of Transcarpathian residents express positive views of the OUN-B leader. The

same percentage of the respondents in this region of historically Western Ukraine have negative

views of Bandera. The very and mostly negative attitudes toward the OUN leader are much

stronger in the Center (25%), Kyiv (30%), the South (45%), and the East (50%) (Table 2).

There are significant differences in attitude toward Stalin and Bandera among the

supporters of different political parties. Favorable views of Stalin are expressed by a minority of

likely voters of all major parties in Ukraine. But backers of Svoboda (2%) and Our Ukraine, led

by ex-president Yushchenko (0%), are much less positively disposed toward the totalitarian

Soviet leader than supporters of the Communist Party of Ukraine (38%) and the Party of Regions

(20%).2 In addition to Svoboda and Our Ukraine, the majority of likely voters for Fatherland, led

by Arseni Yatseniuk and Yulia Tymoshenko, and UDAR, led by Vitali Klitschko (Klychko),

have very or mostly negative opinions of Stalin, unlike Communist (29%) and Party of Regions

voters (40%) (Table 3).

Conversely, Bandera is backed by the majority of likely Svoboda voters (67%), but only

9% of Party of Regions supporters and 11% of Communist Party supporters. The median voter of

Our Ukraine, Fatherland and UDAR has a neutral stance toward the OUN-B leader. Negative

views of Bandera range from a small minority of Svoboda supporters (2%) to the majority of

Party of Regions (53%) and the Communist Party backers (54%). (Table 3).

13
 [Table 3 about here]

The 2013 KIIS Survey shows that attitudes toward both Stalin and Bandera differ

significantly by ethnicity and language. Positive views of the Soviet dictator are held by

somewhat smaller minorities of ethnic Ukrainians (13%) and Crimean Tatars (15%), than

Russians in Ukraine (27%) and 53% of ethnic Ukrainians, 33% of ethnic Russians, and 23% of

Crimean Tatars express negative opinions of Stalin (Table 4). This low proportion of disapproval

by Crimean Tatars is striking in view of Stalin’s mass deportation of them. The number of

respondents among other ethnic minorities is too small to include in the analysis.

[Table 4 about here]

Even though a minority of respondents from these three ethnic groups express favorable

attitudes concerning the OUN-B leader, a greater percentage of ethnic Ukrainians (22%) and

Crimean Tatars (17%), compared to their ethnic Russian counterparts (4%), hold very positive or

mostly positive views of Bandera. Ukrainian and Russian speakers have a similar pattern of

differences concerning these two historical leaders.

There are significant differences in attitudes toward Stalin and Bandera among members

of different religious persuasions (See Table 5). As expected, adherents of the Ukrainian Greek

Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church demonstrate much more negative

views of the Soviet leader, who prohibited these churches, than members of other major

persuasions, believers who do not belong to any persuasion and non-believers or atheists. But

surprisingly, members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) are somewhat

more negatively disposed toward Stalin than their counterparts from the Ukrainian Orthodox

Church (Kyiv Patriarchate).

14
 The absolute majority of Ukrainian Greek Catholics hold positive views of Bandera,

while only 1% of Greek Catholics express a negative opinion of him. Members of the Moscow

Patriarchate with the partial exception of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, believers who do

not belong to any persuasion, non-believers, atheists, and to a lesser extent the Kyiv Patriarchate

and Muslims, have relatively less favorable and more negative attitudes toward this historical

leader (Table 5).

[Table 5 about here]

The 2013 KIIS Survey data shows significant differences in attitudes toward Stalin and

Bandera by age, education, and place of residence. However, the magnitude of these differences

is much smaller than that of differences by region, political party, ethnicity, language, or

religious group. For example, Stalin has less support among the youngest generation of

respondents, those 18-29 years old (9%), than the oldest generation, those 70 years old and older

(29%). Views of Bandera have the reverse generational pattern, with the youngest generation

showing expressing somewhat more positive attitudes toward the OUN-B leader, compared to

the oldest group (22 and 16%, respectively). But supporters of both totalitarian historical leaders

are in the minority among all age groups.

In contrast to attitudes towards Bandera, gender differences in views of Stalin are

statistically insignificant. This is the only case of statistically insignificant effect. Effects of all

other variables examined are statistically significant.

Conclusion

The 2013 KIIS Survey data demonstrates major factors in the public attitudes toward

Stalin and Bandera in contemporary Ukraine. It shows generally expected patterns of regional,

15
political party, ethnic, and language differences concerning views of these two totalitarian

historical leaders. Galicia, and to a lesser extent other regions of Western Ukraine, are much

more inclined against Stalin and toward Bandera than Eastern, Southern, and Central Ukraine.

However, Kyiv City and Transcarpathia are exceptions to this pattern. Supporters of nationalist

political parties, especially Svoboda, express more favorable opinions of the leader of the OUN

and more negative opinions of the Soviet Communist dictator than likely Communist voters. But

the analysis also shows that supporters of the Party of Regions and Ukrainian Communists have

broadly similar views of Stalin and Bandera.

Analysis of ethnic and language factors show a similar pattern of differences. Ethnic

Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speakers favor Stalin less and Bandera more than their ethnic Russian

and Russian-speaking counterparts. But the Crimean Tatars’ attitudes toward Stalin are much

less negative than expected from the historical experience of this ethnic group. Religion is

another major factor affecting attitudes toward Stalin and Bandera.

The 2013 KIIS Survey shows a negative association of views of Stalin and Bandera. But

it has also found a significant proportion of supporters of the Soviet Communist dictator express

positive views of the semi-fascist and radical nationalist Ukrainian leader. In spite of the

difference between their ideologies, which occupied the opposite extremes of the political

spectrum and manifested themselves in a very violent conflict, there is certain communality in

support of these totalitarian leaders.

16
Table 1. Association between attitudes toward Stalin and Bandera, 2013 KIIS Survey, %

Joseph Stalin
Positive Neutral Negative Don’t know/
not sure
Stepan Bandera
Positive 15 7 28 10
Neutral 15 54 26 10
Negative 55 31 35 24
Don’t know/not sure 15 9 11 57
Total, % 100 100 100 100
N 156 260 499 105

17
Table 2. Attitudes toward Stalin and Bandera by region, 2013 KIIS Survey, %

Galicia Volhy Transca Bukovyna Kyiv Center South East

nia rpathia City
Joseph Stalin
Very positive 1 4 0 0 2 4 8 5
Mostly positive 2 6 4 16 0 12 9 17
Neutral 8 30 36 5 18 26 33 28
Mostly negative 17 40 24 26 46 27 15 14
Very negative 64 8 24 37 25 21 23 25
Don’t know/ 8 12 12 16 11 10 11 11
not sure
Total, % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Stepan Bandera
Very positive 53 4 0 11 9 5 2 2
Mostly positive 24 30 4 11 12 9 5 5
Neutral 20 42 21 37 37 44 29 19
Mostly negative 0 6 4 0 9 13 17 17
Very negative 1 2 0 26 21 12 28 43
Don’t know/ 2 16 71 16 12 16 19 15
not sure
Total, % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 109 50 24 19 57 268 160 334

18
Table 3. Attitudes toward Stalin and Bandera by political party preference, 2013 KIIS Survey, %

Svoboda Our Fatherland UDAR Party of Communist

Ukraine Regions Party

Joseph Stalin
Positive 2 0 11 12 20 38
Neutral 11 14 22 15 32 27
Negative 81 57 61 65 40 29
Don’t know/not sure 6 29 6 9 8 7
Total, % 100 100 100 100 100 100
Stepan Bandera
Positive 67 38 28 31 9 11
Neutral 28 25 35 29 25 25
Negative 2 13 20 23 53 54
Don’t know/not sure 3 25 17 17 12 11
Total, % 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 64 8 114 128 161 56

19
Table 4. Attitudes toward Stalin and Bandera by ethnicity, 2013 KIIS Survey, %

Ukrainians Russians Crimean

Tatars
Joseph Stalin
Positive 13 27 15
Neutral 24 33 46
Negative 53 33 23
Don’t know/not sure 10 8 15
Total, % 100 100 100
Stepan Bandera
Positive 22 4 17
Neutral 33 18 8
Negative 32 63 25
Don’t know/not sure 14 15 50
Total, % 100 100 100
N 834 114 13

20
Table 5. Attitudes toward Stalin and Bandera by religion, 2013 KIIS Survey, %

Ukrainian Ukrainian Ukrainian Ukrainian Muslim Believer Non-

Orthodox- Orthodox- Autocephalous Greek but does believer/
Kyiv Moscow Catholic not belong Atheist
Patriarchate Patriarchate to any
persuasion
Stalin
Positive 16 18 7 1 13 17 21
Neutral 31 22 7 6 44 28 25
Negative 44 52 71 86 25 44 46
Don’t
know/ 9 8 14 7 19 11 7
not sure
Total, % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Bandera
Positive 21 12 47 78 20 7 11
Neutral 34 32 27 18 13 32 29
Negative 29 44 20 1 20 44 50
Don’t
know/ 16 12 7 2 47 18 11
not sure
Total, % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 277 237 15 83 16 246 56

21
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 Notes

i
For instance, Stalin’s letter to Kaganovich about “losing Ukraine” and Stalin’s statement

concerning the peasant question.

2
The number of Our Ukraine likely voters is small (8).

25

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